AIR FORCE FELLOWS

AIR UNIVERSITY

IMPLICATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO

INFORMATION SHARING WITHIN THE SPACE

SITUATIONAL AWARNESS DOMAIN

By

Matthew J. Lupone, Lt Col, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows

In Partial Fulfillment of the SDE Graduation Requirements

1

(Disclaimer)

Advisors:

Dr. Steven Warner

Director, Systems Evaluation Division (SED)

Dr. Jim Thorne

Research Staff Member, SED

Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)

March 2013

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not

reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United

States government.

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Contents

Biography ........................................................................................................................................ 3

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 4

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 5

SSA Definition ................................................................................................................................ 6

Space Policy Review....................................................................................................................... 7

Are We Doing the Right Things? ................................................................................................... 8

Expanding SSA Participation ......................................................................................................... 9

SSA Authorities ............................................................................................................................ 10

Space Data Association (SDA) ..................................................................................................... 14

Current SSA Infrastructure ........................................................................................................... 15

Space Surveillance Network (SSN) .......................................................................................... 15

Space Catalog ............................................................................................................................ 20

Formal Framework........................................................................................................................ 27

Data Fusion Opportunities ............................................................................................................ 28

DARPA – SpaceView ............................................................................................................... 28

The International Scientific Optical Network (ISON) .............................................................. 29

Lessons Learned............................................................................................................................ 29

Maritime Situational Awareness ............................................................................................... 29

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) .............................................................................................. 30

Recommended Course of Action .................................................................................................. 31

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 33

Appendix A – NASA Collision Avoidance Maneuvers in 2009 .................................................. 34

Appendix B – Examples of Debris Hits on Spacecraft ................................................................ 35

Appendix C – SSN Sensors ............................................................................................................ 0

3

Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Lupone is an acquisition officer. He has served in a variety of

space and missile acquisition, operations and staff assignments. He has served as a squadron

commander and materiel leader for the Space Test Program (STP), Kirtland AFB NM, a program

manager for the National Reconnaissance Office in Chantilly, VA, and served on the Joint Staff.

Prior to his current assignment as an Air Force Fellow, Colonel Lupone was deployed as the J-8

for the Information Operations Task Force – Afghanistan. In that capacity, he was responsible

for the planning, programming, budgeting and execution of 150M+ annual Information

Operations budget in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

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Abstract

Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is a developing yet extremely challenging capability

pursued within the Department of Defense (DoD). Simply put, SSA is the knowledge and

understanding of orbiting space systems, space objects and space debris. This is important

because U.S. space assets are crucial enablers for military capabilities and that the space domain

is increasingly a contested, congested and competitive environment1. SSA is vital to a sustained

competitive military advantage. Over 17,000 orbiting space objects are routinely cataloged by

USSTRATCOM, and a total of 21,000 are actively tracked. The National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) estimate is that there are over 500,000 pieces of space debris.2 Because

of the extremely high velocities of orbiting objects, even very small debris has the potential to

destroy a National space asset and negatively affect our military operations. Furthermore, there

are active threats with much more nefarious intent than existed 10 years ago. The recent

promulgation of several policies has created a vision towards change, highlighting the need to

create an information sharing approach to the SSA mission; especially now that there are over 60

countries that have a stake in space flight safety. However, implementing policy is a challenge.

Information sharing requires methodical planning to mitigate the programmatic and

organizational impacts to making beneficial and lasting changes. The value proposition requires

a management and automation system to correlate and fuse SSA data, and a military component

commander who possesses the authority, direction, and control of the resources intended for

protection.

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Introduction

Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is an operational necessity.3 Military operations

rarely occur today without deliberate inclusion of space effects4. Joint and coalition forces rely

on ubiquitous space capabilities that if denied or degraded, military operations will be severely

impacted. This is a mounting problem as the space domain has changed from a passive medium

to a much more congested, contested, and competitive environment. SSA mitigates this

challenge by providing time-critical knowledge to ensure continued delivery of space effects.

Several space policies cite the need for greater information sharing between government

agencies and civil, commercial and international entities as a means to sustain safe space

operations. Specifically, correlating and fusing space surveillance and satellite tracking data

from a variety of sources improves collision avoidance, space flight safety, and the ability to

attribute actions in space. While there is great merit with this approach, there are technical

challenges, and likely impacts to USSTRATCOM's space operations role and its inter-agency

relationships.

The purpose of this research is two-fold. First, to develop ideas for a new information

sharing framework under the SSA mission; exploring data fusion for increased synergy between

sensors and space-faring entities. Second, to identify the effects that such a framework might

have on current SSA military operations in order to ensure the most beneficial approach. There

are many SSA customers, but these customers are also SSA data suppliers, together with the

SSA community, we can help create an environment that yields more timely and accurate SSA.

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SSA Definition

The Space Posture Review Interim Report (March 12, 2010) states SSA is “the requisite

foundational, current and predictive knowledge and characterization of space objects and the

operational environment upon which space operations depend—including physical, virtual,

information, and human domains—as well as all factors, activities, and events of all entities

conducting, or preparing to conduct, space operations.”

Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations (6 January 2009) states: “SSA involves

characterizing, as completely as necessary, the space capabilities operating within the terrestrial

environment and the space domain. It includes components of ISR; environmental monitoring,

analysis, and reporting; and warning functions. SSA leverages space surveillance, collection, and

processing of space intelligence data; synthesis of the status of US and cooperative satellite

systems; collection of US, allied, and coalition space readiness; and analysis of the space

domain. It also incorporates the use of intelligence sources to provide insight into adversary use

of space capabilities and their threats to our space capabilities while in turn contributing to the

JFC’s ability to understand enemy intent.”

