Stress conceptions in life event research: Towards a person-centred perspective

European Journal of Personality, Vol. I , 123-140 (1987)

Stress conceptions in life event research: Towards a person-centred perspective

GERHARD VOSSEL University of Mainz, FRG

Abstract

The present article focuses on a discussion of the theoretical foundations of life event research. Since critical life events are usually regarded as stressful events, the main question is which concepts of stress are employed in different life event approaches and what is their rationale. The discussion centres on two topics that have to be treated independently: the question of specificity vs nonspecificity and the question of individualized vs normative weightings. I t is shown that different life event approaches rely on different concepts of stress. Numerous objections lead to a rejection of the nonspecificity concept and a normative proceeding. However, even when a specificity view of stress is advocated and individual weights are used, life stress measures do not account for a substantial proportion of the variance in the stress-related dependent variables. Therefore, a reorientation of life event research is required. It is proposed that future life event research should concentrate on the individual meaning of events and adequately consider the time dimension as well CIS

processes of coping.

INTRODUCTION

Of the different approaches in stress research-biological, sociological, and psychological approaches (see Lazarus, 1966)-it is primarily life stress or life event research that can be characterized as a biographical approach. Life event research is concerned with the influence of critical life events, as for example, pregnancy, death of a family member, personal injury, or marriage, on psychological well- being and somatic health. Thus, life event research focuses on events *at every person has to expect in her or his life. From a methodological point of view, life event research, therefore, relies on biographical data which can be defined as ‘available, subjectively significant and transparent data from a person’s life which she or he reports’ (KeBler, 1982, p. 4).

Address requests for reprints to: Gerhard Vossel, Psychologisches Institut der Universitat Mainz, Saarstr. 2lIStaudingenveg 9, D-6500 Mainz, FRG

0890-2070/87/030123-18$09.00 0 1987 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 15 March 1987 Accepted 11 May 1987

124 G. Vossel

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIFE EVENT RESEARCH

The attempt to define a critical life event already shows that this cannot be done without certain theoretical assumptions. The birth of a child may be a highly desirable event for a long-married couple, it may be an extremely undesirable event for unmarried adolescents. The death of spouse may be experienced as a traumatic shock, as relief after a long time of shared suffering, or even as a desirable event because it allows one to engage in a new relationship. These examples clearly demonstrate that the definition of a critical life event requires considerations about conditions or properties that distinguish them from non-critical events.

The present article focuses on a discussion of the theoretical foundations of life event research. Since critical life events are usually regarded as stressful events or stimuli (see Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1974), the main question is which concepts of stress are employed, what is their rationale and what can be said about their appropriateness. As shown later, our discussion of the theoretical foundations of life event research will centre on two topics, the question of specificity vs nonspecificity and the question of a normative vs an individualized proceeding.

STANDARDIZED MEASUREMENT OF LIFE EVENTS-THE HOLMES AND RAHE APPROACH

Following Adolf Meyer’s contribution to life event research with his advocacy of the life chart as a tool in medical diagnosis (see Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1974; Meyer, 1934) and taking into account numerous single-case and group- studies that revealed an accumulation of life events before the manifestation of a wide range of illnesses (see Holmes, 1979), a new step was taken by Holmes and Rahe in 1967 with their publication of the ‘Social Readjustment Rating Scale’ (SRRS). This new step is characterized by the attempt to assess life events in a standardized way and to quantify their impact. The con&ruction of the SRRS was as follows: Out of the life chart data of approximately 5000 patients those events were selected and composed in a questionnaire that had been mentioned in a relatively consistent manner prior to the manifestation of an illness (cf. Holmes and Masuda, 1974). To quantify the degree of impact of the 43 events the ‘magnitude estimation method’ was chosen. The arbitrary value of 500 was attributed to the .item ‘marriage’ and all of the remaining events had to be rated by a sample of 394 subjects in relation to that event.

Crucial for the understanding of the Holmes and Rahe approach is the question of the dimension on which the ratings had to be made and, consequently, the question of why a certain event becomes a critical and stressful life event. Without giving any reasons, Holmes and Rahe applied a dimension, called ‘social readjustment’. Social readjustment was defined as ‘the amount and duration of change in one’s accustomed pattern of life resulting from various life events. As defined, social readjustment measures the intensity and length of time necessary to accommodate to a life event, regardless of the desirability of this event’ (Holmes and Rahe, 1967, p. 213).

According to this definition, critical life events provoke a change in a person’s habits; they require adaptation and coping behaviours that usually are not part of

Stress conceptions 125

the person’s everyday life repertoire. It is important to note that the definition of social readjustment exclusively emphasizes change as the critical variable, regardless of whether this change is caused by desirable or undesirable events (Holmes and Rahe, 1967).

