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Soviet Satellite Defense Against the US Miniature Vehicle Antisatellite Weapon

. An latelllaenee Assessmeat ~

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Soviet Satellite Defense Against the US Miniature Vehicle Antisatellite '_Veapon.

The Soviets will have only a limited capability to defend their satellites a2ainst an attack by the air-launched miniature vehicle (ALMV), the US antisatellite (ASA T) weapon system that is scheduled to be deployed in 1987; The ASAT weapon will be capable of attacking low-altitude satellites, including most of the Soviet reconnaissance satellites. Once the SovietS detect an attack, the most likely tactic they would to defend

. their-satellites is maneuverinR to avoid interception,

,technological indicate· a iilOdeiiie .. , , __ ,,.._ ___ ..,

'.·. develop additional ~~~~~~~~iiiiilil.i~···· · ~by the late these nu~rm1·~ \•· ~obability of satellite survival, they can only be

implemented after major technical problems have been solved. The weight of countermeasure packages added_ to present satellites probably would

· , c; require .the use ·ora new launch vehicle, and the SoViets have a suitable '': launch vehiCle under development. Alternatively, the inay choose to

:incorporate countermeasures in

_ we that the Soviets may attempt to increase ?·maneuver-caPabilities by increasing propellant capacities, we see no new· :-.~- sp~cecraft designs include this or other modifications for defensive

W~ believe .the Soviets know enough about the ASA T system to develop ·countermeasures designed to increase the survivability of their satellites. Open-source reports about the ALMV contain data on the probable Soviet target satellites, physical dimensions of the ALMV, main components of the system, initial basing of the F-15s modified for ALMV launch, prime contractors and budget, and even a detailed design drawing ofthe ALMV. We believe this information would allow the Soviets to model the ASA T system accurately enough to predict at'ack geometries and to identify threatened satellite targets during an attack .•

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1 Contents

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Summary iii The Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle Projlram

Soviet Knowledie of the ASAT System 2 Soviet WaminK and Countermeasure Command 4

Possible Countermeasures 5 Maneuverin& 5

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Soviet Satellite Defense Against the US Miniature Vehicle Antisatellite Weapon.

The Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle Program

The US air-launched miniature vehicle (ALMV) is part of a direct-ascent, hit-to-lcill antisatellite (ASA T)

. weapon that is scheduled to be deployed in 1987. The weapon consists of the ALMV payload and a two­stage booster. It is carried to launch point by an F-15 aircraft that has been modified to carry cooling and computer interface support equipment on a pallet in

· the ammunition bay and the ASA T weapon beneath · · the fuselage. (s)

... , , In a typical intercept plan, the F-15 carries the ASA T weapon to an altitude of about 13 lcilometers (km); then it performs a supersonic dash and ejects the ASA T "'""""""

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A larg.eamountof open-source informatio~ on the · ALMV and its subsystems is available to the Soviets, and they have recently published a detailed descrip-. tion of the ASAT S}stem in one of their military _journals. The major source of information is Aviation

-~~:~:;~ ____ Wrek and Space Technology, along with technical · ''"·:.~ journals. Congressional and Defense Department re­

ports. and Jane's Weapons Almanac. Information ..

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about the can tractors, ASA T mission. physical di­-mensions (inchidine detailed desiin drawings), sen- -sors, basing, and probable Soviet targets is available in these "pul)Jicatidhs. The' esthnated budget, the in-

.. tended date for initial operational capability, and the _. C1 (command, control, and communications) and

tracking support provided by NORAD also have been · reported. Proposed plans to update tracking and tar-··· geting capabilities of radars have also been

published.

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Soviet w"arnina and. Cowitermeasure (:ommand .... :-· .-. ·.. - t-~-- ..

Defensive Countermeasures again~t an att~ck on an . individual satellite will depend on the Soviets' capabil· ity to obtain a warning of the attack and direct the · · satellite's response. A control center may receive the warning and relay commands to the satellite; or the satellite could be equipped with onboard sensors to detect the attack and could be programed to initiate defensive options.. _ _ _ _ __ _ ________ _

Once a warning has been received and the decision to imple111~'!t a ~!lntermeasure has been made, the new programing data must be sent to the satellites.

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.. :-~·. Thi:-&;vieti have at' l~sf.rilrie-JX>ssr6it"ruture optic·~~· .. for defense·a,ainst the ALMV .

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The maneuver capabilities of Soviet satellites could be incr~ased by using larger space launch boosters, high­er energy propellants, lighter subsystems, or increased satellite propellant ·

RORSATs and EORSA Ts to be deployed by 1990, and they might have increased maneuver capabilities.

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: Although-Soviet knowledge of the ALMV system ·probably is not complete enough to calculate the exact ·magnitude of maneuve-r necessary to avoid an ASAT

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