Royal United Services Institute Summer 2012 Vol 15 No 1

For international defence professionals

ru

si defen

ce system

s

SU

mm

eR 2012 l Vol 15 No 1

The kinetic effect – making an impact on the front line

Time for a change Does the 5.56mm SA80 individual weapon round lack sufficient punch?

Keeping faith with the Warrior The Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP) forges ahead

Bunker bustersIs the West able to neutralise high-value targets buried deep beneath the surface?

RUSI_CoverVol15_1_jw.indd 2 27/7/12 11:02:45

Panick Advert.indd 1 25/05/2012 10:11vislink_placed.indd 1 23/7/12 10:13:38

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RUSI defence SyStemS

FINAL PROOF

Editor-in-chief Colette DoyleManaging editor Barry DaviesSub-editor Laura Pledger Art editors Jean-Philippe Stanway James White Designer Kylie Alder

Production manager Malcolm Green Editorial production assistant Elizabeth Heuchan

Sales director Martin CousensSales manager James Johnston

Managing director Andrew HowardChief executive Alan SpenceChairman Paul Duffen

Published by Newsdesk Media5th Floor, 130 City Road, London EC1V 2NW Tel: +44 (0)20 7650 1600 Fax: +44 (0)20 7650 1609www.newsdeskmedia.com

© 2012. The entire contents of this publication are protected by copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. The views and opinions expressed by independent authors and contributors in this publication are provided in the writers’ personal capacities and are their sole responsibility. Their publication does not imply that they represent the views or opinions of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) or Newsdesk Media and must neither be regarded as constituting advice on any matter whatsoever, nor be interpreted as such. The reproduction of advertisements in this publication does not in any way imply endorsement by RUSI or Newsdesk Media of products or services referred to therein.

Editor Simon Michell Editorial director Michael Codner

Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET Tel: +44 (0)20 7747 2600Fax: +44 (0)20 7839 1090 Email: SimonM@rusi.orgwww.rusi.org

Royal United Services Institute Summer 2012 Vol 15 No 1

For international defence professionals

ru

si defen

ce system

s

SU

mm

eR 2012 l Vol 15 No 1

The kinetic effect – making an impact on the front line

Time for a change Does the 5.56mm SA80 individual weapon round lack sufficient punch?

Keeping faith with the Warrior The Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP) forges ahead

Bunker bustersIs the West able to neutralise high-value targets buried deep beneath the surface?

RUSI_CoverVol15_1_jw.indd 2 27/7/12 11:02:45

Newsdesk Media publishes a wide range of business and customer publications. For further information please contact Alan Spence, chief executive, or Paul Duffen, chairman.

Pictures: Crown copyright, BAE Systems, ISAF Media, Lockheed Martin, MBDA, Missile Defense Agency, NATO, Press Association, Raytheon, Reuters, US Navy Printed by Buxton Press ISBN: 978-1-906940-59-1

Cover image supplied by Lockheed Martin

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www.babcock.co.uk

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FINAL PROOFFINAL PROOF

5

contents

32 Defence Debates and Developments in the UK and the US – the Long-Term Perspective

Arthur I Cyr compares and contrasts UK and US defence policy changes since the end of the Second World War to highlight how the countries can still learn from each other

36 Assessing the Reform of German Defence AcquisitionDr Henrik Heidenkamp provides his assessment of the reform of the German Federal Armed Forces’ defence procurement and in-service process

Defence inDUSTRy

42 The Defence industrial Knowledge Base – the core capability?

Dr John Louth considers the contention by Peter Luff, minister for defence equipment and support, that there is no longer the need to think in terms of a domestic defence industrial base

Defence cAPABiLiTy PRoGRAmmeS – LAnD

44 The medium mythCurrent thinking has led the British Army to define forces as light, medium and heavy. William F Owen explains why the concept of medium forces is potentially dangerous

46 east and central european Artillery and Anti-Tank Guided Weapons

Eugene Kogan presents a market overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the artillery ammunition and anti-tank guided weapons sector across eastern and central Europe

48 The Warrior capability Sustainment ProgrammeBob Armstrong explains the process for keeping the Warrior AFVs in service for another three decades, with major upgrades to lethality, fightability and survivability

50 Supacat SPV400 Delivers improved Ride and impressive Reliability

An insider’s view of the latest status of the SPV400 light patrol vehicle development programme

eDiToR’S LeTTeR

9 feeling the effectsBy Simon Michell

Defence conTenTion

10 7.62 RevisitedNick Watts on why the time is right for a reassessment of the merits of 5.56mm rifle ammunition in favour of a heavier – and more lethal – replacement

Defence AcqUiSiTion

12 The Defence materiel Strategy and the Goco proposal for Abbey Wood

RUSI’s Acquisition Focus Group considers the way in which a government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) defence equipment and services supplier would function

16 Dilemmas in UK Defence PolicyProfessor David Kirkpatrick reveals the linkages between three dilemmas in UK defence policy, and insists that they need to be addressed together to formulate a policy that is coherent and affordable

20 mV(a?): Kinetic Warfare Brings Us Back to the futureKinetic weaponry will remain a key component of land, sea and air arsenals for the foreseeable future, but will struggle to attract R&D investment. Dr Jeffrey Bradford explains why

22 Bringing UK UoRs into the core equipment Programme: Defining the optimum Solution

Stuart Olden proposes a systems approach based on rigorous cost-benefit analysis for the range of systems procured under the Urgent Operational Equipment (UOR) process

26 The moD’s Demographic Dividend: What it means for the UK industrial Base and Acquisition Reform

Graham Jordan explains how a decline in the amount spent on technology development work in industry will have implications for the UK defence industrial base

20

26

Contents_RUSI 15.1 SUMMER2012.indd 5 27/7/12 16:45:28

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FINAL PROOFFINAL PROOF

7

contents

52 JTAC ROVERDelivering fast, accurate targeting information to pilots is an art form practised by the Forward Air Controller. Giles Ebbutt looks at the ROVER and other offerings on the market

55 The International Nature of Terrorism – Why We Need to Listen to Cassandra

Chief Inspector Ken Pennington of the Police Service of Northern Ireland explains why the West needs to keep up with the wide range of networks used by terrorist groups

dEfENCE CApAbILITy pROgRAmmEs – AIR

58 f-35 – getting the UK’s Largest defence Export Opportunity on Track

Simon Michell reviews the latest progress on the F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation multi-role fighter and highlights its economic importance to the UK

63 Airborne Kinetic EffectAvnish Patel assesses some of the latest fighter-jet contract bids, including the way forward for Eurofighter and recent developments in China’s capabilities and export market

66 bunker busters – an Indispensable strategic CapabilityAs the UK’s adversaries increasingly shelter their high-value military and industrial assets underground, Adam Smith considers the need for developing more effective missiles

dEfENCE CApAbILITy pROgRAmmEs – sEA

68 Evolving the Royal Navy’s Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) Capability

Simon Michell reviews how the Royal Navy is addressing the aerial threat and enhancing its ship-to-shore strike capability

72 The Type 26 global Combat ship – a Renaissance Warship?

The next piece in the Royal Navy build-programme jigsaw is the Type 26 surface combatant. Dr Lee Willett outlines how partnerships are key to this project

76 Latin America: the Land of Opportunity for britain’s defence and security Industry?

Matt Ince highlights recent successes for UK defence companies in Latin America

79 Automation at seaDavid Wright of Babcock looks at the move towards the automation of payload handling to improve the flexibility of future surface ships’ launching systems and equipment that is capable of fulfilling a wide range of missions at sea

82 ballistic missile defence for Europe: Now more Than Ever

Captain George Galdorisi, US Navy (retired), and Dr Scott C Truver put a compelling argument for the need for a US/European Ballistic Missile Defence shield

dEfENCE R&T

86 The growing Cyber-security marketChris Aaron explains how major defence contractors have developed their capabilities to take advantage of the increasing demand for cyber-security services

88 A fast-Evolving ThreatIlias Chantzos of Symantec Corporation assesses the extent of the cyber-threat and the difficulties that cyber-attacks present in terms of proportionate, legitimate response

91 The UK and the Joint strike fighter: an Acquisition programme in Crisis?

Peter D Antill and Pete Ito examine the progress of the F-35 programme and suggest that the UK Government still has some difficult decisions to make in the future

