Sociology as subversion: Discussing the reproductive interpretations of Durkheim

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2012 12: 428Journal of Classical SociologyMlanie Plouviez

DurkheimSociology as subversion: Discussing the reproductive interpretations of

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453271JCS123-410.1177/1468795X12453271Journal of Classical SociologyPlouviez2012

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Mlanie Plouviez, Michel Villey Institute, Paris II Panthon-Assas University, 12, place du Panthon, 75 231Paris Cedex 05, France.Email: [email protected]

Sociology as subversion:Discussing the reproductiveinterpretations of Durkheim

Mlanie PlouviezPanthon-Assas University, France

AbstractThis article presents a critical analysis of a recurring interpretation of mile Durkheims sociology,namely that it views society as fixed in a rigid, instituted form, doomed to self-repetition, andimpervious to any type of change except that of its own necessary internal development (see thework of Albert Bayet, Georges Sorel, Georges Gurvitch, Talcott Parsons, Robert Nisbet, or RaymondBoudon). It is argued here that this reproductive interpretation is based on Chapter 3 ofThe Rules ofSociological Method(1895), but that Durkheim himself rejected it altogether in his later writings. Fromhis 1898 article, Individual and Collective Representations, to The Elementary Forms of Religious Life of

1912, Durkheim came to see one activity of society the transformative activity of collective ideation as unconcerned with the satisfaction of purely morphological needs. The point, however, is not thatDurkheims sociology developed from a morphological approach governed by a principle of self-reproducibility to a psychological approach that transcends the production/reproduction dichotomy.The article argues instead that by neglecting the contribution of the discipline of sociology, and ofthe epistemological principles on which it is based, to the instituting activity of collective ideation, thereproductive interpretation offers only a partial reading ofThe Rules of Sociological Method: sociology,as a scientific form of collective ideation, actually instantiates its transformative, even subversive, force.

Keywords

Collective ideation, creativity, morphology, social change, social reproduction, sociology,subversion

The sociology of mile Durkheim has repeatedly been the target of a particular criti-cism: that it seeks to freeze society in a rigid, instituted form, doomed to self-repetition,and untouchable by any form of change except its own necessary internal develop-ment. This is, for example, the objection that Raymond Boudon advances in Theories ofSocial Change (1986 [1984]). In effect, Boudon argues, the sociological naturalism of

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undertaking, whose methodological rules are set out in Chapter 3 of The Rules ofSociological Method(Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 85107), is one of the main bases of thereproductive interpretation.

Chapter 3 ofThe Rules of Sociological Method, entitled Rules for the Distinctionbetween the Normal and the Pathological, is a surprising departure from the overallapproach of the work. In the other chapters, Durkheim lays out the methodological rules

by means of which sociologists can, despite their closeness to their object of study, main-tain a position of evaluative and axiological impartiality; here, however, he claims thatsociology has practical effectiveness (Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 85). But this chapterdoes not mistake scientific knowledge for its practical application. It attempts, rather, toshow that the two are methodologically sequential. Sociology must be first scientific,then practical. More precisely, practical implications can be derived from its scientificconclusions. The scientific value of theoretical sociology and the rationality of the practi-

cal applications that result from it depend on this methodological sequence. However,such a sequence, no matter how purely methodological it purports to be, presupposes thatit is possible to derive values from facts, should from is. Is it possible and legitimate,despite Humes veto, to proceed from knowledge of how a society is to the prescriptionof how it must or should be? To this question, Chapter 3 of The Rules of Sociological

Methodgives an affirmative answer, centered on the concept of the normal.Durkheim here defines the normal in two ways, partly in terms of generality, partly in

terms of health. According to the first definition,

a social fact can only be termed normal in a given species in relation to a particular phase,likewise determinate, of its development. Consequently, to know whether the term normal ismerited for a social fact, it is not enough to observe the form in which it occurs in the majorityof societies which belong to a species: we must also be careful to observe the societies at thecorresponding phase of their evolution.

(1982 [1895]: 92)

For instance, according to this first definition, crime is a normal social phenomenonbecause it occurs in all societies. More precisely, for a given type of society at a givenmoment in its development, criminality is only a pathological social fact when the crimerate is lower or higher than the average rate observed in societies of the same type. Asdetermined by the scientific criterion of generality, the normal on this first definition isan existing fact, the subject of a descriptive statement. The normal state is a scientificconcept, subject via the criterion of generality to empirical corroboration.

According to the second definition, normal phenomena are those that are entirelyappropriate, whereas pathological phenomena are those that should be different fromwhat they are (Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 85). For instance, according to this second defi-nition, crime is a normal social phenomenon, because it is an integrative element in anyhealthy society (Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 98): a society without crime would in effect be

a society with no possibility of dissent or transformation, that is to say, a sick societycollaborating in its own demise. As determined by the criterion of the state of health,normality in this second definition is an ideal to be achieved, the subject of a value

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judgment. The normal state is a practical concept that identifies, via the concept ofhealth, both that which is entirely appropriate and thus constitutes an ideal to beachieved, and also that which, because it should be different from what it is, is a pathol-ogy to be avoided or corrected.

Thus normality is at once indicated in phenomena by the fact of its generality and anindicator of the ideal: that is, the state of health. Because of the intermediate position it occu-

pies in the triptych of the general, the normal, and the healthy, the concept of the normal isthe operator that allows sociologists to derive value judgments and practical prescriptionsfrom their empirical conclusions. The normal state is the tool with which Durkheims soci-ology can possess practical effectiveness without shirking its duties as a science.

Societys self-maintenance

But, in The Rules of Sociological Method, generality is not only the scientific criterionby which the normal social fact can be recognized; more fundamentally, it is the crite-rion of any social fact:

A social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individualan external constraint; or: which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having anexistence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations.

(Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 59)

To avoid confusing genus with species, the type of generality characteristic of the socialfact must be distinguished from that characteristic of the normal social fact. In Chapter1 of The Rules of Sociological Method, entitled What is a Social Fact?, Durkheimdefines the generality of a social fact in terms of its widespread presence in a givensociety a presence that results not, as in the sociology of Gabriel Tarde, from thespreading of some individual action via imitation,1 but from the coercion that the socialfact is able to exert on each individual consciousness. In other words, a social fact is notsocial because it is general, but general because it is social. To put it in a different way,the criterion of generality is dependent on that of coercion: the generality of the socialfact results from its power over individual behavior. Durkheim says in Chapter 3 thatwhat constitutes the generality of the normal social fact is not only its widespread pres-ence in a given society, but specifically its similar frequency within all societies that areof the same social type and are considered to be at an equivalent stage of development.The normal social fact is not only, like all social facts, general in a given society. Whatdifferentiates it from the pathological social fact is that it is also general among all soci-eties of the same social type.

The definition of the normal social fact as one that is widespread in all societies of thesame social type is based on its constitutive role in the conditions of existence of thesocial type in question.

Consequently the normality of a phenomenon can be explained only through it being boundup with the conditions of existence in the species under consideration, either as the



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mechanically essential effect of these conditions or as a means allowing the organism toadapt to these conditions.

(Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 94)

A normal social fact is general either because it results from the state of health of thesocial type in which it appears, or because it contributes to it. Thus, in the vocabulary ofThe Division of Labor in Society, tinged as it still is with organicism, the normal socialfact is one that conforms to the vital order of the social organism, or even promotes it; the

pathological social fact, by contrast, is one that disrupts it. In the more morphologicallanguage ofThe Rules of Sociological Method, the normal social fact is one that contrib-utes to the functioning of the internal social environment; the pathological social fact, bycontrast, is one that disturbs it. Underlying these differences in wording stands an identi-cal social purposiveness, revealed by the concept of normality: every society seeks tomaintain itself.

What are the implications of Durkheims assertion? Customs, rules, values, andbeliefs, whether they are religious, moral, legal, or political, are all so many efforts on thepart of the society in which they occur to maintain itself as a cohesive whole. Social factsand the various institutions through which they are crystallized are the means by whichsociety manages its own continuity. This function [that social phenomena are expectedto fulfill] consists in a number of cases at least, in maintainingthe pre-existent causefrom which the phenomena derive (Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 124, emphasis added). Acomplete explanation of social phenomena thus requires the elucidation of their func-

tional relationship with society, understood as a self-maintaining whole.A particularly telling illustration of this claim can be found in Durkheims under-standing of criminal law. In The Division of Labor in Society, he defines punishment or

penal sanction as an emotional reaction from the community (Durkheim, 1993 [1893]:66). Punishment is more precisely the reaction of the collective consciousness to an actthat it calls criminal because it offends the collective sentiments that constitute it. It isthus a defensive reaction through which the collective consciousness condemns attacksthat weaken it.

Its real function is to maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the common

consciousness in all its vigor. If that consciousness were thwarted so categorically, it wouldnecessarily lose some of its power, were an emotional reaction from the community notforthcoming to make good that loss. Thus there would result a relaxation in the bonds of socialsolidarity. The consciousness must therefore be conspicuously reinforced the moment it meetswith opposition.

(Durkheim, 1993 [1893]: 63, emphasis added)

In societies characterized by mechanical solidarity, where it is predominant, the functionof punishment is to restore the social homogeneity that is threatened by crime.

Consequently, criminal law is not only the visible symbol of mechanical solidarity; itworks to maintain that solidarity by reactivating it. By directing the collective feelings,which have been weakened by crime, against the body of the criminal, it restores the



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strength and tenacity of those feelings. In short, the predominant role of criminal law insocieties characterized by mechanical solidarity is a normal social phenomenon that fol-lows from their conditions of existence as a mechanically necessary effect: punishmentis the social institution through which societies characterized by mechanical solidaritywork to maintain the social homogeneity on which they are based, when they see them-selves threatened by criminal dissidence.

However, societies characterized by mechanical solidarity are not static entities stuckin the uniform reproduction of social homogeneity. As Durkheim says in The Division of

Labor in Society, they are affected by the progress of the division of labor, which leadsthem from an initially homogeneous state toward a heterogeneous structure. They evolvefrom mechanical solidarity, the result of the uniform application of social constraints, toorganic solidarity, which arises out of functional interdependence. In other words, societ-ies, even when governed by the goal of homeostatic self-maintenance, do not perpetuate

themselves in repetitive immobility but instead are transformed through an evolvingdynamic. However, in spite of these transformations, or even because of them, societiesalways seek to maintain themselves. The multiple changes that a society undergoes arethe means for it to adapt to new conditions of existence: that is to say, to maintain itself.

We can see a telling illustration of this claim in Durkheims understanding of contractlaw. Following Henry Sumner Maine (1864 [1861]: 288) and Herbert Spencer (1966[1882]: 611, 614), Durkheim recognized that what characterizes modern societies is thegeneralizing of contractual relations: the contract tends to become the dominant formthat social ties take in many, otherwise disparate, societies, to such an extent that [m]ostof our relationships with others are of a contractual nature (Durkheim, 1993 [1983]:161). However, no matter how numerous and varied they are, private contracts do notfunction in isolation. According to Durkheims famous aphorism in a contract noteverything is contractual (Durkheim, 1993 [1893]: 158) the presence of contracting

parties is only one of the necessary conditions of the contract, and in no way a sufficientcondition. To have legal force, the contracting parties must be supplemented, in factframed, by a regulatory force that is imposed by society and not by individuals(Durkheim, 1993 [1893]: 158). The parties are thus sources of law only insofar as theyconform to social regulation. Far from possessing a priori the power of enforcement, asis argued by legal individualism, they acquire it a posteriori from society by satisfying

societys demands.But modern societies do not delegate their legal authority, except with a view to main-taining themselves. In other words, contractual obligation is the means used by modernsocieties to hold themselves together in the face of the existence of individual diversityand by making use of the diverse individuals whom they contain. In fact, in the modernsocieties that have resulted from the division of labor, individual activities can no longer

be regulated by a uniform, external structure that fails to take account of their diversity.Any such structure must be immanent and adapted to the variety of individual activitiesit regulates. The contract, as a social fact, is appropriate to this type of structure. Heretoo, the predominance of the contract in societies characterized by organic solidarity is a

normal social phenomenon that enables them to adapt to their new conditions of exis-tence: the contract is the social institution through which modern societies maintainthemselves as cohesive wholes despite the fact of social heterogeneity.2



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A society that maintains itself, therefore, is not a society mired in self-repetition, butone that transforms itself by continuously adapting to its conditions of existence.Society maintains itself by unfolding regularly and inevitably, following its inclinationtoward a state of health that only accidental obstacles can interfere with. It is in theseexogenous disruptions that the sociologists margin of intervention is to be found.

