Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises by Richard K. BettsReview by: Richard G. HeadForeign Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Apr., 1978), p. 669Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20039937 .

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RECENT BOOKS 669

major strategy and arms control writings by leading Soviet officials. A superb collection, made even more valuable by the editors' excellent introduction and article summaries.

SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND COLD WAR CRISES. By Richard K. Betts.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, 320 pp. $15.00. An excellent use of analysis to separate policy fact from speculative fiction,

disproving the widely held assumption that military professionals are more

aggressive than civilian leaders in advocating the use of force. The study concludes that military advice has been most influential when it has counseled

against military intervention. An extremely important study for Washington officials and students of defense policy.

WORLD POWER ASSESSMENT 1977: A CALCULUS OF STRATEGIC DRIFT. By Ray S. Cline. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1977, 206 pp. $12.75.

An ambitious attempt to calculate national power by assigning index numbers to a range of critical factors, including population, economic strength, military capability, strategic purpose, and natonal will. As the author's disclaimer

acknowledges, the many charts aggregate not data, but judgments. The result ant perceived-power-weights may be less valuable than the suggestion of

appropriate factors, together with the sure knowledge that the difference between potential and real power is mobilization.

THE PANAMA CANAL CONTROVERSY: U.S. DIPLOMACY AND DE FENSE INTERESTS. By Paul B. Ryan. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1977, 198

pp. $5.95 (Paper). A timely monograph, combining a historical overview with issue analysis.

Ryan's conclusion, that the current treaties do not adequately protect U.S. defense interests, tends to color his presentation.

THE OFFICER'S HANDBOOK (A Soviet View). Edited by General-Major S.N. Kozlov. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971/Washington: U.S. Air Force, 1977, 358 pp.

Intended as a basic working reference, the Handbook assembles a peculiar combination of topics: political ideology, military-party relations, doctrine,

military theory, Soviet and NATO forces, psychology, disciplinary regulations, etiquette, and hygiene. Both the selection of information and the commanding tone tell a great deal about the Soviet military.

BLUE-COLLAR SOLDIERS?: UNIONIZATION AND THE U.S. MILI TARY. Edited by Alan Ned Sabrosky. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research

Institute, 1977, 166 pp. $5.95 (Paper). Articles both for and against military unionization as well as others examining

the constitutional questions, European military unions, a sociological analysis, and alternatives. Arguing that unionization is not inevitable, the most thought ful, and best-written, essay is by William Taylor, who provides a comprehensive, balanced discussion of the six major issues.

LUFTWAFFE: A HISTORY. Edited by Harold Faber. New York: Times

Books, 1977, 267 pp. $15.00. A popularized condensation of 12 official historical studies written by former

high-ranking German Air Force officers for the USAF Historical Division. The officers candidly evaluate German World War II policy in the critical areas of

training, procurement, leadership, strategic bombers, air transport, and jet fighters, and the conduct of lost battles ?most notably against the Soviet Union.

WAR, STRATEGY, AND MARITIME POWER. Edited by B. Mitchell Simpson III. New Brunswick (N.J.): Rutgers University Press, 1977, 350 pp. $19.50.

A collection of 19 essays and lectures originally delivered at the U.S. Naval War College between 1952 and 1974. Overwhelmingly historical, the articles

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