99 sTEmming the tideEdward Lundquist reports on efforts to encourage young people today to participate in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) programmes

102 That sinking feeling: Iran’s Anti-ship missile ArrayIran has a layered network of modern anti-ship missiles sourced from China, which has helped it to implement a plan for maximum sea control. Robert Hewson reports

104 global Challenges – the Ads sector’s New HorizonNick Cook of Dynamixx explains why the aerospace, defence and security sector is suited to the energy and infrastructure markets that have developed due to climate change

106 Index of advertisers102

86

Contents_RUSI 15.1 SUMMER2012.indd 7 27/7/12 16:48:53

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9

editor’s letter

FINAL PROOF

Feeling the Effects

W elcome to the Summer issue of RUSI Defence Systems, which focuses on the kinetic effect – from bullets to missiles; air-launched, ship-borne and ground-deployed. Our contention

piece, written by Nick Watts, asks the thorny question of whether the UK Armed Forces would be better off with a 7.62 calibre personnel weapon or the current family of 5.56 SA80 individual weapons. The arguments are varied and perhaps somewhat inconclusive, but the need to main-tain simple lines of supply in terms of ammunition has been impacted to some degree by the introduction, under the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) system, of 7.62 Sharpshooter rifles, which were needed to engage the Taliban at the greater distances from which they are increasingly operating. The UOR system itself comes under the spot-light in Stuart Olden’s feature on how best to bring much of the UOR-inspired equipment into the core equipment programme. Although this has been exercising minds for a considerable amount of time already, the optimum way to integrate many of these platforms – such as Jackal, Mastiff, Ridgback and Wolfhound – is not always clear, and the potential to spend money unwisely should be avoided at all costs.

The recent announcement that the coalition government intends to build a successor to the Vanguard Trident submarines is good news for Rolls-Royce and its workers in Derby and elsewhere. It also secures the UK’s place at the top table in international affairs for a while longer. However, it is an expensive programme and one that will not see direct benefit in terms of export orders, although the technology and know-how required to build such a complex weapon system will no doubt find its way further afield. In addition, the programme doesn’t really address the vexed question of the UK’s sovereign capabilities on the battlefield, as any use of the deterrent is inconceivable without the overt agreement of the United States. Professor David Kirkpatrick explores the issues surrounding sovereign capability and exportability in his feature on ‘Linked dilemmas in UK Defence policy’.

Nearly two years after the UK’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), its implications are becoming starker. As the British Army prepares to reduce itself to 82,000 soldiers, the test of the Reserve concept will soon be upon us. Employers will face a dilemma of their own when faced with recruiting Reserve members: a topic that was hotly debated at RUSI’s Land Warfare Conference in June. Other capability gaps are also putting strain

By Simon Michell, editor, RUSI Defence Systems

on the acceptance levels of the SDSR. Airborne maritime patrol, as part of a layered system for the nation’s defence, the monitoring of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and, not least, support for the deterrent subma-rines will at some stage assume greater urgency. There are some compara-tively inexpensive routes forward including palletised systems that can be installed onto existing C-130 Hercules aircraft using a similar concept that has been proposed for Merlin helicopters. The Autumn issue will explore this in greater detail.

Exporting our way out of dangerThis year’s Farnborough International Airshow received unprecedented support from government ministers in a sign that the aerospace/defence industry is viewed as one of a number of industrial hotspots that will help the UK to grind itself out of the enduring financial debacle that has overwhelmed Europe. The prime minister backed this sentiment in his opening speech, declaring that, “We’ve established an Aerospace Growth Partnership to make sure that five, 10, 20 years down the line this industry continues to thrive and grow…” He went on to say, “The further develop-ment of Typhoon that we have been working on with our partners is good for the RAF, who need this capability, good for our export customers, who want it too, and brilliant for the British manufacturers and British workers who are going to benefit.” Another programme that also offers significant export potential is the F-35. The scope of this is covered in greater detail in this issue.

As always, RUSI Defence Systems welcomes contributions from our wide audience, be that academia, the military, industry, procurement agen-cies and ministries worldwide. Please do not hesitate to contact me on simonm@rusi.org if you would like to make a contribution.

Simon MichellEditor, RUSI Defence Systems

00 Editors Letter_ka.indd 9 26/7/12 16:09:27

10 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

defence contention

The British know about musketry. It was the rolling volley fire of the Redcoat that won the empire. It was the disciplined rifle fire of the Tommy that halted the Kaiser’s army in 1914. But how are

we faring in an age of asymmetric war among the people? Throughout its long and distinguished 300-year history, the British Army

has seen debates over the effects of innovation on tried-and-tested tactics. About a hundred years ago, such a debate was under way on the effect of machine guns against massed infantry attacks. Unfortunately, a large casu-alty bill was needed before the case was proven. History points to other similar examples. In the woods of North America, columns of Redcoats were easy prey to colonial riflemen. On the North-West Frontier and in

7.62 RevisitedNick Watts argues that the time is right for a reassessment of the merits of 5.56mm rifle ammunition in favour of a heavier – and more lethal – replacement

South Africa, British infantry had to relearn the need to suppress an elusive enemy that knew the terrain in which it was operating.

The current debate surrounds the relative merits of the 7.62mm bullet versus its 5.56mm counterpart. Commentators regarded the introduction of the Sharpshooter into service by the British Army as an admission that the lethality of the 5.56mm bullet fired by the standard issue SA80 rifle was inadequate. This is not the place to revisit the controversy surrounding the performance of the SA80, but it is a chance to revisit the reason why the British switched from a proven 7.62mm round to a lighter one.

The US used a 5.56mm round in Vietnam, where the weight of equipment carried by infantry was an issue. Another factor was that the lighter weight of ammunition gave a soldier more suppressive firepower. Most engage-ments were at close range, for which the 5.56mm round gave adequate lethality. Subsequently, a NATO study determined that any encounters in north-west Europe would be in the 300-metre range, which would suit a

British troops from 1 Welsh Guards respond to enemy fire in Helmand province, Afghanistan

“You don’t win a war by dying for your country – you win it by making the other guy die for his country.” General George S Patton

01 - 7.62 RevisitedLP.indd 10 26/7/12 11:13:07

11

defence contention

5.56mm round. British Special Forces adopted a 5.56mm round by virtue of their adoption of the M-16 rifle. Meanwhile, the Green Army was embroiled in Northern Ireland, where a 7.62mm round was often considered too pow-erful for close-quarter shooting in town centres.

An early portent of what lay ahead emerged from an action in the Falklands campaign. On 31 May 1982 a small detachment of the Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare cadre – acting as a brigade reconnais-sance force – identified Argentine forces at a key location. Top Malo House lay in the line of advance of 3 Commando Brigade. This objective had to be secured in short order. During the successful raid to seize this feature, a British NCO and an Argentine from 602 Commando Company exchanged gunfire at close quarters. The British commando was armed with a 5.56mm weapon, his adversary with a 7.62mm one. Both were wounded, but the recollection of the Royal Marine NCO as he was struck by the more powerful 7.62mm bullets was along the lines of “I’m coming second in this gunfight!”.

The British Army has had recent experience of the effectiveness of small-arms fire in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Making alterations to suit changing tactics is to be welcomed, but doctrine appears to have been confused concerning the relative merits of the 5.56 and 7.62 calibres. As a result of experience in Iraq, additional firepower was needed at section level. The Light Support Weapon (LSW) was a heavier version of the SA80 rifle, but was magazine-fed – reminiscent of the old LMG/Bren gun. It lacked the ability to provide sustained fire. The FN Minimi was acquired for rifle sec-tions; it was belt-fed and it also chambered the 5.56mm round.

Experiences in AfghanistanIn Afghanistan, British forces have found that the Taliban adjust their tactics very quickly. Close-quarter battles are usually won by British and ISAF troops, so gunfights are now conducted at longer range. Taliban fighters are usually equipped with Soviet-era AK47 derivatives, which chamber 7.62mm ammunition, probably produced locally and much more potent than standard issue. They also have ex-Soviet Dragunov sniper rifles. In this scenario the 5.56mm round lacks the lethality to reach the enemy. To provide

suppressive firepower with sufficient lethality required the reintroduction of a 7.62mm version of the Minimi weapon. The Minimi supplemented the punch of the 7.62mm GPMG, which was also issued to section level. The contract to buy the 7.62 Minimi was in the region of £10 million-£20 million.

