SERGEANT PRINGANDTHE

'CALCUTTA' HURRICANE

JOYDEEP SIRCAR

2016

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FOREWORD

Iwas born in 1947,well after World War Two had ended,butIheard the story ofthe Japanese bombing raids on Calcutta from my father,and held in my hands a pieceofmetal he had taken offa crashed Japanese bomber.Some childhood memories simply endure,one does notknow why :Istill remember the way my father said 'SergeantPring'when Iasked him who shotdown the three Japanese bombers in one night.

Some fifty years after Ihad firstheard his name,finding myselfwith time on my hands,I decided to satisfy a dormantchildhood curiosity and find outmore aboutSergeantPring.The internetled me to David McMahon's story ' Hurricane Over Calcutta',and Iwasstartled to learn thatPring losthis life in air combatabove the city,and was interred in the Bhowanipore cemetery,notfar from where Igrew up.Notonly that,butPring was aBeaufighter ace!For mostofmy life Ihad been reading aboutair combatand air aces,and here was one ofthat fabled tribe buried in my own backyard and Idid notknow it!

From then on Ibecame involved in researching Maurice Pring.Ithoughtitunfair thataman who had once been a hero to Calcutta should have been forgotten by the city,and as a 'Calcuttan'itwas up to me to undo the wrong.In the course ofmy studies Ibecame aware of other men who fell in battle the day Maurice died.Ihave tried to dojustice to them,although I confess my knowledge aboutthem is very limited and unsatisfactory.

Ialso discovered thata major 'character'in the Pring story was the truly rare and obscure aircrafthe was flying atthe time ofhis death,the ill-fated radar-equipped Hurricane II C(NF) single-seater night-fighter. Ihave taken the liberty ofgiving this unwantedoffspring ofthe famous Hawker Hurricane family the sobriquetofthe 'Calcutta'Hurricaneas this aircraftspent almostthe entirety ofit's briefoperational career in 176 Squadrondefending Calcutta. Angus Hamilton,who served in 176,wrote thatthe Hurricane II C(NF) was ' … a classic case study thatshould be documented butprobably never will be' .Ihave atlastcorrected thatomission.

The story ofPring's lastflighthas the poignant inevitability ofa Greek tragedy.He wasnoton duty.He had already completed his tour ofoperations and was due for homeleave.He was nota Hurricane pilot.His Squadron C.O.was againsthis going up.Butonthatday Fate was the hunter,and Fate decreed the final paradox :thatdeath should come outofthe noonday sun to the Englishman whose metier was hunting the enemy in the dark.

This essay is dedicated to Flying Officer A.M.O.'Maurice'Pring,DFM,and the AI Mark 6 equipped Hurricane II C (NF),the 'Calcutta' Hurricane.

JoydeepSircar Siliguri,India,

August8,2011

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While researching Maurice Pring and the Hurricane IIC (NF),Ireceived crucial help from the following individuals which Ihave the pleasure to acknowledge with gratitude:

Andy (Sqn.Ldr. Andrew) Thomas,the aviation historian, whose Beaufighter Aces was the starting point for my researches, put the considerable material he had gathered on 176 Squadron at my disposal,particularly Derek Brocklehurst’s notes and logbook pages,and allowed me to use some of his photographs.Mrs.Jenny Sherwood of Berkhamstedprovided details of Pring’s early years. Major inputs came from Ken Annettaka'Waldo.Pepper', radar and night-fighter researcher.Angus Hamilton,176 Sqn.veteran,whose Canadians on Radar in South-East Asia was a goldmine, also helped with his personal recollections, as did SEAC radar veteran W.E.'Ed' Morgan. Ed has passed away at a ripe old age, but I still treasure and re-read his delightful emails.Horace R.Macaulay,Telecommunications Flying Unit(TFU) veteran, whose monograph on Air Interception radar was a valuable resource, contacted Mike Dean and sent me the photograph of the prototype AI mark 6 equipped Hurricane II C(NF).Malcolm Barrass of 'Air ofAuthority'helped with information, particularly Hurricane serial numbers.

In 2011 the radar researcher Mike S. Dean, MBE had forwarded to me through Horace Macaulay the photograph of the prototype Calcutta Hurricane. In September 2016 out of the blue I received a treasure trove of documents and photographs from him about the development of the prototype,and matters relating to 176 Squadron.I am deeply grateful to Mike for his generous help, and have used his material to expand and enrich my 2011 essay, in particular replacing my hypothetical drawings of the AI Mark 6 display and the antenna and cockpit layout with actual drawings and photographs from TFU files.

Jagan Pillarisetti putmy initial essay on Pring entitled 'In the Skies ofCalcutta: A tributeto Maurice Pring'on the Indian Air Force/History section ofthe Bharat-rakshak website.

RobertQuirk agreed to putthis essay on his website,which was a repository ofwritingsby Angus,Horace and the late Carl Morgan which Idrew upon in this work.Thank you,Robert, for putting me in such good company.

Others who helped are mentioned in the 'Notes on Sources' atthe end ofthis essay.

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Flying Officer A. M. O. ‘Maurice’ Pring, DFM

[Photo J.A. O’Neill courtesy Andy Thomas]

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CHAPTER ONE

CALCUTTA

War came to Calcutta on the nightofthe 20th December,1942.(1).

The Japanese had overrun Burma by April 1942,chasing the tattered remnants ofBritish- Indian and Chinese troops across the jungle-clad hills ofthe Indo-Burmaborder,butthey were notstrong enough to push on into India.ButCalcutta lay wellwithin the range oftheir bombers,and whatthe people ofthe city had been fearing eversince the fall ofBurma came to pass on the 20th ofDecember.Aforce of eightImperialJapanese Army Air Force (IJAAF) Ki -21 Type 97 medium bombers,code-named 'Sally'by the Allies,scattered their bombs over the city.They damaged the oil plantatBudgeBudge,located on the Ganges river a little South ofthe city,and one eyewitnessreported a hole in the road opposite the GreatEastern Hotel ,butthe physical damageinflicted on the city was trivial compared to the devastating blow to the morale oftheinhabitants:approximately one-and-a-halfmillion people panicked and fled,among them a majority ofthe conservancy workers from upcountry villages.The effecton the civic services was catastrophic,and there were serious fears ofan epidemic caused by themounds ofrotting garbage thataccumulated.The IJAAFbombers returned on a numberofoccasions on the days thatfollowed,notably on Christmas Eve.The Dec.24/25 nightraid by 10 Sallys (some from 14th Sentai) achieved a scattering ofbombs over the Chowringhee- Bentinck Street- Dalhousie Square area ofCentral Calcutta and caused some loss oflife,thus considerably dampening the Yuletide cheer.(1)(2)(3)(39)

India may have been the 'jewel in the crown',butas far as combataircraftwasconcerned it had traditionally been the Imperial dustbin.The Bolsheviks in theKremlin did notseem inclined to disturb the peace,and barring Russia the geographical neighborhood ofIndia did nothave any other air threat.So itwas logical to putobsoleteand obsolescenttypes outto grass in India where they were perfectly adequate forpunitive raids against the restive Pathans ofthe North WestFrontier.The situation didnotchange with the startofWorld War Two.The war was a continentaway,and India was drained of troops to serve in North Africa.

Butall thatchanged with dramatic suddenness once the Japanese thunderboltfell on Pearl Harbor on December 7,1941.In the samurai version ofblitzkrieg,the Japanese sweptaway the ill-prepared colonial regimes ofEastand South-East Asia,speedilyaltering their image from rather comical orientals to cunning,brave and ruthless warriors.Atsea the Royal Navy's vaunted battleships wentdown under air attack,and the ABDA fleetwas blown outofthe water by cruiser guns and the dreaded 'long lance' torpedoes.On land a large but inadequately trained and incompetently led British army in Malayawas humiliatingly forced to surrender atSingapore to a smaller Japanese force.And inthe air the 'sahibs'who had been pompously dismissive aboutJapanese air powerdiscovered to their dismay thatJapanese aircraftwere notcopies ofoutdated Western types butextremely effective original designs,and they were flown with aggressive elanby very skilled pilots who had honed their fighting edge in the skies ofChina and Khalkin

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Gol.In particular,the Mitsubishi A6M Type 0 'Zero' fighter flown by pilots oftheImperial Japanese Naval Air Force (IJNAF) proved to be an outstanding aircraftthatquickly gained a fearsome reputation.The Zero and it's IJAAFcousin, the equally nimbleifless well-armed Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa fighter (codenamed 'Oscar' and referred to by the RAF as the Army O.1 ) sweptthe skies ofAsia clean ofall opposition barringChennault's American Volunteer Group (AVG).For the Royal Air Force and otheropponents ofthe Japanese,itwas,as Messers Shores,Cull and Izawa named theirauthoritative accountofthis period ofthe air war in Asia, 'Bloody Shambles'.

In the battle for Burma,the RAFand AVGinflicted losses on the IJAAFbutfailed tostop it, and after the disaster ofthe Sittang the British-Indian and Chinese forces wereforced to conducta long retreat.By April 1942 Burma had fallen :wearing seven-leagueboots,the Japanese had accomplished the incredible featofarriving atthe Eastern border ofIndia,6000 kilometres away from Japan,in justfive months.

Suddenly India was desperately vulnerable,and Calcutta was wide open to Japanese air attack. To strengthen India's air defences,a number ofHurricane squadrons were rushedout and a radar network setup. A Ground Controlled Interception (GCI) station was builtat Deganga,North EastofCalcutta.A Filter Room was setup in Calcutta.A number ofnew airfields came up,particularly in Eastern India. The mostfamous and visible one ofthese airstrips was a 1100 yard section ofthe Red Road,between Chowringhee and the Maidan.It was notan easy strip to operate from due to the camber ofthemacadamized road surface and the ornamental balustrades that flanked the road on both sides, and there were occasional mishaps,butthe pilots enjoyed using hotels and restaurants on Chowringhee like the Grand Hotel or Firpo's as their Ready Room,and thesightoffighters operating from the heartofthe city did much to improve the morale ofthe citizenry.(2)(4)(11)

And morale did need improving, for the news was not good.To add to thesuccessive disasters ofMalaya,Singapore and Burma,there was the tremendous scare ofthe arrival of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's formidable fleetin the Bay ofBengal andneighbouring waters in April 1942.Aircraftfrom Nagumo's fleet,which had wreakedhavoc on the USPacific Fleetat Pearl Harbor,made shortwork ofthose unlucky ships ofthe Royal Navy which had not succeeded in fleeing Westtowards Africa, savaged theharbours ofCeylon after brushing aside the Hurricanes and Fairey Fulmars thattried tooppose them,sank some 24 merchantmen by naval and air attack,and dropped the firstbombs on India in WW2,hitting Kakinada and Vishakhapatnam on 6th April 1942.An unexploded 250 lb bomb from the latter raid is exhibited at Vizag Museum. (2)(4)

They missed a plum targetdue to lack of intelligence.Some 250,000 tons ofmerchant shipping was sheltering in Calcutta port,which was already coming within range ofJapanese airfields in South Burma.The Japanese had occupied the Andaman andNicobar Islands in March 1942,and by April moved around 18 Kawanishi H6K'Mavis'long-range flying boats of the Toko Kokutai to Port Blair, aircraft easily capable of reconnoitering Calcutta. In a desperate bid to blind the enemy,two Lockheed Hudsonbombers from 139 'Jamaica' Squadron flew from Chittagong to Akyab on 14th April,refuelled there,and then made the long overwater flightto hitthe flying boatbase. Thisheroic low-level strike destroyed 3 aircraftand damaged 11 others.The raid wasrepeated on the 18th.Pressing home their attack ata heightofonly 30 feet,theintrepid Hudsons destroyed 2 more aircraftand damaged 3,butthis time they were

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intercepted by Zeroes.Only one Hudson,badly damaged,returned.The crew of theother Hudson,no.V9221 flown by Sgt.G.H.Jackson,were taken prisoner.Butthey had crippled the Japanese long-range recce force, and some 70 merchantmensucceeded in safely sailing outofCalcutta and dispersing.(5)(6)

[Postscriptregarding the crew ofHudson IIIno. V9221,from www.rafcommands.comforum thread 'Hudson loss,18th April 1942,PortBlair' :Sgt.s G.H.Jackson,A.Flower and P.W.G.Hall were prisoners ofwar atRangoon.Jackson and Flower were tragically killedin an Allied bombing raid on 29th November 1943.Hall survived the war.Sgt.J.R.Frehner is listed as killed by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission on 18th April1942 buthas no burial site and is commemorated on the Singapore War Memorial ,column 415.]

Luckily for the British,the Japanese Imperial Headquarters decided againstpushingahead into India after considering it.Ironically,one ofthe key Divisional Commanders inBurma who voted againstthe invasion ofIndia in 1942 was Renya Mutaguchi,who twoyears later would do exactly thatin far more adverse circumstances,over-riding theprotests ofhis own Divisional Commanders,and destroy his Army atImphal andKohima.The Japanese had achieved their strategic objective ofisolating China by cutting the Burma Road,and were contentto lettheir western frontfall quietwhile they digested their gigantic conquestand prepared for the coming struggle for the Pacific with the colossal mightofthe United States.

