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    On Humes Is-Ought ThesisDavid C. StoveHume Studies Volume IV, Number 2 (November, 1978), 64-72.

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    6 4 .

    ON HUME'S IS -OUGHT THESIS

    The famous t h e s i s o f Hume ab ou t

    I l i s "

    and "ought"

    I

    (1) F o r any f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t e and any e t h i c a l

    s t a t e m e n t h , h i s n o t d ed u c i b l e f ro m

    e ,

    t a k e

    t o

    be,

    as I

    b e l i e v e

    it

    h a s g e n e r a l l y b e e n t a k e n

    t o

    be:

    My o b j e c t i n t h e s e b rS ef n o t es i s n e i t h e r t o d efend n o r

    t o

    a t t a c k

    (l),

    b u t j u s t

    t o

    p o i n t o u t c e r t a i n m is ta k es w hich

    have been made,

    o r

    are ap t t o be made, abou t

    (1)

    or & o u t

    what

    Hume ' s

    t h e s i s

    i s .

    "only.

    statements

    o f f a c t c a n f o l l o w. f ro m statements of fact?:

    a t h e s i s , B l ack t h i n k s , w hich P o pp e r an d "many o t h e r p h i l -

    o s o p h e r s " l b e l i ev e .

    be :

    A .

    Max

    Black has taken Hume's ' thesis

    t o

    b e t h a t

    Tha t

    i s ,

    Black too k Hume's t h e s i s t o

    2 )

    F or any f a c t u a l e and any non- f ac tua l h ,

    I t i s cer ta in , how ever, t h a t P o pp e r d o es n o t

    h is n o t d ed u c i b l e f ro m e.

    b s l i c v e 2 ) , and

    I

    hope it

    i s

    u n t r u e t h a t many o t h e r p h i l -

    o s o p h e r s b e l i e v e i t . For 2 )

    i s

    o b v i o us l y f a l s e , and on

    th contrary, c v n r y f a c t u a l s t n t c m c n t has a t l c a s t onc non-

    f a c t u a l c on se qu en ce ; s i n c e from any f a c t u a l s t a t e m e nt f ,

    t h e S t a t e m e n t

    ' f

    o r n o t - f ' , which i s n o t f a c t u a l ,

    i s

    deduc-

    i b l e . But t h i s l ea v es Hume's t h e s i s (1) u n t o u c h e d , s i n c e

    t h e r e

    i s

    n o ex cu se f o r c o n f u s in g it w i th t h e f o o l i s h

    t h e s i s 2 ) .

    ment e , t h e n g i v e n

    e ,

    t h e f a l s i t y of h

    i s

    p o ss i b l e ; o r i n

    o t h e r w or ds , h h a s less t h an maximum p r o b a b i l i t y i n re-

    l a t i o n

    t o

    e.

    So

    p a r t

    a t

    l e a s t

    o f t h e co n t en t o f Hume's

    t h e s i s

    (1)

    is:

    ( 3 ) F or any f a c t u a l

    e

    and e t h i c a l h , P ( h / e ) < l .

    S e v e r a l t h i n g s d i s p o s e u s

    t o

    co n fu s e (3 ) w i t h

    B.

    I f

    a

    s t a t em en t h

    i s

    n o t d e d u c i b l e f rom a

    s t a t e -

    an o t h e r p ro p o s i t i o n w h i ch

    i s

    r e a l l y q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from it,

    and which

    it i s

    i m p o r t a n t n o t t o cDnfuse wi th it. T h i s i s

    t h e p r o po s i t i o n :

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    65.

    4 ) For any

    e l

    a n y f a c t u a l

    e

    and any e t h i c a l

    To g r a s p t h e d i f f e r e n c e betw een

    (3 )

    and

    4 )

    , h e

    h , P ( h / e ' . e ) = P ( h / e ' ) .

    b e s t way

    i s

    t o c o n s i d e r t h e i r a n a l o gu e s, where t h e arguments

    from

    e

    t o

    h

    are

    n o t f a c t u a l - t o - e t h i c a l a rg um e nt s, b u t i n -

    s t e a d

    are

    i n d u c t i v e ones : t h a t

    i s ,

    arguments from observed

    t o u no bs er ve d i n s t a n c e s o f e m p i r i c a l p r e d i c a t e s .