In the construction of the SRRS the mean ratings of the original sample for each event were divided by 10. These scores, called ‘Life Change Unit Scores’ (\CU), are the quantitative basis for all further research using the SRRS. The sum of a person’s LCU-Scores is taken as a measure of individual life stress and used to assess its relationship to the occurrence of physical or psychiatric disorders.

THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE HOLMES AND RAHE APPROACH

Neither in the publication of the SRRS nor in later publications do Holmes and Rahe offer any theoretical justification for their procedure (Rahe, 1974, presents a conception that differs from the original approach; see below). Rightly the authors are often criticized for their lack of theory, a criticism that to a large extent pertains to the entire life event research (cf. Katschnig, 1980).

Most commentaries on the theoretical assumptions of the Holmes and Rahe approach are but brief, noting mostly the similarity with the stress concept of Selye (e.g. Lazarus and Launier, 1978; Perkins, 1982; Rabkin and Struening, 1976; Sarason, deMonchaux and Hunt, 1975). Only Katschnig (1980) attempts to describe the common aspects of Selye’s stress concept and the Holmes and Rahe approach in greater detail.

Asking to what degree the approach of Holmes and Rahe is in agreement with the concept of Selye or based on thiz historically older concept two aspects have to be treated separately (cf. Vossel and Laux, 1980): On the one hand, the assumption that change per se is stressful, regardless of the desirability of an event, and, on the other, the assumption that persons do not differ in their reactions to life events. The first assumption is expressed in the definition of social readjustment, the second one in the LCU-methodology which regards LCU-Scores as normative scores that are applicable to all or at least many individuals. Before we come to a detailed discussion of these assumptions the important aspects of Selye’s stress concept should be illustrated.

Selye’s concept of biological stress

Selye’s (1956) concept of biological stress marks the beginning of scientific stress research. Stress is defined as a state of the organism, manifested in a specific syndrome of bodily changes-the General Adaptation Syndrome (G.A.S.). Stimuli inducing stress are defined as stressors. The central characteristic of Selye’s concept is the assumption that stressors of different quality provoke the same specific pattern of bodily changes (concept of nonspecificity). This pattern evolves in three stages: alarm reaction, stage of resistance, and stage of exhaustion. Selye identified the ‘hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal cortex’ system .as the primary mechanism of the physiological-endocrinological changes occurring in these phases.

It must be emphasized that Selye’s concept is primarily based upon animal studies using intense physical stressors, such as heat, physical exercise, or chemical

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"STRESS (SELYE)" I I \ \ \ \

\ \

1- \\

Extremely unpleasant

I I I

1 1 /

/ /

/ /

/ Extremely pleasant

0 e-

EXPERIENCE CONTINUUM +- Figure 1. The theoretical model of Levi (1972) regarding the relation between physiological stress and pleasant, indifferent, and unpleasant experiences (reprinted by permission).

treatment (see Tach6 and Selye, 1978). Much later (cf. Selye, 1974) Selye argued that the physiological-endocrinological stress response may also be elicited by psychogenic stressors. This extension of his stress concept was strongly influenced by the work of Levi (cf. Levi, 1972) who proposed a model combining the physiological stress response and experiences with psychosocial stimuli (see Figure

According to this model, it is exclusively the intensity of environmental events that determines the physiological stress response. In agreement with the assumption of nonspecificity it is proposed that the quality of the emotions evoked by environmental stimuli (pleasant vs unpleasant) does not influence the response to stress.

1).

Theoretical assumptions of Holmes and Rahe and Selye's concept of stress

Comparing the central assumptions of Holmes and Rahe-change per se is stressful and life events have an equal impact for all individuals-with Selye's concept clearly reveals the similarity between their first assumption and Selye's concept of nonspecificity. The specific quality of a stressor or a life event does not influence the stress response. The only determinant of this response is the degree of effort on behalf of the organism to adjust to the changed situation. The greater this effort, the more stressful is a life event or a stressor. Thus, qualitatively different events, as for example, personal injury or illness, marriage, business readjustment, or vacation, can be arranged on one dimension and can be directly compared with regard to their consequences. According to this view, an additive model is appropriate, i.e. a model that condenses the stressfulness of single events into one overall score.