Calcutta's luck had held in April,butitran outin December 1942.The defendingHurricanes took off,the ack-ack guns fired noisily,butthough Wing Commander Tony O'Neill,the Commanding Officer of165 (Hurricane) Wing,claimed to have damagedone Sally on the 23rd,and actually shotone down on the Christmas Eve raid,a successwidely publicized,it was clear thatCalcutta was virtually defenceless atnight.(3)

Butthere was a defence againstnightraiders,something Britain had developed bypainful trial-and-error in the flaming nights ofthe Blitz. As the Japanese bombersharassed Calcutta the Commander-in-ChiefIndia,General Archibald Wavell,sentarequest for night-fighters to London.(16)

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CHAPTER TWO

AIRBORNEINTERCEPTION RADAR AND THEHURRICANEIIC(NF)

AIRADAR

The story ofthe British developmentofradar is too well known to be worth recounting,butthe developmentofAirborne Interception radar (usually called AIradar) is less so,and abrief summary is necessary to set the context. Once the practicability of radar had been established, those involved in British radar developmentbecame aware thatdefeating the day bomber threatwith the help ofradar would inevitably force the enemy,by then clearly identified as Germany,to switch to nightbombing.They were alsoconscious thatthe complex ground-controlled interception method then being developedfor RAFday fighters (later called the Dowding System after Air ChiefMarshal HughDowding,who would lead RAFFighter Command to victory in the Battle ofBritain) wouldnotwork atnight,because visibility atnight was measured in yards rather than in milesas in daytime,and ground controllers simply could notbring a fighter sufficiently closeto the enemy aircraftso as to enable the pilotto see it.The only practical solution wasto puta radar setin the fighter itself,so thatonce ithad been guided by the groundcontroller to the proximity ofit's targetitcould detectthe enemy aircrafton it's onboard radar screens and complete the interception.

In 1936,Edward 'Taffy' Bowen,a brilliant Welsh physicist working atRadio Research Station at Bawdsey Manor,took up the task ofdeveloping an airborne radar set.Itwas a stiffchallenge,because Bowen's team (Gerald Touch,Sidney Jefferson,and PercHibbert) would have to reduce the wavelength from the 10-13.5 metre ofthe ChainHome radar to between 1 to 2 metres,and reduce the pulse width from 20 microsecondto 1 microsecond.The first AIsetdeveloped was far too heavy and large.During 1937the use ofa RCAvalve and a major redesign broughtthe wavelength down sharply to1.25 metres.Itwas found thatincreasing the wavelength to 1.5 metres increased the sensitivity greatly,and the scientists settled for this.

On 17th August1937 the AIsetfirstflew in Avro Anson no.K6260,and workedsuccessfully. In early September the Royal Navy held an exercise to evade detection by48 aircraftof Coastal Command. In weather so foul that the exercise was scrubbed, Bowen's Anson detected the ships by radar,and then returned safely to base,again withthe help ofradar. Tizard was overjoyed,and this led to the developmentofAir to Surface Vessel (ASV) radar.

In 1938,worried by the delay in developmentofthe twin-engined Westland Whirlwindfighter, the Air Ministry accepted a proposal by Bristol to build a stop-gap heavy fighteradapted from the Beauforttorpedo-bomber. The Beaufighter flew in July 1939,andquickly proved suitable as a night-fighter.It's roomy fuselage could take the radar setandobserver,and 4x20 mm cannons and 6x .303 machine-guns gave itthe kind ofpulverizing firepower one needed in night combat where engagements were very

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brief. Underpowered at first, two 1500hp Hercules sleeve-valve radials got it's speedup to a barely adequate 307mph in service trim.

AIMark 1 flew in May 1939.Itwas quickly superseded by the Mark 2,and then the Mark3. Because ofit's size and weightand the need for a radar operator (called an observer in the RAF),radar could be carried only in relatively large,multi-seataircraft. The BristolBlenheim lightbomber up-gunned with a 4x .303 mg belly pack was chosen.Dowdingdisliked it(as he did the Defiants and Bostons thatcame later) for being too slow.Butnothing better was available,and in early August1939 the Air Ministry placed a rushorder for AIMark 3 sets to equip 60 aircraft.Six AIMark 3 Blenheims reached 25 Squadron before the end ofthe month.

AI Mark 3 sets were unreliable, and led to grumbling and distrust by aircrew. The developmentofthe EF50 valve and the entry ofEMIin radar research/manufacturecame as a boon.EMI's engineers led by A.D.Blumlein managed to reduce theoutgoing pulse width significantly,which directly led to reduction in the radar's minimumrange from the 1080 feetof the AIMark 3 to 400 feet.This was vital as a Blenheim night-fighter had to getwithin 600-800 feetofit's targetfor it's machine-guns to be effective. The new set,called AIMark 4, was the firstreally effective radar setand had the following features:

Wavelength /Frequency 1.5 metres/188 – 198 MHzPeak pulse power 10 KilowattsRange Max.3.5 miles atover 18000' /Min.400 feetWeight 118 lbs.

One problem ofthe Mark 4 was thatthe relatively long wavelength caused the radarpulses to go outin lobes in differentdirections. The downward lobe generated 'Christmastree'shaped returns from the ground ofsuch strength thatthey swamped the set,rendering the radar unusable below 10500 feetor so.The setreally worked well at15000 feetor more.

ABlenheim night-fighter scored the firstradar-guided victory in July 1940.BySeptember 1940,justas the Battle ofBritain was won and the mauled Luftwaffe was beginning the night Blitz,a trickle ofBeaufighters and AIMark 4 sets began to enterservice.The firstBeaufighter victory using AIcame on 19 th November 1940.As the bugsgotironed outofAIsets and the aircraft(which suffered from gun recoil problems initially),the toll taken by Beaufighters went up steadily.

Butthere weren'tenough Beaufighters.So Boulton-Paul Defiants,failed day fightersturned night-fighters,some equipped with the AIMark 4,had to soldier on :they wererelatively successful.Less so were radar-equipped Douglas Bostons which were tooslow.Many were additionally fitted with the Helmore Turbinlite so thatthey couldapproach German bombers and then lightthem up for the accompanying Hurricanes tohave a bash atit.Itdidn'twork – the Hurricane pilots gotdazzled as the lightcame on,and the Germans either shotoutthe lightor took quick evasive action and gotaway.The RAFlost32 aircraftfor a single confirmed victory,achieved by a 253 Sqn.Hurricane withoutusing the light !Some Hurricanes wentup at night,trusting to luck and 'EyeballMark One',and a few ofthem reaped success – the outstanding pilotFlt.Lt.R.P.

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Stevens DSO,DFC and bar,scored 14 victories before he died on a nightintrudermission.Buthe was the exception to the rule thatday fighters sentup at nightwere more ofa danger to themselves than the enemy.Itwould be two years and more before HajoHerrmann would devise effective Wilde Sau tactics thatwould see German day fighters exacta real toll from RAFbombers – butonly under favourable circumstances.(41)

The nightBlitz reached a peak on the nightof10-11 May 1941,when 700 acres ofLondon was laid waste and 1436 people killed,and then gradually faded away as Hitlermoved East againstRussia atthe beginning ofJune.

THE HURRICANE IIC (NF)

The Hawker Hurricane had given stalwartservice during the Battle ofBritain,shootingdown more enemy aircraftthan it's partner,the sleeker Supermarine Spitfire.Itwaseasier to repair, a better gun platform,and had a stronger,wider-tracked undercarriage.Butitwas designed and builtin the tradition ofthe venerable Hawker Fury,and the airframe had basically reached it's developmentlimit.Despite the installation ofahigher-powered engine,the Merlin XXof1390 hp,the Hurricane IIwas by 1941 nolonger able to compete on level terms with the later marks ofthe Me.109 and the potentnew Focke-Wulf190.

So whatwas to be done with the enormous manufacturing capacity geared to make the Hurricane? Itwas decided to keep on building itfor everything bar day interception. The Hurricane's rugged construction enabled itto serve in a multiplicity ofroles – fighter-bomber, nightintruder,tank-buster, catapult-launched/shipboard fighter,photo-recce aircraftetc. Developmentcontinued,strengthening the aircraftand increasing firepower. The Hurricane IIBhad 12 x .303s,the IIC (firstflown in February 1941) had 4 x 20mm Hispano cannons, and the IID tank-buster had 2 x 40 mm cannons.The IIC did about336 mph max.ataltitude.

To combat the night blitz, there was a proposal to equip single-seaters like Spitfires, Hurricanes and Typhoons with AIradar to serve as night-fighters.The ideaprobably received a boostafter Stevens' success - 'Justthink,ifStevens had a radar whathe could have done!' In the eventthe plan was really carried outonly for the Hurricane.(20)

Twin-engined aircraftare preferred as night-fighters because the outgoing signal fromthe radar aerial in the nose is unobstructed.In single-engined aircraft,the engine in the nose means thatthe antennae have to be placed in less-than-ideal locations causing problems. These problems had been solved atthe time ofinstallation ofradar in single-engine multi- seater fighters like Defiants and Fulmars.Butputting radar into a single-seater meanthaving to do withoutthe observer.The solution to this difficulty was found in stages.

In the AIMark 5 radar the observer had two tubes. The lefttube gave the range,and had a strobe spotwhich had to be manually keptsuperimposed on the targetecho. The righttube gave the altitude and bearing ofthe enemy,and fed the 'pilot's indicator' tube.The pilot's tube had two vertical bars and a U-shaped notch like a rifle's backsight. The night-

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fighter's own position was the U notch,and the enemy aircraftappeared as a spotoflight,which grew 'wings' thatgotwider as the distance closed. The pilothad to bring the spotoflightto the bottom ofthe U to putthe enemy dead ahead.The enemy's 'wingspan' touched the vertical bars when the range was down to a thousand feet.At500',the lowerrange limitfor the radar, the 'wingspan' widened to touch two smaller marks outside the vertical bars.(22)

Sources claiming Hurricane Mark IIaircraftwere fitted with Mark 5 sets in late 1941are wrong,as in the Mark 5 the observer has to adjustthe range tube for the 'pilot'sindicator'tube to function. Extantliterature reveals a fair degree ofconfusion regarding the AIMark 5 and Mark 6.

The definitive single-seater radar, AIMark 6 ,had the 'automatic' range strobe,which keptthe strobe spot superimposed automatically on a target echo of sufficient strength, thus dispensing with the need for an operator.This was clever technology thatlater led toa patent. Now the pilotcould 'see' the azimuth,elevation and range on the 'pilot's indicator' tube in the cockpitwithouthaving to continually adjustthe set.(22)(8)

Azimuth meant the angle made by the target in the horizontal plane. Zero degree meant the target was dead ahead, and the other degree markers showed the angle the target made to the right or to the left. The location of the echo was sensitive to the performance of the azimuth antennae, and even slight errors could cause the radar to ‘squint’, as in shown the Telecommunications Flying Unit diagram below.

TFU sketch showing Azimuth display of AI Mark 6 radar [Courtesy Mike Dean]

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TFU sketch showing elevation readings.

[Courtesy Mike Dean]

Elevation meant the angle made by the target in the vertical plane.The radar echo position gave the elevation of the target in terms of the angle it bore to the night-fighter.Zero degree meant the target was at exactly the same level. The above diagram by the TFU shows how the position of the radar echo had to be interpreted for elevation.

As if things were not complicated enough for the pilot, the radar echo dot for elevation could have two values for some positions! The pilot had to fly so that the dot came to nestle at the zero degree position in the bottom part of the U notch, when the target would (hopefully) be dead ahead.

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TFU diagram showing range indication of AI Mark 6 radar

[Courtesy Mike Dean]

The range to the target was, as stated earlier, given by the size of the ‘wings’ the radar echo displayed – the wider the wings, the closer the target.

The Mark 6 sets weighed 134 lbs.Peak pulse power was 10 Kilowatt,and maximumand minimum ranges were 2.5-3 miles and 500 feetrespectively.The sets were complexand hard to maintain in good service trim.Moisture build-up in the wing bollards ofthe azimuth and elevation aerials caused the radar to 'squint'.The automatic strobe found itdifficultto 'stick' to a weak target or a rapidly evading one. Using the 'pilot's indicator' effectively required 'considerable skill and practice'.Butthe biggestshortcoming was described in an Air Ministry publication Introductory Survey of Radar Part II (AIR Pub.1093D, Vol.1, written Sept.1943 but firstpublished 1946) as the pilot's

'...difficulttask ofwatching the tube and looking outin the darkness for the enemy.'

Elsewhere in the same book the unknown author commented aboutthe Mark 6 that

'… Experience showed,however,thatan operator could be a greathelp to a pilotduring an interception '

possibly referring to the experience of264 Squadron discussed below. Icannotbelieve that the unnamed author was unaware that this devastating observation

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undermined the very raisond'etre of the AIMark 6,whichwas built toenable anight-fighter pilot todispense with an observer! (22)(23)(7)

The basic problem was one ofphysiology. The pupil ofthe human eye adjusts it's size to suit the level oflight, but it does soslowly . Thatis why when we move from a brightroom to an ill-litone we feel we are in the dark,butafter some time we can see.Pilotsoperating atnight had to spend time in the dark to letthe pupils oftheir eyes dilate tothe fullestextentin order to acquire 'nightvision',the ability to discern details in the dark,and good nightvision was the key to successful nightinterception.Butnightvision wouldbe quickly destroyed the moment the pilotlooked atsomething much brighter than thedark sky – such as a radar screen;and till itwas regained,which took time,he would be unable to see his targeteven ifit was rightin frontofhim.In fact,in such a situation,thenight-fighter pilottracking an enemy bomber stood a better chance ofbeing shotdown by an alertrear-gunner than shooting the bomber down!