Sociological conformism

Durkheims early work identifies two types of disruption capable of interfering with thenatural and regular advance of society toward the state of health or normal state. The firstconsists of phenomena of inertia that are typical of periods of transition:

In that situation the only normal type extant at the time and grounded in the facts is one that

relates to the past but no longer corresponds to the new conditions of existence. A fact cantherefore persist through a whole species but no longer correspond to the requirements of thesituation. It therefore has only the appearance of normality .

(Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 9495)

For example, a rule in positive law that is retained out of sheer force of habit and doesnot reflect changing mores is a pathological phenomenon. In these periods of transition,a society may fail to be all that it should be because one of its components lags behindthe rest. It is then the task of sociology to predict the normal type that is best adapted to

the new conditions of existence and to facilitate its advent. It must restore society to whatit should be by anticipating its future. From science comes prevision; from previsioncomes action: this intervention on the part of the sociologist is based on Auguste Comtesmodel of scientific prediction (Comte, 1988 [18301842]: 38). The second type of dis-ruption is more akin to disease. Society may be other than it should be because it isaffected by pathologies that are deviations from the state of health. Sociology, then,using the benchmark constituted by the state of health, should identify these deviationsin order to eliminate or correct them. Through its knowledge of the pathologies of thesocial body and of the remedies needed to heal them, it can promote the restoration of thenormal state. The intervention of the sociologist in this case is based on the model, alsoderived from Comte, of sociology as therapy.

On this view, the only legitimate sociological intervention, then, is that which, takingthe normal state of society as its benchmark, seeks to maintain it either through correc-tion or forecasting: it is necessary to work steadily and persistently to maintain thenormal state, to re-establish it if it is disturbed, and to rediscover the conditions of nor-mality if they happen to change (Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 104, emphasis added). Thus,the sociologists margin of intervention seems small. In effect, the intervention of thesociologist is itself normalized by the ideal of the society under investigation theachievement of the normal type or state of health. In other words, the practical prescrip-

tions of the sociologist cannot propose an ideal other than the one that the society underinvestigation tends naturally toward. These prescriptions can at best speed up its arrivalor help restore it. In this perspective, sociology merely interprets the natural tendency by



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which a society maintains itself. It may not modify that tendency, much less create a newone, without abandoning its ambition to be a genuine science and without putting societyitself at risk. Moreover, the normal type, a state of health, is already somewhat difficultto determine and rarely enough attained for us to exercise our imagination to find some-thing better (Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 106). Sociology should reflect the evolution ofsociety, and not take to imagining other possible social changes. It must simply record anecessary social change, one that it is not capable of modifying. Hence, sociologicalintervention, being necessarily limited, calls for a prudently conservative dispositionof mind (Durkheim, 1993 [1893]: xxviii). Thanks to the concept of normality, sociologyand social reform are indeed reconciled, but at the cost of conformism on the part ofsociology.

The reproductive interpretation of Durkheims sociologyDurkheims earlier writings seem to assign the work of self-maintenance to societies andinsist on conformism in sociology. For these reasons, they gave rise to a commonlyaccepted interpretation according to which Durkheims sociology is simply the sanctifi-cation of the self-reproducing activity of society. I call this interpretation the reproduc-tive interpretation.

A typical example of the reproductive interpretation occurs in a work by Paul Bureau,Introduction la mthode sociologique, which presents a critical commentary on Chapter3 ofThe Rules of Sociological Method.3 In this work Bureau questions the legitimacy of

the path taken by Durkheim from fact to value by way of the concept of normality.According to Bureau, when Durkheim claims to derive an ethical ideal from a knowl-edge of ethical facts, the ideals that he discovers are simply the rules of morality alreadyoperating in society. But such ethical prescriptions in no way add up to a genuine systemof ethical values:

This is very far from the establishment of a system of values, since the essence of such a systemis that it asserts what ought to be as against what is, in an urgent call to go beyond actualconditions so as to replace them with better principles.

(Bureau, 1923: 261)

According to Bureau, morality cannot be reduced to the currently established body ofprohibitions that regulate individual behavior. It is, rather, a counterfactual optimum thatboth transcends and contests such a body of prohibitions.

Durkheims misconception, on this account, arises precisely because he holds up soci-ety as both the source and the end of morality. But for Bureau, that which is moral in thetrue sense is not the body of assorted rules that society imposes on individuals in orderto sustain its normal functioning; on the contrary, it is something that the individual pro-

poses in opposition to society. Morality is the force of affirmation and resistance that the

individual opposes to the leveling, constraining might of society. In other words, inBureaus view, Durkheim reduces morality to its most inflexible and rigid elements,those that have become petrified within the social body, while the most fully alive and



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most important elements, the individual values that are not reducible to the social bodyand cannot be expressed in it, escape his notice (Bureau, 1923: 91). And according toBureau, to reduce morality to one of societys functions is to detach it from the onlysource of creativity it can possess: the individual. In this way, Durkheim is argued tohave subjected ethics to a conformism and conservatism that makes any real reformimpossible. Bureau thus attacks the cowardly and narrow traditionalism within whichDurkheim confines ethics by assimilating it to the commonly accepted and practiced(Bureau, 1923: 264265).