In 2009, the MoD expressed its satisfaction with the standard-issue 5.56mm round, and in August of 2010, following a US trial, it issued a heavier 5.56mm round. This was judged to be effective out to 500 metres, against a 7.62mm round, reckoned to be effective out to between 600 and 800 metres. In January of the same year, the 7.62mm Sharpshooter was introduced. An initial batch of 400 of the US-produced weapons was ordered as an Urgent Operational Requirement at a cost of £1.5 million. The argument about lighter ammunition seems to have got lost in a campaign

Doctrine appears to have been confused concerning the relative merits of the 5.56 and 7.62 calibres

where soldiers regularly carry a 90-pound load on operations. Likewise, ‘fire for effect’ seemed to have replaced ‘shoot to kill’ as a doctrine in tacti-cal engagements. The quote from General Patton at the beginning of this article makes the point: you don’t necessarily win wars by being effective.

No doubt, lessons will be learnt from the Afghan campaign. I hope that one of them will be to re-examine the calibre of standard-issue weapons. The whole purpose of the NATO standard round was to reduce the strain on supply chains. The 7.62mm was designed to stop a charging Soviet rifleman. The 5.56mm may be suitable for certain types of engagement. Perhaps a standard round nearer to 7mm will be sufficient. After all, there is little value in equipping soldiers with good optic sights, enabling rapid target acquisition, if the end result is not conclusive. n

A member of a boarding team from HMS Somerset takes part in a training exercise

01 - 7.62 RevisitedLP.indd 11 26/7/12 11:13:15

12 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

Defence Acquisition

FINAL PROOF

On 22 June 2012, The Times newspaper reported that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was on the verge of approving a proposal by the Chief of Defence Materiel, Bernard Gray, “for letting the private

sector run Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S)”1. The story offered signif-icant detail and was clearly based on a leak from within the MoD. It showed that the idea of the DE&S being a government-owned, contractor-oper-ated (GOCO) organisation, which was a prominent element of Mr Gray’s 2009 report on defence acquisition reform, was in the lead position of options for reforming the DE&S. However, when the Secretary of State for Defence, Philip Hammond, spoke to Parliament on 18 July, he signalled that commitment to a GOCO approach was far from firm and that nothing decisive would be happening in the short term.

“The work to determine value for money between the options will take place over the next few months, and in parallel we will begin development of a commercial strategy, engaging industry to hone our requirement,” he said. This work will support decisions later in the year on whether to proceed with the GOCO option and whether to launch a competition for

The Defence Materiel Strategy and the GOCO proposal for Abbey WoodRUSI’s Acquisition Focus Group asks some key questions about the way in which a government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) defence equipment and services supplier would function

the private-sector management company to run the organisation. Provided that the further work demonstrates that the Value for Money case for GOCO over ENDPB/SP is conclusive, this will be followed by an Investment Appraisal that will test the GOCO against a public-sector comparator, fol-lowing which a decision on whether or not to proceed will be taken.”

Questions and observations about how a GOCO would workWhile setting up such an undertaking is being, and will be, fully appraised from all perspectives in the business case and subsequent internal govern-ment dialogue, we have attempted to stand back and collate our own set of observations, challenges and questions, to which we hope that the depart-ment’s political leadership should be able to respond with conviction:1. How would assessment in any competition for the selection of a DE&S lead company be arranged? No other country has taken this route, and so no company has the experience of running a state’s total defence acqui-sition function from procurement to through-life support and disposal. The US defence experience of Lead Systems Integrators, under which one

Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) headquarters at Abbey Wood, Bristol

02 - AFG 20 July 2012_ka.indd 12 27/7/12 10:46:46

13

Defence Acquisition

FINAL PROOF

company has overseen the delivery of a programme of projects by other firms, has not been encouraging and the practice has been abandoned.2. What restrictions would be placed on a DE&S lead company with regard to that firm’s other business dealings worldwide? It is conceivable that those links could include working with contractors working on or compet-ing for defence projects in the UK. 3. For what period would a DE&S lead company be appointed? Given that its main performance metric would appear to be the delivery of projects on time, to specification and on budget, how would the contract length be aligned to the life of projects? Many defence projects take more than eight years from what might be called the real commitment to them (the Initial and Main Gate points frequently lack their intended clarity) and the MoD is also keen to manage projects on an early stage on a whole-life basis – a period of perhaps 40 years in some cases.4. Would a DE&S lead company be responsible for decisions or simply for advice? If the latter, life would be much simpler, but what would be the point of making the change? Current DE&S teams already outsource many advisory functions to contract staff and consulting companies.5. If a lead company was to have decision-making authority of the type currently vested in DE&S, what would be the limits of ministerial, Treasury and Cabinet powers and the extent of the company’s legal responsibilities? The Secretary of State referred to the MoD retaining control over ‘strategy’, but what would this mean?6. In legal contractual terms would the company have the status of princi-pal or would it be an agent of the MoD? Would it be the company’s signa-ture on contracts for major projects such as the F-35 and, if so, how would the US Government respond with regard to export licenses and the transfer of classified information?

7. The UK occasionally buys things from the United States under the American Foreign Military Sales framework. The eighth UK C-17 bought earlier this year is a case in point. How would a private-sector firm conduct such a transaction?8. How would a DE&S lead company handle UK involvement in existing and prospective international projects such as Typhoon and the A400M, where its collocutors would all be government staff?9. Would the company take responsibility for a programme only after the prime contractor for its delivery had been chosen by the government as a whole, ie at the preferred bidder stage? On the other hand, could a com-pany be asked to take responsibility for the execution of a contract if it had not selected the contractor? 10. Those taking a decision should be responsible for the risks involved. What financial risks would any DE&S lead company be asked to take on board? As the NAO has documented, defence projects increase in cost and take longer than expected for a range of reasons, many of them well outside the control of DE&S. A project team has little control over foreign

How would assessment in any competition for the selection of a DE&S lead company be arranged?

exchange rates, VAT rate changes or ministerial decisions to stretch out projects. For which sources of delay/cost increases would the DE&S lead company be held responsible? If the answer is few or none, how would the company be incentivised to keep projects on schedule? As one of our group observed, it would have ‘no skin in the mangle’. 11. Could the weight of causes of cost increase be measured sufficiently accurately and reliably to enable the allocation of the extra costs to the government and a DE&S lead company, if necessary in a court? The deci-sion on which agency carried which risk would have implications for the preferences of a DE&S lead company: for instance, if it did not own foreign exchange risk, it would be more relaxed about choosing foreign systems. 12. If the GOCO was to take on multi-dimensional financial risk, which clearly could run into billions of pounds, how much would it charge the MoD for its commitment?13. How would any DE&S lead company make money and, at the same time, how would the MoD save money? A company would inherit thousands of contracts that could not be easily changed, and would have to take on large numbers of DE&S staff under TUPE (Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)) arrangements. That number of staff could not be cut arbitrarily and could be reduced only through legally valid restructuring or performance-management arrangements. Such elements are unlikely to be

RUSI Acquisition Focus Group

The RUSI Acquisition Focus Group comprises individuals with significant defence experience acting in a personal capacity to analyse pressing acquisition issues. Its papers can be found in RUSI Defence Systems since 2006. Its current membership is:

John Weston (chairman, formerly group chief executive ■■

at BAE Systems)Tim Banfield (director at NAO)■■

Bob Barton (formerly managing director at Niteworks)■■

Sir Jeremy Blackham (formerly Deputy Chief of the ■■

Defence Staff at the MoD) Sir Brian Burridge (VP strategic marketing, Finmeccanica ■■

UK, formerly, CinC Strike Command) Hugh Colver (formerly group communications director at ■■

BAE Systems and formerly chief of PR at the MoD)Professor Malcolm Chalmers (head of research at RUSI)■■

John Dowdy (director at McKinsey & Co)■■

Professor Christopher Elliott (formerly director, doctrine ■■

and strategic analysis at General Dynamics)Graham Jordan (formerly science and technology ■■

director at the MoD)Sir Kevin O’Donoghue (formerly chief of defence ■■

materiel at the MoD) Bill Robins (formerly director general of information and ■■

communications services at the MoD)Professor Trevor Taylor (head of RUSI’s Defence, ■■

Industries and Society programme) The Acquisition Focus Group is hosted by RUSI’s Defence, Industries and Society programme, which aims to facilitate an evidence-based understanding of the place of industries in Western defence and wider society.

