SEARLE ON LANGUAGE GAMES AND RELIGION

8/11/2019 SEARLE ON LANGUAGE GAMES AND RELIGION

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/searle-on-language-games-and-religion 1/12

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte

SEARLE ON LANGUAGE GAMES AND RELIGIONAuthor(s): D. Z. PhillipsSource: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 51ste Jaarg., Nr. 2 (JUNI 1989), pp. 245-255Published by: Peeters Publishers/Tijdschrift voor FilosofieStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40885874 .

Accessed: 23/06/2014 05:11

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Peeters Publishers, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, Katholieke Universiteit-Leuven, Hoger Instituut voor

Wijsbegeerte are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Tijdschrift voor Filosofie.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 05:11:28 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=peeters

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=tijdfilo

http://www.jstor.org/stable/40885874?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/40885874?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=tijdfilo

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=peeters



SEARLE

ON LANGUAGE

GAMES

AND RELIGION

by

D. Z. Phillips

(Universityollege

of

Swansea)

The

public

ecturesnd seminars

gave

s the

1988

CardinalMercier

ec-

turer t the

University

f

Leuven,

were

oncerned

ith

ifferent

spects

f

the

influence f

LudwigWittgenstein

n

contemporary

hilosophy

f

religion.

t s

possible

o show ome

ofthe

bearings

hese ifferent

spects

haveononeanother, believe,

y

discussion frecent emarks ade

by

John

earle

n

this ontext.

In

his discussion

ith

Bryan

Magee

on

the

philosophy

f

Ludwig

Witt-

genstein,

earle makes

brief

omments n

Wittgenstein's

emarks n

religious

elief.

Despite

their

brevity,

here re two

reasons

why hey

merit

iscussion.

irst,

hey

re

haracteristicf

frequent

eactiono

Witt-

genstein's

nfluence n the

philosophy

f

religion.

econd,

hey

llustrate

what

happens

requently

hen,

fter

cceptable

xpositions

f

Wittgen-

stein, hilosophersurn oconsider isremarksnreligion.nrelation o

religion,

venmore han

lsewhere,

any

ail o

appreciate

ow

radical

challenge

Wittgenstein

akes o

our

philosophical

ssumptions.

WhenSearle

ommentsn

Wittgenstein's

emarksn

religion,

e

con-

tradicts

hat

he

says

when

expounding

Wittgenstein's

onception

f a

language ame.

t

may

e saidthat he

ontradictions

only pparent,

ince

1.

Wittgenstein:

ialogue

with

ohn

earle,

n: The

Great

hilosophers.

ryan

Magee,

B.B.C.

Books

1987.

All

quotations

refrom his

olume.







246

D.Z.PHILLIPS

whereas earle's ommentsre ritical,nelucidating ittgenstein'sotion

of

language ame,

he is

simply

oncerned

ith

xposition,

ot

riticism.

While

his istinction

s

true,

t does

not

void

he

harge

f

contradiction,

since his s

nternal o what earle

ays

bout

anguage ames.

I

shall

begin

byquoting

n

fullSearle's

ritical omments

n

Wittgen-

stein's

emarksn

religion

„Wittgenstein's

version

o

theory

nd

his nsistence

hat

philosophy

should

e

purely

escriptive

nd

not ritical

eads

him

o a kind

f

waffling

incertainrucial reas.Consider eligiousiscourse,or xample. believe

Wittgenstein

imself

bviously

ad

a

deep

religious

unger.

He

did

not

have

hemiddle-class

nglo-American

ttitude

owards

eligion,

hat twas

just

a matter f

something

or

Sunday

mornings.

here are

frequent

references

n

his

more

ersonal

ritings

o God

and to the

problems

f

get-

tingright

withGod. None

the

ess,

think

most

people

who

knew

him

would

ay

hat

e

was

n atheist. ow

n

a

way,

when

you

read

his

remarks

about

God,

you

lmost

eel hat

he

wants

o have

t

both

ways.

He wants

to talk boutGod and still e an atheist. e wants o nsisthat ounder-

stand

eligious

iscourse

e need

to see

therole

t

plays

n

people's

ives.

And that

s

surely ight.

ut

of

course,

ou

would

notunderstand

he

role

that t

plays

n

theirives

nless

ou

ee that

eligious

iscourse

efers

eyond

itself. o

put

t

bluntly,

hen

rdinary

eople

pray

t s

because

hey

hink

theres a

God

up

there

istening.

ut

whether

r

not here

s a

God

istening

to their

rayer

sn't

tself

art

f he

anguage

ame.