Other critics, like, for instance, Albert Bayet, Georges Sorel, Georges Gurvitch,Talcott Parsons, Robert Nisbet, and Raymond Boudon, share this interpretation, namelythat Durkheims sociology sanctifies societys self-reproducing activity. This is not sanc-tification in a weak sense: it is not by abstaining from social transformation thatDurkheims sociology is argued to sanctify societys activity. They argue that his position

sanctifies it in the strong sense: that is, through its normative prescriptions it reinforcessocietys self-reproducing activity. And the concept that thus subordinates the practicaleffectiveness of sociology to the maintenance of the vital functions of society is the con-cept of normality. In other words, on this interpretation, Durkheims sociology is notsatisfied merely to study social phenomena scientifically; it focuses on the social in itsmaterial existence, in its crystallized forms, and in its self-reproductive purpose.

Those who advance this reproductive interpretation all describe what they consider tobe the misplaced reduction of the social by Durkheims sociology in terms of the denialof individual characteristics and their hypostasis at the level of the collectivity. Durkheimwanted to view the individual subject as a being activated by (even created by) the social.But these critics argued that by elevating society to the point where it is identified as theexclusive source of action, Durkheim eliminated any possibility of innovation, creation,or subversion: the activity of society would then amount to nothing more than a processof steady evolution, with the sole purpose of maintaining and expanding itself whileeliminating radical change or upheaval of any kind. Through this hypostasized substan-tialism, Durkheim is interpreted to have discarded the only real source of creativity:individuals and their capacity for opposition and subversion of crystallized society.According to the reproductive interpretation, through its prescriptive assertionsDurkheims sociology prioritizes societys reproductive activity over the individuals

productive activity, from a conservative, traditionalist position.

The transformative action of collective ideation

According to the reproductive interpretation, Durkheim disconnects society from theindividual and dooms it to mere repetition of itself as a material entity. We have seenthat the textual foundations for this interpretation are to be found in Chapter 3 ofThe

Rules of Sociological Method. However, in Durkheims later writings this position isfirmly rejected. From the 1898 article Individual and Collective Representations to

The Elementary Forms of Religious Life of 1912, Durkheim in fact comes to conceiveof a kind of social activity that is freed from the mere satisfaction of morphologicalneeds, but is more than the mere juxtaposition or diffusion of individual innovating



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actions. In these texts, society in action is a creative power, in fact the most creativeforce in existence:

Society does indeed have at its disposal a creative power that no observable being can match.Every creation, unless it is a mystical procedure that escapes science and intellect, is in fact theproduct of a synthesis. If the syntheses of particular representations that occur within eachindividual consciousness are already, in and of themselves, productive of novelties, how muchmore effective must societies be these vast syntheses of entire consciousnesses!

(Durkheim, 1995 [1912]: 447)

The activity of collective ideation that is creative because it is synthesizing thus consti-tutes the first departure from the reproductive interpretation.

The synthesizing activity of collective ideation

In his 1898 essay Individual and Collective Representations (Durkheim, 1953 [1924]:148) and in the 1901 preface to the second edition of The Rules of Sociological Method(Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 3447), Durkheim describes the material and spiritual dimensionsof the social as temporally related. Maxims, values, ideals, and beliefs what Durkheimcalls, beginning with the 1898 essay, collective representations or collective ideation find their origins in society, or, more precisely, society in its material, crystallized aspect,referred to as the social organism, the social body, or the social structure. Society pro-

duces collective representations in response to its morphological needs or, rather, it repro-duces itself morphologically through the production of collective representations.

Also, while it is through the collective substratum that collective life is connected to the rest ofthe world, it is not absorbed in it. It is at the same time dependent on and distinct from it, as isthe function of the organ. As it is born of the collective substratum the forms which it manifestsat the time of its origin, and which are consequently fundamental, naturally bear the marks oftheir origin. For this reason the basic matter of the social consciousness is in close relation withthe number of social elements and the way in which they are grouped and distributed, etc. thatis to say, with the nature of the substratum.

(Durkheim, 1953 [1924]: 3031)

Thus, for example, totemic beliefs are explained by reference to the clan structure of thesocieties in which they develop.

However, such a morphological explanation is limited in scope. As Durkheim says,it takes account only of the basic matter of the social consciousness. While it may beable to explain the genesis of mental social life, following the reproductive principlesof the social body, it cannot explain its subsequent development. In other words, thereproductive interpretation arises from extending an explanation to the whole of sociallife and its later developments that in fact applies only to its original forms. AsDurkheim says:



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But once a basic number of representations has thus been created, they become partiallyautonomous realities with their own way of life. They have the power to attract and repel eachother and to form among themselves various syntheses, which are determined by their naturalaffinities and not by the condition of their matrix.

(1953 [1924]: 31)

Myths and legends, religious notions, and ethical systems, developing in what Durkheimcalls a luxuriant manner (1953 [1924]: 31), do not have the state of the social structureas their cause and do not have its maintenance as their function. They are created by

preceding collective representations. Collective ideation, the tendency of each collec-tive representation to form a new synthesis, is therefore an activity that is largely inde-

pendent of the reproductive needs of social morphology. Synthesis is not an infertilephenomenon. Every synthesis is a creative synthesis or a sui generis synthesis. Everysynthesis of collective representations in turn creates new collective representations.Collective ideation is thus a creative activity.

This is also what, beyond the distinction between collective representation and indi-vidual representation, distinguishes Durkheims collective ideation from Humes con-cept of the imagination. For Hume the imagination is the faculty of the association ofideas. Yet the association of ideas does not, strictly speaking, create new ideas, only links

between existing ideas. According to an example given by Hume in his EnquiryConcerning Human Understanding(1975 [1748]), the imagination, when it fantasizes acombination of the ideas of mountain and of gold, juxtaposes rather than synthesizes

them.4

In the same way, when the imagination regularly associates the ideas of bread andthat of nutrition, it links them in terms of cause and effect.5 In short, the imaginationaccording to Hume is unlimited in the number of combinations it can invent, but has alimited stock of materials: its combinations will never increase the number of ideasavailable for combination.