    The indu c t iv e ana logue o f ( 3 ) i s :

    (5)

    f o r any e and h such t h a t t h e argument f rom

    e

    t o h

    i s

    i n d u c t iv e , P ( h / e ) c l .

    Now t h i s

    i s

    s imply a judgm ent o f n o n -d ed u c i b i l i t y , o r o f

    non-maximal probabi l i ty . I t s a y s , o f any i n d u c t i v e

    argu-

    ment, j u s t t h a t , i n r e l a t i o n

    t o

    t h e p re m is s

    e ,

    t h e f a l s i t y

    o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n h

    i s

    p o s s i b l e .

    ( 5 )

    ,

    t h e r e f o r e ,

    a s s e r t s

    n o more t h a n t h e f a l l i b i l i t y o f e v e ry i n d u c t i v e a rgument.

    With

    ( 5 )

    ,

    co n s eq u en t l y , ev e ry o n e

    w i l l

    ag ree .

    F or t h e i n d u c t i v e an al og ue o f

    4 1 , it w i l l be

    simp-

    l e s t , and s u f f i c i e n t ,

    t o

    c o ns id e r t h e s p e c i a l case where e '

    i s

    t a u t o l o g i c a l . .

    Here,

    w r i t i n g

    t

    f o r

    some

    t a u t o l og y , t h e

    ana logue

    i s :

    ( 6 ) For any e and h such t h a t t h e a rgument f rom

    e

    t o h

    i s

    i n d u c t i v e , P ( h / t . e ) = P ( h / t ) .

    Now t h i s i s n o t

    a

    judgment

    of

    n o n - d e d u c i b i l i t y , b u t

    a

    pro-

    p o s i t i o n o f t h e k i n d which K eynes a p t l y c a l l e d

    a

    judgment

    o f i r r e l e v a n c e .

    I t

    s a y s , o f any in d u c t i v e ar g u ne n t , t h a t

    i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e p re m is s

    e

    co n j o i n ed w i t h a. t au t o i o g y ,

    t h e f a l s i t y o f t h e c o nc lu s i on h

    i s

    no l e s s p r o b a b l e , o r

    more, than it

    i s

    i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e t au to lo gy a lo ne . Hence,

    whereas

    ( 5 )

    i s a t h e s i s of i n d u c t i v e f a l l i b i l i s m r e r e l y ,

    ( 6 ) i s a t h e s i s o f i nd u ct iv e s c e p t i c i s n j f o r it s a y s , i n t e r

    a h a t i n d u c t i v e e v id e nc e n e v e r

    r a i s e s

    t h e p r o b a b i l i t y

    of

    a

    hypo thes i s above

    i t s

    v al ue p r i o r

    t o

    a l l

    e x p e r i e n c e ,

    or

    i n r e l a t i o n t o

    a

    t au to lo g y. With t h i s t h e s i s , u n l ik e

    (5)

    few

    w i l l

    ag re e1 al tho ug h Hume ma in tai ne d

    a

    s c e p t i c a l t h es i s

    ab o u t i n d u c t i o n wh ich , i f I h av e e l s e w he r e i n t e r p r e t e d him

    r i g h t l y 1 2 was p r e c i s e l y

    (6).

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    65.

    Th e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n

    ( 5 )

    slid ( 6 ) should now be

    manifes t , .

    Well,

    t h e d i f f e r e n c e b et we en ( 3 ) and

    4 ) above

    is

    c x o c t l y t h c

    samc;

    on1.y

    more

    so,

    s i n c e

    4 )

    asserts

    t h e

    i r r e l e v a n c e o f f a c t u a l s t o e t h i c a l s , n o t i r e l a t i o n t o

    t a u t o l o g i c a l . e only, b u t t o any 0 .

