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Social epistemology and socialcognitionJ. Angelo Corlett aa Department of Philosophy , University of Arizona , Tucson,AZ, 87521, USAPublished online: 19 Jun 2008.

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SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY, 1 9 9 1 , VOL. 5 , NO. 2 , 1 3 5 - 1 4 9

Symposium on the implications of social and cognitive psychologyfor analytic epistemology

Social epistemology and social cognition

J. ANGELO CORLETT

I. Introduction

I am quite grateful for the opportunity to reply to each of my commentators: JamesMaffie,1 Frederick F. Schmitt,2 Alvin Goldman3 and C. M. Heyes.4 Each of themprovides the reader with philosophically and psychologically informative concerns withregards to certain claims they understand me to make in 'Epistemology, Psychology andGoldman'.5 For instance, Maffie provides a somewhat skeptical position concerningboth Goldman's proposed distinctions between basic processes and acquired methodsand my own proposed contrast of social and nonsocial cognition. Moreover, Schmitt'sdiscussion of attribution theory is informative, as is his critical account of variouscategories of psychology and epistemology. In addition, Goldman gives the mostupdated and clearest presentation of his theory of epistemics. In so doing, he clarifiescertain points I make concerning his view. On the other hand, Heyes provides aninteresting survey of additional areas of mutual concern for social epistemology andsocial psychology. Having been privileged to study their comments carefully, I concludethat Maffie, Schmitt, Goldman and Heyes have touched on the most basic and essentialquestions facing any theory of social knowledge. I here reply to their concerns in turn,clarifying my position along the way.

II. Objections to 'Epistemology, psychology and Goldman', and replies

My commentators perceive a number of philosphical and psychological concerns withmy argument. First, 'while critical of detail', argues Maffie, 'Corlett accepts thefundamental theses of Goldman's program,6 particularly Goldman's distinctionbetween native process and acquired method'. But, Maffie argues, 'Goldman'sdistinction between native vs. acquired is without epistemic relevance. Asepistemologists we need not worry with Corlett whether social cognition is conductedby native process or acquired method'. Second, Maffie argues that 'Corlett fails todemonstrate that they [social cognitive processes] are basic'. Third, it is argued, byMaffie, that my view is 'solipsistic' because it understands 'cognition without referenceto the states external to the mind-brain of the cognizer'. Fourth, Schmitt argues that'Corlett does not address the queston whether social cognitive psychology is relevant to

Author: J. Angelo Corlett, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 87521, USA.

0269-1728/91 $3.00 © 1991 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

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the question what the conditions of knowledge or justified belief are (as opposed to thequestion whether the conditions are satisfied)'. Fifth, Schmitt argues that I do 'not raisethe question whether knowledge or justified belief must be social'. Sixth, Schmitt pointsout that 'the social psychology to which Corlett appeals is consistent with individualismin psychology... '. This leads Schmitt to point out, quite correctly, that '(Corlett) doesnot address the question whether social cognitive psychology is relevant to groupknowledge,.. '. Seventh, Goldman's concern is that I have not clearly succeeded inshowing that there is a 'distinctive class of social cognitive processes'.7 Thus he remainsskeptical about my proposal that he ought to make room in his theory for a categorycalled 'primary social epistemics'. Finally, Heyes registers her concern in regards to my'deference' toward certain information-processing accounts of social psychology, aswell as my 'bias' toward 'self-endorsement' in my selective reference to certain socialpsychological studies.

Each of these concerns is important and I am thankful to my commentators forpointing them out. For I believe that an adequate theory of social knowledge mustprovide plausible replies to the underlying conceptual issues which each of theseconcerns raises.

1. Native processes and acquired methods, Maffie

Let me begin by saying that 'Epistemology, Psychology and Goldman' is an internalcritique of Goldman's general proposal of epistemics. My objection takes the followingform: given what Goldman says about individual epistemics, he ought to hold that thereis a connection between social epistemics and social cognitive psychology such that theformer is interested in the evaluation of the reliability of social cognition. SinceGoldman denies such a connection, I sought to convince the reader that 'making socialepistemics primary' would be consistent with Goldman's process reliabilism.8 This isimplied when I write, 'the significance of my argument is that, to the extent thatGoldman's categorization of various sorts of epistemics is fundamental to hisepistemological project, the conceptual foundation of his process reliabilism isdubious'. My general aim in the paper was to argue that externalism in individualepistemics ought to commit Goldman to a parallel type of externalism in socialepistemics.9

My commentators argue that, in presenting my argument, I make a number of claimswhich bear upon social epistemology and which are curious. For example, Maffiecontends that I wrongly accept Goldman's distinction between native processes andacquired methods. But nothing in my fundamental view as explicated in 'Epistemology,Psychology and Goldman' commits me to such a distinction. I am committed to the viewthat if there is a category of primary individual epistemics, then one can and shouldthink there is a corresponding category called 'primary social epistemics', one which isconcerned with the evaluation of the reliability of cognitive processes as they operate ina social context. This does not, however, commit me to the precise way in whichGoldman distinguishes processes and methods.

As far as I know, no one seriously questions the fact that native cognitive processessuch as memory exist.10 This is all that my theory of social knowledge assumes alongthese lines. It is not committed to a specific distinction between native processes andacquired methods. In fact, my position does not even entail that there actually existreliable processes or methods. If it turns out, on experimental inspection, that there

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SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 137

simply are no reliably produced beliefs in social contexts, then this just means that thereis no social knowledge (indeed, no knowledge of any sort if cognitive processes producebeliefs unreliably apart from a social context as well!). For reliability is a necessarycondition of human knowledge—individual or social. But this possibility or fact doesnot in any way count against my reliabilist analysis of social knowledge or justified belief(stated below). Thus, Maffie's first concern can be handled by way of clarification anddoes not count as a problem for my theory of social knowledge.