Sgt.Horace R.Macaulay,radar technician who worked in 1942 on the Mark 6 fitted Hurricane BN288 atTelecommunications Flying Unit(TFU) was so convinced thatthis was a fatal faultthathe wrongly believed the type never wentinto production.(23)

TFU, based at RAF Hurn, had been given the job in the second half of1941 to install AI Mark 6 sets in Boulton Paul Defiants and iron out the bugs.Four Defiants took part in these tests and a fair amount of test flying was done. On 26th September an operational night-fighter squadron, no.264 atWestMalling. received it’s first AI Mark 6 equipped Defiant.Following the RAF's lead,the Admiralty tried outthe Mark 6 on a Fairey FulmarII,butrejected itin favour ofthe AIMark 4.In October a 264 Defiant detected a Do.217 atunder one mile range – butitcrashed withoutthe Defiantfiring it's guns! Bad weather inNovember-December keptenemy activity down,butexperience gained showed the AIMark 6 had a very shortrange and the Defiants were too slow.Four firm AIcontacts inMarch 1942 'ran away'from the Defiants.On the nightof17 th April '42 the AI Mark 6was finally 'blooded'when a Heinkel He.111 was shotdown by P/OStuartand F/O Maggs. This was nota conclusive demonstration ofthe feasibility ofpilot-operated AI,for in the two-seater Defiantthe turretgunner could search the dark sky while the pilot'flew'the screen. (7)

Following the C-in-C Fighter Command's visitto 264 Squadron on 1 January 1942 it was decided that AIMark 6 wouldbe installed in 12 Hurricane II C aircraft,which would then be known as Hurricane IIC (NF). Itappears from file no.AIR20/5230 in theKew archives that atone time there was a proposal to form three squadrons ofradar-equipped Hurricane IIC night-fighters for deploymentin India,the Middle Eastand theU.K.:obviously the decision was taken to proceed on a lesser scale.(7)(20)(22)

During the nightblitz standard Hurricanes were converted to ersatz night-fighters by fitting flame shrouds on the exhausts.These aircraftwere then referred to as Hurricane(NF). The RAFused (NF) as a functional designator,and because ofthis Hurricane IIC (NF) could mean either a II C with flame shrouds being used as a makeshiftnight-fighter,or one fitted with AIradar,a horse ofan entirely differentcolor! Ireally don'tknowwhy they didnot find a non-confusing name for the latter aircraft .For reasons set out in the Foreword, Iwill henceforth refer to the AI Mark 6 equipped Hurricane II C(NF) interchangeably as the Calcutta Hurricane.

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According to a private communication from Squadron Leader Mike S Dean, MBE, HurricaneIIC no. BN288 arrived at TFU Hurn in end January 1942. TFU proceeded to install an AIMark 6 radar set operating at 12 volts in BN288,whichbecame the prototype CalcuttaHurricane.This aircrafthas been described as having a Type 69 transmitting dipole froma Mosquito, Type 29 unipole arrays from the Defiant night-fighter, and vertically polarised azimuth dipoles from the Fulmar night-fighter. The 4-inch diameter radar screen was placed in the position ofthe undercarriage indicator,which in turn wentto the position occupied by the clock.The clock was dispensed with, as was the pilot armour and the desert filter to reduce weight.(23)(20)(34)

BN288 was test-flown by the TFU for 30 hours in April and May, first at RAF Hurn and thereafter at RAF Defford where TFU shifted in early May. Mike Dean says the aircraft flew reasonably well despite being overweight(200 lbs over the designed maximum all-up weight without long-range tanks?) and with the centre of gravity position at near rear limit, clocking a max. speed of 320 mph at 22000 feet. Interception tasks showed a maximum detection range of 12000 feet in a straight line on a Wellington target, falling away as the target went off to the side.There was a high rate of success in carrying out ground-controlled interceptions even in poor weather, and four out of six attempts were successful even when the target dived steeply. Cannon firing tests caused no problems with the radar. The aircraft went to the Fighter Interception Unitat Ford in June where it was flown for 27 hours.The FIU reportof7

th

June 1942 praised BN288’s performance,buthinted ata problem by stating

'...inexperienced pilots are notrecommended to fly an AI-equipped Hurricane in badweather atnight '.

which is an oxymoron,as inexperienced pilots are notrecommended to fly ANYaircraft whatsoever in bad weather atnight.What TFU/FIU were really hinting atwas that,aslate as July 1942,the Calcutta Hurricane was considered 'still very unpleasantto fly'.(8)

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BN288, the prototype Hurricane II C(NF) or Calcutta Hurricane , photographed attheTelecommunications Flying Unit,RAF Hurn. A truly rare photograph ofa truly rare aircraft !

[Courtesy Mike Dean via Horace Macaulay]

17

BN288. Azimuth dipoles on left wing. Behind it are the lower pair of Elevation antenna.

[Courtesy Mike Dean]

18

BN288. Arrowhead shaped Transmitting dipoles (left) and Azimuth dipoles (right)on leftwing.

[Courtesy Mike Dean]

19

BN288. Elevation antennas above and below the right wing. Rounded bulges on the upper wing behind the antennas cover 20mm Hispano cannon breeches.

[Courtesy Mike Dean]

20

Radar installation on BN288

[ Courtesy Mike Dean}

21

BN288 cockpit. The AI Mark 6 screen has displaced the Undercarriage Indicator, which has gone lower and displaced the clock.

[Courtesy Mike Dean]

Paralleling the developmentofthe AIMark 6 was the setthatwould render itobsolete,the AI Mark 8.The discovery ofthe cavity magnetron had led to the creation ofthe centimetric radars,so called because they operated in wavelengths measured incentimetres.The limited- production Mark 7 setwith 9.1 cm.wavelength had been rushed into operations in 1941 in some four squadrons ofBeaufighters or so,and givenexcellentresults.It's successor,the AI Mark 8, was already in production from themiddle of1942.It's peak outputof25 Kilowatts gave ita 5.5 mile maximum range,twice thatofthe Mark 6.The integrated transmitting dipole-cum-receiving aerial at the focus ofa three-footdiameter parabolic mirror emitted a focused, narrow beam (like thatfrom afocused torch) thatrotated spirally,covering a cone with an apex angle of90 degrees. The entire assembly was placed behind a transparentperspex nose cone.(22)

Because the Mark 8 did notsend outa strong downward pulse,itwas much less affected by ground returns. The display was a single CRTwith a radial sweep.Itshowed range,location (=elevation and bearing) and IFF(Identification Friend or Foe) response. The

22

Mark 8 was a technological leap,a generation ahead ofthe Mark 6:itmade the Mark 6 obsolete.(22)

The need for Hurricane night-fighters in Home Defence was also coming under question. The Beaufighter had proved adequate,particularly those with centimetric radar. The Mark1F could do a shade over 320 mph, and the 6F version with more powerful 1675 hpHercules VIengines 333 mph around 15000 feet,compared to BN288’s recorded maximum speed of320 mph at TFU,and itis probably safe to say thatin full servicetrim radar-equipped Beaus were as fastor faster than Hurricane II C(NF) at medium altitudes .And by April 1942 157 Squadron was already flying the AIMark 4 equippedMosquito NFII,the firstnight-fighter version ofthe superb De Havilland Mosquito.With a 'clean'maximum speed of370 mph it was far faster than the Calcutta Hurricane,and lethally armed with 4x20mm cannon and 4x.303 mgs.(8a)

Given the unresolved doubts aboutthe practicability ofthe pilotusing the radar whileflying nightcombat,and the performance inferiority ofboth aircraftand radar setcompared to equipmentalready in service,there was no reason for persisting with theHurricane II C (NF). Yet,inexplicably,persisted with itwas,though with a distinctlack ofurgency :someone was being very chary aboutcancelling the order for a dozen aircraft.Was itbecause the AI equipped single-seater idea originated from or was backed by someone Very High Up – like Churchill?(8)(22)

The decision to go ahead with the limited manufacture ofthe Hurricanes had an unexpected result:unnoticed by anyone, the otherwise undistinguishedAI Mark 6 equipped Hurricane II C (NF) entered the recordbooks of aviationhistory as thefirst radar-equippedsingle-seater night- fighter.

In November 1942 a dozen Calcutta Hurricanes were delivered to Fighter Command foroperational trials.Six wentto 245 'Northern Rhodesia'Squadron atCharmy Down,andsix to 247 'China- British'Squadron atHigh Ercall,both being squadrons picked forconversion to Typhoons.245 used them for convoy patrol and did notsee combat.247 pilots,among whom was Flt.Lt. Derek Brocklehurst,were 'coached'aboutthe AIMark6 radar by Mark 6 expertF/OH.A.'Tony'Blondal before they received their aircrafton23rd November.They found the aircraft felt'top-heavy'and difficultto handle,especially when mounted with long-range fuel tanks required to give extended patrol endurance.The actual max.range ofthe Mark 6 turned out to be c.5000' (1 mile) rather than 2.5- 3miles. The radar was calibrated to the estimated wingspan ofthe target,and a targetofdifferentwingspan made the echo grow faster or slower than normal.Ifthe targetwas atan angle or crossing itwas difficultto hold on the four- inch diameter radar screen. (11)(21)(34)

P/OKen Gear of247 said the Hurricane IIC (NF),overloaded with radar and long-range tanks,feltas ifitwas 'flying through mud'.Gear setoutlate one evening on an interception at low level,butdespite being on track the Hurricane was unable to close the targetas itwas doing only around 180 mph [ presumably IAS- JS ]. The Controller askedifhe could increase speed,so Gear 'pulled the tit'and wenton to emergency overboost. This overheated the engine,butotherwise made no difference,the exasperated Controller reporting thatthe target was still pulling away.(34)

23

247 achieved no success with the Calcutta Hurricane. The Luftwaffe were using fastaircraft like the Junkers Ju.88 for raiding,and the Hurricane night-fighter were notquickenough to catch them. The question about the feasibility of single-seater pilots using radar while engaging in nightcombatremained unanswered.(34)

Less than a month after the Hurricane II C (NF)s had arrived at247 Squadron,the C-in-C Fighter Command, Air Marshal T.Leigh-Mallory,wrote on 19 th December 1942 to theUnder- Secretary ofState for Air on the topic ofnight-fighting.Partofhis letter read as follows:

….10.There are many limitations to the useful employmentofsingle-engined fighters atnight, and even ifMark VIAIcan be made to give results comparable with the AIfitted inthe twin- engined aircraft,I am convinced thatother factors will militate againsttheeffectiveness of these aircraft.The Hurricanes with which these squadrons [3,245 and 247 – JS] have been equipped in the pastare too slow for operating againstthe more modern German bombers, and the Typhoons which they are already receiving areunsuitable for flying on dark nights exceptfor experienced pilots.The large nose ofthe Typhoon restricts the view forward while landing and taking off.I propose to allocate these three squadrons to a primary role ofday fighting.

11. Irecommend that one Typhoon be fitted for testing the Mark VIAI and thetwelve Hurricane aircraftalready equipped be transferred elsewhere.The Mark VIAImay be found to be more suitable overseas.(34)

The Governmentevidently concurred with Leigh-Mallory's recommendations.One Typhoon fitted with the AIMark 6 was indeed built,butthatwas all :the experimentwas notadjudged a success.And in view ofthe demonstrated ineffectiveness ofthe AIMark6 Hurricanes in the U.K.,itwas decided to send all twelve ofthem to India!(8)

Imperial habits die hard.