Lastly, the GAO defines SSA in layman’s terms: “A significant aspect of SSA involves

tracking many thousands of man-made space objects that typically travel 9 times the speed of a

bulleti and reside in a search volume 220,000 times the volume of Earth’s oceans. SSA also

involves knowing where each of these objects came from (who owns them), where it is and

where it is going, its purpose, and its capabilities. And, if an anomaly occurs, such as satellite

communications interference or loss of satellite functionality, ascertaining the reasons why.

i Objects in low Earth orbit—defined as an orbit between approximately 100 and 1,000 miles from Earth—typically travel at about 17,000 miles per hour. Objects in higher orbits typically do not travel as fast.

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These definitions validate the wide scope, and a significantly complicated SSA mission.

With 60 countries having equities in the space domain, it makes sense that together, we pool

resources to meet SSA needs.

Space Policy Review

Push Towards Information Sharing

An important early step in military planning and problem solving is understanding higher

headquarters and strategic guidance (ref JP5-0). For SSA, there is ample and consistent

guidance. A summary of several artifacts is below. There is a common thread of information

sharing and collaboration in all cases.

National Space Policy (2010)

The current National Space Policy highlights that the U.S. can no longer be solely

responsible for mitigating all of the challenges in space. It stresses commercial and international

collaboration and partnership to facilitate a mutual adoption of responsible approaches across all

space domain users. The policy identifies space debris as a major and growing problem, and

stresses for Interagency support and international cooperation. It assigns SSA to the Secretary of

Defense, and states the DoD shall consult with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),

NASA and other agencies, and industry and foreign nations to improve space object databases.

An intended ancillary benefit of sharing DoD space information with interested partners is that it

obviates the need to develop their own space surveillance capabilities; which then could be used

to survey U.S. space assets. By maintaining control of SSA, the U.S. sustains market share and a

competitive advantage in space.5

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National Security Space Strategy (2011)

Following on the heels of the U.S. Space Policy, the National Security Space Strategy of

2011 identifies the U.S. as a leader in SSA and directs the DNI to support DoD SSA capabilities

and to work with commercial and foreign entities. It identifies that SSA is a key input for an

effective intelligence posture, but also stresses sharing SSA information with commercial entities

and partnered nations.

DoD Space Policy (2012)

The DoD Space Policy establishes direction regarding information sharing:

a. “share situational awareness and flight-safety information, as well as support the

development of transparency and confidence-building measures and behavioral norms

promoting responsible space operations”

b. “encourage commercial space operators to share their spaceflight safety data”

c. “establish agreements with other nations and commercial firms to maintain and improve

space object databases and to disseminate orbital information to enhance spaceflight safety”.

Current U.S. policies establish a clear position that the U.S. should no longer be solely

responsible for mitigating all of the challenges in space.

Are We Doing the Right Things?

The military is doing much to improve SSA today. New SSA platforms, sensors and

mission systems are in development. Once integrated, they will usher in a new capability to

dramatically increase SSA observation and analytic capacities. Joint and Air Force doctrine has

been updated to clearly capture space support to joint warfighting, and to provide necessary

scope for SSA to complement the space domain. However, it is not clear that we have

thoroughly examined the methodology for accomplishing SSA. Do other agencies, and/or

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commercial and international companies offer cost effective tools or help reduce risk? SSA

requires knowing what our friends, adversaries and others are doing in space, “moving from

'watching and reacting' to 'knowing and predicting' in the space domain”. 6 A better solution

may require redrawing the SSA boundaries from a self-contained “military” mission to

provisioning capability through an amalgam of a military, inter-agency, industry, international

and academic community. Fusing pertinent space operations data from a variety of sources

could allow development of a more accurate, reliable and agile SSA architecture.

Expanding SSA Participation

Effective use of SSA mean different things to different organizations. To the DoD, it

means enabling operations in space to deliver space effects to support military operations, and

identify those that wish to deny the U.S. access to space.7 To commercial industry, it means

creating profitable space services to maintain a competitive edge in a thriving global economy.

To NASA it means furthering space research, and inspiring the next generation of space

explorers. To academia, it is an opportunity to train / educate space science and technology

applications. The FAA approaches SSA somewhat akin to air traffic management. Functionally,

SSA provides surveillance, tracking, statusing and warning to all of the aforementioned. At

most, each has a different needs perspective, priority, contributions and resource strategy, and at

the very least, there are enough subtle differences that one size does not fit all. However,

historically, the DoD has borne the majority of the international SSA burden. By National

Policy and direction, the DoD is the lead agent.

The implementation of information sharing for community SSA has second and third

order effects. To derive full value, the SSA authority needs clear guidance on their mission,

command and control (C2) responsibilities, authorities and resources. If SSA provides

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knowledge to alter satellite(s) configuration changes to ensure continued space flight safety, does

the DoD SSA agent have the authority to affect other agency or commercial space systems?

SSA Authorities

To fully address an expanded SSA partnership requires a closer look at the DoD

component for space operations, the Joint Force Commander for Space (JFCC SPACE) under

USSTRATCOM.

Currently, the authority to conduct SSA is CDRUSSTRATCOM under the Unified

Command Plan (UCP), Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations and U.S. Code Title 10 (Title 10

is the statutory U.S. Code governing military operations). The ultimate purpose of SSA is to

create knowledge to take action. The concern is that the DoD cannot unilaterally take action on

USG or commercial space assets. Therefore, expanding participation of SSA may raise a debate

on JFCC Space authorities for executing the SSA mission.

Cyberspace has an even more complex debate in that it crosses five statutes; U.S. Codes

Title 10 (military), Title 50 (intelligence), Title 15 (commerce, technical standards-making),

Title 18 (law enforcement), Title 154 (FCC). The recent Executive Order on Improving Critical

Infrastructure Cybersecurity (12 February 2013) recognizes this challenge. It attempts to

strengthen “cybersecurity critical infrastructure by increasing information sharing and by jointly

developing and implementing a framework of cybersecurity practices with our industry

partners.” The “[F]ramework shall include a set of standards, methodologies, procedures, and

processes that align policy, business, and technological approaches to address cyber risks. 8

The Cyberspace Domain is ahead of the Space Domain regarding information sharing.