2. Are social cognitive processes native1?, Maffie

Maffie argues that I do not provide enough evidence in favor of my claim that socialcognitive processes are basic. Since I argue that there is, for all Goldman says about thecategories of epistemics, a primary element to social epistemics it is incumbent on me(argues Maffie) to show that the sorts of cognitive processes which are analyzed by socialcognitive psychologists are indeed basic.

But if it is true, as I show, that social cognitive psychologists are much concerned withhuman memory, the use of schemata, etc., and if Goldman categorizes these aspects ofcognition as basic, then why is it my burden to show that they are basic? That humanmemory is basic is not a matter of significant dispute among contemporaryexperimental cognitive psychologists, nor is it disputed by Goldman. And whether ornot one refers to such processes in or out of a social context makes no difference as tothe status of these processes being basic. Maffie's point seems to assume that memory,when considered by epistemologist and cognitive psychologists, is basic and that thissame structural component of cognition somehow changes its status when consideredby social epistemologists and social cognitive psychologists. Memory is a basic cognitiveprocess and an essential feature of human cognitive architecture whether or not it isanalyzed individually or socially. Hence, I follow Maffie's helpful suggestion that 'thereis just one kind of native process that is structurally neutral between social and nonsocialcognition'. Thus Maffie's concern holds only if there is reason to think that there are nobasic cognitive processes at all. However, those processes which are truly basic at theindividual level are also basic at the social level. For they are exactly the same processes.

3. The problem of cognitive solipsism, Maffie

Maffie also charges me with epistemological solipsism in that my view understands'cognition without reference to the states external to the mind-brain of the cognizer'. Ifind this difficult to understand since my view holds (as Maffie correctly indicates) thatinput from other cognizers serves as the defining characteristic of a social context,which in turn influences social cognition. On such a view, does not the input of othercognizers constitute external ones which influence one's cognition? If so, then how ismy position solipsistic? The very defining feature of social cognition and a social contextcommits me to a position which is anything but solipsistic. Thus this rather puzzlingconcern is, I believe, misplaced.

Thus the above concerns Maffie expresses about my position are answered withoutposing a serious problem for what I have said about Goldman's social epistemics. Thefundamental theses I espouse (either directly or by implication) in 'Epistemology,Psychology and Goldman' do not commit me to Goldman's specific categorization of

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138 J. A. CORLETT

the various sorts of processes and methods. As far as I am aware, social cognitiveprocesses are the very same ones considered by nonsocial cognitive psychologists. Thusif such processes (such as memory) are indeed basic, then they are basic when they areconsidered by social cognitive psychologists. Thus, whether one is a social or nonsocialepistemologist of the Goldmanian sort, one ought to consider social cognitive processesas basic if there are any basic processes at all. Furthermore, the charge that my view issolipsistic is simply a misunderstanding of my view. What defines cognition orknowledge or justified belief as being social is that it is in a social context where acognizer is significantly influenced by other cognizers.11 Social cognition, knowledge orjustified belief cannot exist without the influence of other cognizers. For this reason Ido not understand how my view is solipsistic.

4. Is social cognitive psychology relevant to social knowledge or justified beließ,Schmitt

I now turn to the concerns of Schmitt, who argues first that I do not address thequestion as to whether or not social cognitive psychology is relevant to the question ofwhat the conditions of knowledge or justified belief are (as opposed to the questionwhether the conditions are satisfied).

I address this point in a limited fashion in another paper12 where I argue that 'socialreliabilism', as I call it, is a competitor with what Goldman refers to as'consensualism'.13 In answer to Schmitt's incisive comment, it seems that if one is aprocess reliabilist one ought to argue that a cognizer, S, knows that p at tn if, and only if:

(i) p is true;(ii) S believes that p at tn;(iii) S is justified in believing that p at tn;(iv) S's belief that/? at tn is permitted by a right system of justification rules, and where S's belief that p is

not undermined by S's own cognitive state at tn; and(v) S's belief that p at tn is produced by a reliable14 cognitive process.15

What would make S's knowledge that p at tn social knowledge would be if suchknowledge were acquired in a social context. Thus, the context of S is whatdistinguishes between S's belief, knowledge and cognition being social or nonsocial.

However, cognitive processes can be more or less reliable, contingent on the contextin which such processes are functioning. For example, it might be true that in certainsocial contexts my memory of p functions inadequately, whereas apart from some socialcontext my memory of p functions reliably. Or, it might be the case that I commit thefundamental attribution error whenever I am apart from a group, but I correct thiserror whenever I am in a group. If it is also the case that my commiting such an error isthe consequence of a cognitive process, then it seems that the reliability of both socialand nonsocial cognitive processes is relevant to a cognizer's meeting the conditions ofknowledge.