24

CHAPTER THREE

176 SQUADRON AND MAURICEPRING

Flown by skilled night-fighter pilots like John Cunningham,the Beaufighter had defeated the Luftwaffe's nightbombers by late 1941. The improved Beau Mark 6Fdid 333 mph 'clean', andcarried either the AIMark 4 or the superior AIMark 7/Mark 8 centimetric radar.By 1942Beaufighters were carrying the fightto the enemy,flying nightintruder missions over enemy bases. A number ofBeau night-fighter squadrons wentoutto the Middle East.One such squadron was no.89 based at Abu Sueir in Egypt,which had a detachmentflying intruder missions outofLuqa airfield in Malta.As an immediate response to the outcry thatarose after the December raids on Calcutta,culminating in an appeal from General Wavell,89 Squadron was asked to detach a flightofBeaufighters to India to defend the city.(7)(9)(11)

A nucleus ofexperienced 89 Squadron ground crew were flown out to Calcutta. Eight Beaufighters,a mix ofMark 1Fand 6Ftypes (89's Beau 6Fs then had AIMark 4 radar),and their crews were gathered atAbu Sueir to form 'A'Flight,89 Squadron.The flightdeparted Abu Sueir on 10th January and flew v ia Habban iyah, Bahra in ,Shar jah ,Karach i , Jodhpur and Al lahabad to land atDum Dum on the 14th January 1943.Thatvery same day this detached flightof89 Squadron was renamed as a new RAFsquadron,no.176 !The 89 Squadron men,who had come expecting a brief deploymentin India before returning to their parentunitin the Middle East,were notamused when they discovered they were now stuck in India – their reactions varied from 'betrayal' (LAC Carl Norman) to 'Admin balls-up'(Flt.Lt.George C.Nottage).(9)(11)(13)

[Tony O'Neill in Beaufighter Aces wrongly says five Beaus. He is also wrong in saying the Beau 6Fs had AIMark 8.Canadians on Radar in South-EastAsia 1941-1945 says AIMark 4(pages 98,103,281,338), and Angus Hamilton,176 radar hand, confirmed this to me. Photos of 176 Beau 6Fs in Beaufighter Aces show arrowhead aerials typical of AI Mark 4.](9)(11)

In factNottage was right.Air Ministry had decided to form 176 Squadron as a Beaufighter unit,possibly for Long Range Patrol/General Reconnaissance (LRP/GR). The ground crew reached Bombay in November '42 and were sentto Drigh Road,Karachi pending arrival of aircrew and aircraft.When the detached 'A'flightof89 Squadron arrived atCalcutta they were hastily labelled as 176 Squadron! The confusion then prevalentmay be judged from the factthatfive Beaufighter crews (apparently nottrained for night-fighting) were gathered at Edku,Egypt,told they were 176 Squadron,and sentoffin five non-nightfighter Beaus for India on 28th Jan.'43. On arrival at Jodhpur on 6th February they discovered that 176Squadron had already been formed!They were later sentto other units.(11)(19)

So 176 Squadron became the first night-fighter unit in India.Wg Cdr Tony O'Neill was appointed CO– perhaps because he had flown Beaus in nightcombat.The motto ofthe new squadron was Nocte custodimus – 'We keep the nightwatch'.The squadron letters AS were never applied, and the squadron badge, which the UK MoD did not allow me to reproduce, was made in November 1946, six months after 176 was disbanded!(7)(9)(35)

26

moonlight,the three unpainted Mitsubishi Ki-21 (Army Type 97) ‘Sally’s of the 98th Sentai seemed to 'gleam like silver fishes' to F/O'Red' Gray and Flt.Sgt.Mould,another 176 Sqn.crew aloftin Beaufighter 6Fno.X8161.They watched as Pring destroyed all three raiderspiloted by Capt.J.Takita,Capt.K.Tanaka and Lt.J.Ishido in justfour minutes.Thecombattook place about20 miles South-South-WestofKhulna,roughly 70 miles EastofCalcutta.Only one Japanese gunner returned fire.(9)(10)(11)(13)(24)

The following accountofthe combatin Pring's own words was published in the Niagara FallsGazette ofNew York,USAon January 16,1943:

“The first plane I saw had it's navigation lights on, but I wasn't fooled. We had been scrambled outofbed for this show and Iknew thatbloke was notone ofours.We made a swiftpass,shooting him to the ground.Another pass,and number two burstinto flames. About200 yards ahead the third Jap was trying desperately to getaway butIgothim in my sights.He wentinto the ground shooting flames like the oil gushers you Americans tell me about.” (10)

[It was thought that the aircraft with the navigation lights on was the flight leader, who carried the only skilled navigator, and he was flying with his lights on to make it easy for the other two aircraft to follow him.]

The story broke widely,firstin the local papers ofthe 16th,both English and vernacular, and then worldwide. The official communique said Pring had been flying a 'British fighter',not specifying the actual type to keep the arrival ofthe Beaufighter secret(the Army Intelligence officer showing a Turkish delegation around Dum Dum on 21stJanuary was instructed to describe the Beaus as 'obsolete bombers').This led to the widespread impression thatPring had been flying a Hurricane,the only fighter the populace were familiar with.Even my father the late Pradipta Kumar Sircar,a profoundly knowledgeable aviation enthusiast,told me Pring was a Hurricane pilot.However,Pring's above accountofthe combat reveals thathe was notin a single-seater Hurricane:he inadvertently used the plural 'we' twice!(13)(10)

The Courier-Mail ofBrisbane, Australia of18th January 1943 reported on page 1 under the prominentheading MALTAHEROBEATJAPATCALCUTTAthatPring was one ofthe heroes ofthe defence ofMalta,scoring three victories (with two damaged) and being awarded the Maltese Cross (an incorrect assertion) .Itsaid the second bomber had opened fire on Pringbefore being shotdown.It also said he was engaged to a Miss Ray Davis ofAylesbury,andhad declared that"Iwould be happier to geta letter from her than to shootdown three Japplanes on three nights running."

[The official communique aboutPring's featmentioned thathe had three victories earlier, which made his presentconfirmed score 6.However, Andrew Thomas's authoritative Beaufighter Aces of WorldWar 2 [Osprey Book ofthe Aces 65,2005]credits Pring with 7 confirmed victories (+2 probables).In personal communications Andrew was kind enough togive precise details regarding Pring's victories,quoting Aces High by Christopher Shores and Clive Williams [Grub Street1999].There is no doubtthat7 is the correctfigure. ](9)(10b)(14)

Pring musthave been very pleased to join the elite rank offighter aces,buthe cannothave anticipated the instantfame thatcame his way.The Statesman,the leading English daily of

27

Calcutta,carried the account of the combat the next day together with a big war loan advertisementfeaturing Pring with the legend “Lend to be free. Be like SergeantPring, putall your efforts behind the fightagainstthe enemy.Bravo Pring.” The powers-that-be had found in the photogenic fighter pilottheir poster boy. This particular advertisementwas repeated on a number ofoccasions thereafter.(13)

The remains of the three Japanese bombers shot down by Pring were found near the Sibsa River,South of Khulna near SOLADANA, SUTARKHALI and NALIAN (see location map below). None of the crew survived – Sallys generally had a crew complement of seven men.

Bristol Beaufighter 1F, the type Pring was flying on 15 January 1943. Snub-nosed and portly, it was not ‘Beau’ in appearance, but was lethally effective, first as a night –fighter, and later as a strike aircraft equipped withrockets It even usurped the role of it’s progenitor, the Beauforttorpedo-bomber, as the torpedo-carrying ‘Torbeau’.

28

Mitsubishi Ki 21-2 Army Type 97 Heavy Bomber, Allied codename ‘Sally’. The RAF used this American codename sparingly, preferring torefer to these aircraft as Army Type 97.

[Warbird Resource Group]

Kawasaki Ki-48 Army Type 99 Light Bomber ‘Sokei’ (‘Lily’)

29

Photographs of Mitsubishi Ki 21-2 Army Type 97 bomber ( ‘Sally’ ) wreckfound atSOLADANA, Khulna District. This was probably Pring’s first victim as aircraft had extra navigation lights on wings as well as atop fuselage.

[Courtesy Mike Dean]

30

MAP SHOWING VARIOUS LOCATIONS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT

Undeterred by the losses suffered on the 15th,the IJAAFmounted another raid with threeKawasaki Ki-48 'Sokei'Army Type 99 [Allied codename Lily] lightbombers ofthe 8 th Sentaion the nightofJanuary 19,1943.The raiders ran into Charles Crombie and his observerW.O.Raymond Moss in Beaufighter 6Fno.X8164 'G' above Budge Budge ataround 2045. This time the Japanese gunners were notcaught napping,and they setCrombie's starboard engine on fire.Despite this Crombie destroyed two bombers,ordered Moss to jump as flamesstreamed from his wing,and continued attacking, amaging a third for a probable. He baledoutwith his clothes burning seconds before the Beau's fuel tank exploded,landed in aswamp,and made his way back to Dum Dum.

Postwar research shows thatCrombie actually shot down only one Lily, piloted by Sgt.Major H. Sato, which crashed into a large water body at MALIKPUR, c. 2 miles North of Falta (site report of wreck says 3.5 miles North-East of Falta) , and was blown to bits when the bombs still on board went off. The other two bombers took violent evasive action,diving almostto water level,and returned safely to Magwe.(4)(9)(11)(24)

The Lily resembled the Sally to a degree, so it is unsurprising that Crombie mistook the former for the latter, and this mistake is seen in the Operations Record Book (ORB) of 176 Squadron.The ‘Proforma Site Report on Crashed Enemy Aircraft’ unemotionally observed that ‘Four left feet were recovered ‘after draining the tank!Incidentally, the site report of all four wrecks (3 on 15.1.43 and 1 on 19.1.43) provisionally identified the bombers as Army Type 100 (Nakajima Ki-49‘Donryu’/’Helen’).

31

[Apiece ofduralumin from the crashed Lily lay for decades among the junk in our garage tillit was used to block a hole much favoured as a passage by our neighbourhood rats.We could hear them gnawing away for days atthatpiece ofmetal with their formidable incisors beforethey gave up – possibly due to toothache?]

Pring was immediately decorated with the Distinguished Flying Medal (DFM) and Phillips with the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) – Pring did notgetthe DFC because class-conscious Britain gave DFCs only to Warrantand Commissioned Officers!Ironically,he was commissioned as PilotOfficer effective 21st January (new service no.RAFVR 143237)!(15)

[ Pring's DFM decoration and his 1939-45 Star, Air Crew Europe Star, Africa Star with clasp North Africa 1942-43,Burma Star,and War Medal - was puton auction by Dix Noonan Webb as Lot568 of30th June 1998 (expected price Stg.2500-3000),and sold for Stg.2500. ](17)

Crombie won an immediate Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and Moss the DFC for their action.Crombie also gotthe DFC in May 1943 for his service with 89 Squadron in the Middle East.He leftfor Australia in July with his score standing at11 (plus 3 probables),and survived the war,only to die tragically while air-testing a Beau on 26th August1945.(4)

The savage mauling inflicted by Pring and Crombie led to the suspension ofJapanese raids againstCalcutta for eleven months,a welcome respite. The Japanese thoughtfaulty flame dampers were partly responsible for the losses,which they ascribed to Hurricanes. (9)(11)(13)(44)

The grateful British residents ofthe city treated 176 Squadron to an all-ranks dance atFirpo'son Saturday,13th February,where both ladies and liquor were plentiful. Those who had fled in panic after the December raids came trickling back.(13)(44)

Pring soon became the toastofCalcutta,being much in demand in civil and militarydinners.The 'slim young man with a clean-cutlook' gained a fan following long before theterm became current,particularly among children and the teenagers,his boyish good looksdoing no harm atall.

Carl Morgan in his memoirs recounts an anecdote thatis illustrative:on 21stJanuary Pring ,Morgan and others wentby 'gharry'(vehicle) from Dum Dum to Calcutta.Pring wanted to buya .22 rifle for hunting in the jungles around camp,and wentto a gunshop in the Chowringhee area.He found one fitted with a telescopic sightthathe liked.On being told the price,he regretfully remarked thatit was beyond his budget,and he would have to go for something more modest.A well-dressed Indian gentleman who was presentin the shop then asked him ifhe was the SergeantPring who shotdown three Japanese bombers in four minutes.On Pring answering in the affirmative,the gentleman asked the shop owner to pack the weapon and 2000 rounds of.22 ammunition for Pring,and paid for it.He then took Pring in his Rolls-Royce to the Police Commissioner for a gun license ( which Pring did notrequire as a member ofHis Majesty's Forces),and finally to Firpo's for a 'slap-up meal'before dropping him atthe 'gharry pick-up point' for going back to Dum Dum!(10)(11)(13)

32

Distinguished Flying Medal

33

Buta rarer distinction awaited Pring :his photograph was chosen to appear on an Air Force recruiting poster targeted atIndians.The choice appeared to have been dictated in partby the happy rhyming ofPring with Singh,for the poster featured Pring and the Indian Air Force pilotF/OHarjinder Singh.The textofthe 'Pring and Singh' poster began -

This is PRING

The Flight Sergeant who shoots them down quickly. Acool nerve, a clear brain, and unlimited 'guts',that's whatittakes to make an ace pilotlike Pring.----”

This was followed by a matching piece beginning “and this is SINGH….”

In February 1943 176 Squadron moved from Dum Dum to Baigachi,a newly-constructed airstrip some 25 miles North EastofCalcutta,where they were honored by a visitfrom the Governor ofBengal – a film ofthe visitis preserved in the Imperial War Museum [ID:MWY5]. The men lived in Baigachi camp,two miles away from the field.Life was uncomfortable. There was no electricity. The heatand humidity made people suffer.Men were laid low by malaria,dysentery and snake-bites. The single,unfenced runway was litby portable kerosene flares,and atnightthe 'cow patrol' truck had to race down the strip to chase wandering cows away and setup the flares before aircraftcould operate.Despite these precautions two aircraftwere written offafter colliding with cows – luckily the crews were unharmed.The cows were less fortunate.(9)(11)(13)

34

Beaufighter 6Fs of 176 Squadron being readied for night standby at Baigachi,early 1943. Pring sometimes flew X7682’A’ on the right.