    What are t h e th in g s which di:;posc us t o co n fu s e 3 )

    w i t h 4 ; ? One i s t h e c u r r e n c y o f vay.~c?phrases s i l ch as th3

    autonomy

    of

    e t h i c s " . F o r t h e ju dg me nt

    of

    i r r e l e v a n c e

    4 )

    h a s a t l e a s t

    as

    good

    a

    c l a im as t he judgment of non-deduci-

    b i l i t y

    ( 3 ) ,

    t o

    b e d e s c r i b e d

    as

    a s s e r t i n g t h e autononty

    of

    e t h i c s . A no th er t h i n g which l i n k s ( 3 )

    t o

    4 ) i n some minds

    i s ' t h e c u r r c n c y

    of

    t h e t h e s i s

    o f

    deduc t iv i sm:

    7 ) F o r

    any

    e and h , i f P (h /e )

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    67 .

    case 4a ) of a ) , i f , as I have olsewhsxe t r i e d to show , h?

    m a i nt a in s t h e d e d u c t i v i s t 7 ) ,

    as

    well as 3 ) . For t h e s e

    roasoi i s i t will bc: wor thwhi le t o show t h a t ( 4 a ) , l i k e i t s

    i n d u c t i v e a na lo g ue

    6 )

    ,

    can b e v er y . e a s i l y r e f u t e d ; and

    hence

    t h a t

    4 ) t o o i s false.

    6

    Th e g e n e r a l con j u n c t i o n - p r i n c i p l e o f p r o b a b i l i t y i s :

    8 )

    ( 9 ) I f P ( q / p . r) = ? ( q / r ) ther. P ( p / q . r) = P ( p / r ) .

    r ( p . q / r ) = P ( p / r ) x P ( q /p . r )= P ( q / r ) x P ( p / q . r ) .

    Prom t h i s it f o l lo w s t h a t :

    T L i s

    s a y s t h a t i f , i n r e i a t i c n t o

    r ,

    p

    i s

    ( i n K e yn es 's

    s en se ) i r r e l e v a n t to., t h en , i n r e l a t i o n t o

    r , q

    i s a l s o

    i r r e l e v a n t t o p. I n s h o r t , irrelevaiice i n r e l a t i o n t o 1 is

    symmet r i ca l .

    Now

    4 4

    asser t s

    t h a t , i n r e l a t i o n t o

    a t it-

    ology, any f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t i s i r r e l e v a n t : t 9 any

    ethics '

    one. I f t h i s were t r u e , t h e n t he syrr.met?y of

    irrelevance

    (9) would ensure t h a t c o n v e r s e l y ,

    i n

    r e l i ? t ion Lo t a u t -

    o l o gy , any e t h i c a l s t a t em e n t

    i s

    i r r e l e v a n t

    t ~ /

    iip

    r dct1Jnl

    one.

    But

    t h a t i s n o t so. W r i t i n g as b c f o r e t f o r

    z c i k

    t a u t o l o g y , i t is t r u e t h a t

    B u t

    it is

    a l s o

    t r u e t h t

    10)

    P ( S o c r a t e a

    i s

    a man/t)

    e l .

    (11) P ( S o c r a t e s i s

    a nien/Socratcs

    is

    good man.

    t) l.

    Whence t h e e t h i c a l ' ' S oc r a te s is

    .a

    good

    m s n

    i s

    nor

    i r r e l c -

    van=, b u t on t h a cc jntrary fav ou rab ly re.'.cvant to

    t.he f a c t ; . d

    " S o c r a t c s

    is

    a man", i n r e l a t i o n t o

    a t a u t o l o y y . so 4 . 3 )

    i s f a l se . Hence a f o r t i o r i 4 ) i s f a l s e .

    D.

