Strengthening the Partnership: The New PNAC Document?

8/14/2019 Strengthening the Partnership: The New PNAC Document?

1/16

2008 P r e s i d e n t i a l ta s k F orc e s

Strengthening

thePartnership

How to Deepen U.S.-Israel

Cooperation on the

Iranian Nuclear Challenge

Task Force on the Future

of U.S.-Israel Relations


2/16

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States o America. No part o this publication may be reproduced ortransmitted in any orm or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any inor-mation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing rom the publisher.

2008 by the Washington Institute or Near East Policy

Published in 2008 in the United States o America by the Washington Institute or Near East Policy,1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036.

Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and CommunicationFront cover: With American and Israeli ags in the background, Israeli soldiers await the arrival o Vice PresidentRichard Cheney and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Jerusalem, March 18, 2002. Copyright AP Wide World Photos/Elizabeth Dalziel.


3/16

June 2008

2 0 0 8 P r e s i d e n t i a l ta s k F orc e s

StrengtheningthePartnership

Hw dp U.s.-i

cp hi nu chg

Task Force on the Future of U.S.-Israel Relations


4/16


5/16

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy iii

PREFACE

cooperation with briengs and background inorma-

tion that helped inorm the work o the ask Force.Early on, the ask Force decided to issue a rela-

tively brie statement o policy analysis and recom-mendations rather than a lengthy report, so as tohighlight the key indings that emerged rom itsdeliberations. Tis polic y statement is a distillationo the ask Forces months-long eort and representsmany weeks o writing, draing, and critiquing. Tepolicy statement relects the broad, bipartisan con-sensus o the ask Force members. Not every signa-tory endorses every judgment or recommendation

in the statement. Members have endorsed this state-ment solely in their individual capacities, and theirendorsements do not necessarily suggest those o theinstitutions or political campaigns with which theycurrently may be afliated.

he ask Force would like to acknowledge theinvaluable assistance provided by the entire sta o TeWashington Institute in organizing its meetings andpreparing this publication. Special thanks go to BenFishman, Rebecca Saxton, and Zachary Snyder, whosupported the groups work intellectually, organiza-

tionally, and administratively.he work o the ask Force and the visit o Israe-

lis to our Lansdowne retreat were made possible by agenerous endowment established by the Sore Founda-tion to support this quadrennial exercise. Neither theFoundation nor Te Washington Institute, however,had input in or control over the ask Forces delib-erations. Tis policy statement has not been endorsedby the Institute, its Board o rustees, or its Board oAdvisors, and it should not be construed as represent-ing their views.

Dennis Ross Robert SatloCo-convenor Co-convenor

E v E ry p r E s i d E n t i a l E l E c t i o n year since

1988, Te Washington Institute has convened a Presi-dential Study Group o statesmen, diplomats, legisla-tors, scholars, and experts to examine the state o theMiddle East and the eectiveness o U.S. policy towardthe region, and to oer their collective advice on MiddleEast policymaking to a new administration. ime andagain, this bipartisan eort has proven itsel quite suc-cessul at injecting new thinking into the policy pro-cess at precisely the moment when it is most needed.

Tis year, we are taking a dierent tack. With theMiddle East having emerged over the past several years

as the ocal point o American oreign policy, a com-plex array o Middle Easternrelated issues now com-pete or the urgent attention o our nations leaders. Asingle report that assesses all o those issues and oersrecommendations on each o them runs the risk obeing less than the sum o its parts.

Tereore, this year, Te Washington Institute hasdecided to support the establishment o three indepen-dent Presidential ask Forces. Each will be composedo its own bipartisan, blue-ribbon group o experts andpractitioners, and each charged with addressing a dis-

crete issue high on the Middle East policy agenda.Tis is the report o the rst o these initiatives

the Presidential ask Force on the Future o U.S.-Israel Relations. Over the next several months, theInstitute looks orward to publishing the reports oits two cousinsthe ask Force on Countering theIdeology o Radical Islamist Extremism and the askForce on Combating Nuclear Prolieration in theMiddle East.

