Stingray Affirmative - resources.chicagodebates.org · Web view2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Drone Affirmative- No Link/Link Turn344 *** Stingray Affirmative. Stingray Affirmative Summary

CDL Core Files 2015-2016

2015-2016

CDL Core Files

Researched by Hanna Nasser, Alix Dahl and Mike Baxter-Kauf (with contributions from Cydney Edwards, Roman Motley, Travis Ormsby, and David Song)

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance

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Core Files Table of Contents 1/4

*** STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE 9

STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE SUMMARY 10

STINGRAY 1AC—INHERENCY 11

STINGRAY 1AC—PLAN 12

STINGRAY 1AC—DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE 13

STINGRAY 1AC—RACIAL PROFILING ADVANTAGE 15

STINGRAY 1AC—RACIAL PROFILING ADVANTAGE 16

STINGRAY 1AC—SOLVENCY 17

2AC INHERENCY—STINGRAY NOW 18

2AC DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE—STINGRAY VIOLATES 21

2AC DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE—COPS LIE 23

2AC DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE—PRIVACY KEY TO DEMOCRACY 24

2AC RACIAL PROFILING ADVANTAGE—STINGRAY PROFILES 25

2AC RACIAL PROFILING ADVANTAGE—IMPACTS 26

2AC SOLVENCY—FCC GOOD 27

2AC ANSWERS TO: FCC CAN’T DECERTIFY 28

2AC ANSWERS TO: TERROR DISADVANTAGE 29

2AC ANSWERS TO CRIME DISADVANTAGE 31

*** STINGRAY NEGATIVE 32

1NC ANSWERS TO: INHERENCY—STATUS QUO SOLVES 33

1NC ANSWERS TO: DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE 35

1NC ANSWERS TO: RACIAL PROFILING ADVANTAGE 36

1NC ANSWERS TO: SOLVENCY 37

2NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: SOLVENCY—FCC CAN’T DO IT 38

2NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: SOLVENCY—CIRCUMVENTION 39

TERROR DISADVANTAGE LINKS 40

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*** NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS AFFIRMATIVE 42

NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS SUMMARY 43

1AC 1/6: INHERENCY 441AC 3/6: PRIVACY 461AC 5/6: RACISM 48ANSWERS TO: NATIONAL SECURITY DISADVANTAGE 50ANSWERS TO: NATIONAL SECURITY DISADVANTAGE 51ANSWERS TO: CRIME DISADVANTAGE 522AC EXTENSIONS: PRIVACY 532AC EXTENSIONS: RACISM 54

*** NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS NEGATIVE 55

1NC SOLVENCY 561NC RACISM HARMS 571NC PRIVACY HARMS 581NC PRIVACY HARMS 59

*** DRONE AFFIRMATIVE 60

1AC 612AC ADVANTAGE FRONTLINES 702AC INHERENCY 712AC INHERENCY- ANSWERS TO: OBAMA REGULATIONS 722AC CIVIL LIBERTIES 732AC CREDIBILITY 742AC INNOVATION 752AC SOLVENCY 76ANSWERS TO: DRONES BAD DISADVANTAGE 772AC DRONES BAD DISADVANTAGE 78ANSWERS TO: BAN DRONES COUNTERPLAN 802AC BAN DRONES COUNTERPLAN 81

*** DRONE NEGATIVE 83

1NC ADVANTAGE FRONTLINES 841NC INHERENCY FRONTLINE 851NC CIVIL LIBERTIES FRONTLINE 861NC CREDIBILITY FRONTLINE 871NC INNOVATION FRONTLINE 891NC SOLVENCY FRONTLINE 912NC/1NR ADVANTAGE FRONTLINE EXTENSIONS 922NC/1NR INHERENCY 932NC/1NR CIVIL LIBERTIES 942NC/1NR CREDIBILITY 952NC/1NR INNOVATION 972NC/1NR SOLVENCY 98ADVANTAGE FRONTLINE EXTENSIONS 99ANSWERS TO: INHERENCY- EXTENSIONS 100ANSWERS TO: CIVIL LIBERTIES- IMPACT FRAMING 101ANSWERS TO: CIVIL LIBERTIES- ALTERNATE CAUSALITIES 102ANSWERS TO: CREDIBILITY- GLOBAL WARMING IMPACT 103ANSWERS TO: CREDIBILITY- HEGEMONY IMPACT 104

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ANSWERS TO: SOLVENCY- EXTENSIONS 105DRONES BAD DISADVANTAGE 1061NC DRONES BAD DISADVANTAGE 107**UNIQUENESS- DRONES BAD DISADVANTAGE 1102NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: NON-UNIQUE 1112NC/1NR UNIQUENESS WALL- DRONES BAD DISADVANTAGE 112**LINK- DRONES BAD DISADVANTAGE 1132NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: NO LINK 1142NC/1NR LINK WALL- DRONES BAD DISADVANTAGE 115**IMPACT- DRONES BAD DISADVANTAGE 117ANSWERS TO: DRONES SOLVE TERRORISM 118ANSWERS TO: NO IMPACT TO TERRORISM 119BAN DRONES COUNTERPLAN 1201NC BAN DRONES COUNTERPLAN 1212NC/1NR BAN DRONES COUNTERPLAN 1232NC/1NR BAN DRONES COUNTERPLAN- OVERVIEW 1242NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: PERM DO BOTH 1252NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: NO SOLVENCY 1262NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: ADD-ON 127

**CRITICAL SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE- AFFIRMATIVE 129

1AC 1302AC ANSWERS TO: SAFETY DISADVANTAGE 1362AC ANSWERS TO: FRAMEWORK 1372AC ON-CASE FRONTLINE 139

**CRITICAL SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE- NEG 140

1NC FRAMEWORK 141**SAFETY DISADVANTAGE 1441NC ON-CASE FRONTLINE 146

***TOPICALITY NEGATIVE 148

1NC VIOLATIONS 149

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1501NC DRONE SURVEILLANCE- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” VIOLATION 1511NC STINGRAY- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” VIOLATION 1531NC CRITICAL SECURITY- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” VIOLATION 155**CURTAIL ≠ ABOLISH 1561NC SECURITY LETTERS- CURTAIL ≠ ABOLISH 157

2NC/1NR/1NR BLOCKS 158

**2NC/1NR/1NR COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS 1592NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: REASONABILITY 160***”FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” VIOLATION 1612NC/1NR/2NR- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”- EXTENSIONS 1622NC/1NR/2NR- “ITS”- EXTENSIONS 163**2NC/1NR/1NR DRONE AFFIRMATIVE 1642NC/1NR DRONE AFFIRMATIVE- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”- OVERVIEW 1652NC/1NR DRONE AFFIRMATIVE- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”- VIOLATION 166**2NC/1NR/1NR STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE 167

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2NC/1NR DRONE AFFIRMATIVE- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”- OVERVIEW 1682NC/1NR STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”- VIOLATION 169**2NC/1NR/1NR CRITICAL SECURITY AFFIRMATIVE 1702NC/1NR CRITICAL SECURITY AFFIRMATIVE- OVERVIEW 1712NC/1NR CRITICAL SECURITY AFFIRMATIVE- EDUCATION DA 172***CURTAIL ≠ ABOLISH 173**2NC/1NR/1NR SECURITY LETTERS AFFIRMATIVE 1742NC/1NR SECURITY LETTERS- CURTAIL ≠ ABOLISH – OVERVIEW 1752NC/1NR SECURITY LETTERS- CURTAIL ≠ ABOLISH – INTERPRETATION EXTENSIONS 176

**TOPICALITY AFFIRMATIVE 177

**2AC BLOCKS 1782AC- DRONE AFFIRMATIVE- T “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” 1792AC- STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE- T “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” 1802AC- CRITICAL SECURITY- T “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” 1812AC SECURITY LETTERS 182

CRIME DISADVANTAGE 184

CRIME DA 1NC 185

CRIME DA 1NC 186CRIME DA 1NC 187CRIME DA 1NC 1882NC/1NR LINK EXTENSIONS: GENERAL 1892NC/1NR EXTENSIONS: NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS LINK 1902NC/1NR LINK EXTENSIONS - DRONE SURVEILLANCE 1922NC/1NR UNIQUENESS EXTENSIONS – CRIME LOW NOW 1942NC/1NR IMPACTS TURNS CASE - SURVEILLANCE 1962NC/1NR IMPACTS TURNS CASE – RACISM 1972NC/1NR IMPACTS – ECONOMY 1982NC/1NR IMPACT – POVERTY/STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE 202

CRIME DISADVANTAGE AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS 203 NON-UNIQUE: CRIME HIGH NOW 204NO LINK - SURVEILLANCE DOESN’T REDUCE CRIME 206ANSWERS TO: CRIME HURTS ECONOMY 208

TERRORISM DISADVANTAGE 210 2NC/1NR EXTENSIONS: NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS LINK 215

LINKS—DRONES 221

LINKS—GENERIC (2NC/1NR) 223

LINKS—MASS SURVEILLANCE 226

LINKS—PERCEPTION 227

2NC/1NR UNIQUENESS—SURVEILLANCE SOLVES TERROR NOW 228

2NC/1NR UNIQUENESS—TERROR RISK HI NOW 2305


2NC/1NR UNIQUENESS—SURVEILLANCE NOW 232

2NC/1NR EXTENSION: IMPACT (NUCLEAR TERRORISM) 235

IMPACT—TURNS THE AFF (RACISM) 237

IMPACT—TURNS THE AFF (CIVIL LIBERTIES) 239

IMPACT—TURNS THE AFF (ROLLBACK) 241

IMPACTS—BIOTERROREXTINCTION 243

IMPACTS—BIOTERROR RETALIATION 246

ANSWERS TO: SURVEILLANCE HASN’T STOPPED ANY ATTACKS 248

ANSWERS TO: BIOTERROR IMPOSSIBLE 250

ANSWERS TO: BIOTERROR UNLIKELY 252

ANSWERS TO: NO IMPACT TO BIOTERROR 254

TERRORISM DA AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS 255

AFF—ARAB AMERICAN TURN 256

AFF—SURVEILLANCE FAILS/NO LINK 257

AFF—NO IMPACT TO BIOTERROR 259

AFF—NON-UNIQUE: NO TERROR THREAT 261

AFF—LINK TURN: TARGETED SURVEILLANCE 263

AFF—NO LINK 265

AFF—LINK TURN: MASS SURVEILLANCE 267

AFF—NO IMPACT: NO BIOTERROR 269

**ELECTIONS DISADVANTAGE NEGATIVE 272

1NC HILLARY GOOD 273**UNIQUENESS- HILLARY GOOD 276UNIQUENESS- HILLARY GOOD- ANSWERS TO: BERNIE SANDERS 277UNIQUENESS- HILLARY GOOD- ANSWERS TO: TOO EARLY 2782NC/1NR- UNIQUENESS WALL- HILLARY GOOD 279**LINK- HILLARY GOOD 2812NC/1NR- LINK WALL- DRONE AFFIRMATIVE 2822NC/1NR- LINK WALL- STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE 2842NC/1NR- LINK WALL- SECURITY LETTERS AFFIRMATIVE 286**IMPACT- HILLARY GOOD 2872NC/1NR IMPACT- HILLARY GOOD- ANSWERS TO: HILLARY BAD- IRAN 2882NC/1NR IMPACT- HILLARY GOOD- ANSWERS TO: HILLARY BAD- ECONOMY 289

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**ELECTIONS DISADVANTAGE AFFIRMATIVE 290

**2AC BLOCKS 2912AC HILLARY GOOD- LINK TURN STRATEGY 2922AC HILLARY GOOD – IMPACT TURN STRATEGY 295**A2- HILLARY GOOD- NO LINK 2982AC HILLARY GOOD- DRONE AFFIRMATIVE- NO LINK 2992AC HILLARY GOOD- STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE- NO LINK 3002AC HILLARY GOOD- SECURITY LETTERS - NO LINK 301

**STATES COUNTERPLAN NEGATIVE 302

1NC STATES COUNTERPLAN 3032NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY- OVERVIEW 3042NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY- DRONE AFF 3052NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY- SECURITY LETTERS 3062NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY- STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE 3072NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- ANSWERS TO: PERMUTATION 3092NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- ANSWERS TO: FIFTY STATE FIAT BAD 310

**STATES COUNTERPLAN AFFIRMATIVE 311

2AC- STATES COUNTERPLAN 3122AC- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY DEFICIT- DRONE AFFIRMATIVE 3142AC- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY DEFICIT- SECURITY LETTERS AFFIRMATIVE 3152AC- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY DEFICIT- STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE 316

**CISA DISADVANTAGE NEGATIVE 317

1NC- CISA DISADVANTAGE 318**UNIQUENESS 3232NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- UNIQUENESS WALL 324**LINK 3262NC/1NR – CISA DISADVANTAGE- LINK WALL- DRONE AFFIRMATIVE 3272NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- LINK WALL- STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE 3292NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- LINK WALL- SECURITY LETTERS 331**INTERNAL LINK 3322NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- INTERNAL LINK- ANSWERS TO: NO SPILLOVER 333**IMPACT 3342NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- ANSWERS TO: ECONOMIC DECLINE /= WAR 3352NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- ANSWERS TO: CISA GOOD 336

**CISA DISADVANTAGE AFFIRMATIVE 338

2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- LINK TURN STRATEGY 3392AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- IMPACT TURN STRATEGY 3422AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- DRONE AFFIRMATIVE- NO LINK/LINK TURN 344

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*** Stingray Affirmative

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Stingray Affirmative Summary

The Stingray is an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) catcher. That is, it’s a device used for intercepting mobile phone traffic by acting as a fake “cell tower.” The Stingray specifically can use this functionality to:1. Obtain identifying information about a cell phone that can help facilitate wiretapping. 2. Locate a cell phone user3. Capture the content of communications like calls and text messages.4. Block service

The use of these devices has been criticized as a breach of privacy, as well as something that it is difficult to hold agencies accountable for. Federal agencies have denied FOIA requests related to the devices because of “nondisclosure agreements” with the corporation that creates them. They are also often used in secret and without obtaining any kind of warrant.

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Stingray 1AC—Inherency

Contention One is Inherency:

Federal law enforcement agencies use StingRay to search and seize cell phone data without court oversight. This type of surveillance is very intrusive, and unless we intervene, the government will continue to violate our rights.

ACLU 2014 (“StingRays: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won’t Tell You About” Online https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/StingRays_The_Most_Common_Surveillance_Tool_the_Govt_Won%27t_Tell_You_About.pdf)

Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have been using IMSI catchers to engage in dragnet searches and seizures of information from cell phones without disclosing this use to the courts or criminal defendants. By shrouding this technology in secrecy, the government has succeeded in deploying a highly intrusive form of surveillance. In cases

where the government may have used an IMSI catcher, vigorous advocacy is necessary to obtain full discovery and suppression of tainted evidence.

Unless criminal defense attorneys pursue these issues aggressively, the government will continue to write its own rules for conducting surveillance, without the benefit of court oversight or an adversarial process.

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Stingray 1AC—Plan

Plan: The FCC should decertify Stingray catcher devices for use in law enforcement.

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Stingray 1AC—Democracy Advantage

Contention Two is Harms - Stingray devices hurt democracy

Law enforcement agencies don’t only use StingRay to pursue suspects in criminal cases; the devices retrieve data from thousands of innocent civilians as well. This violates the Fourth Amendment and endangers democracy.

Fakhoury 2012 (Hanni Fakhoury for Electronic Frontier Foundation “StingRays: The Biggest Technological Threat to Cell Phone Privacy You Don’t Know About” October 22 Online https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/stingrays-biggest-unknown-technological-threat-cell-phone-privacy)

Beyond the government's conduct in this specific case, there is an even broader danger in law enforcement using these devices to locate suspects regardless of whether they explain the technology to judges: these devices allow the government to conduct broad searches amounting to “general warrants,” the exact type of search the Fourth Amendment was written to prevent.A Stingray—which could potentially be beamed into all the houses in one neighborhood looking for a particular signal—is the digital version of the pre-Revolutionary war practice of British soldiers going door-to-door, searching Americans’ homes without rationale or suspicion, let alone judicial approval. The Fourth Amendment was enacted to prevent these general fishing expeditions. As the Supreme Court has explained, a warrant requires probable cause for all places searched, and is supposed to detail the scope of the search to ensure “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant”.But if uninformed courts approve the unregulated use of Stingrays, they are essentially allowing the government to enter into the home via a cellular signal at law enforcement’s discretion and rummage at will without any supervision. The government can’t simply use technology to upend centuries of Constitutional law to conduct a search they would be prevented from doing physically.Stingrays Collect Data on Hundreds of Innocent PeopleAnd when police use a Stingray, it’s not just the suspects’ phone information the device sucks up, but all the innocent people around such suspect as well. Some devices have a range of “several kilometers,” meaning potentially thousands of people could have their privacy violated despite not being suspected of any crime. This is another fact the government didn’t fully explain to the magistrate judge in Rigmaiden.The government now claims it protected privacy by deleting all third-party data on its own after it collected it. But the government’s unilateral decision to binge and purge comes with its own consequences. Now there’s no way to know what exactly the government obtained when it used the device.Had the government told the court what it really was planning on doing and the amount of information it would obtain, the court may have exercised its constitutional role of ensuring the government narrowed its search. After all, it was for the court, not the government, to decide how best to balance the government’s need for information with third-party privacy, and any suspect’s future interest in access to potentially exculpatory information.

Constitutional violations like StingRay will create an unstoppable police state if they are not stopped.

Whitehead 2012 (John Whitehead for The Rutherford Institute “The Corporate Surveillance State: How the Thought Police Use Your Cell Phone to Track Your Every Move” Online https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/john_whiteheads_commentary/the_corporate_surveillance_state_how_the_thought_police_use_your_cell_)

Advanced technology now provides government agents and police officers with the ability to track our every move. The surveillance state is our new society. It is here, and it is spying on you, your family and your friends every day. Worse yet, those in control are using life’s little conveniences, namely cell phones, to do much of the spying. And worst of all, the corporations who produce these little conveniences are happy to hand your personal information over to the police so long as their profit margins increase. To put it simply, the corporate-surveillance state is in full effect, and there is nowhere to hide.Using the data transferred from, received by, and stored in your cell phone, police are now able to track your every move. Your

texts, web browsing, and geographic location are all up for grabs. Using “stingray” devices, often housed in mobile surveillance vans, federal agents track the cell phones of unsuspecting people. By triangulating the source of a cell phone signal, agents are able to track down the whereabouts of the person holding it. These surveillance sweeps target all cell phone signals, not just those of criminal suspects. Examples of extralegal police surveillance in the years since 9/11 are numerous, from the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program to the NYPD’s spy network that targeted Muslims in the New York area.Unfortunately, the now widespread tactic of spying on people via their cell phones resides in a legal grey area, which has allowed police agencies to take drastic steps to record the daily activity of all Americans. Whereas cell phone tracking once fell only in the purview of federal agents, local police departments, big and small, are beginning to engage in cell phone tracking with little to no oversight. Small police agencies are shelling out upwards of $244,000 to get the technology necessary to track cell phones. And as you might expect, most police departments have attempted to keep knowledge of their cell phone tracking programs secret, fearing (as they should) a public backlash.Federal courts are divided on the issue, some saying that a warrant is necessary before executing a cell phone search. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled that tracking the location of a cell phone without a warrant is legal and, thus, not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This lack of concern for the Fourth Amendment—which requires reasonable suspicion that you’re up to something illegal before the police conduct surveillance on you—is widely shared among the federal and state courts. In fact, courts issue tens of thousands of cell

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tracking orders a year, allowing police agencies to accurately pinpoint people’s locations within meters. Unless they’re charged with a crime, most people remain unaware that their cell data has been tracked.[…]On the rare occasion that a telecom corporation resists a police effort to spy on a particular cell phone customer, there are methods by which companies are coerced to comply with the data requests. Telecoms are frequently harassed by the FBI with National Security Letters (NSL), which are demands for user information without warrant or judicial oversight. These include a gag order, which prevents the recipient from discussing the demand with others, including the media. Roughly 300,000 of these NSLs have been sent out since 2000, implying a massive spying effort on the part of the federal government. One telecom is currently in a battle with the federal government over an NSL demanding user data. The telecom refused to abide by the NSL, and in response the federal government has sued the telecom, insisting that their refusal jeopardizes national security. The end logic of this is that our private data is actually not private. The federal government claims that knowing our personal information is critical to preserving national security, and thus neither telecoms nor users may resist the sharing of that information.Of course, corporations are just as interested in tracking people’s daily activities as the government. Cell phone companies and the software companies that create applications for their devices track your personal information so that they can market their services to you. Unfortunately, this leads to mass aggregation of user data which is then used by government agents to spy on and track all cell phone users. For example, Carrier IQ, a software company, and cell phone manufacturers HTC and Samsung are currently in the midst of a class-action lawsuit brought by Android phone users whose phone activities are recorded by a “rootkit,” a piece of software surreptitiously installed on cell phones that records the keystrokes of phone users. The FBI denied a December 2011 FOIA request to determine how the government was utilizing Carrier IQ’s software, as it could have an adverse impact on ongoing investigations. The agency’s refusal suggests that not only is Carrier IQ spying on cell phone users for their corporate purposes, but that federal agents are utilizing the software to conduct their own spying campaigns.Unfortunately, with intelligence gathering and surveillance doing booming business, and corporations rolling out technologies capable of filtering through vast reams of data, tapping into underseas communication cables, and blocking websites for entire countries, life as we know it will only get worse. As journalist Pratap Chatterjee has noted, “[T]hese tools have the potential to make computer cables as dangerous as police batons.” Telecoms hold on to user data, including text messages and

Internet browsing history, for months to years at a time. This, of course, has some ominous implications. For example, British researchers have created an algorithm that accurately predicts someone’s future whereabouts at a certain time based upon where she and her friends have been in the past.

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Stingray 1AC—Racial Profiling Advantage

Contention Three is Harms – Stingray devices are used for racial profiling

The government uses cell phone trackers like StingRay for racial profilingCalabrese and Fulton 2012 (Christopher Calabrese and Sandra Fulton for The Leadership Conference. “Privacy Rights: A 21st Century Update” Online http://www.civilrights.org/monitor/winter-2012/privacy-rights-a-21st.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/)

Despite the efforts of civil rights groups, the practice of racial profiling by members of law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels remains a widespread and pervasive problem affecting African-American, Muslim, Latino, and other communities.In August 2011, an Associated Press report revealed a massive surveillance department established within the New York Police Department (NYPD) after 9/11 to monitor Muslim neighborhoods and infiltrate their community organizations. According to officials involved, undercover officers were sent to investigate all parts of daily life in these communities including bookstores, bars, Internet cafes, and clubs looking for “hot spots” of “radicalization.” As part of a largely secret police program, they spied on and recorded the lives of innocent Americans without any evidence of wrongdoing.The NYPD has long viewed the Internet as dangerous territory. In a 2009 report it said:“The Internet plays an important role during the radicalization process…. The Internet becomes a virtual ’echo chamber’ – acting as a radicalization accelerant while creating the path for the ultimate stage of Jihadization. In the Jihadization phase, people challenge and encourage each other’s move to action. The Internet (sic) is now a tactical resource for obtaining instructions on constructing weapons, gathering information on potential targets, and providing spiritual justification for an attack.”It’s not known whether NYPD’s efforts to track Muslims involved government surveillance under ECPA because of the secrecy of the program. Assuming ECPA applied, however, there is no question that the outdated nature of ECPA’s protections would have allowed these activities to proceed with little transparency and judicial oversight.Additionally, recent studies have shown that minority communities use smart phones at a significantly higher rate than the rest of the population. At the same time, the sensitive information stored in these phones has become a hot commodity for law enforcement investigations. In just one year, Sprint Nextel provided law enforcement agencies with the specific whereabouts of its customer more than 8 million times without requiring a warrant or probable cause. The company even set up a website for law enforcement agents so they could access these records from the comfort of their desks. “The tool has just really caught on fire with law enforcement,” said Paul Taylor, Sprint’s manager of electronic surveillance, in 2009. The fact that Sprint needs to employ a person with the title “manager of electronic surveillance” may go a long way toward explaining why ECPA needs updating.[…]ConclusionThe Founding Fathers recognized that participants in a democracy need privacy for their “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” That remains as true today as ever. But privacy laws have not kept up as technology has changed the way Americans hold their personal information. Outdated laws allow law enforcement to circumvent the right to privacy, probe personal communications and track an individual’s whereabouts without any evidence of wrongdoing. In many circumstances, such a weak statutory scheme has a disproportionate impact on racial minorities and people who may hold unpopular beliefs. Updating privacy laws to require a warrant for access to sensitive personal information will ensure that police are following proper investigative guidelines and help to guard against profiling. It’s important to update ECPA in order to maintain the robust privacy protections all Americans expect and deserve.

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Stingray 1AC—Racial Profiling Advantage

Racial profiling destroys community and national security, wastes law enforcement resources, damages minority communities, and ruins counterterrorism efforts.

Calabrese and Fulton 2012 (Christopher Calabrese and Sandra Fulton for The Leadership Conference. “Privacy Rights: A 21st Century Update” Online http://www.civilrights.org/monitor/winter-2012/privacy-rights-a-21st.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/)Racial profiling forces individuals who have engaged in no wrongdoing to endure the burdens of law enforcement in order to prove their innocence. For each criminal, terrorist, or undocumented immigrant apprehended through racial profiling, many more lawabiding minorities are treated through profiling as if they are criminals, terrorists, or undocumented immigrants.[…] Texas State Judge Gillberto Hinajosa, the subject of immigration-related profiling on many occasions, has stated that Southern Texas "feels like occupied territory … It does not feel like we're in the United States of America."116 Such alienation is a common consequence of being profiled.Exposure to racial profiling has behavioral as well as emotional consequences. Many minorities who are entirely innocent of any wrongdoing choose to drive in certain automobiles and on certain routes, or to dress in certain clothes, to avoid drawing the attention of police who might otherwise profile and stop them.117 Or they choose to live in areas where they will not stand out as much, thereby reinforcing patterns of residential segregation.118An example of behavioral changes in an effort to avoid racial profiling in the counterterrorism context is provided by Khaled Saffuri. Saffuri, a Lebanese man living in Great Falls, Virginia, has said that he shaves closely and wears a suit when he flies, then remains silent during flights and avoids using the aircraft's bathroom. Sometimes he avoids flying altogether in favor of long drives to his destination.119Defenders of racial profiling argue that profiling is necessary and useful in the effort by law enforcement authorities to fight street-crime, combat terrorism, and enforce the nation's immigration laws. The opposite is true: racial profiling is in all contexts a flawed law enforcement tactic that may increase the number of people who are brought through the legal system, but that actually decreases the hit rate for catching criminals, terrorists, or undocumented immigrants. There are two primary reasons for this.To begin with, racial profiling is a tactic that diverts and misuses precious law enforcement resources. This became clear in 1998 when the U.S. Customs Service responded to a series of discrimination complaints by eliminating the use of race in its investigations and focusing solely on suspect behavior. A study found that this policy shift led to an almost 300 percent increase in the discovery of contraband or illegal activity.120Consider the inefficient allocation of scarce police resources in New Jersey when, as described in Chapter III (C) of this report local law enforcement authorities stopped tens of thousands of Hispanic motorists, pedestrians, passengers, and others in a six-month period. Just 1,417 of the tens of thousands stopped were ultimately charged with immigration offenses by the federal government.121Or, consider the April 2008 assault by more than 100 Maricopa County, Arizona deputies, a volunteer posse, and a helicopter on a small town of 6,000 Yaqui Indians and Hispanics outside of Phoenix, as described in Chapter III (C) above. After terrorizing the residents for two days, stopping residents and chasing them into their homes to conduct

background checks, Sheriff Joe Arpaio's operation resulted in the arrest of just nine undocumented immigrants.122Turning to the counterterrorism context, the use of racial profiling—

and the focus on the many Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and other South Asians who pose no threat to national security—diverts law enforcement resources away from investigations of individuals who have been linked to terrorist activity by specific and credible evidence.A memorandum circulated to U.S. law enforcement agents worldwide by a group of senior law enforcement officials in October 2002 makes clear that race is an ineffective measure of an individual's terrorist intentions. The memorandum, entitled "Assessing Behaviors," emphasized that focusing on the racial characteristics of individuals was a waste of law enforcement resources and might cause law enforcement officials to ignore suspicious behavior, past or present, by someone who did not fit a racial profile.123 One of the authors of the report noted: "Fundamentally, believing that you can achieve safety by looking at characteristics instead of behaviors is silly. If your goal is preventing attacks … you want your eyes and ears looking for preattack behaviors, not characteristics."124In sum, ending racial profiling will result in the more efficient deployment of law enforcement resources. As David Harris, a professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh Law School and a recognized expert on racial profiling, explained in his June 2010 testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee:[…]An additional reason why racial profiling is not an effective law enforcement tactic is that it destroys the relationship between local law enforcement authorities and the communities that they serve. This is particularly true with regard to the enforcement of federal immigration laws by local police under the 287(g) program and other ICE ACCESS programs.When local police function as rogue immigration agents, fear—as opposed to trust—is created in Hispanic and other immigrant communities. U.S. born children with parents who are either U.S. citizens or lawful residents may avoid coming in contact with police or other public officials (including school officials) out of concern that they, their parents, or family members will be targeted by local law enforcement authorities for a check of their immigration status. Victims of domestic violence who are immigrants may fear interacting with the police because of their immigration status, or the status of their families, or even their abusers, and the consequences of that fear can leave them

in dangerous and violent situations. Respect and trust between law enforcement authorities and immigrant communities are essential to successful police work.Racial profiling has a destructive impact on minority communities. How many community members will step up to be "Good Samaritans" and report crimes or accidents, or offer help to a victim until the police arrive, if the risk of doing the good deed is an interaction with a police officer that may result in a background check or challenge to immigration status? Perversely, the ultimate result of racial profiling in minority communities is precisely the opposite of the goal of effective local law enforcement. It is for this reason that many police executives and police organizations have expressed concern that the enforcement of the immigration laws by local law enforcement authorities has a

"negative overall impact on public safety."126The use of racial profiling in the counterterrorism context—as in the immigration context—

alienates the very people that federal authorities have deemed instrumental in the anti-terrorism figh t. Arab and Muslim communities may yield useful information to those fighting terrorism. Arabs and Arab Americans also offer the government an important source of Arabic speakers and translators. The singling out of Arabs and Muslims for investigation regardless of whether any credible evidence links them to terrorism simply alienates these individuals and compromises the anti-terrorism effort. In particular, to the extent that federal authorities use the anti-terrorism effort as a pretext for detaining or deporting immigration law violators, individuals who might have information that is useful in the fight against terrorism may be reluctant to come forward. For a special registration program such as NSEERS, those individuals will choose not to register, thereby defeating the very purpose of the program.127

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Stingray 1AC—Solvency

Contention Four is Solvency:

The FCC Can Withdraw the Authority for Police to Employ Stingray Technology Benson 2014 (Thor Benson, freelance writer. THE ATLANTIC “The Briefcases that Imitate Cell Phone Towers” http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/09/the-briefcases-that-imitate-cell-phone-towers/380678/

The ACLU, on the other hand, wants to know if local police departments are using Stingrays to monitor citizens in a way that they feel should not be allowed. “At the very least, the FCC should be reevaluating these grants of authority to Harris to make sure that they're actually appropriate, in light of the

actual effect,” Wessler told me. If the FCC investigated this possibility and found they were mislead in how the Stingray would be used by police, they could revoke the authorization for police departments using such technology. Whether it be the crimes against minorities committed by police departments, the unprecedented militarization of the police in the past decade or the police acting as appendages of the NSA, it's becoming clear that policies of police forces in the United States are broken. The ACLU and human rights groups around the country are pleading for more information on what these authorities are doing in their day-to-day work, but they are forced to file information requests that only result in being given parts of the greater picture. Instead of a few emails between Harris and the FCC, the ACLU wants a copy of the actual application that was sent. But for now, they are limited to what the government is willing to give them—a string of emails between Harris employees and the FCC regulators who reviewed Harris's application. And from what they can tell based on those emails, today’s use of Stingrays lies in sharp contrast with how they were approved.

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2AC Inherency—Stingray Now

New Stingray reforms have multiple loopholes and don’t apply to federal agents

Mint Press News, 2015 (http://www.mintpressnews.com/justice-departments-new-stingray-surveillance-policy-has-major-loophole/209338/, Sept 8)The new policy [PDF] states “law enforcement agencies must now obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause.” It proceeds to outline two exceptions: (1) “exigent circumstances” and (2) “exceptional circumstances where the law does not require a warrant.”The very existence of this categorical exception seems to entirely undermine the stated intention of the policy.Several examples of “exigent circumstances” are outlined as justifications for not getting a warrant—to protect human life or avert serious injury, to prevent imminent destruction destruction of evidence, to pursue a fleeing felon, to prevent the escape of a suspect or convicted fugitive.These are standard examples of situations, which have typically given law enforcement the authority to waive warrant requirements. Yet, in privacy law, there is no “exceptional circumstances where the law does not require a warrant” category of accepted exemptions to the Fourth Amendment.As the policy outlines, “There may also be other circumstances in which, although exigent circumstances do not exist, the law does not require a search warrant and circumstances make obtaining a search warrant impracticable.”The Justice Department claims “such cases” will be “very limited” but does not bother to provide a single example of a situation where human life would not be in danger, a fugitive would not be on the loose, evidence would be near destruction, but law enforcement would be in circumstances that would make not getting a warrant acceptable.Essentially, the Justice Department seeks to establish a “We Won’t Get a Warrant If We Don’t Feel Like It” loophole in government policy.Nate Freed Wessler, staff attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, asserted, “The guidance leaves the door open to warrantless use of Stingrays in undefined ‘exceptional circumstances,’ while permitting retention of innocent bystander data for up to 30 days in certain cases.”“The second exception listed in today’s policy for undefined ‘exceptional circumstances’ is potentially problematic,” EFF stated. “We have no idea what that means, so we’re waiting to see if and how the exception will be used.”Another problem with the new policy is that it does not apply to federal agents, who use Stingray surveillance in “national security” investigations.The policy applies only to state and local law enforcement agencies, which have partnered with federal agencies which are part of the Justice Department. State and local law enforcement could choose not to be partners and continue to follow their own rules for Stingray surveillance. It also is a policy, not law, which according to EFF means people have their privacy violated cannot seek a remedy if law enforcement abuses these guidelines.

Recent Department of Justice Stingray reforms don’t go nearly far enoughUS News and World Report, 2015

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/04/police-use-of-stingrays-that-gobble-phone-data-unaffected-by-new-federal-warrant-rule, Sept 4

The Justice Department is reining in federal agents’ use of cell-site simulators that collect in bulk information on cellphone users in a specific geographic area, but privacy advocates aren't satisfied with initial steps toward shielding location data of innocent Americans from warrantless collection.Federal and local officials' use of the devices, the best-known being Stingrays made by Harris Corp., is cloaked in secrecy, but appears often done without warrants and at times is concealed from courts, with police citing nondisclosure agreements they signed with the FBI.Now, the Justice Department announced Thursday, its employees and agents working under its umbrella in agencies such as the FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service and Drug Enforcement Agency, must generally get a warrant to use cell-site simulators.

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http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/04/police-use-of-stingrays-that-gobble-phone-data-unaffected-by-new-federal-warrant-rule


http://www.mintpressnews.com/justice-departments-new-stingray-surveillance-policy-has-major-loophole/209338/

http://www.mintpressnews.com/justice-departments-new-stingray-surveillance-policy-has-major-loophole/209338/


But the policy, which retains loopholes for exigent circumstances such as "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon" or to spare someone from death or serious injury and for "very limited" exceptional circumstances, isn’t as far-reaching as privacy advocates would like, and it doesn’t affect local law enforcement agencies when they are not working with federal authorities.

Department of Justice Stingray reforms have limited power – we need the Aff planUS News and World Report, 2015

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/04/police-use-of-stingrays-that-gobble-phone-data-unaffected-by-new-federal-warrant-rule, Sept 4

American Civil Liberties Union attorney Nathan Freed Wessler, one of the most prominent advocates of privacy protections against Stingray use, says the effect of the new policy on state and local authorities appears limited.

“Disturbingly," he said in a statement, "the policy does not apply to other federal agencies or the many state and local police departments that have received federal funds to purchase these devices."Justice Department spokesman Patrick Rodenbush confirms the rules do no constrain law enforcement when they are not working with the department's authorities

Recent Department of Justice policies on StingRay devices allow exceptions and don’t stop their use

Ars Technica, 2015 http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/09/fbi-dea-and-others-will-now-have-to-get-a-warrant-to-use-stingrays/, September 3

Civil liberties advocates generally applauded the DOJ’s move, but felt that more could be done."It’s a welcome and overdue first step, but it is just a first step," Linda Lye , an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California, told Ars. "It doesn’t cover non-DOJ entities and it doesn’t cover the locals."Earlier this year Washington State joined Virginia, Minnesota and Utah in imposing a warrant requirement at the state level.She also pointed out that the new policy grants a non-warrant exception for well-understood "exigent circumstances"—a situation Ars detailed recently—it also creates a new category of "exceptional circumstances."As the document states:There may also be other circumstances in which, although exigent circumstances do not exist, the law does not require a search warrant and circumstances make obtaining a search warrant impracticable. In such cases, which we expect to be very limited, agents must first obtain approval from executive-level personnel at the agency's headquarters and the relevant U.S. Attorney, and then from a Criminal Division [Deputy Assistant Attorney General]. The Criminal Division shall keep track of the number of times the use of a cell-site simulator is approved under this subsection, as well as the circumstances underlying each such use.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for example, would be able to continue using stingrays absent a warrant for now. However, Yates told reporters that DHS was working on its own policy, which is likely to be similar.

Nathan Freed Wessler , an ACLU attorney, noted that the new policy also does not include any sort of mandate that the states change their practices through its grant-issuing power. In many cases, state and local law enforcement obtain the surveillance tools through federal grant money."One thing that DOJ would have in its power to do, and DHS could do this, is to tie its grant funding to this policy," he said.

Warrantless Stingray surveillance is becoming more common in the status quo

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http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/09/fbi-dea-and-others-will-now-have-to-get-a-warrant-to-use-stingrays/





Klonick 2014 (Kate Klonik, lawyer and writer, currently a resident fellow at Yale Law School’s Information Society Project, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/stingrays_imsi_catchers_how_local_law_enforcement_uses_an_invasive_surveillance.html)

One of the tools making it possible for Chief Wiggum to gather all your deets is known colloquially as a Stingray, a

portable gadget about the size of a box of doughnuts. They’re also known as “cell-site simulators,” because, well, that’s exactly what they do: A Stingray mimics a cellphone tower and forces all nearby mobile phones or devices to connect to it. Every phone that connects to the Stingray reports its number, GPS location, and the numbers of all outgoing calls and texts. That’s every location and

outgoing call and text log of every phone within a certain radius—up to several kilometers—of the Stingray, and that’s all without a warrant. It’s probably not a huge surprise to most people in America today that the federal government has incredible surveillance technology that it uses occasionally on its own citizens. (Hi, NSA!) But polling shows that only 27 percent of people think that this technology is focused on them, and even if not, half of Americans surveyed say that there might be a margin of federal surveillance they’re willing to endure in the name of homeland security or fighting terrorism. But that logic is a much harder sell when it comes to local police, who have been acquiring Stingrays in increasing numbers. At least 46 state and local police departments, from Sunrise, Florida, to Hennepin, Minnesota, have gotten cell-site simulators, which range widely in price from

$16,000 to more than $125,000 a pop. And like the federal government, local police are using this technology without any judicial oversight. That means Barney Fife—or, if you’re looking for a more sinister example, think Denzel in Training Day—can walk into your neighborhood with a Stingray, fire it up, and collect all the numbers, GPS, and call logs of every cellphone in the area. If they’re looking for a specific number (hopefully, it’s not you), they can also use a Stingray to trick your phone into being a personal GPS tracker and then use that warrantless cellphone tracking to enter your home and arrest you—again without a warrant.

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2AC Democracy Advantage—Stingray Violates

StingRay capture data in an intrusive and unconstitutional manner; they should be banned for violating the Fourth Amendment.

ACLU 2014 (“StingRays: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won’t Tell You About” Online https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/StingRays_The_Most_Common_Surveillance_Tool_the_Govt_Won%27t_Tell_You_About.pdf)

Federal and state law enforcement entities across the country are using a powerful cell phone surveillance tool commonly referred to as a “StingRay.” These devices are capable of locating a cell phone with extraordinary precision, but to do so they operate in

dragnet fashion, scooping up information from a target device, as well as other wireless devices in the vicinity. In addition, these devices can be configured to capture the content of voice and data communications. Although the federal government has been using these devices since at least 1995, and use by state and local governments is quite widespread, there are only a handful of opinions addressing their use. At this juncture, few criminal defense attorneys are aware of these highly intrusive but extremely common surveillance tools. This is entirely understandable because the federal government has a policy of not disclosing information about this device. The government appears to be withholding information from criminal defendants. It even appears to be providing misleading information and making material omissions to judicial officers when it seeks purported court authorization to use this device – inaccurately referring to it as a “confidential source”

or calling it a different kind of device (like a pen register), and failing to alert courts to constitutionally material facts about the technology, such as the full breadth of

information it obtains from a suspect and its impact on third parties. As a result, courts are probably not aware that they are authorizing use of this device and have

not had an opportunity to rule on its legality, except in very rare instances.

The secrecy surrounding these devices is deeply troubling because this technology raises grave constitutional questions. There is a compelling argument that StingRays should never be used. Because they operate in dragnet fashion, they engage in the electronic equivalent of the “general searches” prohibited by the Fourth Amendment . But at

a minimum, law enforcement should obtain a warrant. Even in those instances when law enforcement obtains a warrant,however, there are likely strong arguments that the warrant is invalid.

StingRay technology violates Fourth Amendment rights

Infosec 2014 (Infosec Technology Institute “StingRay Technology: How the Government Tracks Cellular Devices” Online http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/stingray-technology-government-tracks-cellular-devices/)

StingRay technology raises serious privacy concerns because of the indiscriminate way it targets cellular devices in a specific area. The dragnet way in which StingRay operates appears to be in contrast with the principle of various laws worldwide. Government and law enforcement shouldn’t be able to access citizen’s private information without proving to a court order that must be issued

to support investigation activities.In the US, for example, the Fourth Amendment stands for the basic principle that the US government cannot conduct a massive surveillance operation, also indicated as “general searches”. The Supreme Court recently reiterated that principle in a case involving cell phone surveillance, and confirmed that law enforcement need a warrant to analyze data on the suspect’s cellphone.Organizations for the defense of civil liberties ask governments to provide warrants to use surveillance technologies like StingRay. The warrant still represents a reasonable mechanism for ensuring the right balance between the citizen’s privacy and law enforcement needs.Organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) highlighted the risks related to the indiscriminate collection of a so large amount of cellular data.“I don’t think that these devices should never be used, but at the same time, you should clearly be getting a warrant,” said Alan Butler of EPIC.Unfortunately, cases such as the one disclosed in this post suggest that governments are using StingRay equipment in secrecy. In some cases, a court order is issued for

specific activities, but law enforcement arbitrarily extends the use of technology in other contexts that may be menacing to citizens’ privacy.

Stingray surveillance violates Americans’ 4th Amendment privacy rights

Fakhoury 2012 (Hanni Fakhoury for Electronic Frontier Foundation “StingRays: The Biggest Technological Threat to Cell Phone Privacy You Don’t Know About” October 22 Online https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/stingrays-biggest-unknown-technological-threat-cell-phone-privacy)

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Beyond the government's conduct in this specific case, there is an even broader danger in law enforcement using these devices to locate suspects regardless of whether they explain the technology to judges: these devices allow the government to conduct broad searches amounting to “general warrants,” the exact type of search the Fourth Amendment was written to prevent. A Stingray—which could potentially be beamed into all the houses in one neighborhood looking for a particular signal—is the digital version of the pre-

Revolutionary war practice of British soldiers going door-to-door, searching Americans’ homes without rationale or suspicion, let alone judicial approval. The Fourth Amendment was enacted to prevent these general fishing expeditions. As the Supreme Court has explained, a warrant requires probable cause for all places searched, and is supposed to detail the scope of the search to ensure “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant”.But if uninformed courts approve the unregulated use of Stingrays, they are essentially allowing the government to enter into the home via a cellular signal at law enforcement’s discretion and rummage at will without any supervision. The government can’t simply use technology to upend centuries of Constitutional law to conduct a search they would be prevented from doing physically.Stingrays Collect Data on Hundreds of Innocent PeopleAnd when police use a Stingray, it’s not just the suspects’ phone information the device sucks up, but all the innocent people around such suspect as well. Some devices have a range of “several kilometers,” meaning potentially thousands of people could have their privacy violated despite not being suspected of any crime.

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2AC Democracy Advantage—Cops Lie

Cops purposefully mislead courts about their use of Stingray surveillance

Pell & Soghoian 2014 (Stephanie K. Pell and Christopher Soghoian, “YOUR SECRET STINGRAY’S NO SECRET ANYMORE: THE VANISHING GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER CELL PHONE SURVEILLANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND CONSUMER PRIVACY, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v28/28HarvJLTech1.pdf)

Despite the fact that U.S. government agencies have used cellular surveillance devices for more than twenty years , the

2012 Judge Owsley opinion is one of only two known published magistrate opinions to address law enforcement use of this technology. There are several possible reasons for this dearth of judicial analysis, but one of the most troubling possibilities may be a lack of knowledge on the part of magistrate judges about the specific surveillance technique(s) they are authorizing, due to a lack of candidly presented explanatory information in the government’s applications. In one set of DOJ emails obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) through a Freedom of Information Act request, for example, a federal prosecutor in Northern California noted that “many agents are still using [cellular surveillance technology with a] pen register application [that] does not make [the use of that technology] explicit.” Similarly, at a conference at Yale Law School in 2013, Judge Owsley indicated that federal agents may frequently obfuscate the planned use of a StingRay in authorization requests: “I may have seen them before and not realized what it was, because what they do is present an application that looks essentially like a pen register application . . . . So any magistrate judge that is typically looking at a lot of pen register applications and not paying a lot of attention to the details may be signing an application that is authorizing a Sting[R]ay.” In Tacoma, Washington, the local police have used StingRay surveillance devices since 2009 and insist that they only do so with approval from a judge. When asked about the police department’s statements in 2014, however, the presiding judge of the local Superior Court told a reporter that the StingRay equipment had not been mentioned in any warrant applications that he has seen. He also revealed that other judges in his court were similarly surprised to hear that the Tacoma police were using the technology, stating that “[the judges] had never heard of it.” That prosecutors have not made this information clear to judges often appears to be an intentional action. In the Rigmaiden case, for example, prosecutors conceded that the government had not made a “full disclosure to the magistrate judge [who issued the original order authorizing the surveillance] with respect to the nature and operation of the [StingRay] device [used to locate Rigmaiden].” The reason for that lack of candor, the DOJ later told the court, was “because of the sensitive nature of the device in terms of concerns out of the disclosure to third parties.” Likewise, two notable events in Florida suggest an intentional effort by local law enforcement in that state to protect details about the use and functions of cellular surveillance technology. In a 2008 state case, police in Tallahassee used a StingRay to locate a victim’s stolen phone in the defendant’s apartment. The police later revealed that they “did not want to obtain a search warrant because they did not want to reveal information about the technology they used to track the cell phone signal.” In addition, an investigator with the technical operations unit of the Tallahassee Police Department testified: “[W]e prefer that alternate legal methods be used, so that we do not have to rely upon the equipment to establish probable cause, [in order to avoid] reveal[ing] the nature [of the surveillance] and methods [used].” In Sarasota, police have enacted a policy of describing StingRay derived intelligence in depositions and reports as “‘information from a confidential source regarding the location of the suspect . . . .’” According to emails obtained by the ACLU, this policy, which was requested by the U.S. Marshals, is intended to shield information about the StingRay “so that [law enforcement] may continue to utilize this technology without the knowledge of

the criminal element.” Even if the aim of this policy is to keep the general public in the dark, by including misleading information in court documents, the police are also preventing the courts from having a true understanding of the electronic surveillance that is being conducted under their watch.

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2AC Democracy Advantage—Privacy Key to Democracy

Stingrays destroy the privacy rights that are a necessary ingredient of effective democracy

McFarland, 2012 (Michael McFarland, S.J., a computer scientist with extensive liberal arts teaching experience and a special interest in the intersection of technology and ethics, served as the 31st president of the College of the Holy Cross. http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/technology/internet/privacy/why-care-about-privacy.html)

Therefore privacy, as protection from excessive scrutiny, is necessary if individuals are to be free to be themselves. Everyone needs some room to break social norms, to engage in small "permissible deviations" that help define a person's individuality. People need to be able to think outrageous thoughts, make scandalous statements and pick their noses once in a while. They need to be able to behave in ways that are not dictated to them by the surrounding society. If every appearance, action, word and thought of theirs is captured and posted on a social network visible to the rest of the world, they lose that freedom to be themselves. As Brian Stelter wrote in the New York Times on the loss of anonymity in today's online world, "The collective intelligence of the Internet's two billion users, and the digital fingerprints that so many users leave on Web sites, combine to make it more and more likely that every embarrassing video, every intimate photo, and every indelicate e-mail is attributed to its source, whether that source wants it to be or not. This intelligence makes the public sphere more public than ever before and sometimes forces personal lives into public view." 12

This ability to develop one's unique individuality is especially important in a democracy, which values and depends on creativity, nonconformism and the free interchange of diverse ideas. That is where a democracy gets its vitality. Thus, as Westin has observed, " Just as a social balance favoring disclosure and surveillance over privacy is a functional necessity for totalitarian systems, so a

balance that ensures strong citadels of individual and group privacy and limits both disclosure and surveillance is a prerequisite for liberal democratic societies. The democratic society relies on publicity as a control over government, and on privacy as a shield for group and individual life." When Brandeis and Warren wrote their seminal article on privacy over one hundred years ago, their primary concern was with the social pressure caused by excessive exposure to public scrutiny of the private affairs of individuals. The problem for them was the popular press, which represented the "monolithic, impersonal and value-free forces of modern society," 14 undermining the traditional values of rural society, which had been nurtured and protected by local institutions such as family, church and other associations. The exposure of the affairs of the well-bred to the curiosity of the masses, Brandeis and Warren feared, had a leveling effect which undermined what was noble and virtuous in society, replacing it with the base and the trivial. Even apparently harmless gossip, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people. When personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space available for matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance.... Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence. For Brandeis and Warren, privacy was a means of protecting the freedom of the virtuous to maintain their values against the corrupting influence of the mass media that catered to people's basest instincts. Although the degrading effect of the mass media is still a problem, today a more serious threat to freedom comes from governments and other large institutions. Over the last century, governments have developed sophisticated methods of surveillance as a means of controlling their subjects.

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2AC Racial Profiling Advantage—Stingray Profiles

Modern surveillance, including StingRay, is used to discriminate against and segregate minorities and repress dissidence. It is a part of a larger structure of racial injustice in America, and must be fought against.

Cyril 2015 (Malika Amala Cyril for The Progressive. “Black America’s State of Surveillance” Online http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-state-surveillance)

It’s time for journalists to tell a new story that does not start the clock when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to understand that data has historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually maintain an impoverished underclass . I n an era of big data, the Internet has increased the speed and secrecy of data collection. Thanks to new surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies are now able to collect massive amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections and policies have not caught up to this technological advance. Concerned advocates see mass surveillance as the problem and protecting privacy as the goal. Targeted surveillance is an obvious answer—it may be discriminatory, but it helps protect the privacy perceived as an earned privilege of the inherently innocent.The trouble is, targeted surveillance frequently includes the indiscriminate collection of the private data of people targeted by race but not involved in any crime. […] In a racially discriminatory criminal justice system, surveillance technologies reproduce injustice. Instead of reducing discrimination, predictive policing is a face of what author Michelle Alexander calls the “New Jim Crow”—a de facto system of separate and unequal application of laws, police practices, conviction rates, sentencing terms, and conditions of confinement that operate more as a system of social control by racial hierarchy than as crime prevention or punishment. In New York City, the predictive policing approach in use is “Broken Windows.” This approach to policing places an undue focus on quality of life crimes—like selling loose cigarettes, the kind of offense for which Eric Garner was choked to death. Without oversight, accountability, transparency, or rights, predictive policing is just high-tech racial profiling—indiscriminate data collection that drives discriminatory policing practices.As local law enforcement agencies increasingly adopt surveillance technologies, they use them in three primary ways: to listen in on specific conversations on and offline; to observe daily movements of individuals and groups; and to observe data trends. Police departments like Bratton’s aim to use sophisticated technologies to do all three.They will use technologies like license plate readers, which the Electronic Frontier Foundation found to be disproportionately used in communities of color and communities in the process of being gentrified. They will use facial recognition, biometric scanning software, which the FBI has now rolled out as a national system, to be adopted by local police departments for any criminal justice purpose.They intend to use body and dashboard cameras, which have been touted as an effective step toward accountability based on the results of one study, yet storage and archiving procedures, among many

other issues, remain unclear.They will use Stingray cellphone interceptors. According to the ACLU, Stingray technology is an invasive cellphone surveillance device that mimics cellphone towers and sends out signals to trick cellphones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information. When used to track a suspect’s cellphone, they also gather information about the phones of countless bystanders who happen to be nearby.The same is true of domestic drones, which are in increasing use by U.S. law enforcement to conduct routine aerial surveillance. While drones are currently unarmed, drone manufacturers are considering arming these remote-controlled aircraft with weapons like rubber bullets, tasers, and tear gas.They will use fusion centers. Originally designed to increase interagency collaboration for the purposes of counterterrorism, these have instead become the local arm of the intelligence community. According to Electronic Frontier Foundation, there are currently seventy-eight on record. They are the clearinghouse for increasingly used “suspicious activity reports”—described as “official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.” These reports and other collected data are often stored in massive databases like e-Verify and Prism. As anybody who’s ever dealt with gang databases knows, it’s almost impossible to get off a federal or state database, even when the data collected is incorrect or no longer true.Predictive policing doesn’t just lead to racial and religious profiling—it relies on it. Just as stop and frisk legitimized an initial, unwarranted contact between police and people of color,

almost 90 percent of whom turn out to be innocent of any crime, suspicious activities reporting and the dragnet approach of fusion centers target communities of color. One review of such reports collected in Los Angeles shows approximately 75 percent were of people of color.This is the future of policing in America, and it should terrify you as much as it terrifies me. Unfortunately, it probably doesn’t, because my life is at far greater risk than the lives of white Americans, especially those reporting on the issue in the media or advocating in the halls of power.One of the most terrifying aspects of high-tech surveillance is the invisibility of those it disproportionately impacts.The NSA and FBI have engaged local law enforcement agencies and electronic surveillance technologies to spy on Muslims living in the United States. […].But by far, the widest net is cast over black communities. Black people alone represent 40 percent of those incarcerated. More black men are incarcerated than were held in slavery in 1850,

on the eve of the Civil War. Lest some misinterpret that statistic as evidence of greater criminality, a 2012 study confirms that black defendants are at least 30 percent more likely to be imprisoned than whites for the same crime.This is not a broken system, it is a system working perfectly as intended, to the detriment of all. The NSA could not have spied on millions of cellphones if it were not already spying on black people, Muslims, and migrants.As surveillance technologies are increasingly adopted and integrated by law enforcement agencies today, racial disparities are being made invisible by a media environment that has failed to tell the story of surveillance in the context of structural racism.Reporters love to tell the technology story. For some, it’s a sexier read. To me, freedom from repression and racism is far sexier than the newest gadget used to reinforce racial hierarchy. As civil rights protections catch up with the technological terrain, reporting needs to catch up, too. Many journalists still focus their reporting on the technological trends and not the racial hierarchies that these trends are enforcing. Martin Luther King Jr. once said, “Everything we see is a shadow cast by that which we do not see.” Journalists have an obligation to tell the stories that are hidden from view.We are living in an incredible time, when migrant activists have blocked deportation buses, and a movement for black lives has emerged, and when women, queer, and trans experiences have been placed right at the center. The decentralized power of the Internet makes that possible.But the Internet also makes possible the high-tech surveillance that threatens to drive structural racism in the twenty-first century. We can help black lives matter by ensuring that

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technology is not used to cement a racial hierarchy that leaves too many people like me dead or in jail. Our communities need partners, not gatekeepers.

2AC Racial Profiling Advantage—Impacts

We have a moral obligation to stop racial profiling- it is dehumanizing and prevents justice from being served.

U.S. DOJ 2003 (Department of Justice “Fact Sheet on Racial Profiling” Online http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf)

Racial profiling sends the dehumanizing message to our citizens that they are judged by the colorof their skin and harms the criminal justice system by eviscerating the trust that is necessary if lawenforcement is to effectively protect our communities . America Has a Moral Obligation to Prohibit Racial Profiling . Race-based assumptions in law enforcement perpetuate negative racial stereotypes that are harmful to our diverse democracy, and materially impair our efforts to maintain a fair and just society . As Attorney General John Ashcroft said, racial profiling creates a "lose-lose" situation because it destroys the potential for underlying trust that "should support the administration of justice as a societal objective, not just as a law enforcement objective." The Overwhelming Majority of Federal Law Enforcement Officers Perform Their Jobs with Dedication, Fairness and Honor, But Any Instance of Racial Profiling by a Few Damages Our Criminal Justice System . The vast majority of federal law enforcementofficers are hard-working public servants who perform a dangerous job with dedication,fairness and honor. However, when law enforcement practices are perceived to be biased or unfair, the general public, and especially minority communities, are less willing to trust and confide in officers, report crimes, be witnesses at trials, or serve on juries. Racial Profiling Is Discrimination, and It Taints the Entire Criminal Justice System .Racial profiling rests on the erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in misconduct than any particular individual of other races orethnicities.

Racial profiling destroys community trust in police, which is essential to public safety.

Natarajan 2014 (Ranjana Natarajan for Washington Post “Racial Profiling Has Destroyed Public Trust In Police” Online http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/15/racial-profiling-has-destroyed-public-trust-in-police-cops-are-exploiting-our-weak-laws-against-it/)

Profiling undermines public safety and strains police-community trust. When law enforcement officers target residents based on race, religion or national origin rather than behavior, crime-fighting is less effective and community distrust of police grows. A study of the Los Angeles Police Department showed that minority communities that had been unfairly targeted in the past continue to experience greater mistrust and fear of police officers. To root out this ineffective tactic that undermines public confidence, we need stronger policies against racial profiling at all levels — from local to federal — as well as more effective training and oversight of police officers, and systems of accountability.

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http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf

http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf


2AC Solvency—FCC Good

The FCC has technical expertise in regulating telecommunications networks to protect privacy

Genachowski 2011 (Julius Genachowski, FCC commissioner. Testimony: INTERNET PRIVACY: THE VIEWS OF THE FTC, THE FCC, AND NTIA JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND TRADE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 7/14/11. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72908/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72908.pdf)

Now, technology can and must be part of the solution. I continue to encourage industry to take this very seriously, to use its expertise to empower

consumers, provide transparency, and protect data. And as the government’s expert agency on broadband and communications networks with a long history of taking commonsense steps to protect consumer privacy, the FCC has an important role to play going forward. Our network-focused privacy and data security rules are settled and legally tested.

FCC Chair Tom Wheeler is willing to defy the interests of the industries the FCC regulates

Reardon 2015 (Marguerite Reardon, CNET News reporter, “Net Fix: Why FCC's Wheeler is 'defying the greatest lobbyists in the world', http://www.cnet.com/news/why-fccs-wheeler-is-defying-the-greatest-lobbyists-in-the-world/)

Net neutrality advocates, initially wary of Wheeler because of his past association with the industries he regulates, now applaud his leadership. Reed Hastings, CEO of the Netflix video-streaming service, likens Wheeler's stance to the one taken by business mogul Joseph Kennedy Sr. in 1934, when he was tasked with regulating Wall Street for the first time as chairman of the newly

formed Securities and Exchange Commission. "Chairman Wheeler is on the edge of making history by defying the greatest lobbyists in the world -- from the telco and cable industry -- to secure an open and fast Internet for all Americans," Hastings said. "You have to go back to Joseph Kennedy Sr. running the SEC to find as surprising and courageous an example of policy leadership given the person's prior background." The once-powerful advocate for the cable and wireless companies has rocked his former employers on their heels.

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2AC Answers to: FCC Can’t Decertify

They have everything they need—corporate lies in emails give FCC ability to decertifyArs Technica, 2014 “New e-mail shows “stingray” maker may have lied to FCC back in 2010,” September 17th, 2014 (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/09/new-e-mail-shows-stingray-maker-may-have-lied-to-fcc-back-in-2010/)

A newly published e-mail from 2010 shows that Harris Corporation, one of the best-known makers of cellular surveillance systems, told the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that its purpose "is only to provide state/local law enforcement officials with authority to utilize this equipment in emergency situations."That e-mail was among 27 pages of e-mails that were part of the company’s application to get FCC authorization to sell the device in the United States. Neither the FCC nor Harris Corporation immediately responded to Ars’ request for comment, and Harris traditionally stays mum on its operations."We do not comment on solutions we may or may not provide to classified Department of Defense or law enforcement agencies," Jim Burke, a spokesman for Harris, told Ars last month.If Harris has misrepresented how the devices are used as part of law enforcement operations, then it would mark another controversial moment in the company's shrouded history . In recent months, more information has come out about how stingrays have been used in violent crime investigations, including instances where cops have lied to courts about the use of such technology.Relatively little is known about how stingrays are precisely used by law enforcement agencies nationwide, although documents have surfaced showing how they have been purchased and used in some limited instances. Last year, Ars reported on leaked documents showing the existence of a body-worn stingray. In 2010, Kristin Paget famously demonstrated a homemade device built for just $1,500.Fightin' wordsIn a five-page letter by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler, the group indicated that Harris has not been totally honest with the agency as to how the then "Sting Fish," and presumably subsequent devices like the newer StingRay, TriggerFish, and HailStorm, were to be used by American law enforcement. While StingRay is a trademark of Harris, stingray has come to be known as the generic term that describes all such devices."Contrary to Harris’ claim, we now know—and Harris should have also been well-aware at the time—that state and local law enforcement agencies were using devices in the StingRay line of surveillance products for purposes other than emergency situations long before 2010, and continued to do so after," the letter states. "To the extent the Commission relied on this representation in the authorization and licensing process, its reliance is misplaced since the representation is clearly inaccurate."

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http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/how-florida-cops-went-door-to-door-with-fake-cell-device-to-find-one-man/

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/how-florida-cops-went-door-to-door-with-fake-cell-device-to-find-one-man/

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1302288-aclu-to-fcc-harris.html

http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9179959/Hacker_snoops_on_GSM_cell_phones_in_demo

http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/the-body-worn-imsi-catcher-for-all-your-covert-phone-snooping-needs/

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/meet-the-machines-that-steal-your-phones-data/

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/legal-experts-cops-lying-about-cell-tracking-is-a-stupid-thing-to-do/

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/legal-experts-cops-lying-about-cell-tracking-is-a-stupid-thing-to-do/

https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/documents-suggest-maker-controversial-surveillance-tool-misled-fcc


2AC Answers to: Terror Disadvantage

Most terrorist plots are foiled by traditional law enforcement methods, not cell phone tracking.

Bergen and Sterman 2013 (Peter Bergen and David Sterman for CNN “Did NSA Spying Prevent ‘Dozens’ of Terrorist Attacks?” Online http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/17/opinion/bergen-nsa-spying/)

On Thursday, Sens. Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, Democrats who both serve on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and have access to the nation's most sensitive secrets, released a statement contradicting this assertion. "Gen. Alexander's testimony yesterday suggested that the NSA's bulk phone records collection program helped thwart 'dozens' of terrorist attacks, but all of the plots that he mentioned appear to have been identified using other collection methods," the two senators said.Indeed, a survey of court documents and media accounts of all the jihadist terrorist plots in the United States since 9/11 by the New America Foundation shows that traditional law enforcement methods have overwhelmingly played the most significant role in foiling terrorist attacks .This suggests that the NSA surveillance programs are wide-ranging fishing expeditions with little to show for them.Alexander promised during his congressional testimony that during this coming week more information would be forthcoming about how the NSA surveillance programs have prevented many attacks.A U.S. intelligence document provided to CNN by a congressional source over the weekend asserts that the dragnetof U.S. phone data and Internet information from overseas users "has contributed to the disruption of dozens of potential terrorist plots here

in the homeland and in more than 20 countries around the world."The public record, which is quite rich when it comes to jihadist terrorism cases, suggests that the NSA surveillance yielded little of major value to prevent numerous attacks in the United States, but government officials may be able to point to a number of attacks that were averted overseas.That may not do much to dampen down the political firestorm that has gathered around the NSA surveillance programs. After all, these have been justified because they have supposedly helped to keep Americans safe at home.Homegrown jihadist extremists have mounted 42 plots to conduct attacks within the United States since 2001. Of those plots, nine involved an actual terrorist act that was not prevented by any type of government action, such as the failed attempt by Faisal Shahzad to blow up a car bomb in Times Square on May 1, 2010.Of the remaining 33 plots, the public record shows that at least 29 were uncovered by traditional law enforcement methods, such as the use of informants, reliance on community tips about suspicious activity and other standard policing practices.

Mass data collection like what StingRay is capable of does not keep us safe

Levinson-Waldman 2013 (Rachel Levinson-Waldman for New Republic “Against Our Values – And Bad at Keeping Us Safe” Online http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113416/nsa-spying-scandal-data-mining-isnt-good-keeping-us-safe)There are, needless to say, significant privacy and civil-liberties concerns here. But there’s another major problem, too:

This kind of dragnet-style data capture simply doesn’t keep us safe.First, intelligence and law enforcement agencies are increasingly drowning in data; the more that comes in, the harder it is to stay afloat. Most recently, the failure of the intelligence community to intercept the 2009 “underwear bomber” was blamed in large part on a surfeit of information: according to an official White House review , a significant amount of critical information was “embedded in a large volume of other data.” Similarly, the independent investigation of the alleged shootings by U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood concluded that the “crushing volume” of information was one of the factors that hampered the FBI’s analysis before the attack.Multiple security officials have echoed this assessment. As one veteran CIA agenttold The Washington Post in 2010, “The problem is that the system is clogged with information. Most of it isn't of interest, but people are afraid not to put it in.” A former Department of Homeland Security official told a Senate subcommittee that there was “a lot of data clogging the system with no value.” Even former Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that “we’ve built tremendous capability, but do we have more than we need?” And the NSA itself was brought to a grinding halt before 9/11 by the “torrent of data” pouring into the system, leaving the agency “brain-dead” for half a week and “[unable] to process information,” as its then-director Gen. Michael Hayden publicly acknowledged.

Big data collection and mass surveillance will only make it harder for us to prevent crime and other disasters; it is near impossible for law enforcement to effectively sort through the data.

WashingtonsBlog 2015 (“NSA Admits It Collects Too Much Information to Stop Terrorist Attacks” Online http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2015/05/nsa-admits-it-collects-too-much-info-to-stop-terror-attacks.html)

Top security experts agree that mass surveillance is ineffective … and actually makes us MORE vulnerable to terrorism.For example, the former head of the NSA’s global intelligence gathering operations – Bill Binney – says that the mass surveillance INTERFERES with the government’s ability to catch bad guys, and that the government failed to stop 9/11, the Boston Bombing, the Texas shootings and other terror attacks is because it was overwhelmed with data from mass surveillance on Americans.Binney told Washington’s Blog:A good deal of the failure is, in my opinion, due to bulk data. So, I am calling all these attacks a result of “Data bulk failure.” Too much data and too many people for the 10-20 thousand analysts to follow. Simple as that. Especially when they make word match pulls (like Google) and get dumps of data selected from close to 4 billion people.This is the same problem NSA had before 9/11. They had data that could have prevented 9/11 but did not know they had it in their data bases. This back then when the bulk collection was not going on. Now the problem is orders of magnitude greater. Result, it’s harder to succeed.Expect more of the same from our deluded government that thinks more data improves possibilities of success. All this bulk data collection and storage does give law enforcement a great capability to retroactively analyze anyone they want. But, of course,that data cannot be used in court since it was not acquired with a warrant.Binney and other high-level NSA whistleblowers noted last year:On December 26, for example, The Wall Street Journal published a lengthy front-page article, quoting NSA’s former Senior

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http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/06/15/intelligence-community-provides-fuller-justification-for-data-collection/

http://www.economist.com/node/15557507

http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control

http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/investigative-report-criticizes-counterterrorism-reporting-waste-at-state-and-local-intelligence-fusion-centers

http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-01-06/opinions/36805490_1_cia-base-cia-veteran-agency-officers

http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113416/nsa-spying-scandal-data-mining-isnt-good-keeping-us-safe#_top

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/summary_of_wh_review_12-25-09.pdf

http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/10/05/new.york.terror.plot/index.html

http://homegrown.newamerica.net/

http://homegrown.newamerica.net/

http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/udall-wyden-call-on-national-security-agency-director-to-clarify-comments-on-effectiveness-of-phone-data-collection-program


Technical Director William Binney (undersigned) and former chief of NSA’s SIGINT Automation Research Center Edward Loomis (undersigned) warning that NSA is drowning in useless data lacking adequate privacy provisions, to the point where it cannot conduct effective terrorist-related surveillance and analysis.A recently disclosed internal NSA briefing document corroborates the drowning, with the embarrassing admission, in bureaucratize, that NSA collection has been “outpacing” NSA’s ability to ingest, process, and store data – let alone analyze the take.Indeed, the pro-spying NSA chief and NSA technicians admitted that the NSA was drowning in too much data 3 months before 9/11:In an interview, Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, the NSA’s

director … suggested that access isn’t the problem. Rather, he said, the sheer volume and variety of today’s communications means “there’s simply too much out there, and it’s too hard to understand.

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2AC Answers to Crime Disadvantage

Not only are they used to spy on innocent civilians, StingRay devices allow actual criminals to walk free- law enforcement has been releasing criminals to avoid disclosing secrets about StingRay because of non-disclosure agreements. Banning StingRay devices would allow law enforcement to do their jobs without compromising citizen privacy or safety.

Upriser 2014 (“FBI Lets Criminals Walk to Avoid Revealing This Secret Cell Phone Spying System Used by All Police” Online http://upriser.com/posts/the-fbi-choosing-to-let-criminals-free-rather-than-reveal-stingray-secrets)

FBI just let another criminal walk rather than give details of their cell phone spying system "Stingray" -- a system is used by

local police, shockingly to locate and spy on criminal suspects all over the United States. However, they would apparently rather let suspects go free than reveal in court the details of the high tech tracker. This device, called a "Stingray," tricks cell phones into revealing their locations. Closely guarded details about how police Stingrays operate have been threatened this week by a judge's court order. The federal government has been using these devices since at least 1995. Judge Patrick H. NeMoyer in Buffalo, New York, described a 2012 deal between the FBI and the Erie County Sheriff's Office in his court order Tuesday. The judge, who reviewed the deal, said the FBI instructed the police to drop criminal charges instead of revealing "any information concerning the cell site simulator or its use." Erie police had long tried to keep that contract secret, but the judge rejected that idea and ordered that details of the Stingrays be made public. "If that is not an instruction that affects the public, nothing is," NeMoyer wrote. The judge's order also noted that Erie police had used Stingrays to track down several criminal suspects, a suicidal person and four missing people, including an 87-year-old with dementia. Police spokesman Scott Zylka said they're now working with the FBI to appeal the judge's decision and keep the FBI agreement secret. ACLU is demanding details about Stingray use under public records laws. Few people know Stingrays even exist — or that federal agents and police across the country are increasingly using them to arrest people. It's a small device that mimics a cell phone tower, duping nearby cell phones into connecting to it rather than a real phone company tower. There's a growing privacy concern because while police use the Stingrays to track down an individual, they can potentially grab text messages and phone call data on thousands of innocent people. In November, we learned that federal agents regularly fly planes nationwide that spy on Americans' phone calls. We also know police in at least 20 states use Stingrays, according to public records obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union. But everything else is a mystery because police agencies have non-disclosure agreements with the maker of Stingrays: the Harris Corporation based in Melbourne, Florida. They

also have similar hush-hush contracts with the FBI. There have been several examples of prosecutors dropping charges to keep quiet about Stingrays. Late last year, Tallahassee police gave a sweet plea deal to a pot dealer who robbed someone with a BB gun. A felony charge with a four-year prison sentence became a misdemeanor with six-months' probation because his defense attorney discovered police used a Stingray to locate him. Hanni Fakhoury, an attorney with the pro-privacy Electronic Frontier Foundation, said Tuesday's court order was the first time it became clear that the use of Stingrays is a nationwide tactic. "We've long suspected that's the policy, but now we know," he said. "It's crazy on a billion legal levels." The lead ACLU attorney on this case, Mariko Hirose, described Stingrays as military grade equipment that has no place being used on unsuspecting American citizens. She also said that the FBI's tactic to stay quiet about Stingrays makes little sense. Erie County spent more than $350,000 to buy two Stingray devices and related training and equipment. "Why are municipalities spending so much money when they might have to drop the charges in the name of secrecy?" she asked. All of this raises the interesting question of won't all criminal lawyers now demand Stingray records on their client as a matter of course? The ACLU put out a pamphlet for defense attorneys for exactly this reason. It seems that if the authorities are obtaining their evidence illegally, then it should be challenged. Another very interesting detail about StingRays also recently came to light. Stingrays make it temporarily impossible for anyone nearby to make a cell phone call. “Its use has the potential to intermittently disrupt cellular service to a small fraction of Sprint's wireless customers within its immediate vicinity,” FBI Special Agent Michael Scimeca wrote in his explanation about the StingRay's capability to a judge. “Any potential service disruption will be brief and minimized by reasonably limiting the scope and duration of the use of the Mobile Equipment.” Until now, authorities have maintained that the StingRay doesn't intercept 911 emergency calls. Yet this disclosure raises the notion that the StingRay prohibits other emergency calls in favor of investigations ranging from murder to minor theft. Additionally, the surveillance device also jams 3G and 4G networks. “Depending on how long the jamming is taking place, there's going to be disruption,” ACLU chief technologist Chris Soghoian told Wired magazine. “When your phone goes down to 2G, your data just goes to hell. So at the very least you will have disruption of Internet connectivity. And if and when the phones are using the StingRay as their only tower, there will likely be an inability to receive or make calls.”

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*** Stingray Negative

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1NC ANSWERS TO: Inherency—Status Quo Solves

The Department of Justice now requires warrants for use of Stingray devices

Ars Technica, 2015 http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/09/fbi-dea-and-others-will-now-have-to-get-a-warrant-to-use-stingrays/, September 3

The Department of Justice (DOJ) announced sweeping new rules Thursday concerning the use of cell-site simulators, often called stingrays, mandating that federal agents must now obtain a warrant in most circumstances.

The policy, which takes effect immediately, applies to its agencies, including the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the United States Marshals Service, among others.

"Cell-site simulator technology has been instrumental in aiding law enforcement in a broad array of investigations, including kidnappings, fugitive investigations and complicated narcotics cases," Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates said in a statement. "This new policy ensures our protocols for this technology are consistent, well-managed and respectful of individuals’ privacy and civil liberties."

The move comes after federal agencies, most notably the FBI, have tried to tightly control information about stingrays for years. The FBI and the Harris Corporation, one of the primary manufacturers of the devices, have refused to answer specifics questions from Ars.Not only can stingrays be used to determine location by spoofing a cell tower, but they can also be used to intercept calls and text messages. Once deployed, the devices intercept data from a target phone as well as information from other phones within the vicinity. For years, federal and local law enforcement have tried to keep their existence a secret while simultaneously upgrading their capabilities. Over the last year, as the devices have come under increased scrutiny, new information about the secretive devices has come to light.

Ars has previously reported that while stingrays have been used at the local level for serious violent crimes, they have also been used to investigate ATM robberies, and 911 hangups.In 2015, federal authorities have shown a willingness to open up a little about the technology, although the FBI declared in January that it has a right to use the devices in public without a warrant.Moving forward

In addition to imposing a new warrant requirement, the new seven-page document also requires that DOJ officials are to delete data of non-target phones that is collected by accident, and annually report how often stingrays are used.

The plan is not needed because the FBI is already starting to address possible Stingray abuses

Barrett 2015 (Devlin Barrett is a staff reporter for the Wall Street Journal http://www.wsj.com/article_email/u-s-will-change-stance-on-secret-phone-tracking-1430696796-lMyQjAxMTI1NDA0MzEwNjMzWj)

The Justice Department will start revealing more about the government’s use of secret cellphone tracking devices and has launched a wide-ranging review into how law-enforcement agencies deploy the technology, according to Justice officials. In recent months, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has begun getting search warrants from judges to use the devices, which hunt criminal suspects by locating their cellphones, the officials said. For years, FBI agents didn’t get warrants to use the tracking devices. Senior officials have also decided they must be more forthcoming about how and why the devices are used—although there isn’t yet agreement within the Justice Department about how much to reveal or how quickly.

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The plan is not needed because courts are already starting to address possible Stingray abuses

Supreme Court of Florida 2014 (Written decision in Shawn Alvin Tracey v. State of Florida, 10/16/14, pages 44-45. http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2014/sc11-2254.pdf

For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Tracey had a subjective expectation of privacy in the location signals transmitted solely to enable the private and personal use of his cell phone, even on public roads, and that he did not voluntarily convey that information to the service provider for any purpose other than to enable use of his cell phone for its intended purpose. We arrive at this conclusion in part by engaging in the “normative inquiry” envisioned in Smith. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5. There, the Supreme Court cautioned that where an individual’s subjective expectations have been “conditioned” by influences alien to the well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, a normative inquiry may be necessary to align the individual’s expectations with the protections guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, we conclude that such a subjective expectation of privacy of location as signaled by one’s cell phone—even on public roads—is an expectation of privacy that society is now prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable under the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (establishing the two-pronged “reasonable expectation of privacy” test). Therefore, we hold that regardless of Tracey’s location on public roads, the use of his cell site location information emanating from his cell phone in order to track him in real time was a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment for which probable cause was required. Because probable cause did not support the search in this case, and no warrant based on probable cause

authorized the use of Tracey’s real time cell site location information to track him, the evidence obtained as a result of that search

was subject to suppression.

States are Doing the Plan Now Ars Technica, 2015 “FBI says search warrants not needed to use “stingrays” in public places,” January 5th, 2015 (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/01/fbi-says-search-warrants-not-needed-to-use-stringrays-in-public-places/)

Hanni Fakhoury, an attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, said some states and judges are pushing back against stingrays. "In Tacoma, judges now require police (to) specifically note they plan to use an IMSI catcher and promise not to store data collected from people who are not investigation targets," he said. "The Floridaand Massachusetts state supreme courts ruled warrants were necessary for real-time cell phone tracking. Nine states—Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, andWisconsin—passed laws specifically requiring police to use a warrant to track a cell phone in real time."

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https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2013/related/acts/375

http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?141+ful+HB17

http://le.utah.gov/~2014/bills/static/hb0128.html

http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=SB2087&ga=108

https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/text.php?number=SF2466&version=3&session=ls88&session_year=2014&session_number=0

http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?pid=billpage&stab=01&id=sb0698&tab=subject3&ys=2014RS

http://iga.in.gov/legislative/2014/bills/house/1009/

http://ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=098-1104

http://www.leg.state.co.us/Clics/CLICS2014A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/1C1A65C619C7E9A187257C6F000271B1?Open&file=193_enr.pdf

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=commonwealth+v.+augustine&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&as_ylo=2014&case=17955208180094985775&scilh=0

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=tracey+v.+state&hl=en&as_sdt=2006&as_ylo=2014&case=2844654053105231897&scilh=0

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/2014-review-stingrays-go-mainstream


1NC ANSWERS TO: Democracy Advantage

Stingray devices aren’t a serious threat to innocent people because they release non-target devices

Zetter, 2015 (Kim Zetter, award-winning senior staff reporter at Wired covering cybercrime, privacy, and security http://www.wired.com/2015/03/feds-admit-stingrays-can-disrupt-cell-service-bystanders/)

Although Scimeca disclosed to the magistrate that the equipment could disrupt phone service, he didn’t elaborate about how the disruption might occur. Experts

suspect it has something to do with the “catch-and-release” way stingrays work. For example, once the stingray obtains the unique ID of a device, it releases it so that it can connect to a legitimate cell tower, allowing data and voice calls to go through.

“As each phone tries to connect, [the stingray] will say, ‘I’m really busy right now so go use a different tower. So rather than catching the phone, it will release it,” says Chris Soghoian, chief technologist for the ACLU. “The moment it tries to connect, [the stingray] can reject every single phone” that is not the target phone.

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1NC ANSWERS TO: Racial Profiling Advantage

Racial profiling is subconscious. The plan does nothing to address the cause, so it will continue even if the plan is in effect

Stone 2010 (associate professor of social psychology at the University of Arizona, “Racist, prejudiced attitudes seep from our subconscious”, Arizona Daily Star http://tucson.com/news/opinion/racist-prejudiced-attitudes-seep-from-our-subconscious/article_dd243e21-c99a-55af-851b-ba004f549c91.html)

The problem is that stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination are not entirely conscious and under our control. Research shows that people tend to use race and ethnicity when they interact with others without knowing it, and this leads to subconscious forms of racial and ethnic bias. There was a time in America when stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities were conscious, deliberate and widely accepted. The Jim Crow laws that once characterized race relations promoted prejudice and discrimination in many of its most harmful forms. The Civil Rights Act ushered in new laws against institutionalized discrimination, and with them, new norms among Americans against expressing blatant hatred based on race and ethnicity. Today, Americans simply do not condone or tolerate racism or other forms of bias. Cities and organizations are boycotting Arizona because they believe that SB 1070 reintroduces explicit and deliberate forms of racism. Supporters of SB 1070 strongly deny this and vehemently claim that they are not racist. Supporters of SB 1070 live and work with people of Mexican, Hispanic or Latino descent every day. How can people be racist when they interact daily across racial and ethnic boundaries? Whereas the conscious rejection of racism is critical to maintaining the tight intergroup fabric of our community, it does not keep racial or ethnic biases from happening. Over the last decade, social psychologists have discovered that people who explicitly reject racism can also hold subconscious negative attitudes and stereotypes about racial and ethnic minorities. When these thoughts and feelings operate outside of awareness, people can express hate and discriminate without realizing it. Our brain has a leaky seal that drips hints of dislike when we interact with people who are racially or ethnically different from us. Many subconscious acts of discrimination are subtle, like avoiding eye contact when talking to someone, or avoiding physical contact like a handshake or placing money into a cashier's hand. In its worst form, subconscious bias leads people to refuse to let someone use the bathroom, make someone wait in line while helping other customers or dismiss an application for a job. Subconscious racial and ethnic biases also cause people to mistakenly decide that the tool or wallet in the hand of a minority individual is a gun. When playing a shooter-style video game, people are more likely to accidently shoot an unarmed black person than a white person. Some of these studies have been done with police officers who are trained to avoid making such mistakes because of racial profiling.

There are many examples of racial profiling that don’t involve Stingray surveillance and which the plan can’t fix

Houston Police Department 2015 (“Racial Profiling” http://www.houstontx.gov/police/racialprof.htm)

Racial profiling is any law enforcement-initiated action based on an individual’s race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than on the individual’s behavior or information identifying the individual as having engaged in criminal activity. Examples of racial profiling include but are not limited to the following: Initiating a motor vehicle stop on a particular vehicle because of the race, ethnicity, or

national origin of the driver of a vehicle. Stopping or detaining the driver of a vehicle based on the determination that a person of that race, ethnicity, or national origin is unlikely to own or possess that specific make or model of vehicle. Stopping or detaining an individual based on the determination that a person of that race, ethnicity, or national origin does not belong in a specific part of town or a specific place

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1NC ANSWERS TO: Solvency

Banning Stingray devices won’t work. The people who would enforce the ban don’t know enough about technology to effectively keep them from operating.

Assange et. al, 2012 (Julian, editor-in-chief of WikiLeaks. Andy Muller-Maguhn, specialist on computers, telecommunications, and surveillance. Jacob Appelbaum, computer security researcher. Jeremie Zimmerman, co-founder and spokesperson for the citizen advocacy group La Quadrature du Net. Conversation in the book “Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet,” chapter titled “The Militarization of Cyberspace”)

democratic states within Europe are massively buying machines that allow them to act exactly outside the law in regard to interception because they don’t need a court decision, they can just switch it on and do it, and this technology can’t be controlled. JULIAN: But are there two approaches to dealing with mass state surveillance: the laws of physics; and the laws of man? One is to use the laws of physics by actually building devices that prevent interception. The other is to enact democratic controls through the law to make sure people must have warrants and so on and to try to gain some regulatory accountability. But strategic interception cannot be a part of that, cannot be meaningfully constrained by regulation. Strategic interception is about intercepting everyone regardless of whether they are innocent or guilty. We must remember that it is the core of the Establishment carrying such surveillance. There will always be a lack of political will to expose state spying. And the technology is inherently so complex, and its use in practice so secret that there cannot be meaningful democratic oversight. ANDY: Or you spy on your own parliament. JULIAN: But those are excuses— the mafia and foreign intelligence— they are excuses that people will accept to erect such a system. JACOB: The Four Horsemen of the Info-pocalypse: child pornography, terrorism, money laundering, and The War on Some Drugs. JULIAN: Once you have erected this surveillance, given that it is complex, given that it is designed to operate in secret, isn’t it true that it cannot be regulated with policy? I think that except for very small nations like Iceland, unless there are revolutionary conditions it is simply not possible to control mass interception with legislation and policy. It is just not going to happen. It is too cheap and too easy to get around political accountability and to actually perform interception. The Swedes got through an interception bill in 2008, known as the FRA-lagen which meant the Swedish signals intelligence agency the FRA could legally intercept all communication travelling through the country in bulk, and ship it off to the United States, with some caveats. 48 Now how can you enforce those caveats once you’ve set up the interception system and the organization doing it is a secret spy agency? It’s impossible. And in fact cases have come out showing that the FRA had on a variety of occasions broken the law previously. Many countries simply do it off-law with no legislative cover at all. So we’re sort of lucky if, like in the Swedish example, they decided that for their own protection from prosecution they want to go legal by changing the law. And that’s the case for most countries— there is bulk interception occurring, and when there is a legislative proposal it is to protect the ass of those who are doing it. This technology is very complex; for example in the debate in Australia and the UK about proposed legislation to intercept all metadata, most people do not understand the value of metadata or even the word itself. 49 Intercepting all metadata means you have to build a system that physically intercepts all data and then throws everything but the metadata away. But such a system cannot be trusted. There’s no way to determine whether it is in fact intercepting and storing all data without having highly skilled engineers with authorization to go in and check out precisely what is going on, and there’s no political will to grant access. The problem is getting worse because complexity and secrecy are a toxic mix. Hidden by complexity. Hidden by secrecy. Unaccountability is built-in. It is a feature. It is dangerous by design.

You can’t challenge the surveillance state, it works hard to protect itself

Stanley 2013 (Jay Stanley, Senior Policy Analyst, Speech, Privacy & Technology Project, “How to Think About the National Security State,” American Civil Liberties Union, Free Future, 9—5—13, www.aclu.org/blog/how-think-about-national-security-state)

2) Perpetuation, protection, and expansion of self Like all life forms, bureaucracies seek to perpetuate themselves, and just as species seek to spread their genes, bureaucracies seek to expand their budgets, payrolls, powers, and domain, as political scientists have long noted. The FBI and NSA push for new surveillance powers such as the Patriot Act and the FISA Amendments Act. TSA seeks to expand its airport role into other areas of American life. Agencies relentlessly overdramatize the threat of cybersecurity in order to grab more power and

bigger budgets. By the same token, bureaucracies will generally do whatever it takes to protect their core interests and will rarely if ever be seen sacrificing themselves. Not for principle, or truth, or justice, or morality.

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2NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: Solvency—FCC Can’t Do It

Our evidence is literally a response to yours—the FCC did not certify Stingray based on the information you are referencing and it has no authority over it Law 360, 2015 “FCC Says It Doesn't Control 'StingRay' Cellphone Tracking,” April 29th, 2015 (http://www.law360.com/articles/649460/fcc-says-it-doesn-t-control-stingray-cellphone-tracking)

In a letter released by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission on Tuesday, Chairman Tom Wheeler told a U.S. senator that the agency has essentially no authority over state and local law enforcement agencies’ use of cellphone tracking devices known as “StingRays.” Wheeler’s response to an inquiry by Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., confirmed that the FCC’s certification of the devices manufactured by Harris Corp . was contingent upon the conditions that they only be sold to law enforcement officials and that state and local agencies must coordinate their use of StingRays and other “International Mobile Subscriber Identity catchers” with the FBI , but revealed the limitations of the FCC’s involvement.

“The commission has no information about the extent to which or conditions under which law enforcement has obtained authority to use the devices,” Wheeler said.

In February, Nelson pointed to a Washington Post article that detailed local police departments’ use of StingRays to collect data on phone calls, and asked the FCC to clarify its certification process and oversight of the devices.

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http://www.law360.com/companies/washington-post-co

http://www.law360.com/agencies/federal-bureau-of-investigation

http://www.law360.com/companies/harris-corporation

http://www.law360.com/agencies/federal-communications-commission


2NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: Solvency—Circumvention

The FCC will make it easy to get around the plan because they can’t say no to the wireless industry

Alster 2015 (Norm Alster, Journalism Fellow with the Investigative Journalism Project at the Harvard University Center for Ethics. “Captured Agency How the Federal Communications Commission Is Dominated by the Industries It Presumably Regulates” http://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-for-ethics/files/capturedagency_alster.pdf)

Renee Sharp seemed proud to discuss her spring 2014 meeting with the Federal Communications Commission. As research director for the non-profit Environmental Working Group, Sharp doesn‘t get many chances to visit with the FCC. But on this occasion she was able to express her concerns that lax FCC standards on radiation from wireless technologies were especially hazardous for children. The FCC, however, should have little trouble dismissing those concerns. Arguing that current standards are more than sufficient and that children are at no elevated risk from microwave radiation, wireless industry lobbyists don‘t generally have to set up appointments months in advance. They are at the FCC‘s door night and day. Indeed, a former executive with the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), the industry‘s main lobbying group, has boasted that the CTIA meets with FCC officials ―500 times a year.‖1 Sharp does not seem surprised. ―There‘s no question that the government has been under the influence of industry. The FCC is a captured agency ,‖ she said.2 Captured

agency. That‘s a term that comes up time and time again with the FCC. Captured agencies are essentially controlled by the industries they are supposed to regulate. A detailed look at FCC actions—and non-actions—shows that over the years the FCC has granted the wireless industry pretty much what it has wanted. Until very recently it has also granted cable what it wants. More broadly, the FCC has again and again echoed the lobbying points of major technology interests.

