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Sibley on Aesthetic Perception Author(s): Joseph Margolis Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Winter, 1966), pp. 155- 158 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/429386 . Accessed: 06/05/2014 17:06 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Wiley and The American Society for Aesthetics are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 86.185.191.251 on Tue, 6 May 2014 17:06:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Sibley on Aesthetic Perception

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Sibley on Aesthetic PerceptionAuthor(s): Joseph MargolisSource: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Winter, 1966), pp. 155-158Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/429386 .

Accessed: 06/05/2014 17:06

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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Wiley and The American Society for Aesthetics are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.

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MARGOLIS

Sibley on Aesthetic Perception

FRANK SIBLEY'S recent discussion of aes- thetic judgment and perceptionl provides a welcome clarification of certain issues he first introduced in the well-known paper, "Aesthetic Concepts." 2 I think it is fair to say that this most recent paper is intended to be, and is entirely, consistent with the account first given. Also, as it turns out, certain difficulties of the earlier account re- main unresolved here. It is with these that I am primarily concerned.

It is central to Sibley's view that "aes- thetics deals with a kind of perception. People have to see the grace or unity of a work, hear the plaintiveness or frenzy in the music...."3 To perceive "that something is graceful, dainty, or garish, or that a work of art is balanced, moving, or powerful" is to exercise "aesthetic sensitivity." 4 Sibley held to the same view in his earlier ac- count, remarking that he was "concerned ...with an ability to notice or see or tell that things have certain qualities." 5 There are two correlative questions that his en- terprise suggests, independent of his special and interesting thesis that "in general there are no sets of nonaesthetic features that are logically sufficient for it to have a certain aesthetic quality," 6 but bearing decisively on the evaluation of that thesis. The first concerns what Sibley may mean by "a kind of perception" pertinent to the qualities he isolates; the second concerns

JOSEPH MARGOLIS is professor of philosophy at the University of Western Ontario. His article "Crea- tivity, Expression, and Value Once Again" was published in this journal (Fall 1963).

the sense in which the qualities are in, or ascribed to, the works so perceived.

Sibley has no explicit account of either of these matters. I emphasize this because, quite recently, one writer at least has sought to assimilate Sibley's account to his own regarding allegedly special features of aesthetic perception.7 In short, there is a definite and crucial gap in Sibley's ac- count, which ultimately threatens the force of his thesis.

Now, Sibley says that, in aesthetics, we are concerned with a "kind of perception." If he means this in the sense in which moral intuition is alleged to be a kind of percep- tion, his account is rendered invulnerable but at the familiar extravagant price of multiplying faculties. I have elsewhere ar- gued at length that "aesthetic perception" cannot convincingly be made out to be a dis- tinct kind of perception, though it con- cerns itself (in a great variety of ways) with distinct sorts of qualities and relations.8 Aesthetic perception, then, may perhaps be promisingly treated as the perception (and appreciation) of a kind, or kinds, of qualities (whatever the range of ways in which they may be discriminated) rather than as itself a kind of perception of such qualities. Sibley himself says that "people have to see the grace .., hear the plaintive- ness...." Does the perception of grace and plaintiveness require a kind of seeing and hearing that is different from the kind that usually obtains, or does it, in Sibley's view, merely require a certain sensitivity with respect to these ordinary perceptual

JOSEPH

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abilities? I rather think Sibley inclines to the second, but it is possible (as I have sug- gested and as one reader reads him) that he holds to the first. Now, I am not saying, as we shall see, that these are the only alternatives.

Let me balance my remarks by shifting to what Sibley has to say about aesthetic qualities. I single out two strong commit- ments that he makes. First of all, he says that "aesthetic qualities are 'emergent'" 9 -which bears, of course, on his special thesis regarding logically sufficient condi- tions for the application of aesthetic predi- cates. Second, he says that "If a work is graceful there will be reasons why it is, and this will be so whether anyone ever knows, or thinks, or has any reasons for thinking it so or not" 10 which also bears on his special thesis. The first remark could be made out to support either of the two alternative interpretations of his ex- pression "a kind of perception," already given. But the second very clearly and very forcefully insists that the aesthetic qualities he is interested in are to be taken as being "in" the work examined-in a sense related to that in which qualities like colors are said to be "in" physical ob- Jects.

