- 1 -

CHY4U The West & the World Seminar Readings Package Table of Contents

1. Niccolo Machiavelli The Prince Secondary Reading 2

Primary Source 5

2. Francis Bacon: Novum Organum Secondary Reading 12 Primary Source 14

3. Rene Descartes: Discourse on Method Secondary Reading 20 Primary Source 24

4. Thomas Hobbes: Levithan Secondary Reading 29 Primary Source 31

5. John Locke: Two Treatises of Government Secondary Reading 35 Primary Source 37

6. Adam Smith: The Wealth of Nations Secondary Reading 41 Primary Source 43

7. Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws Secondary Reading 47 Primary Source 49

8. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract Secondary Reading 53 Primary Source 56

9. Edmund Burke: Reflections on the Revolution in France Secondary Reading 62 Primary Source 64

10. Thomas Paine: Rights of Man Secondary Reading 70 Primary Source 73

11. Mary Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Women Secondary Reading 80 Primary Source 82

12. Thomas Malthus: Essay on Population Secondary Reading 86 Primary Source 89

13. Karl Marx: Communist Manifesto Secondary Reading 92 Primary Source 95

14. Charles Darwin: Origin of the Species Secondary Reading 106 Primary Source 109

15. Fredrich Nietzche: Beyond Good and Evil Secondary Reading 117 Primary Source 120

- 2 -

CHY4U The West & the World Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Nicollo Machiavellis The Prince

Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements: Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings

Inferences (reading between the lines) Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that

you already know something about). Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Niccolo Machiavelli

Among the most original thinkers of the Renaissance is a brilliant

and slightly tragic figure, Niccol Machiavelli (1469-1527). Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, his name would be synonymous with deviousness, cruelty, and willfully destructive rationality; no thinker was every so demonized or misunderstood than Machiavelli. The source of this misunderstanding is his most influential and widely read treatise on government, The Prince, a remarkably short book that attempts to lay out methods to secure and maintain political power.

His life spanned the greatest period of cultural achievement in Florence to its ultimate downfall. This period was marked by political instability, fear, invasion, intrigue, and high cultural achievement as the tiny states of Italy, including the Papal States, were pulled into the politics and wars of Europe by the immense gravity of two large states, Spain and France. His life began at the very start of this process: in 1469, when Ferdinand and Isabella married and through this marriage created a new, large kingdom of Spain composed of Castile and Aragon, Machiavelli was born to a wealthy Florentine lawyer. In his lifetime, he would see the efflorescence of Florentine culture and political power under the brilliant political genius of Lorenzo de'Medici. He would also see the twilight of the Medici power as Lorenzo's son and successor, Piero de'Medici, was thrown from power by the Dominican monk, Savonarola, who set up a true Florentine Republic. When Savonarola, fanatic about reform, was himself thrown from power and burned, a second Republic was set up under Soderini in 1498. Machiavelli was the secretary of this new Republic, an important and distinguished position. The Republic, however, was crushed in 1512 by the Spanish who installed the Medici's as rulers of Florence once again.

It seems that Machiavelli really had no political commitments or political stripe: he seems to have been on nobody's side politically. For when the Medici came to power, he began to work overtime to get in good with them. It seems that either he was ruthlessly ambitious or believed in serving in government no matter what political group or party was in charge. The Medici, however, never fully trusted him since he had been an important official in the Republic. They imprisoned and tortured him in 1513 and eventually banished him to his country estate at San Casciano (all this torture and imprisonment, however, didn't stop him from trying to get in good with the Medicis). It was during his exile in San Casciano,

Annotations

- 3 -

when he was desparate to get back into government, that he wrote his principle works: the Discourse on Livy , The Prince , The History of Florence , and two plays. Many of these works, such as The Prince , were written for the express purpose of getting a job in the Medici government.

The tremendous innovation of both the Discourses on Livy and The Prince was Machiavelli's uncoupling of political theory from ethics. Throughout the Western tradition, as in the Chinese tradition, political theory and policy was closely linked to ethics. Aristotle summed up this connection when he defined politics as merely an extension of ethics. Throughout the Western tradition, then, politics had been understood in terms of right and wrong, just and unjust, temperate and intemperate, and so on. The moral terms used to evaluate human actions were employed to evaluate political actions Machiavelli was the first to discuss politics and social phenomena in their own terms without recourse to ethics or jurisprudence. In many ways you could consider Machiavelli to be the first major Western thinker to apply the strictly scientific method of Aristotle and Averroes to politics. He did so by observing the phenomena of politics, reading all that's been written on the subject, and describing political systems in their own terms. For Machiavelli, politics was about one and only one thing: getting and keeping power or authority. Everything elsereligion, morality, etcthat people associate with politics has nothing to do with this fundamental aspect of politicsunles being moral helps one get and keep power. The only skill that counts in getting and maintaining power is calculation; the successful politician knows what to do or what to say for every situation. With this insight, Machiavelli in The Prince simply describes the means by which individuals have tried to seize and to maintain power. Most of the examples he gives are failures; the entire book is suffused with tragedy for at any moment, if the ruler makes one miscalculation, all the authority he has so assiduously cultivated will dry up like the morning dew. The social and political world of the The Prince is monstrously unpredictable and volatile; only the most superhuman calculative mind can overcome this social and political volatility. Throughout The Prince and the Discourses , it's clear that Machiavelli has praise only for the winners. For this reason, he admires figures such as Alexander VI and Julius II, universally hated throughout Europe as ungodly popes, for thei astonishing military and political success. His refusal to allow ethical judgements enter into political theory branded him throughout the Renaissance as a kind of anti-Christ. In chapters such as "Whether a Prince Should Be True to his Word," Machiavelli argues that any moral judgment should be secondary to getting, increasing and maintaining power. The answer to the above question, for instance, is "it's good to be true to your word, but you should lie whenever it advances your power or securitynot only that, it's necessary."

- 4 -

It might help to understand Machiavelli to imagine that he's not talking about the state so much in ethical terms but in medical terms. For Machiavelli believed that the Italian situation was desparate and that the Florentine state was in grave danger. Rather than approach the question from an ethical point of view, Machiavelli was genuinely concerned with healing the state to make it stronger. For instance, in talking about seditious points of view, Machiavelli doesn't make an ethical argument, but rather a medical one"seditious people should be amputated before they infect the whole state." The single most articulated value in the work of Machiavelli is virt (Latin virtus), which is related to our word, "virtue." Machiavelli means it more in its Latin sense of "manly," but individuals with virt are primarily marked by their ability to enforce their will on volatile social situations. They do this through a combination of strong will, strength, and brilliant and strategic calculation. In one of the most famous passages from The Prince , Machiavelli describes the proper orientation towards the volatility of the world, or Fortune, by comparing Fortune to a lady: "la fortuna donna," or "Fortune is a Lady." Machiavelli is referring to the courtly love tradition, where the lady that constitutes the object of desire is approached and entreated and begged. The ideal Prince, however, for Machiavelli does not entreat or beg Lady Fortune, but rather physically grabs her and takes whatever he wants. This was a scandalous passage and still is today, but it represents a powerful translation of the Renaissance idea of human potential to the area of politics. For if, according to Pico della Mirandola, a human being can self-transform into anything it wants, then it must be possible for a single, strong-willed individual to order the chaos of political life.

Despite his hopes that the Medicis might prove to be those ideal rulers that could unite Italy, they did not remain in power for long. When Guilio de'Medici left Firenze to become Pope Clement VII, the subalterns that he left in charge of the city managed it very poorly. The people soon overthrew the Medici rule and established the Third Republic of Firenze in 1527. Machiavelli saw his chance and tried to get a position in the new republic, but the new rulers distrusted him because of his long association with the Medici. So on June 22, 1527, only a few months after the establishment of the Third Republic, Machiavelli died. That same year, Rome was sacked by Emperor Charles VII and the pope was forced to ally with Charles. In 1530, the pope and Charles led a punitive expedition against Firenze and crushed it as an independent state. Three years after the death of Machiavelli and two years before the publication of The Prince , , the state that Machiavelli worked so hard to help and believed so much in blinked out of existence.