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Terror Disadvantage Links

StingRay type surveillance is necessary. Banning it will destroy our ability to fight terrorism and protect our citizens.

Sulmasy 2013 (Glenn Sulmasy 2013 for CNN “Why We Need Government Surveillance” Online http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/10/opinion/sulmasy-nsa-snowden/)

The current threat by al Qaeda and jihadists is one that requires aggressive intelligence collection and efforts . One has to look no further than the disruption of the New York City subway bombers (the one being touted by DNI Clapper) or the Boston Marathon bombers to know that the war on al Qaeda is coming home to us, to our citizens, to our students, to our streets and our subways.This 21st century war is different and requires new ways and methods of gathering information. As technology has increased, so has our ability to gather valuable, often actionable, intelligence. However, the move toward "home-grown" terror will necessarily require, by accident or purposefully, collections of U.S. citizens' conversations with potential overseas persons of interest.An open society, such as

the United States, ironically needs to use this technology to protect itself. This truth is naturally uncomfortable for a country with a Constitution that prevents the federal government from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures." American historical resistance towards such activities is a bedrock of our laws, policies and police procedures.But what might have been reasonable 10 years ago is not the same any longer. The constant armed struggle against the jihadists has adjusted our beliefs on what we think our government can, and must, do in order to protect its citizens.However, when we hear of programs such PRISM, or the Department of Justice getting phone records of scores of citizens without any signs of suspicious activities nor indications of probable cause that they might be involved in terrorist related activities, the American demand for privacy naturally emerges to challenge such "trolling" measures or data-mining.The executive branch, although particularly powerful in this arena, must ensure the Congress is kept abreast of activities such as these surveillance programs. The need for enhanced intelligence activities is a necessary part of the war on al Qaeda, but abuse can occur without ensuring the legislative branch has awareness of aggressive tactics such as these.Our Founding Fathers, aware of the need to have an energetic, vibrant executive branch in foreign affairs, still anticipated checks upon the presidency by the legislature. Working together, the two branches can ensure that both legally, and by policy, this is what the citizens desire of their government -- and that leaks such as Snowden's won't have the impact and damage that his leaks are likely to cause.As for Snowden, regardless of how any of us feel about the national security surveillance programs at issue, he must be extradited back to the U.S. for interviews and potential trial -- if for no other reason than to deter others from feeling emboldened to break the law in the same way in the future.

Information we get from surveillance is vital to preventing terrorist plots, which are even more complex after 9/11. A ban would weaken our defenses.

Hirsh 2013 [Michael Hirsh, chief correspondent, the National Journal, “The Next Bin Laden,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-next-bin-laden-20131114, November 14 2013]

Ever since the death of Osama bin Laden, President Obama and his senior lieutenants have been telling war-weary Americans that the end of the nation’s longest conflict is within sight. “Core al-Qaida is a shell of its former self,” Obama said in a speech in May. “This war, like all wars, must end.” That was the triumphal tone of last year’s reelection campaign, too.The truth is much grimmer. Intelligence officials and terrorism experts today believe that the death of bin Lade n and the decimation of the Qaida “core” in Pakistan only set the stage for a rebirth of al-Qaida as a global threat. Its tactics have morphed into something more insidious and increasingly dangerous as safe havens multiply in war-torn or failed states—at exactly the moment we are talking about curtailing the National Security Agency’s monitoring capability. And the jihadist who many terrorism experts believe is al-Qaida’s new strategic mastermind, Abu Musab al-Suri (a nom de guerre that means “the Syrian”), has a diametrically different approach that emphasizes quantity over quality. The red-haired, blue-eyed former mechanical engineer was born in Aleppo in 1958 as Mustafa Setmariam Nasar; he has lived in France and Spain. Al-Suri is believed to have helped plan the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and the 2005 bombings in London—and has been called the “Clausewitz” of the new al-Qaida.Whereas bin Laden preached big dramatic acts directed by him and senior Qaida leaders, al-Suri urges the creation of self-generating cells of lone terrorists or small groups in his 1,600-page Internet manifesto. They are to keep up attacks, like multiplying fleas on a dog that finds itself endlessly distracted—and ultimately dysfunctional. (A classic Western book on guerrilla warfare called The War of the Flea reportedly influenced al-Suri.) The attacks are to culminate, he hopes, in acts using weapons of mass destruction.Recent terrorist attacks against U.S. targets, from the murderous 2009 spree of Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan at Fort Hood to the Boston Marathon bombings last year, suggest that al-Suri’s philosophy dominates al-Qaida’s newly flattened hierarchy. The late Yemeni-American imam Anwar al-Awlaki, who preached this strategy and induced Hasan’s attack, is said to have developed his ideas from al-Suri’s. Meanwhile, with new refuges in North Africa, Syria, and Yemen, jihadists have much more territory from which to hatch plots unmolested.Yet the politics at home are changing as the threat abroad is growing. The revelations dribbled out by fugitive leaker Edward Snowden have outraged members of Congress and world leaders, including those of close allies such as Germany and France. They say they are aghast at American overreach. Writing in Der Spiegel, Snowden justified himself this way: “Instead of causing damage, the usefulness of the new public knowledge for society is now clear, because reforms to politics, supervision, and laws are being suggested.” Thanks to him, Congress will almost certainly rein in the National Security Agency’s data-trolling methods—though it’s not yet clear how much.But the agency’s opponents may not realize that the practice they most hope to stop—its seemingly indiscriminate scouring of phone data and emails — is precisely what intelligence officials say they need to detect the kinds of plots al-Suri favors. For the foreseeable future, al-Suri’s approach will mean more terrorist attacks against more targets—albeit with a much lower level of organization and competence. “It’s harder to track. Future attacks against the homeland will be less sophisticated and less lethal, but there’s just going to be more of them,” says Michael Hayden, the former NSA director who steered the agency after 9/11 toward deep dives into Internet and telephonic data. Adds Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, “I think al-Qaida’s capabilities for a strike into

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the United States are more dangerous and more numerous than before 9/11.” For better or worse, the only hope to track them all is an exceptionally deep, organized, and free-ranging intelligence apparatus, experts say.Intelligence officials who are well briefed in the technical aspects of NSA surveillance also note that global communications are vastly more complex than they were as recently as 9/11, not just in terms of speed and bandwidth but also in the kinds of digital paths they can take. Messages can travel partly by air and partly by cable, for example, and the NSA must keep up. “If you take the diffuse physical environment [of more failed-state havens] and you layer that with the diffuse communications environment, and then you layer that with the diffuse ideological environment—more lone wolves, for example—that makes for a far more generally dangerous environment,” says a knowledgeable U.S. government official who asked to remain anonymous. All of which means that despite very legitimate questions about whether the National Security Agency is going beyond what the law and Constitution allow, Americans probably need the NSA now more than ever.

Without Stingray style surveillance devices, terrorists will be able to remain anonymous

Gamma Group 2011 (manufacturer of a Stingray style device. “3G-GSM Tactical Interception and Target Location” https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/810727-772-gamma-group-catalogue-3g-gsm-tactical.html)

Cellular networks have created a haven for criminals and terrorists. Over GSM & 3G networks, criminals and terrorist can remain anonymous, able to continue illegal activities on a global scale without fear of action because:

● No Local Registration is required - criminals are able to use pre-paid SIM cards or foreign SIM cards without the need to supply any information

● Post-Paid Subscription Fraud - criminals are easily able to reprogram phones with a fake identity or use stolen phones and SIM cards.

Although powerful Strategic/Countrywide surveillance monitoring tools are at the disposal of Law Enforcement Agencies, the ability to monitor specific criminals/targets critically requires having specific target identity data. In the case of cellular networks the fundamental information is the IMSI (unique identifier or serial number of the SIM) and the IMEI (unique identifier or serial number of the handset)The IMSI and IMEI is highly prized data, and to protect users it is not normally transmitted within cellular networks. However, if the data is obtained, then Law Enforcement Agencies have all they need to monitor Target(s). The challenge is how to overcome the protective security messages within cellular networks protecting their subscribers and covertly elicit specific target user data. Fortunately, to assist Law Enforcement Agencies we are able to offer solutions which

can overcome these challenges. Tactical off-air solutions are available which are able to emulate the cellular network in order to:1. Indentify & Locate GSM Target(s) Cell-phonesDetermine and locate the identity of a Target(s) GSM cell-phone by pretending to be the real network and tricking the phone to register accordingly. This process allows the unique identity of the phone (IMEI) and the SIM card (IMSI) to be covertly captured, and designated a Target to be precisely located.2. Identify & Locate 3G Target(s) cell-phonesDetermine and locate the identity of a Target(s) 3G cell-phone by pretending to be the real network and tricking the phone to register accordingly. THis process allows the unique identity of the phone (IMEI) and the SIM card (IMSI) to be covertly captured, and designated Targets to be precisely located.3. Intercept the Voice and SMS Communication of Designated TargetsThe communication of Target(s) under surveillance can be captured without their knowledge, including:

● all Voice calls & SMS either made or received by Target(s)● spoof the identity of Target(s) to falsely send SMS or Voice calls● divert Calls/SMS so they are not received by the Target(s)

the ability to edit all SMS before they are received by the Target(s)

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*** National Security Letters Affirmative

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National Security Letters Summary

National security letters are notices from the government to allow the FBI to gain access to information relevant to national security investigations. By law, they can’t access content (but can access phone records, numbers, etc.). There is a lot of controversy around them because they are used very frequently, and the FBI has been caught misusing them. Also, because there is no court oversight, some people feel that they have a high potential for abuse and are not constitutional.

National Security Letters (NSLs) are one way that the government has to find out information about people.

How does information about my activities get collected?

Many of the things you do in your life involve interacting with a company that keeps a record of what you’ve been up to. Search for things online? The search company keeps track of it. Make a phone call or send a text? Your phone company has a record of it. Buy something at the grocery store? If you use one of those “rewards cards”, the store keeps a record of what you bought. Since so much of your life involves electronic communication, the companies that facilitate those communications have a lot of records about you.

Why do these companies collect this information?

Companies keep these records partly to provide you with better service, but mostly so they know what kinds of advertisements might work on you.

What does the government want with this information?

The government might want the information in order to find out if you’ve been doing anything illegal. They might want to know if you’ve been searching for how to build bombs or texting known criminals.

Do the companies have to give information about me to the government?

Yes. Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act allows the FBI to send an NSL to a company and order them to turn their records over to the FBI.

Will the company tell me if they turn my information over to the government?

Not usually. The law also allows the FBI to issue a “gag order” about the letter. This means that when a person at a company receive a NSL, they can’t tell anyone about it. Not the person whose information is being turned over. Not their coworkers. Not even their family. If they tell anyone about it, they could go to jail.

Isn’t an NSL basically the same as a search warrant?

NSLs are not like warrants. In order to get a warrant, the FBI would need to convince a judge that they had probable cause to believe a search would reveal evidence of a crime. If the judge is not convinced, the FBI can’t perform the search. NSLs are “administrative subpeonas” that the FBI issues themselves. They don’t need a judge’s permission to send out an NSL and they don’t need to prove to anybody that the search is likely to reveal evidence of a crime.

Doesn’t the Constitution require the government to get warrants when they want to search my stuff?

The FBI doesn’t need a warrant to get these kinds of records about you because of something called the “third party doctrine.” In general, you are only protected from government searches in situations where you have a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” In your house, you have such an expectation, so the government almost always needs a warrant to search there. But courts have ruled that you don’t have a reasonable expectation of privacy for records about your activites that are kept by third parties like Google, Verizon, or Cub. Since you allowed those parties to know the information about you, the courts say that you can’t reasonably expect it to be private.

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1AC 1/ 6: Inherency

First, we will tell you the current state of National Security Letters in the United States

National Security Letters violate the first and fourth amendments; the FBI has ignored Presidential requests to end the use of National Security Letters. Banning gag orders is not enough, we need to put an end to National Security Letters themselves.

Froomkin, 2015 (“FBI Flouts Obama Directive to Limit Gag Orders on National Security Letters” The Intercept February 19, Online: https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/fbi-flouts-obama-directive-limit-gag-orders-national-security-letters/)

Despite the post-Snowden spotlight on mass surveillance, the intelligence community’s easiest end-run around the Fourth Amendment since 2001 has been something called a National Security Letter.FBI agents can demand that an Internet service provider, telephone company or financial institution turn over its records on any number of people — without any judicial review whatsoever — simply by writing a letter that says the information is needed for national security purposes. The FBI at one point was cranking out over 50,000 such letters a year; by the latest count, it still issues about 60 a day.The letters look like this:Recipients are legally required to comply — but it doesn’t stop there. They also aren’t allowed to mention the order to anyone, least of all the person whose data is being searched. Ever. That’s because National Security Letters almost always come with eternal gag orders. Here’s that part:That means the NSL process utterly disregards the First Amendment as well.More than a year ago, President Obama announced that he was ordering the Justice Department to terminate gag orders “within a fixed time unless the government demonstrates a real need for further secrecy.”And on Feb. 3, when the Office of the Director of National Intelligenceannounced a handful of baby steps resulting from its “comprehensive effort to examine and enhance [its] privacy and civil liberty protections” one of the most concrete was — finally — to cap the gag orders:In response to the President’s new direction, the FBI will now presumptively terminate National Security Letter nondisclosure orders at the earlier of three years after the opening of a fully predicated investigation or the investigation’s close.Continued nondisclosures orders beyond this period are permitted only if a Special Agent in Charge or a Deputy Assistant Director determines that the statutory standards for nondisclosure continue to be satisfied and that the case agent has justified, in writing, why continued nondisclosure is appropriate.Despite the use of the word “now” in that first sentence, however, the FBI has yet to do any such thing. It has not announced any such change, nor explained how it will implement it, or when.Media inquiries were greeted with stalling and, finally, a no comment — ostensibly on advice of legal counsel.“There is pending litigation that deals with a lot of the same questions you’re asking, out of the Ninth Circuit,” FBI spokesman Chris Allen told me. “So for now, we’ll just have to decline to comment.”FBI lawyers are working on a court filing for that case, and “it will address” the new policy, he said. He would not say when to expect it.There is indeed a significant case currently before the federal appeals court in San Francisco. Oral arguments were in October. A decision could come any time.But in that case, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which is representing two unnamed communications companies that received NSLs, is calling for the entire NSL statute to be thrown out as unconstitutional — not for a tweak to the gag. And it has a March 2013 district court ruling in its favor.“The gag is a prior restraint under the First Amendment, and prior restraints have to meet an extremely high burden,” said Andrew Crocker, a legal fellow at EFF. That means going to court and meeting the burden of proof — not just signing a letter.Or as the Cato Institute’s Julian Sanchez put it, “To have such a low bar for denying persons or companies the right to speak about government orders they have been served with is anathema. And it is not very good for accountability.”In a separate case, a wide range of media companies (including First Look Media, the non-profit digital media venture that produces The Intercept) aresupporting a lawsuit filed by Twitter, demanding the right to say specifically how many NSLs it has received.But simply releasing companies from a gag doesn’t assure the kind of accountability that privacy advocates are saying is required by the Constitution.“What the public has to remember is a NSL is asking for your information, but it’s not asking it from you,” said Michael German, a former FBI agent who is now a fellow with the Brennan Center for Justice. “The vast majority of these things go to the very large telecommunications and financial companies who have a large stake in maintaining a good relationship with the government because they’re heavily regulated entities.”So, German said, “the number of NSLs that would be exposed as a result of the release of the gag order is probably very few. The person whose records are being obtained is the one who should receive some notification.”A time limit on gags going forward also raises the question of whether past gag orders will now be withdrawn. “Obviously there are at this point literally hundreds of thousands of National Security Letters that are more than three years old,” said Sanchez. Individual review is therefore unlikely, but there ought to be some recourse, he said. And the further back you go, “it becomes increasingly implausible that a significant percentage of those are going to entail some dire national security risk.”The NSL program has a troubled history. The absolute secrecy of the program and resulting lack of accountability led to systemic abuse as documented by repeated inspector-general investigations, including improperly authorized NSLs, factual misstatements in the NSLs, improper requests under NSL statutes, requests for information based on First Amendment protected activity, “after-the-fact” blanket NSLs to “cover” illegal requests, and hundreds of NSLs for “community of interest” or “calling circle” information without any determination that the telephone numbers were relevant to authorized national security investigations

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https://www.eff.org/files/2014/03/20/nsl.13-16732.openingbrief.redacted.032014.pdf

http://www.scribd.com/doc/256148646/Media-Amicus-in-Twitter-Case

https://gigaom.com/2015/02/18/tech-and-media-firms-join-twitter-in-key-test-of-fbi-gag-orders

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/03/depth-judge-illstons-remarkable-order-striking-down-nsl-statute

https://www.eff.org/files/2014/03/27/nsl.13-15957.13-16731.secondoffourbriefs.redacted.0320141.pdf

https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/10/09/court-spotlight-super-secret-national-security-letters/

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-obama-tightens-surveillance-guidelines-uncertainty-lingers-on-nsa-program/2015/02/03/f3862024-abc3-11e4-ad71-7b9eba0f87d6_story.html

http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ppd-28/2015/privacy-civil-liberties

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence

http://vault.fbi.gov/National%20Security%20Letters%20(NSL)/National%20Security%20Letters%20(NSL)%20Part%201%20of%201/view

https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters/faq#5

https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/fbi-flouts-obama-directive-limit-gag-orders-national-security-letters/

https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/fbi-flouts-obama-directive-limit-gag-orders-national-security-letters/


1AC 2/6: Plan

Thus, we propose the following plan:

The United States federal government should ban the use of National Security Letters

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1AC 3/ 6: Privacy

Contention One: Privacy

National Security Letters are an abuse of power that enables needless mass government surveillance, which violates privacy and threatens democracy

Washington Post, 2007 (“My National Security Letter Gag Order” Washington Post March 23, Online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/22/AR2007032201882.html/)

The Justice Department's inspector general revealed on March 9 that the FBI has been systematically abusing one of the most controversial

provisions of the USA Patriot Act: the expanded power to issue "national security letters." It no doubt surprised most Americans to learn that between 2003 and 2005 the FBI issued more than 140,000 specific demands under this provision -- demands issued without a showing of probable cause or prior judicial approval -- to obtain potentially sensitive information about U.S. citizens and residents. It did not, however, come as any surprise to me.Three years ago, I received a national security letter (NSL) in my capacity as the president of a small Internet access and consulting business. The letter ordered me to provide sensitive information about one of my clients. There was no indication that a judge had reviewed or approved the letter, and it turned out that none had. The letter came with a gag provision that prohibited me from telling anyone, including my client, that the FBI was seeking this information. Based on the context of the demand -- a context that the FBI still won't let me discuss publicly -- I suspected that the FBI was abusing its power and that the letter sought information to which the FBI was not entitled. Rather than turn over the information, I contacted lawyers at the American Civil Liberties Union, and in April 2004 I filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the NSL power. I never released the information the FBI sought, and last November the FBI decided that it no longer needs the information anyway. But the FBI still hasn't abandoned the gag order that prevents me from disclosing my experience and concerns with the law or the national security letter that was served on my company. In fact, the government will return to court in the next few weeks to defend the gag orders that are imposed on recipients of these letters. Living under the gag order has been stressful and surreal. Under the threat of criminal prosecution, I must hide all aspects of my involvement in the case -- including the mere fact that I received an NSL -- from my colleagues, my family and my friends. When I meet with my attorneys I cannot tell my girlfriend where I am going or where I have been. I hide any papers related to the case in a place where she will not look. When clients and friends ask me whether I am the one challenging the constitutionality of the NSL statute, I have no choice but to look them in the eye and lie.I resent being conscripted as a secret informer for the government and being made to mislead those who are close to me, especially because I have doubts about the legitimacy of the underlying investigation.The inspector general's report makes clear that NSL gag orders have had even more pernicious effects. Without the gag orders issued on recipients of the letters, it is doubtful that the FBI would have been able to abuse the NSL power the way that it did. Some recipients would have spoken out about perceived abuses, and the FBI's actions would have been subject to some degree of public scrutiny. To be sure, not all recipients would have spoken out; the inspector general's report suggests that large telecom companies have been all too willing to share sensitive data with the agency -- in at least one case, a telecom company gave the FBI even more information than it asked for. But some recipients would have called attention to abuses, and some abuse would have been deterred.I found it particularly difficult to be silent about my concerns while Congress was debating the reauthorization of the Patriot Act in 2005 and early 2006. If I hadn't been under a gag order, I would have contacted members of Congress to discuss my experiences and to advocate changes in the law. The inspector general's report confirms that Congress lacked a complete picture of the problem during a critical time: Even though the NSL statute requires the director of the FBI to fully inform members

of the House and Senate about all requests issued under the statute, the FBI significantly underrepresented the number of NSL requests in 2003, 2004 and 2005, according to the report.I recognize that there may sometimes be a need for secrecy in certain national security investigations. But I've now been under a broad gag order for three years, and other NSL recipients have been silenced for even longer. At some point -- a point we passed long ago -- the secrecy itself becomes a threat to our democracy. In the wake of the recent revelations, I

believe more strongly than ever that the secrecy surrounding the government's use of the national security letters power is unwarranted and dangerous. I hope that Congress will at last recognize the same thing.

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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/22/AR2007032201882.html/


1AC 4/6: PrivacyWithout privacy, there is no democracy

TruthOut 2013(“Without Privacy There Can Be No Democracy TruthOut September 24 Online: http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/19039-without-privacy-there-can-be-no-democracy#)

The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, spoke this morning at the United Nations and delivered a powerful indictment of spying by the NSA on behalf of the United States. She said, "Without respect for a nation's sovereignty, there is no basis for proper relations among nations," adding that "Brazil knows how to protect itself. Brazil ... does not provide shelter to terrorist groups. We are a democratic country."The Brazilian president is so outraged at American spying, both on her country and on her personal emails and her personal life, that she canceled a state dinner with President Obama.While most Americans see this as a rift between Brazil in the United States over the issue of our spying on them, President Rousseff highlighted the most important point of all elsewhere in her speech this morning.She said, "Without the right of privacy, there is no real freedom of speech or freedom of opinion, and so there is no actual democracy."This is not just true of international relations. It's also true here within the United States.Back before the Kennedy administration largely put an end to it, J Edgar Hoover was infamous in political circles in Washington DC for his spying on and blackmailing of both American politicians and activists like Martin Luther King. He even sent King tapes of an extramarital affair and suggested that King should consider committing suicide.That was a shameful period in American history, and most Americans think it is behind us. But the NSA, other intelligence agencies, and even local police departments have put the practice of spying on average citizens in America on steroids.As Brazil's President points out, without privacy there can be no democracy.Democracy requires opposing voices; it requires a certain level of reasonable political conflict. And it requires that government misdeeds be exposed. That can only be done when whistleblowers and people committing acts of journalism can do so without being spied upon.Perhaps a larger problem is that well over half – some estimates run as high as 70% – of the NSA's budget has been outsourced to private corporations. These private corporations maintain an army of lobbyists in Washington DC who constantly push for more spying and, thus, more money for their clients.With the privatization of intelligence operations, the normal system of checks and balances that would keep government snooping under control has broken down.We need a new Church Commission to investigate the nature and scope of our government spying both on our citizens and on our allies.But even more than that we need to go back to the advice that President Dwight Eisenhower gave us as he left the presidency in 1961. Eisenhower warned about the rise of a military-industrial complex, suggesting that private forces might, in their search for profits, override the protective mechanisms that keep government answerable to its people.That military-industrial complex has become the military-industrial-spying-private-prison complex, and it is far greater a threat to democracy then probably was envisioned by Eisenhower.Government is the protector of the commons. Government is of by and for we the people. Government must be answerable to the people.When the functions of government are privatized, all of that breaks down and Government becomes answerable to profit.It's time to reestablish the clear dividing lines between government functions and corporate functions, between the public space and the private space.A critically important place to start that is by ending the privatization within our national investigative and spying agencies.

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1AC 5/ 6: Racism Contention 2: Racism

National Security Letters have been part of a larger pattern of racial profiling and subjugation since 9/11, it is almost impossible to prove racial profiling in a surveillance attempt

Kleiner 2010(“Racial Profiling in the Name of National Security: Protecting Minority Travelers Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism” Yevgenia S. Kleiner November 1 Online: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=twlj

Government-sponsored ethnic and racial profiling in the form of computerized and behavioral screening initiatives implemented as a response to 9/11 has led to the subjection of minorities to increased scrutiny and suspicion in American airports. In the name of national security, safety protocols are being enacted in non-uniform ways that disproportionally infringe on minority passengers’ civil liberties and reinforce harmful racial stereotypes. Focusing on the dissonance between basic freedoms guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the security policies implemented by the federal government, this Note argues that the disparity in scrutiny received by minority travelers is counterproductive because it reinforces racism and ethnocentrism as social norms and fails to ensure a consistent level of protection for all passengers. This Note ultimately advocates for a federal government mandate that delineates a universal, race-blind standard for the level of scrutiny (and accompanying procedures) that all passengers should be subjected to while traveling aboard commercial aircraft.[…] The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act signaled the beginning of an era of reduced judicial oversight of surveillance by the federal government.70Although the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and normally requires probable cause forgovernment interference, no convenient provision exists to explicitly define the way the Amendment should be read in light of a potential terrorist threat.71 As a result, the USA PATRIOT Act granted the government wide-sweeping investigative powers by permitting it to obtainwarrants without a demonstration of the truthfulness of its allegations.72 Furthermore, provisions under Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Actgranted the Department of Justice the freedom to use administrative subpoenas called National Security Letters to obtain records of individuals’electronic communications without judicial oversight.73 This provision essentially means that National Security Letters enable federal officials to obtain information on anyone, because the Act does not require officials to demonstrate probable cause or a compelling need for access to the information.74 It was not until 2003 that Attorney General John Ashcroft finally admitted in a statement before the House Judiciary Committee that the USA PATRIOT Act had lowered the standard of proof for a warrant to something “lower than probable cause,” and that it had enabled federal officials to investigate citizens who were neither spies nor terrorists.75 Unfortunately, this admission did not lessen the burden on wrongfully targeted minorities who wish to assert their constitutional rights: in addition to proving a violation of their Fourth Amendment Due Process rights, individuals alleging a racial profiling claim against the government are required to show that the relevant government agency violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by complying with a “purposefully discriminatory policy.”76 Not surprisingly, meeting such a high burden of proof is usually difficult, if not impossible since government agencies are reluctant to admit such grievous error.77

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1AC 6/6: Racism

Racism makes all forms of violence inevitable. National Security Letters are only one part of a racist justice system, but we must reject anything that contributes to racism

Memmi 2k

MEMMI Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris Albert-; RACISM, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle , difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is “the truly capital sin.”fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death . Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall,” says the bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

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Answers to: National Securit y Disadvantag e

National Security Letters are not necessary for national security- they needlessly violate the privacy of thousands of innocent Americans

Sanchez, 2014 (“Can We Do Without National Security Letters?” Julian Sanchez January 9, Online: http://justsecurity.org/5351/national-security-letters/)

Former top FBI attorney Michael Woods (Quoted in Eric Lichtblau’sBush’s Law) has summarized the ethos that led to the massive explosion of NSLs issued in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks:All of a sudden, every lead needed to be looked at. The atmosphere was such that you didn’t want to be the guy who overlooked the next Moussaoui. . . . If you’re telling the FBI people over and over you need to be preemptive, you need to get out there before something happens, you’re pushing people toward a fishing expedition. We heard over and over again, connect the dots, and we were pushing the envelope and doing things that, in the old days, would have seemed beyond the pale.That is certainly an understandable initial reaction, but at this point it seems fair to question whether the use of such an invasive tool is really necessary as a means of checking out every possible lead. When NSL authority was initially expanded, after all, the requirement that records obtained be relevant to an “authorized investigation” was understood to refer to full investigations, predicated on “specific and articulable facts” providing “reasonable grounds” to believe some real national security threat exists. The guidelines were only later, in 2003, altered to allow their use in “preliminary” investigations based on “information or allegations” suggesting a possible threat—and before long, such investigations accounted for the majority of NSLs issued.If the inability to chase down a sufficient number of thin leads had been at the root of the failure to detect the 9/11 plot, this might well be a reasonable response, but the evidence is fairly overwhelming at this point that this was not the case. The problem, rather, was a failure to “connect dots” by sharing information about known threats across agencies, rather than insufficiently promiscuous collection of dots. Needless to say, the vast majority of the thousands of Americans whose information is collected pursuant to NSLs are not , in fact, terrorists —nor , in all likelihood engaged in criminal wrongdoing of any kind. So if the objection is that such large-scale use of NSLs to collect data about Americans is likely to be infeasible when advance approval is required, one good answer might be: Yes, that is the point. Candidate Barack Obama presumably thought so when hedeclared his intention to put an end to the use of “National Security Letters to spy on citizens who are not suspected of a crime.”NSL authorities have already given rise to misuses the Justice Department’s Inspector General characterized as widespread and serious—but the disclosure of the FISC opinions authorizing bulk collection of metadata under Section 215 of the Patriot Act adds further grounds for concern. The “relevance” standard that the FISC construed to permit huge volumes of irrelevant records as a means of sifting through them for a minuscule fraction of relevant ones, after all, is the same standard found in the NSL statutes. The FISC, to be sure, stressed the many extrastatutory safeguards it had imposed on the NSA’s metadata programs in order to limit the invasion of innocent Americans’ privacy, but the presence or absence of those safeguards cannot really bear on the threshold question of whether the records obtained are “relevant.” Would any FBI agent be so bold as to issue an NSL for the records of all subscribers at a major cell carrier? Almost certainly not, at least in the current climate. But with this broad understanding of “relevance” now on the record, and being openly defended by the Justice Department, it is easy to imagine smaller scale fishing expeditions operating on the same theory—perhaps applying to all users of a particular Web site or online service.Finally, it bears noting that the courts may well force the administration’s hand if it does not undertake its own reforms. One court has already held that NSLs, with their presumptive gag orders, violate the First Amendment—though that ruling has been stayed pending appellate review. So it is at least an open question whether they can survive in their current form whether or not the administration is eager for reform. Fortunately, there is little reason to think that intelligence agencies would be hobbled if deprived of a tool relatively little used before the passage of the Patriot Act, or that the use of intrusive methods to “check out” Americans by the tens of thousands is essential to protecting American security.[…]If the NSL gag provisions can be weakened sufficiently to pass First Amendment muster, such a compromise solution might represent the elusive “balance” between privacy interests and the need to quickly evaluate leads in the initial phases of investigations. But the burden should be on the intelligence community to establish that even more limited authority is genuinely necessary. The absence of broad NSL powers prior to the Patriot Act does not appear to have been a major factor in the failure to detect the 9/11 attacks, and the public has not been made aware of any cases where such easy access to sensitive information has enabled the discovery of some plot or terror cell that would otherwise have gone undetected. The claim that the FBI cannot investigate effectively without a tool that has existed in its current form for roughly a decade should be seen as an extraordinary one—demanding equally extraordinary evidence before we accept it.

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http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/03/nsl-found-unconstitutional

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6fnfVJzZT4&feature=player_embedded


Answers to: National Security Disadvantag e

National Security Letters are intrusive tools that are not as effective as other, more ethical national security efforts.

German and Richardson, 2012 (“National Security Letters: Building Blocks for Investigations or Intrusive Tools?” Michael German and Michelle Richardson for the ABA Journal September 1, Online: http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/

During the original Patriot Act debates, Attorney General John Ashcroft called librarians opposing the legislation “hysterical,” and now Valerie Caproni and Steven Siegel argue that criticism of NSLs is “hyperbole.” Caproni and Siegel repeat the FBI’s previous assertions that NSLs are “critical tools” in the government’s national security arsenal, but there is no public data to support this statement and, despite Caproni and Siegel’s denials, there is ample evidence that this overbroad authority has been abused, as any unchecked power usually is.The founders designed our constitutional system of government to prevent abuse of power through checks and balances between the branches and robust procedural protections where the government attempts to deprive an individual of his rights. Indeed, the most fully developed processes for the protection of civil rights exists within the criminal justice system, which makes the Caproni-Siegel comparison of NSLs to grand jury subpoenas most misplaced.The grand jury, made up of ordinary citizens, is designed to serve as an independent check on law enforcement authority by protecting people against unfounded charges. As the United States Attorneys’ Manual notes, the grand jury’s power is limited by its narrow function of determining whether to bring an indictment for a criminal violation, which reduces the risk of unnecessary, suspicionless data collection. And in grand jury proceedings, the role of prosecutors—who are bound by the ethical obligations of their profession—is also a curb against law enforcement overreach. None of these protections exist with NSLs or other surveillance tools geared toward intelligence collection rather than criminal prosecution. The FBI has the sole discretion to issue NSLs with virtually no independent oversight. Moreover, a grand jury’s indictment only starts the criminal justice process, after which additional rights attach and affirmative discovery obligations are imposed on the government. The government’s obligation to disclose sources and methods of evidence-gathering during trial is likewise a deterrent to improper collection, as the exclusionary rule compels suppression of illegally obtained evidence. The secrecy required in grand jury proceedings is designed to protect the privacy of the witnesses and individuals investigated, not to hide the government conduct from independent oversight and public accountability, as is the case with intelligence tools like NSLs. Victims of NSL abuse have no way of knowing their rights have been violated, and no remedy.The truth is that NSLs are intrusive tools. While the Supreme Court did fail to protect personal data held by third parties in 1976, as Caproni and Siegel point out, Congress then stepped in to protect financial, credit and communications records, which most Americans consider sensitive and private information. The pre-Patriot NSL authorities Caproni and Siegel mention were limited to collecting information about suspected foreign agents or international terrorists. The Patriot Act expansion of NSL authorities allows the collection of data about any American the FBI deems “relevant” to an espionage or terrorism investigation, with no independent review. And given the technological advancements that have occurred since the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision, which now leave vast amounts of personal information unprotected on third-party servers, trusting the government to be judicious with its access to such data through NSLs or other tools is even more misplaced.Caproni and Siegel also note that NSL recipients rarely challenge the government’s demands, which isn’t surprising given that NSLs seek records pertaining to someone other than the recipient. When the entities that hold private information show as little interest in protecting it as the government, everyone should worry. And it’s interesting that in the three cases in which NSL recipients challenged these demands, the government withdrew the NSL requests rather than defend them in court, thereby mooting challenges to the underlying statute and throwing into doubt the government’s justification for making these requests in the first place.Finally, consider the FBI’s continuing minimization of the abuse discovered by the inspector general. The FBI’s own audit found legal violations in 9.43 percent of its NSL files, and the IG later determined that the FBI underreported the number of NSL violations by a factor of three. These figures justify calling the abuse pervasive, and denying their importance only raises further skepticism that Americans can trust government agents with such unfettered power. The IG did indeed say the FBI made strides toward reform in 2008, but concluded that “it is too soon to definitively state whether the new systems and controls developed by the FBI and the department will eliminate fully the problems with the use of NSLs.”

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http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/


Answers to: Crime Disadvantage

The FBI misuses National Security Letters- many are issued, with few prosecutions. A ban would stop the abuse, not increase crime.

Fraase 2013 (“National Security Letter Report” Michael Fraase March 11, Online: http://www.farces.com/national-security-letter-report/)

A Justice Department reportindicates that the FBI illegally obtained personal information including banking and telephone records on thousands of US citizens. The information was gathered without court subpoena through the use of national security letters , the scope of which was significantly expanded under the Patriot Act. These national security letters, intended to be used only in cases of emergency, were used “without an emergency or even without an investigative case,” according to Dan Eggen and John Solomon’s report in the Washington Post . The national security letters were, in some cases, used retroactively.More than 143,000 requests for information on more than 52,000 individuals were issued from 2003-05, figures much higher than those reported to Congress.Some politicians responded by calling for restrictions on the Patriot Act and have pledged investigatory hearings. Senate Majority Whip Richard Durbin (D-Illinois) has been calling for a review of the Bush administration’s use of national security letters for two years told Eggen and Solomon that the report “confirms the American people’s worst fears about the Patriot Act.” Retraction letters flew across Washington last week as administration representatives sought to correct their sworn testimony that the use of national security letters was well-regulated.

National Security Letters are for use only in terrorism or espionage cases; our plan would have little to no effect on non-national security related crime.

German and Richardson, 2012 (“National Security Letters: Building Blocks for Investigations or Intrusive Tools?” Michael German and Michelle Richardson for the ABA Journal September 1, Online: http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/

Many federal agencies use administrative (not court-approved) subpoenas to obtain information relating to their duties—there are more than 300 instances where the law grants such powers. NSLs are a type of administrative subpoena that can be invoked only in terrorism and espionage investigations. They can be issued by the FBI to limited types of third-party records’ custodians, and the custodians are responsible for gathering and producing responsive materials to the FBI. The custodian can object if compliance would be burdensome, and the FBI cannot simply take materials from the custodian. For that reason, NSLs should not be confused with search warrants. Search warrants are issued based on a finding of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate; the person on whom a search warrant is served has no option to decline to cooperate, and the entity serving the search warrant is authorized to seize material from the custodians. Moreover, the scope of a search warrant is set by the specific finding of the magistrate and can be quite broad, depending on the underlying facts. In contrast, NSLs have a strictly defined scope that has been set by Congress.

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http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Durbin

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/09/AR2007030902356.html?referrer=email

http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html

http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nationalsecurityletters/index.html

http://www.boingboing.net/images/doj_fbiletters_032007.pdf


2AC Extensions: Privacy

The FBI has a history of misusing data tools and covering it up. Federal agents frequently violate privacy rules- 70% since 2002 have involved National Security Letters

RTE News, 2007 (“FBI Agents Broke The Rules 1,000 Times” RTE News June 14, Online: http://www.rte.ie/news/2007/0614/90049-fbi/)

An internal FBI audit has found the agency violated rules more than 1,000 times while collecting data on US domestic phone calls, e-mails and financial transactions in recent years. The Washington Post reported today that the number of violations uncovered by the audit was far greater than those previously documented in a Justice Department report in

March. The vast majority of newly discovered violations were instances in which telephone companies and Internet providers gave agents phone and e-mail records the agents did not request and were not authorised to collect. The

agents retained the information in their files, which mostly concerned suspected terrorist or espionage activities, according to the report. The new audit covers just 10% of the FBI's national security investigations since 2002, so the actual number of

violations in the FBI's domestic surveillance efforts probably number several thousand. Of the more than 1,000 violations uncovered by the new audit, about 700 involved the provision of information by phone companies and other communications

firms that exceeded what the FBI's National Security Letters had sought. However, some two dozen of the newly discovered

violations involved agents' requests for information that US law did not allow them to have, the audit found. National Security Letters allow the FBI to compel the release of private information such as communications or financial records without getting court authority. Their use has grown since the 11 September 2001 attacks. More than 19,000 such letters were issued in 2005 seeking 47,000 pieces of information. FBI officials said the audit found no evidence that any agent knowingly or willingly violated the laws or that supervisors encouraged such violations.

Mass surveillance is unconstitutional and a threat to democracy

The New York Times Editorial Board, 2013(“Surveillance: A Threat to Democracy” June 11, Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/opinion/surveillance-a-threat-to-democracy.html

A new Washington Post-Pew Research Center pollfound that a majority of Americans are untroubled by revelations about the National Security Agency’s dragnet collection of the phone records of millions of citizens, without any individual suspicion and regardless of any connection to a counterterrorism investigation.Perhaps the lack of a broader sense of alarm is not all that surprising when President Obama, Senator Dianne Feinstein, the Democratic chairwoman of the Intelligence Committee, and intelligence officials insist that such surveillance is crucial to the nation’s antiterrorism efforts. But Americans should not be fooled by political leaders putting forward a false choice. The issue is not whether the government should

vigorously pursue terrorists. The question is whether the security goals can be achieved by less-intrusive or

sweeping means, without trampling on democratic freedoms and basic rights. Far too little has been said on this

question by the White House or Congress in their defense of the N.S.A.’s dragnet.The surreptitious collection of “metadata” — every

bit of information about every phone call except the word-by-word content of conversations — fundamentally alters the relationship between individuals and their government.Tracking whom Americans are calling, for how long they speak, and from where, can reveal deeply personal information about an individual. Using such data, the government can discover intimate details about a person’s lifestyle and beliefs — political leanings and associations, medical issues, sexual orientation, habits of religious worship, and even marital infidelities. Daniel Solove, a professor at George Washington University Law School and a privacy expert, likens this program to a Seurat painting. A single dot may seem like no

big deal, but many together create a nuanced portrait.The effect is to undermine constitutional principles of personal privacy and freedom from constant government monitoring. The American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit on Tuesday, challenging the program’s constitutionality, and it was right to do so.The government’s capacity to build extensive, secret digital dossiers on such a mass

scale is totally at odds with the vision and intention of the nation’s framers who crafted the Fourth Amendment precisely to outlaw indiscriminate searches that cast a wide net to see what can be caught. It also attacks First Amendment values of free speech and association.In a democracy, people are entitled to know what techniques are being used by the government to spy on them, how the records are being held and for how long, who

will have access to them, and the safeguards in place to prevent abuse. Only then can they evaluate official claims that the correct

balance between fighting terrorism and preserving individual liberty has been struck, and decide if they are willing to accept diminished privacy and liberty. If Americans have been slow to recognize the dangerous overreach of the N.S.A.’s phone surveillance, it is largely because they have scant information to judge the government’s conduct.Even if most Americans trust President Obama not to abuse their personal data, no one knows who will occupy the White House or lead intelligence operations in the future. The government’s capacity to assemble, keep and share information on its citizens has grown exponentially since the days when J. Edgar Hoover, as director of the F.B.I., collected terrorist threats need to catch up.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/us/aclu-files-suit-over-phone-surveillance-program.html

http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/most-americans-support-nsa-tracking-phone-records-prioritize-investigations-over-privacy/2013/06/10/51e721d6-d204-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story.html


2AC Extensions: Racism

Government has a history of infiltrating peaceful groups, mass surveillance is incompatible with human rights and democracy

Stallman 2013(“How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?” Richard Stallman October 14, Online: http://www.wired.com/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-for-democracy-to-survive-surveillance/

The current level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights. To recover our freedom and restore democracy, we must reduce surveillance to the point where it is possible for whistleblowers of all kinds to talk with journalists without being spotted. To do this reliably, we must reduce the surveillance capacity of the systems we use.Using free/libre software, as I’ve advocated for 30 years, is the first step in taking control of our digital lives. We can’t trust non-free software; the NSA uses and even creates security weaknesses in non-free software so as to invade our own computers and routers. Free software gives us control of our own computers, but that won’t protect our privacy once weset foot on the internet.Bipartisan legislation to “curtail the domestic surveillance powers” in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on limiting the government’s use of our virtual dossiers. That won’t suffice to protect whistleblowers if “catching the whistleblower” is grounds for access sufficient to identify him or her. We need to go further.Thanks to Edward Snowden’s disclosures, we know that the current level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights. The repeated harassment and prosecution of dissidents, sources, and journalists provides confirmation. We need to reduce the level of general surveillance, but how far? Where exactly is the maximum tolerable level of surveillance, beyond which it becomes oppressive? That happens when surveillance interferes with the functioning of democracy: when whistleblowers (such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.DON’T AGREE WE NEED TO REDUCE SURVEILLANCE? THEN READ THIS SECTION FIRSTIf whistleblowers don’t dare reveal crimes and lies, we lose the last shred of effective control over our government and institutions. That’s why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has talked with a reporter is too much surveillance — too much for democracy to endure.An unnamed U.S. government official ominously toldjournalists in 2011 that the U.S. would not subpoena reporters because “We know who you’re talking to.” Sometimes journalists’ phone call records are subpoena’d to find this out, but Snowden has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call recordsof everyone in the U.S., all the time.Opposition and dissident activities need to keep secrets from states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has demonstrated the U.S. government’s systematic practice of infiltrating peaceful dissident groups on the pretext that there might be terrorists among them. The point at which surveillance is too much is the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known journalist or a known dissident.Information, Once Collected, Will Be MisusedWhen people recognize that the level of general surveillance is too high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won’t fix the problem, not even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules. (The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it was unable to effectively hold the NSA accountable.) Suspicion of a crime will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of “espionage”, finding the “spy” will provide an excuse to access the accumulated material.The state’s surveillance staff will misuse the data for personal reasons too. Some NSA agents used U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers — past, present, or wished-for — in a practice called “LoveINT.” The NSA says it has caught and punished this a few times; we don’t know how many other times it wasn’t caught. But these events shouldn’t surprise us, because police have long used their access to driver’s license records to track down someone attractive, a practice known as “running a plate for a date.”Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this is prohibited . Once the data has been accumulated and the state has the possibility of access to it, it may misuse that data in dreadful ways.Total surveillance plus vague law provides an opening for a massive fishing expedition against any desired target. To make journalism and democracy safe, we must limit the accumulation of data that is easily accessible to the state. Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be TechnicalThe Electronic Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose a set of legal principles designed to prevent the abuses ofmassive surveillance. These principles include, crucially, explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a consequence, they would be adequate for protecting democratic freedoms — if adopted completely and enforced without exception forever.However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments Act), suspended, or ignored.Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just a handful of people, will give them an opportunity.If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if they had never existed: years worth of dossiers would suddenly become available for misuse by the state and its agents and, if collected by companies, for their private misuse as well. If, however, we stop the collection of dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won’t exist, and there will be no way to compile them retroactively. A new illiberal regime would have to implement surveillance afresh, and it would only collect data starting at that date. As for suspending or momentarily ignoring this law, the idea would hardly make sense.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html

https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text

http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/privacy/lein1.htm

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/24/nsa-analysts-abused-surveillance-systems

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-violations/

https://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/05/14

http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/24/yemen-leak-sachtleben-guilty-associated-press

http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2011/lessons-wye-river

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/nsa-surveillance-patriot-act-author-bill

http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/149481/

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security

http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2013/06/how-can-any-company-ever-trust-microsoft-again/index.htm

http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/09/why-free-software-is-more-important-now-than-ever-before/

http://www.wired.com/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-for-democracy-to-survive-surveillance/

http://www.wired.com/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-for-democracy-to-survive-surveillance/


*** National Security Letters Negative

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1NC Solvency

National Security Letters are very limited in scope and pose very little threat to civilian privacy.

Heritage Foundation 2008 (Charles Stimson and Andrew Grossman. March 14. “National Security Letters: Three Important Facts.” Accessed on the web: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/03/national-security-letters-three-important-facts)

NSLs are narrowly tailored and subject to more and stronger procedural protections and oversight than ever before.The kind of information that the government may obtain from the use of NSLs is far more limited than many realize. Contrary to popular misconceptions, the government cannot use NSLs to wiretap, to access e-mails, or to conduct any kind of surveillance. Rather, NSLs allow the government to retrieve the sort of mundane business records that, while exposing little or no personal information, are extremely useful in uncovering terrorist activities. These records include lists of financial accounts, some bank records, and telephone subscriber

information and toll records.

Though some citizens believe that these types of records should be obtained only with a court-issued warrant, the Supreme Court has stated clearly that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when these types of ordinary business records are shared with the government.[18]The Court has reasoned that when citizens open business accounts

and create business records, they hold no reasonable expectation of privacy in the existence of the accounts and records. In many cases, this is

intuitive: For example, a major piece of evidence in the trial of Scott Peterson for the murder of his wife was a receipt from the hardware store he visited

shortly before the murder to purchase a bag of cement, which prosecutors alleged he used to make anchors to sink his wife's body.[19]This sort of

evidence is routinely obtained with little oversight in police and grand jury investigations. Unlike with NSLs, however, obtaining documents in such

investigations requires no signoffs from high-level officials who could be held accountable for misuse and no reporting or auditing. Convening grand

juries is time-consuming, expensive, and otherwise cumbersome, however, making them unsuitable for national security investigations. They also offer

far fewer procedural protections than NSLs.

Further, despite the limited scope of information that is retrievable with NSLs, they are actually subject to greater privacy protections, by statute, regulation and practice, than ever before.

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http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/03/national-security-letters-three-important-facts#_ftn19



1NC Racism Harms

National security is more important to democracy than personal privacy; getting rid of National Security Letters would be getting rid of an important tool for fighting terrorism.

Debatewise No Date (“Privacy vs. Security: Yes Points” Online http://debatewise.org/debates/3040-privacy-vs-security/#)

The most important job of government is to “secure the general welfare” of its citizens. Security is a common good that is promised to all Americans, and it must outweigh any personal concerns about privacy. The word “privacy” is not found in the US Constitution so it cannot be claimed as a fundamental right.Surveillance is the secret watching of suspects’ private activities. In the past this usually involved following people, or going through their trash. These days it is mostly electronic, with the police and intelligence agencies listening into private phone conversations or reading emails (wiretapping). Surveillance can also involve looking at bank account details to see where money comes and goes. All these are vital tools for tracking the actions of terrorists when they are planning attacks. The government cannot stand by and wait until criminal acts are carried out: it must stop attacks before they happen.

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http://debatewise.org/debates/3040-privacy-vs-security/


1NC Privacy Harms

National Security Letters are rarely abused, consistently reviewed, and necessary for national security.


National security letters (NSLs) "continue to be important tools in the FBI's national security investigations," according to a major audit of NSL use released yesterday.[1] The audit, commissioned by Congress and undertaken by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice, is meant to uncover any abuses, errors, or shortcomings in the use of NSLs.[2] This year's audit report, issued one year after the first such report, commends the FBI for making "significant progress" in implementing recommendations from the previous report and the FBI leadership for making it a "top priority" to correct mistakes in the use of NSLs.[3]Despite the high praise for ongoing

compliance efforts and strong numbers (84 possible violations out of about 50,000 requests) in this year's report, critics will predictably assert that privacy violations from NSLs are widespread and significant. But the two reports, taken together,

show otherwise. Though both reports show that the FBI has sometimes struggled to measure up to its own standards in using NSLs, they also

reveal that incidents of misuse were infrequent and unintentional and did not involve any criminal misconduct. In many cases, misuse was actually due to third parties supplying information beyond the scope of the NSL request, not to any action by the FBI.Like last year's report, this year's report criticizes the Bureau for failing to follow applicable statutes, guidelines, and internal policies in some cases. The OIG notes, however, that because only one year has passed since the issuance of its first NSL report, it is too early for the FBI's corrective measures made since

then to be reflected in the data.[4]While the FBI won praise for its efforts to improve its use of NSLs, the audit notes that Congress has failed to act on a small but significant recommendation from last year's report that would clarify the scope and applicability of NSLs in the telecommunications domain.[5] The Department of Justice submitted draft legislative language in just four months, but Congress has not taken up the matter in the seven months since then.[6]NSLs serve very narrow but important counterterrorism and counterintelligence purposes. As explained below, because of the kinds of information that can be sought with NSLs, they are not searches that trigger Fourth Amendment protections and so do

not require a warrant. NSLs are very limited in the amount of information they can request, serve as a highly effective substitute for more invasive intelligence operations, and have a long and largely

uncontroversial history. They were used long before 9/11 and have been subject to extensive congressional oversight.Understanding the following three facts about NSLs is key to any informed discussion of their use and propriety

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1NC Privacy Harms

National Security Letters are so narrow in scope, banning them would not solve anything. Even if we do have privacy issues in the United States, National Security Letters are not the problem.

Caproni and Siegel 12 (Valerie Caproni and Steven Siegel for American Bar Association. “National Security Letters: Building Blocks for Investigation or Intrusive Tools?” Online http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/)

Congress first granted the Federal Bureau of Investigation the authority to use National Security Letters in 1986. This authority ensured that the FBI would have the necessary tools to investigate threats to the national security posed by terrorists and spies because

Congress had, at the same time, enacted statutory privacy protection to certain classes of records held by third-party businesses. Congress then understood a principle that remains true to this day: To appropriately and efficiently investigate threats to the national security, the FBI needs the ability to gather very basic information about individuals, including information about their finances, where they live and work, and with whom they are in contact, without alerting the targets that it is doing so.The NSL authority is now and always has been quite limited. First, unlike grand jury

subpoenas that can be used to collect any nonprivileged document from any person or entity, the FBI can use NSLs only to obtain a very narrow range of information from a very narrow range of third-party businesses: NSLs can be used to obtain transactional

information from wire or electronic communications service providers (e.g., telephone companies and Internet service providers); financial institutions

(e.g., banks and credit card issuers); and credit reporting agencies. Other documents that can be critical to a national security investigation (e.g., hotel

records, employment records) cannot be obtained using an NSL. Second, unlike grand jury subpoenas that can be issued in any sort of criminal case,

NSLs can only be used during duly authorized national security investigations. Finally, unlike grand jury subpoenas that can

be issued by any assistant U.S. attorney or Department of Justice prosecutor, no matter how junior or inexperienced, NSLs can only be issued with very high-level FBI approval.Although the NSL authority is quite limited, NSLs are nevertheless critical tools that enable FBI investigators to gather the sort of basic information needed as the “building blocks” of national security investigations. It is not an exaggeration to say that virtually every significant national security investigation, whether of an individual suspected of planning to wreak havoc through an act of terrorism or of an individual suspected of spying on the United States for the benefit of a foreign nation, requires the use of NSLs for at least some critical information.

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*** Drone Affirmative

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1AC Contention one is Inherency:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is operating drones in over 30 cities in the status quo- these surveillance operations are conducted without warrantsWashington Post 2015 - “FBI behind mysterious surveillance aircraft over US cities”http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-behind-mysterious-surveillance-aircraft-over-us-cities/2015/06/02/030ce2e2-0959-11e5-951e-8e15090d64ae_story.html, June 2The FBI is operating a small air force with scores of low-flying planes across the country using video and sometimes cellphone surveillance technology — all hidden behind fictitious companies that are fronts for the government , The

Associated Press has learned.¶ The surveillance equipment is generally used without a judge’s approval, and the FBI says the flights are used for specific investigations. The agency says it uses front companies to protect the safety of the pilots and aircraft, shielding their

identities from would-be suspects on the ground.¶ In a recent 30-day period, an AP review found, the FBI flew above more than 30 cities in 11 states across the country, including parts of Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Minneapolis, Phoenix, Seattle, and Southern California.

Additionally, lack of oversight and accountability to the public means drone use will rise exponentially, altering the very character of American lifeACLU 2011- December, American Civil Liberties Union. “Protecting Privacy ¶ From Aerial Surveillance:¶

Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft” https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdfIn short, all the pieces appear to be lining up for the eventual introduction of routine aerial surveillance in American life—a development that would profoundly change the character of public ¶ life in the United States.¶ We need a system of rules to ensure that we can enjoy the benefits of this technology without ¶ bringing us a large step closer to a “surveillance society” in which our every move is monitored, ¶ tracked, recorded, and scrutinized by the authorities. In this paper, we outline a set of protections ¶ that we believe would protect Americans’ privacy in the coming world of drones. ¶ Aerial surveillance from manned aircraft has been ¶ with us for decades. One of the first aircraft the Wright ¶ brothers built was a surveillance aircraft, and it was ¶ sold to the U.S. Army. Many common uses of drone ¶ aircraft—search and rescue, fighting wildfires, dangerous tactical police operations—are beneficial. In ¶ the 1980s the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth ¶ Amendment does not categorically prohibit the government from carrying out warrantless aerial surveillance of private property. ¶ But manned aircraft are expensive to purchase, operate and maintain, and this expense has ¶ always imposed a natural limit on the government’s aerial surveillance capability. Now that surveillance can be carried out by unmanned aircraft, this natural limit is eroding . The prospect of ¶

cheap, small, portable flying video surveillance machines threatens to eradicate existing practical ¶ limits on aerial monitoring and allow for pervasive surveillance, police fishing expeditions, and ¶ abusive use of these tools in a way that could eventually eliminate the privacy Americans have ¶ traditionally enjoyed in their movements and activities.

Thus, the plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially curtail its use of warrantless unpiloted aerial vehicles in the United States

Contention Two is Civil Liberties:

The fourth amendment to the constitution guarantees citizens privacy and freedom from government intrusion and surveillance O’Brien 2013- Jennifer, Warrantless Government Drone Surveillance: A¶ Challenge to the Fourth Amendment, 30 J.¶

Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy L. 155 (2013) The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology &¶ Privacy Law http://repository.jmls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1732&context=jitpl

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https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf


The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of individuals in their¶ property and of their person by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.104 The Fourth Amendment can be broken down into two clauses.¶ 105 The search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment provides¶ “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, ¶ and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.”106 The warrant¶ clause of the Fourth Amendment states “no Warrants shall issue¶ but upon probable

cause, supported by Oath and affirmation and particularly¶ describing the place to be searched and the persons or things¶ to be seized.”107 The Fourth Amendment was meant to prohibit courts¶ from issuing general warrants or “writs of assistance”108 instead of ¶

providing a specified cause for intruding on a specific individual.109 The¶ Fourth Amendment mandates three requirements for a warrant to be¶ valid: probable cause,110 judicial approval111 and particularity.112 A ¶ search or seizure conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform¶ to any of these three requirements is unconstitutional. 113 Absent exigent¶ circumstances114 and exemptions,115 evidence secured in violation¶ of these requirements is generally excluded in an effort to deter illegal police conduct and uphold judicial integrity.116 An individual can give¶ his non-coerced consent to a warrantless search under the Fourth¶ Amendment.117¶ In a warrantless search or seizure situation, the inquiry becomes¶ whether the government’s intrusion upon an individual’s privacy and¶ property is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment .118 A warrantless¶ search or seizure within an individual’s home is presumed unreasonable¶ and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment.119 Generally, a¶ warrantless search or seizure must be within a limited scope and level¶ of intrusiveness.120 Therefore, a search or seizure can become unreasonable¶ if it goes beyond a reasonable scope or level of intrusiveness¶ even if it was reasonable at its inception. 121

Drones threaten our basic fourth amendment rights- warrantless surveillance is becoming the norm among law enforcement Molko 2013- Robert, “The Drones Are Coming! ¶ WILL THE FOURTH AMENDMENT STOP THEIR ¶ THREAT TO OUR PRIVACY?” http://practicum.brooklaw.edu/sites/default/files/print/pdfs/journals/brooklyn-law-review/volume-78/issue-4/blr_v78iv_1.pdfOver the years, courts ¶ have permitted aerial ¶ surveillance from navigable airspace where civilian planes or ¶ helicopters routinely fly,¶ 9¶ although they have prohibited such ¶ surveillance if it occurred from unusually low altitudes.¶ 10¶ Today, however, advances in su¶ rveillance and optics technology ¶ have made it possible to detect ¶ very small objects from high ¶ altitudes. ¶ 11 ¶ In addition to these advances, stealth technology¶ 12 ¶ enables drones to hover above us, silently monitoring ¶ everything we do in areas exposed to the sky.¶ 13¶

Drone ¶ technology, when carried to its ¶ extreme, threatens to destroy ¶ whatever vestiges of privacy remain in modern society, even in ¶ areas like a secluded, fenced-i¶ n backyard or private estate. ¶ Many local law enforcement agencies have already ¶ begun implementing these aerial surveillance technologies. For ¶ example, the city of Lancaster,¶ California recently began using ¶ aerial surveillance to monitor the city’s neighborhoods.¶ 14¶ There, ¶ a plane will fly above the city for up to ten hours a day.¶ 15¶ “Drones are [also] being considered by [San Francisco] Bay ¶ Area law enforcement agencies as¶ a cost-cutting way to replace ¶ helicopters . . . and use technology to fight crime and save ¶ lives.”¶ 16¶ Moreover, North Dakota police recently used a drone to ¶ monitor activity on a ranch to determine when its occupants ¶ would be unarmed in order to avoid a violent shootout when apprehending the suspects. 17¶ Police in Gadsden, Alabama, ¶ bought “a lightweight ¶ drone . . . to help in¶ drug investigations.”¶ 18¶ Authorities in Tampa Bay, Florida, considered using drones for ¶ security surveillance at the 2012 Republican National ¶ Convention.¶ 19¶ The Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office in Texas ¶ has even considered arming a drone with rubber bullets and ¶ tear gas.¶ 20¶ These represent only a small sampling of local law ¶ enforcement agencies that have begun to use drones.¶ 21¶ At the same time, two private software companies, ¶ Apple and Google, used aerial surveillance and military-grade ¶ cameras in a race to create detailed, three-dimensional images ¶ of city and residential streets throughout the world.¶ 22¶ These ¶ cameras are so powerful that “they can show objects just four ¶ inches wide” and “potentially see into homes through skylights ¶ and windows.”¶ 23¶ Apple’s rush to outdo Google led to its ¶ catastrophic premature release of three-dimensional visual ¶ flyovers in Apple Maps in September 2012, which it has been ¶ trying to correct ever since. On the legislative side, on February 14, 2012, President ¶ Obama signed into law the FAA Modernization and Reform Act ¶ of 2012.¶ 25¶ This law requires the FAA to expedite the process of ¶ authorizing both public and private use of drones in the ¶ national navigable airspace. ¶

26¶ This statutory mandate will ¶ inevitably reduce our privacy through increased aerial surveillance ¶ of neighborhoods and public places by law enforcement drones, ¶ bringing us ever closer to an Orwellian state. ¶ 27¶ Indeed, “[t]he ¶ government has predicted that as many as 30,000 drones will be ¶ flying over U.S. skies by the end of the decade.”¶ 28¶ Some experts ¶ predict that those drones will be¶ used by “journalists, police ¶ departments, disaster rescue te¶ ams, scientists, real estate ¶ agents, and private citizens.”¶ 29

Privacy rights are key to a meaningful life- it forms the basis of the social contract between individuals and the state Foster 2008- Oxford University Press, Human Rights and Civil Liberties pg. 159 ¶

The right to privacy, or the right to private life, is at the heart of individual freedom and the right to be free from arbitrary state interference. Traditionally, the right to privacy referred to the right to be let alone and the right to enjoy one's individual space, which the state or other individuals should not penetrate. This includes the right to enjoy one's

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property as well as being free from physical interference and thus allows the individual to enjoy an individual and private existence within a state; although in Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EMIR 97 the European Court held that the notion of private life was not restricted to the

person’s inner circle, but includes the right to develop and establish relationships with other human beings. The enjoyment of privacy and private life is, therefore, essential in honoring the 'social contract', whereby the state allows the individual basic individual rights irrespective of their allegiance to and dependence on the state . Privacy or private life may also refer to the right of personal autonomy and human dignity, demanding the individual has the right to make choices about the, life, such as whom they marry, whether they

should undertake medical treatment, or whether they have the right to die (Pretty v United Kingdom (2002)35 EHRR 1). Equally, the right to private life can be used alongside the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment and thus protect a person from attacks on their person or personal dignity (Costello-Roberts United Kingdom (1993) 19 EHRR 112). More specifically, the right to private life, referred to in this context as the light to privacy, includes the right to choose and practice one's sexual orientation free from undue interference or prosuiption by the state, and privacy is often referred to in connection to the right to lit free from press intrusion or the right to withhold, or access, personal information.

This is the most important impact in the debate- the judge must reject all invasions of liberty Petro 1974 - Professor of Law @ Wake Forest University. University of Toledo Law Review Spring 1974, page. 480However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway—“I believe in only one thing: liberty”. And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects . That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenistyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

Contention 3 is Innovation:

Drone technology is inevitable- the plan ensures that it is used responsibly. This increases public confidence in drones, enabling commercial innovation The National Journal 2013- February 21, “The Backlash Against Drones” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-backlash-against-drones-20130221The Seattle Police Department’s planned demonstration of its small surveillance drones quickly devolved into a noisy protest. Angry residents attending the community meeting in October chanted “No drones!” drowning out officers’ attempts to explain how the unmanned aerial vehicles would support certain criminal investigations, help out during natural disasters, and assist in search-and-rescue operations. Now it’s clear that Seattle’s drones, purchased with federal grants, won’t be flying over the metro area anytime soon. Amid backlash from civil-liberties advocates and citizens worried about government invasion of their privacy, the mayor earlier this month tabled any drone ambitions—for now.¶ Public concerns are not limited to Seattle . Lawmakers in at least 11 states want to restrict the use of drones because of fears they will spy on Americans, and some are pushing to require warrants before the robots collect evidence in investigations. Just this month, the Virginia General Assembly passed a two-year moratorium on drones. The outcry comes after the Electronic Frontier Foundation sued last year for a list of drone applicants within the U.S. When that information went public, staff attorney Jennifer Lynch says, “it really got people up in arms about how drones are being used, and got people to question their city councils and local law-enforcement agencies to ask for appropriate policies to be put in place to regulate drone usage .”¶ Drones change the game: Nearly continuous surveillance could be possible without a physical intrusion such as a property search or an implanted listening device. The flying robots can carry high-powered cameras, even facial-recognition software or thermal imaging to “see” through walls. They can hover, potentially undetected, for hours or days at a time.¶ As of yet, however, there are no laws governing the use of domestic drones when it comes to privacy. Unless Congress or the executive branch moves to regulate the robots’ use before they take to the skies en masse, states will likely continue to try to limit or ban drone use altogether , which could stymie their potential for other, beneficial uses. And failing to enact privacy limits only increases the likelihood of an incident in which the public perceives that the technology is being misused .¶ The Federal Aviation Administration, which is charged with overseeing drone implementation in the U.S., says its focus is “totally on safety,” not privacy worries. “We are concerned about how it’s being used only to the extent it would affect the safety of the operation,” says FAA spokesman Les Dorr.

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Commercial drones are the lynchpin of U.S. growth and leadership- addressing privacy concerns will reduce bureaucratic pressure and enable innovation

Washington Monthly 2015- “Why is American Losing the Commercial Drone Wars?” http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/junejulyaugust_2015/features/why_is_america_losing_the_comm055894.php?page=allCommercial drones, then, could be a fundamental technology driving innovation and growth in coming years. As the

world’s traditional leader in aviation technology (and, for better or worse, the world’s foremost military drone pioneer), the U.S. ought to command this industry.¶ There’s only one hitch: companies like Airware can’t sell many of their products in the U.S. That’s because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been slow to write the regulations drone makers need to test and operate in U.S. airspace. This past February, after years of missed deadlines, the FAA finally published a draft version of regulations for small drones—a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), in Washington argot. The finished version of the rule probably won’t be ready until late 2016 or early 2017, according to the Government Accountability Office. Meanwhile, countries such as the UK, France, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan have had rules for testing and using drones on the books for several years—rules significantly less restrictive than those in the FAA’s recent NPRM.¶ As

a result, American firms are being lured abroad by the more flexible regulatory frameworks of foreign governments. Google is testing package delivery drone technology in Australia. Amazon is doing the same in Canada. Airware is busy selling its products to drone companies in Australia and Europe. Meanwhile, a company called DJI, based in Shenzhen, China, now dominates the world market for smaller, lower-cost commercial drones.¶ The business press and tech websites are filled with stories slamming the FAA’s tardy and constricted regulations. It seems like a classic example of incompetent federal bureaucracy getting in the way of economic progress. Conservatives certainly see it that way. “The FAA is failing big time,” writes Marc Scribner, a fellow with the Competitive Enterprise Institute, because the agency is “mired in its own bureaucracy.” “The FAA is adopting a hyper-precautionary principle position that is holding back innovation,” Adam Thierer, a fellow at the libertarian Mercatus Center at George Mason University, has written.¶ Of course, there’s good reason to be careful and deliberate when it comes to easing restrictions on commercial drones. Nobody wants unmanned aircraft snooping through bedroom windows or getting sucked into jet engines. Still, conservative critics have a point. Other advanced countries have already found ways to allow this industry to grow, with no notable safety problems so far. Why is the FAA lagging?

Commercial drones are key to agriculture- data collection provides vital information to protect against food shortages

Washington Monthly 2015- “Why is American Losing the Commercial Drone Wars?” http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/junejulyaugust_2015/features/why_is_america_losing_the_comm055894.php?page=allBut perhaps the most important immediate application is agriculture. Drones could “provide detailed scouting information on weed emergence, insect infestations, and potential nutrient shortages ,” Jeff Vanderwerff of the American Farm

Bureau Federation told the U.S. Senate this spring. This valuable information allows the farmer to catch these threats “before they develop into significant and catastrophic problems.” Down the road, drones could also enable so-called field-based phenotyping. This involves flying drones over test fields and taking images of experimental varieties of crops designed to, say, build more biomass or thrive in the

heavy-rains-followed-by-drought conditions that climate change is causing. Plant geneticists would then analyze the data from the drones to see which tweaks they’ve made to the plants’ DNA actually work best under real-life conditions . This, in theory, could dramatically speed up the process and lower the cost of developing new and better crop strains. “Maybe ‘Holy Grail’ is overstating it,” says Sam Fiorello, CEO of the Donald Danforth Plant Science Center in St. Louis, which provides cutting-edge research for AgTech startups, “but it’s a huge advance in plant research.”

The prospect of food insecurity alone causes conflict Klare 2013, Michael T., April 22, Author and Professor of Peace and World-Security Studies, Hampshire College, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-t-klare/resource-scarcity-climate-change_b_3132268.htmlStart with one simple given: the prospect of future scarcities of vital natural resources, including energy, water, land, food, and critical minerals.

This in itself would guarantee social unrest, geopolitical friction, and war. It is important to note that absolute scarcity doesn’t have to be on the horizon in any given resource category for this scenario to kick in. A lack of adequate supplies to meet

the needs of a growing, ever more urbanized and industrialized global population is enough. Given the wave of extinctions that scientists are

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recording, some resources -- particular species of fish, animals, and trees, for example -- will become less abundant in the decades to come, and may even disappear altogether. But key materials for modern civilization like oil, uranium, and copper will simply prove harder and more costly to acquire, leading to supply bottlenecks and periodic shortages. Oil -- the single most important commodity in the international economy -- provides an apt example. Although global oil supplies may actually grow in the coming decades, many experts doubt that they can be expanded sufficiently to meet the needs of a rising global middle class that is, for instance, expected to buy millions of new cars in the near future. In its 2011 World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency claimed that an anticipated global oil demand of 104 million barrels per day in 2035 will be satisfied. This, the report suggested, would be thanks in large part to additional supplies of “unconventional oil” (Canadian tar sands, shale oil, and so on), as well as 55 million barrels of new oil from fields “yet to be found” and “yet to be developed.” However, many analysts scoff at this optimistic assessment, arguing that rising production costs (for energy that will be ever more difficult and costly to extract), environmental opposition, warfare, corruption, and other impediments will make it extremely difficult to achieve increases of this magnitude . In other words, even if production manages for a time to top the 2010 level of 87 million barrels per day, the goal of 104 million barrels will never be reached and the world’s major consumers will face virtual, if not absolute, scarcity. Water provides another potent example. On an annual basis, the supply of drinking water provided by natural precipitation remains more or less constant: about 40,000 cubic kilometers. But much of this precipitation lands on Greenland, Antarctica, Siberia, and inner Amazonia where there are very few people, so the supply available to major concentrations of humanity is often surprisingly limited. In many regions with high population levels, water supplies are already relatively sparse. This is especially true of North Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, where the demand for water continues to grow as a result of rising populations, urbanization, and the emergence of new water-intensive industries. The result, even when the supply remains constant, is an environment of increasing scarcity. Wherever you look, the picture is roughly the same: supplies of critical resources may be rising or falling, but rarely do they appear to be outpacing demand, producing a sense of widespread and systemic scarcity. However generated, a perception of scarcity -- or imminent scarcity -- regularly leads to anxiety, resentment, hostility, and contentiousness. This pattern is very well understood, and has been evident throughout human history. In his book Constant Battles, for example, Steven LeBlanc, director of collections for Harvard’s Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, notes that many ancient civilizations experienced higher levels of warfare when faced with resource shortages brought about by population growth, crop failures, or persistent drought. Jared Diamond, author of the bestseller Collapse, has detected a similar pattern in Mayan civilization and the Anasazi culture of New Mexico’s Chaco Canyon. More recently, concern over adequate food for the home population was a significant factor in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Germany’s invasions of Poland in 1939 and the Soviet Union in 1941, according to Lizzie Collingham, author of The Taste of War. Although the global supply of most basic commodities has grown enormously since the end of World War II, analysts see the persistence of resource-related conflict in areas where materials remain scarce or there is anxiety about the future reliability of supplies . Many experts believe, for example, that the fighting in Darfur and other war-ravaged areas of North Africa has been driven, at least in part, by competition among desert tribes for access to scarce water supplies, exacerbated in some cases by rising population levels.

Contention 4 is Credibility:

Warrantless drone surveillance eliminates the right to personal privacy- the plan ensures these rights are preserved Paul 2012- Rand, Senator, June 15, CNN, “Don't let drones invade our privacy” http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/14/opinion/rand-paul-drones/When assuming office, every government official must take an oath to abide by and uphold our Constitution. Since 2010, I have made that my mission in Congress. Unfortunately, the Obama administration is not upholding nor abiding by the Constitution -- in fact, this administration is going to great lengths to continually violate it.¶ Its most recent transgression involves the use of domestic drones.¶ These small drones are to be used as a crime fighting tool for law enforcement officials. But is unwarranted and constant surveillance by an aerial eye of Big Government the answer? ¶ In a memorandum issued by President Barack Obama's secretary of the Air Force, the stated purpose of these drones is "balancing ... obtaining intelligence information ... and protecting individual rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution."¶ Sen. Rand Paul¶ However, flying over our homes, farms, ranches and businesses and spying on us while we conduct our everyday lives is not an example of protecting our rights. It is an example of violating them.¶ The domestic use of drones to spy on Americans clearly violates the Fourth Amendment and limits our rights to personal privacy. I do not want a drone hovering over my house, taking photos of whether I separate my recyclables from my

garbage.¶ Poll: Don't use drones for speeding tickets¶ When I have friends over for a barbecue, the government drone is not on the invitation list. I do not want a drone monitoring where I go, what I do and for how long I do whatever it is that I'm doing. I do not want a nanny state watching over my every We should not be treated like criminals or terrorists while we are simply conducting our everyday lives. We should not have our rights infringed upon by unwarranted police-state tactics.¶ I have introduced legislation into the Senate that restates the Constitution. ¶ This bill protects individual privacy against unwarranted governmental intrusion through the use of these drones. The Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012 will protect Americans' personal privacy by forcing the government to honor our Fourth Amendment rights.¶ I want to make it clear that I am not arguing against the use of technology. But like other tools used to collect information in law enforcement, a warrant needs to be issued to use drones domestically . The police force should have the power to collect intelligence; however, I believe they must go through a judge and request a warrant to do so. The judicial branch must have some authority over drones, as they do with other law enforcement tools.¶ My bill will restate the Fourth Amendment and protect American's privacy by forcing police officials to obtain a

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warrant before using domestic drones.¶ There are some exceptions within this bill, such as the patrol of our national borders, when immediate action is

needed to prevent "imminent danger to life," and when we are under a high risk of a terrorist attack. Otherwise, the government must have probable cause that led them to ask for a warrant before the use of drones is permitted.¶ If the warrant is not obtained, this act would allow any person to sue the government. This act also specifies that no evidence obtained or collected in violation of this act can be admissible as evidence in a criminal, civil or regulatory action.¶ Allowing domestic drones to act as spies for the government is a complete violation of our basic right to personal privacy.¶ Unrestricted drone surveillance conjures up images reminiscent of Orwell's "1984" -- a totalitarian police-state. According to the Fourth Amendment, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."¶ I am sure our police force had good intentions with their suggested drone policies, but do they understand the consequences? Do they realize that they are allowing the government to act as the eye in the sky?

Failure to upload privacy protections undermines international human rights regimes- the U.S. is a key signatory, and other countries will model us Electronic Frontier Foundation 2014- leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/03/how-un-human-rights-committee-should-apply-international-law-nsa-spyingThis past Monday, the Human Rights Committee commenced its one hundredth and tenth session in Geneva from March 10-28. During this session, the Committee will review the reports of several countries on how they are implementing the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( ICCPR ), an international human rights treaty and one of the bedrocks of human rights protections . ¶ Countries that have ratified the ICCPR are required to protect and preserve basic human rights through various means including administrative, judicial, and legislative measures. Additionally, these countries are required to submit a report to the

Human Rights Committee, a body of independent experts who monitor the implementation of States’ human rights obligations, every four years. The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992 and is thus tied to these obligations, and required to regard the treaty the same as it would any domestic law. The Human Rights Committee will review the US’s human rights records on Thursday, March 13. In particular, the Committee will be scrutinizing the US’s mass surveillance practices and its compliance with Article 17 on the right to privacy.¶ At the opening session of the Human Rights Committee meeting, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, made it clear that the topic of privacy and surveillance is a priority: ¶ “Powerful new technologies offer the promise of improved enjoyment of human rights, but they are vulnerable to mass electronic surveillance and interception. This threatens the right to privacy and freedom of expression and association.”¶ We are pleased that the Human Rights Committee has the opportunity to clarify the scope of United States legal obligations under Article 17 on the right to privacy , especially in light of the recent revelations

on mass surveillance leaked by Edward Snowden. Worldwide, the general public is privy to the fact that several US programs have the potential for serious privacy rights violations in the form of mass surveillance both at home and abroad; a blatant violation of the United States' ICCPR obligations.

Strong human rights regimes prevent every scenario for conflictBurke-White 2014- William W., Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Spring 2004, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, p. 279-280This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S.

national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese

bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War

period [*250] indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' h uman r ights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security.¶ Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. n2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections . Fifth, it

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addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

Additionally, a demonstrated commitment to human rights regimes increases overall U.S. hegemony and legitimacy on global warming prevention Schulz 2008 (William F., Senior Fellow – Center for American Progress, Adjunct Professor of International Relations – The New School, Former Executive Direction – Amnesty International, “Introduction,” The Future of Human Rights: U.S. Policy for a New Era, p. 11-14)Which leads to the second general principle the United States must reaffirm: a commitment to global cooperation and respect for

international protocols and institutions, imperfect as they are. Of Francis Fukuyama's four bedrock characteristics of neoconservatism, it is the final one" skepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law and institutions to achieve either security or justice"38-that most dramatically divides normative human rights practice from neoconservative. Sophisticated advocates of human rights are not naive about the failures of the United Nations, the shortcomings of the UN Human Rights Council, the unproven value of the International Criminal Court, or the weakness of unenforceable international law. But to ignore international regimens, much less undermine them, is to sacrifice the best resource the United States has available for convincing the world that we do not suffer from solipsism, immune to the needs and opinions of others; that our intent is benign; and that the most powerful nation on earth is prepared to use its power fairly and wisely. Mighty as we

are, we do not live in a cocoon; we cannot solve our problems by ourselves, be they Iraq or terrorism or global warming. Respect for human rights and the processes by which they are fashioned is one of the best ways to win global friends and influence the passions of people. And whether we think the source of human rights is God, natural law, or consensualism, an international imprimatur lends legitimacy to our pursuit of them. As a study by the Princeton Project on National Security noted recently, "Liberty under law within nations is inextricably linked with a stable system of liberty under law among them. " 40 Surely even Condoleezza Rice who, during the 2000 presidential campaign, wrote that "foreign policy in a Republican administration ... will proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not the interests of an illusory international community [emphasis added] " 41 has come to rue the day she thought the world community no more than a chimera. Repairing the Damage The damaging effect of neoconservative policies on human

rights goes well beyond reinforcement of the suspicion that American advocacy of human rights is a mere cover for an imperialist agenda. Those policies have undermined the notion that spreading human rights and democracy around the globe are viable goals of U.S. foreign policy.

They have weakened international institutions upon which human rights depend . And they have increased a certain natural reticence on the part of the American people to commit U.S. troops to humanitarian and peace keeping missions, even when they are justified, as they are, for example, in Darfur. Coupled with America's human rights practices as part of its prosecution of the war on terror-secret incommunicado detentions,

denial of habeas corpus, winking acceptance of torture-the nation's ability to hold others to account for their own abuses has been severely weakened. A new administration will certainly have its hands full repairing this damage. It will need to find a variety of ways to signal renewed US. support for the international system. RatifYing one or more international human rights treaties would help do that. Perhaps the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which all countries except the United States and Somalia have ratified, would be a place to start now that the U.S. Supreme Court has removed one of the major objections to the treaty by declaring the execution of juveniles unconstitutional. Or closing Guantanamo Bay. Or removing the reservations to various human rights treaties that declare them nonenforceable in domestic law. Or standing for election to the UN Human Rights Council, flawed though it is, and using that forum to articulate a renewed commitment to a comprehensive human rights agenda. Or revisiting U.S. concerns about the International Criminal Court with an eye toward eventually ratifYing the Rome statutes establishing the court, or at least suspending the penalties we have leveraged against those countries that have refused to immunize Americans from prosecution by the court. If Iraq has taught us anything, it ought to have demonstrated that finding ways to deal with tyrants short of military force is to the advantage of all parties. It will need to adopt a more sophisticated, less ham-handed approach to the promotion of democracy around the globe. It ought to go without saying that human rights are served by an increase in the number of stable democracies in the world. But the key word is "stable," since we know that newly formed, unstable democratic states lacking robust civil societies and strong democratic institutions are especially prone to be breeding grounds for all sorts of mischief, not least the production of terrorists. The tragedy of the Iraq War will only be compounded if the lesson drawn from it is that, because force- . feeding democracy proved so destructive, the only alternative is quiescence. While democracy is no magic bullet, tyranny guarantees bullets aplenty. Not every nation is ready to leap into full-blown democracy on a moment's notice. But if, indeed, as worldwide surveys have found, more than 90 percent of Muslims endorse democ- Introduction 13 racy as the best form of government, what is required of us is neither perfectionism nor passivity.42 What is required of us is patience. It will need to codify the positive obligations of the United States under the newly minted doctrine of the "responsibility to protect. "Just as the Iraq War ought not sour us on promoting democracy, so we must not allow it to impose an unfitting shyness upon us about using military power for humanitarian ends. In 2005 the UN General Assembly endorsed the worldwide responsibility to protect civilian populations at risk from mass atrocities.43 That does not imply that the United States will have to be the proverbial "world's policeman," committing its troops willy-nilly to the far corners of the globe. But it does mean that the United States will need to take mass atrocities seriously, adopting an early warning system for populations in danger, shoring up weak and failing states, and providing leadership and support for intervention when necessary, even when it itself stays far away from battle. The American people can distinguish between unwise military posturing and morally justified humanitarian interventions. In January 2007, after more than three years and 3,000 U.S. deaths in Iraq, 63 percent of Americans, quite understandably, said that the world has grown more afraid of U.S. military force and that such fear undermines U.S. security by prompting other nations to seek means to protect themselves.44 Yet, even so, in a poll taken six months later, a plurality of Americans favored deploying U.S. troops as part of a multinational force in Darfur.45 If the American people can tell the difference between legitimate and illegitimate use of force, the American government ought to be able to also. It will need to conform US. practices to international standards on fundamental human rights issues. The United States will never reclaim its reputation for human rights leadership as long as its own policies on such issues as due process for prisoners taken

into custody in the course of the war on terror remain at such radical odds with international law and practice. There is considerable room for debate as to how cases of terror suspects should be adjudicated, especially when highly classified intelligence is involved-whether, for example, the United States should establish special national security courts or integrate such defendants into the regular criminal justice system46- but what is beyond doubt is that the

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current system in which suspects are cast into legal netherworlds of secret detentions and coercive interrogations cannot continue.

And in a broader sense, the United States would do well in the eyes of the world to be less defensive about its own domestic practices that may fall short of international standards. Our credibility in criticizing others waxes and wanes in direct proportion to our willingness to acknowledge our own shortcomings . We should, for example, welcome to this country any UN special rapporteur who seeks an invitation to investigate; we should encourage the solicitor general of the United States to draw upon international law to buttress the government's arguments before the Supreme Court, thereby lending encouragement to those members of the court who are beginning to look to such law to inform their opinions;47 and we should issue an annual report on U.S. human rights practices to complement the State Department's reports on other countries. Mter all, since the Chinese publish such a report on us each year, it could not hurt to publish a more accurate version of our own.

Global Warming Causes extinction Mazo 2010 – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA(Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 122)//BBThe best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded),

global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be catastrophic for the stability and security

of countries in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond

the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.

Lack of U.S. hegemony causes great power war Zhang and Shi 2011 Yuhan Zhang is a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.; Lin Shi is from Columbia University. She also serves as an independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank in Washington, D.C., 1/22, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry”, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful , liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these

circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts . However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation . For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves .’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights,

constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations . However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public

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imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry . Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by

Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and

Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re- emerge , the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

Contention 5 is Solvency:

Requiring warrants for drone surveillance resolves privacy concerns while allowing for drone use in critical national security matters- this no links all disadvantages Congress.gov 2012- “H. R. 5925” https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/5925/textTo protect individual privacy against unwarranted governmental intrusion through the use of the unmanned aerial vehicles commonly called drones, and for other purposes. ¶ Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, ¶ SECTION 1. Short title. ¶ This Act may be cited as the “Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012”. ¶ SEC. 2. Prohibited use of drones. ¶ Except as provided in section 3, a person or entity acting under the authority of the United States shall not use a drone to gather evidence or other information pertaining to criminal conduct or conduct in violation of a regulation except to the extent authorized in a warrant issued under the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. ¶ SEC. 3. Exceptions. ¶ This Act does not prohibit any of the following: ¶ (1) PATROL OF BORDERS.—The use of a drone to patrol national borders to prevent or deter illegal entry of any immigrants or illegal substances. ¶ (2) EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.—The use of a drone by a law enforcement party when exigent circumstances exist. For the purposes of this paragraph, exigent circumstances exist when the law enforcement party possesses reasonable suspicion that under particular circumstances, swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect, or destruction of evidence. ¶ (3) HIGH RISK.—The use of a drone to counter a high risk of a terrorist attack by a specific individual or organization, when the Secretary of Homeland Security determines credible intelligence indicates there is such a risk. ¶ SEC. 4. Remedies for violation. ¶ Any aggrieved party may in a civil action obtain all appropriate relief to prevent or remedy a violation of this Act. ¶ SEC. 5. Definitions. ¶ In this Act: ¶ (1) The term “drone” means any powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. ¶ (2) The term “law enforcement party” means a person or entity authorized by law to investigate or prosecute offenses against the United States.

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2AC Advantage Frontlines

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2AC Inherency

1. Ext our 1ac Washington Post and ACLU evidence- it is impossible for their authors to know the extent of federal government surveillance, our evidence states that most of this surveillance happens through fake companies set up by the FBI. Additionally, their evidence just states that Obama has required the FBI to disclose the location of drone operations, no where in this evidence does it state that the FBI will need warrants, which is the premise of the 1AC

2. Their Washington Times evidence only states that the FBI promises not to conduct warrantless surveillance. However, there is still no legal guarantee that they will not. Cross-apply our 1AC inherency evidence,

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2AC Inherency- ANSWERS TO: Obama Regulations

Obama’s directive on drones is too vague and does not fully regulate their useLevin 2015- Alan, Bloomberg, “Obama Drone Policy Gives FBI Leeway on Privacy Decisions” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-17/obama-drone-policy-gives-fbi-leeway-to-decide-what-s-privateThe White House’s attempt to set privacy policies for government agencies using drones doesn’t go far enough for civil-liberties advocates in the U.S.¶ President Barack Obama’s directive on how unmanned aircraft may be used to gather information on citizens is too vague and lacks protections such as getting a judge’s permission before using drones for surveillance, said Neema Singh Guliani, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union.¶ “That’s simply not strong enough, given how invasive drones can be,” Guliani said in an interview.¶ As aviation regulators struggled to find a way to govern the flood of drones in U.S. skies, law

enforcement agencies including the FBI began using the new technology before government-wide policies could be written.¶ Obama tried to correct that on Sunday, issuing a directive that sets limits on how unmanned aircraft may be used by federal agencies to gather information on people. While the White House said government drones must be used lawfully and “consistent with the Constitution,” civil-liberties advocates are zeroing in on another phrase in the directive: Gathering information on drones may only be done for an “authorized purpose.”¶ “The guidance is pretty vague and doesn’t act to restrict what law enforcement can use drones for.” Guliani said.

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2AC Civil Liberties

1. Extend our Foster and Petro evidence- life is not worth living without basic freedoms and a guarantee of privacy. Totalitarianism robs us of our individual worth. This answers their Cummisky evidence. A consequentialist framework presumes that each life being weighed is said to have equal and unique worth, however absent the affirmative, individuals do not have unique worth since the state does not regard the life of its citizens as an end in itself, but a means to national security.

2. Even if there are other instances of invasion of privacy we will win that drones are particularly harmful – our ACLU evidence states that routine aerial surveillance will alter the very character of American life since citizens will be perpetually watched. The routine, persistent, and inconspicuous nature of drone technology makes it different from other forms of government intrusion

3. Our evidence does state that FBI surveillance can occur without a warrant- cross apply our 1ac Washington Post and ACLU evidence, because drones can fly overhead without detection they can monitor areas of an individual’s home without explicit permission

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2AC Credibility

1. Reject their heg bad evidence- Hass only assumes the possibility of nuclear conflict. However, our Zhang and Shi evidence is in the context of conventional wars- even if a nuclear war does not occur, a shifting power balance paired with collapse of U.S. regional influence will cause conventional conflicts in the interim resulting in deaths on a large scale

2. Their global warming evidence does not sufficiently mitigate the risk of our impact- prefer our Mazo evidence, he has a PhD in climatology and makes predictive claims about anthropogenic warming, they have to prove that he is also utilizing the same flawed warming data their evidence refers to

3. There are no alternate causalities- our 1AC EFF evidence states that civil and privacy rights are the bedrock of every other human rights guarantee- the U.S. cannot be a model for human rights abroad if we compromise on our principles at home

4. There is an internal link- their 1NC stokes evidence is in the context of the NSA, extend our 1AC ACLU and Rand evidence drones are especially bad for privacy rights

5. Extend our Petro evidence- they can win every other argument on this flow and still lose the debate- all we have to do is win that the affirmative prevents the violation of civil liberties in one instance to win the debate

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2AC Innovation

1. There is an impact to food insecurity- prefer our 1AC evidence states that the prospect alone could cause conflict- as countries feel food insecure they will either stat wars to divert public attention away from food shortages or start them to gain resources

2. Drone innovation is not inevitable- extend our 1AC evidence, the commercial drone industry is still at a beginning stage. To ensure that innovation and investment continues, key privacy concerns must be resolved first

3. The Drone industry is not resilient- our evidence indicates that public opinion forms the basis of all legislation that curtails the use of commercial drones

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2AC Solvency

1. Piloted aerial surveillance does not pose the same risks to privacy as drone surveillance- extend our congress.gov evidence, the plan allows for the commercial and civilian uses for drones that their evidence refers to, it merely requires that a warrant be issued if the government wants to conduct specific investigations.