The reason

eople

play

the

anguage ame

f

religion

s

because

hey

hink here

s

something

ut-

side

the

anguage ame

hat

ives

t a

point.

You

have

o

be

a

very

echer-

che ort f

religious

ntellectualo

keeppraying

f

you

don'tthinkheres

any

realGod

outside

he

anguage

who s

istening

o

your

rayers

(pp.

344-5).

Thefirst

roblem

n

these

emarks

s

closely

onnected

ith

Wittgenstein's

critique

f

realism

n

epistemology

nd

n

the

philosophy

f

mind.

Accord-

ing

to realist

heories,

e

first

elieve

n

the

reality

fvarious

tates

f

af-

fairs,

nd

then,

s a

result,

ct

nd

behave

n

the

haracteristic

ays

we do.

Thus,

n

the

ontext

nder

onsideration,

earle

ays

,

The reason

eople







SEARLEON LANGUAGE

GAMES AND RELIGION

247

play the language game of religion is because theythinkthere s

something

utside he

anguagegame

that

gives

t ts

point.

Thiscom-

ment s

open

to an

objectionWittgensteinringsgainst

ll

realist

heories.

If

the

point

f

playing

language ame

s

given

n

a

prior

elief,

what oes

this

believing

amount o ?

,

Believing

is

tself

language

ame.

But

in

what

anguage

ame

s this

believing supposed

o occur

Thus,

Witt-

genstein's

bjection

s directed

gainst

realist

nalysis

f

ny

kind f

belief,

not

implygainst

realist

nalysis

f

religious

elief.

The

realist,

yplac-

ing ,

belief

outside

ll

possibleanguage ames, laces

t

beyond

ll

possi-

ble

techniques

f

application

n

which

t

couldhave

ny

ense.The

belief

would

have

o tell

you

what t s without

ny

uch ontext an incoherent

supposition.

s Searle

ays:

„For

literally

undreds f

paragraphs

n

his

later work

Wittgenstein] oes

through

discussion f how we

use

psychological

erbs.

an examination

fthe

depth rammar

hows ow he

use of he

vocabulary

s

grounded

n

actual ituations

(p.

345

.

But

f

he

belief

hat he

religiousanguage ame

has a

point

s

/¿replaced

n

an ac-

tual

ituation,

t would

be

an instance f

believing

n

God.

This

religious

believing,owever, ouldhave tsmeaningwithin hereligiousanguage

game

nd could

not, herefore,

e

a reason utside he

game

for

laying

t.

Is the

belief

n

the xistencef

state f

ffairs,

n

this ase

the xistence

of

God,

supposed

o

be

the foundation

f the

anguagegame? Surely,

Searle annot

mean

this,

ince, arlier,

e

had said

„Wittgenstein

nsists

thatwe shouldn't ook

for he

oundations

f

anguagegames ny

more

thanwe should ookfor oundationsf

games

uch s

football

r

baseball.

All

of these are

just

human

activities...

A

characteristic

hilosophical

mistakes to think hat heremust esomefoundation,ome ranscenden-

tal

ustification,

or ach

anguagegame" (p. 330).

But,

in

his critical

2 I

would

not

peakmyself

f the

anguage ame

of

religion

.

Religious

elief nvolves

many

language ames. imilarly,

wouldnot

peak

f

religion

s

a

form f

ife,

ut

as

existing

n

a form

of ife.The

significance

f

religious

elief ould not be elucidatedwithout

ringing

ut how t

l-

luminates ther eaturesf

human ife.But

n

the ontext fthis

aper

'll

continue o use Searle'

phrase,

the

anguage ame

of

religion

.

3.

This

was

the themeof

my

CardinalMercier

eminar, ,On

ReallyBelieving".

It is to

be

published

n

a collectionf

ssays

n

realismnd non-realism

n

philosophy

f

religion

dited

y

Dale

Breitkreutzo

be

published y

Macmillan.







248

D.Z.PHILLIPS

remarks,earle oes peak sthough transcendenttate f ffairss the x-

ternal

ustification

or

laying

he

religious

anguage ame.