In contrast, synthesis in Durkheims sense, far from simply organizing existing col-lective representations, creates entirely new ones. Collective ideation, when it synthe-sizes two collective representations, creates a new immaterial reality. Collective ideation,far from having a limited stock of materials, is a kind of immaterial flow: the collectiverepresentations it synthesizes increase in number along with its synthesizing activity.

Hence the luxuriance that characterizes it.Society, as an immaterial activity, is a creative activity because it is a synthesizing

activity. Society, in its mental dimensions, constitutes a creative power. Contrary towhat the reproductive interpretation claims, collective ideation is the place where genu-ine social creativity takes place, with no morphological origin or purpose. Sociology inturn, insofar as it studies the laws of collective ideation, does not sanctify the reproduc-tive principles of the social structure. It illuminates the creative principles through whichcollective representations become independent of the social structure. However, the cre-ative activity of collective ideation does not provide a complete explanation. Indeed, if it

is not the social structure, what is it that makes collective ideation form syntheses, andform one synthesis rather than another? Collective ideation is led to synthesize one col-lective representation rather than another, says Durkheim, under the influence of the



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natural affinities they exhibit (Durkheim, 1953 [1924]: 31), in the same way that theimagination, in Humes theory, is led to associate ideas by their associating qualities(Hume, 2001 [17391740]: 1214 [Part 1, Section 4, Of the Connection or Associationof Ideas]). But what is it that determines the natural affinities of collective representa-tions? These natural affinities cannot be determined directly or indirectly by the socialstructure, for then the activity of collective ideation would lose its independence andcreative power. What is it then that determines them? Does not the activity of collectiveideation, precisely because of its creativity, evade explanation in sociological terms, atleast in part?

The instituting activity of collective ideation

In the conclusion to his last book, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1995 [1912]),

Durkheim came to propose a complete sociological explanation for the mechanism ofsocial production, one that freed him altogether from the reproductive interpretation.Here he uncovered a basis for creative synthesis that recognizes the independence of col-lective ideation from the social structure.

The product of this synthesis is a whole world of feelings, ideas, and images that follow theirown laws once they are born. They mutually attract one another, repel one another, fusetogether, subdivide, and proliferate; and none of these combinations is directly commanded andnecessitated by the state of the underlying reality. Indeed, the life thus unleashed enjoys such

great independence that it sometimes plays about in forms that have no aim or utility of anykind, but only for the pleasure of affirming itself.

(Durkheim, 1995 [1912]: 426)

It is not because syntheses are useful for the social structure that collective ideationforms them. Synthesizing is a profligate activity, carried on for the pleasure of affirmingitself (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]: 426). The principles of collective ideation are in thisrespect opposed to those of the social body: while the latter acts in a self-interested wayguided by the principle of social utility, the former acts in a disinterested way guided bythe principle of profligacy. Society does not act only morphologically, for the sole pur-

pose of maintaining its vital functions. It acts spiritually that is to say, synthetically without counting the cost and for the pleasure of acting (Durkheim, 1953 [1924]: 86).Thus if collective ideation is luxuriant, it is so because it is luxurious, which constitutesan anti-utilitarian argument against the reproductive interpretation.

However, this synthesizing activity of collective ideation is not without an effect onthe social structure.

A society can neither create nor recreate itself without creating some kind of ideal by the samestroke. This creation is not a sort of optional extra step by which society, being already made,

merely adds finishing touches; it is the act by which society makes itself, and remakes itself,periodically.

(Durkheim, 1995 [1912]: 425)



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The purpose of the social production of ideals is neither reproduction nor completion.Social production is not subordinate to the purpose of social reproduction. The social

production of ideals is a dynamic by means of which society creates and recreates itself,makes itself, and remakes itself, periodically.

Ideals, which are the creation of society, in turn create society. According to the per-ceptive phrase of Georges Gurvitch, ideals are themselves both producers and productsof social life (1995 [1937]: 37). Contrary to the reproductive interpretation, the social

production of ideals functions not to reproduce society, but rather to create it endlessly.The synthesizing activity of collective ideation is an instituting activity. It must be added,however, that in this instituting activity the opposition of production to reproduction istranscended. The instituting activity of collective ideation reveals the dynamics of pro-duction and reproduction through which every society creates and recreates itself peri-odically. As Hans Joas writes, it illuminates the alternating play of the institution and the

instituting process in which every social ideal is caught up (1994: 70). The social cre-ation of ideals thus reveals all the more clearly the permeability of the categories ofsocial production and reproduction, in that it subordinates neither one to the other.Collective ideation, far from being subject to the reproductive principles of the socialstructure, is a social dynamic.

But there is another opposition assumed by the reproductive interpretation that disre-gards the instituting activity of collective ideation: that of the individual to society.Society is not, for Durkheim, some external entity that dominates individuals and makesthem act like automata. Society is ourselves or, rather, the best part of us (Durkheim,1953 [1924]: 55). Society is immanent in us because we are the place and the conditionof its existence. The fact that collective ideation has its own laws does not mean that it isdetached from its only possible substratum the individual consciousness. However,while being immanent in individual consciousnesses, society still transcends them.Society is within us, the best part of us: that is to say, this assembly of ideas, feelings,

beliefs and precepts of conduct that we call civilization (Durkheim, 1953 [1924]: 55). Inother words, society is us insofar as we are reflective beings. Society, far from being asubstantial entity, means a system of thought that is immanent in individual conscious-nesses, but which, as its inherent creative force demonstrates, does not proceed fromthem. Collective ideation is precisely that mental activity which, though taking place

within us, transcends and exalts us. Collective ideation, without acting upon us, enablesus to act. Far from precluding individual action, social action is what makes it possible.