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14 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

Defence Acquisition

FINAL PROOF

put in place and implemented in less than two years. For those remaining, changing their culture and behaviours would not be an overnight exercise. 14. Would, or rather should, a government in practice hand over decisions on spending around £16 billion a year to a private company, especially when those decisions have the potential to put in place long-term depen-dences of UK armed forces on foreign sources of supply or to present employment threats and opportunities to specific regions in the UK?

The decision to select an offshore supplier cannot be taken in isolation of wider UK interests. This has long been an area in which the DPA (Defence Procurement Agency) and, latterly, the DE&S have had no government guidance, and under the GOCO no such trade or impact analysis would be considered at all. It seems unlikely that the MoD would give clear guidance on such issues in a ‘strategy’ statement, especially given the rather circular logic to be found in the White Paper on ‘Security Through Technology’2.15. How would a GOCO be held to account by parliament, especially the Public Accounts Committee and the House of Commons Defence Committee? Within a democratic state, the political direction and oversight of defence is a key principle. In considering the establishment of such a GOCO, should there be concern about the government’s level of commit-ment to the proper level of governance, accountability and transparency required in a democratic nation’s public business?16. Who would have the power to dismiss the chief executive of the GOCO or to terminate its contract?17. Would a DE&S lead company have responsibility for safety and envi-ronmental impact – two elements that can add cost and information chal-lenges, especially when dealing with equipment bought from overseas?18. How would the MoD define, oversee and monitor the performance of any DE&S lead company, and how many staff and how much money would this entail? How would the MoD make assessments within a project on whether the ‘right’ balance had been struck on the crucial, but complex, issue of initial acquisition as opposed to through-life costs? 19. What provision would be made with any DE&S lead company for in-year, unexpected demands on Defence spending deemed essential by govern-ment? The DE&S allocation is the only source of in-year funds readily acces-sible to government and has, on occasion, acted as the ‘reserve fund’ of the MoD, being asked to take short-notice cuts in response – for instance, the decision to increase operational allowances. Would future governments lose the ability to do this and the flexibility associated with it?20. How would a changed DE&S respond to the novel priorities associated with military operations? A characteristic of the past decade has been the effectiveness by which the DE&S and industry have responded to Urgent Operational Requirements. This involved reprioritisation and reorganisation of resources within DE&S: any arrangement with the private sector should ensure that this flexibility would be present in future at an acceptable cost.

21. Would the DE&S be entrusted to one overarching prime contractor, albeit one with a number of specialised partners, or would different aspects of the DE&S’s work be entrusted to different corporate leaders?

It seems to us that the questions above all deserve well-thought-through answers before the boards of firms are invited to consider the GOCO oppor-tunity. Bidding would be a considerable and expensive process for industry to undertake, and necessarily demands a high level of confidence that it will result in a contract. UK industry should not be drawn into a lengthy and insufficiently researched solution that fails to result in a final contract, as we have seen in the past.

We recommend that the MoD and Her Majesty’s Treasury undertakes a well-informed and very substantive period of consultation and critical issues examination before any move is made. This should consider the pos-sible unintended consequences of the proposed arrangements, not only for government but also for industry, and the acquisition process as a whole, which has already witnessed too many ‘good ideas’, poorly examined, and equally poorly implemented.

Some dubious positivesWith regard to positives, try as we might, we were able to discern only two clear arguments in favour of a GOCO arrangement, neither of which is con-vincing and one of which may be undemocratic:

The first is that the MoD could acquire the services of a better class ■■

of programme and project managers, because a company can pay higher salaries than the public sector. However, the Prime Minister could easily give dispensation for a limited number of such people to be brought into the MoD at special salaries. That would be a transparent approach, open to the media and the public, whereas if a company is brought in to play a major role in DE&S, details of the salaries of its staff could be kept away from Parliament, the media and the public.The second is that a procurement company might be more resistant ■■

than the current DE&S teams to accepting proposals for require-ments (and so contract) changes from the users. That would help to control costs, but would also enhance the possibility that MoD forces would be equipped with inappropriate and inadequate equipment. In the increasingly important area of information sys-tems and cyber procurement, it is normal for fixed requirements to have a limited life, and there is a particular need for flexibility, agility and a close relationship between supplier and user. We recall that, under the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the Defence Procurement Agency was set up as a trading entity to create clearer arms-length relationships between requirements setters, procurers and industry, but that, in practice, military and political pressures often intervened.

The DE&S acquisition and management function in defence is much more diverse and complex than the development, production and support of nuclear weapons, and thus the GOCO model of the Atomic Weapons Establishment, where industry works under close supervision on a limited range of tasks, cannot be taken as a model. Those considering the chal-lenges that outsourcing can generate might do well to look at the MoD’s experience with the allocation of Joint Personnel Administration to a part-nership with EDS (now Hewlett-Packard) over the past 15 years.

Although this is a judgement call with which others may disagree, we assert that what is needed in the future are closer relationships among those responsible for specifying and prioritising requirements, those arranging procurement and support, and those developing and producing

We were able to discern only two clear arguments in favour of a GOCO arrangement, neither of which is convincing and one of which may be undemocratic

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equipment. Bringing the private sector, with its own financial interests, into a lead place in the procurement and support area will complicate the devel-opment of such close, responsive and agile relationships.

ConclusionThe GOCO proposal suffers from an inherent weakness, since it seemingly rests on an argument that, because the government is not very good at negotiating and managing contracts with the private sector, it is going to negotiate a contract with a private-sector entity to undertake the task on its behalf. Persuasive arguments against this logic need to be marshalled.

Any GOCO decision would have to pass the corporate attractiveness test. This means that the allocation of responsibilities and risks must make good business sense. It is difficult to see how on the bigger programmes such an arrangement could be easily achieved and, if the risks remain with the MoD as before, the result would certainly not be cheaper.

History is littered with ‘outsourcing’ deals that either or both parties eventually find constraining and/or, in practice, more expensive. The rail-ways privatisation is the most obvious example of this, but there are many others. It seems to us that the MoD may be embarking on one of the most complex cases ever attempted, and it should do so with its eyes fully open. An important factor of military acquisition, frequently ignored, is that DE&S is but one aspect of the mix. Any real improvement must consider the entire process and the array of those with a part to play throughout the MoD and the remainder of government, all of which have the power to negate any decisions made in Abbey Wood.

The bottom line is that, as practitioners and observers of defence acqui-sition in the UK and elsewhere, at present we cannot easily see how the DE&S as a GOCO would even work in practice, let alone why it would be a less expensive and better alternative to what is in place today. We ask our-selves what difference it would make to two of the three biggest projects in the UK programme – the deterrent submarine replacement, the carriers and the Joint Strike Fighter.

We also wonder whether ministers are being asked to take a decision about which the major implications are poorly understood, a situation now becoming apparent in the fallout from NHS outsourcing – a much simpler initiative. Ignorance is no substitute for objectivity – the government and the country cannot afford a wrong decision in this area.

In the meantime, we recommend that those tasked with making this solu-tion work use the questions above as an aid to a fuller examination. This might help to avoid the unintended, and potentially huge, negative conse-quences that always emerge from complex and challenging undertakings, especially where the pros and cons have not been thoroughly examined. n

Footnotes

Deborah Haynes, ‘MoD ready to ‘take brave pills’ and go private for procurement’, 1.

The Times, 22 June 2012

See ‘Acquisition Focus Group and the Defence White Paper’, 2. RUSI Defence Systems, Vol 14,

No 3, March 2012, www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201203_RDS_Acquisition_Focus.pdf

How would a GOCO entity impact on the Queen Elizabeth carrier programme?

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16 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

defence acquisition

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In recent decades the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been struggling to formulate a coherent defence policy and, in particular, to resolve dilemmas regarding its policies in international security,

equipment acquisition, and exports.