What about Holmes’s and Rahe’s assumption of an equal impact of events for different individuals? The rationale for this assumption can hardly be derived from Selye’s concept. Although Selye did not systematically investigate individual differences in his animal studies, he was aware of such differences and their significance for the understanding of stress (cf. Selye, 1956; Tach6 and Selye, 1978). Selye’s concept of ‘conditioning’ includes such individual factors that may modify the stress response. He distinguishes between internal and external conditioning factors. Internal factors are those that have become part of the body (e.g. hereditary factors, early experiences), external factors are those that influence the body from the environment (e.g. climate, food). Selye (1956) clearly points out that the development of a stress reaction and the pathological effects of stress can only be understood if such conditioning factors are taken into account.

In summary, it can be concluded that Holmes’s and Rahe’s (1967) concept of social readjustment corresponds to Selye’s idea of nonspecificity, while their assumption of an equal impact of events for different persons as realized in the LCU-methodology is not in agreement with Selye’s conception.

THE CONCEPT OF NONSPECIFICITY

The concept of nonspecificity has been criticized from different points of view. Within the field of endocrinological stress research, particularly Mason (1971, 1975a-c) questioned the validity of the nonspecificity concept (cf. also Lazarus, 1966, who hypothesized that the G.A.S. might be entirely psychologically mediated). He argued that to a large extent the nonspecific physiological responses in the G.A.S. reflect the ubiquity of emotional arousal. Mason contends that the intense physical stressors Selye used very often elicit psychological reactions related to pain or discomfort. When psychological factors are controlled or minimized in the study of physical stressors, the pituitary-adrenal system is not activated in a nonspecific manner. According to this view, the physiological stress response is a consequence of the elicitation of emotional arousal which, in turn, is dependent on higher cognitive processes that evaluate the degree of threat or unpleasantness of environmental stimuli.

Within psychophysiological stress research, with its emphasis on reactions of the autonomic nervous system, it has primarily been Lacey (1967, Lacey and Lacey, 1970) who rejected the idea of a nonspecific increase in the activity of the autonomic system under stress-inducing conditions. According to his view, neither the lack of covariation between different autonomic measures nor the possibility of qualitatively different physiological changes under stress-inducing conditions (directional fractionation) do support such an idea. Additionally, the existence of various autonomic response specificities (e.g. situation-specific and individual- specific responses) argues against the concept of nonspecific arousal (see Fahrenberg, 1986; Foerster, Schneider and Walschburger, 1983).

Also within life event research several alternative suggestions were made that do not follow the concept of nonspecificity . Instead, specific characteristics of life events are employed to define their stressfulness (see Perkins, 1982). It was proposed, for example, to consider the degree of ‘upsettingness’ (Paykel and Uhlenhuth, 1972) or ‘threat’ (Brown, 1974) as the adequate dimension. Other

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proposals emphasize the controllability of events (Dohrenwend, 1977), or their undesirability (e.g. Gersten, Langner, Eisenberg and Orzek, 1974; Paykel, Myers, Dienelt, Klerman, Lindenthal and Pepper, 1969). Contrary to Holmes’s and Rahe’s nonspecific approach, these proposals thus emphasize the importance of specific psychological or emotional aspects of reactions to life events for an understanding of their pathological effects (see below).

THE NORMATIVE APPROACH

The second central characteristic of the Holmes and Rahe approach is the assumption of an equal impact of life events for different persons as realized in the LCU-methodology. In most commentaries on the approach of Holmes and Rahe this assumption and the assumption of nonspecificity are not treated separately (cf. Lazarus and Launier, 1978; Rabkin and Struening, 1976; Sarason et al., 1975). However, this is not adequate because both assumptions are based upon different theoretical positions. While-as shown-the assumption of nonspecificity is related to Selye’s biological concept of stress, the rationale for the normative approach is derived from other sources.

Holmes and Rahe derive the central argument for their normative proceeding from the fact that between different sociodemographic subgroups from their original sample very high correlations were found. For the mean ratings of the items of the SRRS the correlations between different groups (e.g. gender, race, age) were between 0.82 and 0.97 (see Holmes and Rahe, 1967). Similar results were obtained in studies comparing groups of different nationalities (see Holmes and Masuda, 1974; Rahe, 1969). Holmes (1979) considers these findings a proof for the validity of the method of quantification used and a justification for a normative proceeding in life event research.

Objections from life event research

Within life event research the following objections were raised against a normative proceeding:

(a) High correlations do not exclude the existence of significant differences between subgroups. Miller, Bentz, Aponte, and Brogan (1974), for example, reported a correlation of 0.86 between the mean ratings of the SRRS of a rural and an urban sample. At the same time, however, there were highly significant differences between both samples. Persons from the rural sample rated the amount of social readjustment required from the events significantly higher compared with persons from the urban sample. Comparable results were obtained in a number of other studies (e.g. Dohrenwend, Krasnoff, Askenasy and Dohrenwend, 1978; Hough, Fairbank and Garcia, 1976; Hurst, Jenkins and Rose, 1978; Lundberg and Theorell, 1976; Paykel, Prusoff and Uhlenhuth, 1971) and thus cast doubt on the normative proceeding of Holmes and Rahe.