Te ask Force on the Future o U.S.-Israel Rela-tions met on a number o occasions in 2007 and 2008

in the Institutes oices and over a two-day retreatwith ten Israeli counterparts at the Lansdowne Con-erence Center in Virginia. We thank all those in theU.S. and Israeli governments or their assistance and


6/16


7/16

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1

Statement Of The Presidential Task Force

On The Future Of U.S.-Israel Relations

Moreover, our collective ability to wage peace or

prevent conict will, in many ways, be shaped by thesuccess o Irans nuclear ambitions (or, at least, the per-ception o inevitability about Irans nuclear eorts).Should Iran gain a nuclear weapons capability (orshould the international community resign itsel tothat inevitability), Irans negative regional inluencewill grow, emboldening those most determined toembroil the region in conict and eroding the abilityo those Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arabs commit-ted to reaching a secure peace based on a negotiatedtwo-state solution.

Tis is an urgent matter. By all accounts, Iran con-tinues to invest substantial unds and eort in master-ing the centriuge enrichment process and in improvingits ballistic missile capability, two o the three core ele-ments o an independent, sel-sufcient nuclear weap-ons program. Iran persists in these activities despiteunanimous UN Security Council resolutions callingon it to suspend its enrichment program, and despitea generous package o diplomatic and economic incen-tives, including a guaranteed supply o enriched ura-nium or civilian uses, to convince it to change its

nuclear-related policies. According to the NationalIntelligence Estimate (NIE) issued in late 20 07, Iranmay have enough highly enriched uranium to build anuclear weapon in less than two years.

The Importance of PreventionGiven both the enormity and the urgency o the chal-lenge we ace, we support the broad political consensuson the vital importance to U.S. interests o preventingIrans acquisition o a nuclear weapon. Te entire spec-trum o policy instruments must be brought to bear to

advance this objective, beginning with diplomacy andincluding incentives or Iran to alter its behavior on thenuclear issue.

Importantly, the Iran nuclear issue is neither just anAmerican nor an Israeli problem. For Americas otherriends and allies in the Middle East and South Asiaregions, the prospect o Iran gaining a nuclear weap-

We, members of the Washington Institute for Near East

Policys Presidential ask Force on the Future of U.S.-Israel Relations, met periodically in 2007 and 2008

and reiewed the substantial agenda of the U.S.-Israel

bilateral relationship. Recognizing that many issues on

that agenda are of ital importance to U.S. interests, we

decided to focus this brief Statement of Analysis and Rec-

ommendations on the item we determined deseres the

urgent attention of our nations leaders. Te ask Force

therefore issues the following statement:

s i x t y y E a r s a f t E r American diplomatic recogni-

tion o the state o Israel, and as Israel is engaged in newpeacemaking eorts with the Palestinian Authority andSyria, the prospect that the Islamic Republic o Iran maysuccessully develop a nuclear weapons capability couldconront the United States and Israel with the most seri-ous challenge in the history o their relationship.

For America, this is a major challenge, one that coulddestroy the international nonprolieration regime andspark a Middle East arms race o unprecedented scopeand peril. For Israel, the threat is even starker. Te ideathat a regime openly committed to its destruction is

seeking to acquire the means to implement this goal is achallenge that the Israeli people and government legiti-mately view as a threat to their states existence.

Indeed, this issuethe prospect o Irans acquisi-tion o a nuclear weapons capabilityhovers aboveall other items on the U.S.-Israel agenda. Tis includesboth the opportunities or advancing Israeli-Palestin-ian negotiations under the umbrella o the Annapolispeace process as well as the potential or urther roundso war and bloodshedeither between Hizballah andIsrael, between Hamas and Israel, or even on the two

ronts, Lebanon and Gaza, at the same time. Both theopportunities or peacemaking and the potential orconict demand care, investment, and attention, but inthe current environment, neither would have the trans-ormative impact on the strategic calculus o regionaland international actors as would Irans acquisition o anuclear weapons capability.


8/16

Presidential Task Forces

2 WashingtonInstitute.org

duration o Irans suspension o weaponization eortsand are deeply concerned about Irans human, techni-cal, and inancial investment in the enrichment pro-cess, which many expertsby no means only Israelis

regard as the more important element o the program.With Irans president denying the Holocaust, declaringIsrael should be wiped o the map, proclaiming thatthe countdown to Israels destruction is close at hand,and providing substantial unds, training, and materialsupport to terrorist groups dedicated to that goal, it isno wonder that Israelis across the political spectrumsee nuclear weapons in the hands o the leaders o theIslamic Republic o Iran as constituting a threat to thestate o Israel o unprecedented scope and seriousness.Tey will, as a result, always err on the side o worst-

case scenarios in assessing timerames or progress inthe Iranian nuclear program and will consider all steps,including their own preventive military action, in orderto stop or slow Iran rom attaining this capability.