Text Citation: Hooker, Richard. Niccolo Machiavelli World Civilizations, Washington State University, originally published at: http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/REN/REN.HTM, 1996.

- 5 -

CHY4U The West & the World Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Nicollo Machiavellis The Prince

Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements: Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings

Inferences (reading between the lines) Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that

you already know something about). Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Those who want to gain a prince's favour usually offer him those

things they value most or that they think he likes best. So we often see people giving him horses, armour, cloth of gold, gems, and similar ornaments suitable to their position. Wishing to offer Your Magnificence something on my behalf as evidence of my devotion, I find nothing in my possessions I value higher than the knowledge of the actions of great men, which have gained from long experience of the affairs today and from constant study of the past. I have carefully examined and thought about these matters for a long time, and now I have written it all down in a small volume, which I send to Your Magnificence.

Although I judge this book unworthy for you to receive, I am confident that you will generously accept it, especially when you recall that I can give no greater gift than to help you understand in a very short time what it has taken me many years and many dangers and much discomfort to learn.

A prince, first of all, should have no other object or thought in mind than war and how to wage it. He must not take up anything else to be skilful in, for war is the only art essential to those who govern. It is, moreover, of such great value that it not only keeps in power those who have been born rulers, but often helps men of humble origin to rise to high rank. On the other hand, when princes turn their attention more to luxuries than to war, they lose their power. The chief cause of losing power is neglect of the art of war; the chief means of acquiring power is skill in the art of war.

We must now see what methods and rules a prince should use in dealing with his subjects and his friends. Because I know that many have written about this, I fear that my writing about it will be judged presumptuous, since I disagree in this matter completely with the opinions of others. But since I intend to write something useful to those who understand, it seems to me more practical to go directly to the actual truth of the matter than to speculate about it. Many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known really to exist. But there is such a difference between how we live and how we ought to live that he who turns away from what actually does occur for the sake of what ought to occur, does something that will ruin him rather than save him. For he who wants to be a good man all the time will be ruined among so many who are not good. It is therefore necessary for a prince who wants to survive to learn how not to be good and to use

Annotations

- 6 -

goodness, or not use it, according to what needs to be done.

Leaving aside, then, those matters which concern only an imaginary prince and talking about those things that are real, I say that all men, and especially princes because they are situated higher, exhibit certain qualities which bring them either blame or praise. Thus, one is termed liberal or generous, another miserly or stingy...one is thought unselfish, another greedy; one cruel, another compassionate; one unreliable, another trustworthy; one effeminate and cowardly, another fierce and courageous; one humane, another proud; one lascivious, another chaste; one frank, the other crafty; one harsh, the other easygoing, one serious, the other light-minded; one religious, the other an unbeliever; and so on.

I know that everyone will admit that it would be very fine for a prince to have all of the qualities mentioned above that are judged good. But because human nature will not allow it, they cannot all be possessed or maintained. It is necessary, therefore, that the prince be clever enough to know how to avoid a bad reputation for having those vices which might endanger his position, and if he can do so, he should also avoid those vices that are not dangerous to his position. But if he cannot do so, he can let them persist with less worry. He must not care if he gets a bad reputation on account of those vices without which he could not protect the state; because, all things considered, we find that some things which seem to be virtues would, if followed, lead to ruin, whereas something else which seems vicious will bring about security and well-being.

Beginning now with the first of the qualities mentioned above, I say that it would be well to be thought liberal or generous. Nevertheless, liberality used to such a degree that you are known for it, is harmful to you. If you practise it moderately, as one ought to, no one will know about it, and you will be blamed for the opposite vice. If, on the other hand, you want to gain a reputation for being liberal or generous, you must not omit any extravagance, to such an extent that a prince who does so will use up his resources. It will then become necessary at last, if he wants to keep on being known for his liberality, for him to tax his people heavily, to extort money from them, and do everything possible just to get money.

This will begin to make his subjects hate him, and when he becomes poor no one will think much of him. Thus, having harmed many and benefited few by his generosity, he will be subject to all kinds of hardships and all kinds of dangers. If he realizes this and wants to change his ways, he is immediately blamed for becoming stingy.

A prince, therefore, being unable to use this virtue of liberality or generosity to the point where it is recognized without harming himself, ought not, if he is wise, object to being termed stingy. For as time passes he will be termed more liberal when people see that because of his thriftiness his income is enough both to defend himself against those who make war against him and to begin his own enterprises without burdening the people. Such a prince is actually liberal to those from whom he takes nothing, who are numerous, and stingy to those to whom he does not

- 7 -

give, who are few.

In our times we have not seen any great achievements except the ones performed by those considered stingy. The others have failed. Pope Julius II, though he used his reputation for generosity to win the papacy, did not try to maintain it afterwards because he wanted to be able to wage war.The present king of France has made many wars without imposing heavy taxes on his people because the extra expenditures were paid for by his long-term economies.The present king of Spain, if he had continued being liberal, would not have begun or completed so many undertakings.

For these reasons a prince ought to care little about being thought stingy if he thereby avoids robbing his subjects and can still defend himself, and if he does not become poor and contemptible or is not forced to become greedy. For this vice of stinginess is one of those that will enable him to rule. If someone says that Caesar came to power by using liberality and many others attained high rank by being generous or being thought so, I reply that you are already a prince or you are on the way to becoming one. In the first case, this liberality is dangerous; in the second it is quite necessary to be considered generous. Caesar was one of those who wished to come to power in Rome. But if, after attaining power, he had lived and had not decreased his expenditures, he would have destroyed his authority. And if someone should reply that there have been many princes considered to be very generous and who have done great deeds with their armies, I say that either the prince spends his own money and his subjects' or someone else's. In the first case, he ought be careful; in the other case, he should not neglect in any way being very generous.

Generosity is necessary for the prince who marches with his army and lives on plunder, loot, and ransoms, and uses other people's wealth. Otherwise his soldiers would not follow him. You can be very generous with what does not belong to you or to your subjects, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander. To spend others' money does not harm your reputation but helps it. It is only spending your own money that hurts you. There is nothing that uses itself up like generosity. For while you use it, you lose the power to use it, and you become either poor and despised or, in order to escape poverty, you become greedy and hated. Above all, a prince must guard against being despised and hated, and generosity or liberality brings you to one or the other condition. However, it is wiser to be known as stingy, which brings you disgrace without hatred, than trying to be known as liberal, which necessarily makes you known as rapacious; having a reputation for that brings disgrace and hatred....

Proceeding to the other qualities mentioned before, I say that every prince ought to wish to be thought merciful and not cruel, but he ought to be careful not to misuse that mercy. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; nevertheless, his cruelty pacified the Romagna, united it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. If this is well thought through, it will be seen to have been more merciful than the people of Florence who, in order to avoid being called cruel, allowed Pistoia to be destroyed. Hence, a prince ought not to worry about a reputation for being cruel in order to keep his subjects unified and loyal, for with a very few examples

- 8 -

of cruelty he will prove more merciful than those who, because of too much leniency, allow disorder to erupt, whence arise murders and lootings. For these harm a whole community, whereas the executions ordered by the prince harm only individuals. And of all princes, it is impossible for a new one to avoid the reputation of being cruel because new states are full of dangers. Virgil says in Dido's words: "Harsh times and the newness of the state force me to do such things and to guard all my lands." Nevertheless, the prince should be cautious in judging and acting, but not timid. He should proceed in a temperate manner, with prudence and humanity, so that overconfidence does not make him careless, or excessive suspicions make him intolerable.

