Securing Peace in Northern Ireland

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Securing Peace in Northern IrelandEdwina McMahonPublished online: 30 Nov 2010.

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Securing Peace in Northern Ireland 127

American Foreign Policy Interests

American Foreign Policy Interests, 25: 127�137, 2003Copyright © 2003 NCAFP1080-3920/03 $12.00 + .08DOI:10.1080/10803920390204630

Securing Peace in Northern Ireland

Edwina McMahon

ish and Irish governments convoked a series ofall-party roundtables designed to resolve the po-litical crisis, rumors, initially fueled by GerryAdams�s remarks, ran rampant in London,Dublin, and Belfast. Based on hints dropped bythe head of Sinn Fein that the IRA was about toundertake an unprecedented and magnanimousact, speculation soared and centered on the no-tion that the IRA was about to stand down. Be-fore long, both Gerry Adams and MartinMcGuinness, Sinn Fein�s minister of educationin the suspended government and the party�schief negotiator, stated unequivocally that in lightof the British and Irish governments� failure todevise a plan to implement all the provisions ofthe Belfast Agreement at once, the IRA wouldneither complete the decommissioning process ithad undertaken some time ago nor disband. Whatbecame worrisome to proponents of peace was theperception that the all-party roundtables hadbegun to look like the triangular exchanges thatcharacterized the preagreement period. Boy-cotted in its final round by David Trimble, thetalks, presided over by British Prime MinisterTony Blair and Irish Prime Minister BertieAhern, revolved around the unionist agenda asadvanced by the British prime minister: the dis-bandment of the IRA preceded or accompaniedby the complete decommissioning of all its weap-ons.

Because Parliament remains sovereign inNorthern Ireland and the government of GreatBritain has not only resumed exercising directrule over the six counties of the North but alsohas become the spokesman for the boycottingunionists, the unionist agenda is likely to prevail.That judgment, not a questioning of the beliefthat proposals designed to achieve the complete

ince the government of Great Britain sus-pended the power-sharing government of

Northern Ireland on October 14, 2002, the im-passe in implementing the Belfast Agreement hasbecome a political crisis. Three days after the sus-pension, British Prime Minister Tony Blair gavea speech in which he declared that only the com-plete implementation of the agreement wouldlead to permanent peace in Northern Ireland.1

Key to the process of implementation, the primeminister stated, is the disbandment of the IrishRepublican Army (IRA), the logical outcome, heled his listeners to infer, of the IRA�s yet to beundertaken final act of decommissioning. Agree-ing with the British prime minister that the com-plete implementation of the agreement will proveto be the ultimate solution to the crisis, GerryAdams, the president of Sinn Fein, did not dwellon the prime minister�s duo of d-words in hispublic response.2 Instead, he cited all the provi-sions of the Belfast Agreement that must beimplemented without delay. The list ofunimplemented provisions is extensive. It in-cludes every category, including the most conten-tious: cross-border bodies, human rights, polic-ing, and justice.

As 2002 turned into 2003, the British govern-ment had to face the fact that it had a dwindlingnumber of days in which to decide whether torestore the power-sharing Assembly and the Ex-ecutive in time to hold the Assembly electionscheduled for May 1, 2003, or to postpone the elec-tion until the IRA complied with the demandsoriginally made by David Trimble, the leader ofthe Ulster Unionist party (UUP) and the firstminister in the suspended government, and sub-sequently championed by Prime Minister TonyBlair. At the beginning of February, as the Brit-

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128 Edwina McMahon


and timely implementation of the Belfast Agree-ment can be efficacious in securing permanentpeace in Northern Ireland, informs this article.For better or worse, the British prime ministerseems to be preoccupied with the formerly tabooword disbandment. By using it interchangeablywith the term �act of completion,� he has turneddisbandment into a mantra. Now, it seems, whosays decommissioning says disbandment, as if theultimate d-words in Northern Ireland have some-how been incorporated into the syllogistic con-struct �who says a and b says c.� Demanding thatthe IRA provide credible evidence that it has dis-banded is both realistic and logical�or is it inthe context of the political crisis in Northern Ire-land in 2003?