Once

again,

n

his

expository

emarks,

earlehad said

,

Wittgenstein

s anxious o nsist

that here

sn't

nypoint

f

view rom utside he

anguage ames

where

we

can,

so to

speak,

stand

back

and

appraise

he

relationship

etween

language

nd

reality.

e

doesn't hink hatwe can

get

outside f

anguage

to ook

t therelation

etween

anguage

nd

reality

rom

he

ide

and

see

whetherrnot

anguage

s

adequately

epresentingeality.

here

sn't

ny

non-linguistic

rchimedean

oint

romwhichwe can

appraise

he

uccess

orfailure f

anguage

n

representing,oping

with r

dealing

with hereal

world.

We

are

always

perating

ithin

ome

anguagegame

or other.

o

there

an't

be

any

transcendental

ppraisal

f the

adequacy

f

anguage

games

because

here sn't

nynon-linguistic,

ranscendental

oint

fview

from

which

hey

an

be

appraised (p.

331

.

In

hiscriticalomments n

Wittgenstein's

emarksn

religion,

owever,

earle

s himself

nvoking

n

external elation

etween

he

anguage ame

and

reality.

e

is

trading

n

a

non-linguistic,

ranscendental

oint

of

view

which, arlier,

e has said

makes o sense.We have o reach he onclusionhat earle annotmain-

tainhis

xposition

f

Wittgenstein

nd

say

n

criticism

,

The reason

eople

play

he

anguage

ame

of

religion

s

because

hey

hink heres

something

outside he

anguage ame

that

gives

t a

point (p.

345

.

We

also

need

to note hat

earle

s not onsistentven

n

the ritical

om-

ments e

makes.As

we

have

seen,

he

says

hat

people play

the

religious

language ame

because

hey

irst

elieve

hat transcendenttate f

ffairs

obtains.

But Searle

lso

says

hat

Wittgenstein

,

wants o

insist hat o

understandeligious iscourse e need tosee therole tplaysnpeople's

lives.And this s

surely ight.

ut

of

course,

ou

would

not

understand

he

role hat t

plays

n

their ives

nless

you

ee that

eligious

iscourse

efers

beyond

tself. o

put

t

bluntly,

hen

ordinaryeople

pray

t s

because

they

hink here s a God

up

there

istening (pp.

344-5

.

Here,

Searle

s

not

aying

hatwe knowwhat

s meant

y

he

reality

fGod

prior

o

play-

ing

the

religiousanguagegame.

He is

saying

hat

n the context

f this

game,

references

made

to the

reality

fGod.

This s

certainly

rue.

There

is a

conception

f n

independent

eality

n

religion.

et,

to

see what his







SEARLEON LANGUAGE GAMES AND RELIGION

249

conceptionf n independentealitymountso,we must ay ttentiono

the

grammar

f the

religious oncepts

nvolved.

Searle's

xpository

emarks ould ead

us to

expect

im

o

agree

with his

conclusion.or

xample,

t one

point

n

the

discussion,

agee xpresses

he

following isgiving

,

But

you

eem o

be

saying

hat

ccording

o

Witt-

genstein's

ater

hilosophy,

e arenever

ble

to make

ny omparison

e-

tween

anguage

nd

something

hichs not

anguage,

ecause

we can

never

occupy ny osition

hichs

not

mbedded

n

anguage

not,

o to

speak,

inside

anguage.

All

our

conceptual

tructures our

conceptions

f the

everyday

orld,

f

cience,

fthe

rts,

f

religion everything

are

built

up by

us

in

linguistic

erms

hatwe can

never

et

outside f t. On this

showing,

ither heres no external

eality

t all

or,

f

here

s,

t s

something

thatwe can

never ave

ndependent nowledge

for contactwith. s

this

really

hat he ater

Wittgenstein

s

saying

"

(p.

331).

But

Searle

s

quick

to assure

Magee

that

his s not o

, No,

I

think,

n

fact he

way

you

have

stated the

position

s a characteristic

ay

in

which

Wittgenstein

s

misunderstood.

any eople

think

Surely

his

iew eadsto somekind f

idealism, erhaps kind f inguisticdealism. t eadsto theview hat he

only hings

hat

xist rewords...On

Wittgenstein's

iew,

we are

always

working

nside

language,

even

when

we

describe

the

workings

f

language.

Wittgenstein

s notfor ne moment

enying

heexistence f

reality,

e

s not

denying

he xistencefthe

real

world,

rthe

fact hatwe

can

make rue

laims

bout

hereal

world.