Alliance versus independenceIn the modern age, the UK has generally relied on alliances to prevent any single nation (Spain, France, Germany) from dominating Europe1. Today the UK is committed to join collective military operations in defence of the

Dilemmas in UK Defence PolicyProfessor David Kirkpatrick reveals the linkages between three dilemmas in UK defence policy, and insists that they need to be addressed together to formulate a policy that is coherent and affordable

NATO group of nations and in support of UN-authorised actions to promote global peace and security, and it does not plan to engage in any major operation without the active participation of the United States of America. For such military operations, involving the synchronised interaction of many force elements, it is essential that the UK’s armed forces can be integrated (via electronic networks?) with those of its allies2. At minimum, this demands some standardisation of communications and procedures, and preferably coherence in the allies’ national doctrines and equipment. Ideally, an alliance could coordinate the force structure development

British troops man a machine-gun post overlooking Bluff Cove during the Falkland Islands conflict

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of its associated nations, but that ambition has generally been thwarted by chauvinism and industrial rivalry3.

However, the UK’s image of itself remains influenced by the golden age of Victorian imperialism, when the Royal Navy dominated the world’s oceans and the UK fought independently4 a series of victorious ‘small wars’ against smaller or less-developed opponents. The national nostalgia for this epoch has been periodically reinforced by other conflicts (in 1940 and 1982) when the UK apparently fought alone. The recent Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)5 insisted that the UK should retain its ability to undertake alone any military operation needed to defend the UK’s national security or its vital interests, even if its traditional allies and trading partners dis-approved; the scale of such operations was defined in the SDSR, but the scenarios and the military capabilities required remain secret.

All but the simplest military operations need numerous complementary military capabilities, each of which is provided by several different force elements. In planning for a variety of independent military operations, the UK’s armed forces must therefore sustain all of the activities6 that support the force elements involved.

Open competition versus national preference In economic theory, the best value for money in the acquisition of goods and services is obtained by open competition in a free market. Reduction in the barriers to international trade allows nations to exploit their vari-ous competitive advantages to their mutual benefit, and individual con-sumers can, in turn, enjoy the advantages of unrestricted choice in a global market. For about two decades, from 1984 to 2005, the MoD adopted an acquisition policy based on international competition, open to all allied and friendly nations – except in a few particularly sensitive areas, which were restricted to national suppliers. Even in this period, the UK governments occasionally found some overriding national interest that required them to overrule the MoD’s equipment selection and to insist on acquisition from an onshore supplier.

Before and after that period, the MoD recognised that defence equip-ment acquisition was an exception to the general rule favouring open competition, because:

in a protracted war, any nation without a defence industrial base ■■

has to rely on fickle foreign contractors and on long and vulnerable supply lines, and is accordingly at a disadvantage;onshore contractors can, in an international crisis, supply additional ■■

equipment or upgrade equipment already in service more urgently than foreign contractors with other priorities;defence expenditure in peacetime is less unpopular if it is spent on ■■

prestigious (and photogenic) national projects that are claimed to generate jobs, tax revenues and exports7;the knowledge obtained through defence research and development ■■

on national projects can benefit commercial industries and stimulate economic growth.

Because defence equipment is regarded as exceptional, those nations that are sufficiently wealthy and that have the necessary technological competences often prefer to develop and produce equipment onshore to meet their national requirements. Such nations thereby provide their armed forces with assured access to a knowledgeable and experienced defence industrial base, but incur the diseconomies of small scale.

After two decades of adherence to open competition, the MoD’s 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS)8 accepted that the UK had a strategic interest in retaining some onshore technological and industrial capabili-ties. The DIS identified some key weapon systems for which it planned to

sustain onshore the relevant capabilities, through long-term multi-project ‘strategic partnerships’ with chosen onshore contractors to arrange the scale and schedule of future equipment acquisition. This strategy would provide ‘appropriate sovereignty’ over the use of these UK-operated weapon systems (and their supply chains), thus allowing the UK to under-take independent military operations, even if other nations embargoed support for equipment that the UK had previously imported. However, the DIS did not justify its selection of key systems by reference to the indepen-dent operations that they would support9 in extremis, nor did it discuss the likely impact of this strategy on the defence budget.

The 2012 White Paper promised to promote defence exports and to encourage small and medium-sized enterprises, but it was ambivalent about the UK’s overall defence industrial strategy. It did reiterate the UK’s aspirations to retain technological superiority over its potential enemies, and to remain a major military power able to undertake independent military operations when necessary10. It did not, however, indicate how these aspirations might be achieved, nor explain how the objective of national independence via appropriate sovereignty can be reconciled with its preferred acquisition policy of open global competition.

The 2012 White Paper promised to promote defence exports and to encourage small and medium-sized enterprises

Promotion versus opposition to defence exportsSuccessive UK governments have given more or less active support (via trade delegations, Service demonstrations and financing) to onshore defence contractors seeking to win export orders for their products, but this support had always been constrained by the governments’ reluctance to exacerbate a regional arms race or enable a tyrannical government to oppress its own population11. But the international market for defence equipment is relatively small, because rich nations generally supply their own requirements12 and poor nations cannot afford large quantities. Consequently, defence equipment exports benefit the individual onshore contractors involved, and may provide bridgeheads for enhanced UK influence and trade, but they do not yield significant benefits to the MoD’s budget nor to the UK’s balance of trade13.

The dilemmas are linkedIt is true that the UK’s defence policy in any of the areas discussed need not be at either extreme end of the alternatives presented. An alliance-based policy need not preclude the UK having some independent military capa-bilities needed for a few national operations, and national preference in equipment acquisition need not preclude open competition for some par-ticular supplies. But in neither case is there a happy medium; the UK must choose a policy near one alternative or the other. It would be nugatory, for example, to retain half of the military capabilities needed for some planned independent operation, particularly where an alert enemy could identify and exploit deficiencies in the UK’s force structure. Similarly the loss of some key onshore technological and industrial capabilities could erode

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18 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

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the independence of a much larger number of UK military capabilities. The dilemmas are real and cannot be fudged indefinitely.

Furthermore, there are strong linkages between the three dilemmas. For example:

active promotion of exports cannot be very successful without the ■■

prior expenditure on defence research and development sufficient to enable UK-based contractors to offer an array of cost-effective equipment, and without national preference, which has already pro-cured such equipment for the UK’s armed forces;an alliance-based policy, in which the UK relies on the complemen-■■

tary military capabilities of its allies’ forces, reduces the UK’s need for an onshore defence industrial base since allies prepared to fight alongside the UK would continue to supply and support equipment that the UK had previously imported;a defence industrial strategy would be more economical if the ■■

key weapon systems that the UK chose to sustain using strategic partnerships had good prospects of achieving exports14, to spread the relevant contractors’ overheads and reduce fluctuations in their workloads;open competition on most of the UK’s acquisition programme ■■

would involve greater reliance on the goodwill of foreign contractors and their governments (unless technology transfer to an onshore contractor can be negotiated), yielding less UK freedom of action and fewer UK exports.

Because of these linkages, it is important that the MoD should choose a set of policies that is coherent. Of course, they must also be affordable within credible future defence budgets. ■

Footnotes

The war in 1773-83 to retain control of the Thirteen Colonies in North America was a 1.

notable, and unsuccessful, exception

Modern warfare is more complex than in 1914, when the British Army deployed on the left 2.

of the French Army, but did not need to integrate their operations

When one dominant partner can impose its authority on smaller allies and direct their 3.

defence policies, their association becomes an empire rather than an alliance

The Victorian victories were actually gained with the support of substantial Imperial contin-4.

gents, and in 1940 about a fifth of RAF Fighter Command’s aircrew were foreign allies

HM Government, 5. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, Cm 7948, TSO London, Oct 2010

In the UK, these activities are called Defence Lines of Development (DLoD), which are 6.

defined as Training, Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, Doctrine, Organisation, Informa-

tion and Logistics (TEPIDOIL)

The Treasury traditionally insists that the level of UK unemployment depends primarily on 7.

the government’s macroeconomic policy

Ministry of Defence, Defence Industrial Strategy, Cm 6697, TSO London, December 20058.

Another dilemma for the Ministry of Defence is its need to win public support without giv-9.

ing gratuitous information to potential enemies

Ministry of Defence, National Security through Technology, Cm 8278, TSO London, 10.