If "a work is graceful... whether anyone ever knows, or thinks, or has any reasons for thinking it so or not," aesthetic per- ception is certainly perception in the usual sense, that is, it is the power to discrimi- nate the perceptible qualities and proper- ties of things. If these qualities are emergent, in the sense that the ordinary perceptual senses of hearing and seeing and the like are, by nature, incapable of discriminating them, then Sibley means what he calls "a kind of perception" to be distinct, in the strong sense that moral intuition suggests. But if he means that the qualities are emergent, in the sense that what is required is a distinctive de- velopment or refinement of our ordinary perceptual abilities (and comparable abil- ities that we sometimes loosely range under the umbrella heading "perception"), then the concept aesthetic perception does not, in itself, raise philosophical questions be- yond those posed by holding that aesthetic

JOSEPH MARGOLIS

qualities are to be found and discrimi- nated in things. There is no point in spec- ulating further on these alternatives, except insofar as relevant implications may be drawn from the other statements mentioned.

Sibley very perceptively distinguishes "reasons why the work is graceful.. from reasons... for concluding or inferring that the work is graceful." 11 By this, he means to draw attention not only to his special thesis regarding conditions but also to his view, dependent on that thesis, that al- though one might perceive certain im- portant nonaesthetic features of a given work "responsible" for the "resultant aesthetic quality," that quality might it- self be "still missed." 12 He offers the analogies of missing an aspect of a picture puzzle, seeing a face and not noticing its tired look, or seeing two faces and not noticing their resemblance.l2 The analogies should not be inappropriately pressed against Sibley, but it is relevant to ask whether there are any reasonable grounds for holding that the qualities he mentions, or, at the very least, a good number of those he takes as characteristic, are not qualities that are to be found in any work or object, in the strong sense he prefers ("whether any- one ever knows ..."). I believe there are such reasons and I believe that their admission challenges Sibley's central thesis in a funda- mental way.

Suppose I remark that a particular dance is graceful. And suppose further, in ac- cord with Sibley's provision, that I offer you reasons why "the work is graceful." That is to say, I point out qualities, let us say (to avoid unnecessary complication), of a relevant nonaesthetic sort. Seeing these, you come to see that the dance is in- deed graceful. Or, do you merely agree with me that it is graceful, seeing the non- aesthetic qualities and the reasonableness of saying it is graceful for those reasons (the reasons corresponding to the facts)? Or, are you yourself persuaded by my little lesson to hold that it is graceful for the reasons I have advanced?

Sibley offers us one clue here-but I am afraid it is either ambiguous with respect to our alternatives or damaging to his

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Sibley on Aesthetic Perception

case. For he says (of the man following our supporting remarks):

If he then finds himself agreeing with me, I have vindicated my claim in the best possible way, by getting him to see for himself. There is no reason not to say, if one wishes, that I have supported, justified, or even proved my original judgment. One might refer to this activity there- fore as perceptual proof.8

Clearly, the power of this argument rests entirely on the defensibility of holding that the qualities Sibley isolates are indeed qualities that may be perceived in particu- lar objects. I find no other remarks in Sibley's account that can dispel the am- biguity noted, though it is perfectly clear that Sibley himself (as already acknowl- edged) holds that aesthetic qualities are in- deed in these objects and perceivable there.

But, suppose that you follow all my reasons (drawn from nonaesthetic quali- ties, since, otherwise, the difficulty is sim- ply placed at another remove), see that the allegedly relevant nonaesthetic quali- ties are what they are, and still deny that the dance is graceful. You may be pre- pared to say that you quite understand why, given my reasons, I say (or "see") the dance is (or "as") graceful; but you do not find yourself logically bound in any sense, having admitted the nonaesthetic qualities (which I am advancing as rea- sons), to support or share my claim or judgment. In a word, you insist that you appreciate things differently. You see why I say it is graceful all right, but the qual- ities mentioned do not count as deci- sively for grace for you as they do for me. What I am getting at here is simply this: under these circumstances, we shift from speaking of qualities that are in works or objects to speaking of how we appreciate them or of what we may say about them. The qualities are no longer held to be in the work; we merely say, admittedly for reasons, that a work has the quality in question. But of course, if this is allowed, Sibley's sense of aesthetic perception, on either of the alternative in- terpretations given, founders.

I am holding, in short, that we must perceive a work of art (or other eligible object) in order relevantly to say that it is

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graceful, but that we do not perceive that it is graceful (against Sibley's view). Al- ternatively put, if I see that a dance is graceful (being aesthetically sensitive) and you do not see that it is graceful (though you are also aesthetically sensitive and see precisely why I say it is graceful), grace- fulness cannot be a quality that may be perceived (in Sibley's sense). I further maintain that this interpretation is very much closer to the facts of aesthetic ex- change than is Sibley's. For, surely, what I see as moving, you may see as sentimental; what I see as garish, you may see as striking but harmonious; what I see as balanced, you may see as academic. Allowance must be made for the defensibility of these in- compatibly preferred predicates, for the de- fensibility of different percipients' rejecting and supporting such predicates even after appreciating the contrary preferences of an- other. Sibley's account makes no provision for this at all and, therefore, cannot be adequate. And, more important, to make al- lowance for it is to eliminate the sense of perceive on which Sibley's argument rests.