What

he s

anxious o nsist

n,

though,

s that

f

we

have

expressions

n

our

anguage

ike

realworld

,

,

reality

, „

truth

,

then

hey

must

have use

n

anguage ames

hat s

justas humble, ustas ordinary,s theuse of thewords ,chair" and

,

table

,

or

dog

and

,

cat . For

Wittgenstein,

ur ask s

philosophers

is not

o sit

back nd

contemplate

he

ublime

ature f

reality

nd

truth,

but rather o

get

busy

nd

describe

ow

we

actually

se

expressions

ike

„real"

and

„true"

(pp. 331-2).

If

we

apply

hese

emarkso

religion,

e

shall ee

that

Wittgenstein

s

n-

sisting

hat,

n

this

ontext

oo,

philosophy's

ask s a

humble

ne.

Here,

too,

we

haveusesof

real

and

,

true

. The

philosopher

must

getbusy

and show

what he

pplications

fthese

erms

mount o.

This s

precise-







250

D.Z.PHILLIPS

lywhatWittgensteinsdoing nhisremarksnreligion.t s notmypur-

pose

to

expound

heseremarks

ere,

xcept

o

say

that,

n

the course

f

them,

Wittgensteinxplores

he

deep

differences

etween

alking

f the

reality

f

God,

and

talking

bout

he

reality

f

physical

bjects.

hesedif-

ferencesre

brought

ut

by considering

ow ssues

oncerning

dentity

would

be

settled

n

the

twocontexts. onsider

ow we would

go

about

settling

hether e are

alking

bout

he ame

bus,

the

ame

building,

he

same

tar,

he ame

person,

tc.

etc.The methods

or

ettling

hese

ues-

tions

larify

he

grammar

f the ame

in

the

respective

ontexts.ut

how

wouldwe find ut

whetherwo

people

believe

n

the

ameGod ?The

way

we do thishas ittle

n

common

with riteriased

n

theother

ontexts.

n

the

religious

asewe wouldhave o

ook t therole

eligious

elief

lays

n

the ives f the

people

concerned.

he issue ould

not

be

settled

without

considering

he

presence

rthe

ack,

nd

the ontent f

pirituality

n

their

lives.

f

thatwhich urrounds

heuses f

the ame

differs,

tfollows

hat

the

grammar

f

the ame differs

oo.

t s

n

this

way

hatwe

come o

see

that he

grammar

f the ame

God differs

rom

he

grammar

f

the

sameobject .

Magee

and

Searle

eem

to

agree

with hese

onclusions,

hen,

n

their

discussion,

hey

oint

out

striking

ifferencesetween

Wittgenstein

nd

many

ther

hilosophers,

n

their

espective

reatment

f

religion.

Magee

says

,

The

old-styleogical ositivists,

howere

xtremely

nfluenced

y

their

reading

f

Wittgenstein's

arlyphilosophy,

were

also

extremely

dismissive

f

any

form

f

religious

tterance.

ecause

religious

tterances

are

characteristically

nverifiable

hey

ookthem

o

be,

literally,

ean-

ingless.But the aterWittgensteinouldhavehad a quitedifferentt-

titude.

He

would

have aid

that

here

s,

and

has

been

n

every

nown

orm

of

ociety,

eligious

tterance,

nd

f

we want

o understand

twe

must

ay

close ttention

he

the

way

oncrete

xamples

f t function

ithin

iven

formsf

ife.

very

mode

ofdiscourse

as

ts wn

ppropriate

ogic,

nd

t's

simply

o

good

appraising

eligious

tterances

s

one would

ppraise

cien-

tific tterances

which

s what

he

ogical

ositivists

ad

been

doing

(p.

334

.

Searle

grees,

ointing

ut

that

Wittgenstein

thinks

t

s ridiculous

to

suppose

hat

we should

ake

eligious

tterances

s

f

hey

were

ome

ort







SEARLEON LANGUAGE GAMES AND RELIGION

2

5

1

of econd-ratecientifictterances,s f heywere heoriesorwhichwehave

inadequate

vidence.

He

hated

he dea that

we should ver-intellectualise

these

matters,

nd

try

o make

verything

nto ome ort

f heoreticalnter-

prise" (pp.

334-5).

Nowhere

s

this ver-intellectualisation

ore

rotesque

han

he

ttempt

to

apply

t to

human

uffering.pologists

or

eligion

ry

o devise

science

of

suffering

a

theodicy y

means

of which

hey ope

to

show hat

very

conceivable

nd actual vil

must

e

a means o a

higher ood.