[Photo P.G. Hill courtesy Andy Thomas]

Keeping radar sets working in the high humidity was a struggle – a setcould go unserviceable between the morning's Daily Inspection and the afternoon's NightFlying Test. The dark paint scheme of the aircraft (non-reflective jungle-green camouflage above, black underside) soaked up heatlike a sponge,so ground crew began work very early in order to finish before metal parts became too hotto touch.Noon temperature in the observer's compartmentofa Beaufighter was once measured at140 degrees Fahrenheit(54 degrees Celsius)!(11)

There is an anecdote aboutPring dating from around this time.Apparently he wentafter a 'bogey'and forced itdown.Itwas an American bomber with it's IFF(Identification Friend or Foe) switched off.This probably happened on 17 th March 1943 when GCI Deganga reported interception of a X-raid that turned out to be a ‘friendly’. Anyway,theAmerican bomber crew thoughtbeing forced down by the famous Maurice Pring was a greatjoke and asked him to join them for a convivial get-together,which he did.American aircraftoften failed to respond to IFFinterrogation,and this led to the tragic shooting down ofa B29 by a 89 Sqn Beaufighter near Chittagong on 20th Dec.1944.(11)

35

CHAPTER FOUR

A PASSAGETO INDIA - AND A MINOR MYSTERY

245 and 247 Squadrons converted fully to Typhoons in January 1943,giving up their unloved Calcutta Hurricanes.Once the decision was taken to ship these aircraftto India,ifthe usual practice was followed, they would have gone to No. 5 Maintenance Unit at Kemble in Gloucestershire for total airframe overhaul and fitting ofzero-timed engines,and then to 52Maintenance UnitatCardifffor packing for shipmentin big wooden crates.The entire process took time:R4118,now gloriously airborne again,took nine months to reach Bombay from Kemble in 1943-44.(47)

In contrastthe Calcutta Hurricanes took four months or less,for by May 1943 or earlier the crated Hurricanes had arrived at320 Maintenance UnitBase Repair Depot,Drigh Road, Karachi,where no one knew whatwas to be done with them.Among them was HV710,a 247Squadron veteran.Around the same time No.1 Squadron, Indian Air Force (itbecame Royal only in 1946) was moving to Risalpur in the North-WestFrontier Province after briefstints at RAFBairagarh (Bhopal) and RAFChharra (Aligarh,UP).No.1 IAFwas atthattime commanded by Sqn.Ldr.S.N.Goyal,and mounted on somewhatworn Hurricane Mark Is and IIBs.(14)(18)

Air Britain's records for HV710 show 3,247 and 1 IAFas operators ofthis particular aircraft, which was struck offcharge on July 5,1945.Now,why would No.1 Squadron IAF,a day fighter unit,be handed over a night-fighter Hurricane? The noting aboutHV710 going to 1IAFis wrong,possibly data relating to some other aircraftstuck onto HV710. Additional proofofthis mix-up is thatHV710,which was destroyed on 5th December 1943,is shown as being struck offcharge on 5 July 1945!(21)

The pilots for the Calcutta Hurricanes had meanwhile arrived in India,and were ata loose endin the absence oftheir mounts;among them was FlightLieutenantDerek Brocklehurst, whohad been transferred from 247 Squadron to 176.F/OBlondal,the AIMark 6 expert,also landed up at176,and became the well-loved Radar Officer 'Blondie' in charge ofthe squadron's radar unit.The missing Hurricanes were finally traced to Karachi in May 1943,and erected at320 MU.Flt.Lt.Brocklehurstcarried outtestflights at320 MU,and recorded the serial numbers ofthe aircrafthe flew there as :

HV709 ,HV710 ,HV979,HW415,HW426 ,HW432,HW435,HW485,HW541

He flew two more ofthese Hurricanes,KX359 and KX754,atBaigachi.Thatmade a totalof11 aircraft.Which was the twelfth one?(11)(14)(18)

Fighter Squadrons ofthe RAFand their Aircraft by John D.R.Rawlings [Macdonald's,1968, revised edition1976]has the serial no. HW341/'O' for a Hurri II C (NF) serving in 176 Squadron. But HW341 was part of a block of numbers never allotted!

36

Andy Thomas's article on 176 Squadron [ Aviation News,30 Oct.-12 Nov.1987]gives the twelfth aircraftas HW431/'O'– but this was a Hurricane IIB,not a IIC,andservedonly in1564 (Met) Flight inLibya! (14)

In Edward Bishop's Hurricane,Volume 93 [Smithsonian Institution Press,1990],p.137,I found HW415 (“O”) given as a 'tropical NFMark IIC' serving in 11/43 with No.176(F) Squadron,Baigachi':'O', thathardy perennial,appears again,butatleastthis time it's attached to an actual 176 machine!Baffled,I re-read everything,and found a postwhich mentioned KX765.Malcolm Barrass kindly checked itout,and found it was anaircraft that went toRussia – but KX764 went to 176 Squadron !So the mystery ofthe twelfth aircraftwas solved atlast!(21)

By 24th June 1943 all twelve Calcutta Hurricanes had ‘found their way home’ and had joined176 atBaigachi as the Hurricane Flight.The squadron had a new COby then,Wg.Cdr.H.C.Goddard,'Tony'O'Neill having been invalided home in May with jaundice.The BeaufighterFlight( AFlight) was commanded by Sqn.Ldr.Nottage,and Fl t. L t. Derek Brocklehurst,described as 'a pleasantand cheerful person''built like a football player' commanded the Hurricane Flight( B Flight).(3)(11)(14)

The Hurricane aircraftwere assigned squadron letters,some ofwhich are known:

HV709/'L', HV979/'M', HW435/'N',HW415/'O',KX359/'Q', HV710/'S'

KX754 also is given as 'N'.ButNorman Franks in Spitfires over the Arakan [WilliamKimber,1988]identifies HW435 as being N on 5th December 1943.(18)

Perhaps to compensate for the performance penalty imposed by the weightofthe radar set and the drag ofthe aerials,these aircraftwere notfitted with tropical air filters which created high drag.In addition 176 stripped them ofarmour to lighten them.They wore RAF A.1 roundels rather than SEAC ones,and were probably painted like the 176 Beaufighters,matte green/brown camouflage above and matte black below.Pring,a naturally 'keen type',learntto fly the Hurricane,although as a Beaufighter pilothe need nothave done so:as he had flown Defiants earlier with 125 Squadron itwould nothave been difficult.(20)(29)(11)

The hope ofthe Air Ministry in London thatthe Calcutta Hurricanes would prove their worth againstthe relatively slower Japanese aircraftin the more benign weather conditions ofsunny Bengal proved illusory.The bombers kepttheir distance,and the Hurricanes saw no action.

Pring's promotion to Flying Officer came through on 21stJuly 1943.In Augustthe Beaufighter1Fs of176 were replaced by 6Fs .176 sentdetachments to Madras and Ratmalana in Ceylon to offer protection againstraids,and a Beaufighter from Ratmalana flown by Flt.Sgt. L. Atkinson and Flt.Sgt. W.Simpson scored the nextvictory for 176,shooting down a Mavis flying boatcoming from the Andamans on 11th October 1943 after a long chase. The nextday'Bluey' Halbeard belly-landed a AI Hurricane atBaigachi after losing a wheel.(15)(7)(9)(11)

37

Rare photo showing Calcutta Hurricanes of 176 Squadron atBaigachi,circa May1943.RAF roundels visible.Panels covering radar equipment have been taken off in the aircraft in front.

[Photo J AO'Neill courtesy Andy Thomas].

38

CHAPTER FIVE

DAYLIGHTOVER CALCUTTA : SUNDAY,DECEMBER 5,1943

In August1943 fighter Spitfires arrived atlastin India (photo-recce Spitfire Mark IVs ofNo.3PRU Flight(Calcutta) /681 Squadron had been operating from Dum Dum since October1942). These were only Mark 5Cs,butwere still welcome as they could interceptand destroy the Mitsubishi Ki-46 'Dinah'recce aircraftwhich had hitherto generally flown too high and too fastto be caughtby the Hurricanes.607 and 615 Squadrons gave up their Hurricanes and converted to Spitfires,followed by 136.From October onwards these units began moving forward from Calcutta to the Chittagong - Ramu area - 136 was the lastto go on December1,flying from Baigachi to the 'Lyons'strip atRamu - to assistin operations over the Arakan and provide a forward defensive screen against Japanese air incursions. Pilots of152(Hyderabad) Squadron arrived atBaigachi in November 1943,butwithoutaircraft– theirSpitfire VIIIs were yetto arrive.(24)(45)(2)(27)(30)(43)(49)

The Spitfire defensive screen tactic appeared to succeed,butthe wily Japanese were not quite done with Calcutta yet.They planned the nextraid well.

Dinahs had been watching the supply buildup through Calcutta portfor the Burma fronts – the second Arakan offensive started on Nov.30.5th Air Division (Hikodan),the apex IJAAF formation in Burma,had been planning since October for a daylightstrike atthe congested Calcutta docks to disruptthe flow. They calculated correctly thatthe forward movementof fighter squadrons was at the expense of Calcutta's fighter cover. The operation was rehearsed in Malaya.To add weightto the blow,they gotthe IJNAFto join them.Nine Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' bombers of the 705th Kokutai flew in from Padang in Sumatra. The Zeroes of331st Kokutai,normally stationed atSabang in Sumatra to protecttherefineries ofPalembang,flew under the command ofLt.Cdr.Hideki Shingo from Sabangto Tavoy on the 3rd,and to Magwe in Central Burma on the 4th to join the raid,fixed for 5th December.(30)(40)(43)(44)(16)(24)(50)

With Spitfires gone to Arakan,Operations had asked 176 if the unemployed CalcuttaHurricanes could interceptthe fast,high-flying Ki-46 Dinahs which had been coming over. Toenable the aircraftto climb high enough and fly fastenough to do so,they were stripped ofarmour and radar to lighten them. They began their ‘Dinah’ readiness from 0500 on the 4 th

December. The 176 Squadron ORB wished them ‘Happy Hunting’.(9b) (11)(25)(27)(44)

In the morning ofSunday,December 5 th,two Beaufighters of176 scrambled at 0618 hours after a Dinah which flew outofrange (9)(24)(48)(50)

The clear,sunny day promised to be peaceful – until warning came in ofa large raid. The Japanese had launched their strike from Magwe and Allanmyo,and for the firstand only timein their bombing campaign againstCalcutta,they were coming in daylightand in real strength.In the IJAAFfirstwave were 18 Ki-21 Sallys (9 each from the 12th and 98th Sentai)protected by no less than 74 Oscars – 20 from the 33rd Sentai,and 27 each from the 50th and 64th Sentai.20 Oscars from the 204th Sentai at Akyab covered the take-offandwithdrawal.The IJAAF raid was to fly a dog-leg course to reach a point due East of Calcutta before turning for the city.In the IJNAFsecond wave,which setout20 minutes later,9

39

Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' bombers ofthe 705th Kokutai were escorted by 27 Navy Zeroes fromthe 331stKokutai.They were to fly straight to a point due South of Calcutta before turning for the city.(9)(24)(48)(25)(26)(29)(50)

The story ofthis raid has been told in detail by air historians like Christopher Shores [ Air War For Burma]and Norman Franks [ Spitfires over the Arakan].The Japanese had twoDinahs drop 'chaff'to confuse the Allied radar,and other Dinahs feinted towards Silchar.Meanwhile, using their inherentlong range ability and carrying drop tanks,the Japanese main force flew from Magwe far outinto the Bay ofBengal.(18)(24)(43)(50)

The raid was firstdetected at0930 and interpreted as aimed towards the Chittagong area. The earliestto scramble were eleven Hurricanes of258 Squadron led by Flt.Lt.Arthur Brown (27) from Dohazari (SWofChittagong),and ten Spitfires of136 Squadron from the 'Lyons' strip atRamu.258 intercepted,and W/OP.I.Hickes claimed to have seta Sally on fire. Brown,whose aircraftseemed to be flying oddly,was heard to say he was attacking,butthen wentmissing.Japanese sources confirm the loss ofa 98 th Sentai 'Sally'flown by 2 nd Lt.K. Nishimori in this attack.(24)(27)(32)

136 Squadron turned back due to shortage offuel after gaining visual contactwith the distant enemy formation.Flt.Lt. Eric 'Bojo'Brown of136,who missed the recall signal due to a radio malfunction,flew on and was the only Spitfire pilotto attack,claiming a Sally:the bomber was damaged butnotshotdown.On the way back he ran outoffuel and had to crash-land on Sandwip Island.(24)(27)

27 Spitfires scrambled by 607 and 615 squadrons and 17 Hurricanes by 60 and 261 squadrons from bases in the Chittagong - Cox's Bazar - Ramu area failed to find the Japanese.Now itbecame clear thatthe raiders were heading for Calcutta,and there was nothing to stop them except 67 and 146 squadrons,and the depleted Hurricane flightof176.Maj.Gen.Kirby feels this situation came aboutbecause ofthe failure of the controllers toposition the RAF's considerable fighter strength properly :perhaps he fails to do justice to the skilful planning ofthe raid by the Japanese.(24)(25)(27)(32)(43)