One reason is that a thoughtful National Military Strategy (NMS) for Cyberspace Operations was

published five years ahead the Space Operations NMS. Given the recent update to policies,

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military SSA advocates could use the existing NMS as a launching point to clarify roles and

authorities by engaging in a joint discussion between USSTRATCOM, Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD), and the Joint Staff. The purpose of this discussion is to obtain visibility,

establish a DoD position and initiate discussion with the affected agencies and entities. This

discussion could help illuminate acceptable and new SSA practices; leading USSTRATCOM to

revise the SSA CONOPS.

Opening SSA operations into the broader space community will undoubtedly generate

changes to the existing CONOPS. For example, joint warfighters currently are on console 24

hours a day conducting SSA operations. It is unclear whether JFCC Space has C2 over other

space or intel assets affecting or affected by SSA. Seemingly, the answer is most likely “no”, but

this should lead to follow-up discussion on “supported” versus “supporting” command

relationships (Figures 1 & 2).

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Figure 1 Command relationships. Source: U.S. Air Force, Space Operations, Air Force Doctrine

Document 3-14, June 19, 2012, available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil

Figure 2ii illustrates new command relationships likely resulting from implementation of a

information sharing paradigm.

Figure 2

ii New command relationships may require new Direct Liaison Authorities (DIRLAUTH)

- Does JFCC SPACE have

proper authorities under

an open, information

sharing construct?

- Are there any C2 impacts

to Agency tactical space

operations?

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Under the new information sharing paradigm, international relationships are effected as

well.

The European Space Agency (ESA) receives most of their space debris detection data

through the U.S; however, it does not completely meet their needs, and the ESA has concerns

whether that free service will continue. The ESA sees space surveillance as an emerging

capability and is working towards the establishment of a Code of Conduct; a code could serve to

unify the space community to build upon some common ground.9 On 17 January, 2012,

Secretary of State Clinton announced that the U.S. would not sign the European Union (EU)

Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and offered instead to use the EU document as a

starting point from which to negotiate an International Code of Conduct.10

NASA and ESA have already signed an agreement to share satellite tracking, spacecraft

navigation and mission operations.11

The DoD could leverage this agreement to use NASA as a

“pass-through” between the military and ESA. This avoids a conflict with Title 10 regarding the

military providing support to a foreign country.12

With a unified desire forming around federating SSA, the time has come to identify

commonality and formulate a joint strategy for meeting SSA needs. The growth of space

systems and debris, and expansion of many space nations has prompted some to assert that the

SSA mission is bigger than the U.S. military.13

14

Furthermore, the DoD Joint Publication 3-14

Space Operations dated 6 January 2009 states: “The overall SSA of the US can benefit from

cooperation with non-USG satellite operators by gaining insight into commercial and foreign

systems' status, mission capabilities, maneuver plans, and knowing who to call in case of a

potential conflict with a USG satellite, etc.”

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Space policy has attempted to capture the direction, needs and virtues for the future of

SSA. The DoD is planning for change, but it clearly needs executive and DoS engagement to

shape a workable inter-agency and political framework. The technical framework needs an

updated approach, and that should be accomplished in parallel to the political decision making

because sharing SSA information without a proper technical framework does not provide

decision makers adequate context. Progress is being made to achieve a technical solution to

enable and evolve sharing SSA between a variety of entities, but there is so much more to do.

Space Data Association (SDA)

The move towards increased SSA information sharing will require increased involvement

of the Space Data Association (SDA). The SDA is a non-profit organization comprised of multi-

national satellite operators. Three leading global satellite communication companies (Inmarsat,

Intelsat, and SES) established SDA to share data between satellite owners / operators to improve

flight safety and accuracy of satellite collision warnings.15

The SDA has contracted operations

of the Space Data Center (SDC) in Exton, Pennsylania, to Analytical Graphics, Inc (AGI) which

is a recognized leader for software applications, engines and components that enhance SSA.

SDC is a global operator-led network for sharing high-accuracy operational data to

improve overall space situational awareness and satellite operations.16

SDC performs

conjunction assessments (CA) and mitigates electro-magnetic interference (EMI) and radio-

frequency interference (RFI) for their subscribers. Two of the leading SSA applications for

satellite operators.

Recently, NASA and National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have

agreed to participate with SDA together with the industry players already in place. This

demonstrates a unique and mutual strategic engagement between government and industry. With

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access to 16 satellite operators now, the SDA offers a ready pool to start sharing vital data to

better predict orbital conjunctions and EMI/RFI. 17

The SDA has formed a critical mass

demonstrating a joint expansion of SSA players.

SSA could also benefit from collaboration with various international organizations in

addition to ESA; Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUS), International

Academy of Astronautics (IAA) and Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee.

These organizations routinely meet to discuss joint space issues. Expanding SSA to a coalition-

like approach could assist in forming and policing norms.

Current SSA Infrastructure

Space Surveillance Network (SSN)

To appreciate SSA challenges, one must understand the current architecture and the SSA

mission growth. Much the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) in existence today was developed

to support the Integrated Tactical Warning Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) mission; an entirely

different mission than SSA. ITW/AA consists of critical missile warning, air defense and space

surveillance mission functions. Thus early space surveillance was a support function to missile

warning. Space surveillance was limited to determining whether a space object was an incoming

missile or space object. At the time, there were less than one hundred space objects in orbit.

Today, an estimated 17,000 objects are cataloged by the SSN, and that number continues to grow

(see Figure 3).

As the number of space objects grew, space surveillance for SSA purposes became a

burden on the SSN; and today it is out-prioritized by the missile warning mission for scheduling

resources.