The Old D-Word,Deadline, Looms Again

On February 12, when Prime Minister Blairand Prime Minister Ahern concluded the finalmeeting of the roundtables convoked in the firsttwo months of 2003 with and without the UUP,the Social Democratic and Labor party (SDLP),Sinn Fein, the Alliance party, the ProgressiveUnionist party (PUP), and the Women�s Coali-tion in Belfast, both prime ministers announcedtwo deadline dates: (1) March 3, when all pro-posals for resolving the current crisis will haveto be submitted; and (2) March 13, the latest pos-sible date on which the power-sharing institutionscan be restored in time to hold the May 1, 2003,Assembly election. Few failed to notice thatMarch 13 marks the beginning of the week inwhich the Irish prime minister and members ofhis cabinet will join with the U.S. president, lead-ers of Congress, and the leaders of all politicalparties in Northern Ireland�unionists, loyalists,nationalists, and republicans alike�to celebrateSt. Patrick�s Day in Washington, D.C., and thetime in which the United States and Great Brit-ain are likely to be on the verge of waging waragainst Iraq.

Since the period that began on October 17,2002�when Tony Blair announced that he wouldaccept nothing less than acts of completion in-volving the decommissioning of all IRA weaponsand the disbandment of the republican paramili-tary organization�and ended on October 27�when Gerry Adams responded affirmatively tothe prime minister�s speech by placing his pro-posals in the context of the complete and imme-diate implementation of the Belfast Agreement�two things have become evident.

1. Only two people are negotiating anend to the political crisis now: Brit-ish Prime Minister Tony Blair (un-doubtedly in consultation withDavid Trimble) and Sinn Fein Presi-dent Gerry Adams.

2. Despite the apparent agreement onthe part of the two negotiators thatall the provisions of the BelfastAgreement must be implementedimmediately, the provisions still tobe effected probably will be imple-mented in matched sequences thatmay take some time to complete.

Despite highly vocal unionist demands to thecontrary, the last paired sequence is likely to bethe final decommissioning of the last cache of IRAweapons; the disbandment of the IRA; and thecomplete dismantlement of British military in-stallations, especially watchtowers in nationalistand republican areas and the withdrawal of a siz-able number of British military forces fromNorthern Ireland�or normalization, as PrimeMinister Blair prefers to call it now.

Intimations ofan Impending Deal

In the two-week period preceding and follow-ing the February 12 roundtable, the general out-line of a deal, as indicated by the presentation to

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Parliament of specific acts of implementation,seems to have been negotiated. The relativelynarrow focus of the legislative measures suggeststhat the deal to be presented to the political par-ties on March 3 is the first stage of what will prob-ably become a complete plan of implementationafter it has been determined that the Assemblyelection will or will not be held on May 1.

A Possible Sequence of Matched Acts:Before May 1, 2003

1. Decommissioning and Policing. BeforeMarch 3 a fourth act of decommissioning by theIRA probably will be announced and verified bythe team of international inspectors who vali-dated the IRA�s three previous acts of putting asignificant quantity of its weapons beyond use.The fourth but not final act probably will occurin response to the recent parliamentary passageof a bill that extends the deadline date for de-commissioning to February 2004. The fourth actof decommissioning, it seems reasonable to con-clude, also will be a response to the Police Bill of2003. Designed to implement specific provisionsof the Patten Commission recommendations andthe Belfast Agreement, the legislation strength-ens the authority of the police ombudsman inNorthern Ireland and extends the term of Inde-pendent Commissioner Thomas Constantine,who will continue to monitor policing operationsin the North until the fall, when he will return tothe United States after turning over his respon-sibilities to another, already designated indepen-dent commissioner.

2. The Presentation of Charges of Collusionon the Part of the Security Forces in the Murderof Patrick Finucane and Sinn Fein�s Withdrawalof the Demand That an Independent CommissionBe Established to Investigate the Crime. Severaldays after the February roundtable adjourned, SirJohn Stephens, the head of the Metropolitan Po-lice (or New Scotland Yard), announced in Lon-don that he was preparing charges for presenta-

tion to the prosecutor based on evidence of collu-sion on the part of security forces operating inthe North in the murder of solicitor PatrickFinucane in 1989. The former head of the myste-rious and allegedly murderous Force ResearchUnit, now serving in the British embassy inBeijing, is the subject of the investigation.3 Inreleasing information about the charges he willfile soon, Commissioner Stevens refuted the se-curity forces� contention that Finucane was amember of the IRA. Instead, CommissionerStephens maintained, Patrick Finucane was ahard-working, conscientious solicitor who de-fended both Protestants and Catholics.