AugustHansen,a Dane who served in Calcutta as a Customs Officer atthe time,recounts a story that was widely believed, that the Japanese were aided by spies who kept them informed of the state ofthe city's fighter defences:in his version a man who claimed to be halfChinese and worked atthe Wireless Telegraphy departmentofFort William was later caughtand found to have been surreptitiously sending messages to the enemy.He was stood up againsta wall and shot. Whatis indubitably true is thatthe Japanese raid took place precisely when the fighter cover over Calcutta was atit's lowestebb.(1)

Four Hurricanes flown by Flt.Lt.Derek Brocklehurst, Flying Officer A.M.O. ‘Maurice’ Pring, Pilot Officer Andy Whyte of Canada and Warrant Officer E.R.’Curly’ Harris wentup around1030.Maurice Pring,who was really a Beaufighter pilot and aboutto go on home leave,had pleaded to be allowed to join for a lasttrip in a Hurricane,and the squadron CO, W/Cdr.Goddard,had in the end reluctantly agreed to lethim go.Carl Morgan says Goddard'sparting words to Pring were “Very well Pring,be iton your own head”.Instead of being sent after the first wave, they were recalled at 1100 and landed back around 1123.The reason for recall is notexplicitly stated,butitis a reasonable guess thatin view of the size and strength ofthe raid,the risk of committing night-fighter pilots flying converted night-fighterswas considered unacceptably great.(9b)(13)(24)(25)

40

Scrambled ataround 1050,the newly-arrived 67 Squadron led by Sqn.Ldr. T.C.Parker took offfrom Alipore in 12 ex-Middle EastHurricane IIBs. Four aircraft returned due to engine trouble,and the rema in ing 8 joined up with the 9 com ing from 146 Sqn.atBaigachi. They intercepted the IJAAFfirstwave at 26000’ roughly 30 miles Eastof Calcutta andtried to getatthe Sallys,butcould notpenetrate the fighter screen.Flt.Sgt. AlbertCorston,a Canadian pilotin the four-plane lead section of67,had ducked down in his cockpitto try to gethis radio headsetworking :when he raised his head and looked around hefound whathe thoughtwere a pair ofZeroes (they were Oscars) on his tail!He saved himselfby a steep dive,pulled outlow as his glycol spewed outand his engine ran rough, andpancaked in a paddy-field.So did Corston's section leader P/OS.M.Wilson.Another pilotofhis section,22 year old P/OAubrey Fraser Bond RCAFofToronto flying LB569 'K',wasshot down and killed.Oscar pilots loved the accuracy oftheir nose machine-guns and usedthem to shootup the unprotected coolantsystems oftheir enemies.(24)(43)(44)(25)(42)(50)

146 Squadron gotbounced by Oscars and lostone Hurricane :Flt.Lt.R.Evans,RAAF,baled outofHV983 after his engine was shotup by a pair ofOscars.F/O A.B.Summers,RCAF, escaped by diving after sustaining damage,and W/OF.M.Horne,RCAF,crash-landedHL802 atTaki.Between them 67 and 146 claimed one Oscar shot down (by the New Zealander F/OGordon Williams of67),and four enemy aircraftdamaged.Japanese sources do notconfirm Williams's victory claim.(24)(25)(26)(28)(50)

33 Sentai Oscar pilot First Lieutenant Tameyoshi Kuroki, a 16-victory ace, claimed a Hurricane,butwas so severely damaged thathe contemplated a suicide dive;ultimately he did gethome.Another victory was claimed by Capt.Koki Kawamoto ofthe 50 th Sentai.33 rd

and 64th Sentai pilots claimed eightHurricanes destroyed and two probables.(24)(26)

[The raid had an interesting aftermath for 67 Squadron.On Monday the Calcutta papers were scathing :'Where was the RAF? Were they having the day off?'Incensed by whatthey saw as unmerited criticism,67 decided to teach Calcutta's gin-drinking 'boxwallahs'a lesson. There was an importantrace atthe Calcutta Race Course nextweekend,and as itgot underway Hurricanes from 67 proceeded to do a thorough low-level 'beatup'. The horses scattered,the race finished in the slowesttime on record,and carping comments ceased .](32)

As 176's Hurricanes refuelled at Baigachi, there was another raid warning: the IJNAF second wave was coming in 45 minutes after the first wave, and they had achieved tactical surprise. The IJNAF formation flew a differentcourse from that of the IJAAF: while the IJAAF raid had flown a shorter course to approach Calcutta from the East, the IJNAF flew a longer course so that they could hit Calcutta directly from the South, which explains why the time gap between them had increased from 20 to 45 minutes – the cruising speeds of Sallys and Bettys were very similar. Ed Morgan, posted at the Diamond Habour 'Chain Overseas Low' radar station AMES 544, remembers that when the 50+ radar echo was initially detected at the maximum range of about 100 miles and reported to the Filter Room at Calcutta, the latter at first took it to be a formation of American bombers with their IFF switched off(a regular occurrence). As the blip closed in Morgan stepped out of the radar hut to see eight Bettys going past overhead towards Calcutta! He is positive he saw eight – he said it looked like an aircraft was missing from one of the vics. He also watched the same eight coming back a little later after dropping their bombs on the Calcutta docks.The after-action report of the Landing

41

Craft Repair Ship USS Achelous (ARL 1), moored at King George Docks, Kidderpore states eight bombers were sighted at 1227, and they were not subjected to anti-aircraft fire from shore guns!It seems one Betty had dropped out.(11)(24)(25)(50)

67 and 146 Squadrons,heavily engaged by the firstwave,had shottheir bolt. Only 176 wasleft,and in desperation Operations committed them,Beaufighters,Hurricanes and all.(9)(24)(25)(29)(44)(50)

Four 176 Beaufighters led by Flt.Lt.Peter Hill took offaround 1130.As they climbed slowly to interceptthe Beau crews like Peter Lee could hear various aircraftin trouble,obviously the Hurricanes engaging the IJAAFraid.Operations,realizing belatedly thatthe Beaufighters were notable to climb higher than 21000 feet,mercifully recalled them before they became sitting ducks for the Japanese fighters.(9)(29)(50)

Five Hurricanes scrambled ten minutes later, around 1140. Brocklehurst led in Hurricane HV979 'M',followed by redheaded 21 year-old Flt.Lt. G.R. 'Bluey' Halbeard from Wolverhampton in HW435 'N',P/OWhyte in HV710 'S',W/OHarris in KX359 'Q'and F/OPring in HV709 'L'. (11)(13)(14)(25)(31)(29)

Remembering whatOperations had asked them to do,Brocklehurst,Pring and the otherswere initially under the impression thatthey were going after a lone Dinah coming over for post-raid recce.They were tragically wrong.GCIvectored the Hurricanes onto the IJNAFBettys ‘about 50 miles South-East of Calcutta’,and gave them no warning aboutthepresence offighters high above the bombers.As they dived from about 20000'atthe Bettysat18000' they were bounced by the Zeroes ofthe 331 st Kokutai,a thousand feetabove them and coming outofthe sun.(9b)(25)(17)(50)

Raked by 20mm cannon and 7.7 mm machine guns,Pring,Halbeard and Whyte wentdown. Pring’s aircraftwas seen to fall in flames with no sign ofa chute and Halbeard disappeared. Brocklehurst wentinto a spin trying to out-turn the Zero which had shothim up, recovered atlow altitude,and limped back to Baigachi,buthis aircraftwas a write-off.Only ‘Curly’ Harris,who had dived away,escaped unscathed.Itwas bloody shambles once more. (9b)(11)(13)(17)(25)(29)

331st Kokutai claimed six victories,and were awarded four confirmed victories and two probables,all fighters.Ofthese WarrantOfficer Sadaaki Akamatsu ,a very colorfulcharacter who finished the war as Lt.(junior grade) with 27 victories and boasted of'250victories when sober and 350 when drunk',alone claimed four victories over Calcutta on thisday.He was prone to overclaiming,buthe was also an amazingly skilful pilotwho flew 6000+hours in fighters and came through the war unscathed.Itis certain thathe savaged the hapless Hurricanes of176 on this day.Akamatsu was looked up to by his junior squadron-mates,and itis possible thathis wingmen stood by while he made the firing passes.EnsignMasao Taniguchi (final total 14 kills) flew in this raid,and WarrantOfficer Hiroshi Okano (finaltally 19 victories) may also have done so,butIdo notknow ifeither ofthem made anyclaims.(37)(40)

Spitfire VIIIs ofNo.81 Squadron,an unittransferred to India from the Middle East,apparently flew in from Delhi and landed atDum Dum around midday,buttheir COrefused toscramble stating his pilots were tired and in no fitstate to undertake air combat.(17)

42

No.79 Squadron equipped with Hurricane II Cs based at Alipore was preparing to move to Chittagong and were not available nor at readiness . They were not sent up for the first raid, but scrambled at 1215, probably to save them from being bombed on the ground. Their 12 aircraftwere ordered to orbit at 25000’ and then told to land, which they did at 1305. Shoresmerely mentions that79 scrambled late and ‘did notengage’, an obscure way to convey the fact that 79 were not instructed to do so. The ORB of HQ 221 Group makes this abundantly clear when itsays “79 Squadron were not available owing to their move to another area”. However, this begs the question why 79 could not be made combat-ready in the 2+ hours between the detection of Calcutta being the target and the arrival overhead of the IJNAF raid, since their aircraft were airworthy enough for a sauve qui peut scramble.(9)(24)(48)(50)

Eight Hurricanes from 67 were scrambled again from Alipore at 1220 (1230?) after refueling and rearming, but by thattime the IJNAFraid was practically overhead. One aircraft turned back due to oxygen trouble and the remaining seven embarked on a tail chase as the raiders bombed and turned East for home at 220 mph. About 140 miles East of Calcutta 67 gave up ‘when one mile behind (enemy aircraft)’ as they were running out of fuel.A wise decision in hindsight as they were chasing Zeroes! (9)(50)

People gotup on their roofs to watch the Japanese fighters puton an astonishing display of aerobatics to drive home their unchallenged air superiority and demoralize the populace. The Sallys dropped 5x100 kilo HEbombs each on the King George V docks at1147,and the Bettys at1232.The total weightofbombs delivered was only about12 or 13 tonnes. If we compare this to the 5 tonne bombload ofa Main Force Lancaster area-bombing Germany,it would appear thatthe Japanese 'punch' was ridiculously lightgiven the effortinvolved.(38)(24)

Although officially damage was described as 'light', Eastern Air Command confidentially conceded thatthe accurate bombing had inflicted 'considerable damage'.3 merchantmen and1 Naval vessel were hitand 15 barges seton fire.Fires in the dockside sheds were quickly broughtunder control,though notbefore two sheds were gutted.(1)(24)(26)(30)(36)(16)

The official figures ofaround 500 civilian casualties (over one-third killed),and 14 military ones (1 fatal) understated the real civilian death toll,estimated to be around 350. The high number ofcasualties was blamed in parton non-observance of Air Raid Precautions.There was some exodus from the city,butnothing on the scale seen a year earlier. The volume of cargo handled by the portdropped sharply for some weeks as more than 10000 ofthe daily work-force of15000 dock labourers stayed away.(1)(36)(16)(46)

The RAF initially thought only IJAAF fighters had come over – the ORBs of 176 and HQ 221 Group mentioned only Army O.1s (Oscars).Only when they found the drop tanks jettisoned by Zeros did they realize what the pilots of 176 had come up against.(9b)(24)(50)

176 Squadron reacted to the tragedy thathad overtaken their pilots with sadness mixed with anger :the Canadian radar technician Bob Matheson spoke for many when he said he was'very critical ofthe decision to send nightfighter pilots in Hurricanes outto oppose Zeros.' W/Cdr.Goddard was deeply grieved atthe loss ofHalbeard and Pring.(11)(13)(29)

43

Itis necessary for the sake of completeness to analyse the reasons for the debacle that overtook the AIHurricanes.First there is the mystery about the lack of fighter warning by the Controller.Given their experience in the IJAAF raid and the 50+ blip size detected by C.O.L. Diamond Harbour, it should have been apparent that a large fighter escort was present, and the Hurricanes should have been warned.Unfortunately the entry for 5 th December 1943 in the ORB of GCI Jaynagar [AMES 851] is singularly, almost suspiciously uninformative:

R/T tes ts car r ied ou t, p lo tted on “X” ra id . Hos ti le ra ids p lo tted and in te rcep ted .

Numbers were againstthe 176 pilots,and altitude.Atmidday in December the Southern declination ofthe sun automatically placed 331 Kokutai,coming from the South ata higher altitude,up sun to the Hurricanes of176 climbing towards them from the North.The Zero wasthe better dogfighter. The only escape for the AI Hurricanes lay in spotting the Zeroes earlyand diving steeply. The Hurricane dived better than the lighter-builtZero,which suffered control stiffness athigh speed and could pull less Gs.

Why did they notsee the Zeroes? Ithink this was because ofa combination offactors. The initial assumption that they were after a Dinah left the pilots mentally unprepared for desperate combat– Pring wentfor a 'joyride'.GCI's failure to warn them aboutthe presence ofenemy fighters contributed to their lack ofwariness aboutthe 'Hun in the sun',though they already knew thatOscars had come in the firstwave. But the crucial thing that sealed their fate was a mismatch ofskill.