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Figure 3 – Cataloged Space Objects

Another constraint of SSA is the sensor and management architecture. Each sensor is

categorized as either dedicated, collateral or contributing, and each has distinct attributes (see

Appendix C). The number and permutations of sensor observations coupled with an obsolete

information technology (IT) infrastructure that is over 25 years old makes the space object

conjunction assessment (CA) process extremely challenging. The IT systems are known as the

Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC) and the Correlation, Analysis, and Verification of

Ephemerides Network (CAVENet), and is separated into two systems because the intensity of

CA exceeds SPADOC’s capability. While of similar age, the two systems were developed

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separately and serially because the intensity of CA quickly exceeded SPADOC's capability.

“SPADOC’s capabilities are currently overtaxed.iii

It currently handles about 400,000 space

object observations per day from sensors—about 167 percent more than it was designed to

handle.”18

These IT shortcomings are being addressed through procurement of a new mission

management system, but that does not mitigate the shared infrastructure issue between missile

warning and SSA missions.

Another limitation with the SSN is that it lacks Southern Hemisphere coverage; better

orbit predictions could be obtained through a globally distributed surveillance network. Multiple

surveillance observations are required along the entire orbit path to produce more accurate

predicted orbit paths. USSTRATCOM projects object positions 3-7 days forward to determine

potential space object conjunctions. The most useful additional information that SDA members

could provide to USSTRATCOM would come a complementary position on the globe that is far

enough away from SSN sensors to enhance covariance analysis.19

Although an argument could

be made that if a satellite owner’s ground station was in close proximity to a SSN sensor, then

USSTRATCOM could use the satellites ephemerides in lieu of an SSN observation; thereby

freeing up the SSN for other priorities.

Figures 3 and 4 are notional and not drawn to scale, but accurately demonstrates the

benefit to increasing the numbers of observations throughout a space object’s orbit. More

observations reduces the covariance and improves orbit prediction accuracy.

iii The recent launch of the Space Based Surveillance System (SBSS) has shown the frailty of the current architecture.

A large percentage of the data generated from SBSS is not included into the CA equation due to the lack of computational power within SPADOC.

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Multiple observations reduce the

covariance of the predicted orbit

path. This produces a tighter corridor

of where the space object is expected

to be positioned in orbit.

Reduced observations cause the covariance

to grow along the predicted orbit path.

The oval is the predicted position of

where the space object is located as

estimated from the last observation.

Large Covariance

Small Covariance

MORE ACCURATE

LESS ACCURATE

19

Under today’s operational environment and CONOPS, adding sensors to augment SSA

equates to adding sensors to the SSN; this is very challenging. Because SSA and CA occur in

parallel to the missile warning mission, missile warning and the threat of nuclear war has created

a zero-tolerance for jeopardizing operations or changing SSN operations without exhaustive test

measures.20

This has created a system with limited flexibility to experiment with external space

surveillance sensors. Together with the large growth in the space surveillance mission, SSA

performance is experiencing performance challenges at the same time in which SSA demands

are increasing due to the increasing population and activities in space.21

USSTRATCOM executes missile warning responsibilities through JFCC SPACE and its

Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC). The JSpOC provides SSA and maintains the single

integrated space picture that is shared with Combatant Commanders and appropriate SSA users

to ensure space debris and other objects do not damage operational spacecraft. 22

The JSpOC,

through the use of the SSN and other situational awareness tools and intelligence, acquires and

maintain an understanding of space objects to include location, and behaviors. USSTRATCOM

has operational control over the data generated by the SSN and feeds the space catalog.

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Space Catalog

The cornerstone of SSA is the space catalog.23

Currently, the SSN tracks all space

objects greater than 10cm in the catalog, and orbital path accuracy is crucial because collision

avoidance is a game of margins. Since the 2009 collision between the U.S. Iridium 33

communication satellite and Russian Cosmos 2251, USSTRATCOM now provides a warning

service to all satellite owners / operators.iv

The SSN uses legacy astrodynamic models that many

experts assert are not as accurate as newer ones24

. However, because of the difficulty in updating

SPADOC and the impacts on dependent systems, it would require more compute capacity than is

available on the legacy systems. Therefore, until SPADOC and CAVENet are replaced, the SSN

will continue to use legacy algorithms. While this is understandable, there might be a work-

around for improving collision avoidance analysis. Combining SSN data with the satellite

owner’s tracking information and/or other external sensors, may be an interesting compromise

and deserves further discussion with regard to sharing satellite data.

The cornerstones of the space catalog are satellite’s two-line element sets (TLE). A TLE

identifies the satellite and provides orbital geometry and position at a given time. All CAs use

the TLE as a basis of analysis to predict pending collisions. The TLE is fed into an astrodynamic

model, is processed through software filters, calculates orbits, and ultimately predicts

intersecting orbit paths. This is a rigorous, complex and time-consuming task. As previously

highlighted; and in certain scenarios, accepting the satellite owners tracking information would

enhance the CA process. This constitutes transferring a small data file from the satellite owner’s

operations center to USSTRATCOM. Satellite owners routinely contact their satellites for basic

iv “On average, the Joint Space Operation Center (JSpOC) provides information on 20 to 30 close approaches

each day and in 2010, a total of 126 collision avoidance maneuvers were performed based on these warnings.” Weedon, Brian, “Important Steps for SSA, A Final Solution is Still Needed”, OnOrbitWatch, November 14, 2011

21

health and status checks. These contacts include obtaining “ranging” data from the satellite’s

telemetry. This data is important because it is the most accurate information regarding the

satellite’s 3-D position (also known as Cartesian state vector and/or ephemerides). The state

vector is important for performing covariance analyses; which seeks to better understand the

orbital uncertainties, essentially calculating “margin of error.”