To the extent that social cognitive psychology examines social cognitive processes, itis relevant to social epistemology's attempt to analyze knowledge because it can (at thevery least) identify the very processes which are potentially reliable and those which arenot. In fact, it might be argued that reliability requires the proper or adequatefunctioning of such processes both socially and nonsocially, i.e. in and apart from asocial context. After all, why would the process reliabilist want to say that S knows that/»

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at tn where conditions (i)—(v) hold, but where it is also the case that S's memory beliefthat p is reliable in a nonsocial sense but not a social one? This reply goes a long way inanswering Schmitt's concern about the relevance of social cognitive psychology toanalyses of knowledge.16

It might be argued that, assuming that Goldman can give an adequate reply toMaffie's above criticism in regards to the distinction between native processes andacquired methods, Goldman's general structure of epistemics can accommodate myplan by subsuming what I refer to as 'social epistemology' and 'social cognition' underprimary individual epistemics. This is true, one might add, because the processes whichare examined by cognitive psychology and social cognitive psychology are the sameones. Furthermore, what turns out to be social knowledge or socially justified beliefreduces to individual knowledge or justified belief in a social context.

It may be true that Goldman's theory has the potential to accommodate my theory incertain ways, but not without its making significant recantations. For example, if histheory is to make room for my view it must admit that there is much more to primaryindividual epistemics than he has to date admitted. More specifically, analyses ofknowledge or justified belief in primary individual epistemics must take serious heed ofthe sociality of belief, cognition and knowledge. It must seek to answer such questionsas, 'How does a difference in context make a belief, p, justified or not?' Moreover, theburden of explanation then shifts to Goldman to show why there is a genuine need forwhat he calls 'social epistemics'. If it is true that social knowledge, justified belief andcognition reduce to individual knowledge, justified belief and cognition in a socialcontext (Goldman wants to subsume this sort of knowledge, justified belief andcognition under the domain of primary individual epistemics), then why is there a needfor social epistemics?

Goldman might reply that the aim of social epistemics would be to evaluate socialbelief-forming methods, patterns of communicational behavior and institutional rulesand structures.17 But this is a somewhat queer proposal, epistemically speaking. For if,as Goldman might have it, social knowledge, justified belief and cognition reduce to thedomain of primary individual epistemics, then what makes Goldman's social epistemicsa theory of social knowledge? It seems that Goldman's social epistemics is more of asociological look at group beliefs, practices, and so forth, but it is not a theory of socialknowledge. Or, at least, it is not a theory which proffers either an individualist orcollectivist (or hybrid) analysis of social knowledge. It does not tell us whether or notindividuals or groups (or both) can be properly construed as epistemic agents and why.Although Goldman's project can in some way accommodate my view of socialepistemology, it cannot do so without accepting significant modifications in regards tohis notion of social epistemics. For social epistemics would then seem to be not so much(if at all) a theory or analysis of social knowledge, but rather an evaluation of whatcertain groups believe, how they function, etc.

5. Must knowledge be social?, Schmitt

The previous reply serves as the basis of my reply to Schmitt's concern that I do notaddress the question as to whether or not knowledge or justified belief must be social. Itis logically possible for S to meet conditions (i)-(v) without being in a social context (andwithout ever having been in a social context which influenced S's belief that p at tn\). Thisbeing the case, it is not logically necessary that knowledge be social,18 though it may in

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fact be the case that knowledge is social in the sense that it is knowledge acquired by acognizer in a social context. This should suffice as a reply to Schmitt's second concernregarding my position.

6. Psychological individualism, Schmitt

Schmitt's last major concern is that I seem to be explicating an individualisticpsychological view of social epistemology and that I do not address the question as towhether or not social epistemology or social cognitive psychology concerns(normatively speaking) group knowledge. Schmitt appears to agree with MargaretGilbert's 'reasons for preferring a joint acceptance model of group belief.19 Thus heargues for a 'socialist' view of group knowledge, one in which a group, G, knows aproposition, p, at a certain time, tn, when G arrives at that p (understood on a jointacceptance view) via a method, involving social interactions, that tends to yield truegroup beliefs.

Elsewhere I detail a fundamental difficulty for every social epistemology to come toterms with: 'the problem of social epistemic reliability'.20 This is a problem of groupknowledge attributions. I argue that there are at least three empirical problems with theclaim that groups are plausible candidates for knowledge or belief acquisition based ongroup decision-making, providing social cognitive psychological support for Gilbert'sown claim that 'there is no obvious reason to think that group beliefs in general have ahigh probability of truth, or that they are likely to be superior in this respect to thebeliefs of individuals'.21 More specifically, I argue that there are problems with groupdecision-making which make problematic any group-based account of social knowledgewhich is based on the reliability of group decision making. The 'problem of socialepistemic reliability' becomes pronounced when some specific difficulties with groupdecision-making are considered. Groups can adversely affect the decisions of individualcognizers in at least three ways which question the reliability of group decision-makingand group knowledge which is said to result from such decision-making: by the grouppolarization effect, by pressure toward group consensus ('groupthink'), or by deindividuation.Let us consider these aspects of the 'problem of social epistemic reliability' in turn.

The group polarization effect occurs when, after group discussion, group membersoften shift toward views which are more extreme (in the same general direction) thanthe ones they held initially.22 It is the result of both an informational process ofpersuasion and a movement to more extreme, valued beliefs about factual or value-laden matters. It results from a cognizer's conformity to polarized norms, and thepolarization of norms is a function of the relationship between that cognizer's initialdistribution of beliefs and the social frame of reference embodied in the presence of acompeting group belief.23 The group polarization effect casts significant doubt on anytheory of social knowledge which is coUectivistic in the sense that it seeks to attributebeliefs or knowledge to groups of cognizers. How, in light of the prevalence of thegroup polarization effect, is group knowledge possible?