(b) The high correlations between different groups of raters are not sufficient by themselves to justify a normative proceeding. This is a consequence of the way of calculating the correlations. Usually, a correlation gives an estimate of the strength of the relationship between two variables (calculated for a number of persons). By


contrast, the method used by Holmes and Rahe and others gives an estimate of the strength of the relation between the data of two subgroups (e.g. blacks and whites). To obtain this correlation it is necessary to average the judgements of individuals within a subgroup. Consequently, the resulting correlation tells us only something about the similarity between the judgements of a typical representative of one subgroup (e.g. black) and that of another (e.g. white). High correlations tell us nothing about the existence or non-existence of individual differences because the method of averaging inevitably eliminates such differences. When measures of variation for single events or subgroups are calculated and reported, considerable differences within subgroups are usually found (see Dohrenwend et al., 1978; Hurst et al., 1978; Paykel et al., 1971; Wershow and Reinhart, 1974). In proceeding normatively these interindividual differences in the evaluation of life events are not taken into account.

(c) Meanwhile a number of variables are known that systematically modify judgements of the impact of life events. Examples include personal experiences with events and the time period of their occurrence. Lundberg and Theorell (1976), Paykel et al. (1971). Horowitz, Schaefer, and Cooney (1974), and Hurst (1979) were able to demonstrate that persons who have actually experienced life events judge these events significantly differently from persons who have no comparable experiences. Horowitz et al. (1974) could additionally show that with more time elapsed between experience and judgement the impact of events was rated lower (except death of family members). Furthermore, it could be shown that methodological factors, as for example, kind and sequence of events’ presentation, or selection of anchoring events, may considerably influence the ratings of the events’ impact (see Hough et al., 1976).

The normative approach from the view of psychological stress concepts

Numerous objections were raised against the normative approach of Holmes and Rahe, not only within life event research, but also by advocates of psychological stress concepts-particularly by Lazarus (cf. Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus and Launier, 1978). The common characteristic of psychological stress concepts is their emphasis on the importance of cognitive processes (e.g. evaluative perceptions, thoughts, and conclusions) that determine individual reactions to potentially stressful situations. This concept of ‘cognitive appraisal’ was established by Arnold (1961) and Lazarus (1966) as an integral part of psychological stress theory and there is a general agreement today in psychology about its importance for the understanding of stress phenomena (cf. Lazarus and Folkman, 1984).

In recent reviews of the literature three main usages of the concept of stress have been identified: situation-based, reaction-based, and transactional definitions (see Laux, 1983; Laux and Vossel, 1982a, b; McGrath, 1970; Vossel and Laux, 1983). As shown by Laux and Vossel (1982a) and Laux (1983), it is merely a secondary problem if a situation, a state of the organism, or any moment in the process from situation to reaction is defined as stress as long as cognitive appraisal processes are explicitly included. Precisely, that is not the case with the normative approach of Holmes and Rahe. This approach is characterized by a situation-based model of stress that fails to take into account any mediating processes. Stress is defined by external circumstances only, the critical life events. In distinction to many other

130 G. Vossel

situation-based concepts of stress (see Laux, 1983, for a summary), no mediating processes are included. The degree of stress is exclusively determined by stimulus properties, and not by the individuals’ perceptions or evaluations of the significance of events for their well-being. According to this view, the occurrence of events is sufficient to create an identical stress situation for all individuals.

The assumption, however, that different individuals react in the same way to identical situations can hardly be maintained. This is clearly demonstrated in various studies including laboratory experiments on the influence of environmental stressors on performance (e.g. Glass and Singer, 1972) as well as field studies on psychopathological reactions to war experiences (e.g. Grinker and Spiegel, 1945). In all these studies a considerable inter-individual variability in reactions to objectively identical stress situations could be observed. To account for this variability, psychological processes of mediation have to be considered that- depending upon personality traits and previous experiences, for example4eter- mine the individual reactions (cf. McGrath, 1970).

It follows that it is not appropriate to define stress solely on the basis of stimulus properties, since in this case all possible effects have to be considered as stress reactions. The often cited statement that-with the exception of extremely life- threatening situations-no stimulus is a stressor to all individuals exposed to it, further underlines the significance of individual-specific processes of appraisal (see Appley and Trumbull, 1967; Lazarus, 1966).