Our leaders will have to take these actors intoaccount. We have an abiding commitment to the sur-vival and security o Israel, so the potential threat toIsrael o an Iranian nuclear bomb is a major concern oours as well. But entirely apart rom Americas commit-ment to Israels security, the United States has powerulreasons to prevent Iran rom attaining a nuclear weap-

ons capability. We are deeply troubled about the poten-tial havoc to be wrought by a terrorist-supporting statearmed with nuclear weapons, and about the potentialor Irans prolieration to trigger a region-wide armsrace. Indeed, we rightly rank the potential prolierationo nuclear weapons to terrorist groups as among ourmost worrisome ears. At the same time, the UnitedStates is a global power already engaged in two MiddleEastern wars that all Americans are eager to concludeat the earliest practicable moment. While the UnitedStates and Israel share the view that an Iranian nuclear

capability is a grave threat, Americans may have tacticaldierences with Israelis on ways to compel Iran to giveup its nuclear weapons ambitions.

Tese dierences are compounded by the growingperception among Israelis, drawn rom a U.S. policydebate over the appropriateness o relying on a strategyo deterrence vis--vis Iran, that the United States may

ons capability is a serious danger, deepening their earsabout rising Iranian inuence and compelling them toconsider provocative measures in their own deensethat they would not otherwise contemplate. And or

Americas European partners, the danger o globalnuclear prolieration and the risk o Irans nuclearambitions has convinced the European Union, with itsthree largest members representing it, to take the leadin international diplomacy to press or a change in Ira-nian behavior, while NAO has accepted the decisiono others to support (and in the case o Poland and theCzech Republic, to host) ballistic missile deensedecisions made with Irans potential or nuclear weap-onry uppermost in their minds.

Indeed, concerted international action may be the

key to preventing Iran rom acquiring a nuclear weap-ons capability. As the NIE highlighted, Iran appearsto have suspended the third element o its programweaponizationin 2003, under intense internationalpressure and scrutiny. While there is no guarantee thatIran will either maintain that suspension or expand itto include a halt to enrichment or missile delivery pro-grams, urther international pressure could bear ruit.

Regrettably, however, the NIEs crediting pasteorts to pressure Iran with partial success had theunintended consequence o reducing the sense o

urgency or additional pressure. Te result is that theprospects or signicant strengthening o internationalresolve to raise the cost to Iran o continuing to pursueobjectionable policies in the nuclear eld are less hope-ul today than they were prior to the publication o theNIE. While this situation is not irreversible, opinionon the issue may not change swily enough to have animpact on the pace o Irans technical advances. heimplications are proound.

For Israel, not only did the NIE transorm the inter-national approach to dealing with the Iranian nuclear

program, but reactions to it by many in the UnitedStates may have heightened the inclination o someIsraeli strategists to give urther consideration to uni-lateral military action to orestall Irans developmento a nuclear capability. Israel justiably regards this as aundamental issue. On a proessional level, Israeli intel-ligence analysts have doubts about both the act and


9/16


10/16



with the urgency and content necessary and appropri-ate to address the unprecedented nature o the chal-lenge our two countries ace today.

From its birth in the Ford administration to its

growth and development under both Democraticand Republican presidencies, strategic cooperationbetween our two countries has become the operationalnorm in many aspects o our relationship. oday, as aresult, there is an impressive structure o bureaucraticrelations, coordination, and exchanges.

However, there is reason or concern that thecontent, candor, and substance o our dialogue havenot kept pace with the institutionalization o thestructures o dialogue. On the one hand, leaders o

our two nations meet requently, but there is goodreason to believe that these sessions do not allow orthe depth and clarity on undamental issues that thecurrent situation demands. On the other hand, thestrategic relationship has acquired more numerous

ormats and more requent discussions o politi-cal-military issues over the years, but they appearprogressively to have become more technical thanstrategic. he apparent absence o serious, discreet,high-level discussions concerning the deinition othe Roadmap to Middle East peace in 2004, Israelimilitary aims and tactics vis--vis Lebanon in sum-mer 2006, and the merits o various alternatives toaddress Iranian nuclear ambitions are three exam-ples o this trend.