The third Stephens Commission, unlike itspredecessors, seems to be on the verge of present-ing evidence against a British brigadier who isnow serving in a sensitive and high-level post inthe British Foreign Service. The impending ac-tion signals for the first time in 14 years that theBritish government is willing to pursue the in-vestigation as far as the evidence directs and notlimit the presentation of charges to accusationsagainst low-level alleged loyalist assassins.

Although Commissioner Stevens�s announce-ment has not dissuaded the Finucane family fromcontinuing to insist that an independent commis-sion be established to investigate the murder, itseems likely that if the prosecutor rules that theevidence presented by the chief of New ScotlandYard warrants prosecution, Sinn Fein will ceaseto insist that an independent commission be ap-pointed to identify every one of PatrickFinucane�s murderers.

3. The Right of Ex-prisoners to Return andSinn Fein�s Withdrawal of Its Insistence That Ex-prisoners Be Allowed to Serve on District Polic-ing Partnerships. The British and Irish govern-ments have agreed to allow ex-prisoners�thosewho escaped from prisons in Britain, Ireland, andNorthern Ireland and have been on the lam orrunning from capture ever since�to return asfree men and women, no longer subject to serv-ing out their sentences or to serving additionalsentences imposed for breaking out of captivity.

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It is likely that Sinn Fein, in return for the reso-lution of this contentious issue, will no longerinsist that ex-prisoners be given the right toserve on District Policing Partnerships that ex-ercise oversight over the Police Boards and thePolice Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Untila level of trust can be built between these formerlethal enemies that would permit the ex-outlawsto supervise the representatives of law and orderthat prevail in the North today, nothing will pre-vent the loyalists and republicans who finally jointhe Police Boards from conferring with ex-pris-oners, who are their constituents, on policingmatters.

4. The Adoption of a Code of Ethics for thePSNI and the IRA�s Decision to Cease ParapoliceActivities. A stringent and enforceable code of eth-ics was recently devised to govern the professionalconduct of the PSNI. It seems possible that inresponse to this development, the IRA will let itbe known that it has ceased, in a way that can beverified�perhaps by conducting discreet inter-views with the residents of republican enclaveswho have experienced or witnessed IRA acts ofbrutality in the past�the deplorable practices ofpunishment beatings and banishing alleged mis-creants from their homes in republican commu-nities of the North.

A Possible Sequence of Matched Acts:After May 1, 2003

1. Devolution and Deputizing the Garda, thePolice in the Republic of Ireland, to Train NewRecruits to the PSNI. Not likely to be effected atall, or at least not before the final act has beencompleted in the complete implementation of theBelfast Agreement, is the devolution of policepower by Britain to a restored Assembly, as SinnFein advocates. Nor, it seems likely, will the imple-mentation of the Patten Commission�s recom-mendations be delegated to the North�SouthMinisterial Council, as Sinn Fein also advocates.Northern Ireland, a province of the United King-

dom, is not a sovereign state. Turning over to arecently restored Assembly, whose members donot trust one another, the power to control themost controversial force in Northern Ireland�the police, even the reformed PSNI�seems theheight of folly. Similarly, delegating to the North�South Ministerial Council the authority to policethe police would impose on the Republic of Ire-land, a sovereign state, the same de facto statusas the Assembly of Northern Ireland�a legisla-ture that exercises only those circumscribed pow-ers devolved to it by Britain�for the purpose ofoverseeing the police. Until the leaders and thepeople of Northern Ireland learn to trust oneanother or the legal status of Northern Irelandchanges, or both developments occur, it wouldseem prudent for Britain to retain the policepower for Northern Ireland as modified and ap-proved by the oversight boards recommended bythe Patten Commission and established under theBelfast Agreement.