FURTHER APPROACHES IN LIFE EVENT RESEARCH

The manifold criticism of both of Holmes’s and Rahe’s central assumptions-the assumption of nonspecificity and of an equal impact of events-led to various modifications of the original approach which will be discussed below. It must also be kept in mind, however, that even today life event approaches can be found that still rely on the nonspecificity concept as well as the normative approach. Particularly Barbara and Bruce Dohrenwend defend both assumptions in their numerous works. With the ‘Psychiatric Epidemiology Research Interview’ (PERI, Dohrenwend ef al . , 1978) they present a measuring instrument which is a logical advancement of the SRRS. According to Dohrenwend ef al., stressful life events are characterized by the objective occurrence of a certain amount of change in the activities of individuals experiencing them. Individual appraisals and evaluations are disregarded because they do not provide for a clean measure of environmental input in a stress process. Life events should be measured as objective environmental events which exert an equal impact on at least groups of individuals. Therefore, a normative proceeding is proposed using group-specific weights to quantify the impact of life events.

The approach of the Dohrenwends which represents a logical advancement of the Holmes and Rahe approach marks an extreme of a situation-based concept of stress with a dominant sociological-epidemiological orientation. Other approaches in life event research differ from it to a greater or lesser extent. Their theoretical assumptions will be discussed subsequently. This discussion must necessarily start with an analysis of the measuring instruments employed, because the underlying

Stress conceptions 13 1

theoretical concepts of stress have rarely been spelled out in detail. There will be no attempt to give a complete survey of existing life event measuring instruments (see Filipp and Braukmann, 1981; Zimmerman, 1983), but to discuss those approaches which may be considered as ‘prototypes’ for all others.

Eugene S. Paykel

In connection with, primarily, the examination of the role of life stress for the onset of depressive disorders, Paykel (see Paykel, 1974, 1979; Paykel e f al., 1971; Paykel and Uhlenhuth, 1972) developed an instrument for measuring the impact of life events. Continuing with a normative approach, he advocates a specificity view of stress.

On the one hand, a specificity view of stress is expressed by considering different categories of events. The central question is whether all events or only certain classes of events are related to the onset of depression. On the basis of his studies, Paykel concludes that certain specific classes of events are more strongly related to depressive disorders than others. Of particular importance are those events that were described as ‘undesirable’ or as ‘exits’ (see Paykel, 1974, 1979). On the other hand, a specificity view of stress is reflected in the rating dimension used to quantify the impact of life events (Paykel et al., 1971; Paykel and Uhlenhuth, 1972). In contrast to Holmes and Rahe, the concept of ‘change per se’ and, consequently, the idea of nonspecificity are abandoned. The dimension used to quantify the impact of life events is defined as ‘upsettingness’. The concept of upsettingness is not further specified, but only brought in relation to undesirable aspects of life events. ‘It seemed important to us that implications of events involving distress or undesirability were important in relation to psychiatric disorder. We therefore selected a concept with connotations to distress’ (Paykel, 1974, p. 153).

In their scaling study, Paykel and Uhlenhuth (1972) employed a 61 item questionnaire (‘Scale of Life Events’). Subjects of the rating sample were required to scale the events in terms of their degree of upsettingness on a 0-20 rating scale. The rank order of the events obtained from the mean ratings is comparable to that reported by Holmes and Rahe although for some events (e.g. marriage, pregnancy) considerable differences were found that can be attributed to the different rating dimensions.

Like Holmes and Rahe, Paykel tries to prove the validity of his procedure by comparing the mean ratings of different sociodemographic groups. Based upon the high agreement found between groups (see Paykel and Uhlenhuth, 1972), he also proposes a normative approach that uses the mean ratings of the original rating sample to assess the degree of life stress in other individuals. In contrast to Holmes and Rahe, however, Paykel seems to be aware of the problems inherent in this approach. Since he also observed considerable variability in the ratings he admits the existence of substantial differences between individuals that might depend on their varying experience with events or on certain individually specific personality traits. Nevertheless, Paykel accepts the normative approach since ‘there is a common core to the way in which most people in any society experience an event, and this common core can be used to roughly quantify stress, independently of a specific subject’s experience of it’ (Paykel and Uhlenhuth, 1972, p. 99).