The subversive capacity of sociology

The analysis of collective ideation on which Durkheim focuses in his later writingsundermines the oppositions set up by the reproductive interpretation between individualand society and between creation and reproduction. Does this mean that Durkheimssociology evolved from an initially morphological approach governed by the reproduc-tive principles of the social body to an ultimately psychological approach that transcendsthe production/reproduction dichotomy? If the reproductive interpretation can be calledinto question in the case of Durkheims mature work, is it still relevant as a descriptionof his youthful writings? I will seek here to show that the reproductive interpretation



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provides only a partial account ofThe Rules of Sociological Methodbecause it ignoresthe contribution of sociology and of its epistemological rules to the instituting activity ofcollective ideation. A further move away from the reproductive interpretation is thus pos-sible, drawn from The Rules of Sociological Methoditself.

The constituent gap of social meaning6

I come back to the process of collective ideation. Every ideal is the idea [a society] hasof itself (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]: 425), the way the group thinks of itself in its relation-ships with the objects which affect it, or the way in which society conceives of itselfand the world that surrounds it (Durkheim, 1982 [1895]: 40). Collective ideation is thereflexive consciousness of which a group is capable. However, according to Durkheim,such self-consciousness is not acquired at once. A society progressively becomes aware

of itself. Collective ideation is not the consciousness that the group possesses of itself,but the consciousness that it progressively acquires of itself.7 In other words, the reflex-ivity of collective ideation is not and cannot be immediate. Groups do not possess self-consciousness as immediately given. They are not immediately transparent to themselves,nor do they instantly apprehend their own significance. If they become self-conscious,this can only be through a gradual process.

It should also be said that, for Durkheim, this process has no end-point. In otherwords, the reflexivity of collective ideation is never complete. A collectivity is neithertotally unconscious nor totally self-conscious: it becomes more and better aware of

itself (Durkheim, 1953 [1924]: 66). This quantitative and qualitative process of increas-ing self-consciousness, while it allows access to a higher awareness of itself, will neverdissolve into the complete transparency of society to itself. In this way, Durkheim escapesthe objection to the hypostasis of the individual subject at the level of the collectivityadvanced by the reproductive interpretation. Society is not a substantial entity fullyaware of itself and independent from the individuals, but the mental existence of indi-viduals. Thus a society that becomes more and better aware of itself is nothing otherthan a community of individuals whose nature as social beings is strengthened: thatis to say, of spiritual beings (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]: 379).

Thus society is never the direct subject of self-consciousness. In others words, the

reflexivity of collective ideation never operates directly. Society reaches a higher level ofself-consciousness not by itself, but through intermediaries. Foremost among these aidsto the growth of self-consciousness is religion: Religion is in a word the system of sym-

bols by means of which society becomes conscious of itself (Durkheim, 1951 [1897]:312). The elementary form of religion that is totem-worship is a classic illustration ofthis. The totem is a material object that is less a representation of the totemic animal or

plant than a symbol of the group. By expressing the social unit tangibly, the totemmakes the unit itself more tangible to all (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]: 231). This does notmean that the clan projects onto the totem the idea it already has of itself. On the con-trary, it only acquires such a representation of itself through the totem. The clan can gaina clear idea of itself only through the material object that is the totem. Modern societiescan also reach a higher degree of self-consciousness through social objects such as thenational flag. But it is in the state that they find their principal aid to the growth



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of self-consciousness: the state is a special organ whose responsibility is to work outcertain representations which hold good for the collectivity. These representations are dis-tinguished from the other collective representations by their higher degree of conscious-ness and reflection (Durkheim, 1957 [1950]: 50). Societies characterized by organicsolidarity, because they are highly differentiated, need the mediation of a central organ that is, the state in order to reach a clearer and more advanced self-consciousness.Collective ideation, with its increased clarity and intelligence, is thus the product not ofsociety itself but of the state, which communicates it to society.

Every group presents thus a gap with regard to itself: it cannot represent itself directly;it is condemned to apprehend itself clearly only through intermediaries. This is whatBruno Karsenti calls the constituent gap of social meaning, or the impossibility of coin-cidence between the group and the meaning that it bears (Karsenti, 2001: 238; see alsoKarsenti, 2006: 2529). Because of this gap, collective ideation is torn between conflict-

ing demands, that of being diffused and that of being clear. Either it is widely diffusedbecause it has been developed collectively, meaning that it is confused, unintentional,and unreflective, or else it is clear, intentional, and reflective, but its diffusion is limited

because it has been developed by a specific class or group.In modern societies characterized by organic solidarity, the impossibility of collective

representations that are simultaneously diffused and clear is attested especially, as wehave just seen, in the separation of society from the state. I will show now that it is alsomanifested in the distinction between common sense and sociological knowledge. Inother words, modern societies with a highly centralized state are also societies that assignthe production of knowledge about themselves to a group of professionals. Or to put itdifferently, sociology is, in modern societies, one aid to the growth of self-consciousness.This is what is suggested by the famous injunction concerning preconceptions in The

Rules of Sociological Method.

Sociology, an aid to the growth of self-consciousness in modern

societies

In Chapter 2 ofThe Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim says that one must system-atically discard all preconceptions (1982 [1895]: 72). This rule is commonly interpreted

as recommending a radical epistemological break between common sense and sociology,which would prevent the insinuation of lay sociology into scientific sociology.8Interpreted this way, it means that sociologists must disabuse themselves of ordinaryrepresentations and beliefs. To do this, they must take as their objects the social factsthemselves, not the unreflective, experiential, epistemologically inconsistent representa-tions that people have of them. On this interpretation, sociology cannot be scientificunless it sets itself up in opposition to common-sense knowledge and rejects it. Theconsequence of this way of interpreting Durkheim is that sociologists can truly know theobjects they study only if they tear themselves away from the close connections they

have had with them.For Durkheim, preconceptions are spontaneous notions, formed unmethodically forpractical purposes. This makes them the opposite in every way of sociological concepts.However, what preconceptions and sociological concepts have in common is that both



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are impersonal, social representations. Preconceptions are impersonal, familiar notions,self-evident to everyone, which combine to form common opinion or common sense.9Science is also defined by Durkheim as impersonal thought: science is not an indi-vidual; it is a social thing, pre-eminently impersonal (Durkheim, 1953 [1924]: 66). Inother words, sociology is not opposed to collective conscience: it is one form of collec-tive ideation among others. More precisely, sociology is the scientific form of collectiveideation.