Task Force PolicyRecommendationsBased on the above, we urge the ollowing:

t h a t t h E p r E s i d E n t i n i t i a t E , with theprime minister o Israel, a high-level dialogue on themost urgent security matters on our strategic agenda

in itselor Israel, or the Palestinians, and or theUnited Statesand we urge America to take the leadin this eort. While the continuing conict betweenIsrael and the Palestinians is one o many sources o

grievance in the region, we reject the thesis that callsor distancing America rom Israel as a way to promotethe prospects or peace or to bolster American standingin the Middle East, as well as the suggestion that U.S.pressure on Israel to orce concessions on contestedissues would alter the widely held view among radi-cal Islamists o America as the Great Satan. Similarly,there is no evidence to support the thesis that Arabstates would act dierently on matters o concern tothe United States (such as countering Iranian regional

ambitions) i America jettisoned or downgraded itsrelationship with Israel. And there is no support orthe idea that U.S. steps to dissociate itsel rom Israel orweaken Israel politically or militarily would make Arableaders more condent or secure. o the contrary, most

Arab allies o the United States would take cold com-ort rom America distancing itsel rom Israel, earingthat i America does not stick to its commitment toIsrael, Washington could decide to jettison commit-ments to them, too.

Te record o the past sixty years is that large major-ities o Americans have supported Israel and its questor security and peace. Millions o Americans embracethis relationship because o a sense o common values,common threat perceptions, common strategic inter-ests, and a common vision o peace. On none o these

issues may Americans and Israelis have a completeidentity o views, but what our two countries share oneach issue dwars what separates us.

Our main concern here is not to call or anotherround o institutional upgrades in the orm and struc-ture o U.S.-Israel bilateral ties. Rather, our goal is tocall attention to the need to inuse the relationship

Preventing Irans acquisition of a nuclear

weapons capability is not special pleading for

Israelit is vital to Americas own security.


11/16

The Future of U.S.Israel Relations


coercive options (such as an embargo on Irans sale o

oil or import o rened petroleum products), and

preventive military action.

that this for um also be empowered to explore,or the two leaders, understandings that would guidediplomacy on matters related to the pursuit o Arab-Israeli peace. Tis should include, or example:

understandings on both the tactics and the strat-

egy o Israeli-Palestinian negotiations toward atwo-state solution o their conlict, rom resolv-ing dierences regarding Israeli commitmentson settlement policy to deining the appropri-

ate American role in securing a permanent-statusagreement;

an agreed approach toward the Islamic Resistance

Movement (Hamas), based on the need or the latterto accept internationally endorsed requirements orparticipation in peace diplomacy;

a common eort to conront Iranian support or

anti-peace elements among Palestinians and inLebanon;

and ways to harmonize Israeli desiderata vis--vis

peace talks with Syria and U.S. interests to preserveLebanese independence rom Syrian control.

Discussions on these important topics must be inusedwith the same level o candor and openness that needsto animate discussions on addressing the Iraniannuclear issue. Indeed, there is an essential connectionbetween U.S.-Israel dialogue on Iran and on Israelsrelations with its Arab neighbors, given that Iran could

trigger Hizballah-Israel or Hamas-Israel conict as parto its larger strategy to counter eorts to compel it tochange its nuclear strategy.

t h a t t h E p r E s i d E n t b E g i n a national con- versation with the American people on the chal-lenges, risks, and dilemmas posed to U.S. interests by

so as to ensure that common threat perceptions andcommon interests translate into policies that areas coordinated as possible. While our nations haveovercome a sometimes tense period in which intel-

ligence matters were points o contentioncon-cerning the Iranian nuclear program, or examplethe potential to avoid candid discussion o policyoptions and to all into a trap o miscommunicationis regrettably real.

t h a t t h E p r E s i d E n t p r o p o s E a new orumor such a dialogue. Given the proound sensitivity oissues under discussion, leaders themselves may notwish to be the interlocutors; or the same reason, they will not want the unwieldy structures that currently

exist to have the mandate or these matters. Tere-ore, we urge each leader to identiy one or two aidesto represent them. Tese aides should be among themost trusted advisors to the president and prime min-isterofcials or emissaries empowered to engage inall manner o discussion with the utmost creativity andmaximum discretion. Once initiated, this should be anongoing dialogue.