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Richard H. Rahe

Rahe (1974) proposes a modification of the original Holmes and Rahe approach, which retains the concept of nonspecificity but abandons the normative approach. This modification is based on a model that tries to explain in which way life events might lead to the development of illness (Rahe, 1974, p. 75; Rahe and Arthur, 1978). In this model not only psychological defense mechanisms and individual coping strategies are considered, but also the significance of earlier experiences with life events for the evaluation of the actual amount of readjustment required. Depending on these experiences the necessary amount of readjustment can be enhanced or weakened and thus modify the effects of life events on the development of illness. This idea requires abandoning the normative approach and allowing for individualized judgements in the measurement of life stress.

The methodological realization of this idea is found in the ‘Recent Life Change Questionnaire’ (RLCQ, Rahe, 1975). In this questionnaire the ‘Subjective Life Change Unit Scaling System’ (SLCU) is introduced which enables one to obtain individual readjustment scores. First, subjects are required to indicate the events experienced. Secondly, they are asked to indicate the amount of personal readjustment required for each experienced event on a 1 to 100 rating scale. These subjective judgements are added and interpreted as a measure of individual life stress.

While in his model Rahe formulates an appropriate theoretical basis for the consideration of individual differences, he accepts-without further justifications- the rating dimension of ‘social readjustment’. In other words, he accepts the idea of nonspecific effects of events or stressors, which is the central characteristic of Selye’s stress concept. Referring to the discussion of the relation between the Holmes and Rahe approach and Selye’s concept of stress-particularly the latter’s emphasis on conditioning factors that may modify the stress reaction-it can be concluded that the approach of Rahe (1974) is to a large extent equivalent to Selye’s biological concept of stress.

Irwin G. Sarason

Recently, Sarason, Johnson, and Siege1 (1978) described the development of a new instrument to assess life stress, the ‘Life Experiences Survey’ (LES). This instrument differs from the Holmes and Rahe scale in various ways. Numerous items were phrased more precisely, new items were formulated, and specific events from academic life (particularly for the assessment of life stress in students) were additionally included. The LES contains 57 events, 10 of them belonging to academic life. More important, however, is the fact that with the LES the idea of nonspecificity as well as the normative approach was abandoned.

According to Sarason et al. (1978) life stress should be conceptualized primarily by events that have a negative impact on a person’s life. It is not the degree of change or social readjustment per se that determines the stressfulness of life events, but their desirability or undesirability. Referring to the central significance of cognitive appraisal processes for the understanding of stress, an a priori categorization of events (e.g. desirable vs undesirable) is rejected. The measurement of life stress must take into account that the same event can be experienced differently by different persons. The same applies to the quantification of the


impact of events. It cannot be assumed that any event represents an equal amount of stress for different individuals. Consequently, individualized ratings must be used.

The LES considers both claims; subjects are asked to indicate the events experienced during a specified time period as well as (a) whether they viewed the event as being positive or negative, and (b) what perceived impact did the event have on their life at the time of its occurrence. Ratings are made on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from extremely negative (-3) to extremely positive (+3). Several measures can be derived from the LES (see Ganster, 1985). Sarason et al. (1978) propose to use a positive change score (sum of all positive ratings), a negative change score (sum of all negative ratings), and a total change score (sum of positive and negative scores).

The development of the LES was primarily a consequence of empirical findings in life event research. An example of this is the finding that negative events correlate much more strongly with stress-related dependent variables than positive events (Vinokur and Selzer, 1975). The way it is constructed, however, clearly shows its close relationship to psychological concepts of stress (cf. Vossel and Froehlich, 1979). It is not the occurrence of an event and the resulting life changes that define its stressfulness, but exclusively the subjective evaluation of an event’s impact on a person’s life. Consequently, the central role of appraisal processes-as emphasized in psychological stress concepts-is acknowledged and considered in the measurement of life stress.

SYNOPSIS

In the foregoing discussion an attempt was made to analyze the theoretical assumptions of central approaches in life stress research. This attempt was based upon two aspects of life event measuring instruments; the rating dimensions employed and the ways of quantifying the impact of events. Table 1 shows that both aspects have been used independently as guidelines for the construction of life event scales.

The approaches applying normative weights, as for example, the approach of Holmes and Rahe, Paykel, and of the Dohrenwends, assume that individuals do not differ in the way they are being affected by life events. Although the significance of individual factors (i.e. individual perceptions and appraisals) is

Table 1. Aspects for the construction of life event scales

Quantification Unspecific Specific Rating dimension

Normative weights Holmes and Rahe: Social Paykel: Scale of Readjustment Rating Scale; Life Event; Dohrenwend et al.: Psychiatric Epidemiology Research Interview

Change Questionnaire Life Experiences Individual weights Rahe: Recent Life Sarason et al.:

Survey

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generally recognized, they are not considered in the measurement of life stress for methodological reasons. It is the aim of normative approaches to define life events as external stressors. In other words, normative approaches are characterized by a situation-based concept of stress that denies psychological processes of mediation. Corresponding to this concept of stress, normative approaches are dominated by a sociological-epidemiological orientation aimed at formulating general laws about the relation between life stress and illness. On the other hand, the consideration of individual weights in the measurement of life events is more consonant with psychological conceptions of stress. It is not simply the occurrence of a life event that defines its stressfulness, but the subjective evaluation of an event’s impact. Consequently, the use of individual weights acknowledges the central role of appraisal processes.