Wittgenstein

had no time

or uch endencies

n

the

philosophy

f

religion.

or

him, hey

are

failures o take ither

umanity

r

divinity

eriously.

Wittgenstein's

ttack n over-intellectualisation

s

relevant,

owever,

ot

simply

o the

philosophical

reatment

f

religiousanguage,

ut

to the

way

in

which

hilosophers

hink f

anguage

n

a wide

variety

fcontexts.

s

Searle

oints

ut,

one of

themost

owerful

spects

f

Wittgenstein's

ast

work,

n

Certainty,

s ts ttack

n the

ong-standing

hilosophical

radi-

tion

according

o which ll

our

meaningful

ctivities

ust

e

the

product

of ome

nner

heory.

But

Wittgenstein

oints

ut

that or

great

eal of

ourbehaviour, e ustdo it" (p. 346). In this onnection,Wittgenstein

emphasised

he

mportance

f

primitive

eactions,

eactions hich

lay

crucial

ole

in

concept-formation

n

our

language.

It

is

unsurprising,

therefore,

hat o understand

he

roleof

religious

eliefs

n

human

ife,

here, oo,

we need

to take ccount

four

primitive

eactions.

nly

hen re

we

able

to

appreciate

hat

oncept-formation

omes o

n

this

ontext.

Why,given

his

eneral

ackground

fhis

exposition

f

Wittgenstein's

philosophy,

hould

earle,

n

his ritical

emarks,

uggest

hat

Wittgenstein

spoke freligions iftheexistence f God were f no importanceWhy

should

earle

uggest

hat

Wittgensteinpeaks

f

prayer

s

if

twere fno

importance

hatGod hears

rayers

These re

puzzling

uestions,

nd we

can

only peculate

s to

why

earle

does

this.

4. I

explored

his heme

n

the

Cardinal

Mercier

ecture,

On Not

Understanding

od

. The

lecture

as

lso

given

n

the

1988

Enrico

astelli

onference

n

„Theodicy oday"

and s

published

in

Archivio i

Filosofia,

VI,

1988,

N.

1-3.

5.

See D.2. Phillips.

„Primitive

eactions nd theReactions f

Primitives.

1983

Marett

ec-

ture,

Religious

tudies,

Vol. 22.







252

D.Z.PHILLIPS

Thefirstuggestionemightonsiderssimplyhat earles dissatisfied

with he

nalysis

Wittgenstein

ives

f

religious

elief.

ut

this issatisfac-

tion tself

may

have

wo

different

spects.

earle

may

be

claiming

hatwhat

Wittgensteinays

bout

religion

oes not accordwell

withwhat

many

religious

elievers,

theistsnd

philosophers

ay

bout

religion

hen

sked.

This

disagreement

ndoubtedly

xists,

ut

whatof it?

Wittgenstein

s

critical fthese ther ccounts.

he

mere act hat

hey isagree

with

im

neednot

mpress

im.

Wittgenstein

nows hat

many rgue

or

nd

against

religious

elief

n

terms fwhat

hey

all

,,the

theistic

ypothesis".

ut

why

hould

Wittgenstein

emore

mpressedy

hat act,han earlewould

be

by

the fact hat

many

give

Cartesian nswers hen asked

about

the

natureof

thinking

We would

not

dream

of

answering

ssues

n

the

philosophy

f

mind

bycounting

eads and

concluding

The Cartesians

have t

"

Why

do

we

contemplate

uch

procedure

n

the

philosophy

f

religion

ButSearle

may

avemore han

his

n

mind.

He

may

e

saying

hatWitt-

genstein's nalyses

o

not do

justice

o the role

religious

eliefs

lay

n

people's ives.That s a serious riticism.t wouldamount osayinghat

Wittgenstein

s

confused

bout

the

grammar

f

religious oncepts.

uch

disagreements

an

only

e

explored y

discussion.We

can

only roceed

y

endeavouring

o

produceperspicuous

epresentations

f the

contexts

n

which

eligiousoncepts

ave heir

ife.As with he

basic

ropositions

itt-

genstein

iscusses

n

On

Certainty

he ask

n

the

philosophy

f

religion

s

to showhow he

basic

propositions

f

religious

elief

reheld

fast

y

what

surrounds hem.