February 2012, paragraphs 9, 53

Zealous UK pressure groups insist that government policy is never ‘ethical’ enough11.

Saudi Arabia is currently one notable exception to this general rule 12.

A parliamentary inquiry into the UK government’s export credit guarantees is currently 13.

exploring whether they have yielded value for public money; this inquiry should provide an

overdue assessment of the net benefits of defence exports

The 2005 DIS, perversely, planned to support British capabilities to build warships rather than 14.

combat aircraft, which have in recent decades been more successful in export markets

A British Combat Logistics Patrol en route to resupply a Forward Operating Base in Helmand province, Afghanistan

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20 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

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MV(a?): Kinetic Warfare Brings Us Back to the FutureKinetic weaponry will remain a key component of land, sea and air arsenals for the foreseeable future, but will struggle to attract R&D investment. Dr Jeffrey Bradford explains why

indicates that 300- to 900-metre engagements are more commonplace2. This has caused problems for the infantry carrying 5.56mm-chambered weapons, causing the armed forces to either reintroduce heavier-calibre 7.62mm weapons or to experiment with a range of measures such as the US Marine Corps SOST 5.56mm round – all of which, no doubt, placing significant complexity on the logistics supply chain3.

In terms of vehicle-mounted weapon systems, the flirtation with main battle-tank guns above 120mm in diameter seems to have tailed off with the end of the Cold War confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. Heavy armour, the perceived arbiter in land warfare on the northern plains of western Europe, though still crucial, was arguably pushed into second place by the development of the helicopter gunship, which combines lethality with high mobility.

At present, one could make the case that land-combat systems devel-opment has suffered from the diversion of resources into countering the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) encountered on the battlefields of both Iraq and Afghanistan. This has been at the expense of programmes such as the US Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) and the UK’s Future Rapid Effects System (FRES)4.

At seaIn the naval environment, developments to radically employ kinetic effect are challenging strategic thinking. The mock video released in the Chinese media showing a ballistic rocket being used to physically destroy a US Navy aircraft carrier triggered a wave of discussion and, alongside more conventional developments, is solidifying thinking as to Chinese strategic intent to deny access to the littorals5.

British Challenger II main battle tanks on exercise in Oman

It seems almost unfashionable to discuss kinetic warfare when politi-cal interest, defence industrial capabilities and budgets are being realigned towards the latest priorities, such as cyber-warfare – kinetic

warfare being principally concerned with weapons that deliver mass (M) at velocity (V) for effect. In the 21st century, one could suggest that, in addition to MV, a (accuracy) also plays a fundamental part. However, kinetic warfare – while not as exciting, perhaps, as the latest perceived threats – has an important place in the defence arsenal. To paraphrase Lenin, maybe “Mass times Velocity has a quality all of its own”.

Mass multiplied by velocity is as relevant now as a capability, when look-ing at concepts emanating from Asia to neutralise US naval carrier battle group superiority or an underground WMD production facility, as it was in ancient times with the catapult1. The idea of propelling an object at speed as a weapon is evolving across the spectrum of military requirements. This article will seek to review and consider the potential of developments in the land, sea and air environments and their implications for the future.

On landAmong the most intriguing developments are those surrounding guided small-arms munitions. Current testing with ammunition for sniper rifles offers a leap in accuracy and safety for situations involving large numbers of civilians and other non-combatants. Extrapolating the results of these early tests will make infantry increasingly lethal on the battlefield, and the smart small-arms rounds make for a substantial force multiplier.

More generally, in the period since the Second World War, the conven-tional wisdom was that small-arms engagements would occur at ranges of up to 300 metres. Operational experience in recent times, however,

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Meanwhile, the US Navy is testing onshore an electromagnetic gun that, although requiring substantial power, is capable of firing a projectile some 110 nautical miles, potentially at velocities of five times the speed of sound6. Clearly, when perfected, the small size of ammunition required would give this weapon a prodigious capability and herald, perhaps, a mid-21st-century dreadnought to the world’s oceans.

In the airFor aviation, probably the most critical area of development is in small, high-powered kinetic weapons that can be mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at one end of the operational spectrum. At the other extreme is the development of weapons that have deep penetration and destructive power short of a nuclear device, to be deployed in tackling underground facilities used to develop WMD programmes.

For larger UAVs, such as the Predator, the Hellfire missile has been the weapon of choice. However, much smaller kinetic weapons are also being developed, such as the 13-pound Small Tactical Munition from Raytheon7 and the Boeing Small Diameter Weapon programme8. Both are clearly look-ing to the future, when UAVs will dominate the air.

Implications for decision-makersAll of these programmes could create a profoundly different operating environment for planning and executing military operations within our lifetimes. There are a few key implications that these developments can already be seen to have raised:

The Ethical Dimension■■ Development of massively powerful conven-tional munitions, such as the Boeing Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) device – ostensibly devised for use against underground WMD facilities – at one end versus micro-ordnance from an unmanned aerial vehicle, is likely to raise debate as to what is appropriate response in future warfare, especially in low-intensity operations.The Defence Industrial Base Dimension■■ Clearly, these new kinetic-weapon technologies are going to be expensive to develop and to deploy. In some cases, industry players are likely to have to take on a measure of the burden in terms of research and technology as, from a political standpoint, it can be suggested that these are “nice-to-haves” in simplistic terms. The struggles of the electromagnetic

railgun programme to continue to secure funding versus the C-17 airlift programme production line are symptomatic of this situation.The Grand Strategic level of military/political planning■■ Perhaps the thorniest area to consider. Given declining platform numbers as a trend and the increasing expense and technological frailty of weap-ons development, there is likely to be massive pressure to pre-empt an opponent in a crisis or prospective conflict situation.The Operational level of military planning■■ At this level, it could be suggested that pushing ever more powerful kinetic capabilities down- ward into the chain of command will place a greater decision-making burden on ever more junior ranks, given the effect at their disposal.

One is reminded of James Cameron’s 1980s film Aliens, in which a Marine Private has at his disposal thermonuclear weapons. Only a movie, perhaps – although the video cameras and body armour that the soldiers wore in that science-fiction film hardly look out of place when watching CNN today.

In summary, driven by operational experience and political need, there is a substantial level of activity aimed at strengthening kinetic effect in the land, sea and air environments. While budgets and political priorities may delay some projects, the trend towards greater kinetic warfare effects is clear. ■

Footnotes

‘China has carrier-killer missile, US admiral says’, 1. Washington Post, 27 December 2010, and

‘Weapons at heart of US-Israel talks’, Politico, 4 March 2012

‘The Next Generation/Biting the Bullet: The Case for a New NATO Rifle and Machine Gun 2.

Cartridge’, conference presentation by Anthony G Williams, 2010

P Buxbaum, ‘The Right Round’, 3. Special Operations Technology, Vol 4 No 8, June 2010

‘Don’t Rush to Buy New Vehicles, Army and Marine Corps Are Warned’, 4. National Defense,

6 March 2012

Washington Post5. , op cit

US Navy, ‘Navy sets new world record with electromagnetic railgun demonstration’, 6.

ref NNS101210-19, 10 December 2010

‘Mini-Weapons Add Punch to Small UAVs’, 7. Defense Technology International, March 2011

‘Boeing Team Gets USAF Contract for UAV Miniature Weapon Development’, 8. Defense

Industry Daily, 16 November 2009■

The AGM-114 Hellfire missile is the weapon of choice for the Predator/Reaper UAV

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By definition, UORs provide a capability for a specific theatre of operation that cannot be provided from the current Core Equipment Programme (EP) and are Treasury-funded, up to

the point that their capability or theatre of operation is terminated. Operation Herrick, for example, saw UORs such as Mastiff and Ridgback, Jackal and Wolfhound being rapidly introduced. With the drawdown of Herrick in 2014, combined with the government’s commitment to main-taining capacity for medium-scale enduring effort and combined arms manoeuvre capability, the need to confirm the content and structure of Future Force 2020 (FF2020) is becoming an ever-pressing requirement. This is particularly relevant following announcements that FF2020 has

Bringing UK UORs into the Core Equipment Programme: Defining the Optimum SolutionStuart Olden is heading up a team of BMT defence-sector companies advising the UK Ministry of Defence on what to do with wide variety of systems procured under the Urgent Operational Equipment (UOR) process over the past decade. He proposes a systems approach based on rigorous cost-benefit analysis

been secured by an increase in the equipment budget of £3 billion, which will have to be justified against operational requirements and capabilities.