In addition to the group polarization effect, there is the problem of pressure towardgroup consensus. In highly cohesive groups it is often the case that pressures develop toreach agreement on certain issues. As a result, members of such groups may experiencepressure whenever they deviate from the prevailing group belief about something.Consequently, premature decision is made that, though unanimous, may not be thebest, most considered judgment available to that group. Thus group decision-making

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SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 1 4 1

(in highly cohesive groups) about things is not clearly reliable in that pressures toconform to perceived group beliefs about something lead to hasty unanimouslyunchallenged beliefs about that thing.24 How, then, is group decision-making a reliableguide to truth or knowledge in light of the prevalence of this phenomenon?

To this challenge it might be replied that decision-making groups might be openedup to include soliciting the views of members or nonmembers who are capable ofdoubting the group's beliefs. But this reply is problematic because it assumes someonein the group both knows which belief is in need of being doubted and that the group'sbelief in fact needs reconsideration. Even if a group member did recognize these twoproblems, this member would have to go against group unanimity to bring them to thegroup's attention. Yet it is conformity which leads to this difficulty in the first place.

What the problem of pressure toward group consensus shows is that, in a highlycohesive group, members might be quite reluctant to express misgivings about a certaingroup belief. In such groups two things are likely to happen: the presumption ofgenuine unanimity and the suppression of members' doubts about group beliefs basedon group decisions. Thus such beliefs based on group decision-making are notobviously reliably produced.

It might be argued that pressure toward group consensus only shows that groupknowledge and decision-making is not clearly reliable in cases of highly cohesive groups.But, one might add, this does not show that group knowledge or belief based ondecision-making in moderately cohesive groups is problematic. Thus, it might beargued, group knowledge is sufficiently reliable when it is the result of a moderatelycohesive group's decision-making process where the pressure toward group consensusdoes not obtain.

But this reply is inadequate because less cohesive groups are less likely to make aneffective decision which might lead to group belief or knowledge. For the less cohesivethe group, the more disunity or conformity simply to avoid punishment, and selfishbehavior is prevalent (things which create a stumbling block to group goals such asknowledge or belief). Thus less cohesive groups might avoid the problem of pressuretoward group consensus, but they do so at too high a price.

It seems, then, that high group cohesiveness often leads to defective decision-makingwhere cognizers within the group are explicitly or implicitly pressured to conform togroup norms instead of critically evaluating them. How can group knowledge bepossible in light of this prevalent phenomenon? Thus it seems that any theory of groupknowledge or belief faces at least two difficulties: the group polarization effect and theproblem of pressure toward group consensus.

However, collectivist theories of knowledge and belief face yet a third problem: theproblem of deindividuation. Some groups may be composed of members whosefanaticism for believing something or reaching some decision may result in baddecisions to believe something. E. Deiner describes deindividuation in the followingmanner:

people who are deindividuated have lost self-awareness and their personal identity in a group situation.Because they are prevented by the situation by awareness of themselves as individuals and fromattention to their own behavior, deindividuated persons do not have the capacity for self-regulation andthe ability to plan for the future. Thus . . . they become more reactive to immediate stimuli andemotions and are unresponsive to norms and to the long-term consequences of their behavior.25

Thus in highly cohesive groups it is often the case that members are isolated fromoutside (relative to the group) influences which might enable them to be self-consciousand self-regulating insofar as decision-making is concerned.

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When deindividuation occurs in groups it adversely affects the reliability of collectivedecision-making or belief-formation. Not only do such groups (having deindividuatedmembers) not carefully weigh alternative actions or beliefs, but they appear immunefrom influences which might individuate the members of the group (thereby makingthem self-conscious and self-regulating in the requisite sense for the properconsideration of alternative actions and beliefs). How, then, is group knowledge orjustified belief possible in light of the problem of deindividuation?

In reply to this problem with collective knowledge or justified belief it might beargued that it is possible that the group leader ensure that group members adopt acritical attitude sufficient to prevent too high a group spirit which leads todeindividuation. But this reply fails because it assumes that someone, such as the groupleader, is both conscious of such problems and knows which critical attitude needs to beadopted by members of the group. It also ignores the possibility that the group mightreject its leader for not going along with the group's decisions or holding its beliefs. Inthis case, the group leader cannot ensure the adoption of a critical attitude by groupmembers. For these reasons this anticipated reply fails and the problem ofdeindividuation stands as a challenge to collectivist theories of knowledge or justifiedbelief.

Thus there exist at least three widespread difficulties with any claim that groupknowledge or justified belief arrived at on the basis of group decision making ispossible. For this reason, I am an individualist insofar as justification, knowledge andpsychology are concerned.

It might be objected that the 'problem of social epistemic reliability' counts againstthe possibility of social knowledge of any sort (even an individual's knowledge in a socialcontext). But this is untrue because there is social knowledge which is attained (or couldbe attained) by individuals apart from groups, but within a social context. The 'problemof social epistemic reliability' counts against the possibility of knowledge attributions toa group, G, or individuals in G where the beliefs of individual epistemic agents are theresult of collective belief-formation and decision-making.