“The space catalog lost list (objects whose element set epoch age exceeds 30 days) is

currently at an all time high. The cataloging of satellite breakup pieces and the recovering of lost

satellites from uncorrelated tracks are manually intensive and require the talents of subject-

matter experts who are often in short supply.”25

Occasional confusion of space object identities demonstrates that current capabilities can

no longer meet surveillance accuracy requirements to mitigate all potential satellite collisions.

This type of event is called cross-tagging and it occurs when two space objects are in relative

close proximity that their TLEs are confused and erroneously associated with the other’s meta-

data. Permitting external sources of space object data, increasing observations along the orbit

path, and sharing with USSTRATCOM to support collision avoidance could help prevent cross-

tags.

DoD satellite conjunction operations offer an example of how a scenario can unfold.

Until the point when the estimates of two or more orbital paths come within predetermined range

of each other, the collision avoidance process is basically a passive surveillance routine.

However, once that threshold is reached, then the active management process is initiated. For

DoD satellites, this triggers the tactical C2 operator of the satellite to send USSTRATCOM the

most known orbital position, typically the ephemerides data file. For collision avoidance plans, a

satellite’s ephemeris data predicts the orbital path and helps determine conjunction events and /

22

or close approaches. 26

This is a manual process because SPADOC does not maintain high

accuracy state vectors within the space catalog. The replacement system, the JSpOC Mission

System (JMS), will fill the capability gap because it will automate the CA process to routinely

include high accuracy state vectors in the daily CA solutions. However, the plan does not

currently allow external satellite operators to send their data to USSTRATCOM, nor does

USSTRATCOM send the most accurate state vector information, to include covariance accuracy,

of space debris to satellite owners. It “masks” certain data fields as a protection mechanism for

the SSN. This is a conundrum because without this data orbital conjunction assessments lack the

necessary precision to guide safe orbital maneuvers. In some cases, satellite owners proceed

with a “do nothing” course of action for fear of making the situation worse.27

However, if a CA

demonstrates real concerns, the satellite owner will execute one or more small maneuvers (in

coordination with the JSpOC). If those maneuvers are validated through the SSN such that the

range between the objects has increased a safe distance, then the maneuvers will cease and a

potential catastrophe is avoided. The only real impact is the degradation of the satellite's mission

life due to the consumption of fuel to execute the maneuver(s). Since satellites have a finite fuel

supply, this is a major concern for satellite owners.

Seasoned satellite operators such as NASA have refined procedures for conducting CA

and determining the probability for collisions. However, the newer satellite owners/operators

need help in understanding SPADOC (and soon, JMS) astrodynamic algorithms and the space

catalog to develop confidence in the JSpOC CA. In fact, a recent finding from a study that

assessed Air Force Space Command's astrodynamics standards was that the community that is

interested in conjunction assessments needs further improvements in the quality of the

characterization of uncertainty (covariance) realism in the predicted ephemerides.28

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Changing “Sensor-centric” to a “Data-centric” Strategy

It is important to note that routinely accepting satellite ephemerides instead of SSN

observations is essentially a change in procedures. USSTRATCOM does not generally accept

external sensor data.v Current practice for routine space surveillance restricts the SSA to SSN

inputs, i.e. a sensor-driven model with the SSN as the backbone. We propose that the SSN

community would be better served by implementation of a data-centric model of satellite data

ingestion. Allowing external data sources to support SSA increases space object observations,

orbit prediction accuracy, and improves CA. Nevertheless, there have been concerns that it

could induce errors via poor or misleading data. However, use of a statistical data fusion

approach would screen out-liars.

Establishing a shared IT infrastructure with the SSA community, that is separated from

ITW/AA, is important for a data-centric model to succeed. The ITW/AA security domain

prevents sharing data with the civil, commercial and international community. The security

concerns are valid but could be resolved, for example by creating a secure IT environment,

separated from ITW/AA, to share the most accurate space object information with satellite owner

/ operators. Classifying the data as "Secret Releasable" or "SSA Secret" might be a plausible

approach for select space partners. This shared, accessible network will facilitate a change to a

data-centric SSA strategy, but who should have access and how shall it be provisioned? Who

validates a space entity’s requirement to submit and receive SSA data?

v The Phobos – Grunt failed mission to Mars is a single recent example of USSTRATCOM permitting external

sensors to share data to support CA. USSTRATCOM augmented SSN data with several external orbital tracking inputs in the hopes to better predict where the spacecraft would reenter Earth. It is interesting to note that due to varying formats and sensor attributes (of the external sensors), many of the external data feeds could not used by USSTRATCOM.

24

USSTRATCOM and the Air Force are positioned to offer leadership on this new SSA

strategy. USSTRATCOM defines the CONOPS for space operations and the Air Force is the

executive agent for JMS.

A consistent and repeatable SSA CONOPS within an information sharing framework

does not exist. There is an opportunity to leverage JMS to fuse additional non-military satellite

data. JMS will be the heart of the SSA mission and will eventually both SPADOC and

CAVENet to be retired. JMS will incorporate new astrodynamic algorithms and information

technologies that will automate and increase accuracy of space object identification and improve

analytical capacity. While JMS is an open architecture system that is scalable to permit external

DoD data sources, ingest and fusion of external data sources it is not within the current scope of

work.29

Scope issues are easier to solve than software issues. Therefore, preparing now for

external data feeds which includes thoughtful preparation of the supporting infrastructure such as

throughput and automation is important. With potentially "big data" flooding USSTRATCOM,

automating the data fusion process is crucial. Lastly, the GAO (GAO-11-545) asserts a top risk

for JMS is data integration. vi

Data Fusion

“The fact is that despite any advances in sensor technologies, no single sensor is capable

of obtaining all the required information reliably, at all times, in often dynamic environments”30

vi

GAO-11-545, Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering Improved Space Situational Awareness Capabilities, Page

15: “Data integration: JMS and DOD officials pointed to data integration issues as one of the top risks for the JMS program. More specifically, JMS will need to integrate data from numerous heterogeneous sources, many of which are not net-centric. To ensure the data from these sources are compatible, the Air Force is currently working to ensure these sources are net-centric before JMS is complete.”