    (1)

    and ( 3 ) a re n o n - d c d u c i b i l i t y t h e s e s , and

    are

    c o n t r o v e r s i a l . I.Iany o t h e r n o n -d e d uc i b il i ty t h e s e s ,

    however,

    a r e

    n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l , a nd e v en obv ious . For

    example ,

    the

    t h e s i s t h a t ' u n d i s t r i b u t e d middle :

    13

    a

    fa:-

    lacy :

    ( 1 2 ) F o r a n y l o g i c a l l y - i n d e p e n d e n t

    ? re%ca te s

    F and G I P ( x is F/A11 F are G.x i s

    G ) < 1 .

    Another exmiple i s i n d u c t i v e f a l l i b i l i s r c (5) above. A n o 3 1 ~

    i s Hume s " t h e r e car. b e no d e m on s tr a ti v e a r g w e n t s f o r a

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    6 8 .

    m a tt er o f f a c t" ; t h a t i s ,

    (1 3) F o r any n eces s a ry t r u t h e an d any co n t i n g en t

    A n o th e r n o n - d ed u c i b i l i t y t h e s i s which seems o bv i o u s

    h, h i s n o t d ed u c i b l e f ro m

    e .

    t o m e , and which

    w i l l , I

    t h i n k ,

    seem so t o

    o t h e r s as

    w e l l ,

    i s :

    ( 1 4 )

    For any l o g i c a l t r u t h e and any e t h i c a l h ,

    h

    i s

    n o t d e d u c i b l e f r o m

    e .

    I f ( 1 4 ) were f a l s e t he n e t h i c s , o r p a r t o f it a t l e a s t ,

    would be s imply

    a

    b ra n ch o f l o g i c 1 so t h a t e t h i c a l disputes-

    f o r example , abou t h , "Abor tion i s wrong" could

    sometimes

    be d e c i s i v e l y s e t t l e d s im ply by f i n d i n g o u t t h a t h ,

    o r

    i t s

    n e g a t i o n ,

    i s

    among t h e theorems of lo g i c . I t seems ob-

    v i o u s t h a t t h i s

    i s

    an i d l e f a n t a sy .

    But now, a judgment o f n o n - d e d u c ib i l i ty , i f t r u e ,

    i s t r u e n o t i n v i r t u e o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f any s ta t e m e nt t o

    t h e a c t u a l u ni v er se ; b u t j u s t i n v i r t u e of t h e r e l a t i o n

    be tween the

    t w o

    s ta te me nt s which t h e judgment of non-

    d ed u c i b i l i t y m en ti on s . Hence

    a

    j u d g n s n t o f n o n -d ed u c i b i l i t y ,

    i f t r u e , i s

    a

    l c g i c a l t r u t h .

    l o g i c a l t r u t h s . And t h e n , i n view of ( 1 4 1 , it f u r t h e r

    f o l l o w s t h e t t h e s e n o n - d e d u c ib i l i ty t h e s e s o f H u m e , f

    t r u e , ha ve n o e t h i c a l c on se qu en ce s. I n s h o r t ,

    I t f ol lo ws t h a t (1) an d ( 3 ) zihovs, i f t r u e , are

    ( 1 5) F or any e t h i c a l h , h i s n o t d e d uc i b le

    from

    (1):

    and

    ( 1 5 ' ) F or any e t h i c a l h , h

    i s

    n o t d e d u c i b l e f r o m

    These conc lus ions a re i m p o r t a n t , b ec au se b e l i e f s

    ( 3 ) .

    i n c o n s i s t e n t w it h them are widespread . A few years ago I

    r ead i n an u n d e rg rad u a t e e s s ay words

    t o

    t h i s e f f e c t ,

    ( u n f o r t u n a t e l y

    I

    d id n o t make a copy of t h e

    exact

    w o rd s ) :

    "S ince no

    e t h i c a l

    s ta te me nt c an be deduced from

    a

    f a c t u a l

    one , it f ol lo ws t h a t

    w e

    can do what w e l i k e . " Now c l e a r l y ,

    t h e secon d "can " h e r e w a s a n e t h i c a l one: we

    can do

    what

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    69.

    we

    l i k e "

    was a

    v e r s i o n of t h e ' u n i v e r s a l p e rm i ss i on '

    :

    (16) Anyth ing

    i s

    m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e .