I argue, then, that the group polarization effect, pressure toward group consensusand deindividuation cast significant doubt on the claim that (assuming that collectivesare genuine epistemic agents) condition (v) (the social reliability condition) can obtainfor groups. If this is true, then there seems to be no reason to think that collectiveknowledge is forthcoming since (i)-(v) are each necessary and jointly sufficientconditions of social knowledge.26

In answer to Schmitt's third concern, then, I would say the following. Although socialcognitive psychology is relevant to group decision-making, it is not relevant to groupbelief or group knowledge because of the dubious nature of group belief and groupknowledge. Schmitt is correct to categorize my view as individualistic in that it isskeptical of claims about group belief or knowledge based on group decision-making,and that my view therefore sees no relevance of social cognitive psychology to groupknowledge or belief.27

The position I am espousing not only evades the concerns raised by my colleagues,28

it answers the questions which Schmitt himself argues are fundamental for a theory ofsocial knowledge to answer. First, is there sense to be made of the concept of groupaccessibility, group perspective, group belief, or group knowledge? Secondly, is groupknowledge reducible to individual knowledge? To the first question I answer that thereseems to be reason to doubt the sensibleness of the notion of collective belief,knowledge or cognition. To the second query I answer that reducibility is not the real

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focus of attention here. The fact is that individual humans cognize (functioncognitively), and perhaps justifiably believe and know certain things. It is doubtful thatgroups of such cognizers (as groups) do the same. One may be an individualist aboutthis matter without believing that claims about collective belief, justification andknowledge can be linguistically reduced, without loss of meaning and without residue,to claims about individual belief, justification and knowledge. Given the 'problem ofsocial epistemic reliability', one can be led to espouse individualism without an appealto reductionism.

Having provided replies to Maffie's and Schmitt's respective and well-motivatedconcerns, I should now like to say a word about what distinguishes my view of socialepistemology from Goldman's. Some of the obvious similarities include the following:the emphasis on the need for an externalist criterion for evaluating beliefs, theinsistence that epistemology and empirical (cognitive) psychology are crucially related,that the criterion of truth is essential to an adequate social epistemology. But one of thekey differences between Goldman's view and my own is that his is an account of theobjects of social epistemic evaluation (that is, as it is articulated in 'Foundations ofSocial Epistemics'), while mine (as developed in this paper and in 'Goldman and theFoundations of Social Epistemology'), is the basis of a theory of social knowledge. Mineis an individualist view which is skeptical of collectivist claims to cognition, justifiedbelief or knowledge, and where the primary distinction between individual and socialknowledge is the context in which the cognizer finds himself or herself. To the extentthat a cognizer is alleged to know or be justified in believing that p in a social context isthe extent to which such a cognizer is a socially epistemic agent and a candidate forbeing one who knows that p at tn, socially speaking.

7. Are there cognitive processes unique to social cognition1?, Goldman

I now turn to Goldman's concern that my construal of the basicality of social cognitiveprocesses makes social cognitive psychology's relevance to social epistemologysuperfluous in that what I refer to as primary social epistemics can be reduced to orcaptured by primary individual epistemics.29 Goldman's concern seems to be that I havenot adequately identified certain processes as uniquely social ones. However, my claimis not that there is a distinct category or type of cognitive process which is social, butthat cognition is social as well as individual and that it is arbitrary to say that there is aprimary individual epistemic and not a primary social one. What makes cognition, beliefor knowledge social is that cognizers exist and function in a social context. It is notthat there are separate cognitive processes which function for cognizers in a socialcontext. Rather, it is that cognition is inescapably (or nearly inescapably) social. Thisbeing the case, it is arbitrary for Goldman to recognize only the category of primaryindividual epistemics. Why is the reliability of belief-forming processes relevant only toindividual epistemics and not to social epistemics? Why, then, should human cognitionbe relevant to only one category of epistemology?

It does not follow, from all that I have said about Goldman's social epistemics, thatGoldman's social epistemics is irrelevant to my social reliabilism. For in testing andmeasuring the reliability of cognition in groups (not of groups), the social cognitivepsychologist is able to better inform the social reliabilist of the reliability of (belief-forming) cognitive processes as they function in a social situation. This information iscrucial for the social reliabilist in knowing whether or not condition (v) is met in a givencase of knowledge attribution.

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This brings me to the matter of defining more precisely what counts as socialcognition. It seems that social cognition can be plausibly construed on a continuum. Atone end of the continuum is purely individual cognition the input of which is confinedto, say, certain neurological functions or other matters of cognition which have nosocial influence on them. On the other end of the continuum is purely social cognition,where the cognizer's input is direct influence from other cognizers, say, in groupdiscussions. In between purely individual cognition and purely social cognition arevarious gradations of social and nonsocial cognition with various sorts of input. Whatmakes cognition social? The answer is as follows: cognition is social to the extent inwhich a cognizer is influenced by other cognizers (e.g. where the source of the input issome other cognizer), whether directly or indirectly, where the audience of theprocessing is either oneself or others, and where the content of the input is either aboutothers or not.

One might argue that such a view seems to be committed to the position that allcognition is social in that all input is to some extent social. I understand this as beingimplied by one of Maffie's insightful points of criticism. In response to this point, Iargue that individual cognition and knowledge are useful as theoretical constructs andthat it is logically possible that there exist cognizers who know or justifiably believe thatp based on purely nonsocial input. However, it may turn out (as a matter of fact) thatvirtually all cognition is to some extent social in that all input is to some extent social. Ifthis is true, then epistemologists need to explain what role social context, social inputand social cognition play in the reliability of belief-forming processes. Why? Because itmight be the case that S's belief that p at tl in a purely nonsocial context amounts toknowing that p, while S's belief that/) at t2 in a social context does not (or vice versa). Anadequate theory of knowledge must explain why S knows that p at tl and fails to knowthat p at t2. And an account of the reliability of belief-forming processes in regards tothe contextual factors of cognition is relevant here.