This

task

does not involve

reating

hat

belief

as a

hypothesis.

t also

takes s

beyond

heCalvinist

pistemologist's

laim

hat,

in epistemology,esimply ave a negative onfrontationetween on-

theisticnd theistic

pistemologists,

ach

failing

o

deny

heother's

ight

to

exist.

Wittgenstein's

ethods nvite

s to

engage

n

a common

iscus-

sionof

religious

elief.

The

trouble

s

that,

o

often,

n

the

philosophy

6.

I

explored

hese ssues

n

the

Cardinal

Mercierecture

nd seminar

n

,

Can

There e

A

Chris-

tian

Philosophy

and

,

Religion

nd

Epistemology

Plantinga's

eformed

pistemology

nd Witt-

genstein's

n

Certainty17espectively.

he

comparisons

nd contrastsetween

Wittgenstein

nd

Calvinist

pistemology

re

explored

t

ength

n

my

book

Faith

After

oundationalism,

art

One,

Routlegde,

988.







SEARLEON

LANGUAGE GAMES AND RELIGION

253

ofreligion,his sprecisely hatphilosophers illnotdo. Theyprefero

discuss

hilosophical

oncepts,

ather han he

religious

eliefs

which re

important

n

people's

ives,

nd

which ften ccasion ur

puzzlement.

My urpose,

t the

moment,

s not o furtherhis

iscussion,

ut

o

point

out

a

movewhich earle

ries

o

makewithin

t,

but

which

annot,

n

fact

be

made.

Searle

ays

,

You

have

o

be

a

very

echerchéort

f

religious

n-

tellectual o

keeppraying

f

you

don't think

here s

any

realGod outside

the

anguage

who s

istening

o

your rayers (p.

345

.

Butthis annot

e

a remark

gainstWittgenstein'snalyses,

ecause

veryone, ittgenstein

included,

would

ay

hat t s futile o

pray

o God unless here s a God to

pray

o. The

conceptual

isagreement

s

precisely

verwhat

aying

hat

amounts o. Some

think

Wittgenstein's

nalyses

re

penetrating.

thers

disagree

ith

hem,

but

think hat

eligious

elief

s

meaningful. gain,

others

isagree

nd think hat

religious

elief

s

meaningless.

t is

un-

necessary

o

determine

here earle tands

n

this

pectrum

f reactions.

Wherever

e

stands,

e

cannot

ay,

s

though

twere n

argument

gainst

Wittgenstein

,

when

rdinaryeoplepray

t s

because

hey

hink heres

a Godupthereistening(p. 345 , since t spreciselyhegrammarf uch

ordinaryanguage

hat

s

being

discussed.

earle

annot ake ts

grammar

for

ranted.

Grammars often aken or

ranted

when

philosophers

f

religion

n-

dulge

n

what call

philosophy y

talics.

n

objecting

o

Wittgenstein's

remarksn

religion, hilosophers

re

prone

o

say,

After

ll,

God exists

;

,

God is real'

; ,

God

is

there

; ,

Someone

must isten o

prayers

;

etc.

etc.

but

what hese

hilosophers

eemnot o realise

s that

no

grammatical

work asbeendone imply y talicisinghese erms. sSearle aidearlier,

philosophy's

umble

task s the clarificationf these

concepts

n

their

natural

ettings.

uch

larity

s as essential or n

understanding

f

theism,

as it s for n

understanding

f

religious

elief.

The

second

uggestion

hich

might xplain

earle' dissatisfactionith

Wittgenstein's

emarks n

religion,

s the tension

e

perceives

etween

them

nd thefact hat

many

whoknew

Wittgenstein

aid

he was n

atheist.

What

kind f ension

oes Searle ave

n

mind It s

difficulto know.

he

tension

ould

be attributed

o

personal

r

philosophical

onsiderations.







254

D.Z.PHILLIPS

First,hepersonalonsiderationsboutwhich want osayveryittle.Why

should t

be

surprising

f

an

atheist alks lot

about

God,

or

f

a

believer

talks lot

about

objections

o

religious

elief?

f

something

s

deeply

m-

portant

o

one,

one

may

want o make ure

hat ne has done

ustice

o

op-

posingpoints

f view.

Searle

ays

hat

Wittgenstein

ad

,,a

hunger

or

God

,

but

did not allhimself

believer.

am not

onfirming

hese

acts,

but,

f

rue,

why

hould

hey

reate

puzzle

?