Consequently, the distinction between preconceptions and sociological concepts isless an absolute epistemological dichotomy than a difference between two forms of col-lective ideation. Collective ideation can follow the path of opinion or common knowl-edge. In that case it will be pre-conceptual. But it can also follow the path of science. Inthat case it will be sociological.

Preconceptions and sociological concepts are two different forms of collective ide-

ation, and as such are affected by the constituent gap of social meaning. They cannot beboth widely diffused and clear. Collective ideation in its pre-conceptual form is certainlywidely diffused, but also confused. Although it is thinking that is performed by membersof society, it fails to reach an adequate understanding of society as an object of knowl-edge. Collective ideation that takes the form of sociology is certainly clear, but its diffu-sion is limited. It achieves an adequate understanding of society as an object of knowledge,

but those who achieve that understanding are limited to a body of professionals.Sociological knowledge, like preconceptions, can in no way lead to the complete coinci-dence of a group with itself.

But by systematically discarding preconceptions, do sociologists not guide the pre-conceptual social thinking toward scientific knowledge? By systematically discarding

preconceptions and replacing them with sociological concepts, sociology brings collec-tive consciousness closer to sociological knowledge. It gives society access to that higherself-consciousness that is scientific self-knowledge. In stating the methodological injunc-tion that one must systematically discard all preconceptions, Durkheim advocates nei-ther the rejection of common-sense knowledge in favor of the sociologists scientificknowledge, nor the dilution of scientific knowledge by common-sense knowledge. Hecalls instead for guiding common-sense knowledge toward sociological knowledge. Inthis way, he makes sociology the specific form of mediation through which modern soci-

eties will learn more and more about themselves. Society arrives at this fuller conscious-ness only by science (Durkheim, 1953 [1924]: 66). Because it replaces preconceptionswith scientific concepts, sociology is a potential aid to the growth of self-consciousness

and perhaps the best possible aid to the growth of self-consciousness for modernsocieties.

Sociology, the driver of transformation in modern societies

The highest level of self-consciousness that a group attains alters the group in ques-tion. By becoming more and better aware of itself, the collectivity is transformed.The consciousness that society gains of its own condition alters it; by the mere fact ofknowing itself, it is no longer what it was before (Durkheim, 1969: 579). It is precisely

because it is indirectly reflexive that collective ideation is normative. For example, the



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totem for the Australian, or the flag for the soldier, expresses in material form the unityof the clan or the nation. But by representing it, it also constitutes it. The emblem isnot only a convenient method of clarifying the awareness the society has of itself: Itserves to create and is a constitutive element of that awareness (Durkheim, 1995[1912]: 231). The emblem is not the groups outward expression but the idea throughwhich the group is constituted. In exactly the same way, the role of the modern state isnot simply to reflect back to its separate constituents the image of the social whole thatthey combine to form but to which they have no direct access. If it were merely a paleimitation of this sort, it would lose its independent existence relative to society. Thestate must be a centre of new and original representations which ought to put societyin a position to conduct itself with greater intelligence than when it is swayed merely

by vague sentiments working on it (Durkheim, 1957 [1950]: 92). Political representa-tion is not imitative and passive, but speculative and active. It augments unreflective

thinking with deliberative thinking that, once conveyed to the various components ofsociety, makes them behave more intelligently. In other words, the aids to the growthof self-consciousness function to transform society. For that reason, the constituentgap of social meaning must be understood in a strong sense: the gap of social meaningis constitutive of society, for through it society makes itself, and remakes itself, peri-odically. Aids to the growth of self-consciousness are at the same time the drivers ofsocial transformation.

Using the states representations, modern societies make themselves, and remakethemselves, at regular intervals. Using the findings of sociology, modern societies alsomake themselves, and remake themselves, at regular but different intervals. Sociologists,then, are not to be confused either with politicians or with agents of the state. The scien-tific form of the collective ideation is not reducible to its deliberative form, even though

both of these add a level of reflective thinking to spontaneous social thinking, and eventhough both transform society through the addition of reflective thinking.

Consciousness and scientific thinking, which is simply the highest form of consciousness, arenot added onto reality without affecting it, as if they were mere epiphenomena; they put us in aposition to change reality purely by the fact of illuminating it.

(Durkheim, 1969: 572)

Sociology, the highest form of collective ideation, is also the form through which socie-ties make themselves, and remake themselves, at more frequent intervals. The findingsof science are the most transformative social ideals imaginable. Sociology is collectiveideation at its maximum level of creative activity. The advent and the development ofsociology in modern societies are thus not neutral events without practical effect.Sociological knowledge transforms the social phenomena it studies by the very fact ofstudying them. This is the meaning, the exact opposite of that proposed by the reproduc-tive interpretation, of the practical effectiveness claimed for sociology by Durkheim in

Chapter 3 ofThe Rules of Sociological Method.It may be objected that this reading ofThe Rules of Sociological Method, focusing onthe contribution of sociology to the instituting activity of collective ideation, is not in theend any different from the reproductive interpretation more precisely, that it simply



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transposes to the social psyche what the reproductive interpretation claims for the socialstructure. According to the reproductive interpretation, Durkheim reduces sociology to aconformist discipline because the ideal that he identifies in society is not in fact an idealsocial structure but simply the actual, real social structure imagined as functioning opti-mally and in its completely realized form. But does that mean that the ideal Durkheimidentifies in the social psyche scientific knowledge is equally nothing more than theactual, real social psyche imagined as functioning optimally and in its completely real-ized form? If so, that would mean that the contribution of sociology to the institutingactivity of collective ideation is also in fact mere conformism.