8. Is psychology's distinction between individual and social cognition sufficient tojustify the restructuring of social epistemics?, Heyes

In my reply to Maffie (above), I clarify the core of my argument against Goldman'sstructure of epistemics. In 'Epistemology, Psychology and Goldman', my argument isthat, given what Goldman says about individual epistemics, he ought to hold that thereis a connection between social epistemics and social cognitive psychology such thatsocial epistemics is interested in the evaluation of the reliability of social cognition.Moreover, I argue that if Goldman is going to appeal to individual cognitive psychologyto assess the reliability of individual cognition, then he ought to appeal to socialcognitive psychology to evaluate the reliability of social cognition.

Heyes interprets my argument as suggesting that the mere fact that cognitivepsychology (to some extent) makes a distinction between individual and social cognitionis sufficient to justify the restructuring of Goldman's notion of epistemics, especially hisidea of social epistemics (i.e. veritism). But this is not my argument concerningGoldman's proposal. My argument is that, given that cognitive psychology (of theinformation-processing sort) often makes a distinction between individual and socialcognition, such a distinction constitutes a good reason to think that Goldman's notion ofprimary epistemics (as exclusively individualistic) is arbitrary in its exclusion of thesocial. The arbitrariness of Goldman's epistemics is made plain when he draws from the

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area of individual cognitive psychology, but not from social cognitive psychology. Thisclarification should suffice to answer adequately this concern of Heyes'.

9. Horse-and-dray approach or critical dialogue? Heyes

Heyes interprets my view as one of deference to the work of cognitive psychologists,rather than one of critical dialogue between social epistemology and social psychology.To this charge I have three replies. First, elsewhere30 I argue for a critical dialogueapproach to the relation between epistemology and experimental cognitive psychology,a view which I surely espouse regarding the social spheres of these respectivedisciplines. Heyes would be glad to know that my words speak as loudly as my actions inregards to these matters.

Second, in 'Epistemology, Psychology and Goldman', the purpose of my treatment ofthe psychology studies is to provide support for my main thesis (above) againstGoldman's veritism. Although I fully agree with Heyes that the critical dialogueapproach is essential to the working relationship between social epistemology and socialpsychology, my intentionally failing to raise doubts about the fundamental andmethodological assumptions of the information-processing approach to socialpsychology does not count against my argument that Goldman's use of cognitivepsychology in structuring his program of epistemics is arbitrary. My engaging in criticaldialogue with the sources of social cognitive psychology which I cite is simply beyondthe scope of my present purposes, though it is surely not beyond the scope of socialepistemology as I construe it, i.e. social reliabilism. Nor is it beyond the scope of mysocial reliabilism that approaches to social psychology other than that of theinformation-processing approach be considered, and to the extent that they are foundplausible, employed in the analysis.

Third, my suggestion that the difference between individual and social cognition bemade on the basis of the context of cognition ought to demonstrate that my view of therelation between social epistemology and social psychology is not deferential. For as faras I am aware, there is no consensus in psychology as to the precise way to distinguishindividual cognition from social cognition. Furthermore, it appears that at least somepsychologists would draw such a distinction based on the content of a cognizer'scognition: if, for instance, a cognizer has a memory belief about other cognizers, thenthat memory belief is social. If not, then that memory belief is a nonsocial one. Mynotion of contextual sociality rejects the commonly held (though to my knowledge,rarely defended) assumption about how the distinction between the social and thenonsocial should be made. Thus, my social reliabilist view is hardly deferential, as Heyesargues.

I agree with Heyes that I have not sufficiently challenged the several assumptionsunderlying the psychology studies I cite. I agree with her that such a task is part andparcel of the critical dialogue approach to which I myself subscribe. However, I wish topoint out that such a task is beyond the narrow scope of my present project and that mymain argument against Goldman's epistemics remains untouched by the fact that morepsychological assumptions need to be questioned. Nevertheless, Heyes' challengestands for all those, such as myself, who seek to deepen the critical dialogue betweenepistemology and psychology.

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10. Epistemology and psychology: unhealthy alliances?, Heyes

Citing Amundson,31 Heyes argues that

epistemologists and psychologists are at risk of forming alliances that would be judged unhealthy byalmost anyone with an interest in theory of knowledge. . . . these alliances are in danger of promotinglittle more than mutual congratulation because they involve communication only between psychologistsand epistemologists who held similar or mutually endorsing views prior to collaboration. Thedevelopment of such a relationship between some contemporary naturalistic epistemologists andcognitive psychologists is suggested by studying the limited range of psychologists' views thatepistemologists choose to cite when they are discussing what Corlett, for example, regards as individualcognition.32

I wholeheartedly agree with Heyes' caution to epistemologists. Moreover, I would addthat the same sort of caution should be made to those psychologists who seek dialoguewith epistemology. The biased selection of 'evidence' in favor of any thesis is neverjustified when the pursuit of truth is one's task.

However, the extent to which Heyes' point counts against my argument againstGoldman's epistemics is unclear. Recall that my argument is an internal critique ofGoldman's epistemics. As such, it seeks to show that the very type of cognitivepsychology (the information processing type) which Goldman employs in support of hisscheme of (primary individual) epistemics, when seen in full and permitted to speak tosocial as well as individual epistemics, shows that there is (and should be) a socialelement to primary epistemics, contrary to Goldman's veritism. This is precisely why I,as Heyes puts it, sample 'the [psychology] literature in the same way as Goldman didwhen discussing primary epistemics'.