2. The plan is the best compromise between an outright ban of drones and unfettered drone usage. By requiring warrants, the plan shores up U.S. credibility and ensures the protection of key privacy rights while securing the beneficial aspects of drones.

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ANSWERS TO: Drones Bad Disadvantage

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2AC Drones Bad Disadvantage

1. The DA is not unique- counterterrorism drone operations will continue in the status quo- the U.S. just killed a top Al-Qaeda leader

L.A. Times 2015 U.S. intelligence confirms death of Al Qaeda's second-in-command http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-yemen-al-qaeda-20150615-story.html, June 16

U.S. intelligence has confirmed that a CIA drone strike has killed the founder and leader of Al Qaeda’s feared affiliate in Yemen, a significant setback to a group that has repeatedly sought to launch audacious attacks against America, U.S. officials said Tuesday.¶ Naser Abdel-Karim Wahishi was second-in-command and heir apparent to Ayman Zawahiri, who succeeded Osama Bin Laden as head of the global terrorist network. Wahishi's death is arguably the most significant strike against the group since a CIA-led raid killed Bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011.¶ Wahishi had evaded U.S. drones and counter-terrorism raids in Yemen for years while building what U.S. intelligence has called Al Qaeda's most dangerous and active franchise, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.¶ Nearly 100 people killed in Saudi-led aerial assault on Yemen¶ Nearly 100 people killed in Saudi-led aerial assault on Yemen¶ Under his leadership, AQAP repeatedly attempted to smuggle sophisticated bombs onto passenger jets and cargo planes headed for the United States. The group specialized in bombs designed to be hidden in body cavities or smuggled through airport security.¶ "Wahishi's death strikes a major blow to AQAP, Al Qaida's most dangerous affiliate, and to Al Qaeda more broadly," Ned Price, spokesman for the National Security Council, said Tuesday in a statement.¶ "Wahishi had led AQAP since its founding in 2009 and oversaw the group's plotting against the United States, U.S. interests in the Arabian Peninsula, and those of our allies in the region," he added.¶ Analysts said AQAP remains a potent threat despite the death of its leader.¶ Wahishi turned AQAP into the “most aggressive of Al Qaeda affiliates trying to target the U.S., and doing it in ways that were fairly ingenious,” said Seth Jones, a former U.S. counter-terrorism official now with the Rand Corp think tank.

2. There’s no link- the 1AC evidence they refer to makes a claim about public opinion on drones for commercial and other civilian purposes, nowhere does it claim this spills over to influence foreign policy

3. Turn- drone strikes are necessary to win the war on terrorCouncil on Foreign Relations 2013- Jonathan Masters, Deputy Editor, May 23- “Targeted Killings” http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627Drone strikes and special operations raids put fewer Americans in harm's way and provide a low-cost alternative to expensive and cumbersome conventional forces, especially given likely cuts in the U.S. defense budget and a waning public appetite for long,

expensive wars.¶ Proponents of targeted killings say the civilian death toll is exaggerated for political purposes, while claiming drone strikes and night raids remain the most effective and discreet methods of pursuing militant leaders and their networks, especially as the United States begins to seek a smaller military footprint in the region.¶ In May 2013, President Obama acknowledged incidents of civilian casualties, but said that "there is a wide gap between U.S. assessments of such casualties, and nongovernmental reports." In further defense, he said that "the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes."

4. No impact- a terrorist attack has no risk of going nuclear, groups do not have access to nuclear materialMichael, 2012 (Professor Nuclear Counterprolif and Deterrence at Air Force Counterprolif Center, 2012 (George, March, “Strategic Nuclear Terrorism and the Risk of State Decapitation” Defence Studies, Vol 12 Issue 1, p 67-105, T&F Online)Despite the alarming prospect of nuclear terrorism, the obstacles to obtaining such capabilities are formidable. There are several

pathways that terrorists could take to acquire a nuclear device. Seizing an intact nuclear weapon would be the most direct method. However, neither nuclear weapons nor nuclear technology has proliferated to the degree that some observers once feared . Although nuclear weapons have been around for over 65 years, the so-called

nuclear club stands at only nine members. 72 Terrorists could attempt to purloin a weapon from a nuclear stockpile; however, absconding with a nuclear weapon would be

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problematical because of tight security measures at installations .¶ Alternatively, a terrorist group could attempt to acquire a bomb through an illicit transaction, but there is no real well-developed black market for illicit nuclear materials . Still, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons around the world presents the risk of theft and diversion. 73 In 1997, the Russian General, Alexander Lebed, alleged that 84 ‘suitcase’ bombs were missing from the Russian military

arsenal, but later recanted his statements. 74 American officials generally remain unconvinced of Lebed’s story insofar as they were never mentioned in any Soviet war plans. 75 Presumably, the financial requirements for a transaction involving nuclear weapons would be very high, as states have spent millions and billions of dollars to obtain their arsenals. 76 Furthermore, transferring such sums of money could raise red flags, which would present opportunities for authorities to uncover the plot . When pursuing nuclear transactions, terrorist groups would be vulnerable to sting operations. 77¶ Even if terrorists acquired an intact nuclear weapon, the group would still have to bypass or defeat various safeguards, such as permissive action

links (PALs), and safing, arming, fusing, and firing (SAFF) procedures. Both US and Russian nuclear weapons are outfitted with complicated physical and electronic locking mechanisms. 78 Nuclear weapons in other countries are usually stored partially disassembled, which would make purloining a fully functional weapon very challenging . 79¶ Failing to acquire a nuclear weapon, a terrorist group could endeavor to fabricate its own Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). For years, the US government has explored the possibility of a clandestine group fabricating a nuclear weapon. The so-called Nth Country Experiment examined the technical problems facing a nation that endeavored to build a small stockpile of nuclear weapons. Launched in 1964, the experiment sought to determine whether a minimal team –in this case, two young American physicists with PhDs and without nuclear-weapons design knowledge –could design a workable nuclear weapon with a militarily significant yield. After three man-years of effort, the two novices succeeded in a hypothetical test of their device. 80 In 1977, the US Office of Technology Assessment concluded that a small terrorist group could develop and detonate a crude nuclear device without access to classified material and without access to a great deal of technological equipment. Modest machine shop facilities could be contracted for purposes of constructing the device. 81¶ Numerous experts have weighed in on the workability of

constructing an IND. Hans Bethe, the Nobel laureate who worked on the Manhattan Project, once calculated that a minimum of six highly-trained persons representing the right expertise would be required to fabricate a nuclear device . 82 A hypothetical scenario developed by Peter Zimmerman, a former chief scientist for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Jeffrey G. Lewis, the former executive director of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University’s Belfer

Center for Science and International Affairs, concluded that a team of 19 persons could build a nuclear device in the United States for about $10 million. 83¶ The most crucial step in the IND pathway is acquiring enough fissile material for the weapon . According to some estimates, roughly 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium or 8 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium would be required to support a self-sustaining fission chain reaction. 84 It would be virtually impossible for a terrorist group to create its own fissile material. Enriching uranium, or producing plutonium in a nuclear reactor, is far beyond the scope of any terrorist organization. 85 However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which maintains a database, confirmed 1,562 incidents of smuggling encompassing trade in nuclear materials or radioactive sources. Fifteen incidents involved

HEU or plutonium. 86 Be that as it may, according to the IAEA, the total of all known thefts of HEU around the world between 1993 and 2006 amounted to less than eight kilograms, far short of the estimated minimum 25 kilograms necessary for a crude improvised nuclear device. 87 An amount of fissile material adequate for a workable nuclear device would be difficult to procure from one source or in one transaction. However, terrorists could settle on less demanding standards. According to an article in Scientific American, a nuclear device could be fabricated with as little as 60 kilograms of HEU (defined as concentrated to levels of 20 percent for more of the uranium 235 isotope). 88 Although enriching uranium is well nigh impossible for terrorist groups, approximately 1,800 tons of HEU was created during the Cold War, mostly by the United States and the Soviet Union. 89 Collective efforts, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the G-8 Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, have done much to secure nuclear weapons and fissile materials, but the job is far from complete. 90 And other problems are on the horizon. For instance, the number of nuclear reactors is projected to double by the end of the century, though many, if not most, will be fueled with low-enriched uranium (LEU). With this development, comes the risk of diversion as HEU and plutonium stockpiles will be plentiful in civilian sectors. 91¶ Plutonium is more available around the world

than HEU and smuggling plutonium would be relatively easy insofar as it commonly comes in two-pound bars or gravel-like pellets. 92 Constructing an IND from plutonium, though,

would be much more challenging insofar as it would require the more sophisticated implosion-style design that would require highly trained engineers working in well-equipped labs . 93 But, if an implosion device does not detonate precisely as intended, then it would probably be more akin to a radiological dispersion device, rather than a mushroom. Theoretically, plutonium could be used in a gun-assembly weapon, but the detonation would probably result in an unimpressive fizzle, rather than a

substantial explosion with a yield no greater than 10 to 20 tons of TNT, which would still be much greater than one from a conventional explosive. 94¶ But even assuming that fissile material could be acquired, the terrorist group would still need the technical expertise to complete the required steps to assemble a nuclear device. Most experts believe that constructing a gun-assembly weapon would pose no significant technological barriers. 95 Luis Alvarez once asserted that a fairly high-level nuclear

explosion could be occasioned just by dropping one piece of weapons-grade uranium onto another. He may, however, have exaggerated the ease with which terrorists could fabricate a nuclear device. 96¶ In sum, the hurdles that a terrorist group would have to overcome to build or acquire a nuclear bomb are very high. If states that aspire to obtain nuclear capability face serious difficulties, it would follow that it would be even more challenging for terrorist groups with far fewer resources and a without a secure geographic area in which to undertake such a project . The difficulty of developing a viable nuclear weapon is illustrated by the case of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which after 20 years of effort and over ten billion dollars spent, failed to produce a functional bomb by the time the country was defeated in the 1991 Gulf War. 97 Nevertheless, the quality of a nuclear device for a non-state entity would presumably be much lower as it would not be necessary to meet the same quality standards of

states when fabricating their nuclear weapons. Nor would the device have to be weaponized and mated with a delivery system.¶ In order to be successful, terrorists must succeed at each stage of the plot. With clandestine activities, the probability of security leaks increases with the number of persons involved. 98 The plot would require not only highly competent technicians, but also unflinching loyalty and discipline from the participants. A strong central authority would be necessary to coordinate the numerous operatives involved in the acquisition and delivery of the weapon. Substantial funding to procure the materials with which to build a bomb would be necessary , unless a weapon was conveyed to the group by a state or some criminal entity. 99 Finally, a network of competent and dedicated operatives would be required to arrange the transport of the weapon across national borders without detection, which could be challenging considering heightened security measures, including gamma ray detectors. 100 Such a combination of steps spread throughout each stage of the plot would be daunting. 101¶ As Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier once

pointed out, in setting the parameters of nuclear terrorism, the laws of physics are both kind and cruel. In a sense, they are kind insofar as the essential ingredients for a bomb are very difficult to produce . However, they are also cruel in the sense that while it is not easy to make a nuclear bomb, it is not as difficult as believed once the essential ingredients are in hand. 102 Furthermore, as more and more countries undergo industrialization concomitant with the diffusion of technology and expertise, the hurdles for acquiring these ingredients are now more likely to be surmounted, though HEU is still hard to procure illicitly. In a global economy, dual-use technologies circulate around the world along with the scientific personnel who design and use them. 103 And although both the US and Russian governments have substantially reduced their arsenals since the end of the Cold War, many warheads remain. 104 Consequently, there are still many nuclear weapons that could fall into the wrong hands.

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ANSWERS TO: Ban Drones Counterplan

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2AC Ban Drones Counterplan

1. Perm do both- the COUNTERPLAN and the plan are not mutually exclusive, the USFG could ban its use of unpiloted aerial vehicles and require warrants in the event that they’re used

2. Perm do the COUNTERPLAN- the COUNTERPLAN is not textually competitive- the plan text states that the USFG curtail its use of unpiloted aerial vehicles, this is synonymous with banning

Curtail means to limitMerriam Webster Dictionary curtail

verb cur·tail \(ˌ)kər-ˈtāl\

: to reduce or limit (something)

3. The affirmative’s innovation advantage is a disadvantage to the counterplan- our evidence indicates that the commercial drone industry is key to solve agricultural shortages, which prevent global war from food scarcity- public opinion, is crucial to bolster the commercial drone industry. By banning drones, the counterplan shifts public opinion, collapsing commercial drones

4. The counterplan cannot solve our credibility advantage- reform is key. The counterplan is perceived as the U.S. taking drastic measures because they cannot ensure privacy through reform, the plan is perceived as a commitment to 4th amendment rights – additionally, they have conceded that drone use is inevitable, it is only a question of whether the USFG can be a model for responsible use of the technology

5. Add-on Drone technology is key to the aerospace industryMehta 2013 (Aaron Mehta, “States Jockey To Lure UAV Industry”, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130815/DEFREG02/308150009/States-Jockey-Lure-UAV-Industry, August 15, 2013)WASHINGTON — At this week’s Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) annual conference, the show floor was packed with UAV models, video presentations and the ubiquitous free pens. But even among the noise and clutter of a trade show, the giant, blue-faced, inflatable Yeti stood out. He was the property of the Utah Governor’s Office of Economic Development, and his goal was to remind passersby that the Beehive State is open for business when it comes to unmanned systems. While some states are fighting to keep unmanned systems out of their airspace — one Colorado town recently proposed legislation to offer hunting licenses for drones — others are betting they can lure industry to their region using tax breaks and other incentives. And many of those states were represented at AUVSI, with booths that rival those of large corporations. Among states with a presence at the show: Utah, North Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Oklahoma, Florida and Wyoming. The biggest prize at the table is one of six slots in a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) program creating test zones for unmanned vehicles. The FAA is expected to name its choices in December, and those selected stand to win big with an industry that continues to grow. “UAVs are the forefront of the

aerospace industry at this point,” said Marshall Wright, director of business development with the Governor’s Office of

Economic Development in Utah. “The kinds of systems that are going to lead the technology of aerospace for many,

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many years.” He points to over 50 companies that already have offices in Utah as proof the state has the technical and intellectual base to become a hub for the UAV industry.

The aerospace industry is key to overall economic growth Faux 2002 (Jeff Faux, Ex-President and Distinguished Fellow of Economic Policy Institute, Studied, taught and published on a wide variety of economic and political issues from the global economy to neighborhood community development, from monetary policy to political strategy. He is the author or co-author of six books, the latest being, The Servant Economy: Where America’s Elite is Sending the Middle Class (Wiley, 2012).Economic Policy Institute, “The Aerospace Sector as a National Asset—Viewpoint”, http://www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures_viewpoints_airspace_natlasset/, May 14, 2002)

The aerospace industry is a unique strategic asset for America. In addition to its obvious national security benefits, the industry makes, and must continue to make, a critical contribution to our economic growth and rising living standards. U.S. aerospace is a major source of:

Technological innovation with substantial spillovers to other industrial and commercial sectors. High wage employment, which spreads the

benefits of rising productivity throughout the U.S. economy. Exports, which America will need to substantially increase in order to resolve the growing

problem of our current account deficit and rising foreign debt. Thus, a healthy aerospace industry ought to be a primary goal of our nation’s economic policy. It represents the cumulative private and public investments of past decades. Allowing it to wither is, in effect, a national decision to abandon those investments.

Lack of economic growth causes nuclear war Khalilzad 2011 (United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992 (Zalmay, 2/8, “The Economy and National Security,” 2-8, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad, February 8, 2011)

We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China,

India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races,

miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in

their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today.

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http://www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures_viewpoints_airspace_natlasset/


*** Drone Negative

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1NC Advantage Frontlines

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1NC Inherency FRONTLINE

1. The affirmative is not inherent, the federal government is increasing oversight of drone use in the status quoWashington Post 2015- “FAA rules might allow thousands of business drones”, Feb 15 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/faa-releases-proposed-rules-for-domestic-drone-use/2015/02/15/6787bdce-b51b-11e4-a200-c008a01a6692_story.htmlWhile the FAA rules are designed to exploit the economic potential of drones without jeopardizing aviation safety, the order issued Sunday by President Obama is intended to safeguard personal privacy and require the federal government to be more forthcoming about when and where it uses drones to conduct surveillance.¶ All federal agencies, for example, would have to disclose where they conduct drone operations within the United States, as well as their policies for storing and protecting personal information collected from surveillance flights. Agencies would also have to issue an annual report detailing the types

of missions they flew in the previous year.¶ The order will have a large impact on the Defense Department and law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, which uses drones to patrol the nation’s borders.

The FBI has been especially secretive about its drone operations, even ducking lawmakers’ queries about how many it has and how often they are used.¶ “It is a very big deal and a very positive step,” said Lisa Ellman, a former Justice Department official who helped prepare the presidential order and works on drone issues as a lawyer in private practice. The agencies, she said, “understand that even with all the benefits of drones, the American public has concerns — concerns about privacy and concerns about accountability.”¶ In addition, Obama directed the Commerce Department to work with companies and the drone industry to develop a voluntary code of conduct for the private sector regarding surveillance and privacy protections.

2. The FBI does not undertake long-term, warrantless, surveillance missions- specific, targeted instances do not violate the 4th amendment Washington Times 2013- Stephan Dinan, July 29, “FBI says it doesn’t need warrant to use drones” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/29/fbi-says-it-doesnt-need-warrant-use-drones/The FBI has told Congress it does not need to get a warrant to conduct surveillance with drones, in a letter laying out some of the top federal law enforcement agency’s policies for how it uses unmanned aerial vehicles.¶ In a July 19 letter to Sen. Rand Paul, Stephen D. Kelly, assistant director for the FBI’s congressional liaison office, said the agency has used drones in 10 instances, including twice for “national security” cases and eight times for criminal cases. The FBI authorized the use of drones in three other criminal cases but didn’t deploy them.¶

Then, in a follow-up letter Mr. Paul released Monday, Mr. Kelly said they don’t believe they ever need to obtain a warrant to conduct drone surveillance as long as it’s done within guidelines .¶ He said they take their lead from several Supreme Court

cases that don’t deal directly with drones but do cover manned aerial surveillance. In those cases the court ruled that a long as the areas observed were in public view and no law enforcement officer was trespassing, no privacy rights were violated.¶ In one case a

concurring opinion by one of the justices said that there could be a problem if an agency were conducting long-term warrantless surveillance of someone in public, because that could constitute an unreasonable search in violation of the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.¶ “We do not use UAVs to undertake such surveillance, ” Mr. Kelly said.¶ Mr. Paul had been holding up the nomination of James B. Comey Jr. to become the new FBI director, using the blockade as a way to try to force the administration to divulge more information on the FBI’s drone surveillance.¶ Current Director Robert S. Mueller III revealed the agency’s use of drones in a congressional hearing earlier this summer.

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http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/faa-releases-proposed-rules-for-domestic-drone-use/2015/02/15/6787bdce-b51b-11e4-a200-c008a01a6692_story.html


1NC Civil Liberties FRONTLINE

1. Reject the affirmative’s impact framing- the judge should vote for the team whose policy saves the most amount of lives, this is the most ethical framework for the debate

Cummiskey 1990 David, Professor of Philosophy, Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstorWe must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons . Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational

beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings , but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings . Persons

may have "dignity, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), but, as rational beings, persons also have a fundamental equality which dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others. The formula of the

end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many . [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance

2. Privacy invasions are inevitable- drone technology is not uniquely harmfulThompson 2013 – Richard, legislative attorney, April, “Drones in Domestic Surveillance Operations: Fourth Amendment Implications and Legislative Responses” Congressional Research Service https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf

The crucial question, then, is whether drones have the potential to be significantly more invasive than traditional surveillance technologies such as manned aircraft or low-powered cameras— technologies that have been upheld in previous cases. In this vein, some have asked whetherusing sophisticated digital platforms on a drone is any different from attaching the same instrument to a lamppost or traditional aircraft.108 Take, for example, the tracking of license plates. Currently, many states and municipalities employ automatic license plate readers(ALPRs), which are usually mounted on police vehicles or stationary objects along the streets, totake a snapshot of a license plate as a car drives by, and store this information in a large database for possible later use by law enforcement.109 It is alleged that these devices can be used to track a person’s movements when police aggregate the data from a multitude of ALPR

stations.110 A majority of the reviewing federal circuit courts have held that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his license plate number.111

3. Reject their internal link evidence- Malko does not say that drone use would undermine the 4 th amendment, just that the FBI will use the technology, they have to prove that these searches would occur without a warrant

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1NC Credibility FRONTLINE

1. There is no impact to a decline in hegemony- unipolarity does not prevent conflict Haas, 2008 (Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html)

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

2. There is no impact to global warming- most data on climate change is flawedContescu 2012– Professor Emeritus of Geology and Geography at Roosevelt University, Ph.D. (Lorin, "600 MILION YEARS OF CLIMATE CHANGE; A CRITIQUE OF THE ANTHROPOGENIC GLOBAL WARMING HYPOTESIS FROM A TIME-SPACE PERSPECTIVE”, Geo-Eco-Marina, 2012, Issue 18, pgs. 5-25, peer reviewed, Proquest,)

It is true that temperatures are collected throughout the world, but this is not really a correct statement since 90% of the measuring stations are and were emplaced and located on land . Of these, a clear majority covered the territories of North America and Europe. Observations from Asia , South America and Africa were much sparser and the measuring stations were antiquated so that the information they provided was less reliable . But the most important reservation concerning the accuracy of data from measuring stations is their emplacement in or near the cities or towns which are known as " urban heat islands ". The buildings , the pavement , the buses and cars , are all traps of heat that they release later, distorting the temperature of the area . It is claimed that appropriate means and statistical measures were taken to clean and correct the data, but it is doubtful that such measures have been taken in all urban agglomerations, but the real large ones. Thus, some scientists are convinced that "Earth's surface thermometers are heavily skewed by urban heat islands and overstate surface warming by as much as 40%" (Singer and Avery, 2007).

3. There are numerous alternate casualties to a decline in U.S. credibility on human rights: the failure to close Guantanamo, the PATRIOT ACT, and counterterrorism drone strikes non-unique their internal link

4. There’s no internal link- global perception of U.S. civil liberties has little bearing on U.S. credibility

Stokes 2014- Bruce, director of global economic attitudes at the Pew Research Center http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/30/did-nsa-snooping-hurt-u-s-image-not-so-much/ But U.S. spying has tarnished America’s image as a staunch defender of the personal freedoms of its own people, long one of the positive attributes of U.S. soft power.¶ Admiration for America as a defender of such civil liberties has dropped significantly in 22 of 36 nations where there is comparable data for 2013 and 2014. NSA actions have particularly hurt the U.S. reputation in Brazil, where belief that Uncle Sam respects Americans’ freedoms is down 25 percentage points, and in

Germany, where it is down 23 points. Drops of 20 points or more are also found in El Salvador, Pakistan, Argentina, Spain and Russia. ¶ Still, half or more of

the public in 33 of 44 nations surveyed still think that Washington safeguards Americans’ freedoms . And the U.S.

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image as a protector of personal liberties remains quite strong in a number of Asian nations: South Korea, Philippines, Japan and

Vietnam; and also in the Middle East, in Lebanon and Israel.¶ NSA spying has also helped erode President Obama’s standing in some countries. A median of 56 percent in the 43 countries outside the United States have confidence in Obama to do the right thing in world affairs, largely unchanged from last year. But his image is down 17 percentage points in both Germany and Brazil, again the countries where Obama

administration’s alleged spying on their leaders was a major domestic issue.¶ But revelations of NSA snooping have had no appreciable effect on America’s overall standing in the world. A global median of 65 percent see the United States in a favorable light. And the global public’s judgment of the United States is largely unchanged from 2013.

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1NC Innovation FRONTLINE

1. No impact to food insecurity- several studies prove there is no correlation between a lack of food and conflict

Salehyan 2007 – Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas (Idean, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, August 13 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922)

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

2. Drone innovation is inevitable- the plan’s boost in not necessaryMcNeal, 2014 Gregory, professor at Pepperdine University School of Law and a contributor to Forbes. He is an expert in law and public policy with a specific focus on security, technology and crime. Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations For Legislators, November http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/10/drones-aerial-surveillance-legislators/Drones_Aerial_Surveillance_McNeal_FINAL.pdf?la=en, /Bingham-MBThe domestic use of drones by law enforcement is a popular topic following passage of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. The act directed that the FAA must integrate unmanned aircraft systems—drones—into the

national airspace by September of 2015 . A number of organizations have expressed concern over the possibility that thousands of drones will be crowding the skies, some armed with sophisticated cameras. The ACLU, for example, has been quite vocal in its criticism releasing a report that sets out their concerns over the prospect of intrusive aerial surveillance without proper safeguards. While a robust public debate over the use of domestic drones is warranted, the conclusion that widespread privacy violations are imminent is premature. While the FAA Modernization and Reform Act seeks the integration of unmanned aircraft into U.S. airspace by September 30, 2015, most of the provisions dealing with unmanned aircraft create a broad framework under which the FAA can explore the uses and feasibility of integration of this new technology. The key sections of the law direct the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the FAA to draft plans, standards, and rules to ensure that drone integration proceeds in a safe and legal manner. In short, this is a public process where civil liberties and privacy groups will no doubt have a voice in crafting rules, and that voice seems to be at least as effective as the industry association’s voice. What is left out of the process is what state and local governments will do with the technology, and that is the primary focus of this paper.

3. The Drone industry is resilient- it can withstand a lack of public support Thompson 2015 (Cadie Thompson, CNBC, “Here’s where the real money is in drones”, http://www.cnbc.com/id/102676023, May 13, 2015)The drone industry is expected to climb to a whopping $8.4 billion by 2019, according to ABI Research. But most of that growth won't

come from selling hardware. Instead, it's all the applications and services on top of the hardware (sometimes literally), that hold the big 90

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opportunity, said industry experts. All about commercial drone services "Application services, data services, licensing and legal services—once you start adding all of this into the mix, the size of the marketplace starts growing very, very quickly," said Dan Kara, an ABI Research analyst, at the RoboUniverse Conference this week in New York. "The money to be made is actually in the application space to a large degree," he said. Companies playing in this space include those like PrecisionHawk—which combines unmanned aerial systems with information delivery and sensing technologies to enhance business operations for a slew of different industries—and Airware, a developer of drone software, hardware and cloud services. "So the services [offered by drones] are stored, manipulated and optimized depending on what you are looking for. It's then georeferenced and tagged in a way that you can access that data in the cloud," Kara said. "So really what it is is not a drone delivery platform, it's actually an information services architecture." Last month, Airware launched an operating system for commercial drones to help big companies both scale their drone operations, and to help them adhere to safety regulations and insurance requirements. Read More Drone driver Airware ready to take flight "Big companies like GE, they can take a small consumer system, and they can take some pictures, but what happens when they need to use hundreds of them?" said Jesse Kallman, director of business development and regulatory affairs for Airware. "How do you do that safely and reliably? How do you do that at scale? How do you get certification for these types of systems?" Kallman said. "[Big companies] are not going to use this technology unless it's proven to be safe," he said. Read More FAA makes big step for drones Follow the money In total, VC funding in drone companies was more than $108 million across 29 deals in 2014, according to data from CB Insights. According to the research firm, Airware was the best-funded drone start-up in 2014, having raised a total of $40 million from venture capital firms including Kleiner Perkins Caufield Byers, Andreessen Horowitz and First Round Capital. Last month, the company also received an undisclosed investment amount from Intel Capital, which is also invested in PrecisionHawk. "It's a data play. We are going to sell servers and we are going to sell chipsets based on

getting this new class of information that we couldn't get before in the same degree in the same amounts," Kara said. Traditional drone suppliers both in the

consumer and military space are aware this is where the money is flowing and are all trying to get a piece of the action, he said. For example, more consumer-focused drone makers are adding more advanced capabilities, and military drones, which are typically single-purpose, are beginning to add more technologies so that they can be used for many different scenarios. "Every drone supplier knows this, they recognize this. So you see the military and civil guys moving down and adding new technologies and the prosumer folks are also upgrading their systems," Kara said.

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1NC Solvency FRONTLINE

1. Turn- the aff’s characterization of drones is overblown- their insistence on regulating drones leaves the most pernicious forms of piloted aerial surveillance intactMcNeal 2014- Gregory, professor, Pepperdine University, School of Law, “Drones and ¶ Aerial Surveillance: ¶

Considerations For Legislators” Brookings Institute http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/10/drones-aerial-surveillance-legislators/Drones_Aerial_Surveillance_McNeal_FINAL.pdf?la=enThe looming prospect of expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles, colloquially known as drones, has raised understandable concerns for lawmakers.[1] Those concerns have led some to call for legislation mandating that nearly all uses of drones be prohibited unless the government has first obtained a warrant. Privacy advocates have mounted a lobbying campaign that has succeeded in convincing thirteen states to enact laws regulating the use of drones by law enforcement, with eleven of those thirteen states requiring a warrant before the government may use a drone.[2] The campaigns mounted by privacy advocates oftentimes make a

compelling case about the threat of pervasive surveillance, but the legislation is rarely tailored in such a way to prevent the harm that advocates fear . In fact, in every state where legislation was passed, the new laws are focused on the technology (drones) not the harm (pervasive surveillance). In many cases, this technology centric approach creates perverse results, allowing the use of extremely sophisticated pervasive surveillance technologies from manned aircraft, while disallowing benign uses of drones for mundane tasks like accident and crime scene documentation, or monitoring of industrial pollution and other environmental harms.

2. Requiring warrants does not resolve key privacy issues with drones- their 1AC Congress.gov evidence indicates that law enforcement can still use drone technology “in the case of emergencies” this is the status quo policy and it has been abused

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2NC/1NR Advantage Frontline Extensions

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2NC/1NR Inherency

1. Extend our 1NC Washington Post Evidence, Obama directed the FAA to disclose the locations of drone operations, this should at the very least take out solvency for their credibility advantage

2. Extend our Washington Times Evidence- prefer this to their ACLU evidence- the ACLU is making unsubstantiated claims about the possible risk of drones, not their current status or use. Our evidence states that the FBI has only used drones without a warrant in a handful of cases

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2NC/1NR Civil Liberties

1. Extend our Cummisky evidence this answers their ethics framing- Cummisky says that only a consequentialist framework guarantees equality since every life has an equal weight in the risk calculus

2. Extend our Thompson evidence, drones are not a unique threat to privacy, automatic license plate readers, and other NSA-type surveillance measures by the USFG are all alternate causalities

3. Obama’s new drone directive addresses many of the civil liberties concerns associated with drone use- the affirmative is unnecessary

Forbes 2015- Gregory S. McNeal, contributor “What You Need To Know About The Federal Government's Drone Privacy Rules” http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2015/02/15/the-drones-are-coming-heres-what-president-obama-thinks-about-privacy/The President requires Federal agencies to examine their drone policies prior to the adoption of new drone technology and at least every three years thereafter. The Order notes that drones must only be used in a matter consistent with the Constitution, Federal law, and other applicable regulations and policies. It also reaffirms that individuals have the right to seek access to and amendment of records associated with drone usage.¶ The President created new requirements for the collection of

information by drones. The Order requires that agencies only collect information “to the extent that such collection or use is consistent with and relevant to an authorized purpose.” Information collected by drones that is not maintained in a system of records covered by the Privacy Act, shall not be disseminated outside the agency unless dissemination is required by law, or fulfills an authorized purpose and complies with agency requirements. If information collected using drones contains personally identifiable information (PII) that information shall not be retained for more than 180 days unless the retention is determined to be: necessary to an authorized mission of the retaining agency, maintained in a system of records covered by the Privacy Act, or is required to be retained for a longer period by any other applicable law or regulation.

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2NC/1NR Credibility

1. Extend our 1NC Haas evidence- even if their Zhang and Shi evidence is in the context of conventional conflict, Haas indicates that the presence of nuclear weapons is a check on nuclear conflict- only a nuclear war would cause extinction

2. Extend our Contescu evidence, the climate models their author uses is based on faulty data, here’s more evidence

Michaels and Knappenberger- 2013, (*Chip Knappenberger is the assistant director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute, and coordinates the scientific and outreach activities for the Center. He has over 20 years of experience in climate research and public outreach, including 10 years with the Virginia State Climatology Office and 15 years as the Research Coordinator for New Hope Environmental Services, Inc, **Patrick J. Michaels is the director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute. Michaels is a past president of the American Association of State Climatologists and was program chair for the Committee on Applied Climatology of the American Meteorological Society. He was a research professor of Environmental Sciences at University of Virginia for thirty years. Michaels was a contributing author and is a reviewer of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Chanage, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007, “With or Without a “Pause” Climate Models Still Project Too Much Warming”, [ http://www.cato.org/blog/or-without-pause-climate-models-still-project-too-much-warming ] //)

A new paper just hit the scientific literature that argues that the apparent pause in the rise in global average surface temperatures during the past 16 years was really just a slowdown. As you may imagine, this paper, by Kevin Cowtan and Robert Way is being hotly discussed in the global warming blogs, with reaction ranging from a warm embrace by the global-warming-is-going-to-be-bad-for-us crowd to revulsion from the human-activities-have-no-effect-on-the-climate claque. The lukewarmers (a school we take some credit for establishing) seem to be taking the results in stride. After all, the “pause” as curious as it is/was, is not central to the primary argument that, yes, human activities are pressuring the planet to warm, but that the rate of warming is going to be much slower than is being projected by the collection of global climate models (upon which mainstream projections of future climate change—and the resulting climate alarm (i.e., calls for emission regulations, etc.)—are based). Under the adjustments to the observed global temperature history put together by Cowtan and Way, the models fare a bit better than they do with the unadjusted temperature record. That is, the observed temperature trend over the past 34 years (the period of record analyzed by Cowtan and Way) is a tiny bit closer to the average trend from the collection of climate models used in the new report from the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) than is the old temperature record. Specifically, while the trend in observed global temperatures from 1979-2012 as calculated by Cowtan and Way is 0.17°C/decade, it is 0.16°C/decade in the temperature record compiled by the U.K. Hadley Center (the record that Cowtan and Way adjusted). Because of the sampling errors associated with trend estimation, these values are not significantly different from one another. Whether the 0.17°C/decade is significantly different from the climate model average simulated trend during that period of 0.23°C/decade is discussed extensively below. But, suffice it to say that an insignificant difference of 0.01°C/decade in the global trend measured over more than 30 years is pretty small beer and doesn’t give model apologists very much to get happy over. Instead, the attention is being deflected to “The Pause”—the leveling off of global surface temperatures during the past 16 years (give or take). Here, the new results from Cowtan and Way show that during the period 1997-2012, instead of a statistically insignificant rise at a rate of 0.05°C/decade as is contained in the “old” temperature record, the rise becomes a statistically significant 0.12°C/decade. “The Pause” is transformed into “The Slowdown” and alarmists rejoice because global warming hasn’t stopped after all. (If the logic sounds backwards, it does to us as well, if you were worried about catastrophic global warming, wouldn’t you rejoice at findings that indicate that future climate change was going to be only modest, more so than results to the contrary?) The science behind the new Cowtan and Way research is still being digested by the community of climate scientists and other interested parties alike. The main idea is that the existing compilations of the global average temperature are very data-sparse in the high latitudes. And since the Arctic (more so than the Antarctic) is warming faster than the global average, the lack of data there may mean that the global average temperature trend may be underestimated. Cowtan and Way developed a methodology which relied on other limited sources of temperature information from the Arctic (such as floating buoys and satellite observations) to try to make an estimate of how the surface temperature was behaving in regions lacking more traditional temperature observations (the authors released an informative video explaining their research which may better help you understand what they did). They found that the warming in the data-sparse regions was progressing faster than the global average (especially during the past couple of years) and that when they included the data that they derived for these regions in the computation of the global average temperature, they found the global trend was higher than previously reported—just how much higher depended on the period over which the trend was calculated. As we showed, the trend more than doubled over the period from 1997-2012, but barely increased at all over the longer period 1979-2012. Figure 1 shows the impact on the global average temperature trend for all trend lengths between 10 and 35 years (incorporating our educated guess as to what the 2013 temperature anomaly will be), and compares that to the distribution of climate model simulations of the same period. Statistically speaking, instead of there being a clear inconsistency (i.e., the observed trend value falls outside of the range which encompasses 95% of all modeled trends) between the observations and the climate mode simulations for lengths ranging generally from 11 to 28 years and a marginal inconsistency (i.e., the observed trend value falls outside of the range which encompasses 90% of all modeled trends) for most of the other lengths, now the observations track closely the marginal inconsistency line, although trends of length 17, 19, 20, 21 remain clearly inconsistent with the collection of modeled trends. Still, throughout the entirely of the 35-yr period (ending in 2013), the observed trend lies far below the model average simulated trend (additional information on the impact of the new Cowtan and Way adjustments on modeled/observed temperature comparison can be found here). The Cowtan and Way analysis is an attempt at using additional types of temperature information, or extracting “information” from records that have already told their stories, to fill in the missing data in the Arctic. There are concerns about the appropriateness of both the data sources and the methodologies applied to them. A major one is in the applicability of satellite data at such high latitudes. The nature of the satellite’s orbit forces it to look “sideways” in order to sample polar regions. In fact, the orbit is such that the highest latitude areas cannot be seen at all. This is compounded by the fact that cold regions can develop substantial “inversions” of near-ground temperature, in which temperature actually rises with height such that there is not a straightforward relationship between the surface temperature and the temperature of the lower atmosphere where the satellites measure the temperature. If the nature of this complex relationship is not constant in time, an error is introduced into the Cowtan and Way analysis. Another unresolved problem

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comes up when extrapolating land-based weather station data far into the Arctic Ocean. While land temperatures can bounce around a lot, the fact that much of the ocean is partially ice-covered for many months. Under “well-mixed” conditions, this forces the near-surface temperature to be constrained to values near the freezing point of salt water , whether or not the associated land station is much warmer or colder. You can run this experiment yourself by filling a glass with a mix of ice and water and then making sure it is well mixed. The water surface temperature must hover around 33°F until all the ice melts. Given that the near-surface temperature is close to the water temperature, the limitations of land data become obvious. Considering all of the above, we advise caution with regard to Cowtan and Way’s findings. While adding high arctic data should increase the observed trend, the nature of the data means that the amount of additional rise is subject to further revision. As they themselves note, there’s quite a bit more work to be done this area. In the meantime, their results have tentatively breathed a small hint of life back into the climate models, basically buying them a bit more time—time for either the observed temperatures to start rising rapidly as current models expect, or, time for the modelers to try to fix/improve cloud processes, oceanic processes, and other process of variability (both natural and anthropogenic) that lie behind what would be the clearly overheated projections. We’ve also taken a look at how “sensitive” the results are to the length of the ongoing pause/slowdown. Our educated guess is that the “bit” of time that the Cowtan and Way findings bought the models is only a few years long, and it is a fact, not a guess, that each additional year at the current rate of lukewarming increases the disconnection between the models and reality.

3. The NSA is an alternate casualty to the affirmative- reports of widespread snooping have eroded international confidence in U.S. privacy rights

Washington Post 2014- July 14, “America’s ‘freedom’ reputation is on the decline a year after NSA revelations” https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/07/14/americas-freedom-reputation-is-on-the-decline-a-year-after-nsa-revelations/A main selling point of the U.S. brand on the international stage has long been summed up with the screech of eagles and one word: "Freedom." But in the wake of the revelations about U.S. surveillance programs from former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden last year, the world is less convinced of the U.S.'s respect for personal freedoms according to new survey results from Pew Research.¶ The Snowden revelations appear to have damaged one major element of America’s global image: its reputation for protecting individual liberties. In 22 of 36 countries surveyed in both 2013 and 2014,

people are significantly less likely to believe the U.S. government respects the personal freedoms of its citizens . In six

nations, the decline was 20 percentage points or more.¶ ¶ Pew calls this decline "the Snowden Effect." And some of the drops are significant -- especially in countries where NSA surveillance received major domestic news coverage like Germany and Brazil.

4. Extend our 1NC Stokes evidence- double bind, either a) NSA snooping has no effect on overall U.S. credibility, which means surveillance measures are not perceived internationally or b) NSA snooping did have an effect abroad which means the affirmative’s internal link is not unique and we should have seen the effects of a decline in hegemony

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2NC/1NR Innovation

1. Prefer our Salehyan evidence- there is no correlation between food shortages and conflict- he cites multiple studies that prove a lack of food means countries do not have the resources to wage war

2. Extend our 1NC McNeal evidence- the drone industry is a burgeoning one- lack of public confidence will change the billion dollar potential of the industry for investors

3. Extend our 1NC Thompson evidence- prefer this evidence it makes predictions about what the commercial drone industry will be like in

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2NC/1NR Solvency

1. Extend our 1NC McNeal evidence- by focusing on unpiloted surveillance, the affirmative leaves piloted instances of surveillance intact, our evidence indicates that piloted surveillance poses a greater threat to civil liberties

2. Requiring warrants does not solve the affirmative’s internal links- the status quo requires warrants before searches, however, drones can hover over any area undetected, which means surveillance will continue even with warrants. The affirmative only regulates usage without addressing the technology itself.

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Advantage Frontline Extensions

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ANSWERS TO: Inherency- Extensions

Obama’s new drone directive solves the affirmative- it prohibits the use of federal funds for drones that are outside of constitutional boundsForbes 2015- Gregory S. McNeal, contributor “What You Need To Know About The Federal Government's Drone Privacy Rules” http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2015/02/15/the-drones-are-coming-heres-what-president-obama-thinks-about-privacy/The Executive Order addresses civil liberties mostly by referencing existing laws . Specifically, the Order calls on agencies to ensure they have policies to prohibit collection, use, retention, or dissemination of data in a manner that would violate the First Amendment, or would illegally discriminate based on protected categories like ethnicity, race, gender, etc. It also requires that drone related activities are performed in a manner consistent with the Constitution, applicable laws, Executive Orders, and other Presidential directives. The Order also requires agencies to ensure they have in place a means

to receive, investigate, and address privacy, civil rights and civil liberties complaints.¶ Oversight and accountability of Federal drone operations will require creation of new procedures or modification of existing procedures. Agencies will be required to ensure their oversight procedures including audits or assessments, comply with existing policies and regulations. Federal government

personnel and contractors who work on drone programs will require rules of conduct and training, and procedures will need to be implemented for reporting suspected cases of misuse or abuse of drone technologies.

The FBI uses drones in a very limited capacity and steps are being taken to ensure responsible useAl Jazeera 2013- June 20th “FBI says drones used to monitor people in US” http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2013/06/20136191854968801.htmlThe US uses drones for surveillance in some limited law-enforcement situations , the head of FBI has said, prompting additional debate about the Obama administration's use of domestic surveillance.¶ Robert Mueller's acknowledgement came in response to questions on Wednesday from members of the Senate Judiciary Committee who said they wanted to know more about the federal government's increasing use of unmanned aircraft.¶ "Does the FBI use drones for surveillance on US soil?" Republican Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa asked during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing.¶ "Yes," Mueller said, adding that the use was in "a very, very minimal way and very seldom" .¶ Mueller did not go into detail, but the FBI later released a statement that said unmanned aircraft were used only to watch stationary subjects and to avoid serious risks to law-enforcement agents.¶ The Federal Aviation Administration approves each use, the statement said.¶ "I will tell you that our footprint is very small," Mueller said in his testimony.¶ "We have very few [drones] and of limited use, and we're exploring not only the use but also the necessary guidelines for that use."

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ANSWERS TO: Civil Liberties- Impact Framing

Consequentialism subsumes their impact framing- even under a deontological framework, one must weigh the costs and benefits of ethical decisions- the judge should adopt this framework when evaluating the round- if we win that our strategy is net-better than the affirmative’s for human flourishing, we should win the debateSpragens 2000 – Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University (Thomas A., Political Theory and Partisan Politics- "Rationality in Liberal Politics" pg 81-2)My thesis that all three layers/forms of political association are important in a well-ordered liberal democracy also implies the untenability of Rawls's argument that agreement regarding norms of social justice is a possible and sufficient way to overcome the deficiencies of the modus vivendi approach. In the first place, as I have argued in more detail elsewhere, the fundamental unfairness of life and the presence of gratuitous elements in the moral universe make it impossible to settle rationally upon a single set of distributive principles as demonstrably fair (See also,

Spragens 1993). Simply put, the problem is that the contingencies of the world ineluctably allocate assets and sufferings quite unfairly. We can cope with and try to compensate for these "natural injustices," but only at the price of introducing other elements of unfairness or compromising other moral values. The other major problem in this context is that real world human beings are not deontologists: their moral intuitions about distributive justice are permeated and influenced by their moral intuitions about the' good. The empirical consequence of these two difficulties is the falsification of Rawls's hermeneutic claims about an overlapping consensus. Rational people of good will with a liberal democratic persuasion will be able to agree that some possible distributive criteria are morally unacceptable. But, as both experience and the literature attest, hopes for a convergence of opinion on definitive principles of distributive justice are chimerical.

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ANSWERS TO: Civil Liberties- Alternate Causalities

The stingray is an instance of government intrusion that the affirmative cannot account for- even without drones the FBI will use other technology to spy on usThe Guardian 2015- April 10, “Stingray spying: FBI's secret deal with police hides phone dragnet from courts” http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/10/stingray-spying-fbi-phone-dragnet-policeThe FBI is taking extraordinary and potentially unconstitutional measures to keep local and state police forces from exposing the use of so-called “Stingray” surveillance technology across the United States , according to documents obtained

separately by the Guardian and the American Civil Liberties Union.¶ Multiple non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) revealed in Florida, New York and Maryland this week show federal authorities effectively binding local law enforcement from disclosing any information – even to judges – about the cellphone dragnet technology , its collection capabilities or its existence.¶ In an arrangement that shocked privacy advocates and local defense attorneys, the secret pact also mandates that police notify the FBI to push for the dismissal of cases if technical specifications of the devices are in danger of being revealed in court.¶ The agreement also contains a clause forcing law enforcement to notify the FBI if freedom of information requests are filed by members of the public or

the media for such information, “in order to allow sufficient time for the FBI to seek to prevent disclosure through appropriate channels”.¶ The strikingly similar NDAs, taken together with documents connecting police to the technology’s manufacturer and federal approval guidelines

obtained by the Guardian, suggest a state-by-state chain of secrecy surrounding widespread use of the sophisticated cellphone spying devices known best by the brand of one such device: the Stingray.

Commercial drones are an alternate casualty- the affirmative cannot regulate private instances of drone surveillance Slate 2015- February 2015 “The Rules of the Sky” http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/02/faa_small_commercial_drone_rules_don_t_adequately_address_privacy_concerns.htmlBut what about privacy? Drones—including small drones, and especially those driven by commercial motives to voraciously gather all kinds of information—can pose significant privacy threats. They see from new vantage points, they are far lower-cost than older aerial technologies, and they can move over boundaries that otherwise protect activity from sight. These are only a few reasons why drones have been predicted to be a “privacy catalyst”—the drivers of robust discussions about the enactment of new

privacy regulations.¶ The FAA has very little to say about privacy, which might not be surprising. It is primarily an agency concerned with

aircraft safety. When the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a public interest group focused on privacy policy, petitioned the FAA in 2012 to address the threat from drones to privacy and civil liberties, the FAA responded that it “prioritizes its rulemaking projects based on issues that are crucial to the safety of the aviation community and the traveling public.” Similarly, in the required privacy impact assessment that accompanied the FAA’s draft drone rules, the FAA acknowledge privacy concerns over drone operations but pointed elsewhere for legal solutions.

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ANSWERS TO: Credibility- Global Warming Impact

Global warming data is flawed- latest studies proveForbes 2011- “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism” http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2011/07/27/new-nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-in-global-warming-alarmism/NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth’s atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal Remote

Sensing. The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed.¶ Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA’s Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA’s Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models .¶ “The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show,” Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. “There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans.”¶ In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted.¶ The new findings are extremely important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate.¶ Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is “not much”). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but real-world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing as much atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted.¶ The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA’s ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted.¶ In short, the central premise of alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth’s atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space. Real-world measurements, however, show far less heat is being trapped in the earth’s atmosphere than the alarmist computer models predict, and far more heat is escaping into space than the alarmist computer models predict.¶ When objective NASA satellite data, reported in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, show a “huge discrepancy” between alarmist climate models and real-world facts, climate scientists, the media and our elected officials would be wise to take notice. Whether or not they do so will tell us a great deal about how honest the purveyors of global warming alarmism truly are.

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ANSWERS TO: Credibility- Hegemony Impact

A loss of U.S. hegemony wouldn’t cause great power war- the conflicts would be small and manageableHaas, 2008 (Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html)Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a

contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but

again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

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ANSWERS TO: Solvency- Extensions

The affirmative does nothing to regulate piloted aerial surveillance- this is more dangerous than dronesMcNeal 2014- Gregory, professor, Pepperdine University, School of Law, “Drones and ¶ Aerial Surveillance: ¶

Considerations For Legislators” Brookings Institute http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/10/drones-aerial-surveillance-legislators/Drones_Aerial_Surveillance_McNeal_FINAL.pdf?la=enPrivacy advocates contend that with drones, the government will be able to engage in widespread pervasive surveillance because drones are cheaper to operate than their manned counterparts. While drones are cheaper to operate, the drones most law enforcement agencies can afford are currently far less capable than their manned counterparts (oftentimes these drones are small remote controlled helicopters or airplanes,

capable of a flight time of less than one hour). The surveillance equipment that can be placed on these drones is also far less intrusive than that which can be mounted to manned aircraft . Moreover, the term “unmanned aircraft” is also misleading as there are no systems currently available to law enforcement that can conduct fully autonomous operations, all systems need an operator for part of the mission. Thus, in almost all instances drones are less capable than manned aerial surveillance platforms, and while the platform is cheaper (but less capable), the personnel costs still remain constant as an officer is required to operate the drone. Granted, there are very sophisticated systems used by the military, but even if law

enforcement agencies were able to afford the highly sophisticated multi-million dollar Predator and Reaper systems like those used for surveillance on battlefields, those systems (both the aircraft and the ground control station) are more expensive than manned helicopters, require a ground crew to launch and recover the aircraft, and require both a pilot and a camera operator . In light of these facts, the legislation being pushed by privacy advocates has been explicitly directed at drone technology, not because the technology represents an actual threat to civil liberties, but because someday in the future, the technology may be intrusive.[7]

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1NC Drones Bad Disadvantage

1. Uniqueness- military uses of drones will be curtailed in the future due to public perception of ineffectiveness

NEW YORK TIMES 2015- New York Times, Peter Baker, Obama Apologizes After Drone Kills American and Italian Held by Al Qaeda http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/2-qaeda-hostages-were-accidentally-killed-in-us-raid-white-house-says.htmlThe government is conducting two reviews of the drone strike to determine what went wrong , and the episode could force a broader rethinking of Mr. Obama’s approach to fighting Al Qaeda . Under the president’s policy, drone strikes are to be

authorized only when it can be concluded to a “near certainty” that there will not be civilian casualties.¶ The two hostages, Warren Weinstein, an American

kidnapped in 2011, and Giovanni Lo Porto, an Italian seized in 2012, were killed Jan. 15 in a remote area in Pakistan known as a Qaeda sanctuary, officials said. An American affiliated with Al Qaeda, Ahmed Farouq, was killed in the same strike. Another American

member of Al Qaeda, Adam Gadahn, was killed in a separate strike in the same region Jan. 19, according to the officials.¶ Just as the C.I.A. did not know the hostages were present, it also did not know that the American Qaeda members were at the strike targets and they had not been specifically targeted, officials said. Mr. Farouq was the deputy head of Al Qaeda’s relatively new branch in India and was not publicly identified as an American until Thursday. Mr. Gadahn was better known as a Qaeda spokesman.¶ Officials who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence operations said it took weeks to piece together what happened.¶ Intelligence agencies picked up information soon after the January strikes that Mr. Weinstein was dead, but they were not immediately clear how. They pursued theories that he could have died in an American strike, during a Pakistani military operation or at the hands of his captors. Only after pulling together disparate clues did they link the deaths of Mr. Weinstein and Mr. Lo Porto to the January drone strike, the officials said, and only last week did intelligence officials report to Mr. Obama that they had what they called the highest level of confidence. Mr. Obama ordered that the episode be declassified, but he said nothing to Prime Minister Matteo Renzi of Italy when he visited the White House last Friday. Instead, after preparations had been made, Mr. Obama called Mr. Renzi on Wednesday to inform him what had happened and also called Mr. Weinstein’s wife, Elaine Weinstein. Aides described it as one of the most painful moments of his presidency. “It’s like your worst fears realized,” said one aide, who asked not to be named describing the president’s reaction. “He took it pretty hard.” In a written statement, Ms. Weinstein said the family was “devastated” by the news and added that it looked forward to learning more about what happened. But she said his captors bore responsibility. “The cowardly actions of those who took Warren captive and ultimately to the place and time of his death are not in keeping with Islam, and they will have to face their God to answer for their actions,” she said. The issue of killing Americans through drone strikes has been an acutely delicate one for Mr. Obama, who two years ago announced in a speech at the National Defense University that he was beginning to scale back the aerial campaign and restrict it to cases of genuine threat to the United States and its people .

2. Link- extend the 1AC National Journal evidence- public opinion is currently turning away from drone use, the plan revives public opinion on drone technology by making it appear benign and commercially useful

3. Internal Link- Public opinion is crucial for stopping extrajudicial drone usage in counterterrorism operations- the aff diverts attention away from the negative foreign policy aspects of drones by focusing on domestic surveillance

Kreps and Wallace 2015- Sarah Kreps, associate professor of government, Cornell Geoffrey Wallace, Assistant professor of political science, Rutgers july 2015 “International law and US public support for drone strikes”https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/sarah-kreps-geoffrey-wallace/international-law-and-us-public-support-for-drone-striThe use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones, in United States counterterrorism operations has become a “key feature of the administration’s foreign policy”. In late 2014, the US reached a milestone by conducting its five hundredth drone strike to target suspected terrorists

in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.¶ This growing reliance on drones to target militants has generated widespread condemnation worldwide. It has also become the subject of considerable controversy within the US itself. Recent debates have largely centered around two sets of questions: 1) the effectiveness of drones in eliminating terror threats; and 2) the legitimacy of strikes under international law. Domestic supporters point to drones as both effective for disrupting terrorist

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http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204652904577193673318589462

http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/

http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2014/11/21/americas-500th-drone-strike/

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/05/23-drones-obama-singer

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/05/23-drones-obama-singer

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/pivoting-from-a-war-footing-obama-acts-to-curtail-drones.html

http://bringwarrenhome.com/weinstein-family-statement-on-disclosure-of-the-death-in-captivity-of-warren-weinstein/

http://bringwarrenhome.com/weinstein-family-statement-on-disclosure-of-the-death-in-captivity-of-warren-weinstein/

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/18/us/politics/obama-praises-congress-on-iran-and-trade-but-chides-senate-gop-over-nominee.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/middleeast/adam-gadahn-propagandist-for-al-qaeda-who-sold-terror-in-english.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/europe/american-drone-strike-italian-aid-worker-giovanni-lo-porto.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=b-lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/warren-weinsteins-devotion-to-pakistan-was-part-of-a-lifetime-of-service.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/fatal-blunder-was-apparent-in-aftermath-of-drone-strike-in-pakistan.html


networks, and consistent with legal principles of self-defense and military necessity. Critics respond that attacks spawn grievances resulting in more terrorists than they eliminate, and represent fundamental violations of international law by breaching other

countries’ sovereignty while harming countless civilians. Detractors and defenders alike have sought to directly sway the US public by putting forward these contending arguments in the marketplace of ideas.

.

4. Impact- counterterrorism drone strikes are ineffective at countering terrorism, and embolden insurgents, making us more susceptible to a terrorist attack Abbas 2013- Hassan Abbas, senior advisor, Asia Society “How Drones Create More Terrorists” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/how-drones-create-more-terrorists/278743/Mark Bowden's important contribution to the drone debate raises critical questions that policy makers will be wise to consider for the future use of this new tool of war. One of the important arguments mentioned in the piece revolves around the notion that drone strikes might be less provocative than ground assaults for terrorists, meaning that standard warfare might create more terrorists than drones do. Lets first accept what is obvious: more civilians are killed in standard warfare, and the history of warfare in the 20th century sufficiently proves the point. When it comes to drones strikes, the ratio of civilian deaths is certainly lower, but the issue is not about the number of civilian casualties alone . The inherently secret nature of the weapon creates a persistent feeling of fear in the areas where drones hover in the sky , and the hopelessness of communities that are on the receiving end of strikes causes severe backlash -- both in terms of anti-U.S. opinion and violence . ¶ Response to drone strikes comes in many varieties. First, revenge is targeted at those within the easy range of the insurgents and militants. The victims of those revenge terrorist attacks also consider the drone strikes responsible for all the mayhem. Consequently, terrorists and ordinary people are drawn closer to each other out of sympathy, whereas a critical

function of any successful counter-terrorism policy is to win over public confidence so that they join in the campaign against the perpetrators of terror. Poor public awareness -- which is often a function of inadequate education -- about terrorist organizations indeed plays a role in building this perspective. Public outrage against drone strikes circuitously empowers terrorists. It allows them space to survive, move around, and maneuver. Pakistan is a perfect example of this phenomenon.¶ Many in Pakistan now believe that drone strikes tend to motivate Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban to conduct terrorist attacks that target Pakistan's security forces as well as civilians. The duplicity of Pakistan's political and military elite in giving a green light to the U.S. drone policy proved to be

counterproductive. The sponsors and supporters of drone strikes in U.S. policy circles apparently ignored the wider socio-political impact and indirect costs when evaluating its efficacy.

5. An attack by terrorists could cause extinction Ayson, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld) Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington,A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside

considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack,

and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them . In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear

material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group

was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom

and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and

possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting

each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist 109

http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/will-i-be-next-us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemen1013_ForUpload_1.pdf


attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the

pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a

terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack , the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

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**Uniqueness- Drones Bad Disadvantage

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2NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: Non-Unique

Reject their 2AC non-unique evidence, it is in the context of a very specific strike that took place, not Obama’s overall strategy for counterterrorism. Our evidence indicates that the counterterrorism strategy is shifting towards less drone use

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2NC/1NR Uniqueness Wall- Drones Bad Disadvantage

Obama is shifting his terrorism strategy- drone strikes will no longer be the center piece NEW YORK TIMES 2013- Peter Baker, New York Times. 5/23“Pivoting From a War Footing, Obama Acts to Curtail Drones” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/pivoting-from-a-war-footing-obama-acts-to-curtail-drones.html?_r=0Nearly a dozen years after the hijackings that transformed America, President Obama said Thursday that it was time to narrow the scope of the grinding battle against terrorists and begin the transition to a day when the country will no longer be on a war footing.¶ Declaring that “America

is at a crossroads,” the president called for redefining what has been a global war into a more targeted assault on terrorist groups threatening the United States. As part of a realignment of counterterrorism policy, he said he would curtail the use of drones, recommit to closing the prison at

Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and seek new limits on his own war ¶ In a much-anticipated speech at the National Defense University, Mr. Obama sought to turn the page on the era that began on Sept. 11, 2001, when the imperative of preventing terrorist attacks became both the priority and the preoccupation. Instead, the president suggested that the United States had returned to the state of affairs that existed before Al Qaeda

toppled the World Trade Center, when terrorism was a persistent but not existential danger. With Al Qaeda’s core now “on the path to defeat,” he argued, the nation must adapt.

Public opinion is turning away from support for counterterrorism and drone strikes- increasing calls for accountability and transparency NEW YORK TIMES 2013- New York Times, 2/6 “Drone Strikes Under Scrutiny” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/opinion/drone-strikes-under-scrutiny.htmlIn more than a decade at war since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has relied increasingly on drones to kill people away from the battlefield. It has faced few constraints. Now an overdue push for greater accountability and transparency is gathering steam, propelled by growing unease that America’s drones hit targets in countries with whom it is not formally at war , that there are no publicly understood rules for picking targets, and that the strikes may kill innocent civilians and harm, not help, American interests.¶ Stanley McChrystal, the retired general, has warned that drone strikes are so resented abroad that their overuse could jeopardize America’s broader objectives. The secretary of state, John Kerry, spoke at his confirmation hearing of the need to make sure that “American foreign policy is not defined by drones and deployments alone.”¶ Continue reading the main story¶ Related Coverage¶ Drones have obvious advantages. The unmanned vehicles, whose controllers may be hundreds of miles away at a remote base, can hover silently over a target for hours, transmitting images and sound, and then strike quickly if needed. The administration says the use of drones has taken many enemy combatants off the battlefield and reduced civilian casualties.¶ Continue reading the main story¶ Related in Opinion¶ ¶ But skeptics abound. John Brennan, the counterterrorism adviser most responsible for the program, faces a Senate confirmation hearing Thursday as President Obama’s nominee as C.I.A. director. He should be questioned closely about the strikes: their purpose, legal justification and relationship to broader American foreign policy aims.

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**Link- Drones Bad Disadvantage

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2NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: No Link

Foreign and domestic drone usage is inextricably linked in terms of public perceptionGucciardi 2013 (Anthony Gucciardi, creator of Storyleak, accomplished writer, producer, and seeker of truth. His articles have been read by millions worldwide and are routinely featured on major alternative news websites like the infamous Drudge Report, Infowars, NaturalNews, G Edward Griffin's Reality Zone, and many others, “NEW PRECEDENT: ARMED DOMESTIC DRONE STRIKES WILL SOON BE REALITY”, http://www.storyleak.com/armed-domestic-drone-strikes-reality/, May 23, 2013)

A new precedent has been set. Despite extensive denial that drone strikes would endanger Americans, Attorney General Eric Holder has now openly admitted that four US citizens were killed

through overseas drone strikes since 2009. While not on United States soil, the deaths of the US citizens in nations like Yemen and Pakistan highlight the new precedent

being set by US government heads who wish to use drones as a form of lethal enforcement on US soil. With Holder admitting that

Americans have already died via drone strikes following his statements that Obama can already initiate drone strikes on US soil, we are now seeing the way paved to go ahead and announce armed drones to fight terrorism here in the US. We all remember the initial rhetoric that drones were ‘no real threat’, and that they were simply unarmed scouting machines used to save lives overseas. Then, we saw them rapidly enter the nation, and we heard the same tired reassurances. We saw them killing innocents overseas with the high powered weaponry being attached to these ‘scouting’ drones, and we see them still doing so today. But, once again, we’re told not to worry. Political talking heads like Eric Holder assure us that domestic drones, for which over 1,400 permits have been issued, are not meant to be used as weapons. Well, that is unless Obama decides to use the drones as a weapon of war on US soil. ARMED

DOMESTIC DRONES IN THE NEAR FUTURE Despite the message of assurance regarding the promise that domestic drones would never turn into government-controlled war machines, Eric Holder decided to go ahead

and announce that it would actually be entirely ‘legal’ for Obama to issue a drone strike on a US citizen on domestic soil .

In fact, CNN reports that Holder does not ‘rule out’ the possibility of domestic drone strikes, and that a scenario could occur in the future. And to strike someone with a drone, of course, you would need weaponry. You would need an armed drone. In other words, Holder is going against the major promise by the FAA official who ‘promised’ that no armed drones will be flying on domestic soil . But don’t worry, Holder says the government has ‘no intention’ right now of issuing drone strikes on US soil. Just like the government never targeted Constitution and conservative-based groups through the IRS and would never use domestic drones to spy on you. Quite simply, if any power is given to these individuals in government, be sure of one thing: they will use it. And knowing the track record of drone strikes overseas and how they greatly affect the innocent,

drone strikes on US soil against citizens is an even more serious threat. The 3,000 plus deaths from drone strikes overseas in Pakistan alone, which vastly affect the innocent and non-threatening, have even prompted Google employees and big firms alike to develop charts and interactive maps to detail the deaths in a manner that portrays the reality of the situation. One design

firm known as Pitch recently went and created an interactive chart that, along with detailing how less than 2% of strike victims are high priority targets, documents the drone strike deaths throughout recent years. We continue to hear these major announcements from Holder regarding drone strikes, and each time it pushes the

precedent further. Each time, he warps the ‘law’ to justify what is being done with drone attacks, and each time we come closer to the announcement that we ‘need’ to use armed drones against

domestic terrorists. Just wait for the next terrorist hunt in the US for a high profile crime case to hear more from Holder and the gang on why we need armed domestic drones to keep us safe. It already happened with Dorner and others.

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2NC/1NR Link Wall- Drones Bad Disadvantage

Public opinion is crucial to continue military uses of drones- by easing privacy fears the affirmative makes the technology more acceptable Sullivan 2015 (Tom Sullivan, Political Consultant and News Writer, “Commercializing Our Air Force Or Militarizing Our Commerce?”, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/03/17/1371593/-Commercializing-Our-Air-Force-Or-Militarizing-Our-Commerce, March 17, 2015)States scrambled to land one of six FAA drone test sites hoping to get rich on the next tech bubble. The FAA announced draft rules for flying unmanned, commercial drones. But GoPro-equipped toys are not all they're supposed to be testing. We've also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs] that could be used to disperse chemical and biological weapons across broad areas. We're concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States. - Pres. George W. Bush, Cincinnati, OH, October 7, 2002 That was the first time many of us heard the term "unmanned aerial vehicles." Ticking off a litany of bogus reasons for invading Iraq, Bush hoped we would collectively wet our pants in fear of unmanned drones over America unleashing death from above. That was then. This is now. Now, looking to when the wars in the Middle

East wind down, the Air Force faces a dilemma (from February 2012): With a growing fleet of combat drones in its arsenal, the Pentagon is working

with the Federal Aviation Administration to open U.S. airspace to its robotic aircraft ... "The stuff from Afghanistan is going to come back," Steve Pennington, the

Air Force's director of ranges, bases and airspace, said at the conference. The Department of Defense "doesn't want a segregated environment. We want a fully

integrated environment." Now? Now defense contractors want to get into the military drone export business. So now, the Federal Aviation Administration is rolling out

proposed rules for flying "commercial" drones â”� UAVs have been rebranded Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) â”� in U.S. airspace. The FAA has designated six sites around the country for testing how to integrate unmanned aerial vehicles into its Next Generation Air Transport (NGAT) program. The FAA website features pictures of those cool, camera-equipped quadracopters hobbyists, commercial photographers, and technophiles play with. They offer handy tips: What Can I Do with my Model Aircraft? The six selected test sites offer punchy videos touting new careers and billions of dollars to be made in the exciting, new, commercial drone industry. However, the FAA's test site program as mandated by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 requires the plan to provide: (H) the best methods to ensure the safe operation of civil unmanned aircraft systems and public unmanned aircraft systems simultaneously in the national

airspace system; For "public," read "military and other state or federal agency." Including your basic Reapers, Predators, and Global Hawks . Not that anyone wants to play up the military aspect of the test program. Of course, the first test site opened in Grand Forks, North Dakota, with a planned business park butted

up against Grand Forks Air Force Base and sharing a runway. The first announced tenant is Northrop Grumman. Looking at the New York test site in January, Aljazeera reported that advocates want to de-emphasize the Predator angle: Drone supporters in the region acknowledged that creating a distinction in the publicâ™� s perception between military and non-military uses of unmanned flight is central to their goals. For example, the Cyber NY Alliance was initially incorporated as The Central New York Defense

Alliance, but rebranded before beginning the push for the FAA test site. A spokesman for the New York coalition acknowledged, "a lot of work still needs to be done for the commercial drone industry to shape public opinion." Indeed, when North Carolina tried to get its non-FAA drone testing program off the ground, public perception was also an issue , writes Barry Summers at Scrutiny Hooligans: North

Carolinaâ™� s âœ� Next Generation Air Transportation (NGAT)â�� program is launched at NC State University [2012], with support from the NC Department of Transportation, and begins to assume control of the UAV program previously run by the military and the defense industry trade group. All FAA âœ� Certificates of Authorizationâ�� for drone use in North Carolina are now held by NCSU, including those needed to operate military drones like the RQ-7 Shadow in non-military airspace. The handover wasnâ™� t without at least a little complaining. This from a 2013 email from the commanding General of the NC National Guard: Over one year ago I jumped on board in trying to get our UAV units flying, at this âœ� proposedâ�� training facility and was asked

to step back in an attempt to not militarize this initiative placating the concerns that a militarized approach would ... result in erosion of public

support. Summers attended meetings of the NC House Committee on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) set up to discuss commercial drone development and found himself more or

less the only civilian in the room. The rest? Department of Defense, ex-military, National Guard, former Booz Allen Hamilton (the civilian NSA). And they were not there as advocates for GoPro or DJI quadracopters. One of the testing sites in North Carolina is described in a 2014 report to the NC General Assembly as "Private airfield in Moyock." Summers compared an image from the presentation to Google map imagery and found that it was the airfield belonging to Academi, formerly known as Blackwater. Like North Dakota's site, Summers found, North Carolina's Gull Rock Test Site butts up against the Navy's Dare County Bombing Range now reportedly operated by Northrop Grumman. attribution: None Specified Remember Solyndra? Way back in 2011? Back when it was some kind of article of faith that "government shouldn't pick winners and losers"? That was then. This is now. It's not that commercial drones aren't of

interest to the private sector. Ask Amazon. But the military and U.S. defense contractors want access to civilian airspace for testing exportable

military hardware and for keeping their drone pilots' skills sharp. Several drone testing programs are fashioned as university research programs and appear as civilian efforts.

That might be understandable after George W. Bush's speech about drones attacking civilians with "chemical and biological weapons," and after revelations about widespread domestic surveillance here and abroad.

Here’s more evidence- drone manufacturers and the industry itself are suffering from over regulation- the plan salvages drones Kaste 2013 (Martin Kaste / NPR, “Will Bureaucracy Keep The U.S. Drone Industry Grounded?”, http://www.ideastream.org/news/npr/179843540 , April 30, 2013)

Tough federal aviation rules and public backlash against drones have raised worries that the U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle industry will be left behind foreign competitors. Developers say the U.S. light drone industry is being overtaken by manufacturers in Israel and Australia. Americans are suspicious of drones. Reports of the unmanned aerial vehicles'

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http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/03/17/1371593/-Commercializing-Our-Air-Force-Or-Militarizing-Our-Commerce

http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/03/17/1371593/-Commercializing-Our-Air-Force-Or-Militarizing-Our-Commerce


use in war zones have raised concerns about what they might do here at home. For instance, in Seattle earlier this year, a public outcry forced the police department to abandon plans for eye-in-the-sky UAV helicopters. The backlash worries Paul Applewhite, an aerospace engineer with 10 years of experience at companies like McDonnell Douglas and Sikorsky. He now runs his own startup company, Applewhite Aero, in an industrial park on the south side of Seattle. Applewhite is developing drones — or UAVs, as the industry calls them. He shows off a 3-pound Styrofoam plane he has dubbed the Invenio. "We bought the airframe and the motor off of an online hobby shop," he says. To make it a UAV, he added a GPS antenna and a circuit board that allows it to fly autonomously. He hopes to sell it to aid agencies; medical teams could use it to fly tissue samples back to a lab, for instance. They'd enter the coordinates, and the Invenio would find its way back. That's the theory. The reality is, Applewhite can't know for sure what his plane can do, because he's not allowed fly it. The Federal Aviation Administration bars the use of UAVs for commercial purposes. That means, even though it's perfectly legal for hobbyists to fly small UAVs, Applewhite may not, because he's in business. He has applied for a special test permit, called a certificate of airworthiness, but that process has dragged on since last August. "We've generated a 62-page document that we've submitted to the federal government," he says, and he assumes he'll have to meet personally with regulators in Washington, D.C., before he's allowed to make a few short flights with his modified toy. "Quite frankly, I could do what I need to do in a cow pasture," he says. "I just need some legal and efficient way to test this aircraft." Applewhite is quick to stress his respect for the FAA's thoroughness in the interest of safety. But in the case of lightweight experimental UAVs, he says, that thoroughness threatens to stifle startups like his — and perhaps a whole nascent industry. He says he's losing valuable time while potential customers go elsewhere. "A

lot of our universities that are developing [UAV] training programs, they're buying a vehicle from Latvia," he says. "I think I could compete on that, but I just can't test mine in the United States." Developers say the

U.S. light drone industry is being overtaken by manufacturers in Israel and Australia; Seattle's controversial police UAVs came from Canada. The FAA

won't comment on the permitting process for UAV tests. Heidi Williams, vice president for air traffic services and modernization at the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, defends the FAA's cautious approach. "Their primary mission is ensuring that the airspace environment that we all operate in is safe," says Williams, who is also a pilot. "Things that are really tiny or small to see, sometimes can be very close before you actually have time to see them and react and avoid them." UAV developers admit there's still no reliable way to "teach" small drones to avoid other aircraft, but they say there's little danger as long as they're tested at low altitudes, away from airports — the same rules that already apply to radio-controlled hobby aircraft. Juris Vagners, a professor emeritus of aeronautics at the University of Washington, helped pioneer UAVs in the 1990s. "There was some paperwork, but it wasn't anything like what's going on today," he says. Now the permitting process verges on the absurd. During a recent application, he says, it took a couple of months to satisfy the FAA that the

University of Washington is, in fact, a public institution. Vagners blames the red tape on the public's hostility toward drones. "As everyone can't help but be aware, there's the whole big flap about privacy issues," Vagners says. "And the approach that is being taken by the FAA is basically a one

size fits all." For example, commercial developers of 3-pound modified toy airplanes find themselves having to apply for an "N-number" — the same flying license plate that's required for Cessnas and 747s. Some frustrated American companies are now taking their prototypes to Mexico and Australia for testing . In Canada, the Canadian Centre for Unmanned Vehicle Systems is offering access to a test site among the flat farm fields of southern Alberta. One American drone developer has already used the facility, which is run by Sterling Cripps. He marvels at the bureaucratic hurdles for UAVs, both in Canada and in the U.S. "Here's the hypocrisy: Our governments allow us to fly UAVs over war-stricken, terrified civilians in other lands, but the moment you bring them back to our

precious neck of the woods, where we're not getting shot at, where we have insurance, we have lawyers, they won't allow it," Cripps says. Regulators say they will allow it — eventually. Congress has given the FAA until September 2015 to come up with a plan for integrating commercial UAVs

to the domestic airspace. As part of that process, the FAA will pick six sites around the country for UAV testing. The sites are expected to be selected by the end of the year. That's an eternity to UAV developers like Paul Applewhite. "We have a technology — we have an industry — that could be ours for the taking," Applewhite says. "We're losing it because we can't test the vehicles."

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**Impact- Drones Bad Disadvantage

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ANSWERS TO: Drones Solve Terrorism

Prefer our 1NC Abbas evidence- it provides specific warranted analysis for how drones embolden terrorists.

1. It increases civilian casualties, which helps with terrorist recruitment

2. It’s ineffective at targeting top officials

3. It creates bonds of solidarity among terrorists and the civilian population, making it harder to win hearts and minds

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ANSWERS TO: No Impact to Terrorism

Extend our 1NC Ayson 11 evidence, there is an impact to terrorism

1. Terrorists are gaining accesses to nuclear material, which increases the likelihood of miscalculation. Russia and the U.S. would both suspect the other had attacked

2. The plan increases the likelihood of this scenario- by emboldening terrorists, the affirmative ensures that they gain access to nuclear material

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Ban Drones Counterplan

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1NC Ban Drones Counterplan

1. Counterplan text: The United States Federal Government should ban its use of unpiloted aerial vehicles

2. The Counterplan is textually and functionally competitive- the affirmative’s plan is to provide warrants for the use of drones by the federal government this is mutually exclusive with banning their use outright

And, “to curtail” is different from “abolishing”, the COUNTERPLAN would abolish the use of drones, while the plan, in order to be topical, could only restrict or limit their use

To curtail is to reduce or restrictOxford English Dictionary http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/curtail

Definition of curtail in English:¶ verb¶ [with object]¶ 1Reduce in extent or quantity; impose a restriction on: civil liberties were further curtailed

Abolish is to put an end toOxford English Dictionary http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/abolishDefinition of abolish in English:verb[with object]Formally put an end to (a system, practice, or institution):

4. The counterplan solves – banning drones gets rid of key privacy concerns, and resolves the link to our net benefitChicago Tribune 2015- February 27, “We must ban drones before it's too late” http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/zorn/ct-drones-ban-chuy-garcia-rahm-emanuel-perspec-0302-jm-20150227-column.html

In the overnight hours last week, authorities in Paris spotted unmanned drones buzzing the Eiffel Tower, the Bastille, the Place de la Concorde the U.S. Embassy and other high-profile landmarks.¶ Why? It's still a mystery.¶ But whatever the reason, this swarming incident has convinced me: While there's still time — if there's still time — we must ban drones.¶ I don't mean restrict the areas or altitudes where they can fly. I don't mean tighten regulations on the purposes to which private citizens and law enforcement can use the m. Many jurisdictions have already instituted partial crackdowns. I mean ban them outright. Prohibit their ownership and use for all but the most limited law-

enforcement and military purposes. I mean pass legislation and create international norms to treat these small, unmanned flying vehicles the way the law treats machine guns and chemical weapons — as devices so inherently fraught with potential peril that whatever positive uses they may have aren't worth the risks they pose.¶ These nimble, remotely piloted aerial machines

are a significant threat to public safety, even when flown by people who mean no harm, and an obvious threat to privacy.¶ Drone enthusiasts wax optimistically about what a boon they are or will be to photographers, retailers, farmers, bridge inspectors and so on — how cheap and easy drones make it to do important jobs.¶ I fret pessimistically about what a boon they are or will be to terrorists, criminals, goofballs, snoops and so on — how expensive and difficult it will be to create security barriers against their malign use.¶ An anecdote: In September 2013, members of the German Pirate Party flew a quadrocopter over the crowd at a campaign rally in Dresden as a gesture of protest, and crash-landed it more or less at the feet of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her defense minister.¶ The device was basically harmless, but the incident — like the incident in January, when a lost drone crashed on the White House lawn — was ominous. What if it had been weaponized? A flying IED? A drone capable of delivering a package to your door will also be capable of delivering a small bomb. And I know this sounds alarmist, but poke around online a bit, and you'll see that police departments all over are increasingly concerned about malicious uses of drones as well as the inevitable accidents when they malfunction or wander into protected airspace.¶ They can fly under the radar, literally and figuratively, and require sophisticated technology to safely disable.

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Commercial aircraft, power plants, outdoor gatherings and even moderately fortified private homes are vulnerable to stealthy incursions from above.¶ Drone defenders will argue that hobbyists have flown radio-controlled model airplanes for well more than 50 years without ghastly incident, so all this fretting and legislating is unwarranted.¶ If only. These things are no longer glorified toys. They're getting cheaper and more sophisticated all the time, and the costs of protecting ourselves from them will rise accordingly. And for what? So pizzas and prescriptions can one day be delivered faster? So we can enjoy more stunning aerial videos such as the tour of Chicago in winter posted to the Soaring Badger Productions YouTube site? So we can more easily keep track of our crumbling infrastructure? So farmers can monitor their crops from the comfort of their dens?¶ The number of uses — real and on the drawing board — is growing along with the consumer and commercial constituency for drones. Which is why we should prohibit their manufacture and sale now, before we get a heavily financed National Drone Association funding lawmakers at every level of government and trumpeting the idea that it's a right, not a privilege, to keep and fly wee helicopters.¶ We'll be sorry if we don't strike an international treaty banning the civilian use of unmanned aerial vehicles and sharply limiting their use by law enforcement and the military . Do I know how preposterous and reactionary this sounds? How it echoes of the vaporous panic with which history's fools have greeted nearly every technological advance from the printing press to the Internet?¶ Do I realize the futility of railing against the tide of progress with feverish hypotheticals?¶ I do. And I know there's a good chance that my yet-unborn grandchildren will one day find this column in a compendium of retrospectively amusing journalistic hysteria and have a good laugh at my expense over a drone-delivered takeout meal.¶ But do you realize, reader, that, whether we can stop them or not, the dangers of these devices are real and associated tragedies are inevitable? And that every once in awhile, the doomsayers have a point?¶ Re: Tweets¶ First, a bit of old business. Last week I discovered that the winner of the Feb. 1 Tweet of the Week poll — "I told my girlfriend she was drawing her eyebrows way too high. She looked surprised" — was plagiarized. Joke thievery is a common problem on Twitter, where would-be wits hide behind anonymity, and I apologize for not catching this example. But as far as I can tell, that week's runner-up (now the winner) was original with @Rlpihl: "Shout out to Clifford the Big Red Dog. He coulda eaten those kids a long time ago."¶ Meanwhile — this week's survey winner by @elle91, "My Internet was out for a while, so I went downstairs to talk to my mom. She seems nice," seems to be just minor variation on a joke that's been going around for a while, but we'll let her slide.

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2NC/1NR Ban Drones Counterplan

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2NC/1NR Ban Drones COUNTERPLAN- Overview

The plan is a reform of the use of drones by the USFG, while the counterplan is an outright rejection of the use of drone technology. Prefer a ban on drones to the reform of their use- our 1NC uniqueness evidence states that the Obama administration is attempting to cut back on its use of extrajudicial drones strikes for counterterrorism operations. The plan increases the publics’ confidence in the responsible uses of drone technology- our 1NC evidence indicates that this support from the public allows drone strikes to continue unabated. By banning drone use, the COUNTERPLAN ensures that the USFG does not use drones in military operations, which our evidence states would embolden terrorists and cause a nuclear war

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2NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: Perm Do Both

1. The COUNTERPLAN is functionally competitive- the USFG could not reform its use of drones and also ban them. By banning the use of the technology there would be no concerns over privacy rights for domestic use, since the USFG could not conduct surveillance operations with the technology.

2. The COUNTERPLAN is textually competitive- to curtail means to reduce or limit that’s their own 2AC evidence, however, to ban means to prohibit

Merriam Webster Dictionary http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/banFull Definition of BANtransitive verb1archaic : curse2: to prohibit especially by legal means

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2NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: No Solvency

1. The counterplan solves the affirmative’s privacy and credibility advantages. By prohibiting the use of the UAVs, the COUNTERPLAN ensures that the USFG cannot spy on citizens, solving international perception and their value to life claims

2. Even if we cannot resolve the internal link to their agriculture advantage, we will win that a terrorism strike outweighs- our Ayson evidence indicates that these wars go nuclear through miscalculation, which means no intervening actors could prevent the conflict. However, our 1NC impact defense evidence states that food shortages will not cause conflict – there have ben multiple food shortages in the last decade that have not caused a nuclear conflict

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2NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: Add-On

1. There is not impact to a lack of aerospace innovation Axe 2009 (David, military correspondent, regular contributor to The Washington Times, C-SPAN, and Wired, 3/30/9, http://www.warisboring.com/2009/03/30/f-22s-versus-russias-rusting-ramshackle-air-force/)Analyst Gregory Martin, a retired Air Force general, said the erosion of world influence is largely the result of weak public support for the F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters, which are built by Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman. “If you can’t afford that [mix], then your national objectives have to be scaled back,”

Martin said. In other words, stealth fighters equal national power. And the absence of stealth fighters equals weakness. Hogwash . The

economic crisis is having an effect on every country, unevenly. Arguably, the U.S. is faring better than most as investors flee to the comparative safety of the dollar. Power in the world is a relative thing: if everyone else gets much weaker, and we stay the same or only grow a little weak, then we are, in fact, more powerful than we were before. Get it? The global recession, alone, does not mean we are losing influence. In fact, the recession might even boost our influence, by underscoring just how much the world depends on America as a consumer market. But more importantly, American national power does not hinge on fighter jets. We could retire every single fighter in the U.S. Air Force, tomorrow, and still remain the most powerful nation in the

world, by far. National power is a complex and shifting thing, comprising military force, financial and cultural influence, leadership in international coalitions and organizations and even language. Every country in the world teaches American English to its business students, aviators and sea captains. Does that have anything to do with the F-22? Do some of our biggest exports — music, movies and television — depend on a squadron of F-35s flying orbits over North Dakota? Ignore the noise coming out of Washington’s punditocracy as the Obama Administration shapes its first defense budget. And when that budget is published, and it (inevitably) includes

cuts to Air Force fighter programs, take a deep breath before panicking and consider: Nearly everyone telling you we must buy a given quantity of

stealth fighters, or lose global influence, has a financial stake in advocating such purchases. Of the speakers at the Wednesday confab: * Loren Thompson, from the Lexington Institute, runs a private consultancy for the defense industry, with clients including Lockheed Martin *

Thompson’s colleague, Rebecca Grant, also runs her own consultancy for the defense industry * Gregory Martin has been a Northrop Grumman consultant The U.S. Air Force is in deep trouble, but it’s trouble of its own making. And it’s testimony to just how overwhelming, and sustainable, is America’s military, cultural, linguistic and financial dominance in the world that our primary military air service can commit slow, institutional suicide without alarming too many people, aside from a few hardware nerds like me and the consultants who get rich gabbing about certain pointy airplanes on behalf of wealthy corporate clients.

2. There is no impact to an economic decline Thirlwell 2010—MPhil in economics from Oxford U, postgraduate qualifications in applied finance from Macquarie U, program director in International Economy for the Lowy Institute for International Policy (Mark, September 2010, “The Return of Geo-economics: Globalisation and National Security”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, google scholar,)

Summing up the evidence, then, I would judge that while empirical support for the Pax Mercatoria is not conclusive, nevertheless it’s still strongly supportive of

the general idea that international integration is good for peace, all else equal. Since there is also even stronger evidence that peace is good for trade, this raises the possibility of a nice virtuous circle: globalisation (trade) promotes peace , which in turn promotes more globalisation. In this kind

of world, we should not worry too much about the big power shifts described in the previous section, since they are taking place against a backdrop of greater economic integration which should help smooth the whole process. Instead of ending this section on that optimistic note, however, it’s worth thinking about some reasons why the Pax Mercatoria might nevertheless turn out to be a poor , or at least overly optimistic, guide to our future . The first is captured by that all important get-out-of-gaol-free card, ‘all else equal’. It’s quite possible that the peace-promoting effects of international commerce will end up being swamped by other factors, just as they were in 1914. Second, perhaps the theory itself is wrong. Certainly, a realist like John Mearsheimer would seem to have little time for the optimistic consequences of the rise of new powers implied by the theory. Here’s Mearsheimer on how the US should view China’s economic progress, for example: ‘ . . . the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead . . . A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.’ 62 Such pessimistic (or are they tragic?) views of the world would also seem to run the risk of being self-fulfilling prophecies if they end up guiding actual policy. Finally, there is the risk that the shift to a multipolar world might indirectly undermine some of the supports needed to deliver globalisation. Here I am

thinking about some simple variant on the idea of hegemonic stability theory (HST) – the proposition that the global economy needs a leader (or

‘hegemon’) that is both able and willing to provide the sorts of international public goods that are required for its smooth functioning:

open markets (liberal or ‘free’ trade), a smoothly functioning monetary regime, liberal capital flows, and a lender of last resort function.

63 Charles Kindleberger argued that ‘the 1929 depression was so wide, so deep, and so long because the international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and US unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing it’, drawing on the failures of the

Great Depression to make the original case for HST: ‘ . . . the international economic and monetary system needs leadership , a country that is prepared . . . to set standards of conduct for other countries and to seek to get others to follow them, to take on an undue share

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of the burdens of the system, and in particular to take on its support in adversity...’ 64 Kindleberger’s assessment appears to capture a rough empirical regularity: As Findlay and O’Rourke remind us, ‘periods of sustained expansion in world trade have tended to coincided with the infrastructure of law and order

necessary to keep trade routes open being provided by a dominant “hegemon” or imperial power’. 65 Thus periods of globalisation have typically

been associated with periods of hegemonic or imperial power, such as the Pax Mongolica, the Pax Britannica and, most recently, the Pax

Americana (Figure 9). The risk, then, is that by reducing the economic clout of the United States, it is possible that the shift to a multipolar world economy might undermine either the willingness or the ability (or both) of Washington to continue to supply the

international public goods needed to sustain a (relatively) smoothly functioning world economy. 66 That in turn could undermine the potential virtuous circle identified above.