The question, then, is how best to utilise the plethora of UORs that are potentially key to Britain’s ongoing and future capability to defend the interests of our nation, and those of our allies, and how they fit into the long-term plans of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for FF2020. It is an issue that is already receiving consideration at the highest level, with the National Audit Office1 and Public Accounts Committee2 both commenting on the matter during 2011.

Should the MoD wish to maintain the capability that is currently provided by a UOR, several options are available, including to:

Ridgback vehicles were just one of a range of Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) platforms ordered under recent UORs

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Bring the UOR into the Core EP, providing the necessary enhance-■■

ments and support packages to maintain platforms and equipment through an extended life;Dispose of the UOR and replace with a similar (or enhanced) capa-■■

bility through the Core EP;Continue operating the current UOR capability alongside ■■

replacement Core equipment using a more flexible and agile procurement process.

Maintaining the capability by bringing the UOR into Core may, at initial review, be the most logical solution. However, the very nature of UOR pro-curement means that many of the MoD requirements, expressed through their Defence Lines of Development (DLoDs), may have been truncated or even bypassed to deliver the initial capability into service in a compressed timeframe. If not conducted in an appropriate manner, aligning the UOR with Core EP requirements could potentially attract additional resource expenditure that may exceed the initial acquisition costs. Other aspects of Core EP programmes would also need to be developed or extended, includ-ing Safety Assessments, Availability, Reliability and Maintainability studies, and longer-term spares and repairs planning.

The first step in defining which UORs should be taken into Core is to identify the cost benefit of a particular capability against the through-life capability it will deliver in line with the requirements of Defence Strategic Guidance (DSG). Conducting a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) will provide a deeper understanding of the options for delivering the capability required and of the associated pan-DLoD through-life costs associated with the potential solutions. As such, CBA – or, where the benefit is one of mili-tary effectiveness, a Combined Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal (COEIA) – would be a key initial activity of the complete ‘UORs into Core’ decision process and would provide robust evidence to support any funding approval decision or the recommendation of a business case.

BMT’s experience in conducting CBA on a wide variety of complex programmes enables us to identify the following issues as those likely to arise during this process:

In some cases, UORs were intended to fill one capability gap, but have ■■

also contributed to other capability areas. Defining a suitable bound-ary for the capability investigation may not be a simple matter;There are considerable uncertainties involved in defining a starting ■■

point for any comparison. Operational timelines and the attrition rates and serviceability states of UORs are difficult to obtain accu-rately and may have a significant impact on the perceived cost-effectiveness of an option;In most COEIAs, alternative options share a common procure-■■

ment schedule, with defined In-Service Date (ISD) and Initial/Full Operational Capability requirements. Over time, comparing the capability of options with very different schedules introduces an additional dimension. Metrics for through-life capability that have been used successfully in complex programmes, examining alter-native strategies to deliver enduring capabilities using different combinations of new acquisition, life extension and re-rolling other existing equipment, would be appropriate in this case;The fidelity and pedigree of information for different options is ■■

expected to vary considerably. There is likely to be a good under-standing of what would be needed for each DLoD to bring a UOR into Core due to the availability of in-service data; similar informa-tion for a new acquisition is likely to be less mature. Some form of ‘optimism bias’ (similar to that applied to acquisition costs) may be needed to allow a fair comparison;

Comparing Whole-Life Costs (WLC) for options with different ■■

start and end dates is difficult. Standard approaches to assessing the residual value of equipment at the end of a period of use are not always appropriate to this form of CBA and can skew the analysis. The use of Equivalent Annual Costs provides a recognised means of comparison;The cost of conducting a comprehensive COEIA may itself out-■■

weigh the benefits that would be delivered. Just as the BMT FAST (Flexible, Agile, Streamlined and Timely) Acquisition process has been designed to tailor the acquisition process to meet compressed UOR schedules, the COEIA process would need to be tailored to provide the minimum acceptable level of evidence to support the decision on the future of each UOR. This requirement for pace places an increased importance on the identification of, and engagement with, the principal stakeholders.

On conducting a CBA it may become apparent that not all UORs need to be taken into Core, with some capabilities simply being disposed of upon withdrawal from Operation Herrick due to their ongoing cost of ownership or lack of future operational relevance. Other UORs may need to be modified in order to ensure longevity and concurrence with the EP and the FF2020 construct.

With the amount of UORs procured over the Operation Telic/Herrick period, it is not unreasonable to assume that there will be a significant per-centage of this equipment that will not be taken into the Core programme, for a variety of operational, technical and budgetary reasons as outlined above. This could mean a direct disposal of the UOR equipment (via the MoD sales process), or there may be operational and/or cost benefits in putting equipment into storage for future use. The Controlled Humidity Environment (CHE) facilities in both Ashchurch in the UK and Ayrshire Barracks in Germany provide the ability to maintain returned UOR equip-ment in a state of readiness for future deployment and thus provide an alternative to the disposal, or ‘bringing into Core’, options. Developing this particular option further, one could look at the US model of ‘stockpiling’ equipment in areas around the world, which could be regenerated in a short time period for mobilisation in case of future operational need.

In order to handle the complex issues arising from taking UORs into Core, a decision-analysis model is required to enable options to be assessed and a decision taken to implement their ‘bringing into Core’, supported by a robust business case. The filtering process of identifying which UORs to take forward into Core is the critical element of this procedure and this may be assisted by the use of appropriate tools and models. The initial level of capability can then be compared using different parameters, such as time and cost, providing the MoD with a view of how programmes will integrate should various UORs be incorporated.

It may become apparent that not all UORs need to be taken into Core, with some capabilities simply being disposed of

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24 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

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Various approaches may be adopted to address the challenge. At the sim-plest level, a ‘Tetris’ enterprise assessment, which considers each project as a building block to providing a given capability contribution, could be used to examine the impact of different scheduling decisions on the overall abil-ity to achieve a required level of capability and the costs of delivering that capability. These decisions may include adjusting In-Service and Out-of-Service Dates (ISD and OSD), incremental acquisition strategies, re-rolling of existing equipment and taking risks against particular aspects.

The required level of capability will vary over time as threats evolve, and the contribution from each project will change due to technology insertion and attrition. Each project will often contribute towards many capability areas, so considerable care must be exercised to include all the essential information in the multidimensional enterprise view without introducing excessive complexity.

An iterative analysis is recommended, the initial stage of which would use rough estimates of cost and capability to identify the most promising UORs for bringing into Core and those that could be deleted. A modified COEIA process would then examine in detail whether bringing the UOR into Core would be the most cost-effective approach, or whether a new project, possibly extending the OSD of the UOR to provide temporary cover, would be more efficient in the long term. Wider political, economic, societal, tech-nology, legal and environmental aspects would also need to be considered at this stage. The conclusions would update the enterprise-level assess-ment to test that the initial assumptions and results remain valid once more detailed information becomes available.

The UOR/Core COEIA would be tailored to the problem, providing all necessary information at an appropriate level of fidelity, rather than blindly following a pre-defined analysis process. The decision model must take uncertainty into account at all stages, including the likely initial state of UOR equipment on completion of current operations, timelines and project schedules, the level of performance and capability that will be delivered, and the costs and risks of each approach across all of the DLoDs. An adjustment to address ‘optimism bias’ will often also be needed to allow a fair comparison between existing projects, the deficiencies of which have been identified through operational use, and new systems that are still at the concept stage.

By using suitable through-life cost and capability metrics, this approach will provide clear evidence to support and justify decisions on which UORs should be taken into Core and which capabilities could be delivered more cost-effectively through new programmes. Once a decision has been made on which UORs are to be retained and taken into Core, a roadmap for their delivery can be constructed. In a previous article for RUSI Defence Systems (February 2010, Vol 12 No 3), BMT explained its FAST acquisition concept. This process would help add value to the transition of UORs to Core by ensuring that all DLoDs are addressed in a timely manner.