    And ( 1 6 ) i s c l e a r l y an e t h i c a l s t a t e me n t ; i nd ee d, it

    i s

    o n l y

    an extreme

    e x p r e s s i o n

    of

    an e t h i c a l a t t i t u d e which h a s

    r e c e n t l y b e en q u i t e common i n t h e

    w e s t , G.

    l i b e r a l i s m

    o r

    p e r m i s s i v e n e s s .

    I n b e l i e v i n g t h a t (1) e n t a i l s (16)., t h i s s t u d e n t ,

    i n

    view of

    (15 ) , w a s wrong. But h e

    er red

    i n go od,

    o r

    a t

    any

    r a t e

    numer ous, company. F o r

    it

    h a s b ee n q u i t e w i de l y

    be l i eved ,

    or a t l e a s t va gue l y f e l t , t h a t Hume's non-deduc-

    i b i l i t y t h e s i s

    (1) does

    h a v e ( 1 6 )

    as a

    consequence .

    I t

    i s

    i n th is way, I be l i eve , t h a t i n t h e west i n t h i s c e nt ur y ,

    Hume's ph i l o so phy ha s h e l p e d t o b r i n g a b ou t t h e loss of

    moral c onf i de nc e wh i c h

    i s

    e x p r e s s e d i n ( 16 ) a nd w hi ch i s

    o n e a s p e c t

    of

    t h e phenomenon

    of

    "modern nervousness" .

    S i nc e 1965 , e t h i c a l l i b e r a l i s m ha s be e n

    t o a

    c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t r e p l ac e d

    i n

    t h e

    w e s t

    b y t h e e t h i c a l

    f a n a t i c i s m

    of

    l e f t - r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . Some o f t h e s e r e v o l u t -

    i o n a r i e s r e j e c t Hume's (1) b e c a u s e t h e y r e j e c t t h e l i b c r a l

    ( 1 6 ) .

    T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e y s h a r e w i t h nany l i b e r a l s t h e

    e rr on eo us b e l i e f t h a t

    (1)

    e n t a i l s ( 16 ) .

    7

    I

    h av e m ai nt ai ne d i n e f f e c t t h a t :

    (17 ) Fo r any e t h i c a l h , P ( h / ( l ) ) < l ,

    (17 ) For any e t h i c a l h , P ( h / ( 3 ) )< 1 .

    and

    t ha t :

    But I w ou ld go much f u r t h e r t h a n t h e s e

    mere

    n o n - d e d u c i b i l i t y

    t h e s e s . I t seems t o

    m e

    o bv io us t h a t t h e f o l l o w in g i r r e l e -

    vance t h e s i s

    i s

    t r u e :

    (18 ) F o r a ny

    e l ,

    any l o g i c a l t r u t h

    e and

    any

    e t h i c a l h , P ( h / e ' . e ) = P(h/ .e ' ) .

    I f

    so,

    t h e n s i n c e ,

    again,

    (1)

    and

    (3)

    are

    l o g i c a l t r u t h s

    i f

    t r u e , it follows

    t h a t :

    P ( h / e ' ) ;

    ( 19 ) F o r a ny

    e l

    and any e t h i c a l h , P (h /e ' . (1)

    and

    t h a t

    ( 1 9 )

    F or a ny

    e '

    and any

    e th i ca l

    h , P ( h / e ' . ( 3 ) ) =

    P ( h / e ' ) .