Despite some unionist objections, the Gardaare training recent recruits to the PSNI. Playinga professional role of that kind accords with theresponsibility that the Republic of Ireland hasdischarged since the peace process was inaugu-rated: acting with Britain to develop proposalsfor creating a power-sharing government in theNorth and promoting equality, justice, and peacein the province. In response to the demands ofthe UUP, the matters that fall under the purviewof the North�South Ministerial Council have beenlimited to noncontroversial cross-border issuessuch as exchanges of information on health. Del-egating to the council responsibility for what re-mains the political issue of policing in the Northwould almost certainly jeopardize the work of thecouncil and the PSNI as well. Now recruited onthe basis of religious affiliation to allow the neg-ligible number of Catholic recruits to reach par-ity with Protestant members, a number of themembers of the PSNI might be so swayed by thepartisan arguments of the oversight council thatthey would begin to operate in the interests ofthe sectarian monitors who represent them.Eventually every institution associated with po-

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licing in Northern Ireland would become politi-cized, leading to their collapse and the dissolu-tion of all the other cross-border bodies that con-stitute the North�South Ministerial Council. Itis to be hoped that Sinn Fein will rethink its po-sition and come to the conclusion that at this stageof the peace process, the most effective contribu-tion that the Republic of Ireland can make topolicing in the North is to provide professionaland unbiased training for new recruits, Protes-tants and Catholics alike.

2. Human Rights and Sinn Fein�s Willing-ness to Join the Police Boards. The code of ethicsrecently enacted for the PSNI is based on the Eu-ropean Convention on Human Rights. As mem-bers of the European Union (EU), Great Britainand the Republic of Ireland have signed the pro-tocol. Although all signatories are obligated un-der international law to enforce the convention,Parliament is sovereign in Britain and domesticlaw supersedes international law. To allay nation-alist and republican fears that the European Con-vention on Human Rights might be overriddenby or made subordinate to a measure adopted byParliament, such as the reimposition of intern-ment without trial or the reestablishment ofDiplock courts, in a period of perceived emer-gency, the British government may be willing topresent to Parliament a law incorporating theEuropean Convention on Human Rights into anonrepealable domestic law for Northern Ireland.As a symbolic gesture demonstrating its own com-mitment to human rights for all the people ofNorthern Ireland, the restored Assembly mightalso announce that it will observe the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights throughout theprovince.

All the recent initiatives on policing, probablyenhanced by Britain�s probable willingness toincorporate the European Convention on HumanRights into its domestic law, may convince SinnFein to take the seats reserved for the party onthe Police Boards. By playing a dual role of moni-tor and critic, Sinn Fein, like the SDLP and theUUP, will make a significant contribution to en-

suring that the PSNI serves all the people of theNorth, regardless of their religious affiliations orsectarian loyalties.

3. Demilitarization and Complete Decommis-sioning. Dismantling all the remaining watchtow-ers in republican areas, closing a number of armyinstallations, and withdrawing troops in suchstrength that only the number needed to supple-ment the work of the PSNI is retained in the prov-ince would constitute a significant act of demili-tarization on the part of Great Britain. In return,the IRA would be expected to and probably wouldundertake the final and verifiable act of decom-missioning.

4. The Repeal of Laws Affecting the IRA andIts Disbandment. A blanket, unambiguous am-nesty for all members of the IRA�an outlawedorganization in Britain, the Republic of Ireland,and Northern Ireland�may convince the ArmyCouncil of the IRA to announce its disbandment.Following the historic format for the issuance ofsuch definitive declarations, the final statementalmost certainly will take the form of a letter ora memorandum signed by the fabled P. O�Neill.As can be inferred from the preceding sentence,the IRA put all its weapons beyond use in thepast. Moreover, the republican paramilitary or-ganization disbanded in the past. Both historic�acts of completion� occurred after the civil warwaged in the South in 1922 and 1923 betweenthe protreaty and the antitreaty forces. (Thetreaty that led to that internecine conflict endedthe war between Great Britain and Ireland.) Ac-knowledging its defeat in the civil war, the IRA,the army of the antitreaty forces, issued an orderto disband and dump all arms.4 Similarly in thepast, the British government did not demand thatthe IRA decommission or disband.5 After the Brit-ish�Irish War ended in 1921, the realistic Britishgovernment of David Lloyd-George did not jeop-ardize the cessation of hostilities between thecolonizer and its most antagonist colony by con-fronting the issue of decommissioning (or disar-mament, as it was then called).