A

person,

ut of

respect

or

religion,

ealising

he

nature f ts

demands,

may

refuse

o

call

himself

believer.

s

Searle

ays,

he

ast

thing eligion

as

for

Wittgenstein

as

a

matter frespectability.

Second,

what fthe

philosophical

onsiderationshich

might

ave

ed

Searle o see

a tension

etween

Wittgenstein's

emarksn

religion

nd his

alleged

theism

These reof

greater

mportance.

What

does the

tension

amount

o? To

be

a

participant

n

the

religiousanguagegame,

to

be

a

believer,

s to make

confession.here

re

imeswhen

Wittgenstein

n

his

Lectures

nd

Conversations

n Aesthetics.

sychology

nd

Religious elief

and

in

Culture nd

Value

speaks

f

what t would mean

to make con-

fession

efore od. But hat s

not

he

ame s

actually aking

confession.

I amnot t allsure hatWittgensteinid callhimselfn atheist. e certain-

ly

did not

f,

by

atheism,

we

mean the

opposite hilosophical

tance o

philosophical

heism. hat

kind f

philosophy,

ith

ts

rguments

or nd

against

eligion,

as

anathema o him.

Wittgenstein

as nterested

n

the

clarificationf

religious

oncepts.

hat

philosophical

ask

may

e

performed

better

y

omeone

who does not call himself

believer

han

by

omeone

who callshimself

believer.

Two

eparate

heses reoften onfused

n

discussing

hese ssues. he first

is

rightly

ttributed

o

Wittgenstein

to

understand

eligious

elief

ne

must ake ccount ftheuse ofreligiousonceptsnpeople's ives. he sec-

ond

thesis,

ften

onfused ith he

first,

s

attributed

o an

aberration

hich

has

beencalled

Wittgensteinian

ideism that

eligious

elief,

an

only

e

understood

y

hosewho

play

he

religiousanguage ame.Wittgenstein

did notholdthis

iew,

nd

neither

s t held

by

hose

nfluenced

y

him n

the

philosophy

f

religion.

If

one did

hold

this

view,

herewould

be

a

7.

In

fact,

oneofthe heses onnected ith

Wittgensteinian

ideism

reheld

byWittgenstein

or

by

hose nfluenced

y

him n

the

philosophy

f

religion.

have hown his

n

Belief, hange

nd

Forms

f

Life,

Macmillan nd Humanities

ress,

986.







SEARLEON

LANGUAGE GAMES AND RELIGION

2

55

tension etweenayinghat neunderstoodhegrammarfreligiouselief

and

calling

neself n

atheist. ut

ince

Wittgenstein

eld

the

first,

ot he

second

hesiswe have

mentioned,

here s no tension

etween

rying

o

clarifyeligious

oncepts

while

efusing

o call

oneself

believer.

As we have

een,

Wittgenstein's

hilosophical

ethod

s

open

to

believer

and non-believer

like.

We

have

lso een

hat t s

not method

which

p-

peals

to

a common

ssessment,

rom

llegedly

eutral

vidence,

fclaims

for nd

against

he

xistencef

God.

Wittgenstein's

ethod

lso voids

he

totalitarian

pistemologies

f

post-Enlightenmenthought.

t s

well-known

that

writersuch

s

Feuerbach,

reud,

Marx ndDurkheimreat

eligious

beliefs,

ot

as false

beliefs,

ut

as

ideologies.

Recently,

t has

been

clai-

med

by

Calvinist

pistemologists

hat

t s

unbelievers

ho

are

n

the

grip

of

deology.

The aim of

Wittgenstein's

ork,

n the other

hand,

s to

find

ur

way

rom

onceptual uzzlement

o

conceptual

larity.

his

im,

if

chieved,

would

larify

he

grammar

f

belief

nd

unbelief,

nd also

the

grammar

f

the

disagreement

etween

hem.

It is

in

this

sense

that

philosophy's

ask

s a

humble

one,

and it

is

in

this

sense, too,

that

philosophyeaves verythingheret s.

8.

I

havediscussed

most fthese

writers

n

Religion

Without

xplanation,

asil

Blackwell,

976.

9.

See Nicholas

WOLTERSTORFF,,Is

Reason

nough?"

n: The

Reformedournal,

ol.

34,

No.4.

Documents

SEARLE ON LANGUAGE GAMES AND RELIGION