Bob Matheson was rightwhen he laid the blame atthe door ofthose who decided to commit night-fighters and their pilots to a daylightbattle. A night-fighter pilotneeds good nightvision and spatial orientation and skill in nightflying and instrumentflying.He operates alone and musthave the temperamentto fly long patrols.He follows the GCI vectors unquestioningly, unlike day fighter pilots trained in the hard school of the Battle of Britain who learned to disregard vectors, climb for altitude advantage,and follow a flight path that would bring them to a point above and preferably up-sun to the enemy. The night-fighter pilotis the hunter, never the hunted, and he does notinstinctively check above,behind and below him constantly by waggling his wings,peer into the sun,avoid flying straightand level for long,and cover his wingman's six - key requirements for day fighter pilots.Willing and brave though they were,the pilots of176 simply did nothave the skills they needed for fighter-vs-fighter combatin daylightagainst well-flown Zeroes.

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Mitsubishi A6M3 Model 22 'Zero' with drop tank, 1943. (Wikipedia)

Japanese Navy ace Sadaaki Akamatsu(Wikipedia)

45

CHAPTER SIX

AFTERMATH

An air search on the 5 th December by the Bisley flown by W/Cdr. Goddard and a couple of Beaufighters of 176 found no trace of the missing aircraft. On the 6th a pair of Beaufighters and a pair of Hurricanes again conducted air searches, but all that was found was a crashed Hurricane from 67 Squadron near Port Canning.But good news came that day : Andy Whyte was safe and unharmed, and having made his way to Calcutta was celebrating his escape at Firpo’s. He had crash-landed his shot-up Hurricane South-Eastof PALPUR, which is about 10 miles South-East of Port Canning and about 6 miles North of Gosaba, and made his way to Calcutta.(9)(13)(29)

A ground search party went out on the 8 th to the area where Pring and Halbeard were thought to have gone down.It was not until the 10 th that Pring's burnt-out machine was located in tall grass in the SANDESHKHALIarea beside the Bidyadhari river,about 13 miles East with a touch of North of Port Canning. He had succeeded in crashlanding his burning aircraft despite being badly burned about the face, and had managed to get out and crawl away before he died. Halbeard’s crash site was also foundin the SANDESHKHALI area, not far from Pring’s, but the aircraft had dived deep into marshy ground and it proved impossible torecover his body.(9)(13)

Maurice Pring's body was brought back to Baigachi, and laid to rest on Saturday, December11th in the Bhowanipore Cemetery according to the ORBof 176 Squadron (elsewhere the date is given as Sunday 12 th December). He rests in Grave no. 113, Plot L. At Berkhamsted he is commemorated in the town's WW2 Roll of Honour in front of the Church of St. Peter on High Street,and the Roll of Honour of Berkhamsted School on the wall of the school chapel. (9b)(10)(13)

Near Pring in the Bhowanipore cemetery lies Aubrey Bond. Arthur Brown and Geoffrey Halbeard have no resting place :their names appear on the Singapore War Memorial ,where all missing aircrew ofSouth EastAsia are commemorated.(31)(42)

Calcutta grieved for it's dead and wounded,among them it's fallen hero,the 22 year old Englishman it had taken to it's heart. No one mourned Pring more sincerely than the thousands ofchildren and teenagers who had idolized him.We are privileged to hear three voices outofthe pastspeak ofMaurice Pring,and whathe meantto them.

During those many regular air-raids we usually listened to All-India Radio.The reception was notas good as commentary was frequently interrupted by pops,shrieks and whistles caused by atmospherics.Our hero was an Indian Air Force Hurricane pilotby the name ofPring.He was Squadron Leader who,nightafter night,shotdown Zeroes in fierce combat.We used to listen to his exploits with bated breath;we became an integral partofthis man who was up there fighting our battles for us.Itwas rather like listening to a soccer match in the sky.We reacted to his every valiantmove and kill with rapturous joy.

He became the focal pointofa Zero attack in the early hours ofone morning. As we satin the flickering glare ofa lamp,we stared atone another in utter disbelief– through the static

46

came the unmistakable whining ofPring's death dive - the end ofour friend. There was a silence thatseemed to lastfor an eternity.We all cried unashamedly. The poignantwail ofthe all-clear broke the unnerving quiet,it's initial bellows slowly becoming a series ofmuffled moans.”RonM.Walker , 'My Wartime Childhood in Calcutta,India' ,BBC:WW2 Peoples War:Article ID A2780534 recorded in October 2006.

[CopyrightNotice :Reproduced under 'fair dealing'terms for a Non-commercial educationalresearch project. The copyrightremains with the original submitter/author ]

Forgetthe errors and impossibilities and appreciate the impactPring had on the mind ofa boy of7,the way his image as a “Knightofthe Sky” imprinted itselfindelibly.This is reminiscentof the adulation lavished upon Georges Guynemer in France and AlbertBall in Britain during WW1!Did the cunning Brits puton a radio play with Pring as hero? Itsounds plausible!

And observe the tremendous aura ofthe Zero – all Japanese aircraftare Zeroes as far as the public is concerned,though the Zero only appeared once over the city during the entire War!

“Hello again -Ineed to know,as well,ifthere was a RAFbilleton or near Kyd Street,and would somebody remember the name ofthe young airman who broughtdown three Zeroes (?) in a single night? Ibelieve he was subsequently killed.Thanks for any help received -”

Sally,20 March 2007

“Ithink he was called Squadron Leader Pring,Hurricane pilotfor the Indian Air Force in WW2. He would lead the Zero attacks and was killed in one ofthose attacks.He was the hero ofall the kids living in our area.”

Joyce Munro,20 March 2007

“Thanks very much for that– now thatIread it,the name is familiar!Can you recall please,ifI am rightin thinking thathe earned his 'hero'status by bringing down three Japanese planes (fighters) in a single nightand was the firstair raid on Calcutta on 4th December ? Iused to have a Statesman photograph ofhim – now long lost.

Your help is much appreciated.Sally, 21 March 2007

[These e-mails are from INDIA-BRITISH-RAJ-L archives ofMarch 2007 in Rootsweb.]

[Copyrightnotice : Reproduced under 'fair dealing' terms for a Non-commercial educationalresearch project. The copyrightremains with the e-mail authors.]

Here again we encounter the same inaccuracies – a Squadron Leader in the Indian Air Force flying Hurricanes againstZeroes etc., though by a bitterly ironical twist that is exactly what happened in Pring’s last flight.Butletus return to the core value ofthese e-mails :sixty four years after his momentofglory and his death,two old ladies are trying to remember details aboutthe young pilotthey idolized !One could think offates worse than that.

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Calcutta can truly lay claim to two air aces.

One,FlightLieutenantIndra Lal ‘Laddie’Roy,DFC (posthumous) flew with the Royal FlyingCorps in World War One.Like a meteor,he achieved briefbutblazing glory while flying aSE5a with 40 Squadron in France,scoring 10 victories (2 shared) in only fourteen days beforebeing shot down and killed in 1918. He had not turned twenty.This schoolboy-turned-warrior hero lies buried atEstevelles Communal Cemetery in the Pas- de-Calais ofFrance,far from the city where he was born.He has a road named after him at Calcutta, and in 1998, eighty years after his death, the Indian Post and Telegraphs Departmentissued a Rs 3.00 stamp bearing his likeness and thatofthe SE5a.Eight years later, Somnath Sapru redeemed the honor of India by publishing the first full-length biography of Roy in his Skyhawks (Writer’s Workshop, Calcutta, 2006), a valuable pioneering study of Indian pilots who fought in the First World War with the Royal Flying Corps.

The other man,Maurice Pring,was notborn here,butachieved his renown in the darkness of Calcutta's nightskies,and methis tragic end in the blaze ofnoon in the same skies while defending the city.Ithink thatentitles Calcutta to claim him as her own – butshe has forgotten him. Sic transitgloria mundi .

------------------------------------------

Although surviving Hurricanes of176 were refitted with AIsets,Air Command South EastAsia (ACSEA) musthave belatedly realized the whole thing was a blunder,and within a month the Calcutta Hurricanes were gone. Beaufighters replaced them, and the Hurricane pilots retrained to fly Beaus.(11)(14)(18)

IJAAFair strength in Burma declined sharply as two bomber and three fighter units were transferred outin January 1944:the remaining bomber strength (15 lightbombers and 9Sally heavy bombers) was insufficientfor continuing a strategic air offensive,and raids onCalcutta died away.(7)(9)(14)(30)

ACSEA decided on a policy ofrationalisation to utilise scarce repair/maintenance resourcesfor currenthigh-performance aircraft.The policy adopted for the Hurricane IIC was ' to strikeoffany aircraftwhich are uneconomical to repair and ensure rapid turnover to preventdeterioration in storage'.Itwas the end ofthe road for the Calcutta Hurricanes.(47)

HV709,HV710,and HW435 had been destroyed and HV979 written offon 5 December1943.HW432 stalled and crashed on Christmas Day,1943 just after taking off fromChittagong.HW426 and HW485 were struck offcharge on 31 March 1944,HW415 on 5October 1944,and HW541,KX359,KX754 and KX764 on 14 October 1944.(18)(21)

Thus ended the brief,tragic history ofthe Hurricane II C(NF) – a technology demonstrator needlessly builtdespite unresolved doubts aboutit's combatcapability;hurriedly exiled to a distanttheater like an embarrassmentcovered up;unnecessarily deployed on active duty in preference to better,proven aircraft;and suddenly thrustinto a combatsituation neither itnor it's pilots were meantto face.Icannotreadily remember another such unfortunate aircraft.

48

Pring’s headstone at Bhowanipore Cemetery, Calcutta

49

APPENDIX 1

RAFROLLOF HONOUR,CALCUTTA RAID,5TH DECEMBER 1943

NAME BOND,

P/OAubrey Fraser

BROWN,

Flt. Lt.Arthur

HALBEARD,

Flt.Lt. Geoffrey Reeve

PRING,

F/OArthur Maurice Owers

AGE(DATE

OFBIRTH)22 (20 Aug 1921) 27 21 22 (1 Nov 1921)

SERVICENO. RCAF RAFVR RAF RAFVR

J/19439 102062 102540 143237

COUNTRY Canada U.K. U.K. U.K.

UNIT 67 Sqn. 258 Sqn. 176 Sqn. 176 Sqn.

RELATIONS Son of

Owen and

Florence

Brown of

St. John's,

Newfoundland

S/o Richard

Howard and and

Edith

Muriel Halbeard

ofWolverhampton

S/o Arthur Benjamin

and Doris Lilian

Pring (nee Garrett)

of Berkhamsted, Herts.

BURIAL/

COMME-MORATION

PlotO, Row D,

Grave 19,

CWGC

Column 423,

Singapore

War Memorial,

Column 423,

Singapore

War Memorial,

Plot L,

Grave 119,

CWGC

Bhowanipore

Cemetery,

Calcutta

Kranji War

Cemetery

Kranji War

Cemetery

Bhowanipore

Cemetery,

Calcutta

NOTE: One more pilot was lost on this day,F/O Ganasundaram Daniel ofNo. 6 Sqn.,Indian Air Force, missing in

Hurricane II BHV436 on a Tac Recce sortie. His name appears on column 431 of the Singapore Memorial.

50

APPENDIX 2

JAPANESERAIDS ON CALCUTTA

Japanese Army doctrine saw the air arm as an adjunctto the Army,a tactical force meantto carry outoperations to help attain Army goals.The Japanese had gone over to the defensive in Burma after April 1942,so the Burma Area Army (BAA) did notencourage the Fifth Air Division (5AD),the apex IJAAFformation in Burma,to undertake a strategic bombing campaign againstIndia.Then why did they begin bombing Calcutta in December 1942?

Ithink the answer lies in the British offensive in the Arakan launched on December 17,1942. BAA could see thatan increasing flow ofwar materiel was coming through Calcutta.The city also contained many military headquarters.This convinced BAA to allow 5AD to mounta series oflightraids on Calcutta to disruptthe British build-up and strike a blow atmorale (Indian supportfor the war was ata low ebb – the QuitIndia movementhad started in August 1942).By my count,there were seven nightraids in this period,as tabulated below:

Date Enemy aircraft Result etc. Reference20/21 Dec 8 Type 97 Budge Budge oil tanks seton fire Royal Air Force 1939-1945,1942 Ki-21 II'Sally' Massive exodus ofpeople [1.5 million?] Vol.III,p.297

21/22.12.42 2 (Sally?) Only slightdamage Indian Affairs Vols.1 – 5

22/23.12.42 3 Sallys Two Sallys damaged.[Aggt.casualties Indian Affairs Vols.1 - 5 in first3 raids :23 killed,<100 injured.]

24/25.12.42 8 Sallys Some bombs on Central Calcutta ObitofG/CptJ.A.O'Neill in(10?) caused 12+fatalities.W/C O'Neill The Telegraph(UK),15.6.2008

shotdown 1 Sally Also A.P.Hansen quoted in'Bombs on Calcutta' website.

27/28.12.42* 'Afew' (2?) 'Small fires started ' N.Y.Times 28.12.42 (Sallys?)