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The Force of Memory

Will the unionists or the British demandsomething of the IRA that it cannot give? Willone or both of them demand that the IRA offerverifiable evidence that it has disbanded? Assum-ing that a former member of the former organi-zation is ingenious enough to come up with con-crete proof that the IRA no longer exists, howwould it be ascertained that the person who is-sued the statement had the authority to speakfor the extinct organization? Obviously, an an-nouncement made by the Army Council wouldbe legitimate, but it also would reveal that theorganization in the form of the Army Council stillexisted. What means of verification would beused? The first step in a possible verification pro-cess suggests that all the members of the formerparamilitary republican group would have toidentify themselves. Suppose some of them didnot come in from the cold. Surely no one wouldexpect any ex-member to issue a list containingall the names, addresses, and key contacts of allformer members of the IRA. Even if such a listwere submitted, it probably would be only partof the process of verification. Surely the securityforces would not resist the temptation to moni-tor the former members of the former group. Sur-veillance networks would be retained or installedto determine whether ex-members of the formerIRA were speaking to one another. Code break-ers would have to be assembled to decode the sus-pect messages in circulation. The use of suchstratagems would violate the Belfast Agreement,which undoubtedly would collapse as soon as theofficial abuse of human rights was uncovered andrevealed. Refusing to accept another, simpler,nonsinister reason for the connections that wouldprobably be maintained by former members ofthe former republican paramilitary organization,the British government or the government ofNorthern Ireland or both would discount the factthat individual ties of friendship and institutionalties forged by memory, not conspiracy, accountedfor the continuing contacts.

It seems clear that the disbandment of theIRA cannot be verified. It seems clear too thatthe force of memory will impinge on decommis-sioning. Remembering where weapons are storedmay turn out to be an invaluable roadmap shouldit be agreed that the periodic checking of weaponsites should become part of a process of periodicverification. The persistence of memory, consist-ing of the stored knowledge that was acquiredfor more than 30 years about making and buyingweapons, may finally expose the champions of de-commissioning to the charge that their hallowedcause was no more than a hollow one. Not onlyare ex-IRA members sure to remember how touse armalite and semtex, but they undoubtedlywill remember the real name and phone numberof P. O�Neill, the phone numbers of other ex-mem-bers of the IRA�s former Army Council, and thephone numbers of Colonel Qaddafi and otherleaders of states that traffic in arms to outlawedgroups or to rogue states. Abridging the humanrights of ex-IRA members will not erase such in-formation from their memories. Instead, build-ing trust and implementing all the provisions ofthe Belfast Agreement will enable former mem-bers of the former republican paramilitary orga-nization to develop new and peaceful memoriesto counter those of war, death, and destruction.The IRA, it should not be forgotten, was mori-bund in 1968 when the nationalists began theirstruggle to achieve civil rights. Attempts by thegovernment of Northern Ireland to repress civilrights marches and demonstrations by force ledto the reconstitution of its hated enemy. It seemsreasonable to conclude that only the restoredgovernment of Northern Ireland, functioning wellwithin the framework of the Belfast Agreement,will ensure the permanent disbandment of theIrish Republican Army.

The Politics of Security

In the absence of trust, securing the final act ofdecommissioning and complete demilitarizationand disbandment may require regional or inter-

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national assistance. The rioting that is occurringin loyalist neighborhoods, not only fueling loyal-ist attacks on nationalists and republicans butalso fanning loyalist feuds and bloodletting, hasreinforced nationalist and republican perceptionsthat one-sided disarmament will not bring peaceto Northern Ireland. From that perspective, therecent comment made by Paul Murphy, secretaryof state for Northern Ireland, sounds unsound.Evidently trying to justify Prime Minister Blair�sone-sided approach to decommissioning and dis-bandment, Murphy remarked that unlike the loy-alists, the IRA has a party in government. Thatis why, he suggested, it has been singled out toperform certain �acts of completion.�6 But if be-ing part of the government of Northern Irelandconfers on a political party the legal obligation torein in its paramilitary cohort, why did the Brit-ish government suspend the government and thusostensibly nullify, for the duration of the suspen-sion, the role that Sinn Fein undertook to per-form under the Belfast Agreement? It is also clearthat Murphy has adopted the implicit unionistargument that Sinn Fein was allowed to enterthe government of Northern Ireland not as amatter of right based on the results of the demo-cratic election of 1998 conducted under theBelfast Agreement but as the result of grudgingunionist sufferance. It is clear to all the people ofNorthern Ireland who lived through the 30-yearconflict known as the Troubles (and it should beclear to Prime Minister Blair and Mr. Murphy aswell) that perceptions of repression, inequality,the lack of justice, high levels of unemployment,an unresponsive government, and the seemingpower that comes from the barrel of a gun, notparticipation in government alone, deter-minewhether the targets of institutional prejudice orthose who feel betrayed by a government that nolonger considers their interests synonymous withthe interests of state will use force to accomplishtheir aims. Loyalist paramilitary forces are ac-tive and have not disarmed. Based on their recordof aggression, they constitute a clear and presentdanger to the peace process and to the completeimplementation of the Belfast Agreement.