Thus, even if it is true that there are methodological and other fundamentalproblems with the information-processing approach to cognitive psychology, it doesnot follow that my internal critique of Goldman's epistemics fails. For, suppose that theinformation processing approach M dubious. This would show that, to the extent thatGoldman's epistemics depends for its overall plausibility on the information-processingapproach, Goldman's account is itself problematic. But suppose, as I do in'Epistemology, Psychology and Goldman', that the basics of the information-processingapproach are plausible. Then there is a significant sense in which Goldman arbitrarilyappeals to the information-processing approach to evaluate the reliability of individualcognition, while ignoring the need to perform the same evaluative task in the area ofsocial cognition.

I am not committed to the view that the information-processing approach isunproblematic. Nor am I committed to the position that epistemologists do well toignore the inputs of other competing paradigms in psychology, social or nonsocial.Moreover, I am grateful to Heyes for sketching some of the several reasons why I myselfdo not hold such beliefs.

Finally, in the context of her raising this concern, Heyes objects to my notion of thedifference beteen individual and social cognition. Since I have already addressed thispoint in my reply to Goldman (above) I shall not repeat myself here.

III. Conclusion

In sum, I have provided adequate replies to the major concerns raised by Maffie,

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Schmitt, Goldman and Heyes. I have distinguished my own theory of social knowledgefrom Goldman's, set forth the basis of a social reliabilist analysis of knowledge, anddefended the plausibility of the fundamental theses I embrace in my constructiveinternal criticism of Goldman's epistemological project. I have proferred a novelanalysis of social knowledge, one I call 'social reliabilism'. It is not yet a full-blowntheory of social knowledge, but it is the basis of such a theory, one which owes a greatdebt of gratitude to Goldman's process reliabilism.

In regards to social reliabilism, at least one point needs clarification. Precisely what isa reliable social cognitive process? My answer has been that it is a (belief-forming)cognitive process which functions reliably in a social context. But just what makes sucha process reliable? Although my analysis of social knowledge is not one which iscontingent on there actually being reliable social cognitive processes which generatebeliefs which, if held, amount to knowledge, the social reliabilist has the burden ofexplicating the notion of social reliability. This project, it seems to me, constitutes whatought to be one of the primary missions of social epistemology.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Celeste Corlett, Steve Fuller, Alvin I. Goldman, C. M. Heyes, KeithLehrer, James Maffie, John Murray and Frederick F. Schmitt for their very helpfulcomments about social epistemology and social cognition. I am also grateful to theUniversity of Arizona for its support by way of a President's Fellowship.

Notes

1. MAFFIE, J., 'What is social about social epistemics?', Social Epistemology, 5 (1991), pp. 101-110.2. SCHMITT, F. F., 'Social epistemology and social cognitive psychology', Social Epistemology, 5 (1991),

111-120.3. GOLDMAN, A., 'Social epistemics and social psychology', Social Epistemology, 5 (1991), pp. 121-125.4. HEYES, C. M., 'Who's the horse: a response to Corlett', Social Epistemology, 5 (1991), p. 127-134.5. CORLETT, J. A., 'Espitemology, psychology and Goldman', Social Epistemology, 5 (1991), pp. 91-100.6. Goldman also states, 'Corlett accepts all of the main structural features of epistemics'. Heyes states that

'Corlett's prose suggests that he accepts much of Goldman's horse-and-dray approach'.7. Note that Goldman's concern differs from Maffie's above concern. While Maffie wants to know more

about why I think certain social cognitive processes are native, Goldman wants to know why such processesought to be rightly considered social. (Maffie docs not doubt that the processes are social, and Goldmandoes not doubt that such processes are basic).

Maffie too contends that it is unclear, on my view, what counts as social input or social cognition. Thisleads Maffie to charge that 'there is little empirical motivation for conceiving the social as merelya . . . "context" (Corlett) of cognition'.

8. GOLDMAN, A., Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (1986).9. When I describe Goldman's epistemics as externalist, I am not denying that there are internalist elements

to his theory, such as the possibility that coherentist means of picking out which beliefs are reliablyproduced. My point is that there are noninternalist features of his epistemics.

10. Although memory is often referred to as a 'structure', not a 'process', what is crucial for my purpose iswhether or not such a process or structure is reliable in producing beliefs which are epistemically justifiedand true. I shall follow Goldman in calling memory a cognitive 'process'.

11. My understanding of social knowledge as that which is acquired by a cognizer in a social context is similar toKeith Lehrer's notion of the same concept. For Lehrer, social knowledge is that which is acquired byindividual members of a group when they meet certain conscnsualist criteria. See: LEHRER, K., 'Personaland social knowledge', Synthese, 73 (1987), p. 87. However, Lehrer's social epistemology differs from minein that his affirms the possibility of group knowldge. For Lehrer, 'a group is consensually justified inaccepting that p if and only if p coheres with what is consensually accepted;" and "we know that p if andonly if (i) p, (ii) we accept that p, (iii) we are completely justified in accepting that p and (iv) we arecompletely justified in accepting that p in a way that does not depend essentially on any false proposition';

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and 'we are completely justified in accepting that p if and only if we are consensually justified in acceptingthat p (that is, p coheres with our consensual acceptance system), and we are vcrifically justified inaccepting that (that is, p coheres with the subsystem of our consensual acceptance system in which what isaccepted is also true, our social verifie system)'. See LEHRER, pp. 90-91. My own view (which I refer to as'social reliabilism'), as I explain below, is skeptical about attributions of beliefs, justification andknowledge to groups of cognizers. Knowledge, beliefs and cognition may be attributed to individualcognizers within groups, but not to groups themselves. At least, it is not clear that such attributions arejustified.