15/16.1.43 3 Sallys 'Little damage and few casualties.' Niagara Falls Gazette (NY), British communique claimed raid was 16.1.1943in retaliation for bombing raids onAkyab.All shotdown by Pring /Phillips c.70 miles E.ofCal after bombing

19/20.1.43 3 Ki-48 1 shotdown by Crombie/Moss NEof Air War for Burma by'Lily' Budge Budge (original claim 2+1 prob.) Christopher Shores

* Royal Air Force 1939-1945,Vol.III,p.297 gives the aggregate upto end December 1942 as 'twenty three sorties on five occasions';this would mean 8 on 24/25th,and 2 each on 21/22nd and 27/28th.

Raiding resumed on 5th December 1943,although planning had begun earlier,inOctober. The reason was the same – to impede the Allied buildup for the forthcomingmulti-pronged offensive in Burma and create alarm and despondency among thecitizenry. The British Second Arakan offensive had already begun on 30 th November 1943.

The lastraid on Calcutta was on 24/25 December,1944 by a few Sallys,one ofwhichwas damaged by a Beaufighter from 89 Squadron atBaigachi flown by F/Os Devine andCurtis. (11)(33)

The Sallys the IJAAFwere using were able to carry a maximum bombload ofaround1000 kilos.The Japanese Army never developed very heavy bombs – the heaviestwere500kg. Other HEbombs ranged between 50 to 250 kg,and incendiaries between 15 and50 kg.It appears thatthe bombloads during the above raids were a mix oflight1kg anti-personnel bombs,incendiaries and lighter HEtypes.The Howrah Bridge,CentralCalcutta and the docks were supposed to be favourite aiming points.

Japanese bomb kept at Calcutta Police Museum(From The Hindu)

Iwould like to end with an amusing anecdote from the Canadian radar technician Angus Hamilton,who atthe time (December 1942) was living and working atLa Martiniere school in Calcutta with a nameless radar repair and maintenance unitthatlater became No.3 RIMU:

….One nighta friend and Iwere having dinner atFirpo's when the sirens went.The waiters all disappeared. After waiting for sometime we left,too.Iheard stories ofcustomers taking over the bar and giving outfree drinks,butIwasn'ta recipientandcould never confirm the story.(11)

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NOTES ON SOURCES

1.Bombs on Calcutta,gypsyscholar.com/31618historiceventsjapbombst.html2.The Royal Air Force 1939-1945,Volume III by Hilary St.George Saunders [HMSO1954], p..297/p.313 etc.3.Obituary notice of Group Captain Tony O'Neill in The Telegraph (UK),15 June 20084.(a) Australia in the War of1939-1945 ,Series 3,Vol.IIby George Odgers [Reprint1968], Chapters 16 and 25,for details aboutRed Road airstrip,Charles Crombie etc.(b) Wikipedia entry on Charles Crombie (c) Obituary ofGp.CaptFrank Carey in The Telegraph (UK) of 9 Dec. 2004 mentions Carey using Firpo's (a very posh restaurant)as 'Ready Room' for Red Road strip.5. The Royal Air Force 1939-1945,Volume II by Denis Richards and Hilary St.George Saunders [HMSO1954],p.69-70/p.746.History of139 'Jamaica'Squadron in www.historyofwar.org for location ofsquadron at Chittagong. New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force,Vol.III ,by Wg.Cdr.H.L.Thompson states in Part2,page 281 thatthe Hudsons were based atCuttack.7.27 Squadron and 176 Squadron histories at (a) Air ofAuthority,www.rafweb.org (b) Royal Air Force Air Historical Branch (c) History ofWar website.Also (d) 264 Squadronhistory in 264squadron.co.uk/history/. 8.(a)Summary of TFU activity and TFU 30 file photos/diagrams from Mike Dean. (b)The Life and Times ofA.D.Blumlein by Russell Burns [Inst.ofEngg andTech.,1999].9.(a) Beaufighter Aces ofWorld War 2 by Andrew Thomas [Osprey Aircraftofthe Aces 65,2005](b) Selected pages from the Operations Record Book of 176 Sqn received from Mike Dean.10.Biographical details aboutPring are mainly from personal communications fromMrs. Jenny Sherwood ofBerkhamsted.Some additional details are from (a)Commonwealth War Graves Commission certificate about Pring, and (b) item about Pring in Niagara Falls Gazette ,Niagara Falls,NY,USAof16 th January 1943.Thelatter contains the official communique issued after Pring's victories on 15th January.11.(a) Canadians on Radar in South EastAsia 1941-1945 by Angus Hamilton in www.rquirk.com/cdnradar/cdnseacradar.htm.a lso has excerpts from The History of89Squadron RFC/RAF,ed.Joe Warne [89 Squadron Re-union Club,1989].(b) GCI Deganga[AMES 851] activity summary and selected pages from ORB of GCI Jaynagar [AMES 844] from Mike Dean.(d)Reminiscences ofAngus Hamilton and Ed Morgan personally communicated to me.12.Article on Pring in www.en.valka.cz under the Personalities section.13. Strangers in the Sky by Carl Morgan,Forces Publishing Service,UK,1995. Morgan's reminiscences are inaccurate attimes butnevertheless extremely valuable.14.Pers. comm.from Andrew Thomas regarding Pring's victories,serial nos. andsquadron letters ofHurricanes thatwentup on 5 th December 1943 etc.Also his article on176 Squadron India's NightGuardians [ Aviation News,30 October-12 November 1987.]

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15.Pring's DFM award gazetted in page 814 ofthe Supplementto the London Gazette of16th February 1943.His promotion to PilotOfficer gazetted in page 2203,Supplementto the London Gazette of18 th May 1943.Pring's promotion to Flying Officer published inLondon Gazette, 31st

t

August 1943,Second Supplement,page 4.

16. Despatch regarding Operations in India Command, 1 st Jan.- 20th June 1943 by FM Wavell, printed in the Supplement to the London Gazette, 20 April 1948. Also Air Operations in South East Asia, 16 th November 1943 to 31 st May 1944 , in Third Supplement to the London Gazette of 15th March 1951,issued on 19th March 1951.

17.Dix Noonan Webb auction notice with notes on Pring and archived sale price.18.Copy ofFlt.Lt.Derek Brocklehurst's log showing aircraftof176 Squadron flown by him received from Andrew Thomas.19.Sgt.James Denny,pilot,in pp.19-20, Silently into the midstofthings:177 Squadron Royal Air Force in Burma by A.Sutherland Brown [Trafford Publishing,2001].Also entryon Sgt. I.A.W. Gilmore in No.211 Squadron RAF www.users.cyberone.com.au/clardo/index.html20.Technical details of AIMark 6 equipped Hurricane IIC no.BN288 are from National Archives file no.AVIA7/2676,given by Ken Annettaka Waldo.Pepper in various postson the net[e.g.'12'O'Clock High' website (forum.12oclockhigh.net),AviationBanter.com website,'Waldo.Pepper Radar Pages'blog].Summary ofcontents ofKew archives fileno.AIR20/5230 received by him from Ian White sentby Ken to me as personal communication.21.Information aboutHurricane IIC(NF) aircraftserials mainly from Malcolm Barrasswith some inputs from Darryl Gibbs.Use ofaircraftfor convoy patrol by 245 from MalcolmBarrass.22. The EF50,the tube thathelped win the War by Ronald Dekker in www.dos4ever.com, and Introductory Survey ofRadar,PartII [AIR Publication 1093D, AirMinistry,June 1946, reprinted October 1947].23. Air Interception Radar in World War II Night Fighter Aircraft by Horace R. ‘Red’ Macaulay.24.Air War for Burma by Christopher Shores,Grub Street,London,2005

25. Brocklehurst's recollections of 5 th December 1943 from (a) notes made byAndrew Thomas and sentto me as a personal communication (b) Air Enthusiast,Issues 121-126 [PilotPress,2006].26.Entry aboutFirstLt. Tameyoshi Kuroki of33 Sentai IJAAFin the section 'BiplaneFighter Aces :Japan' of Hakan's Aviation Page website.I have taken raid strength and Japanese claim figures from here.Hakan's mentions Hiroshi Okano served in the 331 st

Kokutai.27. Spitfire Aces ofBurma and the Pacific by Andrew Thomas [Osprey AircraftoftheAces no.87,2009]28. New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force,Vol.III by W/C H.L.Thompson,Part2,p.311

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29. 176 Squadron RAFNightfighters by Peter Lee in BBC Series WW2 People's War –Article ID A2740394.30. China-Burma-India :Stilwell's Command Problems by Charles F.Romanus andRiley Sunderland [US Govt.Printing Office,1956],pages 84-85.31.Commonwealth War Graves Commission certificates about P/OA.F.Bond,Flt.Lt.Arthur Brown,Flt.Lt.G.R.Halbeard and F/OA.M.O.Pring and pers.comm.from CWGC and Geoffrey Negus.Library and Archives Canada for age ofP/OBond (not availablewith CWGC).

32. Leslie Chippett's memories are from My Dad's Memories of67 Squadron on theArakan Peninsula by Andy C,Article ID A4040506 in BBC WW2 People's War.

33.Second World War Timeline in New Zealand History Online, www.nzhistory.net,nzgives date oflastair-raid on Calcutta as 24 th December 1944.34. Rise from the East:The story ofNo.247 (China British) Squadron Royal AirForce by David John Marchant[Air-Britain (Historians) Ltd.,1996]35.The RAF Heraldry Trust – An Update August 1998 in www.griffon.clara.net/rafh/press1.htm36.The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette ofDecember 7,1943 quotes the official casualty figure. The Pacific War Day by Day by John Davison,p.90 gives the figure of350 dead.Encounter,Vol.8,1957 says 'nearly a thousand dock-workers'.37. Sadaaki Akamatsu's claim appears in Henry Sakaida's Imperial Japanese NavyAces 1939-1945 [Osprey Aircraftofthe Aces 22].His fighter hours are given as 8000 inwww.PacificWrecks.com review ofSakaida's book and 6000 elsewhere.The entry on Sadaaki Akamatsu in the French site www.cieldegloire.com is the mostcomprehensive ofall.38. Wings ofthe Phoenix [HMSO1949],p.43 mentions 'fancy flying'and 'aerobatics'by the Japanese over Calcutta39.Entry on14 th Sentai and information about705 th Kokutai in www.PacificWrecks.com.40. Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II by Ikuhiko Hata andYasuko Izawa [Naval Institute Press,1989]41.Turbinlite information: only kill from www.kenthistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=9533.0; Turbinlite glare blinding Hurricanepilots from disc.yourwebapps.com/discussion.cgi?disc=244414;article=43; Germans shooting at the light and total losses suffered from jedburgh.wordpress.com/2010/02/16/turbinlite , joebaugher.com/usattack/a20-24.html ,battleofbritain.devhub.com/blog/434910-turbinlite/etc.42. AlbertCorston's recollection appear in the chapter 'Hail the Chief'ofCorston Family History, www.corstonfamily.org.Also in For your tomorrow : Canadians in the Burma Campaign,1941- 1945 by RobertFarquharson [Trafford,2004]43. The War AgainstJapan ,Vol.IIIby S.W.Kirby,page 120 ff.,p.260 etc.[HMSO,1969]

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44.The Forgotten Air Force:the Royal Air Force in the War againstJapan,1941-1945 by Henry Probert[Brassey's,1995]45.History of No. 3 PRU (Calcutta) inwww.airrecce.co.uk/WW2/units/RAF_Sqn2.html46.For effectofraid on dock labour (a) Ways ofwar and the American experience inthe China-Burma-India theater, 1942-1945 by James M. Erhman, Kansas State University [Kansas State University,2006](b) Military Review,Vol.25,p.93 [US.Army Command and General StaffCollege,1945]47. Hurricane R4118 by Peter Vacher [Grub Street,2005]

48.Memories ofF/OT.C.Parker in www.bbm.org.uk,the Battle ofBritain Memorial website49.History of 152(Hyderabad) Squadron in the Squadron website www.152hyderabad.co.uk.50. (a) Operations Record Book of HQ 221 Group RAF, Calcutta for 5 th December 1943 from file AIR 25-909 (b) OPSUM No. 5 for 5 th Dec. 1943 from 221 Group to SEAC and 3 instalments and additions thereto (c)Sketch map entitled ESSENTIAL OF ATTACK ON CALCUTTA HARBOR AND AIRFIELDS FROM WHICH PLANES TOOK OFF, Appended Map no. 28, file MFQ 1- 1411 (all items courtesy Mike Dean).

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A F T E R W O R D 2 0 1 6

When it came out in 2011, this essay met with approval from the cognoscenti, and I had the pleasure of writing a piece on Pring for his alma mater Berkhamsted School,and another one for a periodical called Your Berkhamsted.

As an offshoot of this essay, I wrote another demonstrating conclusively that the ill-fated Calcutta Hurricane did have one claim to aeronautical fame : it was the first single-seater radar-equipped night-fighter in the world. That also evoked a fairly positive response.

Unfortunately I failed in my endeavour to get a Calcutta newspaper or periodical to print a piece on Pring to make the people of Calcutta and Bengal aware of him. Perhaps it is just as well.

JOYDEEP SIRCARSiliguri,24 September 2016

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