The Possible Role of the United Nations

Great Britain and the Republic of Irelandhave played leading and supporting roles in theUnited Nations. Britain was a founding memberof the United Nations and is a permanent mem-ber of the Security Council. Ireland, which re-cently completed a two-year term as a nonper-manent member of the Security Council, has dis-patched members of its armed forces to partici-pate in almost all UN peacekeeping operations.In fact, the first UN peacekeeping operation inthe Congo was led by Irishman Connor CruiseO�Brien, a member of a small unionist party inNorthern Ireland. Accordingly, its historic in-volvement in the United Nations may prompt theBritish government, in concert with the govern-ment of the Republic of Ireland, to ask the inter-national body to station UN observers along thefault lines in Northern Ireland: the interface com-munities that are still sites of loyalist rioting andbloodletting and attacks launched against theirnationalist and republican neighbors and certainsites that house British military installations inNorthern Ireland to witness and testify to theircomplete evacuation.

The Possible Role of Europe

A chance to redeem its sorry record in Bos-nia would be given to the European Union ifit accepted the appeal of two member states,Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, tosend units to Northern Ireland to maintain andpromote peace while all the provisions of theBelfast Agreement were being implemented.Such an undertaking might give the EU achance to test the efficacy of its rapid deploymentforce under conditions not ordinarily associatedwith the disposition of such troops. Moreover, thegovernments of Great Britain and the Republicof Ireland could play long-distant, de factooperational roles in the peacekeeping opera-tion. From their positions on the European Coun-cil they could provide necessary information and

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134 Edwina McMahon


advice that would enable the units deployed bythe EU to help the people of Northern Irelandestablish permanent peace under the terms ofthe Belfast Agreement. Furthermore, all the par-ties of Northern Ireland are members of the Eu-ropean Parliament. Their record of engagementin the suspended Assembly of Northern Irelandsuggests that they would spark vigorous debatesin Brussels and Strasbourg about the EU peace-keeping operation in Northern Ireland andperhaps improve the outcome. Finally, sendingpeacekeepers who are committed to observingthe European Protocol on Human Rights prob-ably will prevent EU units from getting caughtup in a situation that might push them into com-mitting the kinds of abuses that were inflictedby the British Army, which was originally dis-patched to the North in 1972 to defend the be-sieged nationalists.

The Role of the United States

Although disagreement may develop over thenature of the U.S. role, no one doubts that theUnited States will play a vital part in bringingabout the complete implementation of the BelfastAgreement. The governments of Britain and theRepublic of Ireland will urge it, and so will theleaders of all the political parties in the North,who have demonstrated their support for contin-ued U.S. participation in the peace process.

The seemingly obvious way for the UnitedStates to play a visible role in monitoring theimplementation of the final acts of decommission-ing, demilitarization, and disbandment would beto deploy NATO units, rather than UN or EUpeacekeepers, in Northern Ireland. But givingNATO an institutional role to play in the Northwould conflict with the Irish government�s read-ing of the Irish constitution. Since its inceptionas a free state, the Irish polity has been a neutralstate�a choice that has acquired a sacrosanctstatus over the course of 80 years. By substitut-ing U.S. participation stemming from its mem-bership in NATO for a flexible deployment re-

flecting its status as a founding member of theUnited Nations and a permanent member of theSecurity Council or as an ally of the EU and thehistoric supporter of the people on the island ofIreland, American peacekeepers could take uppositions in the North next to their UN or Euro-pean counterparts. Perhaps working together ina unique and cooperative way in Northern Ire-land would convince both Americans and Euro-peans that they can devise many successful strat-egies to defuse tensions between them and topromote collaboration and concord in transatlan-tic relations as long as underlying trust prevailsin the alliance.