From this rises a question: Is it better to be loved than feared, or

the reverse? The answer is that the prince should be both feared and loved, if possible. But since it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to be given up. For it can be said of men in general that they are ungrateful, talkative, tricky and deceitful, eager to avoid dangers, anxious for gain. While you are doing them favours, they are all yours, offering you blood, possessions, life, and children, as I said before, when need for these is remote; but when you need them, they turn on you. And the prince who has trusted their words without making other preparations is ruined, for friendships gained by favours, and not by greatness and nobility, cannot be counted upon when needed. Men care less about offending someone who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared, because love is supported by a chain of obligation, which because of man's debased nature, is broken at every occasion for selfish profit; but fear, maintained by dread of punishment, never fails.

Nevertheless, the prince should make himself feared in such a

way that if he does not gain love, he at least avoids hatred. For to be feared and not to be hated go very well together. This can always be done if the prince refrains from taking the property and women of his subjects. And when indeed it is necessary to take someone's life, it should be when there is sufficient justification and obvious cause. But above all he should refrain from taking the property of others, for men forget the death of their father sooner than the loss of their property. Moreover, reasons for taking property are never lacking, and he who begins to live by extortion always finds reasons to take the goods of others, whereas reasons for taking life are fewer and less lasting.

I conclude, therefore, that as far as being feared or loved are

concerned, men love as they please but fear as the prince wills. A wise prince ought to rely on what is in his power and not in the power of others, only being careful to avoid being hated, as I have pointed out....

Everyone knows how praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his

word and to live honestly and not be deceitful. Nevertheless, experience shows that princes in our times who have done great things have cared little for honesty; they have known how to confuse men's minds with their cleverness and have finally defeated those who put their faith in honesty.

- 9 -

You ought to realize, therefore, that there are two ways of fighting: one according to laws, the other with force. The first is appropriate to men, the second to animals. But often the first is not enough, and it is necessary to turn to the second. Therefore, it is necessary for a prince to know very well the methods of both animal and man. This lesson was secretly taught by writers of antiquity, who tell how Achilles and many other princes of ancient times were given to the centaur Chiron, so that he could raise and teach them. Their having as tutor a creature half-animal and half-man indicates the need of a prince's knowing how to use the nature of both and that one cannot bring success without the other.

Therefore, since it is necessary for a prince to know well how to

act like an animal, he should choose the natures of the fox and the lion; for the lion cannot defend himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. A prince needs to be a fox to know about traps, and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who behave only like the lion do not understand this. Therefore, a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when to do so would be disadvantageous and when the reasons for making promises no longer exist. If all men were good, this precept would not be good. But since they are bad and would not keep their promises to you, it is not necessary for you to keep yours to them. A prince never lacks good reason to excuse his breaking his word. One could give innumerable modern examples of this and show how many peace treaties and promises have been broken ' and made ineffective by the untrustworthiness of princes. He who has best known how to act like a fox has succeeded best. But he who has this talent has to know how to keep it hidden and to pretend and deceive. Men are so simple and yield to the needs of the present so readily that he who deceives will always find those who let themselves be deceived.

I do not wish to remain silent about one recent example.

Alexander VI did nothing else but deceive men and thought of nothing else, yet he always found the opportunity to do so. There never was a man who had greater success in affirming something; and the more oaths he used in affirming it, the sooner he broke his promise. Nevertheless, his deceptions always succeeded in the way he wanted, for he knew the way of the world.

It is not necessary, then, for a prince to have the good qualities

mentioned above, but it is necessary to seem to have them. I would even say this: to have them and use them all the time is dangerous, but seeming to have them is useful. He should seem to be pious, faithful, humane, honest, religious, and to be so. But he should have his mind so prepared that when occasion requires, he is able to change to the opposite. And it must be understood that a prince, especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things for which men are considered good; it is often necessary to act contrary to faith, charity, humanity, and religion in order to maintain the state. It is therefore necessary for him to have the ability to change his mind according to the way the winds of fortune and conditions require. If possible, he ought not, as I have said before, turn away from what is good, but he should be able to do evil if necessary.

- 10 -

A prince should be very careful that nothing ever comes from his mouth that is not full of the aforementioned [good] qualities. Those who see and hear him should think him all compassion, all faith, all integrity, all humaneness, all religion. And nothing is more necessary to seem to have than the last quality. For people in general judge more with their eyes than with their minds. Everyone can see; few have understanding. Everyone sees what you seem to be; few know what you really are. And those few do not dare oppose the opinion of the many, who have the power of the state to support them. In the actions of individuals, especially princes, when there is no judge to appeal to, people look at the results. A prince only has to conquer and maintain the state. His means will always be considered honourable, and everyone will praise them because the common crowd is always deceived by appearances and by the way things turn out. In the world the crowd is everything. The few are isolated when the crowd is in control. A certain prince of the present time, whom it would be well not to mention by name, always preaches peace and fidelity but is actually a great enemy of both. Either of these qualities, had he followed them, would often have taken from him his reputation or his state....

Since I have spoken of the most important of the qualities

mentioned above, I want to discuss the others briefly, with this generalization: the prince should pay attention, as has been said before, to avoiding those things which make him hated and despised. As long as he succeeds in this, he will have done his part and will not find danger in other vices. Hatred, as I have said, comes from being greedy and seizing his subjects' property and women. He must refrain from doing these things. For most men live contentedly as long as they are not deprived of their property or honour. Then he has to contend only with the ambition of a few, which he can easily control in many ways. He is judged contemptible if he is thought changeable, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, and irresolute. A prince ought to guard against these as from a dangerous reef. He must try to show by his actions his greatness, spirit, seriousness, and bravery. In governing the affairs of his subjects, he must make his decisions irrevocable. He ought to maintain such a reputation that no one would think of deceiving or cheating him.

The prince who earns such an opinion for himself has a great

reputation. If a prince has a great reputation, it is difficult to plot against him or to attack him so long as he is thought to have great ability and the respect of his subjects. Therefore, a prince must fear two things: one from inside his state because of his subjects, the other from outside because of foreign enemies. He can defend himself from the latter with good weapons and good friends, and he will always have good friends if he has good arms. Conditions inside the state will remain quiet when conditions outside are quiet, unless they are already stirred up by a conspiracy. When attacked from outside, if he has ruled and lived as I have said, and if he stands firm, he will repel all attacks as the Spartan Nabis did. But concerning his subjects when external matters are stable, he still has to be wary of their plots. The prince can be quite safe from these if he avoids being hated and if he keeps the people satisfied, which will of course happen as I have already explained.

- 11 -

One of the most effective safeguards a prince can have against conspiracies is not being hated by the people, for every conspirator believes that he will please the people by killing the prince. But if he thinks he will offend them by doing so, he does not dare to carry out the action because the difficulties encountered by conspirators are very many. Experience shows that there have been many conspiracies, and few have turned out well because a conspirator cannot act alone. He can get companions only from among those who, he thinks, are discontented. And just as soon as you have revealed your plot to a malcontent, you give him the means to be contented.... He sees on the one hand certain gain and on the other an uncertain prospect full of danger. He would have to be a rare friend to you or a fierce enemy of the prince to keep his word to you.

To put the matter briefly, I say that a conspirator can know

nothing but anxiety, jealousy, and fear of punishment, which terrifies him. But on the prince's side there are the prestige of his office, the laws, and the power of his friends and the state that defend him. When the good will of the people is added to all of these, it is impossible that anyone would be so foolhardy as to conspire. Whereas a conspirator usually has to be afraid before committing the act, in this case he also has to be afraid afterwards, for he will have the people for his enemy too, and he will have no hope of any escape.