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    70

    That

    i s , Hume s

    n o n -d ed u c i b i l i t y

    theses

    (1) and 3 ) n o t only

    h a v e

    no c t h i c a l s t a t cme n t s among

    t h e i r

    consequences , bu t

    a r e e ven i r r e l e v a n t t o e ve ry

    e t h i c a l

    s t a t em en t .

    phi losophy

    I

    t a ke t o be:

    T h i s t h e s i s h as

    sometimes

    b ee n h e l d i n c o n j un c t io n w i t h (I),

    i f ,

    n d eed , t h e

    two

    ha ve n o t b een t h ou g ht t o b e p o s i t i v e l y

    connec ted i n

    some

    way. For t h i s reason

    it

    w i l l be worth-

    whi le t o p o i n t o u t t h a t (1) i s i n co n s i s t e n t w i t h non-

    co g n i t i v i s m ( 2 0 ) .

    e,

    t hen

    i f c is n o t

    s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y , t h e n

    t h e

    conjunct icn

    of e with not -h

    i s

    n o t s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . Where e is

    f a c t y a l , i t i s no t se l f -c on t r ad ic to ry . Hence

    i f h

    i s

    n o t

    deducible from

    a

    f a c t u a l s t at e me n t

    e,

    then e-and-not-h i s

    n o t s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y ; w h e n c e . i t

    i s

    p o s s i b l e f o r e t o be

    t r u e and h fa l se . Hence i f (1)

    i s

    t r u e , t h en , w h e rev e r e

    i s

    f a c t u a l and

    h

    i s e t h i c a l ,

    it

    i s p o s s i b l e f o r e

    t o be

    t r u e and

    h f a l s e .

    I f it

    is poss ib l e

    f o r e t o be t r u e and

    h f a l s e , t h en i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r h t o be f a l s e . I f it. i s

    p o s s i b l e for h t o be f a l s e ,

    it

    i s pos.s ible for it t o be

    f a l s e or t rue . Hence i f 1) i s t r u e th en it i s p o s s i b l e

    f o r a n e t h i c a l s ta te me nt

    t o

    be

    f a l s e

    o r t r u e ; t h a t

    i s , (20)

    is f a l s e .

    E. The

    t h e s i s

    of ' non-cogn i tiv ism ' i n moral

    (20) E t h i c a l s t a t e me n t s c an no t b e t r u e or fa l se .

    I f

    a

    s ta tement h is n o t deduc ib l e from a s t a t em en t

    'Theses

    (1)

    and 2 0 ) are i n c o n s i s t e n t , t he n ,

    a t

    l e a s t

    i f

    i n (1) t h e words

    "h

    is n o t d ed u c i b l e from e "

    t h e i r

    u s u a l s en s e :

    t h e

    s e n s e , t h a t is, t h a t it i s p o s s i b l e

    for

    e

    t o

    be

    t r u e

    and

    h

    f a l s e . Y e t

    I

    am

    n o t s u r e t h a t

    t h i s

    i t a l i c i s e d addendum

    i s

    really needed here . For i f

    it

    i s ,

    then a

    s i m i l a r

    addendum would be needed wherever t w o

    s ta te -

    ments

    are

    asser ted t o

    be

    i n co ns i s t e n t . (Evcn "not -p", after

    a l l ,

    i s n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h

    p ,

    u n l e s s t h e word "not"

    h a s

    i t s usu al scns e.) And t h i s consequence seems absurd.

    main ta in (11, as long as h e a t t a c h e s a s u f f i c i e n t l y ur.usual

    S t i l l ,

    one who su bs cr ib es t o (20) can c o n s i s t e n t l y

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    71.

    s e n s e

    t o

    "h

    i s

    n o t d e d u c i b l e f rom el'. B ut by a d o p t i ng t h i s

    c o u r s e a n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t , w h i l e h e a vo i ds i n c o ns i s t e n c y ,

    i n c u r s a n o t h e r d i s a d va n t a g e . T h i s

    i s

    t h a t h e no l o n g er

    a f f i r m s , by a f f i r m i n g (1)

    ,

    w h a t most n a t u r a l i s t s have

    d e n i e d by d e n y in g it: f o r t h e y h av e t h o u g h t . t h a t some

    e t h i c a l

    s ta tements

    are d e d uc i b le from f a c t u a l on es , i n t h e

    u s u a l s e n s e

    of

    "deducible" .