25

“For multi-sensor data fusion systems, it is useful to divide the system into three parts:

the physical, informative and cognitive domains and to determine the flow of data between these

parts.”31

Shifting the SSN from a sensor-centric to a data-centric paradigm supports these ideas in

several ways. First, it will require development of a new framework potentially allowing for

innovative solutions. Secondly, it allows the disparate domains to analyze how they contribute

and identify critical paths in the information flow. Lastly, decomposing the problem to

effectively apply data-centric strategies will require fresh systems engineering approach.

Successful application of these principles will lead to an effective multi-sensor data fusion

strategy. another advantage is a fresh systems engineering approach to decompose the problem.

Of the 17,000 cataloged objects in the space catalog, approximately 1,000 are operational

spacecraft.32

Those space objects presumably have ground stations that have ranging capability

and can report state vector information, the most accurate 3-D position available from a single

source. If those spacecraft operators had direct access to an information system for space

surveillance and conjunction assessments, then their input could help alleviate SSN taskings and

reduce potential false alarms for conjunctions.

At the most basic level, “the general concept of multi-sensor data fusion is analogous to

the manner in which humans and animals use a combination of multiple senses, experiences and

the ability to reason to improve their chances of survival.”33

Similarly, SSA can be achieved in

much the same way using a combination of senses. Author of Data Fusion: Concepts and Ideas

H.B. Mitchell makes the point that multi-sensor fusion “with a priori information is best handled

within a statistical framework.” Use of a Bayesian statistical analysis incorporates a probability

26

assessment of the problem as NASA does with their a Probability of Collision (Pc) Predictor

(PCP). More sensor data provides higher prediction probabilities. Mitchell cites three

configurations in fusing sensors outputs; (1) complementary sensors which do not directly

depend on each other, but are combined to give a more complete image. (2) competitive sensors

which independently measures the same property, and (3) cooperative sensors which use

information from two or more sources to derive information that would not be available from a

single sensor.

27

Formal Framework

A prototype functional model for fusion integration in the SSA picture is illustrated

below (Figure 5). This describes at a high level of the major processes in the system. Each

panel represents its own domain; e.g. Physical Domain, Informative Domain, and Cognitive

Domain.34

This division allows for a systems engineering functional decomposition of the major

processes and is illustrative of the various interfaces between the subsystems.

Figure 5 – Data Fusion Framework (Per GAO-11-545, “Space intelligence information—provide status and characterization of foreign and adversary

space-related assets, strategies, tactics, intent, activities, and knowledge.”)

One of the virtues of the data fusion model is that it drives all sensors to converge on a

standard data format. While satellite operators perform the same basic satellite commands, each

satellite database are different, and satellite telemetry files are not compatible or interoperable.

28

Thus is becomes necessary to establish a common data format for all participating space

stakeholders. The SDA has already created a model for gathering and sharing data that includes

standard data formats, such as converting ephemerides to a common format.35

Converging to a

common data format is the first step to unify disparate command and control formats and achieve

a common operational picture (COP) of orbiting systems. This COP could further support other

meaningful satellite events such as collaborative planning in orbital maneuvers.

Data Fusion Opportunities

It was previously discussed that any satellite operators might have valuable data to share

and fuse with the SSN data. Two additional potential sources are discussed below.

DARPA – SpaceView

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has initiated a program

called SpaceView that seeks to revolutionize the way space surveillance is accomplished.

SpaceView allow volunteer amateur astronomers from around the world the chance to contribute

to the space surveillance mission. Using their optical telescopes, these amateur operators can

track space objects and their locations and provide that data to SpaceView. This is a feasible

way to supplement the SSN without procuring new sensors for the SSN. Again, this requires a

paradigm shift; shifting from a sensor-centric processing to a data-centric model. 36

This “data-centric” ideology is similar to SDA’s concept of sharing data amongst satellite

owners, and the SDA has expressed an interest to contract with DARPA to validate SpaceView’s

surveillance capabilities. Fundamentally, SSA is about predicting future outcomes, and reducing

false alarms increases the probabilities of successfully predicting orbital conjunctions. Using

archived data from the space catalog, SpaceView hopes to show that ingesting their data would

29

reduce the false alarm rate; thereby freeing up resources to concentrate on other priorities in an

over-taxed network.

The International Scientific Optical Network (ISON)

The ISON is organized by the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, and is

comprised of a consortium of scientific and academic institutions from around the world.

Twenty-three observatories in eleven countries participate in ISON, providing more than thirty

telescopes that are used for space surveillance. 37

The ISON has discovered 152 unknown

objects as distributed by SSN through its Space-Track database, and discovered and established

continuous tracking of 192 previously unknown GEO space debris objects.38

Lessons Learned

Commonality exists between SSA and other mission areas, and the study and application

of lessons learned from similar challenges can help mitigate SSA capability gaps. The areas

below are some likely candidates for space professionals to concentrate ancillary study.

Particularly, regarding tasking, collection, processing, exploitation and dissemination (TCPED)

of data; and how and when there is new knowledge is generated; how does that feeds a decision

support systems to maximize the contributions; and if there are any similarities with

responsibilities impacting combatant commander authorities.

Maritime Situational Awareness

Space capabilities and sea lanes are both vital contributors for our global economy. For

information data sharing analogy in the sea domain, there is an existing model for maritime

domain awareness called the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) which

tracks 6,000 ships and shares positional data with over 50 countries. MSSIS works well because

30

it utilizes “networks of shared information to enhance maritime regional awareness and

security.”39

MSSIS provides a COP for maritime security. The Navy creates an unclassified

network to share this data; however it is not a panacea. The network can be spoofed, so

professional mariners use their own sensors and radar to validate their surface picture. Like the

SSN, some are concerned that MSSIS could compromise US Navy security and protections.