- 12 -

CHY4U The West & the World Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Francis Bacons Novum Organum

Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements: Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings

Inferences (reading between the lines) Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that

you already know something about). Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Francis Bacon as an influence on the Enlightenment

From: Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. Francis Bacon, son of the lord keeper of the great seal of England, Sir Nicholas Bacon, attended Trinity College at Cambridge University and entered the legal profession in 1582. His contacts with the English court brought him knighthood in 1603 (with the accession of James I) and the post of lord chancellor of England in 1618. In 1621, however, Bacon lost the chancellorship after being convicted of bribery. He retired to his estate near Saint Albans and devoted himself to studying the philosophy of science. Although Bacon's life preceded the onset of the Enlightenment by nearly a century, his writings nevertheless served as one of its primary intellectual sources. In the spirit of many figures of the late Renaissance, Bacon envisioned a thoroughgoing reform of all human knowledge, based on a new scientific method. Bacon's method was that of philosophical induction. It involved the careful collection of observations (facts) from experience and experiment and their subsequent organization into a new system of knowledge. He equated the collection and description of observations from nature with natural history and called that discipline the "great root and mother" of all scientific endeavor. The new system of knowledge would include not only the abstract disciplines such as philosophy and mathematics but also the trades and crafts. A group of intellectuals working together (collaborating) at their task would create the new system. Once elaborated, the new system of knowledge would be used to solve practical problems in human life. Knowledge, then, would acquire a certain utility (usefulness) for human society, would serve the cause of progress, and would play a central role in creating a human utopia, Bacon's New Atlantis. Bacon's method stood in stark opposition to the deductive method in philosophy. Deduction began not with observations (facts) but with a single philosophical principle or axiom. From that principle it created a whole system of knowledge by applying the rules of logic. Deduction had produced the great medieval systems of Scholastic philosophy, and in a revised form, it would create the geometric method and mechanical philosophy of Ren Descartes.

Annotations

- 13 -

Bacon outlined his method and program in several works, the most significant of which were: Novum organum (New instrument; 1620), part one of the projected Great Instauration; De augmentis scientiarum (On the advancement of learning; 1623), part two of the projected Great Instauration; The Advancement of Learning (1605), an early English version of De augmentis scientiarum; and New Atlantis (1627), the presentation of Bacon's utopian vision, published in English for the general reading public. Bacon's inductive method, and his conceptualization of science as a collaborative project based on inductive reasoning and aimed at achieving complete human knowledge inspired the work of 17th-century experimental scientists in England, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, and France. His vision of science received institutional form in the creation of the Royal Society of London. The society's founders consciously modeled their organization on Bacon's vision of collaborative, experimental science. Through the activities of the Royal Society and of scientists throughout Europe who were committed to experimental methods, the Baconian vision eventually entered into the discourse and vision of the Enlightenment. Voltaire, whose Lettres philosophiques (Philosophical letters) introduced the general French public to the experimental science of Newton and the sensation psychology of John Locke, included Bacon as one of the philosophers who had proved the necessity of experiment in attaining knowledge. Denis Diderot planned the Encyclopdie as a comprehensive presentation of human knowledge in the sciences, trades, crafts, and arts. He followed not only Bacon's general vision but also the specifics of his classification of human knowledge. In addition, Bacon's elevation of natural history to a primary role in creating comprehensive knowledge helped to stimulate the dramatic growth and intellectual development of that discipline. In short, the Enlightenment in some instances represented an attempt to bring Bacon's New Atlantis, that utopian human society built on knowledge, into actual existence. Text Citation: Reill, Peter Hanns, and Ellen Judy Wilson. "Francis Bacon as an influence on the Enlightenment." Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 14 -

CHY4U The West & the World Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Francis Bacons Novum Organum

Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements: Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings

Inferences (reading between the lines) Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that

you already know something about). Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was among the most important contributors to the development of the scientific method and rational thought. A politician and lawyer as well as a philosopher, Bacon took all knowledge as his province. In Novum Organum (1620), he attempted to develop a new method of philosophical and scientific inquiry that was certain and secure. Bacon's empiricism, an insistence on basing all thought on data derived from experience, became one of the marks of modern intellectual life. Bacon's Novum Organum, never completed, consisted of a series of aphorisms, brief statements about science and knowledge.

Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much and so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature. Beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything.

Neither the naked hand nor the understanding left to itself can effect much. It is by instruments and helps that the work is done, which are as much wanted for the understanding as for the hand. And as the instruments of the hand either give motion or guide it, so the instruments of the mind supply either suggestions for the understanding or cautions.

Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule...

The cause and root of nearly all evils in the sciences is thisthat while we falsely admire and extol the powers of the human mind we neglect to seek for its true helps.

The subtlety of nature is greater many times over than the subtlety of the senses and understanding; so that all those specious meditations, speculations and glosses in which men indulge are quite from the purpose, only there is no one by to observe it.

As the sciences which we now have do not help us in finding out new works, so neither does the logic which we now have help us in finding out new sciences.

Annotations

- 15 -

The logic now in use serves rather to fix and give stability to the errors which have their foundation in commonly received notions than to help the search after truth. So it does more harm than good. The syllogism is not applied to the first principles of sciences, and is applied in vain to intermediate axioms, being no match for the subtlety of nature. It commands assent therefore to the proposition, but does not take hold of the thing. -

The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, words are symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the matter) are confused and overhastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction.....

The discoveries which have hitherto been made in the sciences are such as lie close to vulgar notions, scarcely beneath the surface. In order to penetrate into the inner and further recesses of nature, it is necessary that both notions and axioms be derived from things by a more sure and guarded way, and that a method of intellectual operation be introduced altogether better and more certain.

There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried.

The understanding left to itself takes the same course (namely, the former) which it takes in accordance with logical order. For the mind-longs to spring up to positions of higher generality, that it may find rest there, and so after a little while wearies of experiment. But this evil is increased by logic, because of the order and solemnity of its disputations.

The understanding left to itself, in a sober, patient, and grave mind, especially if it be not hindered by received doctrines, tries a little that other way, which is the right one, but with little progress, since the understanding, unless directed and assisted, is a thing unequal, and quite unfit to contend with the obscurity of things.

Both ways set out from the senses and particulars, and rest in the highest generalities; but the difference between them is infinite. For the one just glances at experiment and particulars in passing, the other dwells duly and orderly among them... Bacon challenged old "Idols," which he believed inhibited the development of knowledge.

The idols and false notions which are now in possession of the human understanding, and have taken deep root therein, not only so beset men's minds that truth can hardly find entrance, but even after entrance is

- 16 -

obtained, they will again in thevery instauration of the sciences meet and trouble us, unless men being forewarned of the danger fortify themselves as far as may be against their assaults.

There are four classes of Idols which beset men's minds. To these for distinction's sake I have assigned names, calling the first class Idols of the Tribe; the second, Idols of the Cave; the third, Idols of the Market Place; the fourth, Idols of the Theater. The formation of ideas and axioms by true induction is no doubt the proper remedy to be applied for the keeping off and clearing away of idols. To point them out, however, is of great use; for the doctrine of Idols is to the interpretation of nature what the doctrine of the refutation of sophisms is to common logic.

The Idols of the Tribe have their foundation in human nature itself, and in the tribe or race of men. For it is a false assertion that the sense of man is the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions as well of the sense as of the mind are according to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe. And the human understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolors the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it.

The Idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For everyone (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts and discolors the light of nature, owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading of books, and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the differences of impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled; or the like. So that the spirit of man (according as it is meted out to different individuals) is in fact a thing variable and full of perturbation, and governed as it were by chance. Whence it was well observed by Heraclitus that men look for sciences in their own lesser worlds, and not in the greater or common world.