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**Critical Surveillance- Affirmative

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1AC Chicago Public Schools is committed to increasing surveillance in public schools at any cost- despite massive teacher layoffs and inadequate facilities, millions have been poured into surveillance technology Chicago Defender 2010- “Chicago Public Schools focus on security” http://chicagodefender.com/2010/01/27/chicago-public-schools-focus-on-security/Chicago Public Schools officials say they realize that unless their students are safe in school , they won’t learn.¶ That’s one reason why it increased its security budget to $8 million this school year from $6.5 million last school year. Upon hiring a new chief executive officer in 2009 it also hired a new security boss, Michael Shields.¶ Shields, a retired deputy superintendent from the Chicago Police Department, said students should be able to feel safe once on school grounds.¶ “My job is to make sure our students are safe and I am prepared to do whatever it takes to make that happen,” Shields, director of the Office of School Safety & Security for CPS, told the Defender. “We don’t want kids to be fearful while in school because it can take away from their productivity in class.”¶ During the 2008-09 school year there were 116,000 incidents recorded at CPS. Incidents range from a shouting match between students to a food fight in the cafeteria.¶ But the total number of “serious misconduct” incidents, which usually means an occurrence so bad, such as violence, that the student was either suspended or expelled, was 17,000, according to Shields.¶ There is a minimum of two Chicago police officers assigned to each high school.¶ And like Shields, who spent 23 years with CPD, Ron Huberman, chief executive officer for CPS, is also a former Chicago cop.¶ But CPS does not rely solely on police assistance when it comes to security for its 408,000 students, said Shields. It relies more on the 2,000 security guards on CPS payroll – with a starting salary of $26,000 – and the 6,200 cameras installed throughout

the school district. There are an average of seven security guards at each high school.¶ And while the bulk of its security budget is spent on personnel costs, Shields, who earns $150,000 a year, said long term plans include using more cameras .¶ “Video surveillance

is a lot more useful because security guards can only be in one place at a time. Cameras are helping us immensely. Plus, cameras can capture activity in the community, which is where most school incidents occur,” he said .¶ J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. awarded CPS a

$2.5 million grant , which will be used to purchase more cameras.¶ “J.P. Morgan is the first major corporation to step for security at CPS and we thank them,” Shields said. “We are also reaching out to other corporations for help.”¶ Huberman said its security efforts are paying off.¶ “There were 143 CPS students shot last school year and this school year there were only 102, so violence incidents are down,” he said. “And none of these shootings took place on school grounds.”¶ CPS received $30 million in federal stimulus money to combat violence and Huberman added that among the things he plans to do is to make traveling to and from school more safer for students .¶ “We plan to spend $2 million to develop a safe

passage program to make sure students are safe when traveling to and from school,” he told the Defender.¶ Additionally, CPS will award a $10 million contract to a community organization to assist it with conflict resolutions strategies, which could include in-school suspensions rather than at-home suspensions. The final $18 million will be used to create a Culture of Calm program at designated schools identified to have high incidents of violence. There are 38 schools targeted for the new program, many of them are on the South Side.¶ Shields said a lot of incidents of violence occur at bus routes where students from different schools ride the same bus.¶ “We have met with private school principals, (Chicago Transit Authority) officials and Chicago police, because many times students from various schools ride the same bus and that’s when problems often occur. These meetings resulted in us getting bus times for routes that we will share with principals and to make sure police are at these bus routes.”¶ In September near Christian Fenger Academy High School on the Far South Side, Derrion Albert, a 16 year-old honor student who was waiting at the bus stop to go home, was beaten to death with a wooden railroad tie after a fight broke out between youth from different neighborhoods.¶ CPS uses cameras and metal detectors at many of its high schools. Metal detectors are not used at elementary schools although handheld detectors are sometimes used. The average elementary school has one security guard assigned to it.¶ One community organizer, Westow Miller, executive director of Neighborhood Watch, a parent patrol group, said more security guards and metal detectors are needed at elementary schools.¶ “There are more violent incidents occurring at elementary schools than people hear about,” he said.¶ Earlier this month a 12 year-old boy who attends Bethune Elementary School on the West Side was caught bringing an unloaded gun with ammunition to school.¶ But CPS officials said eventually it would like to reduce the number of metal detectors at schools. At Defender press time, CPS officials did not know the

total number of metal detectors in use.¶ “Our goal is to have fewer metal detectors at schools,” said Monique Bond, director of communications for CPS.¶ Some schools have more, depending on the number of students, building size and the school’s security needs, Shields added.

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This year the resolution asks us to stand resolved that the United States Federal Government curtail its domestic surveillance. Rather than engage in a hypothetical debate about USFG policy, we have decided to use the debate sphere as a means to resist the surveillance infrastructure of our public school system. Urban youth are currently subject to over-policed and underfunded schools, with surveillance cameras and metal detectors deployed in hallways and classrooms. This should be viewed as a narrative aimed at exposing the ways youth of color are deemed “a security risk”. Weiss 2007- Jen, Ph.D. candidate in Urban Education at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, New York City, New York “Eyes on Me Regardless”: Youth Responses to High School Surveillance”

http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ821604.pdf

In public schools across the country, students are encountering the effects of a variety of security measures designed to make schools safer. Students enter and exit their schools through metal detectors, scanning machines, and under the suspicious stares and booming shouts of security officials and police officers . On their way to classes, they move through hallways, stairwells, and sometimes classrooms mounted with surveillance cameras. From California to Florida, Washington to Maine,

urban and suburban public school officials and government policymakers are choosing to respond to issues related to student violence and school safety by deploying an array of surveilling techniques and technologies . NewYorkCity, home of more surveillance cameras per square foot than any other city in the country, leads the pack in developing and implementing school-based surveillance initiatives (Ruck et al., 2005; Boal, 1998). In 2004,CityCouncilpasseda bill to install surveillance cameras and metal detectors in every public school by 2006 and allocated $120 million in the five year capital budget for new security cameras which cost “Eyes on Me Regardless”: Youth Responses to High School Surveillance By Jen Weiss 48 “Eyes on Me Regardless” approximately $75,000 per school to install (Bennett, 2004). In fact, the City’s Impact schools and nine other large high schools, with large African-American and Latino populations, were top priority to receive cameras, metal detectors, and heavy police presence. Ostensibly designed to improve school safety, the effects of the technologies and personnel required to implement surveillance are manifold—many of which are counterproductive to safety, and, in some cases, actually foment violence. Instead of a greater sense of safety in and around school, along with an active and civilly-minded sense of school community, students describe a feeling of danger and disillusion. More and more, public schools are becoming part of the network of post-9/11, state-sponsored surveillance—spaces in which students experience firsthand what it is to be monitored, feared, contained, and harassed all in the name of safety and protection . Even after security measures are installed, students refer to an increase in the number of violent incidents inside their schools, and attest to the harassment they experience at the hands of police and school safety agents(SSA)1 now located inside their schools.2 As one student put it: “If you would walk outside when the late bell rings, you would hear [the security staff yelling] ‘Get out. Go home. Go home’…They do not want us there. And even when we’re inside the building, they do not want us there. So it’s a constant ‘I don’t want you here’ typa thing.” These stories match up with current research noting that low-income youth of color are being pushed out of public spaces and are increasingly monitored by authority and placed under the threat of criminalization (see Fine et al., 2003; Ruck et al, 2005).

Correspondent with research that contends that with greater police presence comes an elevation in arrests and incarceration rates for youth of color, especially African-Americans (Poe-Yagamata & Jones, 2000), the students with whom I worked are equally aware of heightened scrutiny in their school, as well as in surrounding neighborhoods and around their homes. These studies illuminate some of what gets forgotten in the search for greater school security and fewer incidents of school violence: that school-wide surveillance policies also produce indirect and counterproductive consequences on urban students, especially but not only those already marginalized by the school system. The very presence of urban youth, educational theorist Henry Giroux argues, prompts in the public imagination a “rhetoric of fear, control, and surveillance” (2003, p. 554). Loic Wacquant refers to this level of scrutiny as the phenomenon of “social panopticism” in which social service bureaucracies, like schools and other institutions, are called on to use the

information and human means they possess to exercise close surveillance on ‘problem populations’ (2001, p. 84). Failing to address the larger economic, political, and social conditions faced by poor and working-class youth of color, urban school policies and reform agendas are generated in a context of heightened fear and moral panic . Poor urban high schools have largely become, or are becoming, sites of containment and control. They are spaces where school policies which involve surveillance technologies and techniques get tested on youth bodies already framed by suspicion (Ruck 49 Jen Weiss et al., 2005; Saltman & Gabbard, 2003; Garland, 2001; Males, 1996; Noguera 1995). Neoliberalism, or the retreat of social welfare programs matched by an increase of social control polices, is helping to foment a climate of fear and surveillance. Michelle Fine (2006) argues that privatization and what she names the “privileged public sphere” is not only a re-alignment of public dollars, but also public bodies. In this sense, surveillance and security policies in schools are strategies for moving these public bodies around; not only to and from classrooms, but also from school to prison. Surveillance trends in schools are not merely more cops and more cameras, but are also symptoms that emerge in the context of neoliberalism—represented by a range of educational reform agendas and

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policies. Expecting surveillance and security measure to address the consequences of excessive over-crowding, financial inequity, and lack of educational services

such as counseling and peer mediation signals an unwillingness to deal with underlying macroeconomic issues faced by schools and educators. In the context of No Child Left Behind (NCLB), we witness the retreat of public funding and a demand for state or federal (and private) control and accountability. Although it gave students in failing schools a chance to enroll in successful district schools and required schools and districts to be held responsible for its under-prepared students and teachers, it failed to allocate resources and funding to meet these needs and held them accountable for outcomes they were ill-prepared to meet. It is a good example of an accountability system that is punitive—forcing schools and educators to impose NCLB’s standards without compromise or questions. Such an accountability system fails to address the myriad structural factors that contribute to struggling schools. Ultimately, the law serves to penalize schools and educators—measuring compliance solely by the increase in standardized test scores of its students. Despite an important intent, NCLB has done little to close the ‘achievement’ gap of Black and Latino students—with only 38% of NewYork City’s public high schools tudents graduating in four years. At the same time, NCLB represents a financial windfall for standardized testing and textbook companies and has awarded millions of dollars to security companies. Homeland security-related business is said to be the economy’s “fastest-growing sector—jumping from $28 billion in 2003 to a projected $170 billion by 2015” (Homeland Security Research Corporation, 2005 as quoted by Editors, 2005). Students learn to avoid security at all costs; and they learn that the rules they are expected to follow are not consistently imposed . Interactions with security become moments in which students note the failure of surveillance—on some days they’ll “get caught for going to the bathroom without a hall pass” and on other days they do not. Following the school’s rules, then, means being subjected to ‘the presence of an absence’ of authority and experience the material and psychological impact of these policy trends. What they are responding to, my research contends, is not merely the violence of feeling so heavily watched, but the violence that accompanies unjust school policies directed at low-income, urban youth of color students 50 “Eyes on Me Regardless” in these schools, student who are deeply aware that the persistent advancement of surveillance measures inside their schools has ill-intended consequences on them and their education. Given the context urban youth find themselves in—appropriately described by one student as “eyes on me regardless”3 —what then becomes of student resistance to the oppressive and often punitive conditions they face inside their schools? Although my larger study addresses the political economy informing school-based surveillance policies for youth of color in urban areas, my central research focus has been to trace student resistance to these policies. Students narrate stories of fear and frustration. But they also narrate stories of resistance. Foucault (1980) reminds

us that where the forces of domination reside, so too do the forces of resistance. In school spaces there is a multitude of both; however when power masquerades or is concealed through mechanisms of surveillance, it re-defines what “counts” as resistance . Theorists generally disagree about what constitutes resistance: some argue that it must be collective struggle with specific goals and intentions(Hermans, 2001; Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985); others note that while efforts at resistance are always active under domination, they are harder to detect and may appear complicitous with power (Kelley, 1990; Scott, 1985). Ashforth and Mael (1998) outline a basic framework for understanding the overlapping nature of the concept. They argue that resistance may be directed at a threat or that it may be indirectly targeted at a threat (diffuse); that it may be collective or individual; that it may be authorized by an institution, or remain unauthorized; and, finally, that it may be facilitative of an institution’s goals or oppositional to them. Keeping this basic framework in mind as a guide, this article does not take up what constitutes resistance, but rather what we might learn about resistance and surveillance by looking at how students at a Bronx, New York, high school have responded to security initiatives recently imposed on them. It discusses three responses: theprotest; tactical avoidance; and what I am calling emergent participation. I will address each of these strategies in depth and follow with a brief consideration of what they teach us about resistance. Taken together, these responses offer us a chance to consider the multiple forms that resistance takes and those that emerge over time, in this case, over the course of a school year. I will begin by considering what is perhaps the most promising and definitely the most visible response to school-wide surveillance measures: a student-organized walkout of 1,500 students that took place at a large comprehensive high school in the Bronx, New York, in late September 2005. But before attending to the protest, I will give a brief history of New York City school security policy.

Militarization is often thought of as something that happens “over there” in far off, war-torn nations. Yet, for the average Chicago Public School student, being subject to weapons searches, random stops by security guards and surveillance cameras, is a normal school day. The current discourse on the “failure” of inner-city schools fails to interrogate the ways inner-city students are considered harbingers of violence. At stake is the notion of “schooling” itself Devine 1996- John, director, School Partnership Program, Maximum Security: The Culture of Violence in Inner-City Schools

The response of this New York City high school student summarizes the¶ discourse I try to problematize in the pages that follow.‘ When most¶ people— Americans or foreigners, even those who live in economically im-poverished lands—think about schools, they ordinarily do not think of uniformed security guards, high-tech devices for weapons searches, or the use¶ of police tactics for corridor surveillance. Students attending New York¶ City‘: most troubled high schools do so automatically.¶ The central thesis of this book

based on my ten years of working in New¶ York's inner-city high schools can be described as an attempt to outline the¶ process by which violence becomes normalized in everyday school life, to¶ examine the inner logic of its accompanying ethos of fear, and to suggest¶ that this phenomenon may be proving more widespread throughout American education , even in suburban and rural schools—wherever, in fact. a¶ techno-security apparatus is relied on as the primary mechanism for achieveing

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schoolwide discipline. My basic claim is that the collective imagination¶ of the New York City high school system, fed over the past several decades¶ on an amalgam of real and invented student crime, treacheries. and rampages, has reacted with

intensive paramilitary practices that have engen-¶ dered an antagonistic terrain where traditional public schooling

and urban¶ street culture mingle—the latter conceptualized as both transforming and¶ transformed by the

educational institution. l will contend that state, school,¶ and street languages are merging into a koine of corporeal experiences (the¶ attendant options of

this koine are suspicion. loneliness, anger, terror,¶ fear. and grief. although it also allows for the negation of those feelings).¶ This emerging etiquette has so radically shattered the standard concept of¶ the school and affected the historical teacher-student bond that a novel duality has arisen, assigning to teachers an exclusively cognitive role while¶ delegating to security forces the responsibility for supervising the body, con-¶ trolling student behavior, and managing school discipline . When l ask¶ teachers in

these schools how they maintain classroom control, their re-¶ sponse is, “I can always call security if the kids get too rough.” The chapters¶ that follow question these kinds of responses, now taken for granted,¶ through an anthropology of the body that takes as its starting point Feld-¶ man’s (1994, 407) observation that “relations of domination are spatially¶ marked by the increase of perceptual (and thus social) distance from the¶ body of the Other.”¶ But the hallways of urban schools are not spaces in which educational¶ researchers and theoreticians have been comfortable. Their preference for¶ the classroom as the locus of investigation reflects their interest in the cogni- ¶ tive aspects of teacher training, their fascination with the “hidden curricu-¶ lum,” their rush to create “effective” schools before adequately diagnosing¶ why schools have become ineffective, and their desire to recount success ¶ stories about “transferable” experiments “that work." This study will focus¶ on that most contested of spaces, the high school corridor, understood¶ here-- in opposition to the increasingly privatized universe of the class-¶ room—as emblematic of the whole public dimension of the institution. The¶ corridor calls into question that vast body of literature that centers on the¶ enclosed realm of the classroom and its curriculum, those twin

preoccupa-¶ tions of most educational research journals. The social topography of the¶ urban corridor implies infinitely deferred presence (Derrida's dfiérance),¶ multiplicity, a dispersion of temporality, constant distraction. and the ran dom occurrence of events; the classroom still holds out the promise of dia logue, unity, a coherent configuration of time, concentration.

and the possibility of narrative By refusing to consider the processes whereby the student's body be-¶ comes transformed into a proactive instrument of violence , by disdaining ¶ to theorize about the politically incorrect topic of discipline, research has¶ bolstered those tendencies of the “system” that pretend there are some fac- ¶ ile answers to the overwhelmingly complex problems associated with urban¶ school reform . Such sweeping assertions will rightfully elicit a host of objec-¶ tions from informed readers. I will address some of these objections at the¶ outset.¶ Since l start by attempting to establish that violence does exist in the schools that are the subject of this study and that its discovery is not simply¶ the result of racist interpretation, nostalgic exaggeration about the “good¶ old days." or general adult squeamishness about adolescent culture, perhaps¶ the first question that might arise is precisely why it is necessary to begin in¶ this way—merely confirming the existence of a conspicuous phenomenon.¶ ls it not obvious. one might object. to anyone who watches the news or¶ reads the papers that the schools, especially the public schools, are, like the¶ streets surrounding them saturated with stabbings, muggings, and nurse?¶ The problem is that in attempting to interpret the phenomenon of violence, one immediately encounters a discourse of denial coexisting along-¶ side this discourse 0|’ frank admission. The same high school principal who¶ confides to a visitor that all‘ of the students in his school routinely carry¶ weapons is also able to maintain almost in the same breath that “things ¶ have been getting much better lately“ It is therefore necessary to situate the¶ problem of violence, as I attempt to do in chapter l. to confirm its existence.¶ isolate its components, and circumscribe it, even though it stays one step ¶ ahead and forces researchers to realize their own complicity in constructing¶ the very object to be studied .¶ l shall maintain that this discourse of denial manifests itself on two levels—the practical as well as the theoretical. Since my project aims at ad-¶ dressing both levels, my audience perforce includes scholars interested in¶ analyzing the American educational scene as well as parents, teachers, and¶ the general public, for whom school violence has become an authentic con cern. These reflections are primarily meant to start practical and useful¶ conversations with anyone interested in shaping urban educational policies,¶ in discussing how highly troubled schools can be converted into safer, more¶ respectful places of learning. But l am also arguing that the culture of¶ school violence—whose exact demarcations l shall at this point leave unde fined—is undertheorized. In reacting to right-wing views many academi cians have, for some time that portrayed the inner-city adolescent as pure¶ Without denying the validity of their insights. I will be claiming that¶ the realities of inner-city schooling are far more convoluted.

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We need a counter-discourse, one that questions the existence of surveillance infrastructure in public schools, and exposes the ways students are turned into docile, unquestioning and apolitical subjects. Current post-modern literature on biopower and disciplinary power fails to explain the nexus between pedagogy, violence, and surveillance in the urban school setting. Devine 1996- John, director, School Partnership Program, Maximum Security: The Culture of Violence in Inner-City Schools

At this point, we might turn from the ethnography of the corridors and¶ ask ourselves what messages these public spaces contain for pedagogical¶ theory. It would be easy to conclude that the presence of the SSOs, the¶ police, and the hall deans, with their panoply of electronic surveillance ma-¶ chines, represents a higher-order expansion of the old panopticism, but ¶ dressed up and greatly intensified in hi-tech clothing. Does it not appear¶ self-evident that we are witnessing a heightened kind of surveillance—one¶ infinitely more detailed and pervasive than even the “fussy” seventeenth-¶ century military inspections Michel Foucault refers to in Discipline and¶ Punish (1979, 140)? At first blush, this would seem so, but before answering¶ definitively we should review Foucault’s decipherment of panopticism as¶ the constitutive code of modernity. Most fundamentally, Foucault viewed the Panopticon, Jeremy Ben-¶ tham’s ideal prison, as one of the many new modes of social control that¶ were developing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and that pro-¶ fessed to be more emancipatory than their predecessors but in reality were¶ not. The progression from the confessional box to the psychiatric couch¶ and the evolution from public executions, torture, and dungeons to modern¶ prisons were, for Foucault, steps toward far more efficient and pervasive¶ techniques of social domination. Whereas previously the mutilated body of¶ a regicide who had been hanged, drawn, and quartered could be paraded¶ to instill a lasting message in the minds of onlookers, now—in the classical¶ age—-the body was being converted into a “useful machine" through the¶ mediation of a whole set of methods and rules for controlling and correcting¶ its operations. A “docile body” (Foucault 1979, 138) was being created, one¶ that could be “subjected, used, transformed, and improved” (136), espe-¶ cially in the context of the boarding school or the military camp. Within¶ the space of the barracks or the dormitory, “no detail was unimportant”¶ (140), and the body was subjected to uninterrupted surveillance—the¶ “gaze” (l7l)—eventuating in human subjects mastering, managing, re-¶ pressing, and ultimately supervising themselves. But for Foucault, the effects of this “supervision of the smallest frag-¶ ment of life and of the body” went far beyond seventeenth-century secondary education and prisons: concentration on the “meticulous observation¶ of detail” spilled out of these particular institutions and into modern soci-¶ ety as a whole . Panopticism and surveillance were “destined to spread¶

throughout the social body” (207), to penetrate it “through and through¶ with disciplinary mechanisms” (209), resulting in the formation of “what¶ might be called in general the disciplinary society” (209). As a result of¶ this successful dissemination of

panopticism, societal surveillance became permanent and complete-precisely because modem society was in a per-¶ manent state of fragmentation. Under the regime of modernity, we incorpo-¶ rate into ourselves the role of both supervisor and supervised—we become¶ “the principle of our own subjection” (203), and pedagogy rests on the basic ¶ assumption of an unremitting concern for “character assessment.” In the¶ hands of Foucault, the Panopticon thus becomes a metaphor for all of mo-¶ dernity. “ The man [sic] of modem humanism was born” (141).¶ But the school was not the only instrument of domination: it took its¶ place alongside the prison and, most especially, the industrial factory. Re-¶ call the I913 glass-ceilinged school auditorium reminiscent of the “arcades”¶ and the Benjaminian reading of the same (see the introduction). When all¶ of these large schools were designed at the beginning of this century—(and¶ not just the “vocational” ones)—they were seen as correlates to, and as¶ prep schools for, an industrialized working class that could sit there, look¶ through the glass ceiling at the heavens, and dream the dreams of an ex-¶ panding commercial economy—an economy that no longer exists New¶ York City school discipline of the early days of this century—whose resto-¶ ration will occur, it is now almost unanimously agreed," only through a¶ “strengthening” of the security ggrd apparatus-must be understood as having been, even then, when it seemed to work so well, a response to an¶ already-fractured school system functioning within a constantly fissuring¶ factory economy , which is precisely why the discipline had to be

applied in¶ the first place.“¶ What, then, are we to make of the whole Foucauldian thesis in the light¶ of corridor life today? Can we really say that “docile bodies,” capable of¶ responding to the exigencies of the world of work, are being produced?"¶

Can anyone seriously contend that meticulous attention to detail occurs¶ when the guards’ chief concern is to check for large weapons at the front¶ door? How can the model of “continuous surveillance” continue to function¶ when the “network of gazes” has totally collapsed‘?

By engaging in a discussion of surveillance in our own schools we are no longer the docile, apolitical subjects of surveillance practices Devine 1996- John, director, School Partnership Program, Maximum Security: The Culture of Violence in Inner-City Schools

The lobbies and hallways of inner-city schools, epitomized most concretely in the icon of the student's concealed weapon meeting the guards¶ hand-held metal detector, reveal that none of these educational theories is ¶ any longer particularly germane for the task of mapping the school culture.¶ The question that arises, then, is whether any

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narrative can replace these¶ formulations and adequately interpret these agitated and fragmented social ¶ texts of mimetic violence that masquerade as contemporary schools ¶ I will argue that none of the discourses of present currency is relevant¶ for the job of reflecting this cutting edge of postmodern experience, the ¶ inner-city public school space. If this

claim is even partially correct, what¶ line of commentary is left for us to make? As an exercise in cultural decipherment, postmodernism by its very nature eschews any kind of theory¶ building, social activism, or participation in the political process Some¶

postmodernists dismiss the very possibility of making policy recommendations (Rosenau 1992, 3). But the ruined edifice of the metropolitan school¶ bears a postmodern message that differs radically from that of the collages ¶ of advertising or of boutique windows At issue is the task of finding effective and democratic, if limited, responses to the ritualized violence—even ¶

if these responses run the risk of being labeled neo-humanistic.

Roleplaying as the USFG is not an effective solution to pressing issues in our communities- as urban debaters we must use our knowledge to address social realities

Giroux 2006- Henry, Waterbury Chair of Secondary education at Pennsylvania State University, America on the Edge: Henry Giroux on Politics, Culture, and Education Google books¶

Educators at all levels need to challenge the assumption that politics is dead , or the nature of politics will be determined exclusively by government leaders and experts in the heat of moral frenzy . Educators need to take a more critical position, arguing that knowledge, debate, and dialogue about pressing social problems offer individuals and groups some hope in shaping the conditions that bear down on their lives. Public civic engagement is essential if the concepts of social life and the public sphere are to be used to revitalize the language of civic education anddemocratization as part of a broader discourse of political agency and critical citizenship in a global world. Linking the social to democratic public values represents an attempt, however incomplete, to link democracy to public action, as part of a comprehensive attempt to revitalize civic activism and citizen access with decision-making while simultaneouslyaddressing basic problems of social justice and global democracy. Educators within public schools need to find ways to engage political issues by making social problems visible and by debating them in the political sphere. They also need to be at the forefront of the defense of the most

progressive historical advances and gains of the state. French sociologistPierre Bourdieu is right when he calls for collective work by educators to prevent those who are mobilized against the welfare state from destroying the most precious democratic conquests in labor legislation, health, social protcction and education.’ At the very least, this would suggest that

educators should defend schools as democratic public spheres , struggle against the de-skilling of teachers and students that has accompanied the emphasis on teach ing for test-taking. and argue for pedagogy grounded in democratic values rather than testing schemes that severely limit the creative, ethical, and laboratory potential of education. Urban Debate Leagues represent one reason for hope. Hope is more than roman tic idealism; it is the condition that highlights images of an alternative politics and pedagogy. Hope is not simply wishful thinking; it ¡S Written into those various struggles waged by brave men and women for civil rights, racial justice, decent working conditions, and a society cleansed of war. Hope is the refusal to stand still in the face of human suffering and it is learned by example, inflamed by the passion for a better life, and undertaken as an act of civic courage. The work of Urban Debate Leagues provides a tangible reason to be hopeful. Urban debaters , as they devour newspapers and periodicals, confront information detailing certain realities about our world including the use of war, the severity of environmental degradation, and the increasing gap between the rich and working poor.

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2AC ANSWERS TO: Safety D isadvantage 1. Their evidence is too old- prefer our evidence, it cites the latest statistics about crime in CPS

DNA Info 2014- Ted Cox, “CPS Has Safest Year Ever, Study Says; 'Nothing to Celebrate': Critics” http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20140702/bronzeville/cps-has-safest-year-ever-study-says-nothing-celebrate-criticsThe mayor praised what a study called the safest school year on r ecord, just over a year after school closings led many to predict violence in the streets.

"The fears, justifiably raised, did not bear out," Mayor Rahm Emanuel said after a wide-ranging roundtable on Chicago Public Schools issues Wednesday at Police Headquarters.The mayor and CPS Security Chief Jadine Chou touted a University of Chicago Crime Lab study showing that 2013-14 was what Chou called "the safest school year since we have started tracking student safety in 2007." According to the study, out-of-school suspensions, referrals for expulsions and in-school arrests all declined by more than 30 percent, and 49 fewer CPS students were victims of shootings, with 12 fewer student homicides than the year before, down from 36 to 24. "Our gains in safety are translating to gains in the classroom," Chou added, pointing to figures showing that 82 percent of freshmen are on track to graduate in three more years, and the district graduation rate for seniors rose to 65 percent, up 7 percent since Emanuel took office in 2011 . She said there were no major incidents along Safe Passage routes involving students going to or from school before or immediately after classes.

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2AC ANSWERS TO: Framework 1. We do not foreclose the possibility for discussion or clash – you can still read your generic arguments, but you have to prove that the hypothetical policy making is more valuable than a discussion about events in our communities. Our Giroux evidence indicates that urban debate leagues are meaningful because they provide a forum to discuss issues that impact us- we can still have a discussion about the costs and benefits of surveillance in CPS

2. Roleplaying as the USFG is bad- it leads to political apathy and a sense of powerlessness Kappeler, 1995 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective àssumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent ` powerlessness’ and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere . Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions . It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls òrganized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything , say, about a war , because we deem ourselves to be in the

wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made . Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like Ì want to stop this war', Ì want military intervention', Ì want to stop this backlash', or Ì want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, e ven if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we àre' the war in our ùnconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the òthers'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape òur feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “ destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue

reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things

appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities. Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed”

background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing,

threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the 138


unconcealedness of standing-reserve. (QT, 33) 10 Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential, not technological. 11 It is a matter of how human being s are fundamentally oriented to ward their world vis a vis their practices , skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control. 12

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http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194




2AC On-Case Frontline 1. We do allow for a fair discussion- our Devine 96 evidence states that by providing a counter-discourse we create the possibility for a discussion about the merits of surveillance rather than accepting it as a fact of life- your evidence does not assume the highly contextual nature of our evidence

2. We do not have to present a concrete policy option in order to solve- historically legislation has failed to address surveillance practices, only grassroots solutions such as ours solves

Kundnani and Kumar in 2015 - Deepa Kumar is an associate professor of Media Studies and Middle East Studies at Rutgers University. Arun Kundnani teaches at New York University. His latest book is The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror. <Arun and Deepa. “Race, surveillance, and empire” International Socialist Review. Issue 96, Spring 2015.>

The mechanisms of surveillance outlined in this essay were responses to political struggles of various kinds—from anticolonial insurgencies to slave rebellions, labor militancy to anti-imperialist agitation. Surveillance practices themselves have also often been the target of organized opposition. In the 1920s and 1970s, the surveillance state was pressured to contract in the face of public disapproval. The antiwar activists who broke into an FBI field office in Media, Pennsylvania, in 1971 and stole classified documents managed to expose COINTELPRO, for instance, leading to its shut down. (But those responsible for this FBI program were never brought to justice for their activities and similar techniques continued to be used later against, for example in the 1980s, the American Indian Movement, and the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador.68) Public concern about state surveillance in the 1970s led to the Church committee report on government spying and the Handschu guidelines that regulated the New York Police Department’s spying on political activities. Those concerns began to be swept aside in the 1980s with the War on Drugs and, especially, later with the War on Terror. While significant sections of the public may have consented to the security state, those who have been among its greatest victims—the radical Left, antiwar activists, racial justice and Black liberation campaigners, and opponents of US foreign policy in Latin America and the Middle East—understand its workings. Today, we are once again in a period of revelation, concern, and debate on national security surveillance. Yet if real change is to be

brought about, the racial history of surveillance will need to be fully confronted—or opposition to surveillance will

once again be easily defeated by racial security narratives . The significance of the Snowden leaks is that they have laid out the depth of the NSA’s mass surveillance with the kind of proof that only an insider can have. The result has been a generalized level of alarm as people have become aware of how intrusive surveillance is in our society, but

that alarm remains constrained within a public debate that is highly abstract, legalistic, and centered on the privacy

rights of the white middle class. On the one hand, most civil liberties advocates are focused on the technical details of

potential legal reforms and new oversight mechanisms to safeguard privacy. Such initiatives are likely to bring little

change because they fail to confront the racist and imperialist core of the surveillance system . On the other hand, most technologists believe the problem of government surveillance can be fixed simply by using better encryption tools. While encryption tools are useful in increasing the resources that a government agency would need to monitor an individual, they do nothing to unravel the larger surveillance apparatus. Meanwhile, executives of US tech corporations express concerns about loss of sales to foreign customers concerned about the privacy of data. In Washington and Silicon Valley, what should be a debate about basic political freedoms is simply a question of corporate profits.69 Another and perhaps deeper problem is the use of images of state surveillance that do not adequately fit the current situation—such as George Orwell’s discussion of totalitarian surveillance. Edward Snowden himself remarked that Orwell warned us of the dangers of the type of government surveillance we face today.70 Reference to Orwell’s 1984 has been widespread in the current debate; indeed, sales of the book were said to have soared following Snowden’s revelations.71 The argument that digital surveillance is a new form of Big Brother is, on one level, supported by the evidence. For those in certain targeted groups—Muslims, left-wing campaigners, radical journalists—state surveillance certainly looks Orwellian. But this level of scrutiny is not faced by the general public. The picture of surveillance today is therefore quite different from the classic images of surveillance that we find in Orwell’s 1984, which assumes an undifferentiated mass population subject to government control. What we have instead today in the United States is total surveillance, not on everyone, but on very specific groups of people, defined by their race, religion, or political ideology: people that NSA officials refer to as the “bad guys.” In March 2014, Rick Ledgett, deputy director of the NSA, told an audience: “Contrary to some of the stuff that’s been printed, we don’t sit there and grind out metadata profiles of average people. If you’re not connected to one of those valid intelligence targets, you are not of interest to us.”72 In the national security world, “connected to” can be the basis for targeting a whole racial or political community so, even assuming the accuracy of this comment, it points to the ways that national security surveillance can draw entire communities into its web, while reassuring “average people” (code for the normative white middle class) that they are not to be troubled. In the eyes of the national security state, this average person must also express no political views critical of the status quo.

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**Critical Surveillance- Neg

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1NC Framework

1. Interpretation- the affirmative must defend a fiated governmental action that falls under the resolution

2. Prefer this interpretation

A. It is necessary for all the debaters to agree on what is being debated before the debate can even occur. The resolution provides the foundation for clash

Steinberg 2008, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences , so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a

debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate : the matter can be settled by

unanimous consent . Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate . In addition, debate cannot produce effective

decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered . For example, general argument may

occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration . How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of

illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American

workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose

a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border,

establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus

on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy . To be discussed and resolved

effectively, controversies must be stated clearly . Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor

decisions , frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on

the immigration debate during the summer of 2007 . Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their

discussions , they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential

solutions. A gripe session would follow . But if a precise question is posed —such as "What can be done to improve public

education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid

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discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision

making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined . If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is

mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation . If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or

physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject , we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad , too

loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents,

website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in

assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers

would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by

advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy ; in fact, these sorts of

debates may be very engaging . The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a

particular point of difference , which will be outlined in the following discussion.

A. Education- this is a solvency turn to the affirmative’s advocacy- without engaging in discussions about policy details we risk disengaging from politics altogether, this means students will not be equipped to discuss CPS surveillance policy in a political setting

McClean, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Molloy College in New York, 2011 (David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope”, Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/) Or we might take Foucault who, at best, has provided us with what may reasonably be described as a very long and eccentric footnote to Nietzsche (I have once been accused, by a Foucaltian true believer, of "gelding" Foucault with other similar remarks). Foucault, who has provided the Left of the late 1960s through the present with such notions as "governmentality," "Limit," "archeology," "discourse" "power" and "ethics," creating or redefining their meanings, has made it overabundantly clear that all of our moralities and practices are the successors of previous ones which derive from certain configurations of savoir and connaisance arising from or created by, respectively, the discourses of the various scientific schools. But I have not yet found in anything Foucault wrote or

said how such observations may be translated into a political movement or hammered into a political document or theory

(let alone public policies) that can be justified or founded on more than an arbitrary aesthetic experimentalism. In fact, Foucault would have shuddered if any one ever did, since he thought that anything as grand as a movement went far beyond what he thought appropriate. This leads me to mildly rehabilitate Habermas, for at least he has been useful in exposing Foucault's shortcomings in this regard, just as he has been useful in exposing the shortcomings of others enamored with the abstractions of various Marxian-Freudian social critiques. Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely

more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a

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spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

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**Safety D isadvantage A. The security measures that the affirmative criticizes are vital to prevent the death of CPS students- a CPS student dies from gunfire every two weeks on average- surveillance measures are critical to boost student confidence in the systemChicago Tribune 2003- “Chicago schools to boost security” http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-08-27/news/0308270167_1_metal-detectors-chicago-public-schools-school-yearOne Chicago public school student dies from gunfire every two weeks on average, school officials reported Tuesday as they

announced plans to add X-ray machines and other security measures at city high schools.¶ A security audit at about half of the high schools during the last school year discovered a variety of safety deficiencies, including the fact that not all of the 44 high schools surveyed reported all the violent or dangerous incidents that occurred on their campuses . South Shore High School, at 7529 S.

Constance Ave., reported finding 24 weapons or dangerous objects in the last school year, the most in the city, according to statistics released Tuesday. Curie High School, at 4959 S. Archer Ave., was second with 21 incidents.¶ The audit was prompted by violent incidents on or near school property last winter, including the shooting death of basketball star Maurice Evans across the street from Englewood High School on Dec. 16 and a fight at a basketball game between Manley and Crane High Schools in January.¶ Andres Durbak, director of the Bureau of Safety and Security for the schools, said the most common problem discovered by the audits was that a high-level administrator, such as a principal or assistant principal, was not taking responsibility for safety. He said such a situation contributed to the circumstances that led to Evans' death.¶ Promising that the deficiencies discovered by the audit are already being corrected, schools chief Arne Duncan pledged a $500,000 increase in security spending in the coming school year. The spending includes buying 36 more X-ray machines to scan student backpacks and book bags, closed-circuit televisions and training for school staff.¶ Other high schools in the city will be audited this year, Duncan said, and schools where problems were found last year will be re-evaluated.¶ "This is the price we pay for the sickening role gangs and guns play in young people's lives," said Duncan of the $53 million the Chicago Public Schools spends annually on security. The money pays for 1,700 security employees and metal detectors in every high school, among other things.¶ Duncan made his announcement at Collins High School, 1313 S. Sacramento Ave., which received two new X-ray machines as a result of the audit.¶ Officials said 46 high schools now have the X-ray machines. All high schools have metal detectors, but not all schools use them every day on every student or visitor. Some large schools perform only random checks.¶ School officials believe the

machines have helped reduce the number of weapons in schools, but guns are still in the students' neighborhoods.¶ Twenty-three Chicago students died from gun-related deaths between July 2002 and June 2003 , according to statistics gathered by the Chicago Public Schools crisis intervention staff. None of the incidents occurred on school property. "It's a travesty," Duncan said.¶ The most recent fatality had nothing to do with school security. Ana Mateo, 7, was killed last week as she played outside near her Pilsen home. The child, who would have started 2nd grade next week, was hit by a stray bullet meant for a gang member.¶ Although the number of security personnel varies from one school to the next, at least two Chicago police officers are assigned to every high school. James Maurer, police chief of patrol, said the officers assigned to schools now will

report to district commanders instead of a central administrator. The reorganization will make them more accountable to the school's neighborhood, he said.¶

B. Surveillance Cameras Prevent Disruptive Behavior at High SchoolsWral, 12-1-1999, "Surveillance Cameras Deter Crime Around High School Campus :: WRAL.com," WRAL, http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/143709/Read more at http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/143709/#rL637QVmPqXGee5Z.99The night surveillance cameras have been at the school for almost three years, and have brought quick arrests in two cases of vandalism. When you traverse campus, you are immediately picked up by a camera," said George Ellis, executive director for high schools. "You are picked up by all angles." "If you come in from one of the parking lots, you are picked up," Ellis said. "If you come in from

the back, you are picked up. If you come in from the main drive, you are picked up." There were no surveillance cameras set up at Cape Fear High School when two students allegedly set fire to their school Tuesday morning. The plan to have cameras on campuses was in place before the fires at Cape Fear High School, but beginning next week, cameras will be installed in every Cumberland County high school. System leaders hope to have all of the cameras up and running within three months. Douglas Byrd students say other schools should not consider the cameras a distraction. "Well, they make us feel a lot safer at school about leaving our cars out in the parking lots," said student Lara Steelman. The cameras will not only help authorities catch illegal

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acts on tape, but their presence will make students think twice about their behavior. "The presence of them is a factor that deters bad behavior," Buddy Brown, assistant principal. The cameras have already deterred some bad behavior.

Fights have decreased in the cafeteria. Paul Payne, 16, and Michael Furmage, 17, are accused of setting Tuesday's fire and face several felony charges. During their first court appearance Thursday, they told the judge they understand the list of charges filed against them. The students face up to 18 years in prison each.

C. Increased violence destroys the faith that students and teachers have in the school system- surveillance technologies are key to educational future of CPSSpearman 1993- , David Lee. "Teachers' Opinions of the Security and Safety Climate in Chicago Public Schools at Cabrini-Green." (1993).Because of that, some teachers are placed in life threatening situations as they attempt to instruct, inform, enlighten, discipline, and train the next generation of society in American pUblic schools . Within the last few years, more incidents of school-related crime and violence have been reported to law enforcement agencies and school authorities. Recently, a weekly news magazine ran the cover story, "When Killers Come to Class," which highlighted trends of violence in American sdhools in the 1990's, the fear of parents and teachers, and revealed that 3 million crimes a year are committed in or near the 85,000 U.S. schools (U.S.News and WOrld report, November 1993). Dan Rather reported, on the DeceMber 16, 1993 edition of the CBS Evening News, that many teachers are being victimized by school-related crime even though more teachers feel safe at their schools. From this information, it is clear that teachers would definitely be concerned about their safety on the jab. Chicago public elementary school students and teachers have reported many instances of student directed violence on school grounds according to the "Chicago Union Itacher" (February, 1991). School employees have been attacked by individuals either on the outside, as the they enter the school, or by someone hiding inside the school waiting for a victim. These incidents include, but are not limited to: 1.) Robbery at gunpoint in the school parking lot. 2.) Several thefts of jewelry. 3.) Thefts of purses and articles of clothing. 4.) Automobile theft from the school parking lot. 5.) Muggings and sexual asnaults. At one Northwest Side elementary school, an eight year old girl was shot in her classroom by a fourth grade boy while the teacher and classmates looked on in shock (Casey and Herrmann, 1992). These problems made it necessary for the CTU President Jackie Vaughn to have a representative speak to the superiatentof Chicago Police concerning the matter. At same Chicago pUblic schools, teachers do not wear fur even on the coldest days, neither do they wear jewelry, and same teachers even lock purses and coats in closets and office vaults because the security prablems are worse now than in past years (Chicago Union Tbacher, 1991). The safety of students and teachers became a major concern after 7 year old Dantrell Davis was shot dead while entering a school located in the Cabrini-Green C.H.A. housing project in Chicago. As a result, several law enforcement agencies including the Secret Service presented plans to make the area and schools safer (Lon9, 1993). -2- During this writer's tenure at Sojourner Muth Elementary School, located in Cabrini-Green, there have been numerom, incidents of violence and crime directed at school employees. This study, will examine teachers' opinions of safety and security at the school where they teach. The information should be of interest to educators, papers and politicians. In reviewing the literature, Quarles (1989) stated that

the public school is not a safe place anymore. School violence is highest in high crime areas. This poses a threat to the education of children. School violence is greater in large urban areas than in other areas of the city because of the larger gathering of young adolescents at the schools. As a result: Increasingly, teachers are afraid to go to work. Quarles (1989)

cited examples of cities where sixty-six percent middle school teachers and fifty-two percent of all city teachers polled had considered quitting due to verbal and physical abuse received from students. Statistics from the National Institute of Education reported 2,400 acts of arson, 13,000 thefts, 24,000 incidents of vandalism, and 42,000 cases of damage to property every month in U.S. public schools, while the PTA has shown that school vandalism costs over 600 million dollars a year (p. 8). At the time of this study, the research showed that twenty-seven percent of all Chicago teachers reported being victimized in robberies. Quarles' (1989) study abounds with tips and survival guidelines to prevent robbery, rape, theft, assault and other types of victimization a teacher should 3 4 guard against. The message throughout this report is that crime can be deterred and prevented in public schools. Mile the school may or may not be a safe place, the teacher can be safe by being aware and watchful. According to Dennis Smith (1990) schools have become victims of handgun violence while students and teachers are held hostage in the situation . The reported statistics showed the effects of violence using over 2,500 U.S. newspaper stories specifically dealing with elementary and secondary schools involving handguns in thirty-five states and the District of ColuMbia from 1986 to 1989. During that period of time, 65 students and six school employees were killed with guns, 201 were wounded, and 242 were held hostage at gunpoint. Smith (1990) noted there are ten causes that contribute to gun violence at schools: 1.) Gang-,drug related activity. 2.) Long standing disagreements/grudges. 3.) Cleaning guns. 4.) Fights over material possessions. 5.) Romantic disagreements. 6.) Depression. 7.) Vendetta against society. 8.) Racial. 9.) Name calling. 10.) Vendetta against school employees. Since almost half a million school children carry a gun to school daily according to Smith t is no wonder that teachers are beginning to feel unsafe at their schools. Finally, as it is clear that America's schools are no longer safe havens for learning, it appears that gun control legislation could also be a solution to the problem of school related violence directed toward students and teachers.

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1NC On-Case Frontline 1. Turn- they cannot solve their claims about engaging in a discussion about surveillance, by reading an unpredictable affirmative, they effectively shut us out from the discussion altogetherGalloway, 2007 (Ryan, professor of communication at Samford University, “Dinner and Conversation at the Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate as an Argumentative Dialogue,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), p.5-7)Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table

a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted

affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative

demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate themselves to rules of discussion, are the best ways to decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

2. No solvency- without engaging in discussions about policy, they can never hope to eliminate surveillance practices in CPS outside of this round Eijkman 2012 <The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new

combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming,

whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive,

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challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved

accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely

because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al.

2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their

own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are

popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a

shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

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***Topicality Negative

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1NC Violations

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**Federal Government

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1NC Drone Surveillance- “Federal Government” Violation A. Interpretation-

1. Federal government is the national government that expresses powerBlack’s Law Dictionary, 2004 8th Edition, June 1, , pg.716.

Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government – Also termed national government. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]

2. “Its” refers to the subject preceding it and means ownershipCambridge Dictionary “Its”, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/its) Definitionbelonging to or relating to something that has already been mentioned The dog hurt its paw.Their house has its own swimming pool.The company increased its profits.I prefer the second option - its advantages are simplicity and cheapness.

B. Violation- Drones are used primarily by local law enforcement and the federal government has no jurisdiction over its use, which means the affirmative is not curtailing federal government surveillanceNational Journal 2015- “Few Privacy Limitations Exist on How Police Use Drones” http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/few-privacy-limitations-exist-on-how-police-use-drones-20150205, Feb 5As drones become cheaper and more capable, more police departments across the country are asking for and getting federal approval to use them for law enforcement.¶ But the Federal Aviation Administration only takes safety into consideration when it grants a

law enforcement agency approval to use drones, leaving privacy protections to legislation—which, depending on the state in question , may or may not exist .¶ Agencies as large as the Michigan State Police and as small as the Grand Forks County [N.D.] Sheriff's Department have

received FAA approval to use drones. Most departments use them for missions like search-and-rescue or for photographing a crime scene or an accident site.¶ But unless a law enforcement agency is within one of the 14 states that have passed privacy legislation limiting how police can use drones, there's little in theory keeping it from using a drone for a less innocuous end—such as surveillance without a warrant. "While the federal government retains responsibility for the airspace, under most circumstances a state/local government can impose restrictions on the agencies for which it's responsible," an FAA spokesperson said in an emailed statement.¶ Members in the House and Senate introduced bills in the previous Congress that would have required police everywhere in the country to obtain a warrant before using drones for surveillance, but the bills died at the end of the year.

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C. Standards

1. Limits- allowing the affirmative to claim advantages off of non-USFG surveillance practices unlimits the topic; any non-federal surveillance measure from local traffic cameras to license plate readers becomes a viable affirmative- a limited topic is an educational topic- the fewer affirmatives we can focus on, the more in-depth our discussions

2. Negative ground- as long as the affirmative does not have to stick to the USFG, they will find the most miniscule local surveillance action as a means to bypass links to politics Das, elections, national security Das, and other core negative generics.

a. There is an education DA to a loss of ground- debating about politics, elections, and national security teaches debaters about vital issues regarding national security

D. Prefer competing interpretations- if our definition is net-better for debate, that is, it is more limited and educational then vote negative

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1NC Stingray- “Federal Government” Violation

A. Interpretation-




B. Violation- Stingray technology is not used by the Federal government, only local law enforcementKlonick 2014- Kate, fellow at Yale Law School’s Information Society Project, November 14, “Stingrays: Not Just for Feds!” http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/stingrays_imsi_catchers_how_local_law_enforcement_uses_an_invasive_surveillance.single.htmlFrom Ferguson to Senate hearings, the news of local police arming themselves with federal-grade equipment—tanks, riot gear, M16 rifles—has captivated everyone from civil libertarians to lawmakers. But in the national debate surrounding police militarization, the most effective weapons may have been overlooked: Beyond arming themselves like the federal government, local police are also spying on you like the federal government—using sophisticated surveillance technology without warrants.¶ One of the tools making it possible for Chief Wiggum to gather all your deets is known colloquially as a Stingray , a portable gadget about the size of a box of doughnuts. They’re also known as “cell-site simulators,” because, well, that’s exactly what they do: A Stingray mimics a cellphone tower and forces all nearby mobile phones or devices to connect to it. Every phone that connects to the Stingray reports its number, GPS location, and the numbers of all outgoing calls and texts. That’s every location and outgoing call and text log of every phone within a certain radius—up to several kilometers—of the Stingray, and that’s all without a warrant.¶ It’s probably not a huge surprise to most people in America today that the federal government has incredible surveillance technology that it uses occasionally on its own citizens. (Hi, NSA!) But polling shows that only 27 percent of people think that this technology is focused on them, and even if not, half of Americans surveyed say that there might be a margin of federal surveillance they’re willing to endure in the name of homeland security or fighting terrorism.¶ But that logic is a much harder sell when it comes to local police, who have been acquiring Stingrays in increasing numbers. At least 46 state and local police departments, from Sunrise, Florida, to Hennepin, Minnesota, have gotten cell-site simulators, which range widely in price from $16,000 to more than $125,000 a pop. And like the federal government, local police are using this technology without any judicial oversight. That means Barney Fife—or, if you’re looking for a more sinister example, think Denzel in Training Day—can walk into your neighborhood with a Stingray, fire it up, and collect all the numbers, GPS, and call logs of every cellphone in the area. If they’re looking for a specific number (hopefully, it’s not you), they can also use a Stingray to trick your phone into being a personal GPS tracker and then use that warrantless cellphone tracking to enter your home and arrest you—again without a warrant.

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C. Standards





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1NC Critical Security- “Federal Government” Violation A. Interpretation-




B. Violation- The affirmative focuses on surveillance practices in CPS schools, this occurs at the local, not federal level

C. Standards





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**Curtail ≠ Abolish

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1NC Security Letters- Curtail ≠ Abolish A. Interpretation

1. To curtail is to reduce or restrictOxford English Dictionary http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/curtail

Definition of curtail in English:¶ verb¶ [with object]¶ 1Reduce in extent or quantity; impose a restriction on: civil liberties were further curtailed

2. Abolish is to put an end toOxford English Dictionary http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/abolish

Definition of abolish in English:verb[with object]Formally put an end to (a system, practice, or institution):

B. The plan does not curtail surveillance, it abolishes the surveillance practice of security letters

C. Standards

1. Limits- allowing the affirmative to claim two interpretations of curtail (restrict and abolish) doubles the number of viable affirmatives; a limited topic is an educational topic- the fewer affirmatives we can focus on, the more in-depth our discussions

2. Negative Ground- the negative will not be able to read counterplans that test the affirmative by banning a surveillance practice altogether

D. Prefer competing interpretations- if our definition is net-better for debate, that is, it is more limited and educational, then vote negative

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2NC/1NR/1NR Blocks

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**2NC/1NR/1NR Competing Interpretations

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2NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: Reasonability

Reject reasonability

1. It is too vague and encourages judge intervention- what constitutes a “reasonable” level of predictability is too subjective; what one team finds reasonable another might find unreasonable. Also, absent a debate about the specific costs and benefits of words, the judge will be left to decide for themselves whether they think the affirmative is reasonable

2. Topicality is good for debate- under their interpretation we would not debate about the comparative merits of different interpretations in the resolution, this means we lose vital cost- benefit analysis skills

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***”Federal Government” Violation

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2NC/1NR/2NR- “Federal Government”- Extensions

Federal means relating to the national government of the United StatesBlack’s Law Dictionary, 1999

federal, adj. Of or relating to a system of associated governments with a vertical division of governments into national and regional components having different responsibilities; esp., of or relating to the national government of the United States.

Federal government is central governmentPRINCETON UNIVERSITY WORDNET, 1997, p. http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=federal%20government. Federal government. n: a government with strong central powers.

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2NC/1NR/2NR- “Its”- Extensions

‘Its’ means ownership ownershipGlossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005 (http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

Its means possessionEncarta, 2009 (Encarta World English Dictionary, http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861622735)

its [ its ] adjective Definition: indicating possession: used to indicate that something belongs or relates to something

The park changed its policy.

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**2NC/1NR/1NR Drone Affirmative

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2NC/1NR Drone Affirmative- “Federal Government”- Overview

1. Extend our 1NC Black’s Law and Cambridge Dictionary evidence, the phrase, “The Federal Government should curtail its domestic surveillance”, can only refer to the federal government’s surveillance

2. Extend our violation- drones are used for surveillance by local law enforcement not by federal law enforcement. This puts them in a solvency double bind either: a) they only curtail federal government surveillance, in which case they cannot solve their internal links or b) they curtail both, in which case they are extra topical, extra topicality is a voting issue for predictability and ground- it allows the affirmative to claim advantages based on untopical portions of the plan text

3. Extend our reasons to prefer- by curtailing non-federal government surveillance, the affirmative broadens the scope of the topic, a limited topic is better for our education since we will have in depth discussions on a small number of affirmatives. Also, by having a non-usfg actor, the affirmative does not link to many core negative generics, which are also vital for topic education

4. Prefer a competing interpretations model when evaluating topicality it’s the only objective way to determine what the words in the resolution mean

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2NC/1NR Drone Affirmative- “Federal Government”- Violation

The affirmative regulates only local law enforcement surveillanceNEW YORK TIMES 2013- “Rise of Drones in U.S. Drives Efforts to Limit Police Use” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/technology/rise-of-drones-in-us-spurs-efforts-to-limit-uses.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0For now, drones for civilian use run on relatively small batteries and fly short distances. In principle, various sensors, including cameras,

can be attached to them. But there is no consensus in law on how the data collected can be used, shared or stored.¶ State and local government authorities are trying to fill that void. As they do, they are weighing not only the demands of the police and civil libertarians but also tricky legal questions. The law offers citizens the right to take pictures on the street, for instance, just as it protects citizens from unreasonable

search.¶ State legislatures have come up with measures that seek to permit certain uses, while reassuring citizens against unwanted

snooping.¶ Virginia is furthest along in dealing with the issue. In early February, its state Legislature passed a two-year moratorium on the use of drones in criminal investigations, though it has yet to be reviewed by the governor.¶ In several states, proposals would require the police to obtain a search warrant before collecting evidence with a drone.

Here’s more evidence, surveillance drones are used primarily by local law enforcement Washington Times 2012- December 10, “Homeland Security increasingly lending drones to local police” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/10/homeland-security-increasingly-loaning-drones-to-l/Since then, the Washington Guardian has confirmed, DHS and its Customs and Border Protection agency have deployed drones — originally bought to guard America’s borders — to assist local law enforcement and other federal agencies on several occasions.¶ The practice is raising questions inside and outside government about whether federal officials may be creating an ad-hoc, loan-a-drone program without formal rules for engagement, privacy protection or taxpayer reimbursements. The drones used by CPB can cost between $15 million and $34 million each to buy, and have hourly operational costs as well.¶ In addition, DHS recently began distributing $4 million in grants to help local law enforcement buy its own, smaller versions of drones, opening a new market for politically connected drone makers as the wars overseas shrink .¶ The double-barreled lending and purchasing have some concerned that federal taxpayers may be subsidizing the militarization of local police forces and creating new threats to average Americans’ privacy.

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**2NC/1NR/1NR Stingray Affirmative

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2NC/1NR Drone Affirmative- “Federal Government”- Overview


2. Extend our violation- stingrays are used for surveillance by local law enforcement not by federal law enforcement. This puts them in a solvency double bind either: a) they only curtail federal government surveillance, in which case they cannot solve their internal links or b) they curtail both, in which case they are extra topical, extra topicality is a voting issue for predictability and ground- it allows the affirmative to claim advantages based on untopical portions of the plan text



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2NC/1NR Stingray Affirmative- “Federal Government”- Violation

Stingray technology is used only by local law enforcementScientific American 2015 “What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance?” http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-big-secret-surrounding-stingray-surveillance/, June 25Given the amount of mobile phone traffic that cell phone towers transmit, it is no wonder law enforcement agencies target these devices as a rich source of data to aid their investigations. Standard procedure involves getting a court order to obtain phone

records from a wireless carrier. When authorities cannot or do not want to go that route, they can set up a simulated cell phone tower—often called a stingray—that surreptitiously gathers information from the suspects in question as well as any other mobile device in the area.¶ These simulated cell sites—which collect international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), location and other data from

mobile phones connecting to them—have become a source of controversy for a number of reasons. National and local law enforcement agencies closely guard details about the technology’s use, with much of what is known about stingrays revealed through court documents and other

paperwork made public via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.¶ One such document recently revealed that the Baltimore Police Department has used a cell site simulator 4,300 times since 2007 and signed a nondisclosure agreement with the FBI that instructed prosecutors

to drop cases rather than reveal the department’s use of the stingray. Other records indicate law enforcement agencies have used the technology hundreds of times without a search warrant, instead relying on a much more generic court order known as a pen register and trap and trace order. Last year Harris Corp., the Melbourne, Fla., company that makes the majority of cell site simulators, went so far as to petition the Federal Communications Commission to block a FOIA request for user manuals for some of the company’s products.

Local law enforcement use stingray devices ABC 7 NEWS 2014- December 3, “Investigation: Law enforcement use secret 'Stingray' devices to track cell phone signals” http://abc7.com/news/investigation-law-enforcement-use-secret-devices-to-track-cell-phone-signals/421190/Law enforcement agencies across the U.S. and in Southern California are using a device so secret that agencies are required to sign a non-disclosure agreement before they can buy or use it .¶ The device is commonly referred to as a "Stingray," although

several companies manufacture models under various brand names, including "Kingfish" and "Hailstorm."¶ "Local law enforcement can do things now that we used to relegate to the realm of spies and espionage," ABC7 intelligence expert Hal Kempfer tells Eyewitness News.¶ Stingray-type devices trick a target's cell phone into connecting to it by masquerading as the strongest cell phone tower in the area -- one phones think belongs to a phone carrier like Verizon or AT&T.¶ The tracking device pinpoints a cell phone's location down to about three yards and extracts the numbers of all incoming and outgoing calls.

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**2NC/1NR/1NR Critical Security Affirmative

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2NC/1NR Critical Security Affirmative- Overview


2. Extend our violation- the affirmative does not reduce federal government surveillance, only local surveillance at the level of Chicago Public Schools. This puts them in a solvency double bind either: a) they only curtail federal government surveillance, in which case they cannot solve their internal links or b) they curtail both, in which case they are extra topical, extra topicality is a voting issue for predictability and ground- it allows the affirmative to claim advantages based on untopical portions of the plan text



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2NC/1NR Critical Security Affirmative- Education DA

In order for us to stay engaged on critical issues and effectuate change outside of this round, we need to debate on a limited resolution. This way, we will have more in depth knowledge on surveillance practicesDrew, 2010 [Julie, Sound bite saboteurs: public discourse, education, and the state of democratic deliberation. p. google books] And the means of setting it right is not a naive objectivity but the vigorous contestation of ideas , focusing us on the political and cultural

preconditions for democratic deliberation . Sound-bite sabotage both undermines this dynamic and dissipates our energies to make us afraid of conflict and politics as we slowly unburn the foundations of our own bel iefs in individual freedom or the free

market, thus remaking us without the intellectual and rhetorical skills needed to be free and prosperous. Sound-bite saboteurs short-circuit debate by truncating our thought processes with familiar sounding, but deceptively inaccurate, reassurance that silencing anyone who opposes the familiar and comfortable can only be right. There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. (Mill 1975, 26-27) Third, we argue that, as a consequence, sound-bite saboteurs are responsible for a widespread and growing assault on the possibility and the desirability of democratic decision making . Sound-bite saboteurs, it turns out, are driving a political and cultural process that is eroding the preconditions for democratic deliberation.14 They use public relations tools to redivide key publics along cultural lines expected to be favorable to the saboteurs own narrow, private interest and to privatize conflict management in general. This process is clearest in the stridently partisan and extremist debates animating politics in Washington, D.C., and in state capitals across the country, but it is also manifest in the ways that these debates have turned moderate leaders on both sides of the aisle into endangered species. Cooperation, as a result, is now seen by many as a sign of weakness to be overcome bv remaining resolute despite the best available data (and this approach is seen as just common sense). Instead of understanding that to be free and prosperous we must "fully, frequently, and fearlessly" debate ideas directly with those who disagree with us, sound-bile sabotage encourages a cultural preference for holding our own isolated views "as a dead dogma, not a living truth" (Mill 1975, 44). Mill explains: There is a doss of persons ... who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defense of it against the most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can once get their creed taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its being allowed to be questioned. Where their influence prevails, they make it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately, though it may still be rejected rashly and ignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument. Waiving, however, this possibility—assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument—this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This i» not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth. (Mill 1975, 45) Fourth, sound-bite saboteurs make it nearly impossible for us to understand the grounds of even our correctly held positions, let alone manage conflicts where we remain uncertain how to best proceed. They reframe conflicts to reconstruct common sense as an implicit background consensus to amplify fear of collective action that silences opposing views and truncates the processes that achieve political understanding . For instance, we disapprove of lying, yet we are regularly distracted from lies at the highest levels, in part, because even that truth (Iving is bad) is wrapped in confusions and held more like a superstition "accidentally clinging to words that enunciate a truth." Many of us cheer for our favored leaders when they wiggle out of a tight spot with a well-placed lie; and most top political communications advisors regularly recommend all sorts of truth bending, spinning, and outright lying whenever e

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***Curtail ≠ Abolish

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**2NC/1NR/1NR Security Letters Affirmative

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2NC/1NR Security Letters- Curtail ≠ Abolish – Overview

1. Extend our 1NC Oxford English Dictionary evidence- “to abolish” and “to curtail” are two different actions- the framers of the resolution, if they had intended for the USFG to ban their surveillance practices rather than curtail it, would have used the term “abolished”.

2. Extend the violation- the plan text calls for the federal government to “ban” security letters which is different from substantially curtailing it

3. Prefer this interpretation of the resolution- it allows the negative to read the ban surveillance counterplan, which is an essential component of negative ground on this topic. Also, the affirmative underlimits the resolution. By claiming affirmatives that both ban and curtail surveillance they essentially double the size of the resolution. A limited resolution is key to in depth education on the topic.


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2NC/1NR Security Letters- Curtail ≠ Abolish – Interpretation Extensions

Curtail means to reduce or limitMerriam Webster Dictionary curtailverb cur·tail \(ˌ)kər-ˈtāl\

: to reduce or limit (something)

Abolish means to officially end or stop somethingMerriam Webster Dictionary abolishverb abol·ish \ə-ˈbä-lish\

: to officially end or stop (something, such as a law) : to completely do away with (something)

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**Topicality Affirmative

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**2AC Blocks

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2AC- Drone Affirmative- T “Federal Government” A. We meet their interpretation- the Federal Government uses drones in the status quo

The Guardian 2013- Dan Roberts, “FBI admits to using surveillance drones over US soil” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/19/fbi-drones-domestic-surveillanceThe FBI has admitted it sometimes uses aerial surveillance drones over US soil, and suggested further political debate and legislation to govern their domestic use may be necessary.¶ Speaking in a hearing mainly about telephone data collection, the bureau's director, Robert Mueller, said it used drones to aid its investigations in a "very, very minimal way, very seldom".¶ However, the potential for growing drone use either in the US, or involving US citizens abroad, is an increasingly charged issue in Congress, and the FBI acknowleged there may need to be legal restrictions placed on their use to protect privacy . ¶ "It is still in nascent stages but it is worthy of debate and legislation down the

road," said Mueller, in response to questions from Hawaii senator Mazie Hirono.¶ Advertisement¶ Hirono said: "I think this is a burgeoning concern for many of us."¶ Dianne Feinstein, who is also chair of the Senate intelligence committee, said the issue of drones worried her far more than telephone and internet surveillance, which she believes are subject to sufficient legal oversight.¶ "Our footprint is very small," Mueller told the Senate judiciary committee. "We have very few and have limited use."¶ He said the FBI was in "the initial stages" of developing privacy guidelines to balance security threats with civil

liberty concerns.¶ It is known that drones are used by border control officials and have been used by some local law enforcement authorities

and Department of Homeland Security in criminal cases.

B. Counter- Interpretation: Its means associated withOxford Dictionaries Online, No Date (“Its”, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/its?view=uk)

itsEntry from World dictionaryPronunciation:/ɪts/possessive determiner belonging to or associated with a thing previously mentioned or easily identified: turn the camera on its side he chose the area for its atmosphere

C. We meet- the affirmative reduces surveillance that is associated with the federal government

D. Prefer our interpretation1. Ground- most surveillance is undertaken at the local level, by law enforcement, by limiting out these affirmatives, the aff is left defending only a handful of potential federal government reductions

2. Topic education- debating about surveillance by local law enforcement is key to topic education, these debates are the most salient to current events

E. Prefer reasonability to competing interpretations- if the affirmative is predictable then we should not lose to their interpretation. Predictability is the best standard for topicality. If the negative can predict that they’d debate a drone affirmative on this topic then that leaves ample time to research case specific strategies and links

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2AC- Stingray Affirmative- T “Federal Government”

A. We meet their interpretation- the Federal Government uses stingray technology in the status quo

ACLU 2014- American Civil Liberties Union, June 27, “STINGRAYS: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won't Tell You” Abouthttps://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/StingRays_The_Most_Common_Surveillance_Tool_the_Govt_Won%27t_Tell_You_About.pdf“STINGRAYS: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won't Tell You About”Federal and state law enforcement entities across the country are using a powerful cell phone surveillance tool commonly referred to as a “Sting Ray.” These devices are capable of locating a cell phone with extraordinary precision, but to do so they operate in dragnet fashion, scooping up information from a target device, as well as other wireless devices in the vicinity. In addition, these devices can be configured to capture the content of voice and data communications. Although the federal government has been using these devices since at least 1995,

and use by state and local governments is quite widespread, there are only a handful of published opinions addressing their use.

B. Counter- Interpretation: Its means associated withOxford Dictionaries Online, No Date (“Its”, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/its?view=uk)

itsEntry from World dictionaryPronunciation:/ɪts/possessive determiner belonging to or associated with a thing previously mentioned or easily identified: turn the camera on its side he chose the area for its atmosphere

C. We meet- the affirmative reduces surveillance that is associated with the federal government

D. Prefer our interpretation1. Ground- most surveillance is undertaken at the local level, by law enforcement, by limiting out these affirmatives, the aff is left defending only a handful of potential federal government reductions

2. Topic education- debating about surveillance by local law enforcement is key to topic education, these debates are the most salient to current events

E. Prefer reasonability to competing interpretations- if the affirmative is predictable then we should not lose to their interpretation. Predictability is the best standard for topicality. If the negative can predict that they’d debate a drone affirmative on this topic then that leaves ample time to research case specific strategies and links

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2AC- Critical Security- T “Federal Government”

B. The affirmative is a critique of topicality- extend our Weiss 2007 and Giroux 2006 evidence- by choosing to focus on the local level of politics rather than the national, debaters can stay engaged with issues that are relevant to what occurs in their communities. Our Giroux evidence states that urban debate leagues present hope for politics because it provides a forum to contest vital issues- our Weiss evidence indicates that a vital issue for urban youth is the militarization of their public school system, this discussion is more valuable than a hypothetical debate about United States federal policy

C. Prefer our method of engagement with the resolution

1. Education- our 1AC Devine evidence indicates that by engaging with local issues in our school system we resist the apolitical tendencies of surveillance technologies- we are no longer passive recipients of militarized activities. By questioning the conduct of politics at a local level we become critically aware of pressing issues in our communities

2. Ground- the activity of policy debate is already skewed in favor of those programs with a lot of resources, and coaching. In order to remedy the asymmetry inherent to the activity, we must be able to read arguments that deal with personal experience and politics at a micro level. We do not have the resources to cut a hundred politics updates every week, or research the best counterplan strategy. We can however, still have educational, engaging debates, if we discuss issues that are close to home.

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2AC Security Letters

A. We meet their interpretation- the affirmative curtails the use of the security letters by the USFG

B. Counter-interpretation- to curtail is to ban Vocabulary.com http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/curtail

To curtail something is to slow it down, put restrictions on it, or stop it entirely. If I give up cake, I am curtailing my cake-eating.

C. Prefer our interpretation

1. Ground- most advantage internal links are predicated on the government stopping a surveillance action. The literature does not make the distinction between a partial reduction and an outright ban, the negative, leaves the affirmative with very little advantage ground

D. Prefer reasonability to competing interpretations- if the affirmative is predictable then we should not lose to their interpretation. Predictability is the best standard for topicality. If the negative can predict that they’d debate a drone affirmative on this topic then that leaves ample time to research case specific strategies and links

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Crime Disadvantage

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Crime DA 1NC

186


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Crime DA 1NC

A. Uniqueness: Long term trends show crime rates dropping significantly Fuchs 2015 (Erin Fuchs, 1-27-2015, "It's Incredible How Much Safer America Has Become Since The 1980s," Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/fbi-crime-report-shows-america-is-still-getting-safer-2015-1) LOViolent crime and property crime in America both decreased in the first half of 2014, the FBI said in a new preliminary report released

Tuesday. The FBI's latest crime statistics reflects a long-term trend. Even though America's local police are more militarized than ever, the crime rate has been steadily falling in the past two decades. In the 1980s property crime and violence were both much more common, spurring politicians to bill themselves as "tough on crime" in order to get elected in America. (Presidential candidate Michael Dukakis famously lost against George H.W. Bush, who ran a tough-on-crime campaign.) These days that tough-on-crime rhetoric isn't as common , and there's a excellent reason why. Crime stats consistently show that the country is getting safer . In 2013, the number of murders in America dropped 4.4% to 14,196 — down signifcantly from its peak of 24,703 in 1991. The drop in homicides is even more obvious when you look at individual cities that once had bad reputations. New York recorded 2,245 homicides at its peak in 1990 but only 328 by 2014. Los Angeles had 2,589 homicides in 1992 but only 254 last year. Washington, D.C., a much smaller city, saw its murder number decline from a peak of 443 homicides in 1992 to only 105 last year. Overall, violent crimes including homicide, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery dropped 38% between 1992 and 2011. The dramatic plunge in violent crime shocked many experts, who predicted America would just get more violent. "Recent declines in rates of violent crime in the United States caught many researchers and policymakers off guard," criminology professor Gary LaFree wrote back in 1999. "These declines were perhaps more surprising in that they came on the heels of dire predictions about the rise of a generation of 'superpredators' who would soon unleash the full force of their destructive capacities on an already crime-weary nation." Crime experts have yet to come up with a unified theory for why America has gotten so much safer. However, one of the more plausible reasons for the falling violent crime rate is that many cities in America have more police per capita than they used to — and those police officers have gotten better at doing their job. An omnibus crime bill passed in 1994 provided funding for 100,000 new police officers in the US as and set aside $6.1 billion for crime

prevention programs. In reality, the number of cops on the street only increased by 50,000 to 60,000 in the 1990s, but that was still a bigger increase than in previous decades, according to Levitt's analysis of FBI data. In New York City, which had a particularly sharp drop in violent crime, the police force expanded by 35% in the 1990s. The mere presence of more police officers can obviously be a big crime deterrent. During the 1990s, these police officers has also became more strategic — in part because they began to use computerized systems to track crimes and find out where they should deploy their officers. So-called "hot spot policing" is one of the most effective new strategies, political scientist James Q. Wilson has written in The Wall Street Journal. "The great majority of crimes tend to occur in the same places," Wilson writes. "Put active police resources in those areas instead of telling officers to drive around waiting for 911 calls, and you can bring down crime." One Minneapolis-based study that Wilson cited found that for every minute a police officer spent at a "hot spot" more time passed before another crime was committed in that spot after he left. There are other theories about why violent crime decreased, including that it was because America got its crack epidemic under control and because the US economy grew stronger. Steven Levitt, the economist who wrote the best-seller "Freakonomics," proposed one of the more controversial theories about the crime drop, which was that the legalization of abortion in 1973 was partly responsible. If it weren't for abortion, the theory goes, many unwanted children would have been been grown up to be criminals by the 1990s. An even more bizarre theory ties the rise of lead in the atmosphere to increases in violent crime. Lead emissions rose from the 1940s to the 1960s, while crime rose from the 1960s through the 1980s — when children exposed to lead were becoming adults. In an extensive look at the lead/violence theory, Kevin Drum of Mother Jones cited research that found "even moderately high levels of lead exposure are associated with aggressivity, impulsivity, ADHD, and lower IQ. And right there, you've practically defined the profile of a violent young offender."

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http://www.businessinsider.com/fbi-crime-report-shows-america-is-still-getting-safer-2015-1


Crime DA 1NC

B. Link: Surveillance is an irreplaceable tool for preventing crime; efforts to end government surveillance compromise public safety. In truth, surveillance has little potential for abuse compared to the potential for fighting crime.

Armstrong 13 (Stuart Armstrong for Aeon “The Strange Benefits of a Total Surveillance State” Online http://aeon.co/magazine/society/the-strange-benefits-of-a-total-surveillance-state/)

The first, and most obvious, advantage of mass surveillance is a drastic reduction in crime. Indeed, this is the advantage most often put forward by surveillance proponents today. The evidence as to whether current surveillance achieves this is ambiguous; cameras, for instance, seem to have an effect on property crime, but not on incidences of violence. But today’s world is very different from a panopticon full of automatically analysed surveillance devices that leave few zones of darkness.If calibrated properly, total surveillance might eradicate certain types of crime almost entirely. People respond well to inevitable consequences, especially those that follow swiftly on the heels of their conduct. Few would commit easily monitored crimes such as assault or breaking and entering, if it meant being handcuffed within minutes. This kind of ultra-efficient police capability would require not only sensors capable of recording crimes, but also advanced computer vision and recognition algorithms capable of detecting crimes quickly. There has been some recent progress on such algorithms, with further improvements expected. In theory, they would be able to alert the police in real time, while the crime was still ongoing. Prompt police responses would create near-perfect deterrence, and violent crime would be reduced to a few remaining incidents of overwhelming passion or extreme irrationality.If surveillance recordings were stored for later analysis, other types of crimes could be eradicated as well, because perpetrators would fear later discovery and punishment. We could expect crimes such as low-level corruption to vanish, because bribes would become perilous (to demand or receive) for those who are constantly under watch. We would likely see a similar reduction in police brutality. There might be an initial spike in detected cases of police brutality under a total surveillance regime, as incidents that would previously have gone unnoticed came to light, but then, after a short while, the numbers would tumble. Ubiquitous video recording, mobile and otherwise, has already begun to expose such incidents.On a smaller scale, mass surveillance would combat all kinds of abuses that currently go unreported because the abuser has power over the abused. You see this dynamic in a variety of scenarios, from the dramatic (child abuse) to the more mundane (line managers insisting on illegal, unpaid overtime). Even if the victim is too scared to report the crime, the simple fact that the recordings existed would go a long way towards equalising existing power differentials. There would be the constant risk of some auditor or analyst stumbling on the recording, and once the abused was out of the abuser’s control (grown up, in another job) they could retaliate and complain, proof in hand. The possibility of deferred vengeance would make abuse much less likely to occur in the first place.

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http://aeon.co/magazine/society/the-strange-benefits-of-a-total-surveillance-state/



Crime DA 1NC

C. Impact Continued surveillance along with a reduction in crime would reduce police brutality, war, and the possibility of a global pandemic.


We would likely see a similar reduction in police brutality. There might be an initial spike in detected cases of police brutality under a total surveillance regime, as incidents that would previously have gone unnoticed came to light, but then, after a short while, the numbers would tumble. Ubiquitous video recording, mobile and otherwise, has already begun to expose such incidents.[…]With reduced crime, we could also expect a significant reduction in police work and, by extension, police numbers. Beyond a rapid-reaction force tasked with responding to rare crimes of passion, there would be no need to keep a large police force on hand. And there would also be no need for them to enjoy the special rights they do today. Police officers can, on mere suspicion, detain you, search your person, interrogate you, and sometimes enter your home. They can also arrest you on suspicion of vague ‘crimes’ such as ‘loitering with intent’. Our present police force is given these powers because it needs to be able to investigate. Police officers can’t be expected to know who committed what crime, and when, so they need extra powers to be able to figure this out, and still more special powers to protect themselves while they do so. But in a total-surveillance world, there would be no need for humans to have such extensive powers of investigation. For most crimes, guilt or innocence would be obvious and easy to establish from the recordings. The police’s role could be reduced to arresting specific individuals, who have violated specific laws.If all goes well, there might be fewer laws for the police to enforce. Most countries currently have an excess of laws, criminalising all sorts of behaviour. This is only tolerated because of selective enforcement; the laws are enforced very rarely, or only against marginalised groups. But if everyone was suddenly subject to enforcement, there would have to be a mass legal repeal. When spliffs on private yachts are punished as severely as spliffs in the ghetto, you can expect the marijuana legalisation movement to gather steam. When it becomes glaringly obvious that most people simply can’t follow all the rules they’re supposed to, these rules will have to be reformed. In the end, there is a chance that mass surveillance could result in more personal freedom, not less.The military is another arm of state power that is ripe for a surveillance-inspired shrinking . If cross-border surveillance becomes ubiquitous and effective, we could see a reduction in the $1.7 trillion that the world spends on the military each year. Previous attempts to reduce armaments have ultimately been stymied by a lack of reliable verification. Countries can never trust that their enemies aren’t cheating, and that encourages them to cheat themselves. Arms races are also made worse by a psychological phenomenon, whereby each side interprets the actions of the other as a dangerous provocation, while interpreting its own as purely defensive or reactive. With cross-border mass surveillance, countries could check that others are abiding by the rules, and that they weren’t covertly preparing for an attack. If intelligence agencies were to use all the new data to become more sophisticated observers, countries might develop a better understanding of each other. Not in the hand-holding, peace-and-love sense, but in knowing what is a genuine threat and what is bluster or posturing. Freed from fear of surprising new weapons, and surprise attacks, countries could safely shrink their militaries. And with reduced armies, we should be able to expect reduced warfare, continuing the historical trend in conflict reduction since the end of the Second World War.Of course, these considerations pale when compared with the potential for mass surveillance to help prevent global catastrophic risks, and other huge disasters. Pandemics, to name just one example, are among the deadliest dangers facing the human race. The Black Death killed a third of Europe’s population in the 14th century and, in the early 20th century, the Spanish Flu killed off between 50 and 100 million people. In addition, smallpox buried more people than the two world wars combined. There is no reason to think that great pandemics are a thing of the past, and in fact there are reasons to think that another plague could be due soon. There is also the possibility that a pandemic could arise from synthetic biology, the human manipulation of microbes to perform specific tasks. Experts are divided as to the risks involved in this new technology, but they could be tremendous, especially if someone were to release, accidentally or malevolently, infectious agents deliberately engineered for high transmissibility and deadliness.You can imagine how many lives would have been saved had AIDS been sniffed out by epidemiologists more swiftlyMass surveillance could help greatly here, by catching lethal pandemics in their earliest stages, or beforehand, if we were to see one being created artificially. It could also expose lax safety standards or dangerous practices in legitimate organisations. Surveillance could allow for quicker quarantines, and more effective treatment of pandemics. Medicines and doctors could be rushed to exactly the right places, and micro-quarantines could be instituted. More dramatic measures, such as airport closures, are hard to implement on a large scale, but these quick-response tactics could be implemented narrowly and selectively. Most importantly, those infected could be rapidly informed of their condition, allowing them to seek prompt treatment.With proper procedures and perfect surveillance, we could avoid pandemics altogether. Infections would be quickly isolated and eliminated, and eradication campaigns would be shockingly efficient. Tracking the movements and actions of those who fell ill would make it much easier to research the causes and pathology of diseases. You can imagine how many lives would have been saved had AIDS been sniffed out by epidemiologists more swiftly.Likewise, mass surveillance could prevent the terrorist use of nukes, dirty bombs, or other futuristic weapons. Instead of blanket bans in dangerous research areas, we could allow research to proceed and use surveillance to catch bad actors and bad practices. We might even see an increase in academic freedom.

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2NC/1NR Link Extensions: General

Domestic surveillance deters crime – Cleveland provesMarie Avilez Catherine Ciriello Christophe Combemale Latif Elam Michelle Kung Emily LaRosa Cameron Low Madison Nagle Rachel Ratzlaff Shriver Colin Shaffer December 10, 2014 CMU Ethics, History, and Public Policy Senior Capstone Projecthttp://www.cmu.edu/hss/ehpp/documents/2014-City-Surveillance-Policy.pdf Security and Social Dimensions of City Surveillance PolicyAnalysis and Recommendations for PittsburghThere were many significant, interesting trends identified in the Satisfaction Survey. 56% of “business owners” were dissatisfied with the CPD according to the survey. In response to this, CPD began working with City Council to implement a Wireless Video Surveillance Camera System to install a pilot system of five wireless relays connected with nine cameras surrounding “critical infrastructure in downtown Cleveland.”85 The goal of this system is to support and develop effective preventative and protective measures to deter crime. While this project began in 2008, it significantly expanded in 2011 to reach a total of 19 total cameras and five wireless relays which are directed to the Office of Emergency Management where the data is recorded and stored for up to 30 days. This office is not directly related to

CPD, but rather has a larger function of protecting Clevelanders and visitors from natural disasters or terror attacks, thus making it part of the Department of Homeland Security. It is interesting that a major surveillance/public safety initiative like this is taken out of the hands of

CPD, but it makes sense that Homeland Security is controlling the feed. However, CPD Downtown Services Unit has the ability to also monitor the feeds. This ability

stems from a partnership between Homeland Security and the various law enforcement offices throughout the country, not only

Cleveland, to promote a safer country from terror. It would follow that Pittsburgh would have a relationship with Homeland Security should its efforts

with domestic surveillance come to fruition. A second interesting trend dealt with the methodology of asking questions regarding crime and the responses. The survey structured questions on crime as whether or not it was a CPD issue or a total community issue. Between 61-69% of respondents stated it was a community issue, not one for which the CPD is solely responsible86. There is some ambiguity here because nothing is mentioned about what exactly the community could/should do. The only mentioned societal tool to help police is called Crimestoppers, which is an anonymous tip line that offers cash rewards for

information about crimes. This is not exactly “camera” surveillance, but it is a form of human surveillance that the city uses to help deter crime. There is no information reported about the correlation between the amount of crime reported/taking place before or after the implementation of Crimestoppers. To put this system in a different light, there could be a motive of investigating crime, but that did not come through in the reports compiled. When dealing with neighborhood safety, 84% “totally agreed” that they feel safe in their own neighborhood during the day and 63% feel safe in their own neighborhood at night. In both instances, the strongest dissenting group was the age group 18-24. When dealing with other neighborhoods, 73% “totally agreed” that they feel safe in other neighborhoods during the day while only 40% stated they felt safe in other neighborhoods at night. The strongest dissenting groups were from a particular district and from the number of respondents who were from the economic background earning less than $50k/year87. Again, there is incomplete information on the respondents from this district, (same with the other districts) as well as those earning less than $50k/year. There may be some overlap in this group and there may be non-statistically significant numbers associated with these groups meaning the pool of respondents that fit these particular groups could be underrepresented. While Cleveland’s survey had its defects in terms of clarity, we argue that it lays a solid foundation for Pittsburgh to build on with the hope of better understanding the relationship between city residents and law enforcement so that it can create sound guidelines for surveillance technologies and practice .

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2NC/1NR Extensions: National Security Letters Link

National Security Letters serve a very important purpose in solving high profile cases, banning them would destroy an important tool in fighting crime.


Fact No. 2: NSLs help the FBI to "connect the dots" by using the least invasive and most effective means possible.As noted in each of the two OIG reports, NSLs have proven to be invaluable tools in counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. According to the FBI, the principal uses of NSLs are to:Establish evidence to support FISA applications for electronic surveillance, physical

searches, or pen register/trap and trace orders;Assess communication or financial links between investigative subjects or others;Collect information

sufficient to fully develop national security investigations;Generate leads for other field divisions, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and other federal agencies or to pass to foreign governments;Develop analytical products for distribution within the FBI;Develop information that is provided to law enforcement authorities for use in criminal proceedings;Collect information sufficient to eliminate concerns about investigative subjects and thereby close national security investigations; andCorroborate information derived from other investigative techniques.[12] Information obtained from each type of NSL has allowed investigators to crack cases, especially in the realms of counterterrorism and counterintelligence. A brief examination of the success stories outlined in the OIG reports under each type of NSL proves the point. The following examples, excerpted from the OIG report, show how counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations are supported through the lawful use of NSLs:[…]As these examples

illustrate, NSLs are an extremely effective method of obtaining basic data that are crucial to discovering, monitoring, and undermining terrorist activities. They can also be used to exonerate and are frequently used in place of more invasive methods, such as surveillance, searches, and seizures, that are authorized by law and often applicable.

Banning National Security Letters would be banning a harmless, yet vital, tool that the FBI uses in national security investigations.

Caproni and Siegel 12 (Valerie Caproni and Steven Siegel for American Bar Association. “National Security Letters: Building Blocks for Investigation or Intrusive Tools?” Online http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/)

Second, putting aside the hyperbole about the inherent sensitivity of the information, to consider whether the NSL standard is too low, one must consider whether the standard required in a national security investigation is in sync or out of sync with the standard that exists to get the exact same information in other contexts. The fact is that information obtainable with an NSL is also obtainable with a grand jury subpoena in any criminal investigation and with an administrative subpoena in narcotics investigations. Although such investigations are obviously important, their purpose is to investigate crimes that generally pose far less danger to public safety and the national security than is posed by the targets of national security investigations. The standard for issuance of a grand jury or administrative subpoena is that the information sought must be relevant to the crime being investigated. It would be exceedingly odd public policy to make it harder for investigators who are investigating threats to the national security to get basic transactional data than it is for investigators who are investigating routine federal crimes to get the exact same information .

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2NC/1NR Extensions: StingRay Link

Banning tools like StingRay only make it harder for to prevent crime

Volokh 02 (Eugene Volokh for The Responsive Community “The Benefits of Surveillance” Online http://www2.law.ucla.edu/volokh/camerascomm.htm)

But even if there is slippage, it’s important that the potential for abuse is limited and limitable. The danger isn’t the government looking into homes, or tapping private telephone conversations. Rather, it’s that cameras in public places will be abused by officials who want to harass or blackmail their political enemies.

There are such rotten apples in government. If you think that there are very many and that law enforcement is fundamentally corrupt, you should oppose any extra tools for the police, because in your perspective the tools would more likely be used for ill than for good, but I don’t take so dim a view. I think that for all its faults, law enforcement is filled mostly with decent people. And more importantly, good law enforcement is vitally necessary to the safety of citizens of all classes and races.

Instead of denying potentially useful tools to the police, we should think about what control mechanisms we can set up to make abuse less likely, and we should recognize that some surveillance tools can themselves decrease the risk of government abuse rather than increase it.

Cellphone tracking is vital for catching criminal suspects; it was instrumental in catching the Boston bomber

Warren 13 (Laura Warren for WRDW News “Cellphone Tracking Used to Catch Boston Bomber, Local Criminals” Online http://www.wrdw.com/home/headlines/Cell-phone-tracking-used-to-catch-Boston-bomber-local-criminals-204180651.html)

The whole world watched as police searched for the second suspect in the Boston bombings. A cellphone left behind in a hijacked car helped lead them to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's hiding spot.Ed Deveau, chief of police in Watertown, says, "We were able to ping that phone and find out it was in Watertown, and it was heading in a certain neighborhood of Watertown."Police can have cellphone companies ping cellphones, allowing them to find out how close to a certain cell tower the phone is. But, now, most phones come with built in GPS technology, making the signal much easier to track.Just last week, local investigators used the same technology to track down a suspect in an Augusta murder.It all started with a shooting that happened at Biltmore Place in south Augusta last Tuesday, killing a mother and injuring her two adult children.Scanner chatter revealed that the police were tracking the suspect, Steve Lawrence Allen, on his cellphone.Scanner traffic: "Download text messages and look at it, that way you'll know whether it's him or not ... download text messages and look at it, that way you'll know whether it's him or not ... Is he making calls or texting from it, or is it a possibility that he's turned it on?"The search ended 100 miles away in Toombs County. But tracking your cellphone brings up privacy issues. On the one hand, it can be a great tool for catching criminals.Lonzo Clark agrees, saying, "It's no big deal because you got nothing to hide. If you not hiding anything, it should all be all right ."Others, like Lauren Smith, say it borders on an invasion of privacy."We need to be careful how we use technology, and there's appropriate ways, and there's problematic ways," Smith said.Benjamin Hutton agrees, saying, "I understand the urgency and the desire to be safe, but I also think in 20 to 30 years, we might look back and say to ourselves, that was kind of a bad idea."It's a sticky issue because just last August, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that law enforcement does not need a warrant to track your cellphone, but Congress has been tossing around a bill that would overturn that.

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2NC/1NR Link Extensions - Drone Surveillance

Drones Used to Combat CrimeChris Francescani, 3-4-2013, Journalist for Reuters, "Domestic drones are already reshaping U.S.crime-fighting," Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/04/us-usa-drones-lawenforcement-idUSBRE92208W20130304

"But the reality is you'll have a mission like that once or twice a year," he said. "The real utility of unmanned aerial systems is not the sexy stuff. It's the crime scene and accident reconstruction." Miller's department in rural western Colorado has the widest approval to fly drones of any local law enforcement agency in the U.S. Mesa has flown 40 missions in just over three years, "none of them surveillance," said Miller, who crafted the department's drone program and spent a year devising training protocol for fellow deputies before receiving FAA approval. "We can now bring the crime scene right into the jury box, and literally re-enact the crime for jurors," he said. Miller can program the department's GPS-enabled, 3.5-pound DraganflyerX6 quad copter to fly two concentric circles, at two elevations, capturing about 70 photos, for about $25 an hour.

Drone Are Effective Crime-Fighting ToolsTina Moore, 5-20-2014, police reporter, "NYPD considering using drones to fight crime," NY Daily News, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/nypd-drones-fight-crime-article-1.1799980

Big brother may be watching and listening more closely than ever — as the NYPD considers using drones and other gizmos to fight crime in the city. Police Commissioner Bill Bratton said the unmanned machines equipped with cameras and tiny microphones could help spy on crime hotspots — like housing projects, where shootings are up about 32% this year. “Myself, I’m supportive of the concept

of drones, not only for police but for public safety in general,” Bratton said Tuesday. “It’s something that we actively keep looking at and stay aware of.” Bratton,

speaking in front of the City Council’s Public Safety Committee, said the drones could also help the FDNY more quickly determine the extent of a fire. John Miller, the

NYPD’s head of intelligence, said cops have been studying flying drones. They’re looking at “what’s on the market, what’s available.” Miller said the NYPD has

yet to deploy a drone, but called the technology a potentially valuable weapon against crime. While drones don’t appear to be part

of the city’s immediate future, the NYPD has already budgeted $500,000 for a pilot program to test gunshot detectors. Sensors connected to police cameras detect the sound of gunshots and then direct cops to their origin. The NYPD tested the detectors in Brownsville,

Brooklyn, in 2011 — but the program never expanded citywide. The expense for the new round of gadgets would have to first be approved by City

Council and Mayor de Blasio, who has been supportive of the idea of shot detectors in the past. “They’re extraordinarily effective,” Bratton said. “The mayor is supportive of it as are many members of the Council. ...The best systems are those that you can tie in with your camera systems.