Likewise with SSA, the benefits of a sharing data to form a COP does not necessarily overcome

many of the similar shortcomings that exist today in maritime security. However, MSSIS may

provide the Air Force with some lessons to consider as the SSN changes to a data-centric

paradigm.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)

RPA’s may provide space professionals with some insight into the problem of data

overflow. With the introduction of full motion video (FMV) on RPAs, the amount of data to

analyze surpasses the analytic capacity of the intelligence analyst. “UAVs have collected nearly

three times as much video in 2010 as in 2007 – about 24 years worth if watched continuously.

Analysts spend 75 percent of their time reviewing intelligence data and only 25 percent

analyzing it. It should be reversed.”40 Automating the collection and exploitation process helps

mitigate the risk. However, “a multitude of tasks need to be automated including: detecting,

classifying, characterizing, identifying, and tracking potential targets of interest, particularly

when these targets are present in a highly-cluttered field of other moving objects of lesser

interest.”41

The ultimate goal of automating FMV is to create knowledge for the intelligence analyst;

the bulk of the effort should be in the analysis rather than mundane review. A system had to be

created to sift through large amounts of data, and to tag and index it in such a way that it

31

provides value for the intelligence analysts. For SSA, JMS will automate many processes to

include additional functionality to enhance information sharing.

TCPED is an overarching process to ensure intelligence requirements are met using a

prioritized method of employing high-demand, low-density resources. It is a highly optimized

logistical flow of data so that intelligence that is requested, is ultimately delivered. It is typical

that requirements exceed capacity. By further researching how RPA are resolving their TCPED

challenges, the SSA community may be able to draw some inferences to mitigate ineffectiveness

and inefficiencies to the many planned upgrades to the SSA infrastructure.

Further, the implementation of standards is an industry best practice, and for FMV this

has improved the interoperability and ability to share the data. The ability to move video around

from traditional to hand-held devices while maintaining video quality is directly attributable to

setting and meeting interoperability standards.42

Establishing SSA standard formats will

likewise improve the space community's ability to readily share SSA information.

Recommended Course of Action

New space policies coupled with dramatic increases in the size of the space catalog and

the number of space faring nations necessitate a new SSA approach. The political framework

needs establishment to manage expectations, and OSD, Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM should

engage executive leadership to promulgate amplifying guidance. The DoD has begun to

recognize the utility of leveraging SDA’s leadership in assembling a mass of space players. The

lynchpin of a DoD and SDA relationship hinges on sharing the high accuracy satellite catalog.

However, the process has evolved such that the space catalog has driven a sensor-centric model.

That paradigm must change to become data-centric.

32

Standard formats will enable the swift technical interchange of data. As the JMS is being

developed, there is an opportunity to share with the space community the new astrodynamic

algorithms, the impacts on the space catalog and CA process. Annual conferences and peer

journals offer opportunities to communicate these endeavors, and work towards a common

understand of DoD SSA processes.43

The Russian Phobos-Grunt failed mission to Mars provides is an example of how the lack

of standards impedes information sharing between the JSpOC and space community. The

Phobos-Grunt spacecraft was launch on November 9, 2012 but failed to achieve its transfer orbit,

and Earth reentry was inevitable. USSTRATCOM supported the reentry prediction analyses and

received information from various external sensors to try to compute where the spacecraft would

reenter. Unfortunately, a great deal of the data could not be used by the JSpOC because the data

format was so different from their operations it was indistinguishable.44

Technical interchange discussions with USSTRATCOM, JSpOC and external

organizations will be a long, evolving journey before a seamless information sharing paradigm is

formed. There will be many objectives and goals, but paramount should be a mutual

understanding of each other’s operation to support accurate and efficient space flight safety

procedures. Whereas current procedures today are ad hoc and manual, JMS offers the ability to

automate and fuse data to provide actionable knowledge.

In the near-term, USSTRATCOM should seek to support the DARPA and SDA

SpaceView testing. Those same test objectives may be a benefit to USSTRATCOM;

demonstrating the value-added of data fusion. Moreover, there is an opportunity to use the

classified space catalog as a test scenario to validate a data fusion model. The JMS program

33

office and testers should use this opportunity to build an IT test-bed; a prototype system that uses

JMS specs and facilitate a bifurcation of space surveillance and missile warning data. The

outcome of testing should reveal that data fusion reduce the number of USSTRATCOM close

approaches and the need to perform CA; thereby freeing high demand, low-density resources.

Conclusion

The opportunity to enhance SSA by using resources outside the confines of the military

institution should guide SSN evolution. Conducting SSA in an isolated environment is an

impediment to future mission success. Operational and programmatic impacts can be worked in

parallel starting with revisiting SSA participant roles and authorities and addressing data fusion

requirements in the JMS program of record and culminating with a new SSA CONOPS.

Opening the aperture to include all space players and sharing space data is vital to achieve better

SSA. This approach is necessary to course-correct SSN operations to preserve strategic national

security advantages afforded by space.