There are also Idols formed by the intercourse and association of men with each other, which I call Idols of the Market Place, on account of the commerce and consort of men there. For it is by discourse that men associate, and words are imposed according to the apprehension of the vulgar. Arid therefore the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding. Nor do the definitions or explanations wherewith in some things learned men are wont to guard and defend themselves, by any means set the matter right. But words plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies.

Lastly, there are Idols which have immigrated into men's minds from the various dogmas of philosophies, and also from wrong laws of demonstration. These I call Idols of the Theater, because in my judgment all the received systems are but so many stage plays, representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion. Nor is it only of the systems now in vogue, or only of the ancient sects and philosophies, that I speak; for many more plays of the same kind may yet be composed

- 17 -

and in like artificial manner set forth; seeing that errors the most widely different have nevertheless causes for the most part alike. Neither again do I mean this only of entire systems, but also of many principles and axioms in science, which by tradition, credulity, and negligence have come to be received... Included among the obstacles to scientific inquiry were superstition, religion, and despair.

Neither is it to be forgotten that in every age natural philosophy has had a troublesome and hard to deal with adversarynamely, superstition, and the blind and immoderate zeal of religion. For we see among the Greeks that those who first proposed to men's then uninitiated ears the natural causes for thunder and for stores were thereupon found guilty of impiety. Nor was much more forbearance shown by some of the ancient fathers of the Christian church to those who on most convincing grounds (such as no one in his senses would now think of contradicting) maintained that the earth was round, and of consequence asserted the existence of the antipodes.

Moreover, as things now are, to discourse of nature is made harder and more perilous by the summaries and systems of the schoolmen who, having reduced theology into regular order as well as they were able, and fashioned it into the shape of an art, ended in incorporating the contentious and thorny philosophy of Aristotle, more than was fit, with the body of religion.

To the same result, though in a different way, tend the speculations of those who have taken upon them to deduce the truth of the Christian religion from the principles of philosophers, and to confirm it by their authority, pompously solemnizing this union of the sense and faith as a lawful marriage, and entertaining men's minds with a pleasing variety of matter, but all-the while disparaging things divine by mingling them with things human. Now in such mixtures of theology with philosophy only the received doctrines of philosophy are included; while new ones, albeit changes for the better, are all but expelled and exterminated.

Lastly, you will find that by the simpleness of certain divines, access to any philosophy, however pure, is well-nigh closed. Some are weakly afraid lest a deeper search into nature should transgress the permitted limits of sober-mindedness, wrongfully wresting and transferring what is said in Holy Writ against those who pry into sacred mysteries, to the hidden things of nature, which are barred by no prohibition. Others with more subtlety surmise and reflect that if second causes are unknown everything can more readily be referred to the divine hand and rod, a point in which they think religion greatly concernedwhich is in fact nothing else but to seek to gratify God with a lie. Others fear from past example that movements and changes in philosophy will end in assaults on religion. And others again appear apprehensive that in the investigation of nature something may be found to subvert or at least shake the authority of religion, especially with the unlearned. But these two last fears seem to me to savor utterly of carnal wisdom; as if men in

- 18 -

the recesses and secret thought of their hearts doubted and distrusted the strength of religion and the empire of faith over the sense, and therefore feared that the investigation of truth in nature might be dangerous to them. But if the matter be truly considered, natural philosophy is, after the word of God, at once the surest medicine against superstition and the most approved nourishment for faith, and therefore she is rightly given to religion as her most faithful handmaid, since the one displays the will of God, the other his power. For he did not err who said, "Ye err in that ye know not the Scriptures and the power of God," thus coupling and blending in an indissoluble bond information concerning his will and meditation concerning his power. Meanwhile it is not surprising if the growth of natural philosophy is checked when religion, the thing which has most power over men's minds, has by the simpleness and incautious zeal of certain persons been drawn to take part against her.

Again, in the customs and institutions of schools, academies, colleges, and similar bodies destined for the abode of learned men and the cultivation of learning, everything is found adverse to the progress of science. For the lectures and exercises there are so ordered that to think or speculate on anything out of the common way can hardly occur to any man. And if one or two have the boldness to use any liberty of judgment, they must undertake the task all by themselves; they can have no advantage from the company of others. And if they can endure this also, they will find their industry and largeness of mind no slight hindrance to their fortune. For the studies of men in these places are confined and as it were imprisoned in the writings of certain authors, from whom if any man dissent he is straightway arraigned as a turbulent person and an innovator. But surely there is a great distinction between matters of state and the arts; for the danger from new motion and from new light is not the same. In matters of state a change even for the_ better is distrusted, because it unsettles what is established; these things rest on authority, consent, fame and opinion, not on demonstration. But arts and sciences should be like mines, where the noise of new works and further advances is heard on every side. But though the matter be so according to right reason, it is not so acted on in practice; and the points above mentioned in the administration and government of learning put a severe restraint upon the advancement of the sciences.

Nay, even if that jealousy were to cease, still it is enough to check the growth of science that efforts and labors in this field go unrewarded. For it does not rest with the same persons to cultivate sciences and to reward them. The growth of them comes from great wits; the prizes and rewards of them are in the hands of the people, or of great persons, who are but in very few cases even moderately learned. Moreover, this kind of progress is not only unrewarded with prizes and substantial benefits; it has not even the advantage of popular applause.. For it is a greater matter than the generality of men can take in, and is apt to be overwhelmed and extinguished by the gales of popular opinions. And it is nothing strange if a thing not held in honor does not prosper.

But by far the greatest obstacle to the progress of science and to the undertaking of new tasks and provinces therein is found in thisthat men despair and think things impossible. For wise and serious men are

- 19 -

wont in these matters to be altogether distrustful, considering with themselves the obscurity of nature, the shortness of life, the deceitfulness of the senses, the weakness of the judgment, the difficulty of experiment, and the like; and so supposing that in the revolution of time and of the ages of the world the sciences have their ebbs and flows; that at one season they grow and flourish, at another wither and decay, yet in such sort that when they have reached a certain point and condition they can advance no further. If therefore anyone believes or promises more, they think this comes of an ungoverned and unripened mind, and that such attempts have prosperous beginnings, become difficult as they go on, and end in confusion. Now since there are thoughts which naturally present themselves to men grave and of great judgment, we must take good heed that we be not led away by our love for a most fair and excellent object to relax or diminish the severity of our judgment. We must observe diligently what encouragement dawns upon us and from what quarter, and, putting aside the lighter breezes of hope, we must thoroughly sift and examine those which promise greater steadiness and constancy. Nay, and we must take state prudence too into our counsels, whose rule is to distrust, and to take the less favorable view of human affairs. I am now therefore to speak touching hope, especially as I am not a dealer in promises, and wish neither to force nor to ensnare men's judgments, but to lead them by the hand with their good will. And though the strongest means of inspiring hope will be to bring men to particulars, especially to particulars digested and arranged in my Tables of Discovery (the subject partly of the second, but much more of the fourth part of my Instauration), since this is not merely the promise of the thing but the thing itself; nevertheless, that everything may be done with gentleness, I will proceed with my plan of preparing men's minds, of which preparation to give hope is no unimportant part. For without it the rest tends rather to make men sad (by giving them a worse and meaner opinion of things as they are than they now have, and making them more fully to feel and know the unhappiness of their own condition) than to induce any alacrity or to whet their industry in making trial. And therefore it is fit that I publish and set forth those conjectures of mine which make hope in this matter reasonable, just as Columbus did, before that wonderful voyage of his across the Atlantic, when he gave the reasons for his conviction that new lands and continents might be discovered besides those which were known before; which reasons, though rejected at first, were afterwards made good by experience, and were the causes and beginnings of great events... Source: Francis Bacon, The New Organon and Related Writings, edited by Fulton Anderson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 39, 40-41, 42-43, 47-49, 87-91.