You not only get recording of the gunshots but you get the camera activation right away.” Miller said the gunshot detection

system could be tied in with cameras — which could include drones — to give cops a photograph of a shooter. “You could see an application where a drone could be not only a very effective crimefighting tool but could actually show you where the bad guys are going leaving the scene,” he said. Bratton sat on the board of ShotSpotter, a company that makes the detectors, before returning to his post

as the city’s top cop in January. He said the bidding process hasn’t begun.

Drones Offer Effective Methods to Reduce CrimeNo Author, 3-26-2014, "Domestic Drones To Enhance U.S. Patrol Procedures," No Publication, http://inpublicsafety.com/2014/03/domestic-drones-to-enhance-u-s-patrol-procedures/

These drones allow the Tijuana police to patrol areas without announcing their presence. They also give police a tactical advantage because drone operators can provide timely and accurate reports to responding patrol officers. Tijuana Chief of Police Alejandro Lares wants to use the patrol drones to prevent crime in his city. Chief Lares has

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stated that he is not hiding the drones from the public and wants anyone who lives or visits the city to know that they will be safe because the police are watching day and night with the drones. The drone cameras are capable of night-vision operations so Chief Lares is promising 24/7 drone police patrol coverage when his fleet of drones are fully operational. At this point, they are still experimenting and working out policies and tactics for how best to use the drone platforms for observation and crime prevention. The Tijuana 3D Robotics drones can be programmed to fly a specific pattern or manually flown by a trained operator. Chief Lares stated that one drone is equivalent to 20 police officers patrolling. As the Tijuana experiment continues, early signs indicate that Chief Lares is correct in the fact that his agency is experiencing quicker response times to crimes because of the drone’s capability of offering real-time observation and reporting.

Drones Provide an Advanced Method to Provide CrimeMichelle Fredrickson, 10-24-2014, Science Communications student at Washington State University, "Drones Add a New Dimension to Crime Scene Investigations," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pro-journo/drones-add-a-new-dimensio_b_6033392.html

Anyone who's watched the U.S. TV show "CSI" has probably seen officers carefully measuring the distance between every object in a room, and between every speck of evidence, in order to precisely reproduce the crime scene. Police must ensure they have all the information they need before releasing a crime scene, because there's no going back to it. But now, in some areas, drones are simplifying the process , taking 15 minutes to do what takes hours by hand . In Mesa County, Colorado, the sheriff's department takes a unique approach. A drone shoots 90 photos in a grid, with a programmable amount of overlap in the images, in order to have enough information from enough angles to re-create the scene in 3-D . This conglomeration of photos is called Orthographic Mosaic Imaging, or orthomosaics, said Ben Miller, Mesa County's unmanned aircraft program director at the Sheriff's Office. While taking photos manually to aid in crime scene reconstruction is not a new concept, drones can do many things helicopters can't , and at a fraction of the cost , Miller said."One, you can't get that close to the ground because you'll destroy the crime scene with a helicopter . And two, you can't take 90 photos with a big aircraft--it's just not practical," he said.

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2NC/1NR Uniqueness Extensions – Crime Low Now

Crime rate at its lowest – multiple warrants solveFeeney 14 (Nolan Feeney, 11-10-2014, "Violent Crime Drops to Lowest Level Since 1978," TIME, http://time.com/3577026/crime-rates-drop-1970s/) LOThere were 1.16 million violent crimes in 2013 Violent crime in the U.S. fell 4.4 percent last year to the lowest level in decades , the FBI announced Monday. In 2013, there were 1.16 million violent crimes, the lowest amount since the 1978’s 1.09 million violent crimes, Reuters reports. All types of violent crimes experienced decline last year , with rape dropping 6.3 percent, murder and non-negligent manslaughter dropping 4.4 percent and robbery dropping 2.8 percent. The rate of violent crime is 367.9 crimes for every 100,000 people, which marked a 5.1 percent decline since 2012. The rate has fallen each year since at least 1994. Possible reasons for the decline include the country’s high incarceration rate, an aging population and an increased use of security cameras and cell phone videos capturing incidents.

Crime rates dropping significantlyChettiar 2/11 (Inimai M. Chettiar Is The Director Of The Justice Program At New York University Law School’S Brennan Center., 02-11-15, "Locking More People Up is Counterproductive," Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/the-many-causes-of-americas-decline-in-crime/385364/ ) LO The Crime Decline The drop in crime stands as one of the more fascinating and remarkable social phenomena of our time. For decades, crime soared. Cities were viewed as unlivable. Politicians competed to run the most lurid campaign ads and sponsor the most

punitive laws. Racially tinged “wedge issues” marked American politics from Richard Nixon’s “law and order” campaign of 1968 to the “Willie Horton” ads

credited with helping George H.W. Bush win the 1988 election. But over the past 25 years, the tide of crime and violence seemed to simply recede. Crime is about half of what it was at its peak in 1991. Violent crime plummeted 51 percent. Property crime fell 43 percent. Homicides are down 54 percent. In 1985, there were 1,384 murders in New York City. Last year there were 333. The country is an undeniably safer place. Growing urban populations are one positive consequence. During that same period, we saw the birth of mass incarceration in the United States. Since 1990, incarceration nearly doubled, adding 1.1 million people behind bars. Today, our nation has 5 percent of the world’s population and 25 percent of the world’s prison population. The United States is the world’s most prodigious incarcerator.

Crime rates continuing to fallChokshi 14 (Niraj Chokshi, 12-29-2014, "In major cities, murder rates drop precipitously," Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/01/02/in-major-cities-murder-rates-drop-precipitously/) LOIn 1990, at the height of a decade-long crime wave that swept the nation, 2,245 people were murdered in New York City. In 2014, police investigated just 328 homicides in the five

boroughs — a precipitous drop of 85 percent that’s being duplicated in major cities across the country . Preliminary figures suggest 2014 will continue a decade-long trend of falling crime rates , especially in major cities once plagued by violent crime.

Criminologists say the decrease is linked to several factors, some of which are the product of smart policing , others completely out of authorities’ control. But they also say the lack of a consensus on what’s gone right has them convinced that crime rates could spike once again. “I don’t think anyone has a perfect handle on why violence has declined,” said Harold Pollack, the co-director of the University of Chicago Crime Lab. “So everyone is a bit nervous that things could turn around.” But the numbers are encouraging: Chicago recorded an all-time high of 504 killings in 2012, but just two years later homicides were down to 392, and the overall crime rate has declined to its lowest rate since 1972. Charlotte, N.C., recorded 42 killings last year, the lowest number since Mecklenburg County began keeping records in 1977. Philadelphia’s murder rate has declined from 322 in 2012 to 245 this year. Just 19 slayings were recorded in San Jose, the nation’s 11th-largest city, down from 24 the year before. Even crime-plagued Detroit, which has one of the highest murder rates in the country, is improving: The 304 homicides recorded this year are down from 333 in 2013, the lowest rate since 2010 and the second-lowest number since 1967. In the first half of the year, Phoenix police investigated just 43 homicides, down from 52 in the first half of 2013; final statistics for the Phoenix area haven’t been released yet. Kansas City, Mo., was on pace to reach its lowest rate since 1967, too. Mid-year statistics in Dallas showed the city on pace to record just half the murders of its peak in 2004.

Camden, N.J., has seen the number drop by more than 50 percent since 2012. Murders in Columbus, Ohio, hit a six-year low. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Justice Statistics both collect crime data at the end of each year and issue reports throughout the year. Final statistics for 2014 won’t be available for several months. But the trend lines are clear: The number of violent crimes has declined since 2006, according to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program. The number of violent crimes committed per 100,000 people has been dropping even longer, from a high of 758 in 1991 to 367.9 in 2013. The rate hasn’t topped 500 per 100,000 people since 2001. James Alan Fox, a crime statistics expert and professor of criminology, law and public policy at Northeastern University, pointed to four major factors contributing to the falling crime rate across the country: — Long prison sentences, which have lengthened on average since sentencing reform initiatives in many states in the 1990s, have kept more criminals behind bars, albeit at a significant cost to state budgets. —

Improved community policing strategies are sending cops to places where crime is more likely to occur, as a prevention method. Technologies like video surveillance and acoustic sensors, which can hear gunshots before residents report a crime, are improving police response, too . — A changing drug market has plunged the cost of heroin near historic lows , reducing crime associated with the drug trade. Pollack added that the end of the crack epidemic of the 1990s and 2000s has also contributed to a decline in drug-related violence. — And an aging population is less likely to commit crimes. The fastest growing segment of the population is seniors, an age at which far fewer crimes are committed. Academics advance other theories for the falling crime rate, ranging from the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade legalizing abortion, the declining

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http://time.com/3577026/crime-rates-drop-1970s/


use of lead paint and improvements in medical technologies used in emergency rooms, which can save lives that would otherwise have been lost. “Because the crime drop is being seen in so many places, one should be a bit skeptical of any particular police chief claiming that it is because of what his or her department is doing or any lawmaker claiming that some new legislation is responsible ,” Fox said. “While local efforts may contribute, that the pattern is widespread tends to suggest global factors, not so much local initiatives.” Not every major city is basking in the glow of lower crime rates. A rash of shootings between Dec. 23 and the end of the year brought the number of murders in Washington, D.C., to 105 in 2014, the second consecutive year of triple-digit murders, after the nation’s capital hit a half-century low in 2012. The number of homicides in Los Angeles reached 254 last year, up four from 2013 and the first increase in 12 years. Those statistics may actually understate the real number: A Los Angeles Times investigation earlier this year found the Los Angeles Police Department misclassified about 1,200 violent crimes as more minor offenses in a recent one-year period. Indianapolis, Austin, Pittsburgh, El Paso and Memphis all saw rates rise. But even in El Paso, long ranked as America’s safest big city, there’s reason for optimism: While the number of murders rose from 11 in 2013 to 20 in 2014, crime rates in neighboring Ciudad Juarez, across the Mexican border, are falling. After recording an incredible 3,500 killings in 2010, the number of homicides fell to an estimated 424 in the last year, amid a dramatically increased presence by Mexican military forces aimed at stamping out the drug

war. “Declining crime implies a larger number of police officers per crime. So violence is easier to suppress. Crimes are easier to solve,” Pollack said. “If we are lucky, this is a self-reinforcing process.”

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2NC/1NR Impacts Turns Case - Surveillance

Fear of crime spurs local surveillance in other areas – turns caseAli Winston 9-11-2013 The East Bay Expresshttp://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/we-are-being-watched/Content?oid=3706988 We Are Being Watched Our fear of another 9/11 resulted in the erosion of our privacy rights. And now our fear of crime is pushing the surveillance state to a whole new levelOAKLAND, Calif. (September 11, 2013) -- It's been a dozen years since three jetliners hurtled into the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan and the Pentagon, leaving 2,996 people dead, injuring 6,000, and setting the stage for more than a decade of American war and occupation in Central Asia and the Middle East. The events on September 11 also resulted in the fundamental alteration of American society: Our international borders are now lined with additional fences, security cameras, and thousands of new Border Patrol agents as drones sweep the skies above. And the National Security Agency -- first under President George W. Bush and now under President Barack Obama -- routinely collects our phone records and emails and monitors our Internet activity. Our government, in short, has increasingly infringed on our privacy rights and our civil liberties as part of the so-called War on Terror. And our nation, scarred by the fear of more terrorist attacks, has allowed it to happen. From Congress' easy passage of the Patriot Act to the mandatory use of biometrics to identify welfare recipients to the storing of arrestees' DNA in dozens of states -- including California -- regardless of whether they were convicted of a crime or not, these changes have penetrated every aspect of our relationship with government. And now many local public agencies --

backed by generous funding from the US Department of Homeland Security, an agency established to fight terrorism -- are taking government surveillance to a new level: They're installing high-resolution surveillance cameras on street corners, buying license plate readers to monitor people's

movements, and building large "intelligence centers" to collect and analyze data. And they're doing it not to protect residents from the new threats posed

by terrorists in the 21st century, but to combat an age-old societal fear: crime. "Since 9/11, we've seen a huge shift with justifications and implementations," said Linda Lye, a staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California. Lye has emerged as one of the sharpest critics of law enforcement surveillance programs, speaking out against both the Alameda County Sheriff's proposed purchase of drones earlier this year and Oakland's sweeping new surveillance center. "On one hand, we've got the need to fight terrorism, but what we see on the ground is purportedly anti-terrorist strategies being deployed in fairly mundane ways that alter the relationship between the community and the government." For example, there are now dozens of so-called "fusion centers" -- intelligence centers initially set up by Department of Homeland Security for counter-terrorism purposes that are now migrating toward an "all-crimes" focus -- across the country, including in San Francisco, where the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) is located. Law enforcement agencies around the region feed information to NCRIC through a system called Suspicious Activity Reporting, and each department has at least one "terrorist liaison officer" tasked with delivering potentially actionable information to the fusion center. There is also a strong connection between the expansion of the government's surveillance apparatus and the War on Drugs: NCRIC shares personnel and office space with the Northern California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, a federal counter-narcotics effort that brings federal resources -- including aspects of the US military -- to bear on drug trafficking and drug-related crime. The East Bay, long known for its progressive values, is not exempt from this trend. Years of spiraling crime in Oakland have provided the impetus for a rapid expansion of the surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities of area law enforcement. This summer's furor in Oakland over the construction of the Domain Awareness Center -- a federally funded, citywide surveillance hub originally intended as an anti-terrorism tool for the Port of Oakland -- is only the most overt manifestation of this trend. Cities as divergent as Piedmont, Richmond, and San Leandro have turned to surveillance systems that were designed originally to fight terrorism in order to deal with the threat -- real or perceived -- of violent crime. At the same time, the rush by local governments to add new ways to keep tabs on citizens is being accompanied by virtually no oversight -- and no laws

designed to prevent abuses. The plethora of new surveillance programs is also raising questions about whether our local governments may soon have the ability to monitor our daily movements, using street cameras and license plate readers to track us from the time we leave our homes in the morning to when we return home at night -- and whether such continual surveillance violates our constitutional rights. In addition, at least one high-ranking staffer in the City of Oakland has expressed the desire to use electronic surveillance to monitor political activity. In other words, the privacy rights and civil liberties we've given up since 9/11 to fight the War on Terror are being further eroded in the Fight Against Crime.

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2NC/1NR Impacts Turns Case – Racism

Crime creates fear and discrimination against minorities and womenTheo Lorenc (et al), 2014, London School of Hygiene http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK262852/ Crime, fear of crime and mental health: synthesis of theory and systematic reviews of interventions and qualitative evidence. Public Health Research, No. 2.2 (Chapt 3) Theo Lorenc (et al),1,* Mark Petticrew,1 Margaret Whitehead,2 David Neary,2 Stephen Clayton,2 Kath Wright,3 Hilary Thomson,4 Steven Cummins,5 Amanda Sowden,3 and Adrian Renton6. March 2014 1 Department of Social and Environmental Health Research, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK 2 Department of Public Health and Policy, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK 3 Centre for Reviews and Dissemination, University of York, York, UK 4 MRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit (SPHSU), University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK 5 School of Geography, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK 6 Institute for Health and Human Development, University of East London, London, UK * Corresponding author Third, as suggested earlier, the impacts of fear of crime are highly unequally distributed, and these inequalities tend to closely

shadow the existing power relationships within society. The experience of fear of crime as a pervasive factor in one’s day-to-day existence is one

that disproportionately affects women, ethnic minorities and people living in material disadvantage. For many people, fear of crime may refer as much to the latent violence that is implicit in discriminatory social structures as to the manifest violence that is measured by crime statistics; the inescapability of such fear, and its symbolic resonance with the marginalisation and devaluation of oppressed groups, may amplify its effect on mental health and well-being. Some scholars have utilised the concept of ‘spirit injury’ to encapsulate this link between individual victimisation and structural inequality.74,75

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2NC/1NR Impacts – Economy

Crime increases have a strongly negative effect on growthEleftherios Goulas & Athina Zervoyianni April 2012 University of Patras (Greece) Econ Departmenthttp://www.rcfea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp51_12.pdfWP 12-51 The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Italy ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CRIME: DOES UNCERTAINTY MATTER?Although there is a growing body of literature on the link between crime and macroeconomic performance, there is no cross-country evidence on the impact on economic growth of the crimeuncertainty interaction. Yet, if the growth-uncertainty relationship is negative, as many empirical

studies suggest7 , and the uncertainty-crime relationship is positive, then the crime-uncertainty interaction should exert a strong negative

impact on economic growth. Our results support this view . We find evidence that increasing crime has no independent negative effect on growth under favorable economic conditions and thus under circumstances of low macroeconomic uncertainty. Higher-than-average macroeconomic uncertainty, however, enhances the adverse impact of crime on growth, making the effect of the crime-uncertainty interaction highly significant and negative. Accordingly, crime appears to be particularly harmful to growth in bad times, that is, when worsening economic conditions make the return to investment less secure. This result has important policy implications. Since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the degree of uncertainty surrounding macroeconomic performance in many countries has increased. At the same time, the opportunity cost of engaging in certain types of crime activity, including property crime and drug trafficking, has fallen for a number of individuals who have experienced a reduction in income as a result of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and of the recent European debt crisis. So, increased total crime is a possibility. Accordingly, the combined effect of higher-than average

macroeconomic uncertainty and possibly higher-than-average crime may well be a further reduction in growth rates in the coming years.

Increased crime takes down a sluggish economyEleftherios Goulas & Athina Zervoyianni April 2012 University of Patras (Greece) Econ Departmenthttp://www.rcfea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp51_12.pdfWP 12-51 The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Italy ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CRIME: DOES UNCERTAINTY MATTER?This paper seeks to add to the existing crime literature by exploring to what extent the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty influences the way that changes in crime impact on growth. For this purpose, we examine how the interaction between accelerations of crime and macroeconomic uncertainty affect per-capita income growth, after controlling for other explanatory

variables typically included in growth regressions. We use annual data from 25 countries for the period 1991- 2007 and two alternative measures of uncertainty, based on the

conditional variance of industrial production and the unconditional variance of a survey-based consumer sentiment indicator. We find that the effect on growth of increased crime is asymmetric: as uncertainty regarding the future prospects of the economy increases, increasing levels of crime become more harmful to growth. In particular, we find that accelerations of crime exert a strong adverse influence on growth when interacted with high levels of macroeconomic uncertainty but have no statistically significant impact on growth when interacted with low macroeconomic uncertainty. This

indicates that crime mainly contributes to reducing economic growth in bad times, that is, when worsening economic conditions, and thus

higher-than-average uncertainty regarding the future state of the economy and poor business climate, make the return on private investment less secure. By contrast, in good times, when the perceived degree of macroeconomic uncertainty is low, crime accelerations exert no independent adverse influence on growth. This result has important policy implications. It suggests that viewing crime as an important impediment to growth can be misleading if information regarding the future prospects of the economy is not explicitly taken into account.

Enhanced crime results in poverty because businesses cannot strivePOVERTY AND CRIME: BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE Poverties.orgPublished Apr 2011 - Updated Apr 2013 http://www.poverties.org/poverty-and-crime.html (ac: 7-6-15)

Poverty and crime have a very "intimate" relationship that has been described by experts from all fields, from sociologists to economists. The UN and the World Bank both rank crime high on the list of obstacles to a country’s development. This means that governments trying to deal with poverty often also have to face the issue of crime as they try to develop their country's economy and society. Crime prevents businesses from thriving by generating instability and uncertainty (at micro and macroeconomic levels). This is true in markets of all sizes, national, regional, municipal and even neighborhood-al (okay the word doesn’t exist). That's why having a business in a ghetto is rarely a good idea. The vicious cycle of poverty and crime International organisations also blame crime – including corruption – for putting at risk Africa's chances of development nowadays. The same goes for Latin America. Crime has this capacity to generate vicious cycles causing unemployment, economic downturns and instability. Poverty and crime combined together leave people with two choices: either take part in criminal activities or try to find legal but quite limited sources of income - when there are

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any available at all. Unemployment, poverty and crime Starting from the 1970s, studies in the US pointed more and more at the link between unemployment, poverty and crime. After that other connections with income level, time spent at school, quality of neighborhood and education were revealed as well. Fresh research from the UK even indicates that economic cycles may affect variations in property and violent crimes. But most importantly, what reveals the unmistakable connection between poverty and crime is that they’re both geographically concentrated - in a strikingly consistent way. In other words, where you find poverty is also where you find crime. Of course this doesn't include "softer" crimes such as corruption which causes massive damage to people's lives but in a more indirect type of violence.

Violent crime is costly Robert J. Shapiro is the chairman of Sonecon, LLC, a senior fellow of the Georgetown University McDonough School of Business, an advisor to the International

Monetary Fund, director of the NDN Globalization Initiative, and chairman of the U.S. Climate Task Force. Kevin A. Hassett is director of economic policy studies

and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. The Economic Benefits of Reducing Violent Crime A Case Study of 8 American Cities June 19, 2012 https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/2012/06/19/11755/the-economic-benefits-of-reducing-violent-crime/ (ac: 7-6-15)Violent crimes are costly. Murders, rapes, assaults, and robberies impose concrete economic costs on the victims who survive as well as the families of those who lose their lives, in the loss of earnings and their physical and emotional tolls. Violent crimes also impose large costs on communities through lower property values, higher insurance premiums, and reduced investment in high-crime areas. In addition, violent crimes impose significant costs on taxpayers, who bear the financial burden of maintaining the police personnel and operations, courts, jails, and prisons directed toward these crimes and their perpetrators. Fortunately, the incidence of violent crimes in the United States has fallen sharply over the last 20 years. From 1960 to 400 1990 the rates of these crimes rose sharply as did their attendent costs. Over that period murder rates nearly doubled, rates of rape and robbery increased fourfold, and the rate of assault quintupled. Since the early 1990s, however, rates of most violent crimes have been cut nearly in half. (see Figure 1)

Violent crime leads to cost from both the government and citizensRobert J. Shapiro is the chairman of Sonecon, LLC, a senior fellow of the Georgetown University McDonough School of Business, an advisor to the International


and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. The Economic Benefits of Reducing Violent Crime A Case Study of 8 American Cities June 19, 2012 https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/2012/06/19/11755/the-economic-benefits-of-reducing-violent-crime/ (ac: 7-6-15)By most measures, violent crime continues to impose significant costs on Americans and their communities. The costs borne by the American public for this level of criminal activity are significant. Medical care for assault victims, for

example, costs an estimated $4.3 billion per year. We spend $74 billion per year on incarcerating 2.3 million criminals, including some 930,000 violent criminals. Moreover, the costs of the pain and suffering borne by the victims of violent crimes is several times greater

than the more direct costs of those crimes. As a result, successful efforts to reduce violent crime can produce substantial economic benefits for individuals, communities, and taxpayers. This report presents the findings and conclusions of a yearlong project to examine and analyze the costs of violent crimes in a sample of eight major American cities and estimate the savings and other benefits that would accompany significant reductions in those crimes. This analysis draws on data pinpointing the incidence and location of murders, rapes, assaults, and robberies. The data were provided by the police departments of Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Jacksonville, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, and Seattle. We examined a broad range of both direct and intangible costs associated with those violent crimes based on their incidence in each of the eight cities in 2010. The direct costs reported here are those borne by the residents and city governments of the eight cities, although additional costs are also borne by state and federal governments and the taxpayers who finance them. Finally, we calculated the benefits to those residents associated with substantial reductions in violent crime, including the impact on residential home values and a variety of savings to the city governments. In today’s tight fiscal and economic environment, the mayors and city councils of every city—along with state and the federal governments—are searching for ways to reduce their spending and expand their revenues. The common challenge is to achieve sustainable fiscal conditions without hobbling government’s ability to provide the vital goods and services that most Americans expect, all without burdening businesses and families with onerous new taxes. This analysis provides another way available to many American municipalities: Secure budget savings, higher revenues, and personal income and wealth gains by reducing violent crime rates. To calculate the extent of those savings and benefits, we analyze a broad range of

direct costs associated with the violent crime in the eight cities sampled here. These direct costs start with local spending on policing, prosecuting, and incarcerating the perpetrators of those crimes. These costs also encompass out-of-pocket medical expenses borne by surviving victims of violent crime as well as the income those victims must forgo as a result of the crimes. These costs also include the lost incomes that would otherwise be earned by the perpetrators of violent crimes had they not been apprehended—as

distasteful as it is to calculate the foregone income of rapists or armed robbers who are arrested, convicted, and incarcerated. These direct, annual costs range from $90 million per year in Seattle to around $200 million per year in Boston, Jacksonville, and Milwaukee, to more than $700 million in Philadelphia and nearly $1.1 billion for Chicago.

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The housing market takes the biggest hit when violent crime occursRobert J. Shapiro is the chairman of Sonecon, LLC, a senior fellow of the Georgetown University McDonough School of Business, an advisor to the International


and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. The Economic Benefits of Reducing Violent Crime A Case Study of 8 American Cities June 19, 2012 https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/2012/06/19/11755/the-economic-benefits-of-reducing-violent-crime/ (ac: 7-6-15)

The largest economic benefits, however, arise from the impact of lower rates of violent crime on the housing values in

the cities sampled here. To estimate this effect, we use data covering several years on the incidence of violent crimes by zip code in each city and changes in

housing values in the same zip codes over the same period. Five of the eight cities were able to provide data by zip code covering at least six years. Our analysis

of those data found that a reduced incidence of murders in a particular zip code is followed by a predictable and

significant increase in housing values in the same zip code in the next year. On average, a reduction in a given year of one

homicide in a zip code causes a 1.5 percent increase in housing values in that same zip code the following year. We

applied these findings to available data on the value of the housing stock in the metropolitan areas of all eight cities. The

estimated increases in the value of the housing stock for the eight cities and their immediate metropolitan areas,

following a 10 percent reduction in homicides, range from $600 million in Jacksonville and the surrounding area to

$800 million in the Milwaukee area, to $3.2 billion in Philadelphia and the surrounding suburbs, and $4.4 billion in the

Boston area. Unfortunately, inconsistent reporting of other types of violent crime—rapes, assaults, and robberies—preclude a reliable analysis of the impact on

housing values of changes in the incidence of those crimes.

Surveillance checks crime – the US proves this is essential for economic growth Rohit Choudhry Mar 4 2015 Addl DG in the Punjab Policehttp://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/good-policing-a-must-for-economic-growth/49254.html Good policing a must for economic growthThis result has important policy implications for India. Besides boosting the investor confidence, the programmes that directly or indirectly prevent crime can also generate substantial economic benefits by reducing crime-related costs incurred by victims (medical care costs, lost earnings, and property loss/damage), communities, and the criminal justice system which includes state, and central government funds spent on police protection, legal and adjudication services, and correction programmes. Further, there are the opportunity costs associated with the criminal's choice to engage in illegal rather than legal and productive activities and the indirect losses

suffered by the victims, including pain and suffering, decreased quality of life, and psychological distress. In the US alone, more than 23 million criminal offences were committed

in 2007, resulting in approximately $15 billion in economic losses to the victims and $179 billion in government expenditures on police

protection, judicial and legal activities, and corrections. However, the western world has been consistent in its efforts to raise the policing standards. In America, the fall in crime rate began around 1991; in Britain it began around 1995; in France, property related crimes rose until 2001 but it has fallen by a third since. While the sociological changes like the young becoming increasingly sober and well behaved and repopulating the inner cities, economic and other factors like the end of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the 1990s are widely credited with reducing crime. Better policing, which includes both crime prevention and detection measures, have also contributed significantly to this phenomenon. Combination

of community policing and intensive targeting of crime "hotspots" with the help of "CompStat'", which is a data-driven model of policing, has transformed the way streets are protected. Technology has improved the effectiveness of detective work too. The advent of mobile-phone call analysis and

surveillance, Internet data connectivity, online banking and surveillance cameras have all increased the chances of tracking the digital foot prints and criminals getting caught and punished. The crime and economy correlation would suggest that adequate

allocation in budgets for improving the policing could only be considered as prudent and productive spending by the governments. In the US, COPS programme had a strong federal support and the support of the US President, funds to the tune of $9 billion were provided by the federal government to implement the community policing schemes all over the country. Rule of law and economic growth The rule of law indicator

measures the extent to which individuals and firms have confidence in and abide by the rules of society; in particular, it measures the functioning and independence of the judiciary, including the police, the protection of property rights, the quality of contract enforcement, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

Judicial and the police independence are strongly linked to growth as it promotes a stable investment environment. Also, according to one study, the difference between

developing economies that observe rule of law and economies that do not, is a more than 3 per cent growth in GDP. Realising the need for an environment of rule of law as an essentiality for economic growth, the Chinese government also has implemented a comprehensive legal system to shift from a system of "rule by man" to "rule by law". The Chinese government stresses on strong terms that police administration and operation must be guided by legislative provisions and has passed numerous laws and

regulations in relation to police administration and operation, ushering in a new era of police development in China. CRIMINAL activity can drag the entire economy by discouraging domestic and foreign direct investments, reducing the competitiveness of business organisations, and reallocating resources. It creates uncertainty and inefficiency in the business environment. Thus, law and order is considered an

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important function for the state to perform and is placed among minimal functions of the state in addressing market failure. In today's globalised world, the increasing flows of economic investment and business traffic between the nations bring into focus the relationship between investment confidence and security and crime, the latter being important in terms of both official crime rates and the fear of crime. Recently, the Government of South Africa, in its green paper on policing acknowledged that high levels of violent crime in South Africa are having a significant negative impact on the country's economy. Rise of violent crimes was costing the country dearly due to loss of productivity and foreign investment.

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2NC/1NR Impact – Poverty/Structural Violence

Crime causes povertyLippman, 91. (Theo, author of Spiro Agnew’s America and Editor at the Baltimore Sun. March 30, 1991.) DOA: 7/6/15. BALTIMORE SUN.

“Poverty Doesn’t cause crime. Crime Causes Poverty.” Retrieved from: http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-03-30/news/1991089022_1_cost-of-

crime-poverty-fight-crime // JW

POVERTY DOESN'T cause crime. Crime causes poverty. Therefore, to fight poverty, fight crime. How does crime cause poverty?

Suppose your family lives just above the poverty line. A burglar breaks into your house and steals all your clothes. What it costs you to replace them drops you into poverty,

since you no longer have the minimum needed for food and shelter. Or suppose you're on your way home from work. A mugger takes your paycheck and beats you up so

badly that you have to miss another week's work. Losing two weeks' pay is impoverishing at many levels. In 1988, according to the Department of Justice, "the total estimated cost of crime to victims was $16.6 billion. This estimate includes losses from property theft or damage, cash losses, medical

expenses and other costs. The estimate was derived by summing crime victims' estimates of the amount of stolen cash, the value of stolen property, medical expenses and the amount of pay lost from work because of injuries, police-related activities, court-related activities, or time spent repairing or replacing property ."

Poverty is the deadliest form of structural violence – it is equivalent to an ongoing nuclear war.Gilligan, 96’ [James, Former Director of Mental Health for the Massachusetts Prison System, Violence, p.] // JWIn other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout

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http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-03-30/news/1991089022_1_cost-of-crime-poverty-fight-crime%20//


Crime Disadvantage Affirmative Answers

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Non-unique: Crime High Now 2015 marks the rise of crime rates

Gold 6/5 (Ashley Gold, 6-5-2015, "Why has the murder rate in some US cities suddenly spiked?," BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32995911) LOMurder and violent crime rates have risen in multiple US cities s in ce the beginning of 2015 , after falling for two decades. Some have put this down to a so-called Ferguson effect, referring to the protests against perceived police brutality, that sometimes became violent. Could that be true? What do the statistics say? There are no national figures on crime in the US available yet for 2015, but

some cities have released their own figures. In New York City, the murder rate has gone up by 20% in 2015 compared with the first few months of 2014. Mayor Bill de Blasio called a special news conference at which he acknowledged the increase, but said it could be contained. He said he had faith in the New York

Police Department that they will "turn the tide". In other cities, there are similar increases reported. In Baltimore, murders are up 37% and in Los Angeles, violent crime is up by 27% (although murders are down 2%). In Houston, murders are up nearly 50% so far this year. What is the Ferguson effect? This is a term coined by St Louis Police Chief Sam Dotson, whose police officers had been one of the forces dealing with the summer protests and riots in Ferguson, Missouri, following the fatal shooting of black teenager Michael Brown. He said in

November his police officers had been drawing back from everyday enforcement due to fears they could be charged. As a result, he said, the "criminal element is feeling empowered" . The phrase was repeated recently by Heather MacDonald, a fellow at the US Manhattan

Institute, in a piece for the Wall Street Journal. The Ferguson effect, she said, was taking hold across the country "under the onslaught of anti-cop rhetoric". Multiple police officers Ms MacDonald spoke to told her police morale is at an all-time low and they are now worried about being charged, recorded and assaulted while trying to do their jobs and keep communities safe. "Unless the demonisation of law enforcement ends, the liberating gains in urban safety will be lost," she wrote. Baltimore's police boss, Anthony Batts, said the riots had another effect on crime. Scores of pharmacies had been looted and the surge in the supply of drugs has "thrown off the balance" between gangs in the city, he said. "There's enough narcotics on the streets of Baltimore to keep it intoxicated for a year," he said.

US crime rate experiencing sudden spikeBatley 6/4 (Melaine Batley, 6-4-2015, "Sudden Spike in Violent Crime Across US Raises Alarm," Newsmax, http://www.newsmax.com/US/crime-violent-homicide-cities/2015/06/04/id/648724/) LOMajor cities across the United States are seeing their crime rates skyrocket, sparking alarm about the causes, particularly given that there had been a two-decade drop in crime. A city-by-city look shows: In Baltimore, shootings are up 82.5 percent, or nearly double from last year, the Baltimore Brew reported. In Chicago, there have been over 900 shootings this year, a 40 percent increase, and a 29 percent increase in homicides in the first three months of the year , USA Today reported. In New York City, murders have increased 20 percent and the mayor has already announced that he will put an additional 330 cops on the street by Monday in response to the spike in homicides and shootings. In Los Angeles, violent crime rates increased by more than 25 percent and the city is also deploying more officers to areas where crime is on the rise, The Los Angeles Times reported. And according to Townhall.com: In St. Louis, there have been 55 murders this year In Dallas, violent crime is up 10 percent In Atlanta, homicides are up 32 percent In Milwaukee, homicides have increased by 180 percent Some attribute the rise in crime to a "Ferguson" effect, or a rise in anti-police sentiment born out of the protests

and clashes around the country that followed the deaths of unarmed black men at the hands of police, The Week reported. A dynamic may have emerged in which criminals are more brazen and police are more cautious in fighting crime. "There's a war on cops. Not bad cops, not bad apples, but all cops and the police know it. The conduct of the suspects is never in question — they're always right, it's usually drawn on racial lines. It's a complete, toxic formula to actually do police work," said former Los Angeles Police

Department Homicide Detective Mark Fuhrman, according to Townhall.com. "The police are simply scaling back, exactly what everybody's chanting for in all of these protests. 'Don't be so aggressive. Don't stop and frisk. Don't stop and ask where people are going. Don't make traffic stops.' So, they are," Fuhrman said,

and now crime's skyrocketing . But others say that linking the protests to an increase in crime is misleading. "This is all part of an attempt to tell black people that if we exercise our First Amendment rights, we are somehow now responsible for people who engage in crime," said CNN political analyst Van Jones. "Why should the black community have to choose between police abuse and police neglect? That's a false choice."

Crime rates rising – specifically targeting black and the inner-city poorWood 6/6 (Chip Wood, 6-6-2015, "Why Crime Rates Are Soaring," The NewAmerican, http://www.thenewamerican.com/reviews/opinion/item/21015-why-crime-rates-are-soaring) LOIt’s being called “the Ferguson effect.” It’s the explosion of violent crimes in major U.S. cities , thanks to the ways police have been demoralized — and criminals have been emboldened — in the aftermath of police shootings of supposedly innocent blacks. In Baltimore, there were 43 homicides in the month of May. This is the highest murder rate there in more than 40 years, when the city’s population was almost 50 percent bigger than it is now. This brings the death toll for the year to 116 people, the vast majority of them blacks. Heather Mac Donald, the Thomas W. Smith fellow at the Manhattan Institute, described the situation in a May 29 column, “The New Nationwide Crime Wave.” Her piece carried the subtitle, “The consequences of the ‘Ferguson effect’ are already appearing. The main

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victims of growing violence will be inner-city poor.” Here’s how her article began: The nation’s two-decades-long crime decline may be over. Gun violence in particular is spiraling upward in cities across America . In Baltimore, the most pressing question every

morning is how many people were shot the previous night. Gun violence is up more than 60% compared with this time last year, according

to Baltimore police, with 32 shootings over Memorial Day weekend. May has been the most violent month the city has seen in 15 years. But Baltimore isn’t the only major city that has seen crime rates soar. Homicides in Atlanta were up 32 percent in the first five months of the year. In Chicago, which already was contending for the title “Murder Capital of the Country” because of the high death rate there, homicides are up 17 percent so far this year. In New York, homicides are up almost 13 percent. In St. Louis, robberies were up 43 percent during the first four months of this year. During the same period, homicides increased by 25 percent. St. Louis Police Chief Sam Dotson said a major reason for the increase is that “the criminal element is feeling empowered.” Of course it is! What else would you expect to happen when the media are only too eager to portray police as racist killers and when public officials, from city mayors to the president of the United States, are all too willing to play into this false narrative? Remember the demonization of police that occurred after the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri? Although it was later proved that Brown attacked police officer Darren Wilson and wasn’t standing with his hands up, trying to surrender, the lie that he was doing so led to the slogan “Hands up, don’t shoot” being used by demonstrators all over the country. The mainstream media were only too willing to repeat every dishonest smear against the police. Publicity hound and racist agitator Al Sharpton got massive exposure for every scurrilous attack on the police that he uttered. Who cared what the truth was? The real tragedy here is that it is blacks who are the biggest victims of the soaring crime rates. They’re being raped, robbed, shot and molested by black criminals in increasing numbers. Before this year, violent crimes in America had been declining for the past two decades. Now, crime rates are soaring. As Mac Donald wrote: If

these decriminalization and deincarceration policies backfire, the people most harmed will be their supposed beneficiaries: blacks, since they are disproportionately victimized by crime. Right! But will this be enough to get the Democrats who run virtually every big city in America to change

their policies or for the mainstream media to expose the lies that help fuel the mayhem? Not a chance. I’m afraid things will only get worse, especially in our inner cities, before they get better — maybe a lot worse. Until next time, keep some powder dry.

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No Link - Surveillance doesn’t reduce crime

Studies show surveillance doesn’t stop crime

Ali Winston 9-11-2013 The East Bay Expresshttp://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/we-are-being-watched/Content?oid=3706988 We Are Being Watched Our fear of another 9/11 resulted in the erosion of our privacy rights. And now our fear of crime is pushing the surveillance state to a whole new levelThe Domain Awareness Center -- Oakland's planned surveillance hub that is being designed to collect data from at least 150 city and port cameras, 40

license plate readers, gunshot detectors, alarm notifications, and intelligent video programs -- is the broadest surveillance project in the region and has attracted the most criticism. Funded entirely through federal grant money and being built on a contract by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) -- a defense contractor with a record of making shoddy products; producing cost overruns; and defrauding municipal, federal, and foreign governments -- the surveillance center has also attracted heavy criticism for its lack of privacy or data retention policies, as well as for its plans to incorporate cameras from the Oakland Unified School District, the Oakland Coliseum, and freeways. But expanded electronic surveillance has also garnered widespread support from city

residents who are fed up with crime and are willing to trade their privacy rights and civil liberties for the chance of being safer -- much as Americans have done throughout the past decade in the fight against terrorism. "People who probably in a 'normal' or less fearful crime-ridden situation would not think about wanting more cameras, but in the reality of today, I'm getting people saying, 'Can't we get more cameras in these places?'" said Dan Kalb, who represents North Oakland (one of the city's less crime-impacted neighborhoods) on the city council. "They want to be able to walk back from BART to their homes -- four blocks -- without fearing having to do it. People are taking cabs from Rockridge BART home. It's a shame that it's gotten to that point." While much of the official rhetoric about the surveillance center has revolved around Oakland's high crime rate, a substantial body of research reveals that video surveillance does not impact violent crime . In London, where there are 4.2 million surveillance cameras, police studies last decade concluded that the expansion

of the surveillance state had not resulted in decreased crime. Furthermore, video surveillance by law enforcement raises concerns about racial profiling. In Lansing, Michigan, an independent study of surveillance cameras concluded that black residents were twice as likely to be under continual surveillance than white residents.

No data support surveillance deterrence – it doesn’t reduce crime but trades off with more effective approachesMark Schlosberg August 2007 The California ACLU Affiliateshttps://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/police_practices/under_the_watchful_eye_the_proliferation_of_video_surveillance_systems_in_california.pdf Under the Watchful Eye The Proliferation of Video Surveillance Systems in California (and Nicole A. Ozer, co author)Even in the face of this evidence, law enforcement and government officials in California continue to claim that cameras deter crime. In San Francisco, for example, the Director of the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice admitted, at a public hearing on the proposed expansion of the city’s video surveillance program, that he was unaware of any studies demonstrating the effectiveness of cameras and that there had been no comprehensive study of San Francisco’s system. Yet, he continued to assert that cameras would deter crime.81 Likewise, in Clovis, Police Captain Robert Keyes asserted that cameras contributed to a reduction in

crime, despite the fact that “there’s nothing other than anecdotal evidence to support that.”82 The ACLU survey found that no California

jurisdiction with video surveillance cameras has conducted a comprehensive evaluation of their effectiveness. As comprehensive studies strongly suggest cameras do not deter crime , the rationale of deterrence falls short of justifying either the cameras’ expense or their intrusion into privacy.

Another justification for video surveillance is that its purported ability to capture evidence of criminal activity could potentially increase the success of criminal prosecutions. In London, the role of CCTV cameras in identifying the men involved in the 2005 terrorist attacks has been highly publicized. Cameras undoubtedly capture some evidence of criminal activity, but in the limited studies available, evidence suggests that the impact of video footage on prosecutions may not be as significant as policy-makers expect. First, some evidence suggests that cameras make little difference in the number of crimes actually solved. The Glasgow study cited above, for example, found that “the cameras appeared to have little effect on the clearance rates for crimes and offenses generally. Comparing statistics before and after installation of the cameras, the clear-up rate increased slightly, from 62 to 64 percent. Once these figures were adjusted for general trends, however, the research analysts concluded that the clear-up rate fell from 64 to 60 percent.”83 Second, while some crimes are certainly captured on film, some law enforcement agencies appear to overestimate the degree to which the footage helps law enforcement actually convict criminals. In Maryland, for example, Margaret Burns, a spokesperson for the state attorney’s office, told reporters for the Washington Times that the office has not “found them to be a useful tool to prosecutors . . . they’re good for circumstantial evidence, but it definitely isn’t evidence we find useful to convict somebody of a crime . . . We have not used any footage to resolve a violent-crime case.”84 According to a study by the Maryland state attorney’s office, of the nearly 2,000 arrests made on the basis of video camera footage, the vast majority concluded in an outright dismissal or a conviction for minor crimes. The office is now questioning the large amount of taxpayer money spent on the program. “Do these prosecutorial results support millions of dollars in tax expenditures? There will have to be a public debate about this,” Burns said.85 In Cincinnati, Ohio, police also found cameras to be ineffective. A University of Cincinnati study found that the city’s program, which began in 1998, merely shifted crime beyond the view of the cameras. According to Captain Kimberly Frey, “We’ve never really gotten anything

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useful from them . . . we’ve never had a successful prosecution . . . we’re trying to use . . . money for other things. Video surveillance costs more than the cameras alone: The dollars used to buy the system are not spent in a vacuum. Public safety budgets are stretched very thin, especially in many urban areas,

so money dedicated to video surveillance often comes at the expense of potentially more effective measures, such as lighting, community policing initiatives, and increased foot patrols. Compare the lack of evidence of video surveillance’s ability to reduce crime with the remarkable results that improved lighting produces. A survey commissioned by the British Home Office looked at 13 lighting studies in Great Britain and the United States and evaluated the cumulative impact. The study found a 20 percent average decrease in crime, with reductions in every area of criminal activity including violent crime. In fact, in two areas “financial savings from reduced crimes greatly exceeded the financial costs of the improved lighting.” The report concluded: Street lighting benefits the whole neighborhood rather than particular individuals or households. It is not a physical barrier to crime, it has no adverse civil liberties implications, and it can increase public safety and effective use of neighborhood streets at night. In short, improved lighting seems to have no negative effects and demonstrated benefits for law-abiding citizens.87 Intensive foot patrols have shown similar results—reductions in crime, including violent crime, of 15 to 20 percent.88 These findings suggest that from a law enforcement and

public safety perspective alone, the dedication of scarce resources to video surveillance systems may not only be an inefficient and ineffective use of funds, it may actually be counterproductive.

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Answers to: Crime Hurts Economy

No clear crime-economy relationship John Roman 9-23-2013 Urban Institute, Justice Policy Center Sr Fellow http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/09/puzzling-relationship-between-crime-and-economy/6982/The Puzzling Relationship Between Crime and the Economy Criminologists say bad economies create more crime; economists say the opposite. But recent data reveals neither explanation is right. Looking at the relationship between GDP and crime back to the earliest reliable crime data from 1960 supports both positions,

suggesting there is no relationship between economic growth and crime . In the first part of the series, rising GDP is associated with

rapidly increasing crime. In the second part, it is associated with declining crime. In the middle, there is no relationship at all. Most macroeconomic data show the same pattern. Consider consumer confidence data going back to the inception of the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment data in 1978.

Again, the consumer confidence data show no relationship between consumer sentiment and crime rates. That, however, is because the relationship was strongly negative prior to 1992 (meaning more confident consumers=less crime). After 1992, the pattern reverses, and the better the economy, the more crime there is. The bottom line: Crime is episodic and there is no singular effect of the economy on crime. In order to understand and prevent crime, it is therefore necessary to understand what type of period we are in. It’s also necessary to understand what forces are at work locally, rather than focus on the national picture. Next week, I will address that point.

Weak internal link – overall data is mixedEleftherios Goulas & Athina Zervoyianni April 2012 University of Patras (Greece) Econ Departmenthttp://www.rcfea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp51_12.pdfWP 12-51 The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Italy ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CRIME: DOES UNCERTAINTY MATTER?Nevertheless, despite the growing literature, empirical studies have not yet produced a definite conclusion regarding the impact of crime on economic growth. Existing findings are often contradictory, with some estimates suggesting a strong adverse influence of crime on growth while other studies report evidence indicating no effect at all . For example, Peri (2004) finds crime to have a statistically significant impact in reducing both per capita income growth and employment growth using panel data at provincial level from Italy for 1951-1999. His results, however, indicate the possibility of non-linearities in the crime-growth relationship. Burnham et al. (2004) explore the impact of central-city crime on US county-level per-capita income growth and report results suggesting no clear crime-growth relationship. In particular, while they find a statistically significant adverse violent-crime effect on growth, the impact of property crime is weak and in some specifications perverse. On the other hand, a World Bank study (World Bank, 2006), based on data from 43 countries for 1975-2000, reports results suggesting a strong negative effect of crime on growth even after controlling for human-capital accumulation and income inequality, that is, variables which are likely to be causally linked to crime. Càrdenas (2007) also finds a significantly negative association between crime and per-capita output growth in a panel of 65 countries using homicides data for 1971-1999 and a country-fixed effects specification. Mauro & Carmeci (2007)

find that crime impacts negatively on income levels but exerts no significant long-run adverse influence on growth rates employing the pooled-mean-group estimator (Pesaran et al. (1999)) and homicides data from 19 Italian regions during the period 1963-1995. Dettoto & Pulina (2009) explore the cointegration status between six types of crime and employment growth using Italian national-level data between 1970 and 2004. Their results indicate that property crime, but not homicides, causes lower long-run employment growth. In a more recent study, Dettoto & Otranto (2010) apply an autoregressive model, in which real GDP growth is explained by past GDP and a crime proxy, to monthly data for Italy during the period 1979-2002 and find only a relatively small annualized real-GDP growth reduction due to crime. Chatterjee & Ray (2009), based on a large cross-country data set for the period 1991-2005

and controlling for human capital and institutional quality, also find no strong evidence of a uniformly negative association between crime and growth and this applies both to total crime and to sub-categories of crime.

Their evidence flawed—no systematic study to correlate economy and crimeBY DEBRA RESCHKE A mixed bag of conditions could have various effects on crime RETAIL CRIME IN AN ECONOMIC DOWNTURN National Petroleum

News [serial online]. April 2009;101(4):24. Available from: MasterFILE Premier, Ipswich, MA. Accessed July 6, 2015.

Although it is generally assumed that fluctuations in the economy alter crime, evidence that categorically proves it is hard to find. "There's never been a systematic study that shows it," said Peter Manning, Brooks Professor of Criminal lustice at Northeastern University. He explained the lack of proof by echoing Erickson's statement; the lag between the change in the economy and crime rate makes it difficult to predict. Also, according to Manning, several various different political and philosophical opinions tend to go along with these types of studies as well as possibly erroneous ideas. "The idea that people who commit these crimes become more impulsive (in economic downturns) is simply not true ," he said. In fact, he added, robbers, in either bear or bull markets, are usually unemployed and, therefore, unrelated to the economy. What has been more widely

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studied and documented are the characteristics of retail rohhers. Findings suggest the people who commit robberies at places like c-stores are usually impulsive by nature, low skilled and fairly young, said Manning

The correlation between crime and the economy is not consistent. JOHN ROMAN senior fellow in the Justice Policy Center at the Urban Institute, where he focuses on evaluations of innovative crime-control policies

and justice programsSep 24, 2013 The Puzzling Relationship Between Crime and the Economy http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/09/puzzling-relationship-between-crime-and-economy/6982/But as the figures below show, the relationship between crime and the economy is not as obvious as it seems, and focusing on that

relationship obscures more important predictors. Looking at the relationship between GDP and crime back to the earliest reliable crime data from 1960 supports both positions, suggesting there is no relationship between economic growth and crime. In the first part of the series, rising GDP is associated with rapidly increasing crime. In the second part, it is associated with declining crime. In the middle, there is no relationship at all. Most macroeconomic data show the same pattern. Consider consumer confidence data going back to the inception of the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment data in 1978. Again, the consumer confidence data show no relationship between consumer sentiment and crime rates. That, however, is because the relationship was strongly negative prior to 1992 (meaning more confident consumers=less crime). After 1992, the pattern reverses, and the better the economy, the more crime there is. The bottom line: Crime is episodic and there is no singular effect of the economy on crime. In order to understand and prevent crime, it is therefore necessary to understand what type of period we are in. It’s also necessary to understand what forces are at work locally, rather than focus on the national picture. Next week, I will address that point

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Terrorism Disadvantage

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1NC Terrorism DA

A. Uniqueness

Counterterrorism is successful now because of Obama’s tough approach

Benen 15 (Steve Benen, American political writer and MSNBC contributor "The scope of Obama’s counterterrorism successes," MSNBC, www.msnbc.com/rachelmaddowshow/thescopeobamascounterterrorismsuccesses, accessed 619-15]

Whenever the political world’s attention turns to matters of national security and terrorism, Republican criticisms of President Obama feature familiar talking points. The president isn’t “aggressive” enough, they say. His approach must be “tougher,” like the policies adopted by the Bush/Cheney administration. Obama’s counterterrorism policies are so ineffective, the right insists, that the White House won’t even use the specific words – “radical Islamic terrorism” – that Republicans demand to hear. But the gap between GOP rhetoric and nationalsecurity reality continues to grow. We learned yesterday, for example, that a U.S. airstrike killed Nasir alWuhaysh, al Qaeda’s No. 2 official – and the top guy in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As Rachel noted on the show last night, his death is a “huge deal,” especially given the terrorist plots al Wuhaysh has helped oversee. NBC News had a helpful report yesterday on the frequency with which U.S. strikes have successfully targeted al Qaeda’s top leaders. Since Navy SEALs killed [Osama bin Laden] in 2011, American drone strikes have taken out seven potential candidates to succeed him as the leader of what was once the mostfeared terror gang. The targeted attacks started within weeks of bin Laden’s death. Three al Qaeda higherups were killed in June, August and September of 2011, followed by another three in late 2012 and early 2013.... Now, the death of 38yearold Wuhayshi – killed in a strike on Friday – is seen by American intelligence officials as a major blow to al Qaeda, which is struggling with decimated ranks and ideological competition from the Islamic State. I’m reminded of this piece in The Atlantic last fall, when Jeffrey Goldberg, hardly a liberal, wrote, “Obama has become the greatest terrorist hunter in the history of the presidency.” It’s a detail Republicans simply don’t know what to do with, so they ignore it and pretend the president is indifferent to matters of national security, all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. While GOP officials and candidates continue to insist that what really matters is wordchoice, Obama’s counterterrorism strategy includes so many successes, they no longer generate much attention. Notice, for example, just how little chatter alWuhaysh’s death garnered yesterday.

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1NC Terrorism DA

B. Link: the Perception of Strength in surveillance operations deters terrorism Pittenger 2014 US Rep. Robert Pittenger, chair of Congressional Task Force on Terrorism, “Bipartisan bill on NSA data collection protects both privacy and national security” - Washington Examiner, 6/9/14, http://washingtonexaminer.com/rep.-robert-pittenger-bipartisan-bill-on-nsa-data-collection-protects-both-privacy-and-national-security/article/2549456?custom_click=rss&utm_campaign=Weekly+Standard+Story+Box&utm_source=weeklystandard.com&utm_medium=referralThis February, I took that question to a meeting of European Ambassadors at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. During the conference, I asked

three questions: 1. What is the current worldwide terrorist threat? 2. What is America’s role in addressing and mitigating this threat? 3. What role does intelligence data collection

play in this process, given the multiple platforms for attack including physical assets, cyber, chemical, biological , nuclear and the electric

grid? Each ambassador acknowledged the threat was greater today than before 9/11, with al Qaeda and other extreme Islamist

terrorists stronger, more sophisticated, and having a dozen or more training camps throughout the Middle East and Africa. As to the role of the U nited S tates , they felt our efforts were primary and essential for peace and security around the world. Regarding the

intelligence-gathering, their consensus was, “We want privacy, but we must have your intelligence .” As a European foreign minister stated

to me, “Without U.S. intelligence, we are blind.” We cannot yield to those loud but misguided voices who view the world as void of the deadly and

destructive intentions of unrelenting terrorists. The number of terrorism-related deaths worldwide doubled between 2012 and 2013, jumping from

10,000 to 20,000 in just one year. Now is not the time to stand down. Those who embrace an altruistic worldview should remember that vigilance and strength have deterred our enemies in the past. That same commitment is required today to defeat those who seek to destroy us and our way of life. We must make careful, prudent use of all available technology to counter their sophisticated operations if we are to maintain our freedom and liberties.

1NC Terrorism DA

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C. Internal Link


Hirsh 2013 [Michael Hirsh, chief correspondent, the National Journal, “The Next Bin Laden,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-next-bin-laden-20131114, November 14 2013]

Ever since the death of Osama bin Laden, President Obama and his senior lieutenants have been telling war-weary Americans that the end of the nation’s longest conflict is within sight. “Core al-Qaida is a shell of its former self,” Obama said in a speech in May. “This war, like all wars, must end.” That was the triumphal tone of last year’s reelection campaign, too.The truth is much grimmer. Intelligence officials and terrorism experts today believe that the death of bin Laden and the decimation of the Qaida “core” in Pakistan only set the stage for a rebirth of al-Qaida as a global threat. Its tactics have morphed into something more insidious and increasingly dangerous as safe havens multiply in war-torn or failed states—at exactly the moment we are talking about curtailing the National Security Agency’s monitoring capability. And the jihadist who many terrorism experts believe is al-Qaida’s new strategic mastermind, Abu Musab al-Suri (a nom de guerre that means “the Syrian”), has a diametrically different approach that emphasizes quantity over quality. The red-haired, blue-eyed former mechanical engineer was born in Aleppo in 1958 as Mustafa Setmariam Nasar; he has lived in France and Spain. Al-Suri is believed to have helped plan the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and the 2005 bombings in London—and has been called the “Clausewitz” of the new al-Qaida.Whereas bin Laden preached big dramatic acts directed by him and senior Qaida leaders, al-Suri urges the creation of self-generating cells of lone terrorists or small groups in his 1,600-page Internet manifesto. They are to keep up attacks, like multiplying fleas on a dog that finds itself endlessly distracted—and ultimately dysfunctional. (A classic Western book on guerrilla warfare called The War of the Flea reportedly influenced al-Suri.) The attacks are to culminate, he hopes, in acts using weapons of mass destruction.Recent terrorist attacks against U.S. targets, from the murderous 2009 spree of Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan at Fort Hood to the Boston Marathon bombings last year, suggest that al-Suri’s philosophy dominates al-Qaida’s newly flattened hierarchy. The late Yemeni-American imam Anwar al-Awlaki, who preached this strategy and induced Hasan’s attack, is said to have developed his ideas from al-Suri’s. Meanwhile, with new refuges in North Africa, Syria, and Yemen, jihadists have much more territory from which to hatch plots unmolested.Yet the politics at home are changing as the threat abroad is growing. The revelations dribbled out by fugitive leaker Edward Snowden have outraged members of Congress and world leaders, including those of close allies such as Germany and France. They say they are aghast at American overreach. Writing in Der Spiegel, Snowden justified himself this way: “Instead of causing damage, the usefulness of the new public knowledge for society is now clear, because reforms to politics, supervision, and laws are being suggested.” Thanks to him, Congress will almost certainly rein in the National Security Agency’s data-trolling methods—though it’s not yet clear how much.But the agency’s opponents may not realize that the practice they most hope to stop—its seemingly indiscriminate scouring of phone data and emails—is precisely what intelligence officials say they need to detect the kinds of plots al-Suri favors. For the foreseeable future, al-Suri’s approach will mean more terrorist attacks against more targets—albeit with a much lower level of organization and competence. “It’s harder to track. Future attacks against the homeland will be less sophisticated and less lethal, but there’s just going to be more of them,” says Michael Hayden, the former NSA director who steered the agency after 9/11 toward deep dives into Internet and telephonic data. Adds Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, “I think al-Qaida’s capabilities for a strike into the United States are more dangerous and more numerous than before 9/11.” For better or worse, the only hope to track them all is an exceptionally deep, organized, and free-ranging intelligence apparatus, experts say.Intelligence officials who are well briefed in the technical aspects of NSA surveillance also note that global communications are vastly more complex than they were as recently as 9/11, not just in terms of speed and bandwidth but also in the kinds of digital paths they can take. Messages can travel partly by air and partly by cable, for example, and the NSA must keep up. “If you take the diffuse physical environment [of more failed-state havens] and you layer that with the diffuse communications environment, and then you layer that with the diffuse ideological environment—more lone wolves, for example—that makes for a far more generally dangerous environment,” says a knowledgeable U.S. government official who asked to remain anonymous.All of which means that despite very legitimate questions about whether the National Security Agency is going beyond what the law and Constitution allow, Americans probably need the NSA now more than ever.

1NC Terrorism DA

D. Counter-terrorism is vital- terrorists will go nuclear if we let our guard down.215


New York Times 2012 (Kenneth Brill and Kenneth Luongo. March 15. “Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger.” Accessed online: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?_r=0)

Terrorists exploit gaps in security. The current global regime for protecting the nuclear materials that terrorists desire for their ultimate weapon is far from seamless. It is based largely on unaccountable, voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across borders. Its weak links make it dangerous and inadequate to prevent nuclear terrorism.Later this month in Seoul, the more than 50 world leaders who will gather for the second Nuclear Security Summit need to seize the opportunity to start developing an accountable regime to prevent nuclear terrorism.There is a consensus among international leaders that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real, not a Hollywood confection. President Obama, the leaders of 46 other nations, the heads of theInternational Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and numerous experts have called nuclear terrorism one of the most serious threats to global security and stability. It is also preventable with more aggressive action.At least four terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, have demonstrated interest in using a nuclear device. These groups operate in or near states with histories of questionable nuclear security practices. Terrorists do not need to steal a nuclear weapon. It is quite possible to make an improvised nuclear device from highly enriched uranium or plutonium being used for civilian purposes. And there is a black market in such material. There have been 18 confirmed thefts or loss of weapons-usable nuclear material. In 2011, the Moldovan police broke up part of a smuggling ring attempting to sell highly enriched uranium; one member is thought to remain at large with a kilogram of this materialA terrorist nuclear explosion could kill hundreds of thousands, create billions of dollars in damages and undermine the global economy. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations said that an act of nuclear terrorism “would thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty” and create “a second death toll throughout the developing world.Surely after such an event, global leaders would produce a strong global system to ensure nuclear security. There is no reason to wait for a catastrophe to build such a system.The conventional wisdom is that domestic regulations, U.N. Security Council resolutions, G-8 initiatives, I.A.E.A. activities and other voluntary efforts will prevent nuclear terrorism. But existing global arrangements for nuclear security lack uniformity and coherence.There are no globally agreed standards for effectively securing nuclear material. There is no obligation to follow the voluntary standards that do exist and no institution, not even the I.A.E.A., with a mandate to evaluate nuclear security performance.This patchwork approach provides the appearance of dealing with nuclear security; the reality is there are gaps through which a determined terrorist group could drive one or more nuclear devices.Obama’s initiative in launching the nuclear security summit process in Washington in 2010 helped focus high-level attention on nuclear security issues. Unfortunately, the actions produced by the 2010 Washington Summit and that are planned for the upcoming Seoul Summit are voluntary actions that are useful, but not sufficient to create an effective global nuclear security regime.The world cannot afford to wait for the patchwork of nuclear security arrangements to fail before they are strengthened. Instead, we need a system based on a global framework convention on nuclear security that would fill the gaps in existing voluntary arrangements. This framework convention would commit states to an effective standard of nuclear security practices, incorporate relevant existing international agreements, and give the I.A.E.A. the mandate to support nuclear security by evaluating whether states are meeting their nuclear security obligations and providing assistance to those states that need help in doing so.Nuclear terrorism is a real and present danger for all states, not just a few. Preventing it is an achievable goal. The current focus on nuclear security through voluntary actions, however, is not commensurate with either the risk or consequences of nuclear terrorism. This must be rectified. If the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit makes this a priority, there can be an effective global nuclear security regime in place before this decade ends.

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2NC/1NR Extensions: National Security Letters Link

National Security Letters serve a very important purpose in countering terrorism and upholding national security


Fact No. 2: NSLs help the FBI to "connect the dots" by using the least invasive and most effective means possible.

As noted in each of the two OIG reports, NSLs have proven to be invaluable tools in counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. According to the FBI, the principal uses of NSLs are to:Establish evidence to

support FISA applications for electronic surveillance, physical searches, or pen register/trap and trace orders;Assess communication or

financial links between investigative subjects or others;Collect information sufficient to fully develop national security

investigations;Generate leads for other field divisions, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and other federal agencies or to pass to foreign governments;Develop analytical products for distribution within the FBI;Develop information that is provided to law enforcement authorities for use in criminal proceedings;Collect information sufficient to eliminate concerns about investigative subjects and thereby close national security investigations;

andCorroborate information derived from other investigative techniques.[12] Information obtained from each type of NSL has allowed investigators to crack cases, especially in the realms of counterterrorism and counterintelligence. A brief examination of the success stories outlined in the OIG reports under each type of NSL proves the point. The

following examples, excerpted from the OIG report, show how counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations are supported through the lawful use of NSLs:[…]As these examples illustrate, NSLs are an extremely effective method

of obtaining basic data that are crucial to discovering, monitoring, and undermining terrorist activities. They can also be used to exonerate and are frequently used in place of more invasive methods, such as surveillance, searches, and seizures, that are authorized by law and often applicable.

National Security Letters are an irreplaceable tool in counterterrorism efforts and the FBI is committed to using them ethically.

F.B.I No date (Federal Bureau of Investigation. No date. “Response to DOJ Inspector General’s Report on FBI’s Use of National Security Letters.” Accessed online at http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/response-to-doj-inspector-general2019s-report-on-fbi2019s-use-of-national-security-letters)

Washington, D.C. – In the post-9/11 world, the National Security Letter (NSL) remains an indispensable investigative tool. NSLs contribute significantly to the FBI’s ability to carry out its national security responsibilities by directly supporting its counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence missions. NSLs also allow the FBI to obtain information to eliminate concerns about individuals

and close down investigations with a high degree of confidence there is no terrorism or adverse intelligence-gathering threat. We are pleased the Inspector General concurs with the FBI concerning the value of the NSL tool.“The Inspector General conducted a fair and objective review of the FBI’s use of a proven and useful investigative tool,” said Director Robert S. Mueller, III, “and his finding of deficiencies in our processes is

unacceptable. We strive to exercise our authorities consistent with the privacy protections and civil liberties that we are sworn to uphold. Anything less will not be tolerated. While we’ve already taken some steps to address these

shortcomings, I am ordering additional corrective measures to be taken immediately,” Mueller said. Importantly, the OIG found no deliberate or intentional misuse of authorities, whether NSL statutes or Attorney General Guidelines. Nevertheless, the OIG review identified several areas of inadequate auditing and oversight of these vital investigative tools, as well as inappropriate processes, and these are

findings of significant concern.As a result, Director Mueller is implementing reforms to the process designed to correct those deficiencies identified – with accountability. Those steps include strengthening internal controls, changing policies and procedures to improve oversight of the NSL approval process, barring certain practices identified in the Inspector General’s report, and ordering an expedited inspection.The FBI will work together with DOJ’s National Security Division and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Office to implement these reforms. Throughout this process, the FBI will continue to work closely with the OIG to gauge progress and consider any additional reforms.

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http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/response-to-doj-inspector-general2019s-report-on-fbi2019s-use-of-national-security-letters


CDL Core Files 2015-2016National Security Letters are necessary to keep America safe


In sum, there are extensive judicial, statutory, regulatory, and institutional protections in place to ensure that NSLs are not misused and do not violate Americans' privacy rights. With the number of NSLs issued every year, it is inevitable that there will be some mistakes; but as the OIG report recognizes,

the FBI has taken major steps to improve protections and reduce their number.Conclusion Congress authorized the FBI to use NSLs in counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. Both OIG reports related to the FBI's use of

NSLs unequivocally state that NSLs are an indispensable tool in national security investigations. Law enforcement officials, working closely with the intelligence community, need the tools contained within those authorized NSLs to keep Americans safe and to prevent future terrorist attacks.

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The current state of national security in the United States makes data collection measures like StingRay necessary. Banning them will destroy our ability to fight terrorism and protect our citizens.

Sulmasy 13 (Glenn Sulmasy 2013 for CNN “Why We Need Government Surveillance” Online http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/10/opinion/sulmasy-nsa-snowden/)

The current threat by al Qaeda and jihadists is one that requires aggressive intelligence collection and efforts. One has to look no further than the disruption of the New York City subway bombers (the one being touted by DNI Clapper) or the Boston Marathon bombers to know that the war on al Qaeda is coming home to us, to our citizens, to our students, to our streets and our subways.This 21st century war is different and requires new ways and methods of gathering information. As technology has increased, so has our ability to gather valuable, often actionable, intelligence. However, the move toward "home-grown" terror will necessarily require, by accident or purposefully, collections of U.S. citizens' conversations with potential overseas persons of interest.An open society, such as the United States, ironically needs to use this technology to protect itself. This truth is naturally uncomfortable for a country with a Constitution that prevents the federal government from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures." American historical resistance towards such activities is a bedrock of our laws, policies and police procedures.But what might have been reasonable 10 years ago is not the same any longer. The constant armed struggle against the jihadists has adjusted our beliefs on what we think our government can, and must, do in order to protect its citizens.However, when we hear of programs such PRISM, or the Department of Justice getting phone records of scores of citizens without any signs of suspicious activities nor indications of probable cause that they might be involved in terrorist related activities, the American demand for privacy naturally emerges to challenge such "trolling" measures or data-mining.The executive branch, although particularly powerful in this arena, must ensure the Congress is kept abreast of activities such as these surveillance programs. The need for enhanced intelligence activities is a necessary part of the war on al Qaeda, but abuse can occur without ensuring the legislative branch has awareness of aggressive tactics such as these.Our Founding Fathers, aware of the need to have an energetic, vibrant executive branch in foreign affairs, still anticipated checks upon the presidency by the legislature. Working together, the two branches can ensure that both legally, and by policy, this is what the citizens desire of their government -- and that leaks such as Snowden's won't have the impact and damage that his leaks are likely to cause.As for Snowden, regardless of how any of us feel about the national security surveillance programs at issue, he must be extradited back to the U.S. for interviews and potential trial -- if for no other reason than to deter others from feeling emboldened to break the law in the same way in the future.

Phone surveillance is necessary; arguments to the contrary ignore the very real threat of a terrorist attack.

Walpin 13 (Gerald Walpin for The National Review “We Need NSA Surveillance” Online http://www.nationalreview.com/article/355959/we-need-nsa-surveillance-gerald-walpin)

After repeatedly, and correctly, proclaiming that phone and e-mail surveillance by the NSA is both necessary and constitutional, the president has succumbed to left and libertarian pressure: He has proposed installation in NSA of “a full-time civil-liberties and privacy officer” and other mechanisms in “the transparency community.” A “transparency community” within an “intelligence community” is an unworkable oxymoron. Any “civil-liberties and privacy” officer installed in NSA would, to show that he is performing, have to impede intelligence activities — a burden we do not need in our already difficult war on terrorism. Our Constitution’s authors and proponents warned against bowing to the sort of demagoguery that lies behind attacks on the NSA program as an unconstitutional invasion of our rights. The Federalist Papers — the bible of the Constitution’s meaning — warn at the outset (No. 1) of those who invoke supposed rights of the people to oppose the government’s efforts to defeat an enemy seeking to destroy us: “A dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people, than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government.” Continuing, “Publius” (probably Alexander Hamilton) explains why: “History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people, commencing Demagogues and ending Tyrants.” This warning is repeated: The Government’s “powers” for “the common defense . . . ought to exist without limitation: because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them” (No. 23). Again, our Founding Fathers opposed “every project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the general defense and security” (No. 36). Abraham Lincoln reiterated that view when attacked for violating constitutional rights by suspending habeas corpus: “Would not the

219

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official oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it?” Our Founders’ and Lincoln’s teaching is even stronger when applied to the NSA: Its surveillance program violates no constitutional provision. It examines only the addressee and sender on e-mails, and telephone numbers called and called from. The Supreme Court has long held that such information is not privacy-protected by the Fourth Amendment. As a former federal prosecutor, I often obtained such evidence, through law-enforcement tools known as pen registers and mail covers. Consider this real-life event: Over weeks, twelve jewelry stores in different locations are robbed, apparently by one group of unidentified robbers. Police obtain from telephone companies cell-phone records to locate any phone(s) used within 30 minutes’ distance of each robbery. Analyzing the data, they identify robbery suspects. No claim of “violation” of constitutional rights would void the suspects’ conviction. No reason to treat better those attempting to destroy this country. That enemy exists, the evidence for it consisting of 3,000 lives lost on 9/11, the Boston Marathon massacre, and even the unsuccessful terrorist attacks on our airplanes and at Times Square. The NSA program is logical. Our intelligence people know phone numbers or area codes used by terrorists in various world locations. Wouldn’t you want our intelligence services to know who in the United States called those numbers and area codes and to examine the information to determine whether those calls were innocent or not? I certainly would. If this program had been applied to identify the Boston bombers, that attack could have been prevented. Apparently recognizing that their constitutional argument on the NSA program itself is meritless, many opponents insist on a slippery slope of imagined horribles. They assert that, while using sender and recipient identities for security purposes is lawful, possessing the content of the messages would enable that to be used too, unconstitutionally — despite NSA’s denial that it has been done, and despite the absence of contrary evidence. That imagined horrible is akin to depriving all soldiers and police officers of their guns because it is conceivable that some power-hungry president or governor could, in the future, employ armed soldiers or police to seize autocratic power. Imagined horribles do not supersede the reality of terrorists seeking to destroy us.

StingRay type surveillance is necessary. Banning it will destroy our ability to fight terrorism and protect our citizens.

Sulmasy 13 (Glenn Sulmasy 2013 for CNN “Why We Need Government Surveillance” Online http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/10/opinion/sulmasy nsasnowden/)

The current threat by al Qaeda and jihadists is one that requires aggressive intelligence collection and efforts. One has to look no further than the disruption of the New York City subway bombers (the one being touted by DNI Clapper) or the Boston Marathon bombers to know that the war on al Qaeda is coming home to us, to our citizens, to our students, to our streets and our subways.This 21st century war is different and requires new ways and methods of gathering information. As technology has increased, so has our ability to gather valuable, often actionable, intelligence. However, the move toward "home-

grown" terror will necessarily require, by accident or purposefully, collections of U.S. citizens' conversations with potential overseas persons of interest. An open society, such as the United States, ironically needs to use this technology to protect itself. This truth is naturally uncomfortable for a country with a Constitution that prevents the federal government from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures." American historical resistance towards such activities is a bedrock of our laws, policies and police procedures.But what might have been reasonable 10 years ago is not the same any longer. The constant armed struggle against the jihadists has adjusted our beliefs on what we think our government can, and must, do in order to protect its citizens. However, when we hear of programs such PRISM, or the Department of Justice getting phone records of scores of citizens without any signs of suspicious activities nor indications of probable cause that they might be involved in terrorist related activities, the American demand for privacy naturally emerges to challenge such "trolling" measures or datamining.The executive branch, although particularly powerful in this arena, must ensure the Congress is kept abreast of activities such as these surveillance programs. The need for enhanced intelligence activities is a necessary part of the war on al Qaeda, but abuse can occur without ensuring the legislative branch has awareness of aggressive tactics such as these.Our Founding Fathers, aware of the need to have an energetic, vibrant executive branch in foreign affairs, still anticipated checks upon the presidency by the legislature. Working together, the two branches can ensure that both legally, and by policy, this is what the citizens desire of their government and that leaks such as Snowden's won't have the impact and damage that his leaks are likely to cause.As for Snowden, regardless of how any of us feel about the national security surveillance programs at issue, he must be extradited back to the U.S. for interviews and potential trial if for no other reason than to deter others from feeling emboldened to break the law in the same way in the future.

220




Hirsh 2013 [Michael Hirsh, chief correspondent, the National Journal, “The Next Bin Laden,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/thenextbin laden20131114, November 14 2013]

Ever since the death of Osama bin Laden, President Obama and his senior lieutenants have been telling warweary Americans that the end of the nation’s longest conflict is within sight. “Core alQaida is a shell of its former self,” Obama said in a speech in May. “This war, like all wars, must end.” That was the triumphal tone of last year’s reelection campaign, too.The truth is much grimmer. Intelligence officials and terrorism experts today believe that the death of bin Laden and the decimation of the Qaida “core” in Pakistan only set the stage for a rebirth of alQaida as a global threat. Its tactics have morphed into something more insidious and increasingly dangerous as safe havens multiply in wartorn or failed states—at exactly the moment we are talking about curtailing the National Security Agency’s monitoring capability. And the jihadist who many terrorism experts believe is alQaida’s new strategic mastermind, Abu Musab alSuri (a nom de guerre that means “the Syrian”), has a diametrically different approach that emphasizes quantity over quality. The redhaired, blueeyed former mechanical engineer was born in Aleppo in 1958 as Mustafa Setmariam Nasar; he has lived in France and Spain. AlSuri is believed to have helped plan the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and the 2005 bombings in London—and has been called the “Clausewitz” of the new al Qaida.Whereas bin Laden preached big dramatic acts directed by him and senior Qaida leaders, alSuri urges the creation of selfgenerating cells of lone terrorists or small groups in his 1,600page Internet manifesto. They are to keep up attacks, like multiplying fleas on a dog that finds itself endlessly distracted—and ultimately dysfunctional. (A classic Western book on guerrilla warfare called The War of the Flea reportedly influenced alSuri.) The attacks are to culminate, he hopes, in acts using weapons of mass destruction. Recent terrorist attacks against U.S. targets, from the murderous 2009 spree of Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan at Fort Hood to the Boston Marathon bombings last year, suggest that alSuri’s philosophy dominates alQaida’s newly flattened hierarchy. The late YemeniAmerican imam Anwar alAwlaki, who preached this strategy and induced Hasan’s attack, is said to have developed his ideas from al-Suri’s. Meanwhile, with new refuges in North Africa, Syria, and Yemen, jihadists have much more territory from which to hatch plots unmolested.Yet the politics at home are changing as the threat abroad is growing. The revelations dribbled out by fugitive leaker Edward Snowden have outraged members of Congress and world leaders, including those of close allies such as Germany and France. They say they are aghast at American overreach. Writing in Der Spiegel, Snowden justified himself this way: “Instead of causing damage, the usefulness of the new public knowledge for society is now clear, because reforms to politics, supervision, and laws are being suggested.” Thanks to him, Congress will almost certainly rein in the National Security Agency’s datatrolling methods—though it’s not yet clear how much.But the agency’s opponents may not realize that the practice they most hope to stop—its seemingly indiscriminate scouring of phone data and emails—is precisely what intelligence officials say they need to detect

the kinds of plots alSuri favors. For the foreseeable future, alSuri’s approach will mean more terrorist attacks against more targets—albeit with a much lower level of organization and competence. “It’s harder to track. Future attacks against the homeland will be less sophisticated and less lethal, but there’s just going to be more of them,” says Michael Hayden, the former NSA director who steered the agency after 9/11 toward deep dives into Internet and telephonic data. Adds Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, “I think alQaida’s capabilities for a strike into the United States are more dangerous and more numerous than before 9/11.” For better or worse, the only hope to track them all is an exceptionally deep, organized, and freeranging intelligence apparatus, experts say.Intelligence officials who are well briefed in the technical aspects of NSA surveillance also note that global communications are vastly more complex than they were as recently as 9/11, not just in terms of speed and bandwidth but also in the kinds of digital paths they can take. Messages can travel partly by air and partly by cable, for example, and the NSA must keep up. “If you take the diffuse physical environment [of more failedstate havens] and you layer that with the diffuse communications environment, and then you layer that with the diffuse ideological environment—more lone wolves, for example—that makes for a far more generally dangerous environment,” says a knowledgeable U.S. government official who asked to remain anonymous. All of which means that despite very legitimate questions about whether the National Security Agency is going beyond what the law and Constitution allow, Americans probably need the NSA now more than ever.

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Without Stingray style surveillance devices, terrorists will be able to remain anonymous Gamma Group 11 (manufacturer of a Stingray style device. “3GGSM Tactical Interception and Target Location”

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/810727772gammagroupcatalogue3ggsmtactical.html)

Cellular networks have created a haven for criminals and terrorists. Over GSM & 3G networks, criminals and terrorist can remain anonymous, able to continue illegal activities on a global scale without fear of action because:

• ● No Local Registration is required criminals are able to use prepaid SIM cards or foreign SIM cards without the need to supply any information

• ● PostPaid Subscription Fraud criminals are easily able to reprogram phones with a fake identity or use stolen phones and SIM cards. Although powerful Strategic/Countrywide surveillance monitoring tools are at the disposal of Law Enforcement Agencies, the ability to monitor specific criminals/targets critically requires having specific target identity data. In the case of cellular networks the fundamental information is the IMSI (unique identifier or serial number of the SIM) and the IMEI (unique identifier or serial number of the handset)The IMSI and IMEI is highly prized data, and to protect users it is not normally transmitted within cellular networks. However, if the data is obtained, then Law Enforcement Agencies have all they need to monitor Target(s). The challenge is how to overcome the protective security messages within cellular networks protecting their subscribers and covertly elicit specific target user data. Fortunately, to assist Law Enforcement Agencies we are able to offer solutions which can overcome these challenges. Tactical offair solutions are available which are able to emulate the cellular network in order to: 1. Indentify & Locate GSM Target(s) Cellphones Determine and locate the identity of a Target(s) GSM cellphone by pretending to be the real network and tricking the phone to register accordingly. This process allows the unique identity of the phone (IMEI) and the SIM card (IMSI) to be covertly captured, and designated a Target to be precisely located. 2. Identify & Locate 3G Target(s) cellphones Determine and locate the identity of a Target(s) 3G cellphone by pretending to be the real network and tricking the phone to register accordingly. THis process allows the unique identity of the phone (IMEI) and the SIM card (IMSI) to be covertly captured, and designated Targets to be precisely located. 3. Intercept the Voice and SMS Communication of Designated Targets The communication of Target(s) under surveillance can be captured without their knowledge, including:

● all Voice calls & SMS either made or received by Target(s)

● spoof the identity of Target(s) to falsely send SMS or Voice calls

● divert Calls/SMS so they are not received by the Target(s) the ability to edit all SMS before they are received by the Target(s)

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Links—Drones

Drones are critical to combat bio- and chemical-terrorKoerner 2015 (Matthew R [Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2015]; DRONES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: REDEFINING EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY; 64 Duke L.J. 1129; kdf)Senator Dianne Feinstein, a staunch advocate of governmental surveillance n1 and Chairman of the 113th Congress's Senate Intelligence Committee, n2 recently found herself, rather ironically, as the target of surveillance. n3 One day at her home, Senator Feinstein walked to the window to check on a protest that was taking place outside. n4 Much to her surprise, a small drone n5 hovered on the other side of the window, only inches away, spying on her. n6 The drone immediately flew away. n7 Senator Feinstein's experience is just one example of drones being used for surveillance within the United States. But her story and others like it n8 have sparked significant controversy over the use of drones for domestic surveillance, which falls within a broader debate [*1131] on privacy and governmental

surveillance programs. n9 Advocates of robust federal surveillance policies champion governmental surveillance as the only way to prevent terrorist and cyber attacks against the United States.

n10 President Barack Obama defended these surveillance programs as ""modest encroachments on privacy'" that "strike the "right balance' between national security and civil liberties." n11 In comparison, privacy advocates envision these surveillance programs leading to a dystopian, totalitarian government watching over its citizenry - undetected but omnipresent. n12 References to George Orwell's Nineteen

Eighty-Four n13 abound. n14 [*1132] Apart from the surrounding privacy-concerns debate, drones currently provide many practical benefits and their projected applications seem limitless. n15 Based on their obvious advantage of being

unmanned, drones have the capability to conduct missions previously considered too risky, dangerous, or impracticable. These applications are also provided at continuously decreasing costs and with the latest technological sophistication, such as the capability to see through physical obstructions, to detect various chemical and biological agents in the air, to recognize human faces and license plates , and to fly

in strategic, coordinated formations. n16

The plan grounds drones – blocking preventive measuresMcNeal 2014 (Gregory [prof at Pepperdine University]; Drones and Aerial surveillance: Considerations for Legislators; Nov; www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/11/drones-and-aerial-surveillance; kdf)To counter the threat of surveillance, privacy advocates have focused solely on requiring warrants before the use of drones by law enforcement. Such a mandate oftentimes will result in the grounding of drone technology in circumstances where law enforcement use of drones would be beneficial and largely non-controversial. For example, in light of the Boston Marathon bombing, police may want to fly a drone above a marathon to ensure the safety of the public. Under many bills, police would not be allowed to use a drone unless they had a warrant, premised upon probable cause to believe a crime had been or was about to be committed. This requirement exceeds current Fourth Amendment protections with regard to the reasonableness of observing activities in public places. What this means is that the police would need to put together a warrant application with sufficient facts to

prove to a judge that they had probable cause. That application would need to define with particularity the place to be searched or the persons to be surveilled. All of this would be required to observe people gathered in a public place, merely

because the observation was taking place from a drone, rather than from an officer on a rooftop or in a helicopter. In a circumstance like a marathon, this probable cause showing will be difficult for the police to satisfy. After all, if the police

knew who in the crowd was a potential bomber, they would arrest those individuals. Rather, a marathon is the type of event where the police would want to use a drone to monitor for unknown attackers, and in the unfortunate event of an attack, use the footage to identify the perpetrators. This is precisely the type of circumstance where the use of drone could be helpful, but unfortunately it has been outlawed in many states. To make matters worse, this type of drone surveillance would pose little to no harms to privacy. A marathon is a highly public event, the event is televised, it takes place on streets where there are surveillance cameras and spectators are photographing the event. Moreover, in the states where drones have been banned (unless accompanied by a

warrant), the police have not been prohibited from using any other type of surveillance equipment --- just drones. This technology centric approach has done little to protect privacy, but will certainly harm public safety, depriving law enforcement of a tool that they could use to protect people.

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Domestic drones k2 solve for terrorism Bauer 13 (Max Bauer, of ACLU of Massachusetts 9-11-2013, "Domestic Drone Surveillance Usage: Threats and Opportunities for Regulation," https://privacysos.org/domestic_drones CCC)Unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, are an emerging and rapidly-expanding development in domestic surveillance technology. [4] On Valentine’s Day 2012, President Barack Obama signed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, legislation authorizing the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to develop regulations to facilitate the growing usage of

drones in domestic airspace. [5] Drones are best known for their use in military operations [6] including the use of weaponized drones for targeted killing. But drones have been used for domestic surveillance purposes for years [7] and their usage is expected to grow exponentially. [8] The FAA has issued 1,428 drone operator permits since 2007 (as of mid-February) and predicts there will be 10,000 drones deployed within the next five years. [9] A public information request by the Electronic Frontier Foundation showed that numerous universities and law enforcement agencies have been approved to use drones by the FAA. [10] Of course, the widespread use of drones for domestic surveillance raises serious privacy concerns. [11] Drones can be outfitted with high definition [12] and infrared cameras, [13] and even license plate readers. [14] Drones “present unique threats to privacy,” in the words of one privacy advocate. [15] Why? They are smaller – potentially insect-sized, [16] can fly longer – perhaps soon in perpetuity, [17] and are not bound by the historical, practical check on law enforcement excesses we've had as a result of limited police resources. [18] In a seminal 1890 law review article aptly-titled The Right to Privacy, future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis recognized that “instantaneous photographs… have invaded the secret precincts of private and domestic life…Of the desirability – indeed of the necessity – of some such protection there can, it is believed, be no doubt.” [19] Brandeis and his co-author Samuel Warren were ahead of their time when they wrote that article but even they couldn’t foresee anything like the domestic surveillance schemes that have arisen over a century later. Drones Used in

Massachusetts and Response to Boston Marathon Bombings. Late in 2012, the Boston Globe reported that a SWAT team in Massachusetts had filed an application with the FAA for a drone. [20] As of April 2013, there were no police drones yet in Massachusetts but Waltham-based defense contractor Raytheon was flying many of them in testing capacities. [21] Surveillance and war contracting companies hope to expand their market from military to domestic law enforcement. [22] Following the explosion of two bombs at the 2013 Boston Marathon, parts of the city shut down as the search for a suspect continued, prompting Ron Paul to write: “This unprecedented move should frighten us as much or more than the attack itself.” [23] Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis

told the public shortly afterward that he seeks more surveillance cameras (there are already

hundreds) in downtown Boston. [24] And further, he said, he wants to have drone

surveillance for next year’s marathon. [25]

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Links—Generic (2NC/1NR)

Curtailing surveillance boosts terror risks- that risk is serious and underestimatedLewis ’14 James Andrew Lewis is a senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., where he writes on technology, security, and the international economy. Before joining CSIS, he worked at the US Departments of State and Commerce as a Foreign Service officer and as a member of the Senior Executive Service. His diplomatic experience included negotiations on military basing in Asia, the Cambodia peace process, and the five-power talks on arms transfer restraint. Lewis received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. “Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate” - CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES - STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM – December - http://csis.org/publication/underestimating-risk-surveillance-debateAmericans are reluctant to accept terrorism is part of their daily lives, but attacks have been planned or attempted against American targets (usually airliners or urban areas) almost every year since 9/11. Europe faces even greater risk, given the thousands of European Union citizens who will return hardened and radicalized from fighting in Syria and Iraq. The threat of attack is easy to exaggerate, but that does not mean it is nonexistent. Australia’s then-attorney general said in August 2013 that communications surveillance had stopped four “mass casualty events” since 2008. The constant planning and preparation for attack by terrorist

groups is not apparent to the public. The dilemma in assessing risk is that it is discontinuous. There can be long periods with no noticeable activity, only to have the apparent calm explode. The debate over

how to reform communications surveillance has discounted this risk. Communications surveillance is

an essential law enforcement and intelligence tool. There is no replacement for it. Some suggestions for alternative approaches to surveillance , such as the idea that the National Security Agency (NSA) only track known or suspected terrorists, reflect wishful thinking, as it is the unknown terrorist who will inflict the greatest harm.

Err Neg on the link – your default assumption should be that changing intel gathering could have big security risks.Clarke ‘13(et al; This is the Final Report and Recommendations of The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies. President Obama ordered a blue-ribbon task force to review domestic surveillance. This report releases the findings of that group. The report was headed by five experts – including Richard Alan Clarke, who is the former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States. Other expert contributors include Michael Joseph Morell, who was the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency and served as acting director twice in 2011 and from 2012 to 2013 and Cass Robert Sunstein, who was the Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Obama administration and is currently a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. “LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD” – December 12th, 2013 – Easily obtained via a google search. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=https%3A%2F2Fwww.whitehouse.gov%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fdocs%2F2013-12 12_rg_final_report.pdf&ei=Db0yVdDjKIKdNtTXgZgE&usg=AFQjCNH0S_Fo9dckL9bRarVpi4M6pq6MQ&bvm=bv.91071109,d.eXY)

Most of these challenges have a significant intelligence component. Policymakers cannot understand the issues, cannot make policy

with regard to those issues, and cannot successfully implement that policy without reliable intelligence. Any expert with access to open sources can provide insight on questions such as the Eurozone crisis and

Japanese politics, but insights on the plans, intentions, and capabilities of al-Qa’ida, on the status of the Iranian nuclear weapons

program, and on the development of cyber warfare tools by other nations are simply not possible without reliable intelligence. A wide range of intelligence collectors , including NSA, have made important contributions to protecting the nation’s security. Notwithstanding recent controversies, and the importance of significant reforms, the national security of

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the U nited S tates depends on the continued capacity of NSA and other agencies to collect essential information. In considering proposals for reform, now and for the future, policymakers should avoid the risk

of overreaction and take care in making changes that could undermine the capabilities of the Intelligence Community.