34

Appendix A – NASA Collision Avoidance Maneuvers in 2009

Spacecraft Maneuver Date Object Avoided

TDRS 3 27 January Proton rocket body

ISS 22 March CZ rocket body debris

Cloudsat 23 April Cosmos 2251 debris

EO-1 11 May Zenit rocket body debris

ISS 17 July Proton rocket body debris

Space Shuttle 10 September ISS debris

Aqua 25 November Fengyun-1C debris

Landsat 11 December Formosat 3D

The spacecraft highlighted above conducted collision avoidance maneuvers due to conjunction

potential with space debris. Since the Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 collision in early 2009, the

JSpOC conducts conjunction assessments for all operational spacecraft regardless of ownership

nationality and notifies the satellite owner of close approaches.45

35

Appendix B – Examples of Debris Hits on Spacecraft46 47

Launched Spacecraft/Event detail Occurred 14-Dec-97 Iridium 33 collided with Russian Cosmos 2251 (a retired Strela satellite)

destroying both spacecraft 10-Feb-09

15-Jul-04 Meteosat-8 (MSG) unexpected spin-rate change and orbit change attributed to collision with space debris

unknown

15-Apr-05 Aura (EOS) HIRDLS IR viewing mirror blocked by debris – kapton insulation blanket

unknown

28-Aug-02 DART collided with target spacecraft MUBLECOM during ‘auto’ rendezvous test 22-May-07

3-Jul-02 CONTOUR Star 30B solid motor failed, possibly exploded, during 50s. burn to leave Earth orbit

15-Aug-02

21-Dec-72 Sfera (9) hit by space debris/meteoroid. Part of the spacecraft large enough to be tracked, broke off and re-entered

21-Apr-02

15-Feb-99 Telstar 6 three hour outage, possibly space debris impact 11-Apr-02

26-Dec-99 EORSAT (47) COSMOS 2367 break-up post EOL, 300+ debris. 40% in ISS crossing orbits

21-Nov-01

23-Feb-99 Sunsat lost -possible debris strike 19-Jan-01

6-Apr-97 Progress-M 34 collided with Mir ‘Spektr’ module, damaging its Solar Array, and puncturing Spektr

25-Jun-97

24-Apr-90 Hubble Space Telescope Space Debris damage to aft shroud 11-Feb-97

7-Jul-95 CERISE collided with spent 1986 Ariane stage 6-metre stabilizing boom vapourized

24-Jul-96

10-Mar-94 SEDS II tether snapped by meteorite (June 1994) 15-Jun-94

18-Nov-89 COBE appeared to shed debris (possibly insulation) 15-Jun-93

21-Feb-81 Japan solar observation satellite Astro A (Hinotori): sun shade damaged by Perseid meteors

15-Jun-91

1-Dec-90 DMSP 5D-2 F10 solid motor explosion (50 fragments in-orbit) 1-Dec-90

12-Jul-89 Yantar-4K2 (48) spy satellite automatically exploded for security/safety reasons 26-Jul-89

20-Feb-87 GEO-IK (9) exploded. Hundreds of trackable pieces of debris 17-Dec-87

26-Apr-80 Navstar 6 hit by space debris. Lost one month of life 1-Jul-87

28-Mar-83 NOAA 8 entered safe mode. Battery 1 had no working regulator – overcharged and exploded 5 hr later

30-Dec-85

23-May-85 Yantar-4K2 (16) exploded in orbit 21-Jun-85

18-Jun-83 STS 7 windshield damaged in-orbit by ‘Flek of paint’ impact 20-Jun-83

5-Sep-77 Voyager 1 scan platform initially jammed by debris. Residue from manufacturing process. Later cleared

23-Feb-79

14-Jul-78 ESA GEOS 2 solar cell short-circuit, possibly due to debris collision. Three of seven experiments adversely affected

14-Aug-78

12-Aug-62 ECHO collision with own final stage after 1 orbit. Dent in balloon created strange signal return profile

12-Aug-62

28-Nov-64 Mariner 4 hit by meteoroid – minor damage to thermal insulation

Does not include the anti-satellite events on 11 Jan 07 (Fengyun 1C) or 20 Feb 08 (USA-193)

Appendix C – SSN Sensors

Status Name Sensor Description

Dedicated Sensors

Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS)

Primary sensor for deep-space metric tracking; also provides optical space object identification (SOI) data Detachment 1, Socorro, New Mexico

Detachment 2, Diego Garcia

Detachment 3, Maui, Hawaii

Moron Optical Space Surveillance, Spain Provides deep-space metric tracking and photometric SOI

Air Force Space Surveillance System;

3 transmit antennas and 6 receive antennas located along the U.S. 33rd parallel, from GA to CA

Provides high-volume near-Earth and deep-space metric tracking

Space Surveillance Telescope (SST) Provides wide field of view, deep-space metric tracking

AN/FPS 85 Phased Array Radar (PAR) (Eglin AFB) Primary sensor for near-Earth metric tracking; also provides radar cross section (RCS) measurements and limited deep-space metric tracking

Globus II; Vardø, Norway Provides near-Earth metric tracking and deep-space wideband images

Collateral Sensors

Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) Provides near-Earth metric tracking and RCS measurements

Site 1, Thule

Site 2, Clear AFS, Alaska

Site 3, Royal Air Force Station Fylingdales, UK

PAVE PAWS (AN/FPS-115)

Site 1, Cape Cod AFS, MA

Site 2, Beale AFB, CA

Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (PARCS) – Clear AFS ND

Ascension Radar, Island South Atlantic Ocean

Contributing Sensors

Kaena Point Radar - Oahu, Hawaii Provides near-Earth metric tracking and RCS measurements

Maui Space Surveillance System (MSSS) Produces deep-space metric tracking and photometric SOI, and near-Earth optical images

Haystack - Westford, MA Produces near-Earth and deep-space wideband images and RCS measurements

Millstone – Westford, MA Produces near-Earth and deep-space metric tracking and RCS measurements ALTAIR - Kwajelein Atoll

Cobra Dane - Shemya, Alaska Provides near-Earth metric tracking and RCS measurements

1

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2

26 Major Yingwai Chan, Captain Hector Bayron, and Captain Sean T emple (50

th Space Wing, 4

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27 Ibid, 11

28 Ibid, 24

29Ibid, 19

30 Punska, Olena, Bayesian Approaches to Multi-Sensor Data Fusion, A dissertation submitted to the University of

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Mitchell, H.B. Data Fusion: Concepts and Ideas, Second Edition, 2012

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Ibid, 26 34

Ibid, 26 35

Ibid, 12 36

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41

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3

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