- 20 -

CHY4U The West & the World Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Rene Descartes Discourse on Method

Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements: Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings

Inferences (reading between the lines) Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that

you already know something about). Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Ren Descartes as an influence on the Enlightenment

From: Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. Born into the robe nobility (lawyers and officeholders), Descartes was the son of Olympe-Joachim Descartes and Jeanne Brochard. Descartes's middle name, Du Perron, comes from the estate of Du Perron ceded to him by his father. In 1606, Descartes entered the prestigious Collge La Flche, founded by the Jesuits at the request of King Henri IV. The college provided Descartes with an education steeped in mathematics, philosophy, physics, and Latin classics. After his graduation in 1612, Descartes spent a few months in Paris acquiring the social skills required of his status, then pursued a law degree at the University of Poitiers. In 1616, with law degree in hand, Descartes volunteered for military duty in the army of Prince Maurice of Nassau. He spent the winter of 161819 at the garrison in Breda, where he met the mathematician Isaac Beeckman. Under Beeckman's influence, Descartes began exploring mathematical problems, making his first discoveries in what would become analytical geometry. He also wrote a brief treatise on music theory, the Compendium Musicae (Compendium of music), published posthumously in 1650. The winter of 161920 found Descartes quartered near Ulm in southern Germany, having passed into the service of the elector of Bavaria. For four years, he would participate in the bloody battles of the Thirty Years' War. But the first winter in Ulm had significance far beyond his military career, for it was during that time that Descartes claimed to have gained his most important philosophical insights. He published nothing of his ideas, however, until 1637. [Between 1628 and 1449] Descartes developed the systematic philosophy that made him renowned throughout Europe. Publication of parts of this work was delayed until 1637, for Descartes definitely feared prosecution after hearing of Galileo Galilei's fate at the hands of the Roman Inquisition. His works, however, were circulating before 1637 in manuscript form. When Descartes began his work in 1619, European philosophers and theologians were wrestling with problems about epistemology that were being forcefully stated or restated by skeptics. Skeptics were thinkers who followed several forms of philosophical skepticism that were part of

Annotations

- 21 -

the intellectual inheritance from antiquity. Skepticism claimed that all knowledge obtained through our senses and intellect is unreliable and necessarily subject to doubt. People of Descartes's generation were deeply disturbed by these claims, as they seemed to call into question all tradition and knowledge, even knowledge of God. Descartes was one of many who tried to answer the skeptics in order to restore a sense of intellectual and psychological security. His approach was novel in that he used the very strategy of the skepticsradical doubt and criticismto overturn their claims. He resolved to subject all his own ideas to critical doubt, retaining only those that were "clear and distinct," that is, "self-evident" and impossible to deny. This exercise yielded one self-evident truth, the bit of intuitive knowledge encapsulated in the famed phrase, cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). Starting with this simple idea, Descartes proceeded to formulate additional reliable ideas about humankind, the world, and, ultimately, God. He determined that body and mind are distinctly different, the former made of matter, the latter of spirit (not-matter); that all the phenomena of the universe can be explained in terms of matter and its motion; and that God does indeed exist. The process by which he arrived at these ideas is his famous geometrical method of reasoning, which he sketched out in the Discours de la mthode (Discourse on Method; 1637). Geometrical Method The geometrical method relies wholly on a disciplined form of reasoning to arrive at reliable knowledge. It consists of four simple rules: start only with clear and distinct ideas; divide any complex idea into small, simple ones (analysis); think in an orderly process, moving from the simplest to the most complex ideas; and, finally, subject the process at every point to thorough criticism and evaluation so that nothing escapes your attention. The term geometrical in this method reveals its roots in Descartes's formal Jesuit education at La Flche, specifically his acquaintance with the deductive reasoning used in Euclidean geometry. This geometry constructs a complex system of reliable knowledge about two- and three-dimensional figures from simple axioms such as "two points define a line." That Descartes turned to mathematics as an intellectual model is no surprise, for he believed that only mathematics and theology, both rooted in philosophical logic, provide reliable knowledge, the former about the world, the latter about God. Descartes was not alone in seeking refuge within these two disciplines. The project of mathematizing all human knowledge about the world became a sort of collaborative effort in the 17th century as thinkers all over Europe exchanged their ideas and actual mathematical discoveries through the unofficial network called the Republic of Letters. Descartes has often been hailed as a radical who broke with tradition, but modern scholarship provides a more balanced perspective and reveals the many ways he drew on the past for his ideas, even as he restated them in novel form for his contemporaries. Whatever his indebtedness to the past, it must be emphasized that Descartes took a radical step when he made the thinking, reasoning human being (the subjective self, in philosophical language) the final judge of truth. Many scholars believe this step

- 22 -

prepared the way for the later emergence of individualism in western European thought and society. The geometrical method was just one tool used in a comprehensive work, De mundo (On the world), written between 1627 and 1633, in which Descartes used the method, mathematics, and Copernican theory to demonstrate the unity of all knowledgethat is, the applicability of a few simple principles about matter, motion, and geometrical reasoning to all disciplines. The desire to prove precisely this unity is one of the threads that links 17th-century thinkers to the early Enlightenment. Although Descartes finished De mundo by 1633, he did not publish it as a whole; Galileo had just been condemned for writing from a Copernican perspective, and Descartes did not want to suffer the same fate. Thus, he began testing the mood of the censors by issuing the four sections separately. The sections on optics and meteors came first, followed by the seminal Trait de gomtrie (Treatise on geometry). It spelled out the basic tenets of Descartes's new coordinate geometry, which demonstrated that geometry (lines, planes, and solids) and algebra (numbers and their relationships) could be combined and even made interchangeable. This treatise provides an excellent, still valid example of the results that could be obtained in the search for unified knowledge. Finally, Descartes decided to publish De mundo as a whole in 1637, with its preface, the famed Discours de la mthode. Mechanical Philosophy The unified natural philosophy developed by Descartes is called mechanical philosophy. It begins with the two simple ideas of matter (defined as extension, the ability to occupy space) and motion, then goes on to explain all natural events in the universe in terms of matter moving according to mathematical laws. It addresses the movement of bodies in space as well as the physiology of human bodies, and much more. From our contemporary perspective, much of Descartes's work is imaginary, an exercise in "armchair science," but this view overlooks the fact that Descartes actually developed his ideas by applying his method to the basic mechanical principles he had outlined in the Discours de la mthode. He did not resort to observation because he believed it would produce inferior and unreliable knowledge. One of the foundations of mechanical philosophy was the Cartesian principle of inertia, the notion that an object (matter) in motion continues to move so long as something does not interfere. Changes in the direction of motion occur only as a result of impact between two objects, and the quantity of motion is always conserved in these collisions. Any theory of motion must account for circular motion. In the scientific philosophy of Aristotle, circular motion was considered "natural," "perfect" motion. Galileo changed that conception, making linear motion the natural motion. Descartes accepted Galileo's idea, but then had to explain how circular motion arises. He attempted to explain it by resorting to the impact between particles, and offered a picture of the creation of the universe that was dominated by swirling vortices.