Unlike the United Nations and the EuropeanUnion, the United States has been involved inthe peace process in Northern Ireland for 10years. The positive response of the Clinton ad-ministration to the National Committee onAmerican Foreign Policy�s appeal to issue a visato Gerry Adams to attend the NCAFP�s confer-ence on Northern Ireland in January 1994�asubmission based on the Committee�s analysisthat fostering peace in Northern Ireland was inthe national interests of the United States, for itwould initiate the end of the ruinous expenditureof British resources in Northern Ireland, which,if unchecked, would eventually affect Britain�sability to maintain its strategic relationship withthe United States in NATO�was the first ofmany such positive acts that the United Statestook to advance permanent peace on the islandof Ireland. Seconding his predecessor�s judgment,President Bush has affirmed that securing peacein Northern Ireland is in the national interestsof the United States. The many trips that Rich-ard Haass, the president�s emissary to NorthernIreland and the head of the State Department�sPlanning Board, has made to the North have re-inforced the administration�s commitment to ef-fect permanent peace in Northern Ireland. Add-ing members of its armed services to a UN or Eu-ropean contingent of peacekeepers would only ex-tend the comprehensive commitment�whichincludes extensive trade with the province andinvestment capital earmarked to build industry,

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promote tourism, and curb unemployment�thatthe United States has made to help transformthe situation in Northern Ireland from politicalcrisis to peaceful normalcy.

The Politics of Trust

Rebuilding trust in Northern Ireland will notbe easy. Despite the presence of internation-al peacekeepers, who would undoubtedly preventor counter attacks launched by one communi-ty against the other, trust will never developbetween the two communities in the absence ofloyalist decommissioning and disbandment.Northern Ireland Secretary of State PaulMurphy�s attempt to justify the exclusion ofthe loyalists from the battery of unionist andBritish demands made of the IRA, in a way,acknowledges the underlying political failurethat has plagued the peace process from its in-ception. The loyalists did not have a political partyin the suspended power-sharing government ofNorthern Ireland not because they were denieda place in the Executive but because they failedto garner the number of votes needed to secureone or more ministries based on the Assemblyelection held in 1998. Unlike Sinn Fein, whichtraces its beginnings to the early 20th century,the loyalist political parties are of recent originand lack deep roots in the community. The his-toric unionist political party, whose split gave riseto the reconstituted UUP and the DemocraticUnionist party (DUP), has shirked its responsi-bility to speak for the loyalists. Unionist silenceuntil recently about loyalist decommissioning istelling and destructive to peaceful life in North-ern Ireland.

The Role of Leadership

Acknowledging the problem of leadership thathas been evident in the unionist and loyalist com-munities since the peace process began, the Brit-ish government recently announced that it had

awarded a grant of £3 million to �aid disadvan-taged communities,� that is, loyalist communi-ties.7 In awarding the grant, Prime Minister Blairsaid it was important that loyalism find �a properand true political voice.�8 In effect, a part of thegrant will be used to train would-be leaders who,it is to be hoped, will focus at least some of theirattention on the economic and social needs oftheir community, in contrast to the unionists�apparent preoccupation with the alleged evildeeds of their republican adversaries.

Even though David Ervine, the leader ofthe PUP, seems to be ready to resume the vitalleadership role he assumed during the negotia-tions that led to the Belfast Agreement and totake his seat again when the Assembly of North-ern Ireland is restored, his leadership needs tobe augmented by self-selected, fledgling loyalistleaders, whose training will take time and effortto effect.

If their records can be considered guides tosubsequent action, little help will be offered tothe loyalists by David Trimble and the ReverendIan Paisley, the leader of the DUP. All of theirstatements and actions indicate that they aresteeped in the politics of recrimination that marksthe past. Like the loyalists, perhaps the union-ists should consider whether the time has cometo choose new leadership.

Conclusions

The delegation of Irish and Northern Irishpoliticians who will arrive in Washington, D.C,on March 13 to launch the weeklong celebrationof St. Patrick�s Day probably will say they arecelebrating the restoration of the devolved power-sharing institutions in Northern Ireland butprobably will not be preoccupied with the pros-pect of having to contest an Assembly electionon May 1.