12. Corlett , J. A., 'Goldman and the foundations of social epistemics', forthcoming.13. GOLDMAN, A. I., 'Foundations of social epistemics', Synthese, 73 (1987), pp. 109-144.14. I will leave the sense of 'reliable' (and its cognates) undefined here, since I am not defending a

comprehensive view of social reliabilism, but simply explaining the relevance of social cognitive psychologyto the analysis (namely, the process reliabilist one) of human knowledge.

15. Since my purpose here is to answer the specific concerns of my commentators, I shall not provide adefence of this analysis of social knowledge. Such a defence is the topic of another paper on this subject.

16. This line of reasoning, of course, does not suffice as a justificatory account or full-blown argument insupport of social reliabilism. My purpose here is to introduce the analysis as a plausible competitor withother views of social knowledge. The plausibility of such a view will increase if it can be shown that none ofmy commentators, concerns clearly count againt it. This provides a prima facie case in favor of socialreliabilism. A more detailed assessment of it will have to be made on a later occasion when it is presented ingreater detail and when my primary purpose is not (as it is here) to address the specific concerns ofparticular commentators.

17. GOLDMAN (1987), pp. 130-131, (see note 13).18. That purely individual human knowledge (completely divorced from any s'ocial influence whatsoever) is

likely or actually possible is doubtful.19. GILBERT, M., 'Modelling collective belief, Synthese, 73 (1987), pp. 190-202.20. CORLETT, J. A., 'Goldman and the foundations of social epistemics', forthcoming.21. GILBERT (1987), p. 198 (see note 19).22. BARON, R. A., et al., Social Psychology: Understanding Human Interaction, Allyn and Bacon, Boston,

p. 436 (1984).23. TURNER, J. C., et al. (with Margaret Wetherell), Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory,

Basil Blackwell, London, p. 142 (1987). See also LAMM, H. and MEYERS, D. G., 'Group-inducedpolarization of attitudes and behaviour', in BERKOWITZ, L. (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,Vol. 11, Academic Press, New York (1978). MEYERS, D. G. and LAMM, H., 'The group polarizationphenomenon', Psychological Bulletin, 83 (1976), pp. 602-627.

24. Experimental evidence shows that groups exert pressure on their respective members to conform or arriveat a consensual decision that may be premature or harmful. See SWAP, W. C., 'Destructive effects of groupson individuals', in BRANSTATTER, H. et al. (Eds), Group Decision Making, Academic Press, New York, p. 69(1982). JANIS, I. L., Groupthink, 2nd edition, Houghton Mifflin, Boston (1982).

25. DIENER, E., 'Deindividuation: the absence of self-awareness and self-regulation in group members', inPAULUS, P. B. (Ed.), Psychology of Group Influence, Erlbaum, New Jersey, p. 210 (1980).

26. Indeed, these three experimentally confirmed phenomena pose problems for the claim that individualcognizers in such circumstances know that p at tn. For the group polarization effect, pressure towardgroup consensus and deindividuation seem to give one reason to think that individual cognizers know thatp at tn in highly cohesive groups of which they are members. This is not to imply that the possibility ofindividual knowledge is threatened insofar as its reliability is concerned. Rather, it is to suggest that undercertain circumstances where S is a member of a certain highly cohesive group, S's belief that p at tn may beunreliably produced and thus not amount to knowledge that p because of these problems concerninggroup decision-making.

27. I should point out that my social epistemology is not individualistic in a reductionist sense. For it isirrelevant to me whether or not claims about group knowledge, justified belief or cognition can belinguistically reduced, without loss of meaning, to claims about individual knowledge, justified belief orcognition. What leads me to espouse individualism insofar as social epistemology is concerned is thedubiousness of collectivism. Even if I can begin to make sense of collectives as epistemic agents, it is notclear to me that human collectives can possess reliably formed beliefs.

This individualist position bears some resemblance to Stewart Cohen's in that Cohen argues for theclaim that whether S knows that p at tn depends (in part) on 'intersubjectively determined standards',where 'S' refers to an individual cognizer in a group. See: COHEN, S., 'Knowledge, context and socialstandards', Synthese, 73 (1987), p. 14. What is individualistic about Cohen's view is that (apparently) it is anindividual cognizer in a social context who is the epistemic candidate, not a group of cognizers. However,my positon differs from that of Cohen's on at least one point. On my view, whether or not 5 knows that pdoes not depend on intersubjectively determined standards, as Cohen argues, though I would argue thatwhether or not S is epistemically justified in believing p at tn might, under certain conditions, becontingent on such standards. Just as one must distinguish between justification and knowledge innonsocial epistemology, one must do the same in social epistemology.

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28. Although I do recant my statement in 'Epistemology, Psychology, and Goldman' that 'social epistemicsconcerns individual or group knowledge in a social context '. The collectivist admission that groups may besubjects of knowledge is dubious given the 'problem of social epistemic reliability'. Social epistemologyconcerns the analysis of an individual's knowledge in a social context.

29. Goldman's point is similarly held by Maffie who questions what precisely counts as social cognition orsocial input.

30. CORLETT, J. A., 'Epistemology and experimental cognitive psychology', New Ideas in Psychology,forthcoming.

31. AMUNDSON, R., 'The epistemological status of naturalized epistemology', Inquiry, 26 (1983), pp. 333-344;'Psychology and epistemology: the place versus response controversy', Cognition, 20 (1985), pp. 127-153.

32. Heyes (1991) (see note 4).

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