- 23 -

Descartes's theory was never very satisfactory but it nevertheless had many adherents throughout the 17th century and into the 18th century. Isaac Newton was addressing the problem of circular motion when he developed his substitute theory of universal gravitation with its associated concepts of centripetal and centrifugal motion. Like the geometric method, mechanical philosophy contained troubling implications for Christian theology. If the universe operated according to a set of mathematical laws as Descartes claimed, then it seemed to have no need of God. The later representations of God as a watchmaker and the universe as a clock point to this reduced role. Lacking a deity, humankind would need something other than divine law to provide a basis for morality. This problem would not only bedevil natural philosophers but would also stimulate the development of deism and other contributions of the Enlightenment to the disciplines of natural theology and moral philosophy. Yet another perplexing problem was raised by the implications of Descartes's philosophy for human psychology. At the very outset of his work, in the Discours de la mthode, Descartes claimed that the distinction between soul and body, one of Christianity's central tenets of orthodoxy, follows immediately from the idea of cogito, of knowing oneself directly only as a thinking being. The mind, which is equivalent to the soul, recognizes the body, a type of matter, as something separate. Moreover, it does this without knowing anything about the rest of the external world. Therefore, the mind is distinct from all matter, just as it is from its own body. Descartes wished to refute the claims of the various animist and occult philosophies that were legacies of the Renaissance. The material world he envisioned was dead, stripped of the unruly, capricious forces and the magic present in these Renaissance views. Without a soul, Descartes's mechanical, rational world functioned only according to the orderly, mathematical laws created by God. While this system worked passably for matter, it failed to explain how, in human beings, a nonmaterial soul could act through a material body. Descartes thought that the site of intersection and interaction lay in the brain, in the tiny pineal gland, but he could not develop an adequate explanation of the way in which mind-body interactions occurred. The body-mind (body-soul) problem would challenge philosophers throughout the 17th century and the Enlightenment. If in the end many Cartesian ideas were surpassed, they nevertheless served as important stimuli for the science of the Enlightenment. Text Citation: Reill, Peter Hanns, and Ellen Judy Wilson. "Ren Descartes as an influence on the Enlightenment." Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment, Revised Edition. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2004. Modern World History Online. Facts On File, Inc.

- 24 -

CHY4U The West & the World Seminar Readings Package Primary Source for Rene Descartes Discourse on Method

Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements: Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings

Inferences (reading between the lines) Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that

you already know something about). Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

The Discourse on Method (1637) of Rene Descartes (1596-1650) has had enormous influence on the development of rationalism, deduction, and modern science. Descartes was a mathematician, and he stressed the importance of using the mathematical method as the means of obtaining knowledge that was precise and verifiable. Emphasizing the centrality of the mind in defining human nature, Descartes' work lent authority to those who were investigating nature as an orderly system which could be understood by human beings. The Discourse on Method was a kind of intellectual autobiography, in which Descartes told the reader how he arrived at his methodology. He discussed his early education and why he determined to seek a new method of obtaining knowledge. ... When I was younger, I had studied a little logic in philosophy, and geometrical analysis and algebra in mathematics, three arts or sciences which would appear apt to contribute something towards my plan. But on examining them, I saw that, regarding logic, its syllogisms and most of its other precepts serve more to explain to others what one already knows, or even, like the art of Lully, to speak without judgement of those things one does not know, than to learn anything new. And although logic indeed contains many very true and sound precepts, there are, at the same time, so many others mixed up with them, which are either harmful or superfluous, that it is almost as difficult to separate them as to extract a Diana or a Minerva from a block of unprepared marble. Then, as for the geometrical analysis of the ancients and the algebra of the moderns, besides the fact that they extend only to very abstract matters which seem to be of no practical use, the former is always so tied to the inspection of figures that it cannot exercise the understanding without greatly tiring the imagination, while, in the latter, one is so subjected to certain rules and numbers that it has become a confused and obscure art which oppresses the mind instead of being a science which cultivates it. This was why I thought I must seek some other method which, while continuing the advantages of these three, was free from their defects. And as a multiplicity of laws often furnishes excuses for vice, so that a State is much better ordered when, having only very few laws, they are very strictly observed, so, instead of this great number of precepts of which logic is composed, I believed I would have sufficient in the four following rules, so long as I took a firm and constant resolve never once to fail to observe them.

Annotations

- 25 -

The first was never to accept anything as true that I did not know to be evidently so: that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to include in my judgements nothing more than what presented itself so clearly and so distinctly to my mind that I might have no occasion to place it in doubt. The second, to divide each of the difficulties that I was examining into as many parts as might be possible and necessary in order best to solve it.

The third, to conduct my thoughts in an orderly way, beginning with the simplest objects and the easiest to know, in order to climb gradually, as by degrees, as far as the knowledge of the most complex, and even supposing some order among those objects which do not precede each other naturally. And the last, everywhere to make such complete enumerations and such general reviews that I would be sure to have omitted nothing.

These long chains of reasoning, quite simple and easy, which geometers are accustomed to using to teach their most difficult demonstrations, had given me cause to imagine that everything which can be encompassed by man's knowledge is linked in the same way, and that, provided only that one abstains from accepting any for true which is not true, and that one always keeps the right order for one thing to be deduced from that which precedes it, there can be nothing so distant that one does not reach it eventually, or so hidden that one cannot discover it. And I was in no great difficulty in seeking which to begin with because I knew already that it was with the simplest and easiest to know; and considering that, among all those who have already sought truth in the sciences, only the mathematicians have been able to arrive at any proofs, that is to say, certain and evident reasons, I had no doubt that it was by the same things which they had examined that I should begin, although I did not expect any other usefulness from this than to accustom my mind to nourish itself on truths and not to be content with false reasons...

And, indeed, I dare say that the exact observation of these few

precepts that I had chosen gave me such ease in unravelling all the questions covered by these two sciences in the two or three months which I spent on examining them, having begun by the simplest and most general, and each truth that I found being a rule which served afterwards to find others, not only did I resolve several questions which I had earlier judged to be very difficult, but it also seemed to me, towards the end, that I could determine, even in those of the solution of which I was ignorant, by what means acid how far it would be possible to resolve them. In this I shall not perhaps appear to you to be too vain, if you consider that, as there is only one truth of each thing, whoever finds it knows as much about the thing as there is to be known, and that, for example, a child who has been taught arithmetic, having added up according to the rules, can be sure that he has found out, as far as the sum he was examining is concerned, all that the human mind is capable of finding out. For, after all, the method which teaches one to follow the true order and to enumerate exactly all the factors required for the solution of a problem, contains everything which gives certainty to the rules of arithmetic.

- 26 -

But what satisfied me the most about this method was that, through it, I was assured of using my reason in everything, if not perfectly, at least to the best of my ability. Moreover, I felt that, in practising it, my mind was accustoming itself little by little to conceive its objects more clearly and distinctly, and not having subjected it to any particular matter, I promised myself that I would apply it just as usefully to the difficulties of the other sciences as I had to those of algebra...

The mind-body distinction was an important one for Descartes. In the work he arrived at his famous definition of his own being: "I think, therefore I am.

I do not know if I ought to tell you about the first meditations I pursued there, for they are so abstract and unusual that they will probably not be to the taste of everyone; and yet, so that one may judge if the foundations I have laid are firm enough, I find myself to some extent forced to speak of them. I had long ago noticed that, in matters relating to conduct, one needs sometimes to follow, just as if they are absolutely indubitable, opinions one knows to be very unsure, as has been said above; but as I wanted to concentrate solely on the search for truth, I thought I ought to do just the opposite, and reject as being absolutely false everything in which I could suppose the slightest reason for doubt, in order to see if there did not remain after that anything in my belief which was entirely indubitable. So, because our senses sometimes play us false, I decided to suppose that there was nothing at all which was such as they cause us to imagine it; and because there are men who make mistakes in reasoning, even with the simplest geometrical matters, and make paralogisms, judging that I was as liable to error as anyone else, -I rejected as being false all the reasonings I had hitherto. accepted. as' proofs. And finally, considering that all the same thoughts that-We had when we are awake can also come to us when we are asleep, without any one of them then being true, I resolved to pretend that nothing which had ever entered_ my mind was any more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately afterwards I became aware that, while I decided thus to think that everything was false, it followed necessarily that I who thought thus must be something; and observing that this truth: I think, therefore I am, was so certain and so evident that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were not capable of shaking it, I judged that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.