    i b i l i t y

    or

    o t he r w is e of e t h i c a l s t a te m e n ts f rom f a c t u a l

    o ne s , f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t s a r e d e du c i b l e f rom e t h i c a l o n es ,

    i n t h e u s ua l sense

    of

    "de duci b le " . (Such exampl es as t h e

    d e d u c i b i l i t y

    of

    " S o c r a t e s i s a

    man

    from " S o c r a t e s i s a

    good

    m a n

    show t h i s . ) And t h i s f a c t w i l l n o t be e a s y t o

    r e c o n c i l e w i t h n o n - c o g n i t i v i s m 2 0 ) .

    e s i d e s , w h a t e v e r t h e t r u t h may b e a b o u t t h e d educ-

    D. C. S t o v e

    D ep ar tm en t o f T r a d i t i o n a l a n d

    Modern Ph i losophy ,

    U n iv e r s i ty o f S ydney.

    1.

    2.

    3 .

    4 .

    5.

    T h e s e q u o t a t i o n s

    are

    fro m p.99 o f Hudson ( ed .) The

    I s -O u gh t Q u e s t io n , ( Macm i ll an , 1 9 6 1) , where

    B l a F s

    a r t i c l e , o r i g i n a l l y

    i n

    The Ph i. l os oph ic a1 Review

    ,

    1964,

    i s r e p r i n t e d .

    See my P r o b a b i l i t y aild Hu r n e ' s I n d u c t i v e S c e p t i c i s m

    ( r e f e r r e d

    t o

    h e r e a f t e r

    a s

    P r o b a b i l i t y )

    ,

    O .U . P .

    ,

    1 9 7 3 ) ,

    c h s .

    1

    -

    4 .

    P r o b a b i l i t y , ch . 6 , s e c t i o n ( i v ) .

    Moore

    s a y s , f o r exam ple , t h a t it i s co m m i t t in g th e

    n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y

    t o

    h o l d t h a t f rom a f a c t u a l s t a t e -

    ment we can i n f e r , or o b t a i n c o n f i rm a t i o n f o r " , an

    e t h i c a l s t a t e m e n t . Aga ln , he s a y s t h a t an e t h i c a l ,

    s t a t e m e n t " c an n ot b e r ed u ce d t o any a s s e r t i o n & o u t

    r e a l i t y , and t h e r e f o r e m ust

    remain

    u n a f f e c t e d by" a ny

    s u c h a s s e r t i o n . ( P r i n c i p i a Z t h i c a , p. 1 1 4 . I t a l i c s

    n o t i n t e x t i n

    e i t h e r case.)

    M r . R. F. A tk i ns o n, ( i n

    a

    v a l u a b l e

    a r t i c l e

    i n The P h i l -

    o s o p h i c a l Review, 1961, r e p r i n t e d

    i n

    t h e Hudson volume

    r e f e r r e d t o i n f o o t n o t e 1 above); b u t ev en he s u g g e s t s

    what i s

    f a l s e ,

    t h a t 4 ) e n t a i l s ( 3 ) .

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    72 .

    6 .

    7.

    P r o b a b i l i t y , c h . 3 ,

    T hi s e f f e c t o f (1)

    when

    Moore

    r e v i v e d

    s e c t i o n ( i v )

    ,

    and ch .4 ,

    i s

    a l l t h e more c u r i o u s

    t h i s Humean t h e s i s , i t s

    s e c t i o n ( v ) . .

    because .

    f i r s t e f f e c t

    was r a t h e r t o i nc re as e moral c o n f id e n c e . T h e t o n o m y

    of e t h i c s ,

    in fhe

    form of 1)

    was

    c l e a r l y . t ho ug ht

    o f ,

    by Moore and t h e o t h e r i n t u i t i o n i s t s , as s e t t i n g t h e i r

    own e t h i c a l knowledge, for t h e f i r s t

    time,

    on s o l i d

    ground. Only l a t e r d i d (1) come

    t o

    be though t of as

    i m p l y i n g t h a t athlcal 'knowledge'

    is

    ground les s .