Mass surveillance has thwarted many attacks – more transparency of the programs makes attacks very likely Nakashima 13 [Ellen Nakashima, national security reporter for The Washington Post. She focuses on issues relating to intelligence, technology and civil liberties. “Officials: Surveillance programs foiled more than 50 terrorist plots”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/officials-surveillance-programs-foiled-more-than-50-terrorist-plots/2013/06/18/d657cb56-d83e-11e2-9df4-895344c13c30_story.html, June 18th, 2013//Rahul]The U.S. government’s sweeping surveillance programs have disrupted more than 50 terrorist plots in the United States and abroad, including a plan to bomb the New York Stock Exchange, senior government officials testified Tuesday. The officials, appearing before a largely friendly House committee, defended the collection of telephone and Internet data by the National Security Agency as central to protecting the United States and its allies against terrorist attacks . And they said that recent disclosures about the surveillance operations have caused serious damage. “We are now faced with a situation that, because this information has been made public, we run the risk of losing these collection capabilities,” said Robert S. Litt, general counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “We’re not going to know for many months whether these leaks in fact have caused us to lose these capabilities, but if they do have that effect, there is no doubt that they will cause our national security to be affected.” The hearing before the House Intelligence Committee was the third congressional session examining the leaks of classified material about two top-secret surveillance programs by Edward Snowden, 29, a former NSA contractor and onetime CIA employee. Articles based on the material in The Washington Post and Britain’s Guardian newspaper have raised concerns about intrusions on civil liberties and forced the Obama administration to mount an aggressive defense of the effectiveness and privacy protections of the operations. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the head of the NSA, told the committee that the programs had helped prevent “potential terrorist events over 50 times since 9/11.” He said at least 10 of the disrupted plots involved terrorism suspects or targets in the United States. Alexander said officials do not plan to release additional information publicly, to avoid revealing sources and methods of operation, but he said the House and Senate intelligence committees will receive classified details of the thwarted plots. Newly revealed plots In testimony last week, Alexander said the surveillance programs had helped prevent an attack on the subway system in New York City and the bombing of a Danish newspaper. Sean Joyce, deputy director of the FBI, described two additional plots Tuesday that he said were stopped through the surveillance — a plan by a Kansas City, Mo., man to bomb the New York Stock Exchange and efforts by a San Diego man to send money to terrorists in Somalia. The officials said repeatedly that the operations were authorized by Congress and subject to oversight through internal mechanisms and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, whose proceedings are secret. Alexander said that more than 90 percent of the information on the foiled plots came from a program targeting the communications of foreigners, known as PRISM. The program was authorized under Section 702 of a 2008 law that amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The law authorizes the NSA to collect e-mails and other Internet communications to and from foreign targets overseas who are thought to be involved in terrorism or nuclear proliferation or who might provide critical foreign intelligence. No American in the country or abroad can be targeted without a warrant, and no person inside the United States can be targeted without a warrant. A second program collects all call records from U.S. phone companies. It is authorized under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. The records do not include the content of calls, location data, or a subscriber’s name or address. That law, passed in 2001 and renewed twice since then, also amended FISA. Snowden, a high school dropout who worked at an NSA operations center in Hawaii for 15 months as a contractor, released highly classified information on both programs, claiming they represent government overreach. He has been in hiding since publicly acknowledging on June 9 that he leaked the material. Several lawmakers pressed for answers on how Snowden, a low-level systems administrator, could have had access to highly classified material such as a court order for phone records. “We need to seal this crack in the system,” said Rep. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger (Md.), the ranking Democrat on the intelligence panel. Alexander said he is working with intelligence officials to come up with a “two-person” rule to ensure that the agency can block unauthorized people from removing information from the system. But Alexander and the other witnesses focused more heavily on justifying the programs and arguing that they operate under legal guidelines. “As Americans, we value our privacy and our civil liberties,” Alexander said. “As Americans, we also value our security and our safety. In the 12 years since the attacks on September 11th, we have lived in relative safety and security as a nation. That security is a direct result of the intelligence community’s quiet efforts to better connect the dots and learn from the mistakes that permitted those attacks to occur on 9/11.”

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Mass surveillance key to prevent terrorist attacks—ISIS is recruiting from the USRory Carroll, 4-1-2015, "NSA surveillance needed to prevent Isis attack, claims former intelligence chair," Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/22/mass-surveillance-needed-isis-attack-mike-rogersMass surveillance should be retained because of the prospect of Islamic State attacks within the United States, a key Republican ally of the National Security Agency has claimed. Mike Rogers, the former chairman of the House intelligence committee, said the NSA needed to preserve its wide powers in case Isis used its bases in Syria and Iraq to unleash atrocities on the US homeland. “Now you have a very real face on what the threat is,” Rogers told the Guardian on Tuesday. “Somebody calling back from Syria to Minnesota, either recruiting somebody or giving the operational OK to do something. That’s real and it’s serious. Before it seemed all hypothetical. Now you can see it.” He added: “Think about how many people are in Syria with western passports or even American passports. I want to know if they pick up the phone. If they’re calling back to the States, I don’t know about you, but I want to know who they’re talking to and what they’re talking about.”

Surveillance prevents terrorist attacks and must be continued or increased, not banned.

Rubio 15 (Marco Rubio for USA Today “Sen. Rubio: Now’s No Time to End NSA Program” Online http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/05/10/nsa-patriot-act-sen-marco-rubio-editorials-debates/27097131/)

Today our nation faces a greater threat of terrorist attack than any time since Sept. 11, 2001. Because of the dedicated work of U.S. intelligence, military and law enforcement personnel,

Americans have been largely kept safe for almost 14 years. A major contributor to this success has been the development and use of counterterrorism tools such as those authorized under theForeign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Patriot Act.After the Sept. 11 attacks, the federal government mobilized to defend the country and prevent further loss of innocent

life. This included the NSA's collection of bulk telephone metadata.Bulk metadata includes phone numbers, the time and duration of calls — nothing else . No

content of any phone calls is collected. The government is not listening to your phone calls or recording them unless you are a terrorist or talking to a terrorist outside the United States.Despite recent court rulings, this program has not been found unconstitutional, and the courts have not ordered a halt to the program.In fact, this program has been found legal and constitutional by at least 15 federal

judges serving on the FISA Court on 35 occasions.There is not a single documented case of abuse of this program. Internet search providers, Internet-based email accounts, credit card companies and membership discount cards used at the grocery store all collect far more personal information on Americans than the bulk metadata program.FBI Director James Comey warned last week that potentially, thousands of terrorist sympathizers in the United States are being self-radicalized online by foreign terrorists associated with the Islamic State who are urging

them to conduct attacks against Americans in our cities and towns.Given these threats, now is not the time to end this program, which remains essential to our security. Congress has until the

end of May to act before the current authorities expire. We must renew these authorities and provide those we charge with protecting us every tool they need to do so.

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http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-james-m-cole-director-keith-b-alexander-and-general-counsel

http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-james-m-cole-director-keith-b-alexander-and-general-counsel

http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/05/10/nsa-patriot-act-sen-marco-rubio-editorials-debates/27097131/

http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/22/mass-surveillance-needed-isis-attack-mike-rogers

http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/22/mass-surveillance-needed-isis-attack-mike-rogers


Links—Mass Surveillance

Mass surveillance has thwarted many attacks – more transparency of the programs makes attacks very likely Nakashima 13 [Ellen Nakashima, national security reporter for The Washington Post. She focuses on issues relating to intelligence, technology and civil liberties. “Officials: Surveillance programs foiled more than 50 terrorist plots”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/officials-surveillance-programs-foiled-more-than-50-terrorist-plots/2013/06/18/d657cb56-d83e-11e2-9df4-895344c13c30_story.html, June 18th, 2013//Rahul]The U.S. government’s sweeping surveillance programs have disrupted more than 50 terrorist plots in the United States and abroad, including a plan to bomb the New York Stock Exchange ,

senior government officials testified Tuesday. The officials, appearing before a largely friendly House committee, defended the collection of telephone and Internet data by the National Security Agency as central to protecting the United States and its allies against terrorist attacks . And they said that recent

disclosures about the surveillance operations have caused serious damage. “We are now faced with a situation that, because this information has been made public, we run the risk of losing these collection capabilities,” said Robert S. Litt, general counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “We’re not going to know for many months whether these leaks in fact have caused us to lose these

capabilities, but if they do have that effect, there is no doubt that they will cause our national security to be affected.” The hearing before the House Intelligence Committee was the third congressional session examining the leaks of classified material about two top-secret surveillance programs by Edward Snowden, 29, a former NSA contractor and onetime CIA employee. Articles based on the material in The Washington Post and Britain’s Guardian newspaper have raised concerns about intrusions on civil liberties and forced the Obama administration to mount an aggressive

defense of the effectiveness and privacy protections of the operations. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the head of the NSA, told the committee that the programs had helped prevent “potential terrorist events over 50 times since 9/11.” He said at least 10 of the disrupted plots involved terrorism suspects or targets in the United States. Alexander said officials do not plan to release additional information publicly, to avoid revealing sources and methods of operation, but he said the House and Senate intelligence committees will receive classified details of the thwarted plots. Newly revealed plots In testimony last week, Alexander said the surveillance programs had helped prevent an attack on the subway system in New York City and the bombing of a Danish newspaper. Sean Joyce, deputy director of the FBI, described two additional plots Tuesday that he said were stopped through the surveillance — a plan by a Kansas City, Mo., man to bomb the New York Stock Exchange and efforts by a San Diego man to send money to terrorists in Somalia. The officials said repeatedly that the operations were authorized by Congress and subject to oversight through internal mechanisms and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, whose proceedings are secret. Alexander said that more than 90 percent

of the information on the foiled plots came from a program targeting the communications of foreigners, known as PRISM. The program was authorized under Section 702 of a 2008 law that amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The law authorizes the NSA to collect e-mails and other Internet communications to and from foreign targets overseas who are thought to be involved in terrorism or nuclear proliferation or who might provide critical foreign intelligence. No American in the country or abroad can be targeted without a warrant, and no person inside the United States can be targeted without a warrant. A second program collects all call records from U.S. phone companies. It is authorized under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. The records do not include the content of calls, location data, or a subscriber’s name or address. That law, passed in 2001 and renewed twice since then, also amended FISA. Snowden, a high school dropout who worked at an NSA operations center in Hawaii for 15 months as a contractor, released highly classified information on both programs, claiming they represent government overreach. He has been in hiding since publicly acknowledging on June 9 that he leaked the material. Several lawmakers pressed for answers on how Snowden, a low-level systems administrator, could have had access to highly classified material such as a court order for phone records. “We need to seal this crack in the system,” said Rep. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger (Md.), the ranking Democrat on the intelligence panel. Alexander said he is working with intelligence officials to come up with a “two-person” rule to ensure that the agency can block unauthorized people from removing information from the system. But Alexander and the other witnesses focused more heavily on justifying the programs and arguing that they operate under legal guidelines. “As Americans, we value our privacy and our civil liberties,” Alexander said. “As Americans, we also value our

security and our safety. In the 12 years since the attacks on September 11th, we have lived in relative safety and security as a nation. That security is a direct result of the intelligence community’s quiet efforts to better connect the dots and learn from the mistakes that permitted those attacks to occur on 9/11.”

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Links—Perception

Terrorists’ perception of surveillance effectively deters terrorist communication – the plan makes effective regrouping more successfulRascoff 14 (Samuel J. Rascoff, Associate Professor of Law, Faculty Director, Center on Law and Security, New York University School of Law, “COUNTERTERRORISM AND NEW DETERRENCE,” http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-89-3-Rascoff_0.pdf2014) An open question - an answer to which requires more empirical data - is whether the government's prosecution of relatively amateur would-be terrorists based on stings is likely to be effective in deterring better-trained terrorists. n109 But it bears remembering that the viability [*855] of the deterrence-based account of stings does not depend on who is prosecuted. The mere fact of prosecution can alter terrorists' perceptions of future success by implying a pervasive surveillance network

n110 facilitated by technology . n111 As Alex Wilner observed of Canadian counterterrorism, the fact that the country's

" intelligence community clearly has the means and the tools to uncover plots expeditiously" creates an "overwhelming perception ... that terrorists are unlikely to evade Canada's watchful eye." n112 In sum, the meaning of a sting operation and subsequent trial must include the strategic benefits of revealing the fact of undercover surveillance

as well as the normative costs implied by widespread surveillance . n113 This in turn illustrates the [*856] complicated

relationship between transparency and secrecy entailed by new deterrence. C. Psychology and Strikes New deterrence also enriches understanding of the role of fear and emotion in counterterrorism. Terrorism aims at communicating vulnerability and sowing distrust; violent attacks are, in a sense, means to bring about these more intangible objectives. n114 (Thus, building sufficient social resiliency to withstand terrorist attacks, as new deterrence counsels, deprives terrorists of an important goal, even when an attack succeeds. n115) But fear n116 and distrust are also part of the counterterrorism repertoire. n117 Inevitably this fact raises serious [*857] normative issues. First is the foundational question of what it means for the state to manage terrorist risk through the potentially widespread, deliberate employment of fear. n118 Rich sociological and historical literature attest to the emotional costs of aggressive national security tactics. n119 Second is a concern about the distribution of fear and whether the government considers race and religion when employing it. n120 My central point here, however, is not normative so much as conceptual: Whereas policymakers, lawyers, and the general public often define counterterrorism as the sum of so many violent interventions, new deterrence reminds us that counterterrorism also operates in a psychological register. Unlike traditional deterrence, which conveys its message through

fear of being caught and punished, new deterrence relies on a wider and subtler range of official modalities that go to the likelihood of terrorist success. For example, the government may aim to demoralize an adversary by telegraphing the state's overwhelming might . The state might do so by

"spreading false or exaggerated rumors of the [*858] existence of sting operations," n121 sowing a sense of distrust within a cell by implying that one among them is on an official payroll, or even conveying an image of officials as irrational and prone to unmeasured violence. n122

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2NC/1NR Uniqueness—Surveillance Solves Terror Now

WMD attacks will inevitably be attempted. US will win. Intel gathering’s key

McDONOUGH ‘15DOUG McDONOUGH -managing editor at Plainview Herald. Internally quoting James Olson – who has 31 years as an American spy – “U.S. winning the war on terror” – MyPlainview.com - February 28, 2015 - http://www.myplainview.com/news/article_c1881ec4-bf9b-11e4-a9b1-b342ff9491d6.html

After spending 31 years as an American spy, James Olson is blunt in his assessment. "Make no mistake, our country is at war," he said Thursday while keynoting the annual Plainview Chamber of Commerce banquet. "It's a war on terror, and it will be long, bloody and deadly. But

America will win this war because our best young people today are stepping forward in droves." While

many of those are putting on uniforms and joining the ranks of the nation's combat forces on the front lines, still more are going in harm's way behind the scenes as counterintelligence operatives. "We are on the front lines in the war on terror," Olson warns. "And we will be hit again, inside our own borders. It will be a weapon of mass destruction, and no region or sector is immune from this attack. The best way to combat this threat is through good intelligence."

The war on terror is on the brink — status quo surveillance solves, but removal of any one part can cause collapse. Hamilton 15 — Lee Hamilton, Professor of Practice and International Law at Indiana University, Director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, J.D. from DePauw University, 2015 (“To Win the War on Terror, We Must Win the War of Ideas,” Huffington Post, February 20th, accessible online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lee-h-hamilton/to-win-the-war-on-terror-_b_6722214.html, accessed on 6-20-15)Clearly then, the unpredictable danger posed by terrorism has not subsided. The fact that terrorism is becoming increasingly decentralized makes dealing with it even more difficult. While ISIS has become the major terrorist group, it is one of many groups engaged in deadly activities, including al-Qaeda.The question now is: Can we roll ISIS back? To do so, we need a more comprehensive approach and a unity of effort that fully engages the president, Congress, our military and intelligence capabilities, and our allies around the world.Without doubt, we have experienced considerable success in the fight against terror. Almost weekly we hear of top terrorist leaders being removed by our drone and other anti-terrorism strikes. Yet somehow the terrorists seem to recover quickly and keep coming. Our attacks, while effective, haven't quite quelled the terrorists' momentum, which is reflected by the numbers of members and new recruits. In 2001, by one estimate, we identified about 300 al-Qaeda members and affiliates worldwide. In 2015, there are more than 30,000 al-Qaeda fighters in Syria alone.We should not forget the successes we've had in the fight against terror. At the same time, surveying the current landscape suggests that the U.S. and its allies need to up their games considerably in dealing with ISIS and other terrorist groups.

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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lee-h-hamilton/to-win-the-war-on-terror-_b_6722214.html


Upping our game will require that we focus more intently on several critical components of our counterterrorism policy. Among those components is intelligence. Because it can prevent attacks, intelligence is everyone's favorite weapon in the fight against terrorism.Simply put, even the smallest amount of information , combined with other bits of

information, can prevent a massive attack . However, gathering meaningful intelligence has become an increasingly formidable task , since, once again, we're not dealing with a single state. We're faced with a diffuse threat and groups that continue to evolve, spread out and decentralize. ISIS is expanding beyond Syria and Iraq to Libya, Egypt, Algeria and other countries.

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2NC/1NR Uniqueness—Terror Risk Hi Now

Terror risk is high- maintaining current surveillance is keyInserra, 6-8-2015David Inserra is a Research Associate for Homeland Security and Cyber Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation, 6-8-2015, "69th Islamist Terrorist Plot: Ongoing Spike in Terrorism Should Force Congress to Finally Confront the Terrorist Threat," Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/69th-islamist-terrorist-plot-ongoing-spike-in-terrorism-should-force-congress-to-finally-confront-the-terrorist-threat

On June 2 in Boston, Usaamah Abdullah Rahim drew a knife and attacked police officers and FBI agents, who then shot and killed him. Rahim was being watched by Boston’s Joint Terrorism Task Force as he had been plotting to behead police officers as part of violent jihad. A conspirator, David Wright or Dawud Sharif Abdul Khaliq, was arrested shortly thereafter for helping Rahim to plan this attack. This plot marks the 69th publicly known Islamist terrorist plot or attack against the U.S. homeland since 9/11, and is part of a recent spike in terrorist activity. The U.S. must redouble its efforts to stop terrorists before they strike, through the use of properly applied intelligence tools. The Plot According to the criminal complaint filed against Wright, Rahim had originally planned to behead an individual outside the state of Massachusetts,[1] which, according to news reports citing anonymous government officials, was Pamela Geller, the organizer of the “draw Mohammed” cartoon contest in Garland, Texas.

[2] To this end, Rahim had purchased multiple knives, each over 1 foot long, from Amazon.com. The FBI was listening in on the calls between Rahim and Wright and recorded multiple conversations regarding how these weapons would be used to behead someone. Rahim then changed his plan early on the morning of June 2. He planned to go “on vacation right here in Massachusetts…. I’m just going to, ah, go after them, those boys in blue. Cause, ah, it’s the easiest target.”[3] Rahim and Wright had used the phrase “going on vacation” repeatedly in their conversations as a euphemism for violent jihad. During this conversation, Rahim told Wright that he planned to attack a police officer on June 2 or June 3. Wright then offered advice on preparing a will and destroying any incriminating evidence. Based on this threat, Boston police officers and FBI agents approached Rahim to question him, which prompted him to pull out one of his knives. After being told to drop his weapon, Rahim responded with “you drop yours” and moved toward the officers, who then shot and killed him. While Rahim’s brother, Ibrahim, initially claimed that Rahim was shot in the back, video surveillance was shown to community leaders and civil rights groups, who have confirmed that Rahim was not shot in the back.[4 ] Terrorism Not Going Away This 69th Islamist plot is also the seventh in this calendar year. Details on how exactly Rahim was radicalized are still forthcoming, but according to anonymous officials, online propaganda from ISIS and other radical Islamist groups are the source.[5] That would make this attack the 58th homegrown terrorist plot and continue the recent trend of ISIS playing an important role in radicalizing individuals in the United States. It is also the sixth plot or attack targeting law enforcement in the U.S., with a recent uptick in plots aimed at police. While the debate over the PATRIOT Act and the USA FREEDOM Act is taking a break, the terrorists are not. The result of the debate has been the reduction of U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities, meaning that the U.S. has to do even more with less when it comes to connecting the dots on terrorist plots.[6] Other legitimate intelligence tools and capabilities must be leaned on now even more. Protecting the Homeland To keep the U.S. safe, Congress must take a hard look at the U.S. counterterrorism enterprise and determine other measures that are needed to improve it. Congress should: Emphasize community outreach. Federal grant funds should be used to create robust community-outreach capabilities in higher-risk urban areas. These funds must not be used for political pork, or so broadly that they no longer target those communities at greatest risk. Such capabilities are key to building trust within these communities, and if the United States is to thwart lone-wolf terrorist attacks, it must place effective community outreach operations at the tip of the spear. Prioritize local cyber capabilities. Building cyber-investigation capabilities in the higher-risk urban areas must become a primary focus of Department of Homeland Security grants. With so much terrorism-related activity occurring on the Internet, local law enforcement must have the constitutional ability to monitor and track violent extremist activity on the Web when reasonable suspicion exists to do so. Push the FBI toward being more effectively driven by intelligence. While the FBI has made high-level changes to its mission and organizational structure, the bureau is still working on integrating intelligence and law enforcement activities. Full integration will require overcoming inter-agency cultural barriers and providing FBI intelligence personnel with resources, opportunities, and the stature they need to become a more effective and integral part of the FBI. Maintain essential counterterrorism tools. Support for important investigative tools is essential to maintaining the security of the U.S. and combating terrorist threats. Legitimate government surveillance programs are also a vital component of U.S. national security and should be allowed to continue. The need for effective counterterrorism operations does not relieve the government of its obligation to follow the law and respect individual privacy and liberty. In the American system, the government must do both equally well. Clear-Eyed Vigilance The recent spike in terrorist plots and attacks should finally awaken policymakers—all Americans, for that matter—to the seriousness of the terrorist threat. Neither fearmongering nor willful blindness serves the United States. Congress must recognize and acknowledge the nature and the scope of the Islamist terrorist threat, and take the appropriate action to confront it.

Terror threat high now—encryption and radicalization Investor's Business Daily, 6-23-2015, "Despite Obama's Claim, Our Terror Threat Level Is High," http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/062315-758709-diminishing-us-power-has-elevated-our-terror-threat-level.htm

Homeland Security: The president repeatedly claims we're safer than ever. The chairman of the House Intelligence Committee just warned of the opposite. Apparently we have difficulty tracking U.S.-based terrorist cells. The attitude of the Obama administration toward terrorism is summed up by the National Terrorism Advisory System page on the Homeland Security website. "There are no current alerts," it reports. And "there are no expired alerts." Nearby is the question, "Was this page helpful?" The answer is no. The five post-9/11 color-coded terrorism alert levels, abandoned in 2011, were lampooned by comedians for being vague and based on hidden criteria. With the threat level never dropping below "elevated" (yellow), down to "guarded" (blue) or "low" (green), the public was ignoring it, it was said. But now, in its place, is a National Terrorism Advisory System that never issues alerts. In fact, over

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nearly six and a half years, President Obama has not once, under either the old or new system, issued an alert. Last August he promised "things are much less dangerous now than they were 20 years ago, 25 years ago, or 30 years ago." That contradicted his own Joint Chiefs chairman, secretary of defense, and even his then-Attorney General Eric Holder, who called potential undetectable explosives smuggled in from Syria the most frightening thing he had seen while in office. Enter House Intelligence Committee Chairman Devin Nunes, R-Calif., who told CBS' "Face the Nation" on Sunday that "we face the highest threat level we have ever faced in this country today . .. including after 9/11." Because of obstacles such as encrypted Internet chat rooms, "we are having a tough time tracking terrorist cells," according to Nunes. And "the flow of fighters" from Western nations who have been radicalized into the Islamic State, but "who have now come out" and may seek to commit terrorist attacks back home, is another reason the threat is greater than ever. Nunes noted that the FBI has "cases open in 50 states." Then there is civil war in Yemen, with the AQAP branch of al-Qaida "everywhere," according to Nunes. Last September, outlining his noncombat approach against the Islamic State, Obama cited his Yemen policy as the model. Eleven days later, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels toppled the U.S.-backed government. Obama is poised to make a nuclear deal with those same Iranians, lifting sanctions and handing Tehran tens of billions in cash to terrorize even more and gain regional dominance — all before getting nuclear weapons, which will launch an atomic arms race in the Mideast. Russia's new aggressiveness counters Obama's claims that the Cold War is ancient history. Iran, the Islamic State and other terrorists are actually, while lacking Moscow's massive nuclear arsenal, a greater threat because of the theocratic-based, self-destructive irrationality and instability underlying their motivations. The Soviets, after all, never murdered thousands of Americans on their own soil. Far less powerful Islamist fanatics did. Under the old color-coded system, today's level of alert would be "severe" (red).

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2NC/1NR Uniqueness—Surveillance Now

US surveillance is increasing to deal with new terrorist threatsBennett 5/18/15 (Brian, washington based reporter for the LA Times, "White House Steps Up Warning About Terrorism on US Soil")Alarmed about the growing threat from Islamic State, the Obama administration has dramatically stepped up warnings of potential terrorist attacks on American soil after several years of relative calm.¶ Behind the scenes, U.S. authorities have raised defenses at U.S. military bases, put local police forces on alert and increased surveillance at the nation's airports, railroads, shopping malls, energy plants and other potential targets.¶ Driving the unease are FBI arrests of at least 30 Americans on terrorism-related charges this year in an array of "lone wolf" plots, none successful, but nearly all purportedly inspired by Islamic State propaganda or appeals.¶ The group's leader, Abu Bakr Baghdadi, drove home the danger in a 34-minute audio recording released online Thursday. He urged Muslims everywhere to "migrate to the Islamic State or fight in his land, wherever that may be."¶ It is pretty easy for [Islamic State] to reach out to a very large number of people using a very robust social media presence. I suspect we should see more plots going forward.¶ - J.M. Berger, a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution¶ The audio was released with translations in English, French, German, Russian and Turkish, signaling the militants' increasingly ambitious attempts to draw new recruits — and to spark violence — around the world.¶ U.S. officials estimate the Sunni Muslim group has drawn 22,000 foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, including about 3,700 from Western nations. About 180 Americans have gone, or tried to go.¶ U.S. counter-terrorism officials initially viewed Islamic State as primarily a regional security threat, focused on expanding and protecting its self-proclaimed Islamist caliphate in Syria and Iraq, rather than launching attacks abroad.¶ But the analysis has shifted sharply as gunmen inspired by the group, but not controlled or assisted by them, opened fire at the Parliament in Ottawa; at a cafe in Sydney, Australia; at a kosher grocery in Paris; and, on May 3, in Garland, Texas.¶ In the Texas case, two would-be terrorists apparently prompted by Islamic State social media messages tried to shoot their way into a provocative contest for caricatures of the prophet Muhammad. Both gunmen were shot to death, and no one else was killed. Islamic State later claimed responsibility for the assault, the first time it has done so for an attack on U.S. soil.¶ James B. Comey, the FBI director, warned this month that "hundreds, maybe thousands" of Americans are seeing recruitment pitches from Islamic State on Facebook, Twitter and other social media, as well as messages sent to smartphones of "disturbed people" who could be pushed to attack U.S. targets.¶ "It's like the devil sitting on their shoulders saying, 'Kill, kill, kill,'" Comey told reporters.¶ The United States has entered a "new phase, in my view, in the global terrorist threat," Jeh Johnson, director of Homeland Security, said Friday on MSNBC.¶ "We have to be concerned about the independent actor, and the independent actor who is here in the homeland who may strike with little or no warning," he said. "The nature of the global terrorist threat has evolved."¶ That poses a special challenge for U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, which spent years desperately trying to penetrate and understand Al Qaeda's rigid hierarchy and top-down approach to terrorism.¶ Now they are struggling to detect and prevent lethal attacks by individuals — such as the April 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon by two Russian-born brothers — with little or no outside communication or support.¶ The administration has sought to stiffen homeland defenses, and intelligence gathering, in response.

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2NC/1NR Extensions – Uniqueness (general)

Widespread Surveillance Programs are Keeping Terror Plots in Check—Massive Attacks Would Have Taken Place Without ItBoot ’13 Max Boot is a Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2004, he was named by the World Affairs Councils of America as one of "the 500 most influential people in the United States in the field of foreign policy." In 2007, he won the Eric Breindel Award for Excellence in Opinion Journalism. From 1992 to 1994 he was an editor and writer at the Christian Science Monitor. Boot holds a bachelor's degree in history, with high honors, from the University of California, Berkeley and a master's degree in history from Yale University. Boot has served as an adviser to U.S. commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is the published author of Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present. From the article: “Stay calm and let the NSA carry on” - LA Times – June 9th - http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/09/opinion/la-oe-boot-nsa-surveillance-20130609After 9/11, there was a widespread expectation of many more terrorist attacks on the United States. So far that hasn't happened. We haven't escaped entirely unscathed (see Boston Marathon, bombing of), but on the whole we have been a lot safer than most security experts , including me, expected. In light of the current controversy over the National Security Agency's monitoring of telephone calls and emails, it is worthwhile to ask: Why is that? It is certainly not due to any change of heart among our enemies. Radical Islamists still want to kill American infidels. But the vast majority of the time, they fail. The Heritage Foundation estimated last year that 50 terror ist attacks on the American homeland had been foiled since 2001. Some, admittedly, failed through sheer incompetence on the part of the would-be terrorists. For instance, Faisal

Shahzad, a Pakistani American jihadist, planted a car bomb in Times Square in 2010 that started smoking before exploding, thereby alerting two New Yorkers who in turn called police, who were able to defuse it. But it would be naive to adduce all of our security

success to pure serendipity. Surely more attacks would have succeeded absent the ramped-up counter-terror ism efforts undertaken by the U.S. intelligence community , the military and law enforcement. And a large element of the intelligence community's

success lies in its use of special intelligence — that is, communications intercepts. The CIA is notoriously deficient in human intelligence — infiltrating spies into terrorist

organizations is hard to do, especially when we have so few spooks who speak Urdu, Arabic, Persian and other relevant languages. But the NSA is the best in the world at intercepting communications. That is the most

important technical advantage we have in the battle against fanatical foes who will not hesitate to sacrifice their lives to take ours. Which brings us to the current kerfuffle over two NSA monitoring programs that have been exposed by the Guardian and the Washington Post. One program apparently collects metadata on all telephone calls made in the United States. Another program provides access to all the emails, videos and other data found on the servers of major Internet firms such as Google, Apple and Microsoft. At first blush these intelligence-gathering activities raise the specter of Big Brother snooping on ordinary American citizens who might be cheating on their spouses or bad-mouthing the president. In fact, there are considerable safeguards built into both programs to ensure that doesn't happen. The phone-monitoring program does not allow the NSA to listen in on conversations without a court order. All that it can do is to collect information on the time, date and destination of phone calls. It should go without saying that it would be pretty useful to know

if someone in the U.S. is calling a number in Pakistan or Yemen that is used by a terrorist organizer. As for the Internet-monitoring program, reportedly known as PRISM, it is apparently limited to "non-U.S. persons" who are abroad and thereby enjoy no constitutional protections. These are hardly rogue operations. Both programs were initiated by President George W. Bush and continued by President Obama with the full knowledge and support of Congress and continuing oversight from the federal judiciary. That's

why the leaders of both the House and Senate intelligence committees, Republicans and Democrats alike, have come to the defense of these activities. It's possible that, like all government programs, these could be abused — see, for example, the IRS making life tough on tea partiers. But there is no evidence of abuse so far

and plenty of evidence — in the lack of successful terrorist attacks — that these programs have been effective in disrupting terrorist plots. Granted there is something inherently creepy about Uncle Sam scooping up so much information about us. But Google, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, Citibank and other companies know at least as much about us, because they use

very similar data-mining programs to track our online movements. They gather that information in order to sell us products, and no one seems to be overly alarmed. The NSA is gathering that information to keep us safe from terrorist attackers. Yet somehow its actions have become a "scandal," to use a term now loosely being tossed around. The real scandal here is that the Guardian and Washington Post are compromising our national security by telling our enemies about our intelligence-gathering capabilities. Their news

stories reveal, for example, that only nine Internet companies share information with the NSA. This is a virtual invitation to terrorists to use other Internet outlets for searches, email, apps and all the rest. No intelligence effort can ever keep us 100% safe, but to stop or scale back the NSA's special intelligence efforts would amount to unilateral disarmament in a war against terrorism that is far from over.

It’s not about “winning or losing” in absolute terms. The US is doing well – and far better than if softer intel approaches like plan – were used.

Zenko ‘15 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The author is internally quoting Director of Central Intelligence John Brennan – “CIA Director: We’re Winning the War on

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Terror, But It Will Never End” Politics, Power and Preventive Action – a blog coordinated by the Council of Foreign Relations April 8, 2015 http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2015/04/08/cia directorwerewinningthewaronterrorbutitwillneverend/)

Last night, Director of Central Intelligence John Brennan participated in a questionandanswer session at Harvard Kennedy School’s Institute of Politics. The first thirtyseven minutes consisted of an unusually probing exchange between Brennan and Harvard professor Graham Allison (full disclosure: Graham is a former boss of mine). Most notably, between 19:07 and 29:25 in the video, Allison pressed Brennan repeatedly about whether the United States is winning the war on terrorism and why the number of alQaedaaffiliated groups has only increased since 9/11: “There seem to be more of them than when we started...How are we doing?” Brennan replied: If I look across the board in terms of since 9/11 at terrorist organizations, and if the United States in all of its various forms. In intelligence, military, homeland security, law enforcement, diplomacy. If we were not as engaged against the terrorists, I think we would be facing a horrendous, horrendous environment. Because they would have taken full advantage of the opportunities that they have had across the region... We have worked collectively as a government but also with our international partners very hard to try and root many of them out. Might some of these actions be stimulants to others joining their ranks? Sure, that’s a possibility. I think, though it has taken off of the battlefield a lot more terrorists, than it has put on. This statement is impossible to evaluate or measure because the U.S. government has consistently refused to state publicly which terrorist organizations are deemed combatants, and can therefore be “taken out on the battlefield.” However, relying upon the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism,the estimated strength of all alQaedaaffiliated groups has grown or stayed the same since President Obama came into office. Of course, nonalQaedaaffiliated groups have arisen since 9/11, including the selfproclaimed Islamic State, which the Central Intelligence Agency estimated last September to contain up to 31,500 fighters, and Boko Haram, which has perhaps 10,000 committed members. However, the most interesting question posed to Brennan came at the very end from a Harvard freshman who identified himself as Julian: “We’ve been fighting the war on terror since 2001. Is there an end in sight, or should we get used to this new state of existence? Brennan replied: It’s a long war, unfortunately. But it’s been a war that has been in existence for millennia, at the same time—the use of violence for political purposes against noncombatants by either a state actor or a subnational group. Terrorism has taken many forms over the years. What is more challenging now is, again, the technology that is available to terrorists, the great devastation that can be created by even a handful of folks, and also mass communication that just proliferates all of this activity and incitement and encouragement. So you have an environment now that’s very conducive to that type of propaganda and recruitment efforts, as well as the ability to get materials that are going to kill people. And so this is going to be something, I think, that we’re always going to have to be vigilant about. There is evil in the world and some people just want to kill for the sake of killing...This is something that, whether it’s from this group right now or another group, I think the ability to cause damage and violence and kill will be with us for many years to come. We just have to not kill our way out of this because that’s not going to address it. We need to stop those attacks that are in train but we also have to address some of those underlying factors and conditions. I’m not saying that poverty causes somebody to become a terrorist, or a lack of governance, but they certainly do allow these terrorist organizations to grow and they take full advantage of those opportunities. To summarize, the war on terrorism is working, compared to inaction or other policies. But, the American people should expect it to continue for millennia, or as long as lethal technologies and mass communication remain available to evil people.

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2NC/1NR Extension: Impact (Nuclear Terrorism) Surveillance prevents war and terrorist attacks


The military is another arm of state power that is ripe for a surveillance-inspired shrinking. If cross-border surveillance becomes ubiquitous and effective, we could see a reduction in the $1.7 trillion that the world spends on the military each year. Previous attempts to reduce armaments have ultimately been stymied by a lack of reliable verification. Countries can never trust that their enemies aren’t cheating, and that encourages them to cheat themselves. Arms races are also made worse by a psychological phenomenon, whereby each side interprets the actions of the other as a dangerous provocation, while interpreting its own as purely defensive or reactive. With cross-border mass surveillance, countries could check that others are abiding by the rules, and that they weren’t covertly preparing for an attack. If intelligence agencies were to use all the new data to become more sophisticated observers, countries might develop a better understanding of each other. Not in the hand-holding, peace-and-love sense, but in knowing what is a genuine threat and what is bluster or posturing. Freed from fear of surprising new weapons, and surprise attacks, countries could safely shrink their militaries. And with reduced armies, we should be able to expect reduced warfare, continuing the historical trend in conflict reduction since the end of the Second World War. […]Likewise, mass surveillance could prevent the terrorist use of nukes, dirty bombs, or other futuristic weapons. Instead of blanket bans in dangerous research areas, we could allow research to proceed and use surveillance to catch bad actors and bad practices. We might even see an increase in academic freedom.

Counterterrorism is vital terrorists will go nuclear if we let our guard down.

Brill & Luongo 2012 (Kenneth Brill and Kenneth Luongo. March 15. “Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger.” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear terrorism a clear danger.html?_r=0 )

Terrorists exploit gaps in security. The current global regime for protecting the nuclear materials that terrorists desire for their ultimate weapon is far from seamless. It is based largely on unaccountable, voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across borders. Its weak links make it dangerous and inadequate to prevent nuclear terrorism.Later this month in Seoul, the more than 50 world leaders who will gather for the second Nuclear Security Summit need to seize the opportunity to start developing an accountable regime to prevent nuclear terrorism.There is a consensus among international leaders that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real, not a Hollywood confection. President Obama, the leaders of 46 other nations, the heads of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and numerous experts have called nuclear terrorism one of the most serious threats to global security and stability. It is also preventable with more aggressive action. At least four terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, have demonstrated interest in using a nuclear device. These groups operate in or near states with histories of questionable nuclear security practices. Terrorists do not need to steal a nuclear weapon. It is quite possible to make an improvised nuclear device from highly enriched uranium or plutonium being used for civilian purposes. And there is a black market in such material. There have been 18 confirmed thefts or loss of weaponsusable nuclear material. In 2011, the Moldovan police broke up part of a smuggling ring attempting to sell highly enriched uranium; one member is thought to remain at large with a kilogram of this material. A terrorist nuclear explosion could kill hundreds of thousands, create billions of dollars in damages and undermine the global economy. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations said that an act of nuclear terrorism “would thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty” and create “a second death toll throughout the developing world. Surely after such an event, global leaders would produce a strong global system to ensure nuclear security. There is no reason to wait for a catastrophe to build such a system.The conventional wisdom is that domestic regulations, U.N. Security Council resolutions, G8 initiatives, I.A.E.A. activities and other voluntary efforts will prevent nuclear terrorism. But existing global arrangements for nuclear security lack uniformity and coherence.There are no globally agreed standards for effectively securing nuclear material. There is no

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obligation to follow the voluntary standards that do exist and no institution, not even the I.A.E.A., with a mandate to evaluate nuclear security performance.This patchwork approach provides the appearance of dealing with nuclear security; the reality is there are gaps through which a determined terrorist group could drive one or more nuclear devices.Obama’s initiative in launching the nuclear security summit process in Washington in 2010 helped focus highlevel attention on nuclear security issues. Unfortunately, the actions produced by the 2010 Washington Summit and that are planned for the upcoming Seoul Summit are voluntary actions that are useful, but not sufficient to create an effective global nuclear security regime.The world cannot afford to wait for the patchwork of nuclear security arrangements to fail before they are strengthened. Instead, we need a system based on a global framework convention on nuclear security that would fill the gaps in existing voluntary arrangements. This framework convention would commit states to an effective standard of nuclear security practices, incorporate relevant existing international agreements, and give the I.A.E.A. the mandate to support nuclear security by evaluating whether states are meeting their nuclear security obligations and providing assistance to those states that need help in doing so.Nuclear terrorism is a real and present danger for all states, not just a few. Preventing it is an achievable goal. The current focus on nuclear security through voluntary actions, however, is not commensurate with either the risk or consequences of nuclear terrorism. This must be rectified. If the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit makes this a priority, there can be an effective global nuclear security regime in place before this decade ends.

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Impact—Turns the Aff (Racism)

Terror attack spikes racial hate crimesAkram ‘2Et al - SUSAN MUSARRAT AKRAM, Professor and Supervising Attorney - Boston University International Human Rights Clinical Program. “Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims.” NYU Annual Survey of American Law 58 (2002), 295-355. http://www.privacysos.org/sites/all/files/akram.pdfTimes of crisis are often accompanied by hostility toward minorities in the United States . For Arabs and Muslims, this may be even more problematic, as perpetrators of hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims

frequently fail to differentiate among persons based on religion or ethnic origin, from Pakistanis, Indians, Iranians, and Japanese to Muslims, Sikhs and Christian Arabs .89 The widespread perception in the United States is that Arabs and Muslims are identical and eager to wage a holy war against the U nited S tates . 90 In fact, according to a 1993 report, only 12% of the Muslims in the United States at that time were Arab,91 and Arab Mus-lims are even a minority in the Arab-American community.92 Although there are Muslim “extremists,” the

majority of Muslims are “decent, law-abiding, productive citizens.”93 Because of the lack of differentiation between different

types of Arabs and Muslims, terrorist acts by small groups of Arabs and Muslims often have been followed by generalized hostility toward entire communities of Arabs and Muslims in the United States. For example, after Lebanese Shi’a gunmen in 1985 highjacked TWA Flight 847 to Beirut, beat an American on the plane to death, and held the remaining passengers hostage for over two weeks,94 violent attacks against persons of Arab and Muslim origin occurred across the United States.95 Islamic centers and Arab-American organizations were vandalized and threatened. A Houston mosque was firebombed. A bomb exploded in the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee office in Boston, severely injuring two policemen. 96 Later that same year, after terrorists hijacked the Achille Lauro cruise liner and murdered a passenger, a wave of anti-Arab violence swept the country, including the bombing of an American- Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee office that killed its regional executive director.97

empirics proveKing, 12(Ryan D. King is an associate professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Albany in the United States., “Terrorist Attacks and Hate Crimes: Lessons from 9/11”, http://extremisproject.org/2012/12/terrorist-attacks-and-hate-crimes-lessons-from-911/, December 10, 2012, ak.)Yet there is also a story to be told about the aftermath, and among the lessons we learned from 9/11 is that a backlash in the form of hate crime is likely to foll ow . The murder of Balbir Sodhi was one of many hate crimes perpetrated against Muslims and Arabs , or those who appeared to be of that faith or ethnicity , beginning on September 11th, 2001. According to hate crime statistics provided by the FBI, there were over 1,000 hate crimes with an anti-Muslim or anti-Arab motive during the fourteen-day period beginning on September 11th.* By comparison, fewer than 300 hate crimes with this motivation were reported to the FBI between January 1st and September 10th of that year. If we focus only on anti-Islamic hate crimes (omitting anti-Arab), 60% of the hate crimes that year occurred during that two-week

stretch. The post-9/11 hate crime wave was fueled largely by the emotion of anger and the desire for retribution that pervaded the United States, a fact that should not surprise us. The 20th century is replete with examples of mass violence against minority groups that were ignited by terrorist attacks or assassinations . For instance, the Kristallnacht pogrom that took of the lives of many German Jews in November of 1938 followed the assassination of a German diplomat at the hands of a

Jewish youth. The psychologist Brian Lickel and his colleagues refer to this tendency as ‘ vicarious retribution’ – a

proclivity to punish innocent third parties who in some way resemble the perpetrators of an attack – and this sentiment is often found in the wake of terrorist acts . When my colleagues, Ilir Disha (University at Albany and lead author of the study) and James Cavendish (University of South Florida), and I wrote about post-9/11 hate crimes in the United States in the journal Social Problems, we focused on the broader lessons to be learned from the 9/11 case. Our study looked at the pre and post-9/11 hate crimes in detail, breaking down crimes by day and type to answer some fundamental questions. For instance, how long did the post-9/11 hate crime wave last? Were hate crimes more likely to be perpetrated in New York and Washington than places not directly targeted by the terrorists? Were these crimes perpetrated by organized groups? And what, if anything, might be done to stymie hate crime waves in the future? Our results suggest a few patterns. Hate crime waves following terrorist attacks are

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intense but short in duration With respect to the first issue – the duration of the hate crime wave – our analysis shows that post 9/11 hate crimes took the form of a peak more than a plateau (see Figure below). The crime wave began abruptly on September 11th and reached its highpoint within 48 hours, and the subsequent decline was nearly as rapid. In short, we can expect hate crime waves following terrorist attacks by foreign groups to be immediate and intense, but ultimately short in duration. There is some evidence that hate crime levels never fully returned to pre-9/11 averages, but clearly the initial wave quickly subsided. Attacks are geographically dispersed and victimization risk is associated with target population size We also find that hate crimes increased across the country. That Balbir Sodhi was murdered thousands of miles from the site of the attacks is not anomalous. Anti-Muslim hate crimes increased in Mesa as well as New York; in Chicago as much as in Washington. Among the few demographic characteristics that help sort out where Arabs and Muslims were at higher risk are the size of these respective populations. Intuitively, the raw number of hate crimes was more likely in counties with larger Arab and Muslim populations, largely because of opportunity; more targets equate to more crimes. Yet if we look at the rate of hate crimes per Arab or Muslim population, our analysis suggests that individual Arabs and Muslims were at higher risk of victimization where they were small in number. Counties with large Arab populations, such as Wayne County in Michigan (largest city is Detroit) experienced more hate crimes than other large counties, but when standardizing this number by the Arab population the rate was far smaller than other counties. From the victim’s perspective we might say there is safety in numbers. Evidence suggests hate crimes were rarely the work of organized hate groups Finally, there is no evidence that a sizeable proportion of hate crime was perpetrated by organized hate groups. According to the Southern Poverty Law

Center, an organization that tracks extremist groups, the number of anti-Muslim hate groups increased after the attacks of 2001, yet the FBI data and media reports of hate crimes indicate that people like Frank Roque were the more common perpetrator – angry men with a grievance, but not actively involved with an extremist organization. Two additional points are pertinent to the aftermath of mass terrorism, particularly as it relates to hate crime. First, is the post 9/11 hate crime wave unique? Or should we expect a similar backlash in other settings? In my assessment 9/11 is unique only in its magnitude. We saw a smaller but hardly negligible increase in hate crimes against Muslims following the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, for which responsibility was initially attributed to Islamic fundamentalists (it was soon revealed that an American, Timothy McVeigh, was responsible, and the anti-Muslim attacks ceased). As the economist Steven Machin has found in his research, attacks against Muslims also rose sharply following the bombing of the London Underground in July of 2005. A violent wave of anti-Islamic attacks also followed a

deadly attack on a train in India in February of 2002. A backlash seems predictable, particularly following lethal attacks in which responsibility is attributed to a specific minority group. Finally, can anything be done to prevent hate crimes against innocent civilians if another terrorist attack occurs? My guess is there is little that local or federal governments could have done to prevent the murder of Mr. Sodhi. However, if the goal is to minimize the intensity of attacks on innocent third parties following a terrorist act, two actions are worth trying. The first is simply disseminating

information to at-risk populations. Arabs and Muslims (and Sikhs as well) should take extra precautions during the week following a terrorist attack in

which Islamist fundamentalists are suspects. They are clearly at a higher risk of victimization during the week or two after an attack such as 9/11 or July 7. A second action calls on leaders to confront the issue early and publicly. About a week following the 9/11 attacks President Bush gave a speech stating that the true faith of Islam was not about terrorism, and that Muslim Americans should be treated with respect. Whether this speech truly had an effect is beyond the scope of this blog (although hate crimes decreased after the speech), but setting the tone at the top is among the few weapons in the government’s

arsenal. Our first hope is that terrorism does not occur. But if it does, the lessons of 9/11 suggest that the potential for reactionary crime and violence is high, and we should plan accordingly.

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Impact—Turns the Aff (Civil Liberties)

Even an infinitesimal risk of our disad should outweigh the aff – all of their harms assume “potential” surveillance and ignore that another domestic terror attack would decimate the civil liberties that exist nowFriedman, 13(Thomas L. Friedman became The New York Times foreign affairs Op-Ed columnist in 1995. He joined the paper in 1981, after which he served as the Beirut bureau chief in 1982, Jerusalem bureau chief in 1984, and then in Washington as the diplomatic correspondent in 1989, and later the White House correspondent and economic correspondent. Mr. Friedman was awarded the 1983 Pulitzer Prize for international reporting (from Lebanon) and the 1988 Pulitzer Prize for international reporting (from Israel). He also won the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for commentary. Mr. Friedman is the author of “From Beirut to Jerusalem,” which won the National Book Award in 1989. He has written several other books, including “Hot, Flat and Crowded,” an international best seller. Born in Minneapolis, Mr. Friedman received a B.A. degree in Mediterranean studies from Brandeis University in 1975. In 1978 he received a master’s in modern Middle East studies from Oxford, “Blowing a Whistle”, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/opinion/friedman-blowing-a-whistle.html, June 12, 2013, ak.)I’m glad I live in a country with people who are vigilant in defending civil liberties. But as I listen to the debate about the disclosure of two government

programs designed to track suspected phone and e-mail contacts of terrorists, I do wonder if some of those who unequivocally defend this

disclosure are behaving as if 9/11 never happened — that the only thing we have to fear is government intrusion in our lives, not the intrusion of those who gather in secret cells in Yemen,

Afghanistan and Pakistan and plot how to topple our tallest buildings or bring down U.S. airliners with bombs planted inside underwear, tennis shoes or computer printers. Yes, I worry about potential

government abuse of privacy from a program designed to prevent another 9/11 — abuse that, so far, does not appear to have happened. But I worry even more about another 9/11 . That is, I worry

about something that’s already happened once — that was staggeringly costly — and that terrorists aspire to repeat. I worry about that even more, not because I don’t care about civil liberties, but

because what I cherish most about America is our open society, and I believe that if there is one more 9/11 — or worse, an attack involving nuclear material — it could lead to the end of

the open society as we know it . If there were another 9/11, I fear that 99 percent of Americans

would tell their members of Congress: “Do whatever you need to do to, privacy be damned , just

make sure this does not happen again .” That is what I fear most. That is why I’ll reluctantly, very reluctantly,

trade off the government using data mining to look for suspicious patterns in phone numbers called and e-mail addresses — and then have to go to a judge to get a warrant to actually look at the content under guidelines set by Congress — to prevent a day where, out of fear, we give government a license to look at anyone, any e-

mail, any phone call, anywhere, anytime. What we don't need is to give up our freedoms just to address levels of paranoia that are, frankly, infantile. So I don’t believe that Edward Snowden, the leaker of all this secret material, is some heroic whistle-blower. No, I believe Snowden is someone who needed a whistle-blower. He needed someone to challenge him with the argument that we don’t live in a world any longer where our government can protect its citizens from real, not imagined, threats without using big data — where we still

have an edge — under constant judicial review. It’s not ideal. But if one more 9/11 - scale attack gets through, the cost to civil liberties will be so much greater. A hat tip to Andrew Sullivan for linking on his blog to an essay by David Simon, the

creator of HBO’s “The Wire.” For me, it cuts right to the core of the issue. “You would think that the government was listening in to the secrets of 200 million Americans from the reaction and the hyperbole being tossed about,” wrote Simon. “And you would think that rather than a legal court order, which is an inevitable

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consequence of legislation that we drafted and passed, something illegal had been discovered to the

government’s shame. Nope. ... The only thing new here , from a legal standpoint, is the scale on which the F.B.I. and N.S.A. are apparently attempting to cull anti-terrorism leads from that data. ... I know it’s big and scary that the government wants a database of all phone calls.

And it’s scary that they’re paying attention to the Internet. And it’s scary that your cellphones have GPS installed. ... The question is not should the resulting data exist. It does. ... The question is more fundamental: Is government accessing the data for the legitimate public safety needs of the society , or are they accessing it in ways that abuse individual liberties

and violate personal privacy — and in a manner that is unsupervised. And to that, The Guardian and those who are wailing jeremiads about this pretend-discovery of U.S. big data collection are noticeably silent . We

don’t know of any actual abuse .” We do need to be constantly on guard for abuses. But the fact is, added Simon, that for at least

the last two presidencies “this kind of data collection has been a baseline logic of an American anti-terrorism effort that is effectively asked to find the needles before they are planted into haystacks, to prevent even such modest, grass-rooted conspiracies as the Boston Marathon bombing before they occur.” To be sure, secret programs, like the virtually unregulated drone attacks, can lead to real excesses

that have to be checked. But here is what is also real, Simon concluded: “Those planes really did hit those buildings. And that bomb did indeed blow up at the finish line of the Boston Marathon. And we really are in a continuing , low-intensity, high-risk conflict with a diffuse, committed and ideologically motivated enemy. And, for a moment, just imagine how much bloviating would be wafting across our political spectrum if , in the wake of an incident of domestic terrorism , an American president and his administration

had failed to take full advantage of the existing telephonic data to do what is possible to find those needles in the haystacks.” And, I’d add, not just bloviating. Imagine how many real restrictions to our beautiful open society we would tolerate if there were another attack on the scale of 9/11 . Pardon me if I blow that whistle.

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Impact—Turns the Aff (Rollback)

With each new attack, more invasive security measures are created. Disad turns the case. Balko 14 – Radley Balko, senior writer and investigative reporter at the Huffington Post, graduate of Indiana University, and policy analyst at the Cato Institute, 2014 ( “Was the police response to the Boston bombing really appropriate?,” Washington Post, April 22 nd , Available Online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/04/22/the-police- response-to-the-boston-marathon-bombing/ , Accessed June 17 th 2015, J.L.) The economist and historian Robert Higgs has written prolifically over the years about what he calls the “ratchet effect .” In times of crisis , governments tend to expand , usually at the expense of civil liberties . When the crisis abates, government power does, too, but never completely back to where it was before. With each subsequent crisis, government encroaches a bit more. Higgs has documented the effect through major wars, depressions and other national emergencies. But t he effect may be particularly pronounced and dangerous with respect to the war on terror, because as crises go, terrorism can never completely be defeated. We’re now more than a year out from the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 . The studies, reviews, and after-action reports have been written. Politicians and other public officials have held hearings, cast blame and pontificated on the lessons they have learned. There have been calls for more monitoring of foreign travelers; better information-sharing among federal, state and local government police agencies; and the inevitable demands for more security, more surveillance and generally more government power to prevent similar attacks in the future. We instinctively put our faith in government to protect us in times of crisis, even when those crises are the result of the government’s failure to protect us. We regret it

later. Shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Gallup polling found that 47 percent of the public was willing to sacrifice its civil liberties for security. Within two years, that figure was down to 33 percent, and by 2012, it was at 25 percent. Those figures show why it’s dangerous to pass new policies when the public is fearful and emotional, and why politicians are particularly eager to do exactly that. (See the Patriot Act.) The danger here is that the Boston response tightens the ratchet and becomes the default response to similar crises in the future . For example, we’ve already seen other examples of wanton, indiscriminate gunfire from cops during manhunts for fugitives suspected of killing cops,

Plan rollback – interest groups favored by changes preserve the status quo. Bainbridge 13 – Stephen Bainbridge, Joseph Flom Visiting Professor of Law and Business at Harvard law School and author of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 2013 (“The Global Ware on Terror & the Ratchet Effect,” Stephen Bainbridge's Journal of Law, Politics, and Culture, May 27th, Available online at http://www.professorbainbridge.c om/professorbainbridgecom/2013/05/the-global-ware-on-terror-and-the-ratchet-effect.html, accessed 6/19/15, J.L.)Robert Higgs demonstrated that wars and other major crises typically trigger a dramatic growth in the size of government, accompanied by higher taxes, greater regulation, and loss

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of civil liberties. Once the crisis ends, government may shrink somewhat in size and power, but rarely back to pre-crisis levels. Just as a ratchet wrench works only in one direction, the size and scope of government tends to move in only one direction—upwards — because the interest groups that favored the changes now have an incentive to preserve the new status quo , as do the bureaucrats who gained new powers and prestige. Hence, each crisis has the effect of ratcheting up the long-term size and scope of government. There's a slew of domestic restrictions on our liberties that came into place after 9/11. The TSA's security theater apparatus at airports

is just the most noticeable. As Jonathan Turley has noted: For civil libertarians, the legacy of bin Laden is most troubling because it shows how the greatest injuries from terror are often self-inflicted. Bin

Laden's twisted notion of success was not the bringing down of two buildings in New York or the partial destruction of the Pentagon.

It was how the response to those attacks by the United States resulted in our abandonment of core principles and values in the "war on terror." Many of the most lasting impacts of this ill- defined war were felt domesticall y, not internationally. Starting with George W. Bush, the 9/11 attacks were used to justify the creation of a massive counterterrorism system with growing personnel and budgets designed to find terrorists in the heartland. Laws were rewritten to prevent citizens from challenging searches and expanding surveillance of citizens. Leaders from both parties acquiesced as the Bush administration launched programs of warrantless surveillance, sweeping arrests of Muslim citizens and the creation of a torture program. What has been most chilling is that the elimination of Saddam and now bin Laden has little impact on this system, which seems to continue like a perpetual motion machine of surveillance and searches.

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Impacts—BioTerrorExtinction

Bioterror attacks cause extinctionMhyrvold ‘13 Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD, Princeton “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action,” Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2 – 2013As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the worst attack one can imagine, for several reasons. First, most of the classic bioweapons are based on 1960s and 1970s technology because the 1972 treaty halted bioweapons development efforts in the United States and most other Western countries. Second, the Russians, although solidly committed to biological weapons long after the treaty deadline, were never on the cutting edge of biological research. Third and most important,

the science and technology of molecular biology have made enormous advances, utterly transforming the field in the last few decades. High school biology students routinely perform molecular-biology manipulations that would have been impossible even for the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of biological-weapons research. The biowarfare methods of the 1960s and 1970s are now as antiquated as the lumbering mainframe computers of that era.

Tomorrow’s terrorists will have vastly more deadly bugs to choose from . Consider this sobering development: in 2001, Australian researchers working on mousepox, a nonlethal virus that infects mice (as chickenpox does in humans), accidentally discovered that a simple genetic modification transformed the virus.10, 11 Instead of producing mild symptoms, the new virus killed 60% of even those mice already immune to the naturally occurring strains of mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected by any existing vaccine or antiviral drug. A team of researchers at Saint Louis University led by Mark Buller picked up on that work and,

by late 2003, found a way to improve on it: Buller’s variation on mousepox was 100% lethal, although his team of investigators also

devised combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were partially effective in protecting animals from the engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is that the genetically altered virus is no longer contagious. Of course, it is quite possible that future tinkering with the virus will change that property, too. Strong reasons exist to believe that the genetic modifications Buller made to mousepox would work for other poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses as well.

Might the same techniques allow chickenpox or another poxvirus that infects humans to be turned into a 100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is resistant to any known antiviral therapy? I’ve asked this question of experts many times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation couldn’t be done. This case is just one example. Many more are pouring out of scientific journals and conferences every year. Just last year, the journal Nature published a controversial study done at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in which virologists enumerated the changes one would need to make to a highly lethal strain of

bird flu to make it easily transmitted from one mammal to another.14 Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential threats. Nor is it clear that anyone is even trying. In addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other parameters can be played with, given that the infectious power of an epidemic depends on many properties, including the length of the latency period during which a person is contagious but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each new case to spread to more people and thus makes the virus harder to stop. This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by HIV , which is very difficult to transmit compared with smallpox and many other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The balancing factor is that HIV can take years to progress to AIDS , which can then take many more years to kill the victim. What makes HIV so dangerous is that infected people have lots of opportunities to infect others. This property has

allowed HIV to claim more than 30 million lives so far, and approximately 34 million people are now living with this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15 A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or months—and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV . It

could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly . This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens

that could drive the human race to extinction . Indeed, a detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to

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extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to

come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race — or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.

ExtinctionMakhan Saikia 14, researcher at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Mumbai, was an Assistant Professor at the Symbiosis School of Economics, Challenges of Globalization, Journal of Politics & Governance, Vol. 3, No. 1

The unique feature of invisibility of the biological weapons make them the worst predators.

Their ability to disseminate fear and cause chaos amongst the victims has a much more grim effect than a bomb attack. By impinging on the Governing bodies from the roots and snatching away every viable option to control them from the authorities, has made this type of terrorist attack the best innovation brought out of

the evil side of the humanity. In order to fight back the horrifying potential of a biological weapon global

preparedness and individual response capabilities are the only viable option that come our way at this point of

time. This transition of the anti-humane weapons from concrete metal objects to undetectable micro-organisms has quite

detrimental effects which need to be dealt [with] effectively and intelligently in order to save life on

this Earth .

Bioterror causes extinctionMatheny 7 [Jason, research associate with the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, where his work focuses on technology forecasting and risk assessment - particularly of global catastrophic risks and existential risks.[1] He previously worked for the World Bank, the Center for Biosecurity, the Center for Global Development, and on national security projects for the US government. He is a Sommer Scholar and PhD candidate in Applied Economics at Johns Hopkins University. He holds an MPH from Johns Hopkins, an MBA from Duke University, and a BA from the University of Chicago, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” http://www.physics.harvard.edu/~wilson/pmpmta/Mahoney_extinction.pdf]Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism. The knowledge needed to engineer a virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment and materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5

Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines,

monitor biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006). There is currently no independent body assessing the risks of high-energy physics experiments. Posner

(2004) has recommended withdrawing federal support for such experiments because the benefits do not seem to be worth the risks.

Bioweapons are easily accessible by terrorists and lead to mass deathsWilson 13

(Grant, 1/17/13, University of Virginia School of Law, “MINIMIZING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC AND EXISTENTIAL RISKS FROM EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW,” professor @ University of Virginia School of Law, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/lawjournals/sites/lawjournals/files/3.%20Wilson%20-%20Emerging%20Technologies.pdf, 7/15/15, SM)

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ii. Risk of bioterrorism∂ The threat of the malicious release of bioengineered organisms (i.e.,∂ bioterrorism) poses a GCR/ER.75

Bioengineering enables a malicious∂ actor to create an organism that is more deadly to humans, animals, or∂ plants than anything that exists in the natural world.76 Experts contend∂ that the barriers for a terrorist to order a DNA sequence for a highly∂ pathogenic virus online or acquire a DNA synthesis machine online are∂

“surmountable.” 77 Alternatively, bioterrorists could break into∂ laboratories housing dangerous bioengineered organisms—like the∂ H5N1 virus, for example—and release them. Meanwhile, third world∂ countries with laxer standards and lower laboratory accountability are∂ rapidly discovering and using bioengineering, which may give∂ bioterrorists an easier pathway to obtain deadly bioengineered∂ organisms.78∂ There have already been several occasions in which groups attempted∂ to use or successfully used biological weapons. One unsophisticated∂ example of bioterrorism occurred when an individual contaminated∂

salads and dressing with salmonella in what apparently was an attempt∂ to decide a local election.79 Another example occurred in 2001, when∂ bioterrorists sent envelopes containing anthrax spores through the mail, infecting twenty-two people and killing five of them.∂ 80 While these∂ particular acts of bioterrorism did not cause

widespread death,∂ deploying extremely deadly bioengineered organisms over a large area∂ is a real possibility: tests by the United States in 1964 demonstrated that∂ a single aircraft can contaminate five thousand square kilometers of land∂ with a deadly bacterial aerosol.81∂ The recent engineering of an airborne H5N1 virus demonstrates∂ society’s concern over risks of bioterrorism arising from∂ bioengineering. Before scientists could publish their results of their∂ bioengineered airborne H5N1 virus in the widely read journals Nature∂ and Science, the NSABB determined that the danger of releasing the∂ sensitive information outweighed the benefits to society, advising that∂ the findings not be published in their entirety.82 The main risk is that∂ either a state or non-state actor could synthesize a “weaponized” version∂ of the H5N1 virus to create a disastrous pandemic.83 There is precedent∂ of outside groups recreating advanced bioengineering experiments, such∂ as when many scientists immediately synthesized hepatitis C replicons∂ upon publication of its genetic code. 84 However, the NSABB’s∂ recommendation was nonbinding, and there is nothing to stop other∂ scientists from releasing similar data in the future. Furthermore, while∂ the NSABB merely asserts that the “blueprints” of the virus should not∂ be printed, other biosecurity experts argue that the virus should never∂ have been created in the first place because of risks that the viruses∂ would escape or be stolen.85

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Impacts—Bioterror Retaliation

Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war – draws in Russia and ChinaRobert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted

that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated

entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency

of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of

nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was

fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington

would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly

Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear

Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even

limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example,

in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack , the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

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Retaliation is risky—multitude of escalation scenariosMallow 97(Brittain P., 1997, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, “Terror vs. Terror: Effects of Military Retaliation on Terrorism,” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/icaf/97-e-12.pdf)

Like terrorism, retaliation is a form of communication through violence. It can affect multiple audiences for many purposes: bolstering public opinion, destroying/disrupting terrorist infrastructure, and potentially deterring the choice of the terrorist tactic. Symmetry, proportionality, and discrimination in the targeting of retaliation all vary its effects on audiences. To deter terrorists and their supporters, retaliation must meet the

requirements of deterrence theory: credibility, shared interest, and rationality. Examples of retaliation for terrorism indicate there are significant problems with its effectiveness as a deterrent. Its viability is diminished by the transience and fragility of credibility, the moral and legal "baggage" of retaliation itself, and the differences in values and interests between terrorists/supporters and retaliating states. Retaliation also presents substantial risks beyond its failure to deter. Force protection, dangers of escalatory violence, and risks of condemnation by the world community accompany the use of retaliation. These risks, combined with its questionable viability as a deterrent, make retaliation a difficult policy choice.

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ANSWERS TO: Surveillance Hasn’t Stopped Any Attacks

Meta-data does not need to directly stop attacks – it’s indirectly allowed for prioritization.Lewis ‘14James Andrew Lewis is a senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., where he writes on technology, security, and the international economy. Before joining CSIS, he worked at the US Departments of State and Commerce as a Foreign Service officer and as a member of the Senior Executive Service. His diplomatic experience included negotiations on military basing in Asia, the Cambodia peace process, and the five-power talks on arms transfer restraint. Lewis received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. “Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate” - CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES - STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM – December - http://csis.org/publication/underestimating-risk-surveillance-debate

Assertions that a collection program contributes nothing because it has not singlehandedly prevented an attack reflect an ill-informed understanding of how the U nited S tates conducts collection and analysis to prevent harmful acts against itself and its allies. Intelligence does not work as it is portrayed in films—solitary agents do not make startling discoveries that lead to dramatic, last-minute success (nor is technology consistently infallible). Intelligence is a team sport. Perfect knowledge does not exist and success is the product of the efforts of teams of dedicated individuals from many agencies, using many tools and techniques, working together to assemble fragments of data from many sources into a coherent

picture. Analysts assemble this mosaic from many different sources and based on experience and intuition. Luck is still more

important than anyone would like and the alternative to luck is acquiring more information. This ability to blend different sources of intelligence has improved U.S. intelligence capabilities and gives us an advantage over some opponents.

Aff demand to “name one attack the program stopped” is wrong and a poor standard.Branda ‘14(et al; JOYCE R. BRANDA, Acting Assistant Attorney General, BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEES - Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama – before the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. “Amici” means “friend of the court” and – in this context - is legal reference to the Reporters Committee – October 2nd - https://www.eff.org/document/governments-smith-answering-brief)

Plaintiff asks the government to show more, claiming that the program is an unconstitutional means of serving the paramount

need of preventing terrorist attacks because the government has not “describe[d] a single instance” in which the program has “actually stopped an imminent attack” or “aided . . . in achieving any objective that was time-sensitive in nature.” Pl.

Br. 33 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d. at 40). The Constitution does not require an anti-terrorism program to have demonstrably prevented a specific terrorist attack to be reasonable. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676 n.3 (“a demonstration of danger as

to any particular airport or airline” is not required since “[i]t is sufficient that the Government have a compelling interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive societal problem from spreading”); Cassidy, 471 F.3d at 84-85; MacWade, 460 F.3d at 272. Nor is it problematic that the Section 215 program is only “one means” among many government programs that work together to accomplish the paramount goal of countering terrorism. Pl. Br. 35. To protect the Nation, the government employs a range of counter-terrorism tools and investigative methods in concert, which often serve different functions in order to complement one

another in the service of achieving the overarching goal of preventing attacks. Those tools rarely, however, operate in isolation, and

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nothing in the Fourth Amendment’s special needs jurisprudence requires a showing that any single program is essential or itself prevented a particular attack. The government has provided examples in which the Section 215 program provided timely and valuable assistance to ongoing counter-terrorism investigations. See ER 74-75.

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ANSWERS TO: Bioterror Impossible

Synthetic biology makes bioterror inevitable- creates means and motiveRose, 14 -- PhD, recognized international biodefense expert [Patrick, Center for Health & Homeland Security senior policy analyst & biosecurity expert, National Defense University lecturer, and Adam Bernier, expert in counter-terrorism, "DIY Bioterrorism Part II: The proliferation of bioterrorism through synthetic biology," CBRNePortal, 2-24-14, www.cbrneportal.com/diy-bioterrorism-part-ii-the-proliferation-of-bioterrorism-through-synthetic-biology/, accessed 8-16-14]In Part I of this series, we examined how the advancement of synthetic biology has made bio-engineering accessible to the mainstream biological community . Non-state actors who wish to employ biological agents for ill intent are sure to be aware of how tangible bio-weapons are becoming as applications of synthetic biology become more affordable and the probability of success increases with each scientific breakthrough. The willingness of non-state actors to engage in biological attacks is not a new concept; however, the past biological threat environment has been subdued compared to that of conventional or even chemical terrorism. The frequency and deadliness of biological attacks has, thankfully, been limited; much of which can be

attributed to the technical complexity or apparent ineptitude of the perpetrators developing biological weapons. Despite the infrequency and

ineffectiveness of biological attacks in the last four decades, the threat may be changing with the continued advancement of synthetic biology applications. Coupled with the ease of info rmation

sharing and a rapidly growing do-it - yourself-biology (DIYbio) movement (discussed in Part I), the chances of not only , more attacks , but potentially more deadly ones will inevitably increase . ¶

During the last half century terrorist organizations have consistently had an interest in using biological weapons as a means of attacking their targets, but only few have actually made a weapon and used it. The attraction is that terrorist activities with biological weapons are difficult to detect and even more difficult to attribute without a specific perpetrator claiming responsibility. Since 1971 there have been more than 113,113 terrorist attacks globally and 33 of them have been biological. The majority of bio-terrorism incidents recorded occurred during the year 2001 (17 of the 33); before 2001 there were 10 incidents and since 2001 there were 6 (not counting the most recent Ricin attacks). The lack of a discernable trend in use of bio-terrorism does not negate the clear intent of extremist organizations to use biological weapons. In fact, the capacity to

harness biological weapons more effectively today only increases the risk that they will successfully be employed.¶ The landscape is

changing : previously the instances where biological attacks had the potential to do the most harm (e.g., Rajneeshees cult’s Salmonella attacks in

1984, Aum Shinri Kyo’s Botulinum toxin, and Anthrax attacks in the early 90’s) included non-state actors with access to large amounts of funding and

scientists. Funding and a cadre of willing scientists does not guarantee success though. The assertion was thus made that biological

weapons are not only expensive, they require advanced technical training to make and are even

more difficult to effectively perpetrate acts of terrorism with. While it is difficult to determine with certainty whether the expense and expertise needed to create biological weapons has acted as a major deterrent for groups thinking of obtaining them, many experts would argue that the cost/expertise barrier makes the threat from biological attacks extremely small. This assertion is supported by the evidence that the vast

majority of attacks have taken place in Western countries and was performed by Western citizens with advanced training in scientific research.¶ In the past decade the cost/expertise assertion has become less accurate. Despite the lack of biological attacks,

there are a number of very dangerous and motivated organizations that have or are actively pursuing biological weapons. The largest and most outspoken organization has been the global Al Qaeda network, whose leaders have

frequently and passionately called for the development (or purchase) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The principal message from Al Qaeda Central and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has included the call to use biological WMDs to terrorize Western nations. Al Qaeda has had a particular focus on biological and nuclear weapons because of their potential for greatest harm. Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Anwar al-Awlaki have all called for attacks using biological weapons, going so far as to say that Muslims everywhere should seek to kill Westerners wherever possible and that obtaining WMDs is the responsibility of all Muslims. Before the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had spent significant funds on building a bio-laboratory and had begun collecting scientists from around the world; however, the Afghanistan invasion and subsequent global War on Terrorism is thought to have disrupted their capabilities and killed or captured many of their

assets. Despite the physical setbacks, this disruption does not appear to have changed the aggressive attitude towards obtaining WMDs (e.g., more recently U.S. Intelligence has been concerned about AQAP attempting to make Ricin).¶ The emergence of synthetic biology and DIYbio has increased the likelihood that Al Qaeda will succeed in developing biological WMDs. The low cost and

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significantly reduced level of necessary expertise may change how many non-state actors

view bio logical weapons as a worthwhile investment. This is not to say that suddenly anyone can make a weapon or that it is easy. To the contrary making an effective biological weapon will still be difficult, only much easier and cheaper than it has been in the past.¶ The rapid

advancements of synthetic bio logy could be a game changer , giving organizations currently pursuing biological weapons more options, and encouraging other organizations to reconsider their worth. Because the bar for attaining bio logical weapons has been lowered and is likely to

continue to be lowered as more advances in biological technology are made, it is important that the international community begin to

formulate policy that protects advances in science that acts to prevent the intentional misuse of synthetic biology. Disregard for this consideration will be costly. A successful attack with a potent biological weapon, where no pharmaceutical interventions might exist, will be deadly and the impact of such an attack will reverberate around the globe because biological weapons are not bound by international borders.

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ANSWERS TO: Bioterror Unlikely

Al-Qaeda is gearing up for bioterror attacks – disrupting groups keyObwale 12 [David, Clinical and Experimental Medicine graduate, University College London Clinical and Experimental Medicine graduate, 8/5/12, The Observer, “Ebola a potential bio-terror weapon,” http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20215:ebola-a-potential-bio-terror-weapon&catid=37:guest-writers&Itemid=66, accessed 9/3/12, JTF]Ebola has capabilities of biological weaponization with catastrophic consequences, especially due to the fact that it lacks adequate and effective vaccines and therapeutics that would counter any prospective mass attacks. Its zoonotic origin, distribution route and exposure in the tropical climatic conditions conceal its incubation and concurrence in these

belligerent conditions.¶ Also, Ebola, being highly contagious, presents an adaptability factor likely to be exploited by biological terrorists willing to be infected by these bio-hazardous agents. The terrorists would then have to deliberately transport themselves into their targeted areas during the incubation period in order to initiate person-to-person transmission , either by secretion contact

or airborne dissemination.¶ The relatively low production cost, that only entails human contact and enormous availability of

willing volunteers, which already exists amongst Al Qaeda radicals, poses a threat of unprecedented scale . Al Qaeda and its extremist networks have already carried out numerous terrorist attacks around the globe. Needless to say,

arming themselves with Ebola, as a highly effective weapon, would lend them the capacity to unleash a high-impact attack causing mass civilian casualties.¶ Proliferation of the Ebola virus for bioterrorism may also arise from the way biological specimens are stored, which is unique to agents of viral hemorrhagic fevers. Most virological laboratories are not specialized and equipped adequately for rapid diagnosis and appropriate examination of the Ebola samples. The storage of Ebola virus samples requires maximum security in the specimen laboratories.¶ This has resulted into the monopoly by some reference laboratories dealing with scientific repositories’ management. This raises the issues of sharing specimens and the illicit use of these infectious agents which can stream into the possible risk of bioterrorism during diagnostic research and procedures.

Bioterror is coming now---wide range of motivational factors and new technical capabilities ensure CBRN useAsal et al. 12—Professor in the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy at the University at Albany–SUNY—AND Gary Ackerman, Member of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland—AND R. Karl Rethemeyer, Professor in the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy at the University at Albany–SUNY (Victor, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 35, Issue 3, Taylor & Francis)

The State of the Literature A recent survey of over 120 books , journal articles, monographs, and government reports dealing with CBRN terrorism10 revealed that there are a disproportionate number of studies and publications dealing with the potential for terrorists to attain a CBRN weapons capability and the response to the consequences of a CBRN attack, as opposed to the terrorists’ motivations for using CBRN weapons. Within that portion of the literature that does delve into aspects of intentionality, the closest thing to a consensus among scholars is the following set of assertions: 1. There is a wide variety of motivational incentives that might make the acquisition and/or use of CBRN weapons attractive to terrorists. These range from (a) ideological or psychological imperatives, such as an apocalyptic worldview or a fetishistic relationship toward technology, to (b) operational or instrumental objectives, such as the ability to inflict mass casualties or contaminate large areas, to perhaps most importantly, (c) the singularly tremendous psychological effects exerted on targeted societies by CBRN agents. There are also a host of corresponding disincentives to using

these weapons,11 including possible alienation of supporters and the lack of certainty in the scope of consequences relative to conventional weapons such as high explosives. 2. Many terrorist organizations have considered CBRN use. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that a multiplicity of terrorist organizations and individuals representing different backgrounds and espousing different ideologies have either considered using CBRN weapons or have attempted to acquire a CBRN weapons capability. This includes, among others, terrorist organizations and individuals motivated by ethno-nationalist, Marxist, right-wing, animal rights, and religious

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causes. 3. Technical and knowledge-sharing innovations are making it easier for terrorist entities to achieve a CBRN capability, which could facilitate the decision to pursue these weapons. The prospects for acquiring a CBRN capability are increasing, both as a result of technological advances and the diffusion of knowledge. The Internet, access to technical schools and

universities, and the spread of “dualuse” technologies into many countries are major contributors.12 These dynamics facilitate terrorists’ awareness of CBRN weapons and provide new opportunities to acquire them, which might shift their weapons selection calculus toward CBRN.

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ANSWERS TO: No Impact to Bioterror

Bioterror spreads – defense failsMetcalfe 13 (John Metcalfe, Staff Writer for Atlantic Cities, 7/24/2013, "Cities Might Not Be as Prepared as They Think for a Bioterrorism Attack", www.defenseone.com/threats/2013/07/cities-might-not-be-prepared-they-think-bioterrorism-attack/67352/)Imagine that a small group of terrorists deliberately infect themselves with smallpox and then walk around London,

spreading it to the populace. How much could the terrible disease proliferate before the world realized something was amiss? This

unsettling question is at the heart of new computer model showing how a bioterrorism attack in one city could quickly become the world's problem. Scientists started off with the hypothetical release of smallpox in London, New York, Paris and other major cities, then simulated how travelers would carry the virus to a host of other countries. Their conclusion: In the best-case scenario, smallpox could spread to two to four nations before doctors managed to diagnose it. Still ahead would lie the monumental task of quarantining the infected, distributing vaccines and tracing the source of the outbreak. Previous research into bioterrorism have indicated that Western cities, with their protocols and vaccines, are pretty well prepared to handle a biological attack, says Alessandro Vespignani, a computer and health-sciences professor at Boston's Northeastern University.

But in a paper in this month's Scientific Reports (don't worry, it was vetted for international-security issues), he and his fellow researchers argue that the assumption of local readiness is missing the big picture. "The problem is that most of those studies don't consider the global dimensions of the event ," Vespignani says. " Before

you even realize there is an outbreak, it might already be in other places. That changes the game." One major danger: From London, the smallpox might spread to countries that don't have the health infrastructure of the Western world. In these places it could become potent pandemics that might wash over into still more

nations. And that's not only possible for attacks in cities near the less-developed corners of the world. No matter what metropolis a bioterrorist targets for harm, the dispersion of disease unfolds more or less the same way , at least according to the computer model. Vespignani says there are two big things that people should take away from these findings. The first is that

governments and international health organizations, whether it be WHO, the CDC or whoever, need to develop contingency plans for a pandemic that originates from afar. "They need to think about sharing resources," he says. The second is that wanna-be terrorists

playing with pathogenic agents ought to consider that a biological attack is a double-edged sword. "They think they're going to affect only the area that they target. But quickly and easily, it will spread all over the world ," perhaps

even right back to their own motherland. "Using these kinds of weapons, there is no winner, for sure."

Air travel means their quarantine defense doesn’t applyOCC ’10 [Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, August 5, 2010, Global Security, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2010/c-rprt-terrorism_2009-04.htm, accessed 10/2/12, JTF]Bioterrorism, another deadly threat, is the deliberate dispersal of pathogens through food, air, water, or living organisms to cause disease. The 2009 Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism concluded that it is more likely that terrorists would be able to acquire and

use biological agents than nuclear weapons due to the difficulty in controlling the proliferation of biotechnologies and biological agent information. If properly produced and released, biological agents can kill on a massive scale and, if terrorists use a pathogen that can be transmitted from person to person, the disease could quickly spread through commercial air travel across oceans and continents before authorities realize their nations have been attacked.

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Terrorism DA Affirmative Answers

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Aff—Arab American Turn

mass surveillance kills law enforcement coop with US-Arab Americans – that’s key to check terror.Risen ‘14(Internally quoting Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow on foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Tom Risen is a reporter for U.S. News & World Report. “Racial Profiling Reported in NSA, FBI Surveillance” - U.S. News & World Report - July 9, 2014 - http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/09/racial-profiling-reported-in-nsa-fbi-surveillance)The National S ecurity Agency and the FBI have reportedly been overzealous trying to prevent terrorist attacks to the point that anti-Islamic racism in those agencies led to the surveillance of prominent Muslim-Americans, revealing a culture of racial profiling and broad latitude for spying on U.S. citizens. An NSA document leaked by former agency contractor Edward Snowden to reporter Glenn Greenwald shows 202 Americans targeted among the approximately 7,485 email addresses monitored between 2002 and 2008, Greenwald’s news service The Intercept reports. To monitor Americans, government agencies must first make the case to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that there is probable cause that the targets are terrorist agents, foreign spies or “are or may be” abetting sabotage, espionage or terrorism. Despite this filter The Intercept identified five Muslim-Americans with high public profile including civil rights leaders, academics, lawyers and a political candidate. Racial profiling of Muslims by security officers has been a controversy since the terrorist attacks of 2001 spiked fears about al-Qaida trainees preparing more attacks. The New York Police Department has disbanded its unit that mapped New York’s Muslim communities that designated surveillance of mosques as “terrorism enterprise investigations” after pressure from the Justice Department about aggressive monitoring by police. A 2005 FBI memo about surveillance procedures featured in The Intercept story uses a fake name “Mohammed Raghead” for the agency staff exercise. This latest report about email surveillance of successful Muslim-Americans is akin to “McCarthyism” that fed paranoia about communist spies during the Cold War, says Reza Aslan, a professor at

the University of California, Riverside. “The notion that these five upstanding American citizens, all of them prominent public

individuals, represent a threat to the U.S. for no other reason than their religion is an embarrassment to the FBI and an affront to the constitution,” Aslan says. There is a risk of radicalization among

citizens Americans, evidenced by some who have gone to fight jihads in Syria and Somalia, but mass shootings carried out by U.S. citizens of

various racial backgrounds occurs much more often, says Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow on foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Since 1982, there have been at least 70 mass shootings across the U.S. “We have seen very little domestic terrorism in the U.S.,” Felbab-Brown says. This lack of terrorism is due in part to the

willingness of the Islamic community to cooperate with law enforcement to identify possible

radical threats , out of gratitude that the U.S. is a stable, secure country compared with the Middle East, she says. “ That could go

sour if law enforcement becomes too aggressive, too extreme ,” she says.

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Aff—Surveillance Fails/No Link

Current surveillance techniques are unsuccessful – ISIS is beginning to evade themDale 14 (Helle Dale, a senior fellow in public diplomacy focusing on US outreach to foreign countries, published on the Daily Signal, “ISIS Is Getting Smarter About Avoiding U.S. Surveillance,” http://dailysignal.com/2014/11/21/isis-getting-smarter-avoiding-u-

s-surveillance/, November 21st, 2014) aj

Social media can be a double-edged sword for terrorists groups such as ISIS, a fact that its leadership appears to be aware of. According to recent reports, the group’s top cadre has

curtailed electronic communications, hoping to shrink its footprint and exposure to western

intelligence agencies. A terrorist group of the 21st century, ISIS is adept at the use of social media, producing “cruelly effective” propaganda, as retired Marine Corps Gen. John Allen has put it. Yet, that same propaganda also has provided a wealth of information for the U.S. and other governments. As reported by The Daily Beast’s Shane Harris, who cited U.S. intelligence sources, ISIS is changing its “communications strategy.” It is encrypting its electronic communications, limiting its online presence and using services that delete messages as soon as they are sent. Its top cadre uses couriers rather than electronic devices to deliver orders, making them elusive in the U.S.-led surveillance campaign. As human intelligence is hardly available on the ground, especially in Syria, and the number of unmanned drones is limited, cyber surveillance has been a key tool in the fight against ISIS. Yet, although ISIS leadership may be wise to its cyber vulnerabilities, its followers are not as easy to control in the electronic sphere. The group disseminates its grisly propaganda on social media, and its thousands of followers and recruits continue to post pictures and information on their social media accounts. According to reports by communications expert James Farwell published by the London-based Institute for International Strategic Studies, “advances in technology may eventually leave the group vulnerable to cyber attacks, similar to those reportedly urged by U.S. intelligence sources to intercept and seize funds controlled by Mexican drug cartels.”

Communications strategy must be a critical component in combatting this latest form of violent Islamism, which itself uses propaganda so effectively to magnify its own image of invulnerability. Most effectively, writes Farwell, would be a message that shows the opposite, that the United States and its allies are powerful and determined to win. (Though unfortunately that has hardly been forthcoming yet.) Communications strategy is currently in the hands of Rick Stengel, undersecretary of state for public diplomacy. Stengel recently attended a meeting with Arab nations in Kuwait to discuss precisely this issue and encourage their participation in the communications battle. It is clear though, as Farwell writes, that information warfare should be seamless with military tactics, allowing Gen. Allen to coordinate the resources of the whole of the U.S. government. Strategic communication is as important today as at any time during the Iraq and Afghan wars.

No link – targeted warrants, which plan allows, solve the terror disad just as well.Wyden ‘14(et al; This amicus brief issued by three US Senators - Ron Wyden, Mark Udall and Martin Heinrich. Wyden and Udall sat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and had access to the meta-data program. “BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE SENATOR RON WYDEN, SENATOR MARK UDALL, AND SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, URGING REVERSAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT” – Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama – before the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals - Appeal from the United States District Court District of Idaho The Honorable B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding Case No. 2:13-cv-00257-BLW – Sept 9th, 2014 – This Amicus Brief was

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prepared by CHARLES S. SIMS from the law firm PROSKAUER ROSE LLP. Amici” means “friend of the court” and – in this context - is legal reference to Wyden, Udall, etc. This pdf can be obtained at: https://www.eff.org/document/wyden-udall-heinrich-smith-amicus)As members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, amici Senators Wyden and Udall have for

years participated in the oversight of government surveillance conducted under the Patriot Act that they knew would astonish most Americans. They sought to warn the public about those activities as best they could without disclosing classified information. They also co-sponsored an amendment to the Patriot Act’s reauthorization that sought to address the problem of government officials “secretly reinterpret[ing] public laws and statutes” and “describ[ing] the execution of these laws in a way that misinforms or misleads the public.” See 157 Cong. Rec. S3360 (daily ed. May 25, 2011) (introducing SA 384 to S. 990, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011)); see also 157 Cong. Rec. S3386 (daily ed. May 26, 2011) (statement of Sen. Wyden) (“The fact is anyone can read the plain text of the PATRIOT Act. Yet many Members of Congress have no idea how the law is being secretly interpreted by the executive branch.”); 157 Cong. Rec. S3258 (daily ed. May 24, 2011) (statement of Sen. Udall) (“Congress is granting powers to the executive branch that lead to abuse, and, frankly, shield the executive branch from accountability”). Now that the government’s

bulk call-records program has been documented and exposed, the executive branch has retreated from frequently repeated

claims about its necessity and expressed an intent to end government bulk collection under section 215. Press Release, FACT SHEET: The Administration’s Proposal for Ending the Section 215 Bulk Telephony Metadata Program (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/27/fact-sheet-administration-s-proposal-ending-section-215-bulk-telephony-m (“White House Press Release”). While Senators Udall, Heinrich and Wyden broadly support a policy aimed at ending the government’s indiscriminate collection of telephony metadata, they share a concern that there is no plan to suspend the bulk collection of Americans’ phone records in the absence of new legislation, which is not necessarily imminent. Meanwhile, the government continues to defend its bulk call-record collection program vigorously against statutory and constitutional challenges in the

courts. Amici submit this brief to respond to the government’s argument that its collection of bulk call records is necessary to defend the nation against terrorist attacks. Amici make one central point: as members of the committee charged with overseeing the National Security Agency’s surveillance, amici have reviewed this

surveillance extensively and have seen no evidence that the bulk collection of Americans’ phone records has

provided any intelligence of value that could not have been gathered through means that

caused far less harm to the privacy interests of millions of Americans. The government has at its disposal a number of

authorities that allow it to obtain the call records of suspected terrorists and those in contact with suspected terrorists. It appears to amici that these

more targeted authorities could have been used to obtain the information that the government has publicly claimed was crucial in a few important counterterrorism cases.

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Aff—No Impact to Bioterror

Bioterror risk is low and wouldn’t kill many people anyway. Keller 13 (Rebecca, 7 March 2013, Analyst at Stratfor, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently

being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits . Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal . The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long

held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low . Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe

constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors . Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion . Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also

cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact .

Terrorist can’t obtain and correctly deploy bioweaponsOuagrham-Gormley 14Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is Assistant Professor of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. She worked for a decade at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. She was for two years research director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies office in Kazakhstan and was founding editor of the International Export Control Observer, Cornell University Press, November 2014, “Barriers to Bioweapons”, http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100857780In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this

perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult , protracted , and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment . Her findings

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are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs. Bioweapons

development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a

bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational , managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production.