Then, examining attentively what I was, and seeing that I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world or place that I was in, but that I could not, for all that, pretend that I did not exist, end that, on the contrary, from the very fact that I thought of doubting the -truth of other things, it followed very evidently and very certainly that I existed; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although all the rest of what I had ever imagined had been true, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I thereby concluded that I was a substance, of which the whole essence or nature consists in thinking, and which, in order to exist, needs no place and depends on no material thing; so that this 'I', that is to say, the mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and even that it is easier to know than the

- 27 -

body, and moreover, that even if the body were not, it would not cease to be all that it is.

After this, I considered in general what is needed for a proposition to be true and certain; for, since I had just found one which I knew to be so, I thought that I ought also to know what this certainty consisted of. And having noticed that there is nothing at all in this, I think, therefore I am, which assures me that I am speaking the truth, except that I see very clearly that in order to think one must exist, I judged that I could take it to be a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true, but that there is nevertheless some difficulty in being able to recognize for certain which are the things we see distinctly. God was conceived by Descartes as a "perfect Being," though he used concepts of nature and mathematics to discuss his idea of a deity.

Following this, reflecting on the fact that I had doubts, and that consequently my being was not completely perfect, for I saw clearly that it was a greater perfection to know than to doubt, I decided to inquire whence I had learned to think of some thing more perfect than myself; and I clearly recognized that this must have been from some nature which was in fact more perfect. As for the notions I had of several other things outside myself, such as the sky, the earth, light, heat and a thousand others, I had not the same concern to know their source, because, seeing nothing in them which seemed to make them superior to myself, I could believe that, if they were true, they were dependencies of my nature, in as much as it had some perfection; and, if they were not, that I held them from nothing, that is to say that they were in me because of an imperfection of my nature. But I could not make the same judgement concerning the idea of a being more perfect than myself; for to hold it from nothing was something manifestly impossible; and because it is no less contradictory that the more perfect should proceed from and depend on the less perfect, than it is that something should emerge out of nothing, I could not hold it from myself; with the result that it remained that it must have been put into me by a being whose nature was truly more perfect than mine and which even had in itself all the perfections of which I could have any idea, that is to say, in a single word, which was God. To which -I added that, since I knew some perfections that I did not have, I was not the only being which existed (I shall freely use here, with your permission, the terms of the School) but that there must of necessity be another more perfect, upon whom I depended, and from whom I had acquired all I had; for, if I had been alone and independent of all other, so as to hafe had from myself this small portion of perfection that I had by participation in the perfection of God, I could have given myself, by the same reason, all the remainder of perfection that I knew myself to lack, and thus to be myself infinite, eternal, immutable, omniscient, all-powerful, and finally to have all the perfections that I could observe to be in God. For, consequentially upon the reasonings by which I had proved the existence of God, in order to understand the nature of God as far as my own nature was capable of doing, I had only to consider, concerning all the things of which I found in myself some idea, whether it was a

- 28 -

perfection or not to have them; and I was assured that none of those which indicated some imperfection was in him, but that all the others were. So I saw that doubt, inconstancy, sadness and similar things could not be in him, seeing that I myself would have been very pleased to be free from them. Then, further, I had ideas of many sensible and bodily things; for even supposing that I was dreaming, and that everything I saw or imagined was false, I could not, nevertheless, deny that the ideas were really in my thoughts. But, because I had already recognized in myself very clearly that intelligent nature is distinct from the corporeal, considering that all composition is evidence of dependency, and that dependency is manifestly a defect, I thence judged that it could not be a perfection in God to be composed of these two natures, and that, consequently, he was not so composed; but that, if there were any bodies in the world or any intelligences or other natures which were not wholly perfect, their existence must depend on his power, in such a way that they could not subsist without him for a single instant.

I set out after that to seek other truths; and turning to the object of the geometers, which I conceived as a continuous body or a space extended indefinitely in length, width and height or depth, divisible into various parts, which could have various figures and sizes and be moved or transposed in all sorts of waysfor the geometers take all that to be in the object of their studyI went through some of their simplest proofs. And having observed that the great certainty that everyone attributes to them is based only on the fact that they are clearly conceived according to the rule I spoke of earlier, I noticed also that they had nothing at all in them which might assure me of the existence of their object. Thus, for example, I very well perceived that, supposing a triangle to be given, its three angles must be equal to two right angles, but I saw nothing, for all that, which assured me that any such triangle existed in the world; whereas, reverting to the examination of the idea I had of a perfect Being, I found that existence was comprised in the idea in the same way that the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles:--is comprised in the idea of a triangle or, as in the idea of a sphere,-the--fact that all its parts are equidistant from its centre, or even more obviously so; and that consequently it is at least as certain that God, who is this perfect Being, is, or exists, as any geometric demonstration can be... Source: Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and the Meditations, Translated by F.E. Sutcliffe (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 40-43, 53-57.

- 29 -

CHY4U The West & the World Seminar Readings Package Secondary Source for Thomas Hobbess Levithan

Each paragraph should have at least 2 different annotations. Please read the following article and using the space on the right hand side of the page please annotate the text by adding the following elements: Identification of Main Ideas Questions about supporting details Words to Define or look up Key Points & understandings

Inferences (reading between the lines) Prior Knowledge (is there something you have read that

you already know something about). Key Passages for answering quiz or discussion questions.

Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes

From: Encyclopedia of Political Thought. The modern liberal concepts of rights, individualism, liberty, government by consent, and social contract begin with Hobbes's philosophy. A materialist, he looked at human nature and society from a scientific, biological perspective. For Hobbes, people are just like everything else in the universe: matter in motion. He applies this scientific method to humans through their physical senses (sight, smell, hearing, taste, touch), being their only source of knowledge. Thus, human action or behavior can be explained by either pain or pleasure: People have "appetite" to more toward something that pleases their senses (beauty, food, warmth, etc.) and "aversion" to move away from things that hurt their senses (excessive heat or cold, poverty, or boring lecturers). All human thoughts, therefore, are derived from sensory data. This empiricism forms the philosophical basis of behaviorism in social science. It contrasts with earlier Western social thought that explains human conduct in terms of virtue or ethics (Plato and Aristotle) or moral reason. It reduces the human being to the status of any other animal except for one thing: rationality. Rationality for Hobbes is a calculating faculty that humans use to add and subtract pleasures and pain. So, unlike other creatures who are wholly governed by their sensory feelings, human reason allows us to calculate the total pleasure or pain of an experience and sometimes endure some pain for a greater pleasure (like sacrificial saving, investing) or forgo a pleasure that causes greater pain later (such as drunkenness, illicit sex, "flying" off a rooftop). This materialistic view of Hobbes leads him to define human relationships in terms of power. He divides power into natural (one's physical strength, intelligence, eloquence, beauty) and instrumental (money, fame, prestige, honor), but more power allows an individual to acquire more pleasure and avoid more pain. All humans, then, want more power. This is because the worth of a person in Hobbes's view is the amount of power the person has (or what another would pay to use itleading to the labor market). So, the worth of a person in this materialistic philosophy is the person's price. This reduces people to being products to be bought or sold. It violates the classical and Christian view of human dignity as a moral being created in God's image, capable of noble deeds. Hobbes reduces human dignity to social prestige, especially honors (such as titles) conferred by the state (awards, knighthood, earldoms, etc.).

Annotations

- 30 -

Such a view of humanity logically leads to an original society (or "state of nature") that is highly competitive and combative. All individuals seek their own pleasure, power, and prestige, and soon they are in conflict with ea