It seems clear that the British government,supported by the Irish government, is determinedto restore the government of Northern Irelandsooner rather than later. That decision would be

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136 Edwina McMahon


the first step in the long and arduous task of build-ing trust in Northern Ireland. Suspending thepower-sharing government four times in fiveyears in response to David Trimble�s demandsfor the IRA to decommission and recently to dis-band and acting on his allegations that the IRAis guilty of a number of offenses that he judges tobe in violation of its cease-fire have created theperception in the unionist and loyalist communi-ties that the Belfast Agreement benefits the re-publican community alone. Their perceptionmakes sense only when one considers that eachsuspension has occurred in response to SinnFein�s failure to convince the IRA to comply withDavid Trimble�s ultimatum. If a fit punishmentfor Sinn Fein is the suspension of the power-shar-ing institutions in which it held only two minis-tries, then it follows that the institutions of gov-ernment are of inestimable value only to SinnFein and to the republican community that itrepresents. Thus has the first minister in thesuspended power-sharing government of North-ern Ireland�aided and abetted perhaps unwit-tingly by the British prime minister who wieldssovereignty in the North on behalf of the UnitedKingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-land�created a myth that has undermined sup-port for the Belfast Agreement among unionistand loyalist communities.

Behind closed doors in Washington, many ofthe holiday revelers undoubtedly will be work-ing hard to shore up the Belfast Agreement. Forits part, the United States should make a com-mitment to participate in peacekeeping opera-tions in the North. It also should work to con-vince Great Britain not to suspend the govern-ment of Northern Ireland again. Finally, it shouldoffer to conduct a campaign designed to convinceall the people of Northern Ireland of the benefitsof the Belfast Agreement. As the initiators of theNorthern Ireland Investment Fund, the UnitedStates possesses all the information necessary topresent to all the people of Northern Ireland along list of economic and social improvementsthat have occurred since they endorsed theBelfast Agreement in 1998.

It may be politically expedient to leave to theBritish government the determination of whetherto hold the Assembly election on May 1, 2003.Like other political decisions that have thrustNorthern Ireland into political crises in the pastfive years, this decision probably will be DavidTrimble�s to make. Whether, as rumored, he re-signs as the leader of the UUP and joins theshadow government of the Conservative party inParliament or decides to stay and lead his partyinto the forthcoming Assembly election wheneverit is held, Trimble has hinted that he is unwillingto challenge the DUP in an election slated to takeplace in less than two months. Based on local elec-tions that were held in the North last year, theDUP has become the larger of the two unionistparties. It is ironic that David Trimble�s evidentattempts to steal the rhetorical ire of Ian Paisleyhave led his party to lose credibility among itsconstituents. Will the other political parties inthe North agree to the postponement of the As-sembly election? Because Prime Minister Blairmay be willing to go along with erstwhile FirstMinister Trimble again, the SDLP, the Allianceparty, Sinn Fein, the PUP, and the Women�s Coa-lition probably will have to go along too.

Trying to adduce political outcomes from arange of disparate information is fraught withproblems. In being challenged to devise an infi-nite variety of responses to times and situationsof crises, people throughout history have some-times improvised solutions and developed work-able timetables that those from afar can onlyadmire. It is to be hoped that the people of North-ern Ireland will prove to be far more creative andresourceful than some of the leaders who claimto speak for them and will insist that all provi-sions of the Belfast Agreement be implementedin ways and at times that accord with their bestinterests.

About the Author

Edwina McMahon is a senior fellow of theNational Committee on American Foreign Policy.

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Notes

1. �Speech by the British Prime Minister Mr.Tony Blair, in Belfast, 17/10/2002,� http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/ireland/2002/1018/pf207911598HM11BLAIRSPEECH, 10/18/02.

2. �Speech Given by Sinn Fein PresidentGerry Adams at the Hillgrove Hotel, Monaghan,in Response to Speech by British Prime MinisterTony Blair in Belfast 10 Days Ago,� http://sinnfein.org/releases/02/pro22610.html.

3. Rosie Cowan, �Brigadier May Face UlsterMurder Charges,� The Guardian, February 14,2003; http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,895315,00.html.

4. John Bowman, DeValera and the UlsterQuestion, 1917�1973 (London, 1982), 106; TimPat Coogan, The IRA (New York, 1970), 35.

5. Tim Pat Coogan, The Man Who Made Ire-land: The Life and Death of Michael Collins(Niwot, Colorado, 1992), 216.

6. Mary Dundon, �Bid to Resurrect NorthExecutive,� Irish Examiner, February 10, 2003;http://www.examiner.ie/pport/web/ireland/Full_Story/did-sgoW09ILnEGow.asp.

7. �Cautious Welcome for Loyalist Initiative,�BBC News, February 13, 2003; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/2756211.stm.

8. Ibid.

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Documents

Securing Peace in Northern Ireland