While differences in the way of quantification primarily reflect differences between a sociological-epidemiological and a psychological orientation, differences in the rating dimensions reflect differences between biological and psychological concepts of stress. Those approaches that employ, for example, the dimension of ‘social readjustment’ emphasize change per se, regardless of whether this change is experienced as positive or as negative, as desirable or as undesirable. This idea corresponds to Selye’s concept of biological stress with its central assumption of nonspecificity. By contrast, the approaches of Paykel and Sarason et al. that employ specific rating dimensions seem to have much more in common with psychological concepts of stress. There is a general agreement in psychological stress theory that stress occurs only when a stimulus situation is perceived as threatening or harmful. Consequently, stress is not considered the result of change per se, but the result of a negative evaluation of a situation and its consequences. Life event approaches that emphasize, for example, upsettingness or negative emotional reactions, therefore, correspond far more to psychological stress conceptions.

Another important approach in life stress research, the approach of George Brown (cf. Brown, 1974), can hardly be classified according to the scheme presented in Table 1. His interview method represents the most complex method in the measurement of life events. With his emphasis on the individual meaning of events, Brown acknowledges the significance of appraisal processes. As a consequence, the idea of nonspecificity is abandoned and life events are primarily conceptualized in terms of the degree of threat they involve. For methodological reasons, however, this psychological view of stress is not systematically sustained. To avoid the risk of direct contamination, self-report measures of threat are replaced by contextual measures. Contextual measures are neither obtained from the person who is interviewed nor from the interviewer, but are made by persons who take into account the context information of a life event provided by the interview data without considering information about the individual’s emotional reactions. Exactly these measures, however, seem to be problematic because they rely on a common sense concept about the impact of life events on a ‘typical’ person. Given the same event and the same external circumstances the same contextual ratings of threat are applied, regardless of an individual’s emotional reactions. Thus, in spite of his emphasis on the importance of the individual meaning of events, Brown, after all, actually uses a kind of normative weighting. Even if the methodological arguments against the use of self-ratings of threat are


acknowledged (cf. Brown, 1974), the question must be raised if a different methodology (i.e. prospective instead of retrospective designs) would not permit one to abandon the normative approach completely and to rely on individual measures of meaning alone.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper it was shown that different approaches in life event research rely on different theoretical concepts of stress. This is clearly evident in the rating dimensions used and the ways of quantification proposed. Given the fundamental criticism of the concept of nonspecificity and of the assumption of identical effects of events for different persons, those approaches would seem to be most appropriate that rely on specific rating dimensions and on an individualized method of quantification. However, even when life stress is conceptualized in terms of negative impacts and when individual weights are used, it only accounts for a relatively sm^all proportion of the variance in the dependent measures (cf. Kessler, Price and Wortman, 1985; Perkins, 1982; Thoits, 1983). Predictability has only been slightly increased by considering moderator variables such as social support, locus of control, or past experiences with events (cf. Johnson and Sarason, 1979).

There seem to be several reasons for this generally disappointing situation of life event research that should be considered in the future. First, individual ratings of the impact of life events do not tell us very much about the meaning of a life event for a person. In order to determine adequately the meaning of an event it is necessary to obtain additional informations about, for example, the circumstances under which a life event occurred, the personal significance of an event, and the reasons why an event is personally significant. These informations can only be obtained by an in-depth examination of the personal experience of life events. This can only be done on an individual basis using, for example, structured interviews or appropriate questionnaires (see Thomae, this issue; Laux and Weber, this issue). Perkins (1982, p. 327) emphasizes this point in his following statement: ‘Progress in the near term may also require a levelling off of trends towards the complete quantification of phenomena and a measured return to interest in the qualitative aspects of life stress.’ Additionally, such an in-depth examination would require to abandon the traditional subject-researcher relationship. To obtain the relevant informations a situation of trust and respect must be created in which subjects are considered competent partners in the research process (see Thomae, this issue).