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Aff—Non-Unique: No Terror Threat

Terrorism isn’t an existential threat – Obama confirms, intelligence hasn’t found any terrorists Mueller and Stewart 15 (John Mueller and Mark Stewart, professor of political science at Ohio State University and engineer and risk analyst at the University of Newcastle in Australia, 2-24-2015, "Terrorism poses no existential threat to America. We must stop pretending otherwise," Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/24/terrorism-poses-no-existential-threat-to-america)//MJ

One of the most unchallenged, zany assertions during the war on terror has been that terrorists present an existential threat to the United States, the modern state and civilization itself. This is important because the overwrought expression, if accepted as valid, could close off evaluation of security efforts. For example, no defense of civil liberties is likely to be terribly effective if people believe the threat from terrorism to be existential. At long last, President Barack Obama and other top officials are beginning to back away from this absurd position. This much overdue development may not last, however. Extravagant alarmism about the pathological but self-destructive Islamic State (Isis) in areas of Syria and Iraq may cause us to backslide. The notion that international terrorism presents an existential threat was spawned by the traumatized in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Rudy Giuliani, mayor of New York at the time, recalls that all “security experts” expected “dozens and dozens and multiyears of attacks like this” and, in her book The Dark Side, Jane Mayer observed that “the only certainty shared by virtually the entire American intelligence community” was that “a second wave of even more devastating terrorist attacks on America was imminent”. Duly terrified, US intelligence services were soon imaginatively calculating the number of trained al-Qaida operatives in the United States to be between 2,000 and 5,000. Also compelling was the extrapolation that, because the 9/11 terrorists were successful with box-cutters, they might well be able to turn out nuclear weapons. Soon it was being authoritatively proclaimed that atomic terrorists could “destroy civilization as we know it” and that it was likely that a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States would transpire by 2014. No atomic terrorists have yet appeared (al-Qaida’s entire budget in 2001 for research on all weapons of mass destruction totaled less than $4,000), and intelligence has been far better at counting al-Qaida operatives in the country than at finding them. But the notion that terrorism presents an existential threat has played on. By 2008, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff declared it to be a “significant existential” one - carefully differentiating it, apparently, from all those insignificant existential threats Americans have faced in the past. The bizarre formulation survived into the Obama years. In October 2009, Bruce Riedel, an advisor to the new administration, publicly maintained the al-Qaida threat to the country to be existential. In 2014, however, things began to change. In a speech at Harvard in October, Vice President Joseph Biden offered the thought that “we face no existential threat – none – to our way of life or our ultimate security.” After a decent interval of three months, President Barack Obama reiterated this point at a press conference, and then expanded in an interview a few weeks later, adding that the US should not “provide a victory to these terrorist networks by over-inflating their importance and suggesting in some fashion that they are an existential threat to the United States or the world order.” Later, his national security advisor, Susan Rice, echoed the point in a formal speech. It is astounding that these utterances – “blindingly obvious” as security specialist Bruce Schneier puts it – appear to mark the first time any officials in the United States have had the notion and the courage to say so in public. Whether that development, at once remarkable and absurdly belated, will have some consequence, or even continue, remains to be seen. Senators John McCain and Lindsay Graham have insisted for months that Isis presents an existential threat to the United States. An alarmed David Brooks reported that financial analysts have convinced themselves that the group has the potential to generate a worldwide “economic cataclysm.” And General Michael Flynn, recently retired as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has been insisting that the terrorist enemy is “committed to the destruction of freedom and the American way of life” while seeking “world domination, achieved through violence and bloodshed.” It was reported that his remarks provoked nods of approval, cheers and “ultimately a standing ovation” from the audience. Thus even the most modest imaginable effort to rein in the war on terror hyperbole may fail to gel.

Terrorist threats overblown – terrorists only have regional interests Norton-Taylor 14 (Richard, writer for The Guardian on defense and security and former security editor, “Islamist terror threat to west blown out of proportion – former M16 chief,” The Gaurdian, 7-7-14, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jul/07/islamist-terror-threat-out-proportion-former-mi6-chief-richard-dearlove)//MJ

The government and media have blown the Islamist terrorism threat out of proportion, giving extremists publicity that is counter-productive, a former head of Britain's intelligence service has said. Sir Richard Dearlove, chief of MI6 at the time of the Iraq invasion, said that Britons spreading "blood-curdling" messages on the internet should be ignored. He told an audience in London on Monday there had been a fundamental change in the nature of Islamist extremism since the Arab spring. It had created a major political problem in the Middle East but the west, including Britain, was only "marginally affected". Unlike the threat posed by al-Qaida before and in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 13 years ago, the west was not the main target of the radical

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fundamentalism that created Isis, (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), Dearlove said. Addressing the Royal United Services Institute, the London-based security and defence thinktank, he said the conflict was "essentially one of Muslim on Muslim". He made it clear he believed the way the British government and the media were giving the extremists the "oxygen of publicity" was counter-productive. The media were making monsters of "misguided young men, rather pathetic figures" who were getting coverage "more than their wildest dreams", said Dearlove, adding: "It is surely better to ignore them." The former MI6 chief, now master of Pembroke College, Cambridge University, was speaking to a prepared text hours after the ITV programme Good Morning Britain broadcast an interview with a Briton who had appeared in an Isis video saying he was recruited through the internet and was prepared to die for his cause. Abdul Raqib Amin, who was brought up in Aberdeen, appeared in an online video last month with two men from Cardiff urging western Muslims to join the fighting with Isis. He told Good Morning Britain: "I left the UK to fight for the sake of Allah, to give everything I have for the sake of Allah. One of the happiest moments in my life was when the plane took off from Gatwick airport. I was so happy, as a Muslim you cannot live in the country of kuffars [non-believers]."Amin added: "I left the house with the intention not to go back, I'm going to stay and fight until the khilafah [rule of Islam] is established or I

die." Dearlove said he was concerned about the influence of the media on the government's security policy. It was time to take what he called a "more proportionate approach to terrorism". MI5, MI6, and GCHQ devoted a greater share of their resources to countering Islamist fundamentalism than they did to the Soviet Union during the cold war, or to Irish terrorism that had cost the lives of more UK citizens and British soldiers than al-Qaida had done, Dearlove noted. A massive reaction after the 9/11 attacks was inevitable, he said, but it was not inevitable the 2001 attacks would continue to "dominate our way of thinking about national security". There had been a "fundamental change" in the nature of the threat posed by Islamist extremists. Al-Qaida had largely failed to mount the kind of attacks in the US and UK it had threatened after 9/11. It was time, he said to move away from the "distortion" of the post-9/11 mindset, make "realistic risk assessments" and think rationally about the causes of the crisis in the Middle East.

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Aff—Link Turn: Targeted Surveillance

Mass surveillance is a terrible strategy to find terrorists – only targeted surveillance can thwart attacks Schneier 15 [Bruce Schneier is an American cryptographer, computer security and privacy specialist, and writer. He is the author of several books on general security topics, computer security and cryptography, “Why Mass Surveillance Can't, Won't, And Never Has Stopped A Terrorist”, http://digg.com/2015/why-mass-surveillance-cant-wont-and-never-has-stopped-a-terrorist, March 25th, 2015//Rahul]In his latest bestseller, Data and Goliath, world-renowned security expert and author Bruce Schneier goes deep into the world of surveillance, investigating how governments and corporations alike monitor nearly our every

move. In this excerpt, Schneier explains how we are fed a false narrative of how our surveillance state is able to stop terrorist attacks before they happen. In fact, Schneier argues, the idea that our government is able

to parse all the invasive and personal data they collect on us is laughable. The data-mining conducted every day only seems to take valuable resources and time away from the tactics that should be used to fight terrorism. Illustration: Electronic Frontier Foundation/Hugh D'Andrade The NSA repeatedly uses a connect-the-dots metaphor to justify its surveillance activities. Again and again — after 9/11, after the Underwear Bomber, after the Boston Marathon bombings — government is criticized for not connecting the dots. However, this is a terribly misleading metaphor. Connecting the dots in a coloring book is easy, because they’re all numbered and visible. In real life, the dots can only be recognized after the fact. That doesn’t stop us from demanding to know why the authorities couldn’t connect the dots. The warning signs left by the Fort Hood shooter, the Boston Marathon bombers, and the Isla Vista shooter look obvious in hindsight. Nassim Taleb, an expert on risk engineering, calls this tendency the “narrative fallacy.” Humans are natural storytellers, and the world of stories is much more tidy, predictable, and coherent than reality. Millions of people behave strangely enough to attract the FBI’s notice, and almost all of them are harmless. The TSA’s no-fly list has over 20,000 people on it. The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment,

also known as the watch list, has 680,000, 40% of whom have “no recognized terrorist group affiliation.” Data mining is offered as the technique that will enable us to connect those dots. But while corporations are successfully mining our personal data in order to target advertising, detect financial fraud, and perform other tasks, three critical issues make data mining an inappropriate tool for finding terrorists. The first, and most important, issue is error rates. For advertising, data mining can be successful even with a large error rate, but finding terrorists requires a much higher degree of accuracy than data-mining systems can possibly provide. Data mining works best when you’re searching for a well-defined profile, when there are a reasonable number of events per year, and when the cost of false alarms is low. Detecting credit card fraud is one of data mining’s security success stories: all credit card companies mine their transaction databases for spending patterns that indicate a stolen card. There are over a billion active credit cards in circulation in the United States, and nearly 8% of those are fraudulently used each year. Many credit card thefts share a pattern — purchases in locations not normally frequented by the cardholder, and purchases of travel, luxury goods, and easily fenced items — and in many cases data-mining systems can minimize the losses by preventing fraudulent transactions. The only cost of a false alarm is a phone call to the cardholder asking her to verify a couple of her purchases. Similarly, the IRS uses data mining to identify tax evaders, the police use it to predict crime hot spots, and banks use it to predict loan defaults. These applications have had mixed success, based on the data and the application, but they’re all within the scope of what data mining can accomplish. Terrorist plots are different, mostly because whereas fraud is common, terrorist attacks are very rare. This means that even highly accurate terrorism prediction systems will be so flooded with false alarms that they will be useless. The reason lies in the mathematics of detection. All detection systems have errors, and system designers can tune them to minimize either false positives or false negatives. In a terrorist-detection system, a false positive occurs when the system mistakenly identifies something harmless as a threat. A false negative occurs when the system misses an actual attack. Depending on how you “tune” your detection system, you can increase the number of false positives to assure you are less likely to miss an attack, or you can reduce the number of false positives at the expense of missing attacks. Because terrorist attacks are so rare, false positives completely overwhelm the system, no matter how well you tune. And I mean completely: millions of people will be falsely accused for every real terrorist plot the system finds, if it ever finds any. We might be able to deal with all of the innocents being flagged by the system if the cost of false positives were minor. Think about the full-body scanners at airports. Those alert all the time when scanning people. But a TSA officer can easily check for a false alarm with a simple pat-down. This doesn’t work for a more

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general data-based terrorism-detection system. Each alert requires a lengthy investigation to determine whether it’s real or not. That takes time and money, and prevents intelligence officers from doing other productive work. Or, more pithily, when you’re watching everything, you’re not seeing

anything. The US intelligence community also likens finding a terrorist plot to looking for a needle in a haystack. And, as former NSA director General Keith Alexander said, “you need the haystack to find the needle.” That statement perfectly illustrates the problem with mass surveillance and bulk collection. When you’re looking for the needle, the last thing you want to do is pile lots more hay on it. More

specifically, there is no scientific rationale for believing that adding irrelevant data about innocent people makes it easier to find a terrorist attack, and lots of evidence that it does not. You might be adding slightly more signal, but you’re also adding much more noise. And despite the NSA’s “collect it all” mentality, its own documents bear this out. The military intelligence community even talks about the problem of “drinking from a fire hose”: having so much irrelevant data that it’s impossible to find the important bits. The NSA's Utah Data Center Photo Credit: Electronic Frontier Foundation We saw this problem with the NSA’s eavesdropping program: the false positives overwhelmed the system. In the years after 9/11, the NSA passed to the FBI thousands of tips per month; every one of them turned out to be a false alarm. The cost was enormous, and ended up frustrating the FBI agents who were obligated to investigate all the tips. We also saw this with the Suspicious Activity Reports —or SAR — database: tens of thousands of reports, and no actual results. And all the telephone metadata the NSA collected led to just one success: the conviction of a taxi driver who sent $8,500 to a Somali group that posed no direct threat to the US — and that was probably trumped up so the NSA would have better talking points in front of Congress. The second problem with using data-mining techniques to try to uncover terrorist plots is that each attack is unique. Who would have guessed that two pressure-cooker bombs would be delivered to the Boston Marathon finish line in backpacks by a Boston college kid and his older brother? Each rare individual who carries out a terrorist attack will have a disproportionate impact on the criteria used to decide who’s a likely terrorist, leading to ineffective detection strategies. The third problem is that the people the NSA is trying to find are wily, and they’re trying to avoid detection. In the world of personalized marketing, the typical surveillance subject isn’t trying to hide his activities. That is not true in a police or national security context. An adversarial relationship makes the problem much harder, and means that most commercial big data analysis tools just don’t work. A commercial tool can simply ignore people trying to hide and assume benign behavior on the part of everyone else. Government data-mining techniques can’t do that, because those are the very people they’re looking for. Adversaries vary in the sophistication of their ability to avoid surveillance. Most criminals and terrorists — and political dissidents, sad to say — are pretty unsavvy and make lots of mistakes. But that’s no justification for data mining; targeted surveillance could potentially identify them just as well. The question is whether mass surveillance performs sufficiently better than targeted surveillance to justify its extremely high costs. Several analyses of all the NSA’s efforts indicate that it does not. The three problems listed above cannot be fixed. Data mining is simply the wrong tool for this job, which means that all the mass surveillance required to feed it cannot be justified. When he was NSA director, General Keith Alexander argued that ubiquitous surveillance would have enabled the NSA to prevent 9/11. That seems unlikely. He wasn’t able to prevent the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, even though one of the bombers was on the terrorist watch list and both had sloppy social media trails — and this was after a dozen post-9/11 years of honing techniques. The NSA collected data on the Tsarnaevs before the bombing, but hadn’t realized that it was more important than the data they collected on millions of other people. This point was made in the 9/11 Commission Report. That report described a failure to “connect the dots,” which proponents of mass surveillance claim requires collection of more data. But what the report actually said was that the intelligence community had all the information about the plot without mass surveillance, and that the failures were the result of inadequate analysis. Mass surveillance didn’t catch underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in 2006, even though his father had repeatedly warned the U.S. government that he was dangerous. And the liquid bombers (they’re the reason governments prohibit passengers from bringing large bottles of liquids, creams, and gels on airplanes in their carry-on luggage) were captured in 2006 in their London apartment not due to mass surveillance but through traditional investigative police work. Whenever we learn about an NSA success, it invariably comes from targeted surveillance rather than from mass surveillance. One analysis showed that the FBI identifies potential terrorist plots from reports of suspicious activity, reports of plots, and investigations of other, unrelated, crimes. This is a critical point. Ubiquitous surveillance and data mining are not suitable tools for finding dedicated criminals or terrorists. We taxpayers are wasting billions on mass-surveillance programs, and not getting the security we’ve been promised. More importantly, the money we’re wasting on these ineffective surveillance programs is not being spent on investigation, intelligence, and emergency response: tactics that have been proven to work. The NSA's surveillance efforts have actually made us less secure.

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Aff—No Link

Data shows no meaningful terror plots have been stopped via mass surveillance Osterndorf 15 [Chris Osterndorf, reporter for the Daily Dot, “Edward Snowden is right—NSA surveillance won't stop terrorism”, http://www.dailydot.com/opinion/edward-snowden-mass-surveillance-nsa-america/, March 17th, 2015//Rahul]It appears that Snowden season is approaching once again. The controversial whistleblower made a surprise appearance via Google Hangout at SXSW this week, where his remarks proved captivating as always. Essentially a less flashy sequel to his ACLU speech from 2014, Snowden only spoke to a few people this time around, engaging in a conversation with a select group of leaders from America’s tech sector. In particular, he urged tech companies to become "champions of privacy," suggesting that they use their power to help shield Americans from an increasingly watchful government. In addition to speaking at SXSW in Austin, Snowden also said a few words at FutureFest in London, where he warned that massive surveillance won't stop terrorism. In this instance, Snowden is absolutely correct, and it’s time we start heeding his advice. At this point, the only people clinging to this idea is an effective is the NSA themselves. In 2013, NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander went before the House Intelligence Committee to testify to claim that increased surveillance had helped to stop terrorist threats over 50 times since 9/11, including attacks on U.S. soil such as a plot to blow up the New York Stock Exchange and a defunct scheme to fund an overseas terrorist group. Other witnesses in the same hearing also suggested that the Snowden leaks had harmed America greatly. “We are now faced with a situation that because this information has been made public, we run the risk of losing these collection capabilities,” stated Robert S. Litt, general counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “We’re not going to know for many months whether these leaks in fact have caused us to lose these capabilities, but if they do have that effect, there is no doubt that they will cause our national security to be affected.” However, the details the NSA provided in this hearing were somewhat hazy, and a closer look at the numbers indicates the benefits of increased surveillance may not be so clear-cut after all. Research from International Security found that out of the 269 terrorist suspects apprehended since 9/11, 158 were brought in through the use of traditional investigative measures. That’s almost 60 percent of all who were arrested. Meanwhile, 78 suspects were apprehended through measures which were “unclear” and 15 were implicated in plots but were not apprehended, while the remaining 18 were apprehended by some form of NSA surveillance. Eighteen is no small number when you’re discussing matters of national security; however, the above statistics do not necessarily indicate that mass surveillance was responsible for the apprehension of these 18 terrorists or whether these suspects were detained under more traditional surveillance measures. Moreover, the evidence suggests that traditional means of combatting terrorism are more effective than surveillance when it comes to overall arrests. Additional analysis from the New America Foundation further supports these findings. Examining 225 post-9/11 terrorism cases in the U.S., their 2014 report found that the NSA’s bulk surveillance program “has had no discernible impact on preventing acts of

terrorism, ” citing traditional methods of law enforcement and investigation as being far more effective in the majority of cases.

In as many as 48 of these cases, traditional surveillance warrants were used to collect evidence, while more than half of the cases were the product of other traditional investigative actions, such as informants and reports of suspicious activity. In fact, New America determined that the NSA has only been responsible for 7.5 percent of all counterterrorism investigations and that only one of those investigations led to suspects being convicted based on metadata collection. And that case, which took months to solve, as the NSA went back and forth with the FBI, involved money being sent to a terrorist group in Somalia, rather than an active plan to perpetrate an attack on U.S. soil. According to the report’s principal author Peter Bergen, who is the director of the foundation’s National Security Program and their resident terrorism expert, the issue has less to do with the collection of data and more to do with the comprehension of it. Bergen said, “The overall problem for U.S. counterterrorism officials is not that they need vaster amounts of information from the bulk surveillance programs, but that they don’t sufficiently understand or widely share the information they already possess that was derived from conventional law enforcement and intelligence techniques.” Of course, even when all of the data has been collected, it still isn’t enough to stop a terrorist attack. “It’s worth remembering that the mass surveillance programs initiated by the U.S. government after the 9/11 attacks—the legal ones and the constitutionally dubious ones—were premised on the belief that bin Laden’s hijacker-terrorists were able to pull off the attacks because of a failure to collect enough data,” asserts Reason’s Patrick Eddington. “Yet in their subsequent reports on the attacks, the Congressional Joint Inquiry (2002) and the 9/11 Commission found exactly the opposite. The data to detect (and thus foil) the plots was in the U.S. government’s hands prior to the attacks; the failures were ones of sharing, analysis, and dissemination.” So once again, we see that the key is not collection, but comprehension. If all of this still doesn’t seem like enough evidence that mass surveillance is ineffective, consider that a White House review group has also admitted the NSA’s counterterrorism program “was not essential to preventing attacks” and that a

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large portion of the evidence that was collected “could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional [court] orders.” But mass surveillance isn’t just the United States’ problem. Research has shown that Canada's Levitation project, which also involves collecting large amounts of data in the service of fighting terrorism, may be just as questionable as the NSA’s own data collection practices. Meanwhile, in response to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, British Prime Minister David Cameron has reintroduced the Communications Data Bill, which would force telecom companies to keep track of all Internet, email, and cellphone activity and ban encrypted communication services. But support for this type of legislation in Europe doesn't appear to be any stronger than in North America. Slate’s Ray Corrigan argued, “Even if your magic terrorist-catching machine has a false positive rate of 1 in 1,000—and no security technology comes anywhere near this—every time you asked it for suspects in the U.K., it would flag 60,000 innocent people.” Fortunately, the cultural shift against increased data collection has become so evident in the U.S. that even President Obama is trying to get out of the business of mass surveillance; the president announced plans last March to reform the National Security Agency's practice of collecting call records, which have yet to come to fruition. Benjamin Franklin famously said that “those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” While this quote has been notoriously butchered and misinterpreted over the years, it has now become evident that we shouldn’t have to give up either of these things in pursuit of the other. The U.S. is still grappling with how to fight terrorism in this technologically advanced age, but just because we have additional technology at our disposal, doesn’t mean that technology is always going to be used for the common good. You may believe Edward Snowden to be a traitor or a hero, but on this matter, there is virtually no question: Mass surveillance is not only unconstitutional, it is also the wrong way to fight terrorism.

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Aff—Link Turn: Mass Surveillance

Mass surveillance creates useless data, allows for terrorist attacksPatrick Eddington, 1-27-2015, "No, Mass Surveillance Won't Stop Terrorist Attacks," Reason, http://reason.com/archives/2015/01/27/mass-surveillance-and-terrorism#.bejqzr:U8Io, Patrick G. Eddington is a policy analyst in Homeland Security and Civil Liberties at the Cato Institute, and an assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. From 2004-2010, he served as communications director and later as senior policy advisor to Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ). Eddington’s legislative portfolio included the full range of security-related issues, with an emphasis on intelligence policy reform in the areas of surveillance, detainee interrogation, and the use of drones, both in overseas and domestic contexts.¶ From 1988 to 1996, Eddington was a military imagery analyst at the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation CenterThe recent terrorist attack on the office of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo generated a now-familiar meme: Another terrorist attack means we need more surveillance.¶ Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) said that while "Congress having oversight certainly is important ... what is more important relative to these types of events is ensuring we don't overly hamstring the NSA's ability to collect this kind of information in advance and keep these kinds of activities from occurring." Similarly, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) spoke of his "fear" that "our intelligence capabilities, those designed to prevent such an attack from taking place on our shores, are quickly eroding," adding that the government surveillance "designed to prevent these types of attacks from occurring is under siege."¶ A recent poll demonstrates that their sentiments are widely shared in the wake of the attack.¶ But would more mass surveillance have prevented the assault on the Charlie Hebdo office? Events from 9/11 to the present help provide the answer:¶ 2009: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab—i.e., the "underwear bomber"—nearly succeeded in downing the airline he was on over Detroit because, according to then-National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) director Michael Leiter, the federal Intelligence Community (IC) failed "to connect, integrate, and fully understand the intelligence" it had collected.¶ 2009: Army Major Nidal Hasan was able to conduct his deadly, Anwar al-Awlaki-inspired rampage at Ft. Hood, Texas, because the FBI bungled its Hasan investigation.¶ 2013: The Boston Marathon bombing happened, at least in part, because the CIA, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FBI, NCC, and National Security Agency (NSA) failed to properly coordinate and share information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his family, associations, and travel to and from Russia in 2012. Those failures were detailed in a 2014 report prepared by the Inspectors General of the IC, Department of Justice, CIA, and DHS.¶

2014: The Charlie Hebdo and French grocery store attackers were not only known to French and U.S. authorities but one had a prior terrorism conviction and another was monitored for years by French authorities until less than a year before the attack on the magazine.¶ No, mass

surveillance does not prevent terrorist attacks.¶ It’s worth remembering that the mass surveillance programs initiated by the U.S. government after the 9/11 attacks—the legal ones and the constitutionally-dubious ones—were premised on the belief that bin Laden’s hijacker-terrorists were able to pull off the attacks because of a failure to collect enough data. Yet in their subsequent reports on the attacks, the Congressional Joint Inquiry (2002) and the 9/11 Commission found exactly the opposite. The data to detect (and thus foil) the plots was in the U.S. government’s hands prior to the attacks; the failures were ones of sharing, analysis, and

dissemination . That malady perfectly describes every intelligence failure from Pearl Harbor to the present day.¶ The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (created by Congress in 2004) was supposed to be the answer to the "failure-to-connect-the-dots" problem. Ten years on, the problem remains, the IC bureaucracy is bigger than ever, and our government is

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continuing to rely on mass surveillance programs that have failed time and again to stop terrorists while simultaneously undermining the civil liberties and personal privacy of every American. The quest to "collect it all," to borrow a phrase from NSA Director Keith Alexander, only leads to the accumulation of masses of useless information, making it harder to find real threats and costing billions to store.¶ A recent Guardian editorial noted that such mass-surveillance myopia is spreading among European political leaders as well, despite the fact that "terrorists, from 9/11 to the Woolwich jihadists and the neo-Nazi Anders Breivik, have almost always come to the authorities’ attention before murdering."¶ Mass surveillance is not only destructive of our liberties, its continued use is a virtual guarantee of more lethal intelligence failures. And our continued will to disbelieve those facts is a mental dodge we engage in at our peril.

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Aff—No Impact: No Bioterror

No impact to bioterrorism—attack won’t happen because no resources

Burton and Stewart 08(Fred, Scott, 7/30/08, Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Busting the Anthrax Myth,” Fred is the VP of Stratfor, former deputy chief of counterterrorism at the Diplomatic Security Service, former counterterrorism agent with the US State Department, Scott is the VP of tactical analysis at Stratfor, former special agent with the US State Department involve din terrorism investigations, lead State Department investigator assigned to investigate 9/11, https://www.stratfor.com/node/154114, 7/16/15, SM)

We must admit to being among those who do not perceive the threat of bioterrorism to be as significant as that posed by a nuclear

strike. To be fair, it must be noted that we also do not see strikes using chemical or radiological weapons rising to the threshold of a true weapon of mass destruction either. The successful destonation of a nuclear weapon in an American city would be far more devastating than any of these other forms of attack.∂ In fact, based on the past history of nonstate actors conducting attacks using biological weapons, we remain skeptical that a nonstate actor could conduct a biological weapons strike capable of creating as many casualties as a large strike using conventional explosives — such as the October 2002 Bali bombings that resulted in 202 deaths or the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191.∂ We do not disagree with Runge's statements that actors such as al Qaeda have demonstrated an interest in biological weapons. There is ample evidence that

al Qaeda has a rudimentary biological weapons capability. However, there is a huge chasm of capability that separates intent and a rudimentary biological weapons program from a biological weapons program that is capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people.∂ Misconceptions About Biological Weapons∂ There are many misconceptions involving biological weapons. The three most common are that they are easy to obtain, that they are easy to deploy effectively, and that, when used, they always cause massive casualties.∂ While it is certainly true that

there are many different types of actors who can easily gain access to rudimentary biological agents, there are far fewer actors who can actually isolate virulent strains of the agents, weaponize them and then effectively employ these agents in a manner that will realistically pose a significant threat of causing mass casualties. While organisms such as anthrax are present in the environment and are not difficult to obtain,

more highly virulent strains of these tend to be far more difficult to locate, isolate and replicate. Such efforts require highly skilled individuals and sophisticated laboratory equipment.∂ Even incredibly deadly biological substances such as ricin and botulinum toxin are difficult to use in mass attacks. This difficulty arises when one attempts to take a rudimentary biological substance and then convert it into a weaponized form — a form that is potent enough to be deadly and yet readily dispersed. Even if this weaponization hurdle can be overcome, once developed, the weaponized agent must then be integrated with a weapons system that can effectively take large quantities of the agent and evenly distribute it in lethal doses to the intended

targets.∂ During the past several decades in the era of modern terrorism, biological weapons have been used very infrequently and with very little success. This fact alone serves to highlight the gap between the biological warfare misconceptions and reality. Militant groups desperately want to kill people and are constantly

seeking new innovations that will allow them to kill larger numbers of people. Certainly if biological weapons were as easily obtained, as easily weaponized and as effective at producing mass casualties as commonly

portrayed, militant groups would have used them far more frequently than they have.∂ Militant groups are generally adaptive and responsive to failure. If something works, they will use it. If it does not, they will seek more effective means of achieving their deadly goals. A good example of this was the rise and fall of the use of chlorine in militant attacks in Iraq.∂

Anthrax∂ As noted by Runge, the spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis is readily available in nature and can be deadly if inhaled, if ingested or if it comes into contact with a person's skin. What constitutes a deadly dose of inhalation anthrax has not been precisely quantified, but is estimated to be somewhere between 8,000 and 50,000 spores. One gram of weaponized anthrax, such as that contained in the letters mailed to U.S. Sens. Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy in October 2001, can contain up to one

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trillion spores — enough to cause somewhere between 20 and 100 million deaths. The letters mailed to Daschle and Leahy reportedly contained about one gram each for a total estimated quantity of two grams of anthrax spores: enough to have theoretically killed between 40 and 200 million people. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the current population of the United States is 304.7 million. In a worst-case scenario, the letters mailed to Daschle and Leahy theoretically contained enough anthrax spores to kill nearly two-thirds of the U.S. population.∂ Yet, in spite of their incredibly deadly potential, those letters (along with an estimated five other anthrax letters mailed in a prior wave to media outlets such as the New York Post and the major television networks) killed only five people; another 22 victims were infected by the spores but recovered after receiving medical treatment.

This difference between the theoretical number of fatal victims — hundreds of millions — and the actual number of victims — five — highlights the challenges in effectively distributing even a highly virulent and weaponized strain of an organism to a large number of potential victims.∂ To summarize: obtaining a biological agent is fairly simple. Isolating a virulent strain and then weaponizing that strain is somewhat more difficult. But the key

to biological warfare — effectively distributing a weaponized agent to the intended target — is the really difficult part of the process. Anyone planning a biological attack against a large target such as a city needs to be concerned about a host of factors such as dilution, wind velocity and direction, particle size and weight, the susceptibility of the disease to ultraviolet light, heat, dryness or even rain. Small-scale localized attacks such as the 2001 anthrax letters or the 1984 salmonella attack undertaken by the Bhagwan Shri Rajneesh cult are far easier to commit.∂ It is also important to remember that anthrax is not some sort of untreatable super disease. While anthrax does form hardy spores that can remain inert for a period of time, the disease is not easily transmitted from person to person, and therefore is unlikely to create an epidemic outside of the area targeted by the attack. Anthrax infections can be treated by the use of readily available antibiotics. The spores' incubation period also permits time for early treatment if the attack is noticed.∂ The deadliest known anthrax incident in recent years occurred in 1979 when an accidental release of aerosolized spores from a Soviet biological weapons facility in Sverdlovsk affected some 94 people — reportedly killing 68 of them. This facility was one of dozens of laboratories that were part of the Soviet Union's massive and well-funded biological weapons program, one that employed thousands of the country's brightest scientists. In fact, it was the largest biological weapons program in history.∂ Perhaps the largest attempt by a nonstate actor to cause mass casualties using anthrax was the series of attacks conducted in 1993 by the Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo in Tokyo.∂ In the late 1980s, Aum's team of trained scientists spent millions of dollars to develop a series of state-of-the-art biological weapons research and production laboratories. The group experimented with botulinum toxin, anthrax, cholera and Q fever and even tried to acquire the Ebola virus. The group hoped to produce enough biological agent to trigger a global Armageddon. Its first attempts at unleashing mega-death on the world involved the use of botulinum toxin. In April 1990, the group used a fleet of three trucks equipped with aerosol sprayers to release liquid botulinum toxin on targets that included the Imperial Palace, the National Diet of Japan, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, two U.S. naval bases and the airport in Narita. In spite of the massive quantities of toxin released, there were no mass casualties, and, in fact, nobody outside of the cult was even aware the attacks had taken place.∂ When the botulinum operations failed to produce results, Aum's scientists went back to the drawing board and retooled their biological weapons facilities to produce anthrax. By mid-1993, they were ready to launch attacks involving anthrax; between June and August of 1993, the group sprayed thousands of gallons of aerosolized liquid anthrax in Tokyo. This time, Aum not only employed its fleet of sprayer trucks but also used aerosol sprayers mounted on the roof of their headquarters to disperse a cloud of aerosolized anthrax over the city. Again, the attacks produced no results and were not even noticed. It was only after the group's successful 1995 subway attacks using sarin nerve agent that a Japanese government investigation discovered that the 1990 and 1993 biological attacks had occurred.∂ Biological Weapons Production∂ Aum Shinrikyo's team of highly trained scientists worked under ideal conditions in a first-world country with a virtually unlimited budget. They were able to travel the world in search of deadly organisms and even received technical advice from former Soviet scientists. The team worked in large, modern laboratory facilities to produce substantial quantities of biological weapons. They were able to operate these facilities inside industrial parks and openly order the large quantities of laboratory equipment they required. Yet, in spite of the millions of dollars the group spent on its biological weapons program — and the lack of any meaningful interference from the Japanese government — Aum still experienced problems in creating virulent biological agents and also found it difficult to dispense those agents effectively.∂ Today, al Qaeda finds itself operating in a very different environment than that experienced by Aum Shinrikyo in 1993. At that time, nobody was looking for Aum or its biological and chemical weapons program. By contrast, since the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States and its allies have actively pursued al Qaeda leaders and sought to dismantle and defang the organization. The United States and its allies have focused a considerable amount of resources in tracking and disassembling al Qaeda's chemical and biological warfare efforts. The al Qaeda network has had millions of dollars of its assets seized in a number of countries, and it no longer has the safe haven of Afghanistan from which to operate. The chemical and biological facilities the group established in the 1990s in Afghanistan — such as the Deronta training camp, where cyanide and other toxins were used to kill dogs, and a crude anthrax production facility in Kandahar — have been found and destroyed by U.S. troops.∂

Operating in the badlands along the Pakistani-Afghan border, al Qaeda cannot easily build large modern factories capable of producing large quantities of agents or toxins. Such fixed facilities are expensive and consume a lot

of resources. Even if al Qaeda had the spare capacity to invest in such facilities, the fixed nature of them means that they could be compromised and quickly destroyed by the United States.∂ If al Qaeda could somehow create and hide a fixed biological weapons facility in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas or North-West Frontier Province, it would still face the daunting task of transporting large quantities of biological agents from the Pakistani badlands to targets in the United States or Europe. Al Qaeda operatives certainly can create and transport small quantities of these

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compounds, but not enough to wreak the kind of massive damage it desires.∂ Al Qaeda's lead chemical and biological weapons expert, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, also known as Abu Khabab al-Masri, was reportedly killed on July 28, 2008,

by a U.S. missile strike on his home in Pakistan. Al-Sayid, who had a $5 million dollar bounty on his head, was initially reported to have been one of those killed in the January 2006 strike in Damadola. If he was indeed killed, his death should be another significant blow to the group's biological warfare efforts.

No risk of bioterrorism—success too unreliableKeller 13

(Rebecca, 3/7/13, Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” Rebecca is a science and technology analyst @ Stratfor, holds a bachelor’s degree in biochemistry from Washington University, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential, 7/16/16, SM)

The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to

isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. ∂ Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 — or any influenza virus, for that matter — is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent

to freely circulate within a population.∂ There are severe constraints that make success using either of these

methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

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**Elections Disadvantage Negative

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1NC Hillary Good 1. Uniqueness- Hillary Clinton currently leads every other presidential

candidate in the pollsChristian Today 2015 “Hillary Clinton vs Jeb Bush and Donald Trump polls 2016: Clinton leads in latest CNN poll” http://www.christiantoday.com/article/hillary.clinton.vs.jeb.bush.and.donald.trump.polls.2016.clinton.leads.bush.and.trump.in.cnn.poll/57836.htm, July 6Democrat presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and Republican candidate Donald Trump appear to be competing head to head in the 2016 US presidential race, and as a result, both are scoring high in the polls.¶ Clinton is now slightly leading the Democrats, while ex-governor of Florida Jeb Bush and Donald Trump are two of the Republican candidates scoring high, a new national poll from CNN/ORC finds.¶ According to political writer, Ron Kampeas, in a report from the Irish Examiner, Republicans seem to like Trump because of his attacks targeted at each of Clinton's turns, adding that each time the former first lady retaliates, she ends up boosting her standing.¶ The Wednesday CNN poll showed Clinton ahead of other challengers from the Democratic side by more than 40 percentage points . She stands ahead of vice president Biden, Bernie Sanders, Jim Webb and Martin O' Malley.¶ For the Republican candidates, Bush is seen to have 19% of the votes and Trump has 12%, Mike Huckabee 8%, and Ben Carson and Rand Paul 7% each.¶ The CNN/ORC Poll was done via telephone on June 26 to 28, CNN reports. The poll was conducted on 1,017 randomly selected adults, with a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points.¶ Meanwhile, it appears that Clinton's support extends all the way to Canada, based on a new poll that surveyed how Canadians feel about U.S. politics.¶ According to the report, if Canadians had to vote for the next president of the U.S., Clinton would surely "win by the largest landslide in the country's history."¶ The Canadian poll also revealed that the country's voters would willingly elect another Clinton for president and it won't matter who her contenders were. If Clinton were to run against Bush or the real estate mogul Trump, Canadians would still vote the former first lady any time.

2. Link- recent polls prove the public views domestic surveillance as a necessary evil-the plan makes Americans feel more vulnerable to national security issues

Pew Research Center 2013- “Majority Views NSA Phone Tracking as Acceptable Anti-terror Tactic” http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/10/majority-views-nsa-phone-tracking-as-acceptable-anti-terror-tactic/A majority of Americans – 56% – say the National Security Agency’s (NSA) program tracking

the telephone records of millions of Americans is an acceptable way for the government to

investigate terrorism , though a substantial minority – 41% – say it is unacceptable. And while the public is more evenly

divided over the government’s monitoring of email and other online activities to prevent possible terrorism, these views are largely unchanged since 2002, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.¶ The latest national survey by the Pew Research Center and The Washington Post, conducted June 6-9 among 1,004 adults, finds no indications

that last week’s revelations of the government’s collection of phone records and internet

data have altered fundamental public views about the tradeoff between investigating possible terrorism and protecting personal privacy.¶ Currently 62% say it is more important for the federal government to investigate possible terrorist threats, even if that intrudes on personal privacy. Just 34% say it is more important for the government not to intrude on personal privacy, even if that limits its ability to investigate possible terrorist threats.¶ These opinions have changed little since an ABC News/Washington Post survey in January 2006. Currently, there are only modest partisan differences in these opinions: 69% of Democrats say it is more

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important for the government to investigate terrorist threat s, even at the expense of personal privacy, as do 62% of Republicans and 59% of independents.

3. Internal Link- vulnerability means the American public will elect a republican,

Kuttner 2015- Robert, The American Prospect, co-founder and co-editor of The American Prospect, and professor at Brandeis University's Heller School “National Security and the 2016 Election” http://prospect.org/article/national-security-and-2016-electionSo, like it or not, the 2016 presidential election will be about national security. And most Americans and most voters will be very fearful of the threat that the Islamic State represents and confused about how we should respond.¶ In its lifetime, the United States has faced countless threats, and it has overreacted to many. Often in the 20th century, the U.S. government acted as an agent of U.S. corporate interests, wrapping them in the broader rhetoric of the Cold War. And the

Cold War itself led to policies that were often excessive and self-defeating, not the least of which was Vietnam.¶ That said, the Islamic State is a true threat, and one that presents difficult if not impossible choices . It is hydra-headed. Lop off one leader and 10 others appear.¶ The threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban was easy compared to this new one. These organizations actually had a command structure that could be monitored and disrupted.¶ The Islamic State and kindred groups represent a throwback to barbarism, yet because of the broad unrest of hundreds of millions of people, their cause has appeal on the ground. And the West has precious few allies in the region that can plausibly serve as either ideological or military counterweights.¶ Even if the West had the stomach for ground warfare in a war of civilizations, it is not clear where the theatres of operation would be. There is potentially a band that stretches all the way from Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, through Libya and Somalia, into the region of Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, that is vulnerable to the most brutal sort of Islamist fundamentalism.¶ There are three broad strands of thinking on how the United States ought to respond. One is basically isolationist. Let them stew in their own juices. My wife taught me a terrific Polish proverb that translates, "Not my circus, not my monkeys."¶ There are some conservatives who espouse this view, such as Rand Paul and the Cato Institute, some lefties like Noam Chomsky who think this retribution is the West's just dessert for its past sins, as well as such centrist foreign policy scholars as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt.¶ I am a little queasy about such views because I find the prospect of the Islamic State taking over much of the world frightening. Even if you write off the fates of hundreds of millions of people (half them women by the way), the march of the Islamic State really does increase the chances of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of people who don't mind blowing up the world, because they are certain that they are bound for glory.¶ The second strand of thinking might be called Wilsonian. The U.S., in this view, has a duty to intervene because of the need to bring true Enlightenment democracy to regions that are otherwise vulnerable to the appeal of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Well, based on the events of the past 15 years, good luck to that.¶ The third viewpoint we might call realpolitik. It argues that the West needs to act against the threat of the Islamic State, even if that means getting into bed with some unsavory people -- the very people whose dominance in the region helped seed the unrest that led to fundamentalist Islam. Are we to say that the Saudi monarchy is the lesser evil? How about Bashar al-Assad?¶ There have been times in American history when we sided with lesser evils against greater ones, our wartime alliance with Stalin against Hitler being the epic case. Henry Kissinger, the ultimate foreign policy realist, persuaded Richard Nixon to embrace Red China as a counterweight to the USSR, back in an era when China really was ferociously communist as well as brutal.¶ The problem is that President Obama has

vacillated between wanting to be Wilson and wanting to be Kissinger. Whatever the policy, it needs to be coherent. So we will go into the 2016 election with the electorate feeling very uneasy about our national security, and with Democrats somewhat on the defensive.¶ Normally, that would help the Republicans. Except that no Republican first-tier presidential candidate has foreign policy experience.¶ Let's see. Chris Christie can see the World Trade Center from his window. Scott Walker led wars -- on unions and on the University of Wisconsin. Marco Rubio sees national security through the prism of immigration and Cuba.

And Jeb Bush has only the proxy foreign policy expertise of his family connections -- which did not perform so well.¶ Which brings us to Hillary Clinton. On the plus side, she was Secretary of State. On the minus side, she was Secretary of State.¶ She is also female, which some retrograde voters associate with weak -- and she has bent over backwards to be the most hawkish of the Democrats, a posture that could wear better than expected as more threats unfold. But whatever you think of her views, Clinton does have more national security chops than anyone else in the field.

4. Impact- A Hillary Clinton presidency is key to preserve the progress made by Obama on Iranian nuclear negotiations Washington Post 2015 - “Clinton backs Obama on opposing new Iran sanctions http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/01/21/clinton-backs-obama-on-opposing-new-iran-sanctions/

New congressional sanctions on Iran would give Iranian allies Russia and China an excuse to to back out of international negotiations and destroy chances for a nuclear deal , former secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton said Wednesday.¶ The likely Democratic presidential candidate praised President Obama's strategy of holding off on new penalties against Iran while seeking a deal to curb that nation's nuclear program. The United States and many

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other nations suspect Iran has used its nuclear research as cover for a secret weapons development program.¶ "If the U.S. Congress imposes sanctions before we even know the answers to the questions we are asking, I think it is highly likely that Russia and China" would walk out and end the United Nations Security Council-backed effort to curb the Iranian program, Clinton said.¶ The White House is trying to quash a bipartisan proposal to levy new economic restrictions on Iran, arguing that the talks, already in overtime, must run their course. In his State of the Union address Tuesday, Obama repeated a threat to veto those sanctions, but the White House is worried that the current debate will poison what have been mostly cordial negotiations.¶ Clinton was Obama's chief diplomat when preparations for the talks were laid, but has also backed harsh penalties against Iran in the past. She said she agrees with Obama that "no deal is better than a bad deal," but that a good deal is still possible.¶ Speaking at a forum sponsored in part by Canadian businesses,

Clinton said additional sanctions would give "Iran and others an excuse not to continue negotiations" at a time when existing sanctions and falling oil prices appear to be helping U.S. bargaining power.¶ "That would be, in my view, a very serious strategic error," Clinton said. "Why would we want to be the catalyst for the collapse of negotiations before we really know whether there is something we can get out of them?"

5. Failure to sustain the negotiations independently causes global war through miscalculation PressTV, 2013 (“Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail,” http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/)A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on

Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculatio n and general roa r,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war.

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**Uniqueness- Hillary Good

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Uniqueness- Hillary Good- ANSWERS TO: Bernie Sanders

Bernie Sanders will not get the democratic nomination- 2016 isn’t 2008, Hillary Clinton won’t lose Washington Post 2015 - “Bernie Sanders isn’t Barack Obama, and 2016 isn’t 2008” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bernie-sanders-isnt-barack-obama-and-2016-isnt-2008/2015/07/17/5d85377e-2b37-11e5-bd33-395c05608059_story.html, July 17

Hillary Clinton is once again campaigning for president as the prohibitive front-runner, and once again, she faces a challenge from an insurgent progressive outsider with grass-roots support. Once again, while Clinton (re)introduces herself to voters in a low-key listening tour of sorts, her challenger is drawing huge audiences — 10,000 in Madison, Wis., 8,000 in Portland, Maine, 5,000 in Denver and overflow crowds in Iowa’s small towns and elsewhere.¶ Eight years ago, Clinton led in the polls for most of 2007, only to lose the Iowa caucuses — and, eventually, the Democratic nomination — to a favorite of the party’s progressive base. It’s feeling a bit like deja vu. “If she doesn’t change the terms of the race, she’s going to lose. Again,” former Mitt Romney strategist Stuart Stevens warned in the Daily Beast this month.¶ It may be tempting to compare the race between Clinton and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) to the epic race between Clinton and Sen. Barack Obama: Sanders, like Obama, has consolidated a good portion of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. Sanders, like Obama, is raising millions from small-dollar donors on the Internet. Sanders, like Obama, is channeling the anger and frustration of some in the party. Then, it was about the Iraq war; now, it’s about Wall Street.¶ But that’s where the similarities end. From the perspective of someone who worked on his campaign and in his White House, it’s clear that Obama’s race against Clinton

is not a useful example. Understanding the dynamics at play in the 2016 primaries requires looking further back at history. And unfortunately for Sanders, history shows that there are only two types of Democratic insurgent candidates: Barack Obama and everyone else.¶ The current system for selecting nominees in the Democratic Party is less than 50 years old. After the disastrous 1968 campaign and nominating convention in Chicago, the party abandoned the smoke-filled rooms of yore and shifted to a series of primaries and caucuses. The 1972 nomination went to the grass-roots favorite, Sen. George McGovern (S.D.), who used the new rules to edge out establishment picks Hubert Humphrey and Henry “Scoop” Jackson. (McGovern won only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia in the general election against Richard Nixon.) In nearly every election since then, an anti-establishment figure has sought the nomination.

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Uniqueness- Hillary Good- ANSWERS TO: Too Early It is not too early to predict the election- prefer Nate Silver he has predicted every election outcome correctly Five Thirty Eight 2014- Micah Cohen, New York Times, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/is-it-too-early-for-2016-polls/?_r=0But isn’t it too early to even look at such polls? Aren’t they more valuable as entertainment than information?¶

Not necessarily.¶ An examination of pre-midterm presidential polling since 1984 — surveys conducted from the day after the

preceding presidential vote to the day before the midterm elections — shows that while early primary polls are not determinative, they are not meaningless, either.¶ Presidential polls generally become more numerous after

midterm elections, and our polling database is too spotty in the pre-midterm period to draw a solid picture before 1984. Since 1984, however, we have at least two pre-midterm polls for each party for each election, and those surveys have followed a consistent pattern: the early leader on the Republican side is very likely to become the nominee, while the early leader on the Democratic side is not.

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2NC/1NR- Uniqueness Wall- Hillary Good 1. Hillary Clinton is poised to win the election- she is polling higher than

every other Republican and Democratic contenderThe Guardian 2015 (June 23, “Hillary Clinton on course to win presidential election, poll says” http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/23/hillary-clinton-presidential-election-poll

Hillary Clinton is on course to win the Democratic primary and would go on to trounce her Republican opponents, according to a new poll.¶ The NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll found that the former secretary of state was the first choice for nominee of 75% of her party , with Vermont socialist Bernie Sanders far behind on 15%.¶ Analysis Clinton v Bush: Martin O’Malley, the former Maryland governor, was on 2%, while Lincoln Chafee, the former governor of Rhode Island, polled less than 1%. Former Virginia senator Jim Webb, who has not yet formally declared he is running, was on 4%.¶ According to the poll, 92% of likely Democratic voters said they could see themselves supporting Clinton.¶ The poll asked 1,000 likely voters about their opinions on potential presidential candidates, both Republican and Democrat.¶ It showed Clinton polling at 48% to 40% against her closest Republican contender, former Florida governor Jeb Bush, the brother of former president George W Bush and son of former president George HW Bush.¶ Against the Florida senator Marco Rubio, Clinton polled 50% against 40%. And against Wisconsin governor Scott Walker she polled 51% to 37%.¶ Among Republican primary voters, the poll showed Bush ahead with 22% of the vote. Walker was next with 17% and Rubio third with 14%. Retired neurosurgeon Ben Carson had 11%, while former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee (9%), libertarian senator Rand Paul (7%), former Texas governor Rick Perry (5%), New Jersey governor Chris Christie (4%) and Texas senator Ted Cruz (4%) were all in single figures.¶ The poll is likely to encourage the Clinton camp, whose campaign got off to a rough start when questions arose about Clinton’s use of personal email as secretary of state, this spring. But it is possible that early polls may not reflect the true strength of Clinton’s challengers.

2. Hillary Clinton will win the Hispanic vote- latest Univision poll provesThe Fiscal Times 2015 “As Trump Surges in the Polls, Hispanic Voters Flock to Hillary Clinton” http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/07/17/Trump-Surges-Polls-Hispanic-Voters-Flock-Hillary-Clinton, July 17The Washington Post reports that Hillary Clinton’s campaign is thrilled with the contrast between Trump’s take-no-enemies approach and Clinton’s more seasoned and sober leadership style and fluency in discussing domestic and foreign policy issues .¶ While Trump has made headlines by denouncing illegal immigrants from Mexico as rapists, murderers and criminals and vowing to build a wall along the southwest border to prevent further illegal crossings, Clinton has spoken on the need for comprehensive immigration reform, including a pathways to citizenship for many of the more than 11 million illegal immigrants in the country.¶ Related: Ted Cruz on Donald Trump – I ‘Salute’ Him ¶ More important, though, is that – whether or not he ultimately wins the GOP nomination—the bombastic Trump may be assuring his party’s failure in trying to woo Latino voters. A new Univision News poll shows that seven in ten Hispanic voters have a negative view of Trump. And in a hypothetical matchup, Clinton beats Trump and other potential GOP opponents by huge margins among Hispanic voters.¶ The Univision findings are part of a larger bipartisan polling project conducted by the research firms of Bendixen & Amandi International and the Tarrance Group to establish a baseline for attitudes of Hispanic voters on a range of issues and candidate s. Roughly 90 percent of Hispanic voters interviewed said they have heard about Trump’s insulting comments, and when they have read specific remarks, nearly 8 in 10 say they find them offensive.

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3. Democrats’ successful Iranian negotiations are a boost for the Hillary campaignThe Washington Post 2015 Greg Sargent, “David Axelrod: Hillary Clinton and Democrats can win the Iran debate” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/07/17/david-axelrod-hillary-clinton-and-democrats-can-win-the-iran-debate, July 17But in an interview with me, David Axelrod — the chief strategist of Barack Obama’s two successful presidential campaigns — made the opposite case. He said the Iran debate actually could favor Hillary Clinton and Democrats , and put the GOP presidential nominee in a politically untenable spot. That is, if Democrats prosecute it correctly.¶ “Broadly, I don’t think it’s at all clear that Americans are opposed to this,” Axelrod said. “Americans recognize that a verifiable agreement is a better option than war.”¶ “The key question here is, If you walk away from this, then

what?” Axelrod continued. “It’s the responsibility of every single politician, Republican and Democrat, to answer the what’s-the-alternative question. And ‘let’s go to tougher sanctions’ is not a real answer.”¶ As many Democrats remain undecided about the substance of the deal, some also appear skittish about the politics of backing it. One exception has been Clinton, who spoke positively about the deal after it was announced. In so doing, she may have offered a template for how Dems should talk about it, hailing it as an “important first step” while stressing that “the agreement will have to be enforced vigorously, relentlessly,” an apparent nod to worries that Iran might try to cheat.¶ Nobody knows how the debate over the deal will play throughout the hot month of August,

and both sides are gearing up to spend huge sums to pressure lawmakers back at home. It will also come up repeatedly for the presidential candidates. Asked whether it was reasonable for some Dems to be skittish about the politics of the deal, Axelrod said he thought Dem lawmakers were mostly worried about offending donors, not voters. And he suggested — perhaps counterintuitively — that its very riskiness could play Clinton’s favor.

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**Link- Hillary good

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2NC/1NR- Link Wall- Drone Affirmative 1. The drone lobby is massively influential and will backlash against Democrats because of the plan- drones are key to border security and the plan makes the dems look weak on national security Martin and Viveca 2012 (Gary Martin and Viveca Novak, “Drones: Despite Problems, A Push to Expand Domestic Use”, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/11/drones-despite-problems-a-push-to-e/, November 27, 2012)WASHINGTON – Are unmanned aircraft, known to have difficulty avoiding collisions, safe to use in America’s crowded airspace? And would their widespread use for surveillance result in unconstitutional invasions of privacy? Experts say neither question has been answered satisfactorily. Yet the federal government is rushing to open America’s skies to

tens of thousands of the drones – pushed to do so by a law championed by manufacturers of the unmanned aircraft. The drone makers have sought congressional help to speed their entry into a domestic market valued in the billions. The 60-member

House of Representatives’ “drone caucus” _ officially, the House Unmanned Systems Caucus – has helped push that

agenda. And over the last four years, caucus members have drawn nearly $8 million in drone-related campaign

contributions , an investigation by Hearst Newspapers and the Center for Responsive Politics shows. The Federal Aviation Administration has been

flooded with applications from police departments, universities and private corporations, all seeking to use drones that range from devices

the size of a hummingbird to full-sized aircraft like those used by the U.S. military to target al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and

elsewhere. PATROLLING THE BORDER Domestic use of drones began with limited aerial patrols of the nation’s

borders by Customs and Border Patrol authorities. But the industry and its allies pushed for more , leading to provisions in the

FAA Modernization and Reform Act, signed into law on Feb. 14 of this year. cuellar.jpgThe law requires the FAA to fully integrate the unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, into national airspace by September 2015. And it contains a series of interim deadlines leading up to that one: This month, the agency was supposed to produce a comprehensive plan for the integration, and in August it was required to have a plan for testing at six different sites in the U.S. Neither plan has been issued. “These timelines are very aggressive,” said Heidi Williams, a vice president of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, one of the stakeholders taking part in a working group put together by the FAA to help develop a regulatory plan. “These issues are very complex, and we have a long way to go.” Many potential uses for unmanned aircraft, which are cheaper to operate than piloted planes or helicopters, have been identified. Among them: monitoring pipelines and power lines, finding lost hikers, surveying crops, and assessing environmental threats and damage from natural disasters. The FAA has predicted that 30,000 drones could be flying in the United States in less than 20 years, sharing space with commercial, military and general aviation. An FAA official, who spoke on background, said “one of the main safety issues” with drones is lack of ability to “sense and avoid other aircraft.” A September report by the Government Accountability Office identified the same concern: “Obstacles include the inability . . . to sense and avoid other airborne objects in a manner similar to manned aircraft.” In addition, the GAO report said, “Concerns about national security, privacy and interference with Global Positioning System signals have not been resolved.” FAA Administrator Michael Huerta told a conference on drones earlier this year in Las Vegas that the agency is making progress working through the issues. FAA is working with “collision avoidance experts” from the Defense Department, NASA and private firms to determine what standards and requirements should be set. SOURCES OF

FUNDS House members from California, Texas, Virginia and New York on the bipartisan “drone caucus” received the lion’s share of the funds channeled to lawmakers from dozens of firms that are members of the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, Hearst and CRP found. Eleven drone caucus lawmakers from California, where many aviation firms are located, received more than $2.4 million from manufacturers’ political action committees and employees during the 2012 and 2010 election cycles, according to CRP tabulation of Federal Election Commission reports. Eight Texas House members in the caucus received more than $746,000. And four caucus members from New York got more than $185,000 from companies connected to the business of unmanned vehicles. Rep. Henry Cuellar, D-Laredo, said drone manufacturers contribute just as other interest groups do. “We get contributions from media PACs, from teachers, from doctors and from a whole lot of companies that produce drones,” Cuellar said. EDUCATING LAWMAKERS The House “drone caucus” was established three years ago. Senate lawmakers followed suit this fall. Sen. Joe Manchin, D-W.Va., co-chairman of the fledgling Senate drone caucus, said the caucus would help frame future legislation because the use of drones “carries great potential – and great risk.” The Senate caucus has only eight members, including Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, D-N.Y. Gillibrand did not return a request for comment. Cuellar also said the purpose of the House caucus is to educate other members on the need for and uses of drones for public safety, border enforcement, search-and-rescue and commercial uses. mckeon.jpgThe global market for drones is expected to double in the next decade, from $6.6 billion to $11.4 billion, and could top $2.4 billion in the U.S. alone, said Philip Finnegan, director of corporate analysis with the Teal Group, an independent research group which studies the industry. Growth in UAV technology and operations is encouraged by AUVSI, which represents drone and systems manufacturers. AUVSI firms have been far more generous to Republicans than Democrats when it comes to campaign donations. According to CRP analysis, GOP drone caucus members received 74 percent of the group’s donations. In the House, the top recipient was Rep. Howard “Buck” McKeon, R-Calif., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. He received $833,650 in drone-related campaign contributions. McKeon and Cuellar are co-chairmen of the caucus. Other Republican California lawmakers – Reps. Darrell Issa, Jerry Lewis, Duncan Hunter and Ken Calvert – each received more than $200,000 from drone firms. And in Texas, Rep. Silvestre Reyes, D-El Paso, a former U.S. Border Patrol sector chief who lost his seat in the Democratic primary, received $310,000. Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Austin, chairman of the House Homeland Security subcommittee on oversight, received $100,000, and Cuellar received

almost $77,000. The two have pushed for drone surveillance of the U.S.-Mexico border. CRP’s analysis also showed that companies with drone

aircraft currently used by the military , but with potential civilian applications, were among the largest donors

to caucus members. Those firms include BAE Systems , which makes the Mantis and Taranis drones; Boeing Co., maker of

the hydrogen-fueled Phantom Eye; Honeywell International, RQ-16 T-Hawk; Lockheed Martin , RQ-170 Sentinel; Raytheon Co., Cobra; and

General Atomics, Pred ator. PRIVACY CONCERNS mccaul.jpgSome lawmakers remain skeptical. Along with civil rights advocates, they worry over

government eavesdropping, surveillance photography and other potential privacy violations. “The drones are coming,” shouted Rep. Ted Poe, R-Humble, earlier this year from the House floor, as he warned of encroachment by government into the rights of citizens. A North Dakota court upheld the arrest of a Lakota, N.D., farmer by a police SWAT

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team using information from a Customs and Border Protection Predator drone over the northern U.S.-Canadian border. The June 2011 incident began when several cows found their way to Rodney Bossart’s 3,000-acre farm. He claimed ownership of the wayward bovines and allegedly brandished firearms at law enforcement officials. During the ensuing standoff, a SWAT team received surveillance information from Customs and Border Protection, gathered from a high-flying Predator drone. That information was used to locate and arrest the farmer. The Bossart case was apparently the first use of national security surveillance to aid the arrest of a U.S. citizen on non-terror-related charges. More such cases should be expected, said Jay Stanley, a senior policy analyst with the American Civil Liberties Union. “Based on current trends, technology development, law enforcement interest, political and industry pressure, and the lack of legal safeguards – it is clear that drones pose a looming threat to Americans’ privacy,” Stanley said. Law enforcement agencies say drones will better protect the safety of officers and the public in dangerous situations, and can be used for search and rescue during natural disasters. They have joined drone manufacturers in pressuring Congress to relax limitations. vanguard shadowhawk.jpgLast year the sheriff of Montgomery County, north of Houston, purchased a $300,000 Vanguard Shadowhawk – a small unmanned helicopter – with a grant provided by the Department of Homeland Security. But deputies have yet to use the drone, mainly because of FAA restrictions, said Randy McDaniel, the Montgomery County chief deputy. McDaniel created an Internet stir a couple of years ago when he mentioned that drones could be armed with rubber bullets or tear gas, something he now says will never happen. This year McDaniel told Congress that FAA restrictions were making it difficult to use the drone. He said the agency denied use of the drone during a raid on a compound with pit bulls because there was no demonstrated “potential loss of life.” The FAA limits, as well as maintenance costs, battery-life problems and poor video quality, prompted the Texas Department of Public Safety to discontinue its $298,000 drone program in 2010. The four hand-held WASP drones were used in fewer than 10 missions in two years. SEEKING NEW OVERSIGHT Law enforcement officials are lobbying lawmakers to shift the oversight for use of drones from FAA to the Department of Homeland Security. That position is supported by McCaul, who said DHS has more familiarity with drones and is best equipped to handle a potential risk of hijacking by terrorists. He’s alarmed at the lack of federal preparation for the influx of drones, particularly in light of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Anxiety over the possibility of drones falling into terrorist hands is bipartisan. Rep. Yvette Clarke, D-N.Y., said civilian drones pose “an emerging threat” that needs to be addressed. While law enforcement has complained the FAA regulations are too confining, others believe that the rules are too lenient. Seattle police held a public meeting in October to try to allay citizens’ concerns over two Draganflyer X6 drones it purchased with an $82,000 DHS grant. The crowded meeting was disrupted with protesters shouting “No drones! No drones!” Seattle is working with the FAA on guidelines to use the craft. “Right now, all we are allowed to use them for is training,” said Detective Mark Jamieson. Leonard Montgomery, the police chief of North Little Rock, Ark., says “privacy is a nonissue” for his department. “We have no plans to surveil people’s

back yards,” he said. The privacy issue also bothers both Democrats and Republicans. This year’s Republican platform stated: “…[W]e support pending

legislation to prevent unwarranted or unreasonable governmental intrusion through the use of aerial surveillance … with

the exception of patrolling our national borders.” The Fourth Amendment governs when, where and how the government can

gather information on an individual, including whether officials need a search warrant before acting. Courts have given the greatest protection to people when they’re in the privacy of their homes. For instance, in a 2001 Supreme Court case, the justices nixed the Interior Department’s use of thermal imaging to detect heat patterns coming from the home of someone suspected of growing marijuana indoors using heat lamps, saying it was an illegal search and required a warrant. The court’s reasoning relied in part on the fact that the technology was not in “general public use.” That’s language that might be applicable to drones using cameras to get glimpses of individuals inside their homes. NOT JUST POLICE Outside a home’s walls, though, privacy rights decrease. Courts blessed an arrest after a flyover by police revealed marijuana growing in someone’s back yard. ed.markey.jpgLiberal Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass., and libertarian-leaning Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., have crafted legislation to put a tight rein on drone use. Privacy advocates note that not just the police, but individuals and commercial enterprises will be using the devices. Paparazzi are already using small drones on the Riviera to shoot photos of celebrities in otherwise hard-to-access areas. Texas’ Poe has offered another bill, which would ban private citizens from using drones to spy on other citizens and strictly limit law enforcement use of drones. “The Constitution limits eavesdropping, snooping and spying on American citizens,” Poe said. Customs and Border Protection’s use of drones began in 2004, when the agency began tests on the craft along the U.S.-Mexico border. CBP has 10 drones operating along U.S. borders, including two stationed in South Texas and two operating out of Arizona. Other CBP Predators are based in Grand Forks, N.D., and Cocoa Beach, Fla. The drones costs approximately $4 million apiece, and CBP wants to expand its fleet from 10 to 24 within the next decade, according to Retired Maj. Gen. Michael Kostelnik, an assistant CBP commissioner. The need for personnel to operate military drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan has created a shortage of trained operators for domestic drones. In June 2010, a Predator drone flying to Texas from Arizona experienced a “lost-link” incident, when the craft and operators lost radio contact for roughly 30 seconds. That forced the drone to automatically drop to a lower altitude until recovery. NTSB and congressional aides said the incident occurred when the radio signal to the drone was blocked by severe weather. In 2006 a Predator crashed near the border city of Nogales, Ariz., just missing homes on a hillside. NTSB ruled the cause of the crash was human error. Kostelnik said he is confident about the Predator “in terms of

safety to the national airspace, in terms of safety to the public.” General Atomics, the builder of the Predator, supported lawmakers with more than $287,000 in campaign contributions in the 2012 election cycle, according to CRP research.

2. The latest polls prove- the American public is generally supportive of domestic drone operationsChristian Science Monitor 2013 June 3, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2013/0603/American-public-has-few-qualms-with-drone-strikes-poll-findsBut the American public appears to be unmoved by such arguments. A new Monitor/TIPP poll finds that a firm majority of Americans – 57 percent – support the current level of drone strikes

targeting “Al Qaeda targets and other terrorists in foreign countries.” Another 23 percent said the use of drones for such purposes should increase. Only 11 percent said the use of drones should decrease.

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2NC/1NR- Link Wall- Stingray Affirmative 1. The public is increasingly willing to allow law enforcement to spy on them if it keeps them saferNEW YORK TIMES 2013- New York Times, 5/01, “U.S. poll finds-strong-acceptance-for-public-surveillance” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/us/poll-finds-strong-acceptance-for-public-surveillance.htmlAmericans overwhelmingly favor installing video surveillance cameras in public places, judging the infringement on their privacy as an acceptable trade-off for greater security from terrorist attacks, according to the latest New York Times/CBS News Poll.¶ A week after the Boston Marathon attack, which was unraveled after the release of video footage of the two suspects flushed them out of hiding, 78 percent of people said surveillance cameras were a good idea, the poll found.¶ The receptiveness to cameras on street corners reflects a public that regards terrorism as a fact of life in the United States — 9 out of 10 people polled said Americans would always have to live with the risk — but also a threat that many believe the government can combat effectively through rigorous law enforcement and proper regulation.¶ For all that confidence, there are lingering questions about the role of the nation’s intelligence agencies before the attacks, with people divided about whether they had collected information that could have prevented them (41 percent said they had; 45 percent said they had not).¶ The murkiness of the case — the Tsarnaev brothers’ ties to the Caucasus; the warnings from Russian intelligence about potential extremist sympathies — has clearly left an impression on the public. A majority, 53 percent, said the suspects had links to a larger terrorist group, while 32 percent said they had acted alone.¶ President Obama, in a White House news conference on Tuesday, defended the performance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security, saying the agencies had done their job, while acknowledging, “This is hard stuff.”¶ The poll suggested that Americans are willing to tolerate further tough measures to foil future attacks. Sixty-six percent said information about how to make explosives should not be allowed on the Internet, where

it would be available to aspiring terrorists, even if some would view that as a form of censorship. Thirty percent said it should be permitted in the interest of free expression.

2. Public support for law enforcement is high- they will view stingray technology as a necessary evil to combat crimeUSA Today 2014 “Slow down, police are the good guys: Column” http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/08/21/police-militarization-ferguson-crime-violence-justice-bureau-column/14307505/, August 21If an American institution inspires public confidence through conspicuous, consistent progress over the course of many years, why seek to change or challenge its direction ? That's the question for politicians and activists who denounce alleged "militarization" of local police departments despite their recent achievements in slashing rates of violent crime .¶ Numbers from the

authoritative Bureau of Justice Statistics give some indication of the scope of the improvement. The incidence of violent crime reached its all-time high in 1991, and since that time has been cut nearly in half. The homicide rate was also cut at roughly the same pace, reaching its lowest level since 1963.¶ If any other serious social problem — such as poverty, or marital instability — showed similarly encouraging results we would applaud policies that might have contributed to progress. Instead, the American Civil Liberties Union insists that "American policing has become unnecessarily and dangerously militarized, in large part through federal programs that have armed state and local law enforcement agencies with the weapons and tactics of war." Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., enthusiastically agrees, decrying 1997 legislation providing local police forces with free surplus equipment from the Pentagon. But statistics show such programs have done nothing to slow declining crime rates, and might have even accelerated those improvements in public safety .¶ Moreover, there's no evidence that

trigger-happy police use more deadly force because they're itching to try their new fire power. The number of annual police killings from 2005 to 2012 remained stable at about 400. Nearly all the tragic, well-publicized incidents of young black males dying at the hands of white cops occur when officers

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are isolated and vulnerable; none of the controversial recent shootings involved military style deployments with hordes of police in riot gear. Less than a quarter of all police uses of deadly force involved white officers firing at black suspects; in fact, a black male is 60 times more likely to die at the hands of another black male than to perish through actions of a white cop.

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2NC/1NR- Link Wall- Security Letters Affirmative

1. Extend the 1NC link evidence- the public is willing to endure privacy violations if it makes them safer- NSL are vital to preventing terrorism- there would be public backlash against democrats

Wall Street Journal 2014- Wall Street Journal, Oct. 8 “U.S. Asks Court to Overturn National Security Letters Ruling” http://www.wsj.com/articles/appeals-court-asked-to-overturn-nsl-ruling-1412803781The Federal Bureau of Investigation would lose a powerful tool against terrorism if a federal ruling against the agency’s use of secret requests for information about individuals’ phone usage and electronic transactions isn’t overturned, a U.S. lawyer warned an appeals court hearing the matter.¶ The agency each year issues thousands of the so-called “national security letters,” or NSLs, Justice Department attorney Douglas Letter said during the hearing Wednesday before the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.¶ The letters allow the FBI to obtain records from telephone, banking and Internet companies without court approval as long as the bureau certifies that the records would be relevant to a counterterrorism investigation.¶ “The NSLs are an extremely useful tool to use,” Mr. Letter said

during the hourlong hearing before a three-justice panel.¶ The judges are considering the government’s request to overturn a ruling last year by U.S. District Judge Susan Illston of San Francisco, who found that the laws behind the use of NSLs violated constitutional free speech rights because of gag orders that bar recipients from telling anyone about the requests.¶ Judge Illston, who ruled in the case of an unnamed phone company that in 2011 mounted a legal fight against one of these letters, stayed enforcement of her judgment pending appeal.

2. The plan would force a contentious debate over national security and civil liberties- risking a loss for Hillary ClintonElias 2014 – Associated Press 10.18 “Court mulls secrecy of national security letters” http://www.publicopiniononline.com/nation-world/ci_26685218/court-mulls-secrecy-national-security-lettersA government lawyer argued Wednesday that national security efforts would be "hamstrung" if the FBI was barred from sending secretive demands for customer data — national security letters — to

telecommunication companies, banks and other businesses.¶ The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals is considering whether gag orders that bar recipients from discussing the letters are free speech violations rendering the demands unconstitutional.¶ The FBI issues thousands of national security letters annually while investigating terrorism and espionage cases. Unlike warrants, the demands for information are made without judicial oversight. A lower court judge ruled the letters unconstitutional because of the gag orders but allowed the FBI to continue sending the letters, also known as NSLs, pending an appeal.¶ On Wednesday, federal prosecutor Douglas Letter urged the San Francisco-based appeals court to overturn the trial judge's decision. Letter says the NSLs are a crucial tool for combatting terrorism and that the gag order is necessary to protect investigations. Letter said that national security would be "greatly hamstrung" without NSLs.¶ At issue is a 2011 lawsuit filed by an unnamed telecommunications company that received a letter and objected to the gag order. Last year, U.S. District Judge Susan Illston declared the gag order unconstitutional and the FBI appealed.¶ The case pits civil libertarians who say that the letters trample individual rights against government officials who maintain that secrecy is a necessary tool to protect the country against terrorism and other threats.

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**Impact- Hillary Good

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2NC/1NR Impact- Hillary Good- ANSWERS TO: Hillary Bad- Iran

Hillary Clinton is the only candidate who can preserve negotiations with IranReal Clear Politics 2015, “Earnest: Hillary Clinton's Role In Bringing Iranians To Negotiating Table "A Testament To Her Diplomatic Skill" March 20 http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/03/20/earnest_hillary_clintons_role_in_bringing_iranians_to_negotiating_table_a_testament_to_her_diplomatic_skill.htmlAt Friday's White House press briefing, White House press secretary Josh Earnest praised former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for helping to bring the Iranians to the negotiating table,

calling it a "testament to her diplomatic skill."¶ Earnest was answering a question from FOX News' Ed Henry

regarding what role Secretary Clinton had in getting these negotiations started.¶ JOSH EARNEST: Secretary Clinton did the difficult diplomatic work that was required to get some of our allies in the region to cooperate with the broader international community to prevent the importation, or at least limit the importation of Iranian oil, and that is what maximized the pressure that has compelled the Iranians to come to the negotiating table. I think that is a testament to her diplomatic skill that we have reached a point that we have convened serious negotiations like the ones that are currently taking place.

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2NC/1NR Impact- Hillary Good- ANSWERS TO: Hillary Bad- Economy

Hillary Clinton is good for the economy- she boosts the middle class tax baseCNN 2015- “Hillary Clinton's economic pitch: Americans 'need a raise'” http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/12/politics/hillary-clinton-economic-policy-speech/, July 12Hillary Clinton pledged to rein in out-of-control financial institutions on Monday as she detailed an economic vision that she said would achieve the "defining economic challenge of our life " of lifting middle-class wages.¶ The Democratic front-runner lambasted a marketplace she said is too obsessed with second-to-second stock trading and quarterly earnings reports, at the expense of long-term growth and stability in a speech that was heavy on politics and light on policy specifics.¶ Clinton even took a veiled shot at President Barack Obama's administration for failing to prosecute individuals for banking crimes in the wake of the 2008 economic downturn.¶ She accused hedge funds and high-frequency traders of "criminal behavior," and promised to "prosecute individuals as well as firms" when they break the law -- which liberals have long clamored for, but the Obama administration largely didn't do. She also said she'd seek to expand on the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial regulatory law designed to prevent future economic crises. ¶ "'Too big to fail' is still too big a problem," Clinton said.¶ The assault on Wall Street pleased liberal groups that have often criticized Clinton. "There were notable overtures to the Elizabeth Warren wing of American politics, and nothing major for the dwindling DLC corporate crowd -- which shows that Clinton sees a rising economic populist tide in our politics and wants to be part of it," said Adam Green, a founder of the Progressive Change Campaign Committee who has at times been a thorn in Clinton's side.¶ Republican National Committee spokeswoman Allison Moore, meanwhile, hit Clinton for failing to explain how she'd pay for the policies she's championing. Moore said that "it's pretty clear: she will have to raise taxes on American families. If she doesn't raise taxes, then she will have to break her promises.¶ "That's Clintonomics: tax hikes or broken promises," she said. "There's no way around it."¶ Held at The New School, a university in lower Manhattan, the event was billed as Clinton's first major economic policy speech. She touched a long list of items she'll expound on in additional events over the summer, and included several sections -- including the attack on Wall Street -- that could help blunt the progressive dissatisfaction demonstrated in Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders' rapid rise up the Democratic primary polls .¶ But Clinton didn't mention Sanders at all -- and instead, she went after her potential Republican rivals.

Economic decline does not cause war- the economy is resilientDrezner 2014 (Daniel W., professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His latest book, The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression, is just out from Oxford University Press; “The Uses of Being Wrong” http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T20276111299&format=GNBFI&sort=DATE,D,H&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T20276111283&cisb=22_T20276111282&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=171267&docNo=1)My new book has an odd intellectual provenance-it starts with me being wrong. Back in the fall of 2008, I was convinced that the open global economic order, centered on the unfettered cross-border exchange of goods, services, and ideas,

was about to collapse as quickly as Lehman Brothers. A half-decade later, the closer I looked at the performance of the system of global economic governance, the clearer it became that the

meltdown I had expected had not come to pass . Though the advanced industrialized

economies suffered prolonged economic slowdowns, at the global level there was no great

surge in trade protectionism, no immediate clampdown on capital flows, and, most

surprisingly, no real rejection of neoliberal economic principles . Given what has normally transpired after severe economic shocks, this outcome was damn near miraculous. Nevertheless, most observers have remained deeply pessimistic about the functioning of the global political economy. Indeed, scholarly books with titles like No One's World: The West, The Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn and The End of American World Order have come to a conclusion the opposite of mine. Now I'm trying to understand how I got the crisis so wrong back in 2008, and why so many scholars continue to be wrong now.

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**Elections Disadvantage Affirmative

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**2AC Blocks

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2AC Hillary Good- Link Turn Strategy 1.Hillary Clinton won’t win in 2016- the democratic base prefers Bernie SandersThe Daily Beast 2015 - “This Is How Hillary Loses the Primary” July 9, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/09/this-is-how-hillary-loses-the-primary.htmlSomething remarkable is happening in American politics. For the first time in our history , a socialist is running a close second and gaining ground on the front-runner in a presidential race.¶ Anyway you look at it, Senator Bernie Sanders is making history and may very well play a deciding role in who will be the next president. How real is the Sanders movement? Well, at this point in his campaign in 2007, Barack Obama had 180,000 donors on his way to setting records with low-donor contributions; Bernie Sanders has 250,000.¶ How’s he doing with voters in early states? “The next time Hillary Rodham Clinton visits New Hampshire, she need not look over her shoulder to find Bernie Sanders; the Vermont Senator is running right alongside her in a statistical dead heat for the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination, according to a CNN/WMUR poll,” wrote The New York Times on June 25.¶ But lest the Sanders surge in New Hampshire be dismissed as neighboring state advantage, the Clinton campaign seems even more worried about losing Iowa. In a carefully orchestrated bit of expectation lowering, Clinton campaign manager Robby Mook recently said, “the caucuses are always such a tough proving ground” and Clinton campaign spokeswoman Jennifer Palmeri said, “We are worried about [Sanders].”¶ Here’s what we know has happened so far in the Democratic primary for president. Since Hillary Clinton started spending money, hiring staff and campaigning, she has lost votes. In Iowa and New Hampshire, she was doing better in the polls in January than she is today. Heck, she had more votes last month than she has today.¶ Politics is about trends and the one thing we know is that trends escalate in speed as elections near. Even starting out with the huge lead that she did, Clinton can’t allow Sanders to keep gaining votes while she loses votes in the hope that the bleeding won’t be fatal in the long run.¶ Thinking that little tricks like getting an “organizer” to introduce the candidate at a rally will change an image built over four decades in politics is like McDonald’s thinking they can take on Starbucks because they now sell espresso.¶ So far Clinton’s approach has been to try to demonstrate to the element of the party that finds Sanders so appealing that she is really one of them. This seems like an extremely flawed strategy that plays directly to Sanders’s strengths . If the contest is going to come down to who can be the most pure liberal, the best bet is on the guy who actually is a socialist. Particularly when running against someone with Hillary Clinton’s long record of being everything that the current left of her party hates.¶ The truth is, Hillary Clinton has supported every U.S. war since Vietnam. She supported not only DOMA, which her husband signed, but a travel ban on those who were HIV

positive. She supported welfare cuts (remember her husband’s efforts toward “ending welfare as we know it”?). She supports the death penalty and campaigned in her husband’s place during the 1992 New Hampshire primary when he left to oversee the execution of an African-American man whose suicide attempt left him brain damaged.

2. Link Turn- the public is weary of surveillance- recent polls prove Americans are more worried about government surveillance than terrorismThe Guardian 2013- July 29, “Major opinion shifts, in the US and Congress, on NSA surveillance and privacy” http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/29/poll-nsa-surveillance-privacy-pewNumerous polls taken since our reporting on previously secret NSA activities first began have strongly suggested major public opinion shifts in how NSA surveillance and privacy are viewed . But a new comprehensive poll released over the weekend weekend by Pew Research provides the most compelling evidence yet of how stark the shift is.¶ Among other things, Pew finds that "a majority of Americans – 56% – say that federal courts fail to provide adequate limits on the telephone and internet data the government is collecting as part of its anti-terrorism efforts." And " an even larger percentage (70%) believes that the government uses this data for purposes other than investigating terrorism." Moreover, "63% think the government is also gathering information about the content of communications." That demonstrates a decisive rejection of the US

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government's three primary defenses of its secret programs: there is adequate oversight; we're not listening

to the content of communication; and the spying is only used to Keep You Safe™.¶ But the most striking finding is this one:¶ "Overall, 47% say their greater concern about government anti-terrorism policies is that they have gone too far in restricting the average person's civil liberties , while 35% say they are more

concerned that policies have not gone far enough to protect the country. This is the first time in Pew Research

polling that more have expressed concern over civil liberties than protection from terrorism

since the question was first asked in 2004 ."¶ For anyone who spent the post-9/11 years defending core liberties against assaults relentlessly perpetrated in the name of terrorism, polling data like that is nothing short of shocking. This Pew visual underscores what a radical shift has occurred from these recent NSA disclosures:

3.It is too early to make predictions about the race, a lot will change between now and November- polls this early are almost always inaccuratePolitico 2015, “The Dirty Little Secrets About 2016 Predictions” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/07/the-dirty-little-secrets-about-2016-predictions-119860.html#.Vaq3mypViko, July 8Election after election around the world has proven that electoral predictions aren’t always to be trusted. In March, analysts failed to foresee Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s victory. In May, most people thought the Tories were doomed in England. Last weekend, pollsters got the Greek referendum result badly wrong. For political forecasters like me, the big worry is that America is next.¶ The sudden emergence of Nate Silver of FiveThirtyEight.com in 2008 helped to bring scores of previously obscure electoral forecasters to the forefront of American culture, and enabled dozens of writers with similar interests to make careers out of what looked like a hobby. But the amount of faith the public now puts in us is misplaced. Electoral modelers have a nerdy little secret: We aren’t oracles.

Draw back the curtain, and you’ll see that we are only as good as the polls we rely on and the models we invent. And there are real problems with both.¶ That’s why the “data journalism” movement contains the seeds of

its own destruction. The danger lies in data journalists’ tendency to belittle skeptics and other analysts who get it wrong. Worse is the distinct tendency to downplay how much uncertainty there is around our forecasts. This is a shame, because sooner or later—probably sooner—the models are going to miss in an American presidential election and data journalism as a whole is going to suffer.¶ Consider Silver (who is, to his credit, fastidious about pointing out the limits and uncertainty surrounding his predictions). He became a household name in 2008 and 2012 by insisting, correctly, that Barack Obama remained the favorite, even when the polling looked “iffy.” But it isn’t at all difficult to imagine an alternate universe where Silver’s predictions went awry. In 2008, if the financial collapse had come two months later, whether Obama would still have won is debatable. Or, as Silver himself likes to point out, the polls in 2012 were actually off by about three points in the Republicans’ favor. There is no reason they might not have been off by a similar amount in the opposite direction, which would have resulted in President Romney.

4. Hillary Clinton not key to prevent sanctions- she does not trust IranBusiness Insider 2015, - “CLINTON: I don't trust the Iranians” July 16, http://www.businessinsider.com/clinton-i-dont-trust-the-iranians-2015-7Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton said on Thursday that critics of the Iran nuclear deal had a "respectable argument."¶ "There are people on the other side of this whom I respect, who have said very

clearly: 'I can’t support it, I think it’s a mistake.' They believe the Iranians will cheat," Clinton said at a town hall meeting in Dover, New Hampshire. "I think that is a respectable argument. However, I think it’s important to ask what are our alternatives."¶ "Do I trust the Iranians?" she added. "Absolutely not."

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5. An Iranian war will not go nuclear- deterrence will prevent escalationSappenfield 2006 (Mark, staff, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0718/p01s01-wome.html July 18)Yet there are signs of increasing sophistication, perhaps due to help from Iran, experts say. On

Friday, Hezbollah launched a more advanced missile, which struck an Israeli warship. Hizbullah rockets are also penetrating deeper into Israel than ever before, with several striking Haifa, Israel's third-largest city, on Sunday. Israel claims that four of the missiles were the Iranian-made Fajr-3, with a 28-mile range. For its part, Israel has so far relied mostly on air strikes as its military response. Monday, Israel acknowledged that its forces had invaded Lebanon, though they returned shortly after. Israel invaded southern Lebanon in 1982. Its army occupied the territory for three years, then withdrew because of the strain of the occupation and broad international condemnation. History also offers a note of caution to Israel's foes. In 1967, Israel responded to Egyptian aggression by taking the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Years later, when

Syria and Israel fought over control of Lebanon in 1982, Israeli jet fighters reportedly shot down 80 Syrian planes without losing any of its own. Israel's military superiority is built on American support and a skill honed by decades of fighting for the very existence of the nation. Israel receives the best equipment that the United States can offer its allies. "They have some of the most highly advanced weapons systems in the world," says Dr. Jones. Israel's air force, in particular, has no rival in the region, which makes air strikes the most effective – and most probable – means of Israeli retaliation and aggression. Yet Israel has so far focused most of its attacks on Lebanon, despite Hizbullah's links to Syria and Iran. Indeed, both sides have long used Lebanon as a way to harass the other, since Lebanon's military is almost irrelevant, analysts say. Even though Israel accuses Syria and Iran of backing Hizbullah's attacks, it hesitates to attack them directly. The reason is simple: Though Syria's aging military is no match for Israel's, it has missiles that could strike any part of Israel, as well as stocks of chemical weapons. Moreover, the 60 miles from the Israeli border to the Syrian capital of Damascus is one of the most heavily fortified zones in the world. "Syria doesn't have the capacity to win [a war against

Israel], but it can cause lots of suffering," says Nadav Morag, former senior director for domestic policy in the Israel National Security Council. Iran more formidable than Syria By contrast,

Iran presents a far more formidable challenge – but one that is so remote from Israel geographically as to make hostilities difficult. As with Syria, Iran's greatest threat lies in its missiles. Yet the prospect of firing missiles at America's greatest ally – at a time when it is surrounded by American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan – is decidedly risky. Likewise, the

notion of an Israeli air strike against Iran presents enormous logistical hurdles. Although Iran does not possess a credible air force and has only mid-grade Russian air-defense systems to contend with Israeli jets, Israel would surely be denied overfly rights by the Arab countries that surround them, meaning it would have to take a circuitous and difficult oversea route to Iran. It would probably be a measure taken only as a last resort., Mr. Morag says.

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2AC Hillary Good – Impact Turn Strategy

1.Hillary Clinton won’t win in 2016- the democratic base prefers Bernie SandersThe Daily Beast 2015- “This Is How Hillary Loses the Primary” July 9 http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/09/this-is-how-hillary-loses-the-primary.htmlSomething remarkable is happening in American politics. For the first time in our history , a socialist is running a close second and gaining ground on the front-runner in a presidential race.¶ Anyway you look at it, Senator Bernie Sanders is making history and may very well play a deciding role in who will be the next president. How real is the Sanders movement? Well, at this point in his campaign in 2007, Barack Obama had 180,000 donors on his way to setting records with low-donor contributions; Bernie Sanders has 250,000.¶ How’s he doing with voters in early states? “The next time Hillary Rodham Clinton visits New Hampshire, she need not look over her shoulder to find Bernie Sanders; the Vermont Senator is running right alongside her in a statistical dead heat for the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination, according to a CNN/WMUR poll,” wrote The New York Times on June 25.¶ But lest the Sanders surge in New Hampshire be dismissed as neighboring state advantage, the Clinton campaign seems even more worried about losing Iowa. In a carefully orchestrated bit of expectation lowering, Clinton campaign manager Robby Mook recently said, “the caucuses are always such a tough proving ground” and Clinton campaign spokeswoman Jennifer Palmeri said, “We are worried about [Sanders].”¶ Here’s what we know has happened so far in the Democratic primary for president. Since Hillary Clinton started spending money, hiring staff and campaigning, she has lost votes. In Iowa and New Hampshire, she was doing better in the polls in January than she is today. Heck, she had more votes last month than she has today.¶ Politics is about trends and the one thing we know is that trends escalate in speed as elections near. Even starting out with the huge lead that she did, Clinton can’t allow Sanders to keep gaining votes while she loses votes in the hope that the bleeding won’t be fatal in the long run.¶ Thinking that little tricks like getting an “organizer” to introduce the candidate at a rally will change an image built over four decades in politics is like McDonald’s thinking they can take on Starbucks because they now sell espresso.¶ So far Clinton’s approach has been to try to demonstrate to the element of the party that finds Sanders so appealing that she is really one of them. This seems like an extremely flawed strategy that plays directly to Sanders’s strengths . If the contest is going to come down to who can be the most pure liberal, the best bet is on the guy who actually is a socialist. Particularly when running against someone with Hillary Clinton’s long record of being everything that the current left of her party hates.¶ The truth is, Hillary Clinton has supported every U.S. war since Vietnam. She supported not only DOMA, which her husband signed, but a travel ban on those who were HIV

positive. She supported welfare cuts (remember her husband’s efforts toward “ending welfare as we know it”?). She supports the death penalty and campaigned in her husband’s place during the 1992 New Hampshire primary when he left to oversee the execution of an African-American man whose suicide attempt left him brain damaged.

2. Extend the 1NC link evidence- the plan is unpopular with voters, makes Hillary Clinton lose

3. That’s good- Hillary Clinton will sabotage progress on Iran- she’s suspicious of their intentions

NEW YORK TIMES 2015 - New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/04/02/saying-the-onus-is-on-iran-hillary-clinton-calls-nuclear-framework-an-important-step, April 2Mrs. Clinton, who is all but certain to seek the presidency in 2016, said she supported the Obama administration in trying, between now and June, to achieve a deal that “verifiably cuts off all of Iran’s paths to a nuclear weapon, imposes an intrusive inspection program with no sites off limits, extends breakout time, and spells out clear and overwhelming consequences for violations.”¶ “The onus is on Iran and the bar must be set high,” she said.¶ “It can never be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon. It is also vital that these efforts be part of a comprehensive strategy to check Iran’s regional ambitions,

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defend our allies and partners and reinforce American leadership in the Middle East.”¶ Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has repeatedly criticized the negotiations to curtail Iran’s nuclear program as ineffective, and on Wednesday he said that a deal would “threaten the survival” of Israel.¶ Mrs. Clinton, who was secretary of state under Mr. Obama when the seeds of the Iran negotiations began, has been measured in discussing them publicly over the last 18 months, supporting the administration but also sounding a note of caution about whether Iran would honor a deal.