Consider that you find my reasons telling ones for viewing some work as graceful. You will then perceive the work as graceful be- cause the reasons will designate responsible nonaesthetic qualities that you perceive. You will not perceive (in a full-fledged sense of perceive) the grace in the work and then support your judgment by reference to qualities on which the emergent aesthetic quality depends; you will rather appreciate the work as graceful (that is, be prepared to judge to be graceful the work you do per- ceive) and, insofar as you may be able to identify responsible nonaesthetic qualities, be justifiably said to see the grace. It is be- cause we emphasize, in the aesthetic con- text, the perception of works of art that we speak also of perceiving those qualities that we assign in terms of our apprecia- tive differences. But if it is conceivable that two relevantly sensitive aesthetic per- cipients, after appreciating one another's reasons for saying that a given work is graceful or not, persist in their prefer- ences, how can we insist that graceful designates a quality that may be in the object "whether anyone ever knows..."?

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I am saying, in a word, that, in the con- text of the usual discussions about the grace of a particular work, a point is reached where it is not convincing to say that the grace simply is in the work and that one's opponent simply does not see it (in the strong sense of see).

Isabel Hungerland very pertinently re- marks here-in fact, in discussing Sibley's earlier paper-that there is no use for the contrast between "really is" and "only looks" in the ascription of aesthetic qual- ities (as there is for the usual perceptual qualities).14 I think she is quite right for certain of Sibley's choices-for instance, graceful, dainty, garish, plaintiveness, frenzy. And I think that where the con- trast is allowed-as significantly, for bal- anced, unified, and the like-the contrast ceases to be a perceptual one, becomes in- stead valuational.

Now appreciation moves between a de- scription-like and an evaluation-like pole. Just as we perceive qualities in an ob- ject, we speak of perceiving (by a kind of extension) the qualities we ascribe to an object because we appreciate it the way we do. And just as we evaluate objects on grounds independent of our taste, so we speak of evaluating objects (by a kind of extension) even where the value we place on these objects depends on our personal taste or appreciative preference; further- more, we employ the "is-seems" contrast here to convey this preference emphati- cally.

If the foregoing arguments hold, Sibley's central thesis is placed in jeopardy. That "there are no sets of nonaesthetic fea- tures that are logically sufficient for a work to have a certain aesthetic quality" is no longer a surprising thesis, since a work cannot properly be said to have these aesthetic qualities at all. We say it has these qualities, for reasons; we impute these qualities to it because we appreciate

JOSEPH MARGOLIS

what we perceive in distinctive and per- sonal ways. And only if we first ascribe an aesthetic quality (of Sibley's sort) to a work are we called on to give supporting reasons. But then all of the interesting consequences that Sibley draws from this may be dis- missed (or reinterpreted) if the aesthetic predicate is itself assigned not on the basis of a "kind of perception" (on either of the two interpretations advanced) but on the basis of personal taste and appreciation.

Finally, I am not prepared to hold that all of the usual range of aesthetic con- cepts behave in a logically uniform way; neither is Sibley, if I understand him rightly. The sorting out of those very slip- pery notions deserves a separate hearing.15 In any case, I do not believe it can be suc- cessfully undertaken without a satisfactory solution of the problem of aesthetic per- ception.

1"Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic," The Philosophi- cal Review, LXXIV (1965), 135-159.

2 The Philosophical Review, LXVIII (1959), 421- 450; reprinted, with extensive minor revisions, in Joseph Margolis, ed., Philosophy Looks at the Arts (New York, 1962).

"Aesthetic... ," p. 137. 4 Ibid., p. 135.

'"Aesthetic Concepts." '"Aesthetic...," p. 152. 7Cf. Virgil Aldrich, Philosophy of Art (Engle-

wood Cliffs, N. J., 1963), p. 20; also my The Lan- guage of Art and Art Criticism (Detroit, 1965), Ch. VIII.

8Cf. my "Aesthetic Perception," JAAC, XIX (1960), 209-213; now, somewhat revised, in The Language of Art and Art Criticism, Ch. II.

9 "Aesthetic ...," p. 138. 0 Ibid., p. 146.

Ibid., p. 146. " Ibid., pp. 141-142. 18 Ibid., p. 143. 14 "The Logic of Aesthetic Concepts" (Presidential

Address of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, 1962).

1 Cf. The Language of Art and Art Criticism, Ch. VIII.

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