Second, life event research must take into account the time dimension, that is it must take into account the different phases of potentially stressful experiences with life events. It can, therefore, no longer rely on aggregated data, i.e. data averaged over events, time periods, or persons. It is likely that during the course of a stressful encounter personal meanings and appraisals change. Only by proceeding in such a process-oriented manner, can it be demonstrated that changes in the experience and appraisal of events covary with changes in somatic health and psychological well-being. This demonstration on a within-subjects basis is necessary in order to establish a causal link between life changes and adaptational outcomes (cf. Lazarus, 1984).

136 G. Vossel

Third, and in our view most important, is that life stress research must consider processes of coping with life events. Although in other areas of research successful attempts in the study of coping behaviour have been made, there is surprisingly little sound, empirical research bearing on the relationship between life events and coping (cf. Kessler et al., 1985). Previous life event research was almost exclusively concerned with the study of the effects of external life events on somatic health and psychological well-being. Following Lazarus’s recent concept of stress and emotion (see Lazarus and Folkman, 1984, this issue), however, stress itself becomes less important than coping. Stress is, of course, an inevitable feature of living and some persons do indeed experience more frequent and more severe environmental demands than others. It is probably coping that makes the major difference in adaptational outcome. According to Lazarus (cf. Lazarus and Launier, 1978), stress p e r se should not be simplistically regarded as causal in human maladaptation since it can generate a variety of coping processes. Coping must, therefore, be considered one of the major factors in adaptational outcomes, since it is not only a response to stress but also an active force in determining which stressful events will happen in the future and in which way they will be experienced.

Taken together, a complete reorientation of life event research is required that abandons the traditional approaches and methods. The consequence of our proposals would be that future life event research fully accepts the criteria of biographical research (see Laux and Weber, this issue) and accordingly adopts a person-centred perspective in spite of all the difficulties accompanying such an endeavour. We are convinced that such a person-centred approach will furnish informations about the relationship between life events and somatic and/or psychological well-being that are not only of theoretical, but also of practical significance.

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pp. 199-211.

RESUME

Cet article se concentre sur une discussion portant sur les fondements thtoriques de la recherche sur les evenements stressants (life events). Etant donnt que les evenements critiques dans la vie de quelqu’un sont gtntralement considtrts comme des tvknements stressants, la question la plus importante est de savoir quels sont les concepts de stress employts dans les difftrentes approches des life events, et quelles e n sont les bases. La discussion est principalement axte sur deux sujets qui sont traitts de faqon indtpendante: la question de la sptcificitt vs non-sptcificitt et l’utilisation de poids individuels vs normatifs. On y montre que les difftrentes approches reposent sur diffkrentes conceptions du stress. Nombre d’objections mtnent a un rejet de la non-sptcificitt et a une approche normative.

140 G . Vossel

Toutefois, m&me lorsque I’on part de la spkcificitt et que l’on utilise des poids individuels, les mesures des tvenements stressants ne prennent pas une part importante de la variance dans les variables dbpendantes relatives au stress. Voillr pourquoi une rtorientation au sein de la recherche sur les life events est ntcessaire. On propose que la recherche future sur les Cvhements importants dans la vie se concentre sur la signification individuelle de ces tvenements et que l’on porte l’attention, de fason adtquate, la dimension temps et aux processus qui permettent de faire face au stress.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der vorliegende Artikel konzentriert sich auf die theoretischen Grundlagen der Life Event Forschung. Da kritische Lebensereignisse gewohnlich als belastend angesehen werden, geht es um die zentrale Frage, welche Auffassungen von Stress einzelnen Life Event Ansatzen zugrundeliegen und wie diese begriindet werden. Anhand von zwei unabhangig zu behandelnden Kriterien-Spezifitat vs Unspezifitat und individuelle vs normative Gewich- tung-wird gezeigt, daB in den einzelnen Ansatzen unterschiedliche Konzeptionen von Stress realisiert sind. Aufgrund zahlreicher Einwande wird eine Unspezifitatsauffassung und eine normative Vorgehensweise zuriickgewiesen. Da allerdings auch diejenigen Life Stress MaBe, die auf einer Spezifitatsauffassung von Stress basieren und individuell gewichtet werden, keinen substantiellen Varianzanteil in den abhangigen stress-bezogenen Variablen aufklaren, muB die Forderung nach einer Neuorientierung der Life Event Forschung erhoben werden. Die dazu unterbreiteten Vorschlage beziehen sich auf die Erfassung der individuellen Bedeutung von Lebensereignissen, die adaquate Beriicksichtigung der Zeitdimension und die Einbeziehung von Bewaltigungsprozessen.

Documents

Stress conceptions in life event research: Towards a person-centred perspective