t h a t t h E f i r s t i t E m on the agenda or thisorum should be a discussion o each sides view about

current and potential eorts to compel a change inIranian behavior on the nuclear issue. Tis orum hasspecial responsibility to undertake a thorough assess-ment o costs and benets o each alternative, includ-ing their potential implications or other U.S., Israeli,and allied interests inside and outside the Middle East.Tis should cover the entire range o policy options,including:

diplomatic engagement (including coordinating

the agenda and timetable o a potential U.S.-Iran

dialogue),

political and economic pressure (including bring-

ing Israel in as a ull partner in planning discussionsregarding initiatives involving the UN SecurityCouncil and U.S.-EU, U.S.-Arab, and other relevantorums),


12/16



nuclear weapons. Te central argument is that prevent-ing Irans acquisition o a nuclear weapons capability isnot special pleading or Americas ally Israelit is vitalto Americas own security.

Given the urgency o the challenges our two coun-tries ace together, these proposalsdraed with theinauguration o a new president in mindare no lessappropriate or the incumbent; they deserve immedi-ate consideration.

the potential Iranian acquisition o a nuclear weaponscapability, and on ways to prevent it. While this askForce statement emphasizes the need or strengthen-ing U.S.-Israel dialogue on the issue, it is even more

important or the president to use one o the mostimportant tools at his disposal, the bully pulpit, toraise popular awareness o the act that Irans nuclearambitions are likely to trigger a surge o nuclear pro-lieration and raise the potential o terrorists gaining


13/16


WaltEr slo comb E , ormer undersecretary o

deense or policy, Clinton administration

vin WEbEr , ormer U.S. congressman (Republican,Minnesota); chairman, National Endowment orDemocracy

r . J a m E s W o o l s E y , ormer director o centralintelligence, Clinton administration

Co-Convenors

d E n n i s r o s s , counselor and Ziegler distinguishedellow, Te Washington Institute

r obEr t satloff , executive director, Te Wash-ington Institute

Washington InstituteParticipants

patr ick claWson , deputy director or research

david makovsky , senior ellow and director,Project on the Middle East Peace Process

r o b E r t b l a c k W i l l , ormer deputy national secu-

rity advisor or strategic planning, presidential envoy toIraq, and ambassador to India, Bush administration

r i c h a r d c l a r k E , ormer national coordinatoror security, inrastructure protection, and counterter-rorism, Clinton and Bush administrations

t h o m a s d o n i l o n , ormer chie o sta andassistant secretary o state or public aairs, Clintonadministration

John hillEn, ormer assistant secretary o stateor political-military aairs, Bush administration

m a x k a m p E l m a n , ormer ambassador and arms-control negotiator; recipient, Presidential Medal oFreedom

b o b k E r r E y , ormer U.S. senator (Democrat,Nebraska); president, New School University

a n t h o n y l a k E , ormer assistant to the president

or national security aairs, Clinton administration

s a m u E l l E W i s , executive committee member,American Academy o Diplomacy; ormer ambassadorto Israel, Carter and Reagan administrations

m a r k p a r r i s , ormer ambassador to urkey andsenior director o the National Security Council

s u s a n r i c E , ormer assistant secretary o state orArican aairs, Clinton administration

J a m E s r o c h E , ormer secretary o the Air Force,Bush administration

WEndy shEr man, ormer ambassador and coun-selor to the State Department, Clinton administration

Signatories


14/16


15/16


16/16

1828 L Street NW Suite 1050 Washington DC 20036 www washingtoninstitute org

Sixty years afteram pm g f h

f i, i gg w pmg ff

wh h P auhy sy, h pp h h im

rpub f i my ufuy vp u wp pb-

y u f h U s i wh h m uhg h hy f h hp.

Endorsed by

rb Bw

rh c

P cw

thm dJh H

Mx kmpm

Bb ky

ahy l

smu lw

dv Mvy

M Psu r

Jm rh

d r, co-convenor

rb sff, co-convenor

Wy shm

W smb

V Wbr. Jm Wy

Documents

Strengthening the Partnership: The New PNAC Document?