To these objections, Durkheims final work, the Introduction to Ethics, offers a neg-ative response.

Every morality, no matter what it is, has its ideal. Therefore, the morality to which men

subscribe at each moment of history has its ideal which is embodied in the institutions, traditionsand precepts which generally govern behavior. But above and beyond this ideal, there arealways others in the process of being formed. For the moral ideal is not immutable: despite therespect with which it is vested, it is alive, constantly changing and evolving. New ideas andaspirations appear which modify or even revolutionize existing morality. And since [themoralist] is not held back by the established morality, he [sic] claims the right to sweep itcompletely aside should his principles so demand. He is at liberty to create something originaland break new ground. Through him all the many currents, which run through society and overwhich minds are divided, attain awareness and are given conscious expression.

(Durkheim, 1979 [1917]: 81)10

There is no unique ideal, but rather a multiplicity of ideals. More precisely, there is oneideal that, in its unique, instituted form, seeks to maintain itself; but over and above thisideal, there are always multiple ideals with productive and instituting activity. In otherwords, the reproductive interpretation is misled by the unity and the institutional visibil-ity of the instituted ideal. It does not recognize the essential multiplicity of the ideals.

Collective ideation is plural because it is a synthesizing activity. There is no singleideal, but a multiplicity of ideals, precisely because ofthe synthesizing activity of collec-tive ideation. Society, under the impact of this plural collective ideation, creates and recre-ates itself, makes itself, and remakes itself, periodically. Social changes modify or evenrevolutionize existing morality because of the instituting activity of collective ideation.Therefore, the object of sociological knowledge is not the ideal in its unique, institutedform. If it were merely to conform to this ideal, as the reproductive interpretation claimsit does, it would not even function to strengthen it. It would be nothing but useless ver-

biage. Sociology can create something original and break new ground (Durkheim, 1979[1917]: 81). It has as its object the currents of ideals in all their diversity and their institut-ing activity. More specifically, by helping these currents to gain a better understanding ofthemselves, it brings them to conscious expression, and thus puts them in a position to

change the instituted ideal. As an aid to the growth of self-consciousness of the currents ofideals, as a driver of transformation, sociology functions to subvert the instituted socialideal. Sociology is collective ideation in its subversive capacity.



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This subversive capacity is in reality already present in The Rules of SociologicalMethod, and specifically in Chapter 3, at the core of Durkheims account of the socialnormality of crime. Every criminal is an innovator. For example, Socrates was the inter-

preter of a current of ideals that was just coming into being and was thereby innovative.He gave expression to that current, in opposition to the instituted ideal, which reacted bycalling him a criminal. But by giving that current access to a greater consciousness andknowledge of itself, Socrates subverted the instituted ideal and precipitated its transfor-mation, which is what made him an innovator. Every crime expresses underlying cur-rents of ideals and in so doing functions to subvert the instituted ideal. This is why crime,as Durkheim argues in Chapter 3 ofThe Rules of Sociological Method, is a normal social

phenomenon. In this respect, sociologists are distinguished from criminals in two mainways: they give conscious expression to currents of ideals, and when they subvert theinstituted ideal they know that the activity of innovation is a normal one. In other words,

sociology is the criminal form of collective ideation, but one that is reflective and con-scious of its normality.

Notes

This article was translated by Linda Gardiner, in collaboration with Anne Warfield Rawls and theauthor, with the support of Paris I Panthon-Sorbonne University Philosophies contemporaines/NoSoPhi.

1. On the relation between generality and diffusion, see Durkheim (1982 [1895]: 5059; 1951[1897]: 133ff.), and Tarde (1993 [1890]).

2. For a more detailed discussion of Durkheims definition of the contract as a social institution,see Plouviez (2009: 6990).3. Paul Bureau, a Catholic and republican trained as a lawyer but converted to sociology, out-

lined a rapprochement between the trend typified by Le Play and the Durkheim school inthe first half of the twentieth century. While he acknowledged the necessity and legitimacyof sociology, he rejected the normative role that Durkheim assigned to it (Bureau, 1923:251265). For a more detailed discussion of Bureaus proposed reading of Durkheims sociol-ogy, see Plouviez (2005: 89120).

4. Hume discusses this example in Section Two of theEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding(Hume, 1975 [1748]: 19).

5. Hume discusses this example in Section Four of the Enquiry Concerning HumanUnderstanding(Hume, 1975 [1748]: 32ff.).

6. This expression is borrowed from Bruno Karsenti (2001).7. For example, the awareness that society takes of its condition (Durkheim, 1969: 579);

society becomes conscious of itself (Durkheim, 1951 [1897]: 312); If society is to be able tobecome conscious of itself and keep the sense it has of itself at the required intensity, it mustassemble and concentrate (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]: 424).

8. This interpretation is supported by the reading of the injunction as proposed by PierreBourdieu, Jean-Claude Chamboredon, and Jean-Claude Passeron inLe mtier de sociologue(2005 [1967]: 2749).

9. For a more detailed discussion of Durkheims preconceptions, see Plouviez and Keck (2008:

6264).10. In this last work, unlike its predecessors, Durkheims reference to the moralist is not meant

negatively. For moralist here we may read sociologist.



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Author biography

Mlanie Plouviez is laureate of the agrgation in Philosophy. She received a Ph.D. inphilosophy from Paris I Panthon-Sorbonne University and is currently studying for

her post-doc at the Michel Villey Institute, Paris II Panthon-Assas University. Herresearch focuses on philosophy of law and philosophy of social sciences. She is inter-ested, in particular, in exploring the birth of scientific sociology in the nineteenth cen-tury. She has published articles about Durkheim and has written, with Frdric Keck,

Le vocabulaire de Durkheim (Ellipses, 2008). She is currently writing a book entitledLes normes sociales chez Durkheim to be published at ditions CNRS (2013).

Documents

Sociology as subversion: Discussing the reproductive interpretations of Durkheim