4. A Clinton presidency causes economic decline- her policy proposals are too outmoded

National Review 2015 - “Hillary Clinton’s Economic Policy Ideas Belong in 1947” July 17 , http://www.nationalreview.com/article/421301/hillary-clinton-economic-policy-ideas-outdatedBut laced throughout the sterile verbiage is an assumption that was more widely shared by policy elites and ordinary American voters in 1947, the year Hillary Clinton was born, than it is today, 68 years

later. That is the assumption that government is capable of solving just about every problem. You can understand why that confidence was strong in Clinton’s early years. The United States had just won a world war and was facing not the widely predicted resumption of the Depression of the 1930s but the surging postwar prosperity that is still fondly remembered by many. “We must drive steady income growth,” Clinton said, as if that were as simple as popping those new automatic-transmission shift levers into D. “Let’s build those faster broadband networks,” which private firms were building until Barack Obama demanded an FCC network-neutrality ruling. We must provide “quality, affordable childcare,” as if government were good at this. “Other trends need to change,” Clinton said, including “quarterly capitalism,” stock buybacks, and “cut-and-run shareholders who act more like old-school corporate raiders.” This sounds like a call to return to the behavior of dominant big businesses in the early postwar years, when they worked in tandem with big government and big labor — and faced little foreign competition or market discipline . As for new growing businesses, Clinton hailed the “on-demand or so-called gig economy,” but said it raises “hard questions about workplace protections and what a good job will look like in the future .” She endorsed the Obama extension of overtime to $50,000-plus employees and said, “We have to get serious about supporting union workers.” America In other words, let’s try to slam the growing flexible economy into the straitjacket of the rigid regulations and the union contracts of half a century ago . Everybody should

punch a time clock and work the same number of hours, in accordance with thousands of pages of detailed work rules. That template hasn’t produced much economic growth since the two postwar decades. But it would siphon a lot of money via union dues from the private sector to the Democratic party . On top of

that, Clinton would expand paid family days, mandate more sick leave, increase overtime pay, and raise the minimum wage even higher — measures that would tend to subsidize or produce non-work in an economy that has the lowest work-force participation in nearly 40 years. She would make “investments in cleaner renewable energy” — Solyndra? — and spend billions on universal pre-kindergarten, even though researchers (including the Obama administration’s Department of Health and Human Services) say it has no lasting benefit.

5. Lasting economic growth is necessary to prevent a nuclear warMead 2009 (Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)

So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are

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determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well.If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone

powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American

Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward

Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

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**A2- Hillary Good- No Link

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2AC Hillary Good- Drone Affirmative- No Link

Public opposition to drones is increasing- the plan is key to shore up supportGreenwald 2013 (Glenn Greenwald, Business Insider, “GLENN GREENWALD: The US Needs To Wake Up To Threat Of Domestic Drones”, http://www.businessinsider.com/drone-threats-strikes-us-2013-3, March 30, 2013)

Notably, this may be one area where an actual bipartisan/trans-partisan alliance can

meaningfully emerge , as most advocates working on these issues with whom I've spoken say that libertarian-minded GOP state legislators have been as responsive as more left-wing Democratic ones in working to impose some limits. One bill now pending in Congress would prohibit the use of surveillance drones on US soil in the absence of a specific search warrant, and has bipartisan

support . Only the most authoritarian among us will be incapable of understanding the multiple dangers posed by a domestic drone regime (particularly when their party is in control of the government and they are incapable of perceiving threats from

increased state police power). But the proliferation of domestic drones affords a real opportunity to forge an enduring coalition in defense of core privacy and other rights that transcends partisan allegiance , by working toward meaningful limits on their use. Making people aware of exactly what these unique threats are from a domestic drone regime is the key first step in constructing that coalition.

Here’s more evidence- the plan would help democrats’ chances in 2016Rees 2013 (Jennifer Rees is based in Seattle, Washington, United States of America, and is an Anchor for Allvoices, “Legislators push for restricted domestic drone use”, http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/14638539-legislators-push-for-legislation-to-restrict-domestic-use-of-drones, May 19, 2013)Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner's Opening Statement on 'Clean Up Government Act of 2011' In the wake of rising apprehensions over using drones for domestic surveillance purposes, a bipartisan group of legislators is trying to restrict the use of unmanned observation aircraft or "eyes in the sky.” Republican Reps. James Sensenbrenner and Ted Poe have teamed up with Democrat Rep. Zoe Lofgren to sponsor legislation aimed at codifying due process shields for US citizens regarding

drones. It would also prohibit the use of armed drones in the US. "Every advancement in crime fighting

technology, from wiretaps to DNA, has resulted in courts carving out the Constitutional limits within which the police operate," Sensenbrenner said at a House Judiciary subcommittee hearing Friday on the issues surrounding drones, according to Fox News. Virginia, Florida, Montana and Idaho have already approved laws to restrict the use of drones by police. According to a computation by the American Civil Liberties Union, laws to restrict drone use has been proposed in 41 states and is operational in 32 states.

Moreover, pressure is increasing at the federal level to restrict the domestic use of drones. It is pertinent to mention here that the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations has proposed to hold a hearing called "Eyes in the Sky: The Domestic Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems."

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2AC Hillary Good- Stingray Affirmative- No Link

The public has been clamoring for more oversight over the use of stingray technology- the plan is a positive for democrats Washington Post 2015- “Secrecy around police surveillance equipment proves a case’s undoing” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secrecy-around-police-surveillance-equipment-proves-a-cases-undoing/2015/02/22/ce72308a-b7ac-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html, Feb 22The secrecy surrounding the device’s use has begun to prompt a backlash in cities across the country. In Baltimore, a judge is pushing back against the refusal of police officers to answer questions while testifying. In Charlotte, following a newspaper investigation, the state’s attorney is reviewing whether prosecutors illegally withheld information about the device’s use from defendants. In Tacoma, Wash., after a separate newspaper investigation found that judges in almost 200 cases had no idea they

were issuing orders for the StingRay, the courts set new rules requiring police to disclose the tool’s use. The state legislature is weighing a bill to regulate police use of the equipment.¶ The FBI and Tallahassee police say that the device is used only with an appropriate court order and that they do not collect the content of calls or text messages. The FBI also said it retains only location data that is relevant to an investigation and immediately discards all other data.¶ So far, there is virtually no case law on how the Fourth Amendment — which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures — should apply to this technology.

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2AC Hillary Good- Security Letters - No Link

The public is asking for more oversight over security lettersHuffington Post 2015- Matt Sledge, “The Gaping Hole In Obama's FBI Surveillance Reform” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/04/national-security-letter-reform_n_6617572.html, Feb 2For years, Crocker and other lawyers at the privacy watchdog have been fighting to force the federal government to reveal in court the name of a phone company challenging one gag order. A federal district judge handed the foundation a major victory in 2013, ruling that the gag order violates the First

Amendment's right to free speech. The case -- which stems from a 2011 government order -- has remained on appeal since then.¶

The FBI has wielded national security letters for decades, but the authority to do so was vastly expanded by the post-9/11 Patriot Act. Department of Justice inspector general reports released since then have

documented widespread abuse of the letters. But the bureau keeps using them, to the tune of 21,000 letters in the 2012 fiscal year.¶ Because the recipients of all those letters are often barred by the gag orders from speaking out, their voices in the debate has been silenced . That changed a little in 2010, when Nicholas Merrill was finally able to reveal as the result of a long court battle that his small Internet service provider had received a letter -- in 2004.¶ Merrill was back in court in December, trying to force the government to allow him to reveal what it had sought (he never supplied them with any of data after the government backed down on its original request, but that portion of the gag order still stands).¶ If the reforms announced this week have affected his case, Merrill wrote to HuffPost in an email, "nobody has told me." He said the government has shown no sign of surrender in trying to block him from speaking out.¶ The White House last year rejected a review panel's proposal to make national security letters subject to court order. Administration counterterrorism adviser Lisa Monaco heralded the minor changes to some national security letters' gag orders in a statement on Tuesday.¶ Merrill was unimpressed.¶ "The issue at hand is that the government doesn't want me to discuss what was in the third page of the (national security letter) I received, namely, the types of data they demanded (and I did not hand over)," Merrill wrote. "The problem with not being able to discuss that openly, is that is the heart of the public policy issue -- what kinds of information can the government get on an innocent citizen without a warrant, or even any suspicion of wrongdoing.”

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**States COUNTERPLAN Negative

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1NC States Counterplan Counterplan Text: The 50 states and all relevant territories should <insert affirmative plan text>

Solvency: The counterplan solves- The 50 states have taken the lead on protecting individuals from federal government surveillance BBC 2015- April 27, “US states take aim at NSA over warrantless surveillance” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32487971These days Stickland, a Texas state representative, isn't spending most of his time worrying about the government "stealing" through high taxes or onerous regulation - standard political fare for the kind of conservatives who populate the state capitol in Austin.¶ Instead his cause has been what he sees as government theft of privacy - the unlawful acquisition by the National Security Agency of personal information in the form of metadata about electronic communications by US citizens.¶ The particular target of his ire is the Texas Cryptologic Center, an NSA facility located near San Antonio. He has proposed a state law cutting off the building's access to public utilities - water and electricity - until the agency ceases what he says is unconstitutional warrantless data collection.¶ "I believe the first role of government is to protect the personal rights and liberties of its citizens," says the Republican, who has represented a district near Dallas for two years . "Before we build a road or anything else, we have to ensure that those exist for every Texan."¶ "I believe that it is my responsibility as a representative at the state level to fight against that kind of tyranny," he continues. "Whether it's from the federal government or a foreign entity, it doesn't matter."¶ The Texas bill is just one of the most recent examples of a growing movement among states - both liberal and conservative - to end government support for NSA facilities.¶

Last year California became the first to pass what's been called a Fourth Amendment Protection Act. Its law prohibited the state from providing support to a federal agency "to collect electronically stored information or metadata of any person if the state has actual knowledge that the request constitutes an illegal or unconstitutional collection".¶ This year 15 other states have introduced some kind of anti-NSA legislation, including politically diverse locations like liberal Washington and Maryland and conservative Oklahoma and Mississippi.¶ The movement has been championed by the Tenth Amendment Center and its OffNow coalition, which provides support and model legislation to politicians like Stickland interested in challenging the NSA.¶ According to Mike Maharrey, communications director for the centre, the California law, with its "actual knowledge" provision, is significantly weaker than they had hoped - but a good first step in the nation's most populous state.¶ He says they came up with the suggested legislation because they don't trust the US Congress to do anything to keep the NSA in check. The Patriot Act, which authorises the NSA surveillance programme, is up for renewal in May, and Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has already proposed that it be extended to 2020.¶ "I'm not really faithful in things that are going on in Washington, DC," he says. "People can make a difference more rapidly and more readily at the state level."¶ He adds that state politicians are generally more responsive to their constituents. "A lot of phone calls make a state legislator really nervous," he says. Maharrey says his proposed legislation is just the latest example of a US tradition of states expressing their independence from an intrusive federal government. He says the movement's inspiration was the efforts of Northern states to undermine the federal requirement to return fugitive slaves prior to the Civil War.¶ "It's called the anti-commandeering doctrine," he says. "The federal government cannot force the states to provide personnel or resources to any federal regulation or federal act or federal process. If the feds want to do it they can do it, but they have to do it themselves."

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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- Solvency- Overview

Extend our 1NC BBC evidence, the states are more responsible with surveillance than the federal government- our evidence indicates that states have already begun passing legislation to curb government intrusion, proving that they can do the plan

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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- Solvency- Drone Aff States and localities are taking the lead on banning domestic drone surveillance Swanson 2013 - David, author War is a Lie “Banning Surveillance: What States and Localities Can Do About Drones” http://www.occupy.com/article/banning-surveillance-what-states-and-localities-can-do-about-drones

Charlottesville, Va., passed a resolution that urged the state of Virginia to adopt a two-year moratorium on drones (which it did), urged both Virginia and the U.S. Congress to prohibit information obtained from the domestic use of drones from being introduced into court, and to preclude the domestic use of drones equipped with "anti-personnel devices, meaning any projectile, chemical, electrical, directed-energy (visible or invisible), or other device designed to harm, incapacitate, or otherwise negatively impact a human being." It also pledged that Charlottesville would "abstain from similar uses with city-owned, leased, or borrowed drones."¶ St. Bonifacius, Minn., passed a resolution with the same language as Charlottesville, plus a ban on anyone operating a drone "within the airspace of the city," making a first offense a misdemeanor and a repeat offense a felony.¶ Evanston, Ill., passed a resolution establishing a two-year moratorium on the use of drones in the city with exceptions for hobby and model aircraft and for non-military research, and making the same recommendations to the

state and Congress as Charlottesville and St. Bonifacius.¶ Northampton, Mass., passed a resolution urging the U.S. government to end its practice of extrajudicial killing with drones, affirming that within the city limits "the navigable airspace for drone aircraft shall not be expanded below the long-established airspace for manned aircraft" and that "landowners subject to state laws and local ordinances have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the airspace and that no drone aircraft shall have the 'public right of transit' through this private property," and urging the state and Congress and the FAA "to respect legal precedent and constitutional guarantees of privacy, property rights, and local sovereignty in all matters pertaining to drone aircraft and navigable airspace."¶ Other cities, towns, and counties should be able to pass similar resolutions. Of course, stronger and more

comprehensive resolutions are best. But most people who learned about the four resolutions above just leaned that these four cities had "banned drones" or "passed an anti-drone resolution."¶ The

details are less important in terms of building national momentum against objectionable uses of drones. By including both surveillance and weaponized drones, as all four cities have done, a resolution campaign can find broader support. By including just one issue, a resolution might meet fewer objections. Asking a city just to make recommendations to a state and the nation might also meet less resistance than asking the city to take actions itself. Less can be more.¶ Localities have a role in national policy . City councilors and members of boards of supervisors take an oath to

support the Constitution of the United States. Cities and towns routinely send petitions to Congress for all kinds of requests. This is allowed under Clause 3, Rule XII, Section 819, of the Rules of the House of Representatives. This clause is routinely used to accept petitions from cities, and memorials from states.¶ The same is established in the Jefferson Manual, the rulebook for the House originally written by Thomas Jefferson for the Senate. In 1967, a court in California ruled (Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal.2d 325) that "one of the purposes of local government is to represent its citizens before the Congress, the Legislature, and administrative agencies in matters over which the local government has no power. Even in matters of foreign policy it is not uncommon for local legislative bodies to make their positions known."¶ Abolitionists passed local resolutions against U.S. policies on slavery. The anti-apartheid movement did the same, as did the nuclear freeze movement, the movement against the PATRIOT Act, the movement in favor of the Kyoto Protocol, etc. No locality is an island. If we become environmentally sustainable, others will ruin our climate. If we ban assault weapons, they'll arrive at our borders. And if the skies of the United States are filled with drones, it will become ever more difficult for any city or state to keep them out.

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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- Solvency- Security Letters

The states can legally deny the FBI’s security letter- this solves the affirmative’s internal linksDoyle 2014- Charles, Senior Specialist in American Public Law “National Security Letters in¶

Foreign Intelligence Investigations:¶ Legal Background” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33320.pdf¶

The ancestor of the first NSL letter provision is a statutory exception to privacy protections¶ afforded by the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA).14 Its history is not particularly instructive¶ and consists primarily of a determination that the exception in its original form should not be too¶ broadly construed.15 But the exception was just that, an exception. It was neither an affirmative¶ grant of authority to request information nor a command to financial institutions to provided¶ information when asked. It removed the restrictions on the release of customer information¶

imposed on financial institutions by the Right to Financial Privacy Act, but it left them free to¶

decline to comply when asked to do so.¶ [I]n certain significant instances, financial institutions [had] declined to grant

the FBI access¶ to financial records in response to requests under [S]ection 1114(a). The FBI informed the¶ Committee that the problem occurs particularly in States which have State constitutional¶ privacy protection provisions or State banking privacy laws. In those States, financial¶ institutions decline to grant the FBI access because State law prohibits them from granting¶ such access and the RFPA, since it permits but does not mandate such access, does not¶ override State law. In such a situation, the concerned financial institutions which might¶ otherwise desire to grant the FBI access to a customer’s record will not do so, because State law does not allow such cooperation, and cooperation might expose them to liability to the¶ customer whose records the FBI sought access. H.Rept. 99-690, at 15-6 (1986).

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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- Solvency- Stingray Affirmative

Some state governments have already taken the lead on banning warrantless tracking of cellphones- other states are sure to followWatchdog.org 2015 -Eric Boehm, bureau chief Pennsylvania Independent, May 29th“State governments taking the ‘sting’ out of surveillance”, 5/29

State governments are laying down an example for Congress to follow when it comes to limiting electronic surveillance.¶ As Congress continues to debate the future of the National Security Agency’s telephone metadata collection program, Washington state has banned the warrant-less use of similar technology that allows law enforcement to track cell phones . Police using so-called “stingrays,” also known as simulated cell towers, now have to get approval from a judge, and they will have to use the devices to seek specific individuals rather than sweeping all calls in a certain area.¶ “The warrant-less, illegal collection of data, not only by the federal government but by our state agencies; we understand that it violates the constitution,” said state Rep. David Taylor, R-Yakima, who sponsored the bill. “It’s a civil liberties issue, a civil rights issue; I think it’s an issue that’s ripe for everybody.”¶ Ballotpedia¶ SHUT IT DOWN: State Rep. David Taylor, R-Yakima, says states must place limits on illegal, warrant-less electronic surveillance by law enforcement.¶ The bill got broad bipartisan support as it sailed through the Washington Legislature and was signed earlier this month by Gov. Jay Inslee, a Democrat. ¶

Washington becomes the first state to place such limitations on the use of stingrays. A few states are considering similar bills and one other, Virginia, has already approved one.¶ Taylor told Watchdog.org he believes the stingray technology can be a useful tool for law enforcement, but without requiring a warrant it was wide open for abuse.¶ Stingrays work by essentially fooling cell phones into thinking they’re cell towers. The devices, about the size of a small suitcase, can be used to monitor calls and track all phones within a given area.¶ They’ve been used by the FBI and local police since at least 2008, but their existence has been kept under wraps thanks to non-disclosure agreements between the feds, local cops and the company that manufactures the devices.¶ Use of stingray devices did not become public knowledge until 2013, when the ACLU successfully exposed the FBI’s use of the surveillance technology with a Freedom of Information Act request.¶ In Washington, an investigation by the Tacoma News Tribune revealed judges had given police the authority to use stingrays — apparently without realizing exactly what they were doing.¶ “If they use it wisely and within limits, that’s one thing,” Ronald Culpepper, the presiding judge of Pierce County Superior Court, told the newspaper last year. “I would certainly personally have some concerns about just sweeping up information from non-involved and innocent parties — and to do it with a whole neighborhood? That’s concerning.”¶ Taylor says the revelation prompted his legislation.¶ In addition to requiring police to get a warrant from a judge before using a stingray device in an investigation, the new law requires that police disclose to the judge how they intend to use the technology. Police are also required to immediately delete any data collected on individuals that are not a part of the investigation.¶ ¶ Image via ACLU¶ LISTENING IN: The FBI has given stingray technology to local police departments in a number of states, but the secrecy of the program means no one is sure exactly how many departments are using them.¶

Police and law enforcement groups in Washington seem to agree with Taylor. Though they wield considerable power in state governments across the country, law enforcement lobbyists did not attempt to fight the bill’s passage.¶ The lack of opposition was a surprise to Taylor, who said he expected a lengthy battle.¶ “Its incumbent upon each and every one of us as individual states to take action and correct the situation,” Taylor told Watchdog.org. “We did it and I hope other states will follow suit.”¶ But police in other states are putting up a fight.¶ In California, a similar bill requiring a warrant before cops can use stingrays and other electronic surveillance technology is working its way through the Legislature.¶ But law enforcement groups say the legislation would hurt their ability to go after child predators.¶ The bill has been stuck in the committee process since mid-March, but a hearing is scheduled for this week.¶ In Texas, two bills would place similar restrictions on how and when cell phone interceptor technology could be used by law enforcement.¶ And Virginia actually beat Washington to the punch. The state Legislature there approved a bill requiring a warrant before stingrays can be used, but even though the bill was signed by Gov. Terry McAuliffe in March, it will not become law until July.¶ In signing the Washington measure, Inslee used his executive discretion to waive the waiting period and make the new law effective immediately.¶ The ACLU says at least 50 police agencies in 20 states have been revealed to use the devices, but the exact number is unknown. It has praised legislative and judicial efforts, like the one in Washington, to place limitations on law enforcement’s ability to cast a wide net of electronic surveillance.¶ “Around the country, local police departments and the FBI have engaged in a campaign to conceal the use of cell site simulators from judges and from the public,” said Jared Friend, who directs the ACLU of Washington State on issues of technology and liberty.

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“These devices epitomize the continuing militarization of local law enforcement and should not be free from judicial and public scrutiny.”

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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- ANSWERS TO: Permutation

1. Prefer the counterplan alone

a. Extend our 1NC BBC evidence; the federal government is not suited to ensure privacy protections, national security concerns will always trump individual liberty. However, the states have proven that they respond to the public’s privacy concerns with concrete legislative reductions in domestic surveillance

b. The permutation links to the net benefit- the plan is perceived as a democratic president being “soft” on national security matters- this decreases the chances of a Hillary Clinton presidency

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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- ANSWERS TO: Fifty State Fiat Bad

50 state fiat is good

1. Education- weighing the costs and benefits of federal versus state policy is crucial to effective policymaking skills- most real world policy making involves deciding whether to implement a policy at the local or federal level

2. Ground- the topic is very large and most of the literature is skewed affirmative- without the States Counterplan, the negative is stuck defending the status quo. The affirmative also has built in advantages such as the first and last speech

3. Reject the argument not the team- if the affirmative wins that 50 state fiat is illegitimate do not vote us down. Instead, disregard the COUNTERPLAN and weigh the net benefit against the affirmative’s impacts

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**States COUNTERPLAN Affirmative

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2AC- States Counterplan 1. Permutation do both- the counterplan is not functionally competitive-

the 50 states and the USFG can do the plan- this would shield the link to the net benefit, if the 50 states do the affirmative along with the federal government, it will not spur backlash against the democrats or with members of congress

2. The counterplan cannot solve- the most pernicious forms of surveillance occur at the federal level, the counterplan has no jurisdiction over FBI surveillance

NEW YORK TIMES 2015- New York Times, “F.B.I. Is Broadening Surveillance Role, Report Shows” http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/us/politics/beyond-nsa-fbi-is-assuming-a-larger-surveillance-role-report-shows.htmlWASHINGTON — Although the government’s warrantless surveillance¶ program is associated with the National Security Agency, the Federal¶ Bureau of Investigation has gradually become a significant player in¶ administering it , a newly declassified report shows.¶ In 2008, according to the report, the F.B.I. assumed the power to¶ review email accounts the N.S.A. wanted to collect through the “Prism” ¶

system, which collects emails of foreigners from providers like Yahoo and¶ Google. The bureau’s top lawyer, Valerie E. Caproni, who is now a Federal¶ District Court judge, developed procedures to make sure no such accounts¶ belonged to Americans.¶ Then, in October 2009, the F.B.I. started retaining copies of¶ unprocessed communications gathered without a warrant to analyze for its¶ own purposes. And in April 2012, the bureau began nominating new email¶ accounts and phone numbers belonging to foreigners for collection,¶ including through the N.S.A.’s “upstream” system, which collects¶ communications transiting network switches.¶ That information is in a 231-page study by the Justice Department’s¶ inspector general about the F.B.I.’s activities under the FISA Amendments¶ Act of 2008, which authorized the surveillance program . The report was¶ entirely classified when completed in September 2012. But the government has now made a semi-redacted version of the report public in response to a¶ Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by The New York Times.¶ The Times filed the lawsuit after a wave of declassifications about¶ government surveillance activities in response to leaks by the former¶ intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden.¶ The report was delivered late Friday to The Times. In it, the inspector¶ general, Michael E. Horowitz, concluded that the F.B.I. was doing a good¶ job in making sure that the email accounts targeted for warrantless¶ collection belonged to noncitizens abroad.¶ But parts of the report remained heavily redacted. For example, there¶ was only one uncensored reference to the Prism system. It was not clear¶ why the Justice Department had redacted all the other references to Prism¶ in the report; the name of that program and many details about it have¶ been declassified and were discussed in a July 2014 report by the Privacy¶ and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.¶ David McCraw, a Times lawyer, said the newspaper may challenge the¶ redactions at a later stage in the Freedom of Information Act litigation.¶ The report also filled in a gap about the evolving legality of the¶

warrantless wiretapping program, which traces back to a decision by¶ President George W. Bush in October 2001 to direct the N.S.A. to collect¶ Americans’ international phone calls and emails, from network locations on¶ domestic soil, without the individual warrants required by the Foreign¶ Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA . The Times revealed that program in¶ December 2005.¶ After the article appeared, telecommunications providers that had¶ voluntarily participated in the program were sued, and a Federal District¶ Court judge in Detroit ruled that the program was illegal, although that¶ decision was later vacated. The Bush administration sought to put the¶ program on more solid legal footing by gaining orders from the Foreign¶ Intelligence Surveillance Court approving it In January 2007, the Bush administration persuaded the court’s Judge¶ Malcolm Howard to issue an order to telephone and network companies¶ requiring them to let the security agency target foreigners’ accounts for¶ collection without individual warrants. But in April 2007, when the order¶ came up for renewal before Judge Roger Vinson, he said that it was illegal.¶ Judge Vinson’s resistance led Congress to enact, in August 2007, the¶ Protect America Act, a temporary law permitting warrantless surveillance¶ of foreigners from domestic network locations. The next year, Congress¶ replaced that law with the FISA Amendments Act.¶ Last month, as a result of separate Freedom of Information Act¶ lawsuits by The Times and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the¶ government declassified the identities of the judges who disagreed in early¶ 2007 and several court filings from

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that episode. But it remained unclear¶ what the N.S.A. had done in June and July of 2007.¶ The newly declassified report said Judge Vinson issued an order on¶ May 31, 2007, that allowed existing surveillance to continue by approving¶ collection on a long list of specific foreign phone numbers and email ¶

addresses. But after that, when the agency wanted to start wiretapping an¶ additional person, it had to ask the court for permission.¶ The report said that “the rigorous nature of the FISA Court’s probable¶ cause review of new selectors submitted to the various FISA Court judges¶ following Judge Vinson’s May 31, 2007, order caused the N.S.A. to place¶ fewer foreign selectors under coverage than it wanted to.” That and other¶ factors “combined to accelerate the government’s efforts” to persuade¶ Congress to enact the Protect America Act.

3. 50 State Fiat is a reason to reject the team

A. Not real world- surveillance practices that occur at the federal level are under USFG jurisdiction and cannot be wished away by state actors

B. Education- the topic is about the federal government curtailing its surveillance, the negative shifts the discussion towards 50 state solvency, which was not the framers’ intention for the resolution

C. Ground- it’s unfair for the affirmative to have to defend against a counterplan that results in the entirety of the plan, there is not much literature on a difference between the federal and state governments doing the plan

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2AC- States COUNTERPLAN- Solvency Deficit- Drone Affirmative

1. The COUNTERPLAN cannot solve the privacy advantage- our 1AC evidence is predicated on FBI use of drones, this is the federal bureau of investigation, and thus, the states do not have the jurisdiction to regulate FBI activity

2. The COUNTERPLAN cannot solve the credibility advantage- our 1AC internal link evidence states that the United States erodes international confidence in human rights regimes by not upholding their commitments- the states cannot resolve international perception only federal action can, the impacts are global warming and hegemony

3. The COUNTERPLAN cannot solve the innovation advantage- our 1AC evidence indicates that state governments are banning drones to resolve privacy concerns, this triggers the impact to the advantage- the 1ac solvency evidence indicates that federal legislation is necessary to reform drones to alleviate privacy concerns, which boosts the commercial drone industry, the impact is conflict through food scarcity

4. Here’s more evidence- the FBI is operating a secret fleet of drones, the states cannot solveHuffington Post 2015- “FBI Confirms Wide-Scale Use Of Surveillance Flights Over U.S. Cities” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/02/fbi-surveillance-flights_n_7490396.html, June 2

The FBI is operating a small air force with scores of low-flying planes across the U.S. carrying video and, at times, cellphone surveillance technology -- all hidden behind fictitious companies that are fronts

for the government, The Associated Press has learned.¶ The planes' surveillance equipment is generally used without a judge's approval, and the FBI said the flights are used for specific, ongoing investigations . In a recent 30-day period, the agency flew above more than 30 cities in 11 states across the country, an AP review found.¶ Aerial surveillance represents a changing frontier for law enforcement, providing

what the government maintains is an important tool in criminal, terrorism or intelligence probes. But the program raises questions about whether there should be updated policies protecting civil liberties as new technologies pose intrusive opportunities for government spying .

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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/02/fbi-surveillance-flights_n_7490396.html

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/02/fbi-surveillance-flights_n_7490396.html


2AC- States COUNTERPLAN- Solvency Deficit- Security Letters Affirmative

1. The COUNTERPLAN cannot solve any of the case- extend our 1AC Froomkin and Washington Post evidence, the FBI has been requesting national security letters from the federal government, only they have the authority to OK the use of security letters, not the state governments

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2AC- States COUNTERPLAN- Solvency Deficit- Stingray Affirmative

1. There are over 50 federal agencies that use stingray technology- the counterplan cannot solveACLU No Date- American Civil liberties Union, https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-themThe map below tracks what we know, based on press reports and publicly available documents, about the use of stingray tracking devices by state and local police departments. Following the map is a list of the federal law enforcement agencies known to use the technology throughout the United States. The ACLU has identified 53 agencies in 21 states and the District of Columbia that own stingrays, but because many agencies continue to shroud their purchase and use of stingrays in

secrecy, this map dramatically underrepresents the actual use of stingrays by law enforcement agencies nationwide.¶ Stingrays, also known as "cell site simulators" or "IMSI catchers," are invasive cell phone surveillance devices that mimic cell phone towers and send out signals to trick cell phones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information. When used to track a suspect's cell phone, they also gather information about the phones of countless bystanders who happen to be nearby. Click here for more info on stingrays.

2. The COUNTERPLAN cannot solve the racism advantage- our 1AC Kleiner evidence states that stingray technology targets persons of color an ongoing federal practice since 9/11, only the plan can set precedent at the federal level.

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**CISA DISADVANTAGE Negative

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1NC- CISA DISADVANTAGE 1. Uniqueness- CISA will not pass in the status quo- too much senate oppositionWashington Examiner 2015 - “Senate vote falls short of approving defense act with CISA amendment”¶ http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senate-vote-falls-short-of-approving-defense-act-with-cisa-amendment/article/2566527, June 22Memories are long in the Senate, and it will probably take Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., more than a week or two to get over the rebuff he suffered on the floor when he tried to attach cybersecurity legislation as an amendment to a pending defense bill.¶ That procedural gambit was blocked on June 11 by most Democrats and three Republicans , just days after McConnell's move to renew

National Security Agency surveillance authorities was similarly rejected.¶ Last week, McConnell walked away from a reporter without comment when asked about prospects in July for the cybersecurity bill, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing Act, which would

encourage the sharing of cyberthreat indicators between government and industry with liability protection for participating companies. Critics of the bill say it places more personal information in government hands and raises profound concerns over privacy . And that

it could also open the door to retributive hacking by government and private companies.¶ Later, McConnell said the cyber bill "is important, it's a priority, we will continue to look for a way forward."

2. Link- The plan restricts government surveillance- CISA will be deemed necessary to bridge the gapFlores 2014- Christian, Medill school of journalism reporter, “CISA puts Congress in rough spot”¶ http://nationalsecurityzone.org/site/cisa-puts-congress-in-rough-spot/The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence passed the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014 – or CISA – last month. But, as with recent attempts at passing other cyber security bills, Congress is once again put in a delicate position.¶ On the one hand, past cyber attacks from China and Russia – as well as the fear of future ones – has led Congress to try and step up with cybersecurity bills.¶ “The continued cybercriminal activity and threats have become so great that everyone realizes something has to be done,” said Jerry Irvine of the National Cyber Security Task Force. “While this may not be the best or even the correct reaction, it is necessary to get something in place now.”¶ But that last part about the bill perhaps not being the best or correct reaction has been the exact complaint by those opposed to the perceived privacy intrusions that come tacked on to CISA.¶ “The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence…continues to attempt to expand the ability of the government to engage in mass surveillance of online communications by Americans without adequate protections for privacy…while at the same time shielding companies providing this information from consequences even if they violate the law,” said Ray Trygstad, a retired U.S. Navy Security Manager and current Associate Director of Cyber Security and Forensics Education at the Illinois Institute of Technology.¶ The proposed bill – drafted by Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Vice Chairman Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) – removes legal barriers for private companies to share cyber threat information with the government voluntarily. This means companies will receive liability protection for the data sharing if used for cyber security

purposes. The government can also share information with the companies.¶ CISA passed the Intelligence Committee with an overwhelming 12-3 vote. But U.S. Senators Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Mark Udall (D-Colo.) have been two of the most vocal senators opposed to CISA, stating concerns over the combination of the lack of privacy protections and the bill perhaps not materially improving cyber security. They issued the following statement:¶ “Cyber-attacks on U.S. firms and infrastructure pose a serious threat to America’s economic health and national security. We agree there is a need for information-sharing between the federal government and private companies about cybersecurity threats and how to defend against them.. However, we have seen how the federal government has exploited loopholes to collect Americans’ private information in the name of security The only way to make cybersecurity information-sharing effective and acceptable is to ensure that there are strong protections for Americans’ constitutional privacy

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http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senate-vote-falls-short-of-approving-defense-act-with-cisa-amendment/article/2566527


rights. Without these protections in place, private companies will rightly see participation as bad for business.”¶ An Electronic Frontier Foundation – or EFF – article and Trygstad point to President Obama’s signing of Executive Order 13636 as a good start to ensuring national cyber security. The executive order directed the Department of Homeland Security to expand information-sharing programs in a way that provides more privacy protections than CISA and previous cyber security bills.¶ The EFF article also raises concerns with CISA and previously proposed cybersecurity bills. The article calls to question what exactly is a “cybersecurity purpose” and “cybersecurity threat,” two phrases used in CISA, arguing that these broad definitions “grant new spying power to companies.”¶ But these broad definitions are inevitable with all of the advancements in cyber crime, Irvine says .¶ “Unfortunately because of the ever changing technologies and risks that are associated with cyber events, it is difficult if not impossible to provide more specific definitions as both purposes and threats of cyber criminals continuously changes,” Irvine said.

3. Internal Link- CISA is terrible for privacy and greatly expands the U.S. surveillance state through data sharing - political capital is key to prevent passageThe Guardian 2015- “A government surveillance bill by any other name is just as dangerous” Trevor Timm, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/13/cisa-cybersecurity-surveillance-government-data-access, June 13Less than two weeks after Congress was forced into passing historic NSA reform, the Senate tried Thursday to sneak a dangerous “cybersecurity” proposal, which would exponentially expand the spy agency’s power to gather data on Americans, into a massive defense-spending bill. The amendment

thankfully failed, but it will be back – possibly within days – and it may require a huge grassroots effort to stop its passage .¶ Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell wanted to attach the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (Cisa) to the defense bill in order to push through the controversial measure while avoiding a large public debate about it. But he just missed getting the 60 votes required to move the amendment forward .¶ Cisa, which supporters have euphemistically labeled “info-sharing” legislation, essentially carves a giant hole in our privacy laws to allow tech companies like Google and Facebook to hand over our private data to the government with no legal process whatsoever. The bill is a disaster for transparency too: it contains what would be the first exemption to the Freedom of Information Act in 50 years , which could allow corporations to hide all sorts of information from public view that have nothing to do with cybersecurity.¶ But the bill has an even darker, more dangerous element that’s only come to the fore in the last couple weeks, even though the legislation has been kicked around for a few years.¶ In a little-reported speech on the Senate floor on Thursday, Oregon Democrat Ron Wyden issued an ominous warning to the public about the so-called “cybersecurity” bill, which he has called a “surveillance bill by another name” on multiple occasions. He warned every senator not to vote on the bill without reading a secret Justice Department memo interpreting the government’s existing legal authorities.

4. Massive governmental surveillance programs such as CISA devastate investor confidence, ongoing trade talks, and every other facet of the economyHRW 2013- Human Rights Watch, July 15, “How the NSA Scandal Hurts the Economy”https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/15/how-nsa-scandal-hurts-economyThe National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance scandal has been devastating to the U.S. government’s credibility as an advocate for Internet freedom. But as the EU-U.S. trade talks began last week,

the impact on U.S. technology companies and a fragile American economy may be even greater.¶ Every new revelation suggests far more surveillance than imagined and more involvement by telephone and Internet

companies, with much still unknown. One of the most troubling aspects of this spying is that foreign

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http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/13/cisa-cybersecurity-surveillance-government-data-access


nationals abroad have no privacy rights under U.S. law. Foreigners using the services of global companies are fair game. (There is also a certain irony to the revelations considering that some European governments such as Germany and the Netherlands are strong U.S. allies on Internet freedom but may simultaneously be targets of U.S. surveillance online). ¶ A July 1 report by Der Spiegel on the NSA spying on European officials infuriated governments a week before negotiations started on a massive U.S.-EU trade agreement that could be worth almost $272 billion for their economies and 2 million new jobs. Officials throughout Europe, most notably French

President Francois Hollande, said that NSA spying threatens trade talks. ¶ The French government unsuccessfully called for a two week postponement of the trade talks . The next day it had to address allegations in Le Monde

of its own domestic mass surveillance program.¶ For the Internet companies named in reports on NSA surveillance, their bottom line is at risk because European markets are crucial for them. It is too

early assess the impact on them, but the stakes are huge . For example, Facebook has about 261 million active monthly European users compared to about 195 million in the U.S. and Canada, and 22 percent of Apple’s net income came from Europe in the first quarter of 2013. ¶ Europe was primed for a backlash against NSA spying because people care deeply about privacy after their experience of state intrusion in Nazi Germany and Communist Eastern Europe. And U.S. spying on Europeans via companies had been a simmering problem since at least 2011.¶ In June 2011, Microsoft admitted that the United States could bypass EU privacy regulations to get vast amounts of cloud data from their European Customers. Six months later, U.K.-based BAE Systems stopped using the company’s cloud services because of this issue.¶ A major 2011 European Union survey released that June found that “[t]hree out of four Europeans accept that revealing personal data is part of everyday life, but they are also worried about how companies – including search engines and social networks – use their information.” Only 22 percent trusted e-mail, social networking, and search companies with their data.¶ Then the European Parliament issued a report on privacy in October 2012 confirming Microsoft’s claim and urging new privacy protections between the EU and the United States. The EU tried, but the Financial Times reported that senior Obama administration officials and tech industry representatives successfully lobbied against it.¶ The NSA scandal has brought tensions over spying to a boil. German prosecutors may open a criminal investigation into NSA spying. On July 3, Germany’s Interior Minister said that people should stop using companies like Google and Facebook if they fear the U.S. is intercepting their data. On July 4, the European Parliament condemned spying on Europeans and ordered an investigation into mass surveillance. The same day, Neelie Kroes, the EU’s chief telecom and Internet official, warned of “multi-billion euro consequences for American companies” because of U.S. spying in the cloud.¶ The companies have belatedly distanced themselves from the NSA and called for more transparency. Google, Microsoft, Yahoo! and Facebook, are in a particularly tough spot as members of the Global Network Initiative, a group (including Human Rights Watch) formed to verify whether companies respect freedom of expression and privacy online.¶ Their role in NSA surveillance raises serious questions about whether they have done their utmost to protect billions of people’s privacy or whether it is even possible to know since virtually everything is classified. Yahoo! unsuccessfully challenged a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act request in 2008, the New York Times reported and the company is trying to publicly release its petition to the government. But on July 11, The Guardian reported that Microsoft helped the NSA and FBI bypass its own encryption to access its users’ data, based on documents from Edward Snowden.¶ Transparency is an important first step. Its absence only exacerbates a trust deficit that companies already had in Europe. And trust is crucial. Google’s chief legal officer recognized this on June 19 when he

said, “Our business depends on the trust of our users,” during a web chat about the NSA scandal .

Some companies have been aggressive in trying to disclose more, and others have not. But unless the U.S. government loosens strictures and allows greater disclosure , all U.S. companies are likely to suffer the

backlash .¶ Since the story broke, the United States has allowed companies to disclose the number of FISA requests they receive, but only combined with all law enforcement requests in ranges of 1,000. So the exact number is impossible to determine.¶ Google has been the most aggressive, including by petitioning the FISA court. Microsoft hasfollowed. Apple, Yahoo!, and Facebook are starting to report aggregate data in the wake of the NSA fallout.¶ Companies should press for meaningful disclosure about the scope and scale of government surveillance and their role in it. They also need to support laws and policies, including changes to surveillance laws, to protect their customers’ privacy. Ultimately, they need to show how they actually protect users from government spying.¶ The Obama administration needs to recognize and mitigate the serious economic risks of spying while trying to rebuild its credibility on Internet freedom. The July 9 hearing of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is a start, but much more is needed. More disclosure about the surveillance programs, more oversight, better laws, and a process to work with allied governments to increase privacy protections would be a start.¶ The European customers of Internet companies are not all al Qaeda or criminals, but that is essentially how U.S. surveillance efforts treat them. If this isn’t fixed, this may be the beginning of a very costly battle pitting U.S. surveillance against European business, trade, and human rights.

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5. Impact- the collapse of the economic system creates great power warsRoyal 2010 — Jedidiah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, M.Phil. Candidate at the University of New South Wales, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edited by Ben Goldsmith and Jurgen Brauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult [end page 213] to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write,The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that

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the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

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**Uniqueness

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2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Uniqueness Wall

Democrats and libertarians successfully blocked passage in the status quo, but they need to sustain that momentum Politico 2015 “Democrats block cyber bill, leaving measure in limbohttp://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/democrats-cybersecurity-cyber-bill-block-limbo-gop-amendments-118890.html, June 11Democrats made good on their threats to block a bipartisan cybersecurity bill on Thursday , after they were infuriated by Republican procedural moves to pass the bill with only limited amendments, something Democrats called a “cynical ploy.”¶ The partisan blowup marked a stunning turn for legislation that’s enjoyed broad support. The measure had gained new urgency after the Office of Personnel Management announced 4 million federal employees’ records had been breached — at the hands of Chinese hackers, according to anonymous federal officials.¶ Story Continued Below¶ Privacy advocates in both parties had wanted to strengthen personal data protections in the measure, but Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s (R-Ky.) procedural gambit made it next to

impossible to make those changes.¶ So Democrats and libertarian-leaning Republicans banded together to defeat McConnell’s plan to attach the cyberthreat information sharing legislation to the National Defense Authorization Act days. The procedural vote was 56-40, with McConnell needing 60 votes to advance the cyber bill.¶ The majority of Democrats were joined by several Republicans, including Sens. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), Mike Lee (R-Utah) and Dean Heller (R-Nev.), to block the bill from moving forward.¶ On the other side, a handful of Democrats, including Sens. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.), Mark Warner (D-Va.) and Bill Nelson (D-Fla.), voted with McConnell to advance the cyber measure.

Democrats will block the defense bill if CISA is attached The Hill, 2015 “Senate Dems threaten to block cyber bill as defense add-on”http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/244594-senate-dems-threaten-to-block-cyber-bill-as-defense-add-on, June 10Senate debate was tied up Wednesday as Democrats lashed out against an upcoming vote on whether to attach the Senate’s main cyber bill to the defense budget bill. Majority Leader McConnell (R-Ky.) wants to combine a stalled cyber measure — intended to boost the public-private exchange of hacking information — with the annual defense authorization measure under consideration this week. It’s an effort to rush the bill, known as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), in the wake of the massive data breach at the Office of Personnel Management that exposed 4 million federal workers’ records. But the move has cracked bipartisan support for one of the few issues that has united Congress this year — cybersecurity. Democrats that had previously backed CISA are now refusing to support the bill as a defense budget add-on. The left is threatening to block the attachment, accusing Republicans of trying to avoid a bruising fight over privacy. Several Democrats have vowed to offer privacy-enhancing amendments to the bill, fearing it could shuttle more surveillance data to the National Security Agency (NSA) as written. “We cannot trifle with Americans’ civil liberties,” the top four Senate Democrats said in a letter sent Wednesday to McConnell, calling his strategy “ridiculous.” “This is a pure political ploy that does nothing to advance America’s national security,” they said. The White House has also threatened to veto the defense bill, known as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). "We look foolish to the rest of the country, actually the rest of the world, doing it this way," Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) told The Hill. Even CISA’s co-sponsors — Sens. Richard Burr (R-N.C.) and Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) — split over the tactic Wednesday, with Feinstein arguing on the Senate floor that the move has imperiled the bipartisan bill.

CISA is too unpopular with dems, privacy groups, and the president to pass SC Magazine 2015- “OPM breach exposed SSNs, personnel records of all fed workers” http://www.scmagazine.com/opm-breach-larger-than-anticipated-worker-info-on-dark-web/article/420348, June 12Calling Senate Democrats out for a 56-40 voteThursday that failed to garner enough support to more the Defense Authorization Bill forward, and with it the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), that Republicans had attached to the bill, Senate Majority Whip John Cornyn, R-Texas, said “the refusal to move forward with this legislation, particularly the cybersecurity part of this discussion, is just unconscionable.”¶ CISA had enjoyed bipartisan support, easily passing the Senate

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http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/244594-senate-dems-threaten-to-block-cyber-bill-as-defense-add-on

http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/democrats-cybersecurity-cyber-bill-block-limbo-gop-amendments-118890.html

http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/democrats-cybersecurity-cyber-bill-block-limbo-gop-amendments-118890.html


Intelligence Committee in a 14-1 vote in March, although it continued to draw criticism from privacy groups . ¶ After the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revealed a data breach that is now believed to have

exposed the social security numbers and personnel information on every federal worker, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., tried to attached CISA to the Defense Authorization Bill and fast track its passage.¶ Prior to the vote and amid Republican criticism, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid noted that Democrats had been trying for five years to pass a cybersecurity bill but it was consistently blocked by Republicans. ¶ “So why does the Republican leader now come and say look how strong I am on cybersecurity, look at me, I lifted my cybersecurity weights this morning,” Reid said in a statement issued the day before the vote. “But what he's done is now he's going to put cybersecurity on this bill the President has said he's going to veto.”

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2NC/1NR – CISA DISADVANTAGE- Link Wall- Drone Affirmative

Restricting armed domestic drones popular- shores up political capital for passage FoxNews 2013 (Fox News, “Lawmakers eye regulating domestic surveillance drones”, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/05/19/congress-eyes-regulating-drones/, May 19, 2013)

Amid growing concern over the use of drones by police and government officials for surveillance, a bipartisan group of lawmakers is pushing to limit the use of unmanned

surveillance "eyes in the sky" aircraft . Rep. James Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., along with Rep. Zoe Lofgren, D-Calif., and Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, is sponsoring legislation that would codify due process protections for Americans in cases involving drones and make flying armed

drones in the U.S. sky illegal . Sensenbrenner believes it is necessary to develop new standards to address the privacy issues associated with use of drones — which can be as small as a bird and as large as a plane. "Every advancement in crime fighting technology, from wiretaps to DNA, has resulted in courts carving out the Constitutional limits within which the police operate," Sensenbrenner said at a House Judiciary subcommittee hearing Friday on the issues surrounding drones. The subcommittee heard from experts who were divided on what actions Congress should take to address the new technology. But the four witnesses all agreed that drones raised new, often unprecedented questions about domestic surveillance. "Current law has yet to catch up to this new technology," said Chris Calabrese, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union. Calabrese said he supported immediate regulation of the drone industry and said his biggest concern was the overuse of drones by police and government officials for surveillance. But Calabrese said he doesn't want to hinder the growth of drones with the power to do good, including helping find missing persons, assisting firefighters and addressing other emergencies. Tracey Maclin, a professor with the Boston University School of Law, said the issues raised by drones haven't been addressed by courts before because the technology goes beyond what humans had been capable of through aerial surveillance. Past court rulings, "were premised on naked-eye observations — simple visual observations from a public place," he said. Rep. Cedric Richmond, D-La., said he wanted to know when drone technology will advance to the point where Congress will have to act on the issue. He said he was concerned about the effect on privacy. "At what point do you think it's going to get to a point where we have to say what a

reasonable expectation of privacy is?" Richmond said. Republicans expressed similar concerns. "It seems to me that Congress needs to set the standard, rather than wait and let the courts set the standard," Poe said. " Tech nology is great — as long as it's used the right and proper way ," Rep. Jason

Chaffetz, R-Utah, said at Friday's hearing. Some experts urged caution. Gregory McNeal, an associate law professor at Pepperdine University, said writing laws to cover drones will be difficult because the technology continues to improve and Congress could think it's addressing key issues, only to have new ones emerge. He compared drones to the privacy concerns raised by development of the Internet in the 1990s. Regulating then, he said, could have stymied the rapid growth of the Internet and wouldn't have addressed today's Internet privacy issues. If Congress feels compelled to act, McNeal said, it should think in terms broader than a "drone policy" and set standards for surveillance or realistic expectations of privacy. "A technology-centered approach to privacy is the wrong approach," he said. But the ACLU's Calabrese said Congress should work quickly. "This can't be adequately addressed by existing law," he said. "Manned aircraft are expensive to purchase. Drones' low cost and flexibility erode that natural limit. They can appear in windows, all for much less than the cost of a plane or a helicopter." A future with domestic drones may be inevitable. While civilian drone use is currently limited to government agencies and some public universities, a law passed by Congress last year requires the Federal Aviation Administration to allow widespread drone flights in the U.S. by 2015. According to FAA estimates, as many as 7,500 civilian drones could be in use within five years.

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The plan functions as an olive branch for bipartisanship- massively popular gets republicans the necessary votes Greenwald 2013 (Glenn Greenwald, Business Insider, “GLENN GREENWALD: The US Needs To Wake Up To Threat Of Domestic Drones”, http://www.businessinsider.com/drone-threats-strikes-us-2013-3, March 30, 2013)

Notably, this may be one area where an actual bipartisan/trans-partisan alliance can

meaningfully emerge , as most advocates working on these issues with whom I've spoken say that libertarian-minded GOP state legislators have been as responsive as more left-wing Democratic ones in working to impose some limits. One bill now pending in Congress would prohibit the use of surveillance drones on US soil in the absence of a specific search warrant, and has bipartisan

support . Only the most authoritarian among us will be incapable of understanding the multiple dangers posed by a domestic

drone regime (particularly when their party is in control of the government and they are incapable of perceiving threats from

increased state police power). But the proliferation of domestic drones affords a real opportunity to forge an enduring coalition in defense of core privacy and other rights that transcends partisan allegiance , by working toward meaningful limits on their use. Making people aware of exactly what these unique threats are from a domestic drone regime is the key first step in constructing that coalition.

Limiting domestic drones is popular- shores up support for CISA Sasso 2012 (Brendan Sasso, “Lawmakers mull restrictions on domestic drones”, http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/264189-lawmakers-mull-restrictions-on-domestic-drones, October 25, 2012)At Thursday's forum, lawmakers, academics and privacy advocates worried that widespread drone use would pose a serious threat to privacy. "Persistently monitoring Americans' movements can reveal their political identity, their religious views and even how safe your marriage is, how strong it is," Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) said. "Both parties cast a skeptical eye toward drone surveillance in law enforcement," he added. Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) emphasized that he believes drones are essential for killing suspected terrorists overseas and monitoring the border, and he said drones have a "real benefit and use" for law enforcement. But he added that he would support legislation to limit their use in domestic airspace. Chris Calabrese, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, explained that drones can be equipped with surveillance technologies such as night-vision cameras, body scanners and license plate readers. " Drones should only be used if subject to a powerful framework that

regulates their use in order to avoid abuse and invasions of privacy," he said. The lawmakers

and witnesses agreed that domestic drones should not be equipped with weapons , like the military drones that fly over Afghanistan. But David Crump, a professor at the Houston University Law Center, said Poe should revise his legislation to allow for more uses of drones. He said the law should make it clear that police can use drones in hostage situations, car chases and for security around sensitive government buildings or officials. He predicted that as drones become more widespread, a university may want to use a drone to televise views of a sports game.

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2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Link Wall- Stingray Affirmative

The plan has the kind of bipartisan support necessary to get republicans a win on CISA Washington House Republicans 2015- “Rep. Taylor's 'drone' and 'stingray' bills pass the state House” http://houserepublicans.wa.gov/uncategorized/rep-taylors-drone-and-stingray-bills-pass-state-house, March 4Legislation passed the state House of Representatives today setting parameters around the state's use of drones and cell site simulators, commonly called "stingrays."¶ Rep. David Taylor, R-Moxee, sponsored both bills and said today was a good day for open government advocates and those who value individual freedom and liberty.¶ "Today's actions by the House prove once again that freedom and liberty are not partisan issues," said Taylor. "When we work together we can do great things for Washington citizens."¶ House Bill 1639 creates new guidelines for when a state or local agency can use extraordinary sensing devices (ESD) or "drones," and what they can do with the personal information gathered. Specifically, the bill:¶ Prohibits state agencies from procuring an extraordinary sensing device (ESD) without an appropriation by the Legislature and prohibits a local agency from procuring an ESD without explicit approval of its governing body.¶ Requires agencies to publish written policies for the use of ESDs and to minimize collection and disclosure of personal information.¶ Prohibits agencies from operating an ESD and disclosing personal information unless specifically authorized by the act.¶ Allows agencies to operate an ESD without obtaining a warrant if the agency does not intend to collect personal information.¶ Allows agencies to operate an ESD and disclose personal information from the operation under certain circumstances.¶ Excludes all evidence collected by an ESD from all court, legislative, or regulatory proceedings if the collection or disclosure of personal information violates any provision of this act.¶ Creates a legal cause of action for damages where an individual claims a violation of this act injured his or her business, person, or reputation.¶ Requires agencies to maintain records related to each use of an ESD and file an annual report with the Office of Financial Management.¶ Taylor said the bill is similar to bipartisan legislation he proposed last year. His previous bill placing restrictions on drones passed the Legislature but was vetoed by Gov. Jay Inslee. The governor then placed a limited moratorium on the state's use of drones and convened a task force to study the issue more thoroughly.¶ "While the task force didn't come to a clear consensus, we did take some of their suggestions and cleaned up the language of the bill a little bit," said Taylor. "With the amount of lawmakers on both sides of the aisle pushing for this bill, I don't anticipate the governor will veto it this time around."¶ House Bill 1440 prohibits the use of cell site simulators, commonly referred to as "stingrays," unless a warrant is issued.¶ A cell site simulator is a device that emits a signal mimicking a cellphone tower. It allows law enforcement agencies to capture detailed information from a suspect's cell phone, including location and who the person calls or texts.¶ "As technology evolves and is enhanced, electronic privacy is an important component to consider," said Taylor. "I have serious concerns about information collected from third parties when these devices are used and we will hopefully address that at some point in the future. For now, we're drawing a clear line in the sand and saying you can't use this new technology unless you go to a judge and convince them to give you a warrant to do so."¶ HB 1440

passed the House unanimously. HB 1639 passed the House 73-25. Both bills now move to the state Senate for further consideration.¶ The 105-day 2015 legislative session is scheduled to end April 26.

Here’s more evidence- there is bipartisan support for the aff, leads to eventual compromiseBabcock 2015- Steven, lead reporter for Technical.ly Baltimore, “Senators, feeling disconnected from Stingray details, press FBI for answers” http://technical.ly/baltimore/2015/01/07/leahy-grassley-stingray-fbi-letter, Jan 7As a new Congress dawns, a pair of powerful U.S. senators told FBI officials that they’re in the dark about police use of cell phone tracking devices, known as Stingrays .¶ In a Dec. 23 letter, Senate

Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and Ranking Member Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) (who will switch places when the Republican-controlled Congress assumes office) asked Obama administration officials for information on how the FBI uses cell phone data surreptitiously collected by the devices, but has nothing to do with police investigations . ¶ “Specifically, we are

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concerned about whether the FBI and other law enforcement agencies have adequately considered the privacy interests of other individuals who are not the targets of the interception, but whose information is nevertheless being collected when these devices are being used,” the letter states. ¶ Stingrays, which have also been used by Baltimore Police, mimic cell phone towers. When activated, Stingrays force all cell phones in an area to connect to the device, allowing authorities to see the precise location of the phone, its electronic serial number and other information. The data helps police track suspects, but it also gives them the information about other phones that just happen to be in the area.¶ In November, the American Civil Liberties Union intervened in a Baltimore man’s lawsuit against police over Stingray use. The defendant, Robert Harrison, argues his 4th Amendment rights were violated when he was named as an accomplice in a murder-for-hire case because he had the phone police were tracking with a Stingray. A hearing was scheduled in the case for Jan. 7 in federal court, and the ACLU of Maryland submitted the senators’ letter to the judge, arguing that Harrison’s case raises similar concerns to those raised by Grassley and Leahy. The hearing on various motions in the case is scheduled for 11 a.m. in the courtroom of Judge Catherine Blake. In that case, police did not obtain a search warrant to use the Stingray, but instead got a court order for a “pen register” device. The ACLU argues that the order only covers devices that track cell phones by connecting to a single device. ¶ According to the two U.S. senators, the FBI recently updated their policies, requiring a search warrant to be obtained before a Stingray can be used. But Leahy and Grassley still have a lot of questions. They sent U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson a list of seven multi-part questions, and want each answered by Jan. 30.¶ Specifically, the two senators questioned three exceptions to the use of a search warrant. According to administration policy, authorities can forego a warrant if a case poses an “imminent threat to public safety,” involves a fugitive or if it used in public places at which the FBI deems there is “no reasonable expectation of privacy.”¶ “We understand that the FBI believes that it can address [privacy] interests by maintaining that information for a short period of time and purging the information after it has been collected,” the letter states. “But there is a question as to whether this sufficiently safeguards privacy interests.”¶ They also want to know how other agencies use the technology, which could potentially include local police.¶ Any answers from the feds would add a lot to the debate, since very little has

been said publicly about Stingrays.¶ The information in the senators’ letter was summarized after a classified hearing, and, in Baltimore, police even withdrew evidence in a separate case from Harrison’s because the FBI wouldn’t let them talk about the devices publicly .

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Empirically proven that surveillance reforms enjoy bipartisan supportThe Nation 2014 John Nichols, co-author with Robert W. McChesney of Dollarocracy: How the Money and Media Election Complex is Destroying America, “NSA Reform Is Blocked by Constitutionally Disinclined Senate Republicans” http://www.thenation.com/article/could-mark-udall-make-last-ditch-difference-nsa-reform/, Nov 19The vital cause of NSA reform—which seemed to be gaining strength as not just citizens but their elected representatives came to recognize the consequences of the issues raised by Edward Snowden’s leaks—has hit a rough spot in recent weeks. Allies of the cause are being defeated or

abandoning their principles and major initiatives are failing.¶ The first bad news came November 4, when Colorado Senator Mark Udall lost his campaign for a second term. In his first term, the Democrat had emerged as one of the steadiest,

and frequently most aggressive, critics of National Security Agency abuses. Arguing that there was “a groundswell of public support for reform,” and that such reform had to “reject half-measures that could still allow the government to

collect millions of Americans’ records without any individual suspicion or evidence of wrongdoing,” Udall worked with Oregon Democrat Ron Wyden and Kentucky Republican Rand Paul to get Congress to crack down on the NSA. ¶ Udall is still in the Senate until January, and he moved in the immediate aftermath of his defeat to gain

Senate support for at least a small measure of NSA reform. But even that initiative fell short Tuesday night, as Udall and his allies could muster only fifty-eight of the sixty needed votes to prohibit the NSA from holding the phone records of Americans and to establish better procedures for challenging the claims and initiatives of government agencies that overreach. ¶ Though the measure fell far short of what was needed, the American Civil Liberties Union argued that the so-called “USA Freedom Act,” which was

introduced by outgoing Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont, “is our chance to turn the tide on suspicionless mass surveillance, restoring some of the crucial privacy protections lost with passage of the Patriot Act in 2001.”

Here’s more evidence- the plan’s introduction would create an unusual alliance between dems and republicans NEW YORK TIMES 2015- “Patriot Act Faces Revisions Backed by Both Parties” http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/01/us/politics/patriot-act-faces-revisions-backed-by-both-parties.html, May 1After more than a decade of wrenching national debate over the intrusiveness of government intelligence agencies, a bipartisan wave of support has gathered to sharply limit the federal government’s sweeps of phone and Internet records.¶ On Thursday, a bill that would overhaul the Patriot Act and curtail the so-called metadata surveillance exposed by Edward J. Snowden was overwhelmingly passed by the House Judiciary Committee and was heading to almost certain passage in that chamber this month.¶ An identical bill in the Senate — introduced with the support of five Republicans — is gaining support over the objection of Senator Mitch McConnell, Republican of Kentucky, who is facing the prospect of his first policy defeat since ascending this year to majority leader.¶ The push for reform is the strongest demonstration yet of a decade-long shift from a singular focus on national security at the expense of civil liberties to a new balance in the post-Snowden era.¶ Under the bipartisan bills in the House and Senate , the Patriot Act would be changed to prohibit bulk collection, and sweeps that had operated under the guise of so-called National Security Letters issued by the F.B.I. would end. The data would instead be stored by the phone companies themselves, and could be accessed by intelligence agencies only after approval of the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court.¶ The legislation would also create a panel of experts to advise the FISA court on privacy, civil liberties, and technology matters, while requiring the declassification of all significant FISA court opinions.¶ The debate has resulted in a highly unusual alliance of House Speaker John A. Boehner, the White House, the Tea Party and a bipartisan majority in the House. They are in opposition to Mr. McConnell, his Intelligence Committee chairman, and a small group of defense hawks. In addition, two Republican presidential candidates in the Senate, Ted Cruz of Texas and Rand Paul of Kentucky, have made it clear they will not accept a straight extension of the current Patriot Act.

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https://www.aclu.org/support-usa-freedom-act

http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&session=2&vote=00282

http://www.thenation.com/article/mark-udall-senator-defending-your-privacy-fighting-his-political-life

http://www.denverpost.com/election2014/ci_26931359/mark-udall-consider-all-options-reveal-cia-torture

http://www.denverpost.com/election2014/ci_26931359/mark-udall-consider-all-options-reveal-cia-torture

http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-wyden-nsa-surveillance-20140617-story.html

http://www.thenation.com/article/could-mark-udall-make-last-ditch-difference-nsa-reform/

http://www.thenation.com/article/could-mark-udall-make-last-ditch-difference-nsa-reform/

http://www.amazon.com/Dollarocracy-Election-Complex-Destroying-America/dp/1568589530/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&sr=&qid=

http://www.amazon.com/Dollarocracy-Election-Complex-Destroying-America/dp/1568589530/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&sr=&qid=


**Internal Link

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2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Internal Link- ANSWERS TO: No Spillover

Issues do spillover- the plan would have repercussions for CISA

ESHBAUGH-SOHA, 2005 Matthew, T¶ EXAS¶ T¶ ECH¶ U¶ NIVERSITY, “The Politics of Presidential Agendas” June http://www.psci.unt.edu/~EshbaughSoha/jun05prq.pdfTwo scholars have explored the determinants of the president's policy agenda. Light (1099) notes that

information, expertise, and political capital are a premium in the presidents agenda decisions, and that presidents have the

most potential to shape the legislative agenda early in their tenure. He shows how these factors influence the types of policies on the president's agenda, without confirming his inferences through hypothesis testing (see King 1993). Peterson (1990) also studies the president's agenda. He analyzes the contextual environment and its impact on whether presidents prefer large or small, and new or old policies. Although he finds that the Congressional environment is important in the president's agenda decisions, seemingly relevant variables such as the federal budget deficit are statistically insignificant. ¶ The underlying premise of agenda-setting research is

that the president should be able to package policy priorities so as to increase the likelihood of their adoption. Doing so may require presidents to assess the probability that a proposal will be successful depending on contextual circumstances, such as Congressional makeup. Nevertheless. Peterson (1990: 20"-08) finds little impact of the contextual environment on presidential policies, bringing into question the conventional wisdom that presidents can package their agendas strategically to increase their success in Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989). With this in mind, I rely on agenda-setting and

anticipative reactions theories to argue that fiscal and political factors should affect the content of the presidents yearly domestic policy

agenda from 1949-2000. Lacking any readily available data source to test this argument. I also advance a new policy typology that categorizes domestic policies across both time and importance dimensions. 1 use the number of yearly policies for each policy type (.major, minor, incremental, and meteoric) as dependent variables in four

separate analyses. To account for the yearly changes in the political environment. I offer a time-series analysis of several hypotheses. I argue that presidents seek to optimize their domestic policy preferences , and because their success depends on broad legislative cooperation, presidents anticipate the reaction of Congress and support or propose different policies accordingly in their yearly domestic policy agendas.1

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**Impact

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2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- ANSWERS TO: Economic Decline /= War

Extend our 1NC Royal evidence- Royal cites multiple statistical correlations between economic decline and an increase in conflict. First, is the rally around the flag effect, bad economic times result in leaders creating conflict to divert attention away from crises. Second, is resource shortages. Bad economic times create the impetus for conflict over scarce resources

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2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- ANSWERS TO: CISA Good

CISA is bad- does little to protect against cyber attacks and hinders privacy protections Laperruque 2015- Jake, fellow on Privacy, Surveillance, and Security. Jake previously served as a law clerk for Senator Al Franken on the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, and as a policy fellow for Senator Robert Menendez. “How the OPM Hack Demonstrates the Need to Improve CISA” https://cdt.org/blog/how-the-opm-hack-demonstrates-the-need-to-improve-cisa/The recent mass breach of computers at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has increased pressure on Congress to act to enhance cybersecurity. However, the OPM hack demonstrates the importance of strengthening the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA, S. 754) in two important ways that would not undermine the goals of the legislation. First, information shared under the bill by the private sector with the government should go to the Department of Homeland Security National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (DHS NCCIC) and not to any government agency, as would be permitted under the current bill. This would direct the flow of cyber threat indicators to an entity that was created to receive and protect them. Second, the requirements to eliminate personal information from cyber threat indicators before they are shared should be strengthened. If less personal information is shared, less personal information is available to the bad guys when they break in.¶ CISA Should Direct the Cyber Threat Indicators that Companies Share to the DHS NCCIC¶ CISA authorizes private entities share cyber threat indicators (CTI’s) with any department or agency within the federal government (Sec. 3(c)(1)). Many agencies do not have the operational ability to receive, store, and process these data, or – as the OPM breach demonstrates – the security protocols and experiences to adequately protect personal information.¶ A far better path would be to follow the model of Rep. McCaul’s National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act (H.R. 1731), passed in the House earlier this year. That legislation required that companies sharing cyberthreat indicators share them with the DHS NCCIC. The NCCIC was created to receive, process, and protect sensitive cyber data. Requiring all private-to-government sharing be directed at this entity would enhance data security and operational functionality.¶ CISA Should Require Implementation of Adequate Privacy Protections Before Information Is Shared.¶ CISA requires that all information shared with the federal government be automatically and instantaneously shared with a range of federal entities (Sec. 5(a)(3)(A)(i)).[1] However, this sharing would occur without full application of privacy protections. The bill requires that automated sharing occur in “real-time” without any “delay, modification, or any other action”

that would impede instantaneous receipt by all other designated agencies (Sec. 5(a)(3)(A)(i)). This would prohibit any privacy protections – including redaction and removal of unnecessary personal information – that would require any human effort or review.¶ Thus under CISA, personal data could be instantly distributed to over half a dozen federal departments without adequate privacy protections, and would then be vulnerable if computer networks in any of these entities were breached. In contrast, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (H.R. 1560, passed in the House earlier this year) requires sharing not be subject to “delay, modification, or any other action without good cause that could impede receipt” (emphasis added). This provision would better protect privacy and data security than CISA. Additional language should be added to make it clear that application of the privacy policies to be created by the bill constitute “good cause.”¶ CISA Should Be Amended To Strengthen Requirements To Remove Personal Information Before Cyber Threat Indicators Are Shared.¶ CISA’s requirement to remove personal information (Sec. 4(d)(2)) is riddled with loopholes that can be closed without harming the goals of the legislation. Closing the loopholes in three ways would mean less personal information is available if (and when) computer systems are penetrated again:¶ CISA does not require that companies “take reasonable efforts” to review cyber threat indicators or remove personal information before sharing – any review, even if it were cursory and ineffective, would be sufficient. Both House information sharing bills (H.R. 1731 and H.R. 1560) require a benchmark of “reasonable” efforts be taken, ensuring that attempts to review and remove personal information before sharing are effective.¶ Even if an acceptable review were to occur, CISA only requires companies to remove personal information they “know” is unrelated to a cybersecurity threat . This could lead companies to take a “default share” policy for personal information, and always include it unless there is a rare smoking gun demonstrating irrelevance. Both House information sharing bills address this loophole as well, requiring companies to remove personal information that is that is “reasonably believed” to be irrelevant.¶ CISA only requires removal of information that is “not directly related” to a cyber threat, meaning that victims’ personal information (which is generally related to the threat) will often go unprotected. A better standard would require removal of information not necessary to respond to the threat.¶ Information Sharing Is Not a Cybersecurity Silver Bullet.¶

Passing CISA without addressing operational, security, and privacy issues risks new problems

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without providing significant benefits. Attacks from “zero-day” vulnerabilities – which were used in major recent breaches such as OPM and Sony – cannot be prevented through information sharing, because the exploit is unknown and unpatchable at the time it is used. The impact of new information authorities may actually be limited – a letter sent to Congress this April from over 65 technologists and network security experts concluded that “ We do not need new legal authorities to share information that helps us protect our systems from future attacks,” and categorized information necessary to share as “far more narrow” than

what is authorized by CISA. Greater focus should be placed on commonsense security measures that can prevent the infiltrations that lead to and aggravate the impact of major breaches: encrypting data, regularly reviewing and updating systems, and using multi-factor authentication.¶ [1] Specifically, cyber threat indicators shared under the bill must be shared with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

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https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/technologists_info_sharing_bills_letter_w_exhibit.pdf

https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/technologists_info_sharing_bills_letter_w_exhibit.pdf


**CISA DISADVANTAGE Affirmative

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2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Link Turn Strategy

1. Non-unique- CISA will pass in the status quo- it has just enough votesThe Hill 2015- “GOP senator: Cyber bill has real shot in chamber” June 25 http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/246111-gop-sen-leaders-still-want-to-move-cyber-billSen. Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) expressed optimism Thursday about the chances of moving a stalled cybersecurity bill through the Senate. “The leader wants to be able to get a bill out,” Fischer said an event hosted by

The Hill and sponsored by Visa, referring to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). “I think he has the support of the majority of members in our conference and I would hope the American people would continue to push all members to say we need to get this done.” ADVERTISEMENT Cybersecurity is “at the

forefront of discussions that we’ve had in leadership since the beginning of the session,” she added. In the wake of the recent blistering cyberattack on federal networks, the upper chamber tried to attach a major cyber bill — intended to bolster the public-private exchange of data on hackers — to a defense authorization measure. Democrats rebelled, angry they would not be able to offer privacy-enhancing amendments to the bill, known as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA). With the help of a few Republicans, they blocked the maneuver. Civil liberties advocates have argued CISA could shuttle sensitive data to the National Security Agency (NSA), empowering the spy agency weeks after Congress voted to rein in its authority. CISA’s prospects have been uncertain since. Senate leaders have indicated there is no set timeline to bring the measure up as a standalone bill. And House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-Texas) said on Wednesday that the Senate bill in its current form would be a nonstarter in the House, which has already passed its two complementary companion bills. CISA supporters — including a bipartisan group of lawmakers, most industry groups and potentially the White House — believe the measure is necessary to better thwart cyberattackers. By knowing more about our enemies, we can better repel them, they reason. “If we don’t allow companies to be able to share information when they see something, the American people are not going to be protected,” Fischer said. The bill would also help in the wake of massive data breaches, such as the one that has felled the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Fischer believes. If the public and private sector are swapping more data, both sides can know sooner exactly what has happened, she said. That “will get consumers more involved, I think, at an earlier time so that they know that their information has been compromised,” Fischer said.

2. The plan prevents passage- it starts a debate about surveillance in congress, which alienates republicans

The Hill 2015- “Senate GOP whip hopes to act on cyber bill in early August” http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/247921-senate-gop-whip-eyes-early-august-for-cyber-bill, July 14It would be the last chance for the upper chamber to try to pass the anti-hacking measure before a four-week recess. The bill, known as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), is intended to boost the exchange of cyber threat data between the public and private sectors. The House has already passed its two companion pieces of legislation.¶ But the prospect might seem a longshot to many. The Senate’s calendar is packed in its final weeks before the August break. Myriad budget bills and a fight over the recently struck deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program are expected to dominate

the diminishing floor time.¶ The Senate has been trying to move the bill for months to no avail.¶ Those backing the measure — a bipartisan group of lawmakers, most industry groups and potentially even the White House — were hopeful for swift passage in the upper chamber after the House approved its two measures by wide margins in April . ¶ But the Senate bill was derailed amid a fight over reforming the National Security Agency. ¶ A right-left coalition of privacy advocates in Congress are concerned that CISA would simply shuttle more sensitive consumer information to the NSA, further enabling its surveillance programs only months after the Senate voted to restrict the agency’s authority.¶ Senate Republicans tried to attach the CISA language onto a defense authorization bill in an attempt to rush the bill through following the massive data breach at the Office of Personnel Management.¶ But Democrats revolted and blocked the maneuver. Many on the left, including bill co-sponsor Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), were upset

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http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/247410-report-opm-hack-hit-over-25-million-people

http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/239933-senates-nsa-skirmish-stalling-cyber-bill

http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/239933-senates-nsa-skirmish-stalling-cyber-bill

http://thehill.com/policy/international/247785-iranian-nuclear-deal-reached

http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/247921-senate-gop-whip-eyes-early-august-for-cyber-bill

http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/247921-senate-gop-whip-eyes-early-august-for-cyber-bill


lawmakers wouldn’t get to offer any privacy-enhancing amendments on the bill.¶ Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) over the weekend insisted Republicans were going to try and move the bill in the coming weeks.¶ “These cybersecurity issues are enormously significant,” he said during an interview on “Fox News Sunday.” “What we're going to do is before August, take a step in the direction of dealing with the problem with information sharing bill that I think will be broadly supported.”¶ Cornyn backed McConnell’s plan.¶ “He would like to prioritize this and get it done before we leave,” Cornyn said.

3. Issues are compartmentalized- support for the plan will not spill over to effect CISA

Bouie 2011 (Jamelle, graduate of the U of Virginia, Writing Fellow for The American Prospect magazine, May 5, [prospect.org/csnc/blogs/tapped_archive?month=05&year=2011&base_name=political_capital)

Unfortunately, political capital isn’t that straightforward. As we saw at the beginning of Obama’s presidency, the mere fact of popularity (or a large congressional majority) doesn’t guarantee support from key members of Congress. For Obama to actually sign legislation to reform the immigration system, provide money for jobs, or reform corporate taxes, he needs unified support from his party and support from a non-trivial number of Republicans. Unfortunately, Republicans (and plenty of Democrats) aren’t interested in better immigration laws, fiscal stimulus, or liberal tax reform. Absent substantive leverage—and not just high approval ratings—there isn’t much Obama can do to pressure these members (Democrats and Republicans) into supporting his agenda. Indeed, for liberals who want to see Obama use his political capital, it’s worth noting that approval-spikes aren’t necessarily related to policy success. George H.W. Bush’s major domestic initiatives came before his massive post-Gulf War approval bump, and his final year in office saw little policy success. George W. Bush was able to secure No Child Left Behind, the Homeland Security Act, and the Authorization to Use Military Force in the year following 9/11, but the former two either came with pre-9/11 Democratic support or were Democratic initiatives to begin with. To repeat an oft-made point, when it comes to domestic policy, the presidency is a limited office with limited resources. Popularity with the public is a necessary part of presidential success in Congress, but it’s far from sufficient.

4. There is no impact to economic declineDrezner 2014 (Daniel W., professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His latest book, The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression, is just out from Oxford University Press; “The Uses of Being Wrong” http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T20276111299&format=GNBFI&sort=DATE,D,H&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T20276111283&cisb=22_T20276111282&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=171267&docNo=1)My new book has an odd intellectual provenance-it starts with me being wrong. Back in the fall of 2008, I was convinced that the open global economic order, centered on the unfettered cross-border exchange of goods, services, and ideas, was about to collapse as quickly as Lehman Brothers. A half-decade later, the closer I looked at the performance of the system of global economic governance, the clearer it became that the meltdown I had expected had

not come to pass . Though the advanced industrialized economies suffered prolonged

economic slowdowns, at the global level there was no great surge in trade protectionism, no

immediate clampdown on capital flows, and, most surprisingly, no real rejection of neoliberal

economic principles . Given what has normally transpired after severe economic shocks, this outcome was damn near miraculous. Nevertheless, most observers have remained deeply pessimistic about the functioning of the global political economy. Indeed, scholarly books with titles like No One's World: The West, The Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn and The End

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of American World Order have come to a conclusion the opposite of mine. Now I'm trying to understand how I got the crisis so wrong back in 2008, and why so many scholars continue to

be wrong now.

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2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Impact Turn Strategy

1. Non-unique- CISA will pass in the status quo- it has just enough votesThe Hill 2015- “GOP senator: Cyber bill has real shot in chamber” June 25, http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/246111-gop-sen-leaders-still-want-to-move-cyber-billSen. Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) expressed optimism Thursday about the chances of moving a stalled cybersecurity bill through the Senate. “The leader wants to be able to get a bill out,” Fischer said an event hosted by

The Hill and sponsored by Visa, referring to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). “I think he has the support of the majority of members in our conference and I would hope the American people would continue to push all members to say we need to get this done.” ADVERTISEMENT Cybersecurity is “at the

forefront of discussions that we’ve had in leadership since the beginning of the session,” she added. In the wake of the recent blistering cyberattack on federal networks, the upper chamber tried to attach a major cyber bill — intended to bolster the public-private exchange of data on hackers — to a defense authorization measure. Democrats rebelled, angry they would not be able to offer privacy-enhancing amendments to the bill, known as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA). With the help of a few Republicans, they blocked the maneuver. Civil liberties advocates have argued CISA could shuttle sensitive data to the National Security Agency (NSA), empowering the spy agency weeks after Congress voted to rein in its authority. CISA’s prospects have been uncertain since. Senate leaders have indicated there is no set timeline to bring the measure up as a standalone bill. And House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-Texas) said on Wednesday that the Senate bill in its current form would be a nonstarter in the House, which has already passed its two complementary companion bills. CISA supporters — including a bipartisan group of lawmakers, most industry groups and potentially the White House — believe the measure is necessary to better thwart cyberattackers. By knowing more about our enemies, we can better repel them, they reason. “If we don’t allow companies to be able to share information when they see something, the American people are not going to be protected,” Fischer said. The bill would also help in the wake of massive data breaches, such as the one that has felled the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Fischer believes. If the public and private sector are swapping more data, both sides can know sooner exactly what has happened, she said. That “will get consumers more involved, I think, at an earlier time so that they know that their information has been compromised,” Fischer said.

2. Extend the 1NC link evidence- the plan causes the passage of CISA

3. That’s good- CISA is key to prevent a cyber attackNational Journal 2015-Here’s What Is in the Senate’s Cybersecurity Bill” http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/here-s-what-is-in-the-senate-s-cybersecurity-bill-20150318, March 18The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act is intended to help forestall cyberattacks like the one that crippled Sony Pictures last year , but concerns about government surveillance prevented a similar measure from earning a vote on the Senate floor in the last Congress . The

legislation creates a voluntary framework for the private sector to share more computer data with the government by offering companies expanded legal liability if they choose to participate.¶

"This legislation protects the privacy rights of Americans while also minimizing our vulnerability to cyber-attacks," Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Burr said in a statement Wednesday.

"Information sharing is purely voluntary and companies can only share cyber-threat information and the government may only use shared data for cybersecurity purposes."¶ ADVERTISEMENT ¶ Thanks to an extended spate of high-profile hacks, the bipartisan measure could earn an expedited review and land on the Senate floor as soon as April. In the House, Homeland Security Committee Chairman Michael McCaul signaled on Tuesday he plans to introduce his own information-sharing bill this week.¶ The White House has identified information-sharing as a key priority this year, although it has yet to say if it supports the current CISA language. President Obama issued a veto threat for a similar measure that passed the House a few years ago, partly because of privacy concerns.¶ "We are committed to working with Congress to craft legislation that reflects that balance, and can pass both houses," a senior administration official said in a statement. "In that spirit, we thank the committee for working with us to address some of the administration's most significant concerns with the committee's bill, and look forward to reviewing the legislation."¶ Among the nuanced changes, the latest iteration of CISA grants

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liability protection for companies that share information related to "defensive measures" used to fend off hacks, a term substituted for the more controversial "countermeasures." The bill further clarifies that "defensive measures" does not include data that "destroys, renders unusable, or substantially harms an information system."

4. A cyber attack would cause a nuclear warTilford 2012 (Robert Tilford, Wichita Military Affairs Examiner, Former soldier US Army, infantry, July 27, 2012, Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa)¶ To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple the U.S. military . ¶ The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns,

stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power “every military base in our country.”¶ “Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out”, he said.¶ Which means military command and control centers could

go dark.¶ Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely.¶ “Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power”, said Senator Grassley.¶ “So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in

the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions”, he said.¶ We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the

threat of a cyber attack is something very real.¶ Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country” (source: Congressional Record).¶ So how serious is the Pentagon

taking all this?¶ Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure. A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met with a “full scale” US military response.¶ That could include the use of “nuclear weapons”, if authorized by the President.

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http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa)

http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa)


2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Drone Affirmative- No Link/Link Turn

Congress is on board with armed drone surveillance- restriction unpopular- this prevents passage Hill 2012 (Kashmir Hill, Forbes, “Congress Welcomes The Drones”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/07/congress-welcomes-the-drones/, February 7, 2012)Congress Welcomes The Drones Congress says, 'Bring in the drones!' The Senate passed a $63 billion bill Monday

to provide four years of funding for the Federal Aviation Administration. One of the provisions of the Reauthorization Act is that the FAA clear the path for wider spread use of drones (a.k.a. unmanned aircraft) for governmental and commercial purposes. Within 90 days, the FAA has to speed up the process by which government agencies and law enforcement can get permission to use drones, and by 2015, it has to start allowing commercial use of drones: The FAA is also required under the bill to provide military, commercial and privately-owned drones with expanded access to U.S. airspace currently reserved for manned aircraft by Sept. 30, 2015. That means permitting unmanned drones controlled by remote operators on the ground to fly in the same airspace as airliners, cargo planes, business jets and private aircraft. via Congress OKs FAA bill allowing drones in U.S., GPS air traffic control – chicagotribune.com. Currently, private use of drones is basically limited to hobbyists, and they have to keep the drones under 400 feet and within their line of sight. Once the FAA changes the rules, a company such as Google for example could finally buy drones and use them for mapping purposes. Yes, we may finally have Google Street Drone View. Currently, the FAA restricts drone use primarily to segregated blocks of military airspace, border patrols and about 300 public agencies and their private partners. Those public agencies are mainly restricted to flying small unmanned aircraft at low altitudes away from airports and urban centers. Within nine months of the bill’s passage, the FAA is required to submit a plan on how to safely provide drones with expanded access. via Congress OKs FAA bill allowing drones

in U.S., GPS air traffic control – chicagotribune.com. Drones are already being used to patrol our border s (and

occasionally to catch cattle rustlers), but their use beyond that is very limited. This Act will change that. “ We are looking at border

security using UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) research, law enforcement , firefighting, just to name a few,” said Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison. “There are going to be more and more uses for unmanned aerial vehicles to be able to do the surveillance and photographing that have taken helicopter pilots and small general aviation and even large aircraft to do in the past.”

Drone surveillance is popular with republicans- the plan is perceived as a loss Jones 2013 (Trahern Jones, Cronkite Borderlands Initiative, “U.S. Set to Deploy More Drones Along U.S. Borders, Despite Concerns about Effectiveness and Cost”, http://cronkite.asu.edu/buffett/canada/drones.htmlCORPUS CHRISTI, Texas — Despite critical reports saying that the use of drones to patrol the nation’s borders is inefficient and costly, the leading Congressional proposal for immigration reform would drastically

expand their use . In fact, the compromise bill would have U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which currently has a fleet of 10 Predator

drones, using the unmanned aircraft to patrol the southern border with Mexico 24 hours a day, seven days a week. An expanded drone program is also sure to draw the ire of privacy advocates who already worry that increasing use of unmanned aircraft will result in intrusive surveillance of U.S. citizens. The proposal for around-the-clock drone use flies in the face of recent reports from the Government Accountability Office and the Office of the Inspector General. In a 2012 report, the OIG estimated that the agency only used its current Predator fleet about 40 percent of time the time it had projected for use of the crafts. The same report criticized CBP for failing “to obtain reimbursement for missions flown on stakeholders’ behalf,” such as U.S. Border Patrol, local law enforcement or emergency organizations, like FEMA. Criticism of the program also came in 2012 GAO report that said drone program staff frequently had to be relocated from other regions to support Predator operations on the southwestern border. In spite of such measures, the report noted that air support requests were more often left unfulfilled in this high-priority region when compared to lower-priority areas like the Canadian border. Initiated in 2005 at a cost of nearly $18 million for each of the 10 drones and their support systems, the use of unmanned aircraft is a relatively new tool for the Custom and Border Protection’s Office of Air and Marine. While agency officials say that the program is useful in border surveillance, Predator aircraft cannot be launched on a 24/7 basis due to weather conditions and safety regulations. Unmanned aerial vehicles are usually restricted to regions and altitudes where other aircraft do not share the same airspace in order to prevent mid-air collisions. That’s why CBP’s Predator fleet almost always flies at night, further limiting potential operational hours. During an April visit to the National Air Security Operations Center in Corpus Christi, Texas, which controls Predator flights over the Rio Grande, Cronkite student reporters observed that high winds deterred launches for four days. A tire-puncturing device used by drug smugglers to evade Border Patrol agents. Known as 'caltrops,' such devices are made from steel nails welded together. Photo by Trahern W. Jones. SLIDESHOW: A tire-puncturing device used by drug smugglers to evade Border Patrol agents. Known as "caltrops," such devices are made from steel nails welded together. Photo by Trahern W. Jones A pilot for the program, who requested to be unnamed for security reasons, described some of the challenges the agency has had in learning the new systems. “We’re bringing our people up and getting more experience,” he said. “The technology changes; they can change the software. They can give us new payloads. Things come pretty fast in the unmanned aircraft world as opposed to the manned aviation world.” The drones fly for an average of seven to nine hours a mission, often covering

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many miles of uninhabited deserts, rivers and forests. CBP’s Predator aircraft are equipped with high-tech cameras and communications equipment to coordinate with Border Patrol and first responder agencies on the ground. Unlike the Predator program used in overseas military missions, CBP’s fleet does not carry weapons payloads. The aircraft often provide useful information for agents in complex situations or difficult-to-reach areas, according to Hector Black, border patrol associate Chief, and the agency’s liaison with CBP’s Office of Air and Marine at the Corpus Christi Predator Operations Center. “When we come across something, we’ll contact the guys on the ground,” Black said in a phone interview. “Rather than sending agents in their vehicle, where it may take an hour and a half or two hours to get out and look at these areas, we can cover it in five or ten minutes with this aircraft.” The camera equipment aboard CBP Predators is sophisticated enough, according to Black, that even from an altitude of many thousands of feet, “you can actually zoom in and get street names.” While the same camera equipment can be found on the agency’s manned aircraft, the Predator’s longer flying time allows for increased surveillance and more immediate responsiveness to situations on the ground, according to CBP officials. In attempting to measure the successes or failures of the program, Black cautioned that metrics like apprehensions, seizures or flight hours might not be appropriate. Predator missions are often used for intelligence-gathering purposes, alongside interceptions of illegal crossings. A more subtle measure of drones’ effectiveness is how they impact smuggling patterns in areas they patrol, Black said. “First we’ll see a spike in apprehensions in those zones, and then the spikes will start to show a direct downward trend,” he noted. Not everyone is convinced of their effectiveness, however. The perceived shortfalls noted by the GAO and OIG represent a systemic problem, according to Ed Herlik, a researcher with Market Info Group, an aviation and defense analysis firm. “They already don’t fly their Predators much at all,” Herlik said in a phone interview. “We ran the numbers. Part of the time there are no Predators in the air anywhere in the nation and most of the time there might be one.” “Now, of course they can launch two or three or five if they want

to,” he added, “but they almost never do, just by running the averages from what they report from flight times.” The reason for the program’s existence in the first place may have had more to do with the politics of border security than actual need, according to Herlik. “The Predators were forced on them” he said. Herlik explained that such systems were

adapted from their wartime purposes in Iraq and Afghanistan for domestic use. “ Congress wanted Predators over the

border, therefore it happened ,” Herlik said. “The fact that they’re not tremendously useful is not helpful.”

Plan reignites turf battles about Congressional oversight- distracts from bill passage Munoz, 2013 -- The Hill staff writer, covering Defense and National Security [Carlo, "Turf battle builds quietly in Congress over control of armed drone program," The Hill, 4-9-13, thehill.com/homenews/administration/292501-turf-battle-builds-quietly-over-control-of-armed-drone-program-, accessed 5-23-13,]The fight is a typical battle over who on Capitol Hill will retain power over the program, according to

several analysts, who described it as predictable. ¶ “There is always going to be a turf battle” when dealing with congressional oversight, said Lawrence Korb, a former DOD official and defense analyst at the liberal-leaning Center

for American Progress. ¶ But that battle could become particularly heated, given the high-profile nature of the drone program, which since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has become a huge factor in shaping counterterrorism policy, given its success, Korb said. ¶ For congressional panels, the fight over who will control the drone program will have a say in the relevancy of the two committees. ¶

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Documents

Stingray Affirmative - resources.chicagodebates.org · Web view2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Drone Affirmative- No Link/Link Turn344 *** Stingray Affirmative. Stingray Affirmative Summary