BMT believes that, by undertaking a systems approach to the complex UOR- to-Core problem, key areas of focus can be identified and a cost-effective way ahead can be detailed for FF2020. This will ensure that the correct capabilities are selected to match the future operational requirements and that the cost drivers, risks and benefits are sufficiently defined for the capa-bilities to be efficiently and effectively delivered into long-term service. n

Footnotes

The cost-effective delivery of an armoured vehicle capability. National Audit Office, 1.

20 May 2011

Treasury minutes. Committee of Public Accounts Session 2010-122.

Once a decision has been made on which UORs are to be taken into Core, a roadmap for their delivery can be constructed

The Supacat Jackal MRAP has proved to be effective in Afghanistan

07 - UORsLP.indd 24 26/7/12 11:37:03

sponsored feature

An Exceptional Show Year

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As a reflection of the overall state of the defence market, there were relatively few innovative offerings available in the defence vehicles sector at Eurosatory, but Iveco’s stand, held jointly with Oto Melara, was something of an exception. In addition to two new configurations of the 8 x 8 VBM – one of them a fully equipped recovery vehicle – Iveco was particularly proud to present the prototype of the newly developed SUPERAV 8 x 8 amphibious vehicle.

For those who did not get a chance to see this exceptional vehicle, it exploits all of the lessons which Iveco’s designers have learnt over the past decades. Automotive reliability and simplicity is assured by the use of the Centauro driveline and the COTS Cursor 13 engine, with the majority of innovation focused on the hull design. By adopting the innovative approach of focusing protection on the areas of key value, SUPERAV’s design combines class-leading mine and ballistic protection with amphibiosity beyond Sea State 3, 13 cubic metres of internal volume and a mission payload allowance of up to 10 tonnes. Both wide and narrow variants are available, with the wide variant providing a greater amphibious mission

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allowance and the narrow version being capable of carriage in a C130. SUPERAV is a vehicle with exceptional promise and its low price tag and outstanding capability are already attracting widespread interest.

DVD saw further excitement, with the company’s contender for the Norwegian/Swedish joint logistic vehicle programme being shipped directly to the show from the trials ground. The vehicle is based on the protected 8 x 8 Trakker already in service with the British and numerous other NATO armies.

Following Iveco’s preference for partnering approaches, where industrial teaming arrangements are built up over time with like-minded team members, this variant has been fitted with a flatrack and a Hiab load handling system by Marshall Vehicle Engineering. Both on the trials

and on the Millbrook circuit, many users commented on the vehicle’s extraordinary comfort and ease of use. The ease with which the vehicle’s high level of mobility is maintained derives in part from the Automatic Drive Management (ADM) system, which will automatically switch diff locks on and off, maximising vehicle performance while reducing driver effort. The high-performance cab suspension and excellent noise and vibration insulation create a truly memorable driving experience – a great distance away from the traditional image of a more spartan military vehicle.

These state-of-the-art vehicles are setting the standard in the key capability areas of low-cost, high-performance 8 x 8 armoured utility vehicles, and heavy-duty COTS-protected logistics vehicles, and they promise to make an impressive impact in the years ahead.

SUPERAV is a vehicle with exceptional promise and its low price tag and outstanding capability are already attracting widespread interest

The SUPERAV 8 x 8 combines amphibiosity with air mobility and high levels of blast and ballistic protection

The EPLS variant of the Trakker has been praised for its drivability and comfort

IVECO_placed.indd 44 3/8/12 09:21:08

26 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

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FINAL PROOF

As crime rates began to fall in the early 1990s, reductions were attributed to factors ranging from economic prosperity to com-munity policing. It transpires that most crimes are committed

by a specific sub-population of young men, and when their numbers decrease the crime rate falls1. Governments usually claim the improve-ment as a victory for law-and-order policies, but in reality they are simply receiving a free gift from demography – a ‘demographic dividend’.

There is a similar dynamic at play with the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) portfolio of acquisition projects. They are getting older and, in terms of time and cost overruns, can be expected to improve. The success of the MoD’s acquisition reform programme, and popular perceptions of the

The MoD’s Demographic Dividend: What It Means for the UK Industrial Base and Acquisition ReformThe costs of major Ministry of Defence (MoD) projects have remained relatively stable since 2005. Linked to project maturity, the amount spent on technology development work in industry has been declining, which will have implications for the UK defence industrial base. Graham Jordan explains

effectiveness of Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), will need to be judged against this maturing project portfolio, not simply against past performance. To put it another way, the MoD should not count its ‘demo-graphic dividend’ as evidence of successful reform. This ageing of the port-folio also has adverse implications for the UK defence industrial base.

Where are we now?Project time and cost overruns do not occur uniformly across the life of a project. Data analysed by the National Audit Office (NAO) in 2008 for MoD Major Projects2 shows that about half of all overruns are declared during the second quarter of the interval between the decision to invest

The RAF Typhoon cost overruns are dropping out of the Minsitry of Defence budget equation

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funding, the Main Gate3, and the eventual In-Service Date, when capability has been delivered4 (see Figures 1 and 2, page 29). Most of the rest occur in the first and third quarters after Main Gate. A project at the mid point between Main Gate and the In-Service Date has three-quarters of its time and cost overruns behind it. When it is three-quarters of the way from Main Gate to the In-Service Date, almost all of its overruns have already occurred – overruns in the last quarter of a project’s life before the In-Service Date are very small, and smaller still after the In-Service Date itself.

What does this mean for the MoD’s current portfolio of major acquisi-tion projects as they have evolved over time? From data given in the NAO’s 2011 Major Projects Report (henceforth, the MPR 2011), it can be calculated that the proportion of the MoD’s Major Project portfolio that is now past the halfway point between Main Gate and In-Service Date is approximately 80-90 per cent of the total5. Most current Major Projects, in other words, should have 75 per cent of their time and cost overruns behind them, lead-ing us to expect relative stability for them in the future.

This increased stability is already visible in the Major Projects portfolio. Analysis presented by the NAO in the MPR 2011 shows that most of the cost overruns that have occurred since 2000 took place before 2005. And the projects that led to most of the cost growth before 2005 have now ended, or are nearing completion (Typhoon, Nimrod, Type-45 and Astute).

Figure 3 (see page 29), taken from the NAO’s MPR 2011, shows the rapid increase in costs up to 2005, and the relative stability thereafter. Within the stable area post 2005, the uptick at around 2009 deserves special mention. As MPR 2011 makes clear6, this recent bout of cost growth is due entirely to budgetary decisions taken by the MoD Main Building (for instance, opting to reduce spending on the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers and slow the production of Astute-class submarines, both of which led to extra costs in the longer term), and to external factors, such as adverse movements in exchange rates. Almost none of the increases originated within the proj-ects. This contrasts to the situation pre 2005, when cost increases mostly originated in the projects themselves. In the period between 2005 and 2008, cost increases originating within projects fell to a much lower level than before and were largely cancelled out by other factors.

Even cost increases that the NAO shows as originating in the individual projects may have their origin in decisions taken in MoD Main Building. The MoD has repeatedly allowed projects to pass Main Gate without first ensuring that their main risk areas had been resolved, or allocating the money to do so7 – contrary to both good practice and the MoD’s own policies at the time. At least some of the cost increases attributed to the projects, therefore, probably originate in Main Building decisions. This is crucial to prospects for the future and for acquisition reform.

What about the future?Looking five years into the future from 2011 (on current forecasts of In-Service Dates), by 2016 all but three of the current major projects can be expected to have reached their In-Service Date. One of the three projects is the second batch of Astute-class submarines, and since two boats from the first batch should be in service by then, we can probably regard the second batch as being ‘post In-Service Date’ as far as overruns are concerned. That leaves just two projects: the Joint Combat Aircraft ( JCA – the formal des-ignation for the F-35 Lightning II) and Specialist Armoured Vehicle (SV)8. Whichever way we look at it, the rest of the current portfolio is mature and unlikely to generate much in the way of overruns to disturb the stability portrayed in Figure 3. The key question is: what new projects are likely to come into the Main Project portfolio?

The successor submarine for the UK’s future nuclear deterrent is due to pass Main Gate in 2016, and it seems inevitable that it will have first

The key question is: what new projects are likely to come into the Main Project portfolio?

call on the resources available for equipment acquisition. The cost of the submarine programme has been announced as £20 billion-£25 billion at out-turn (that is, future year) prices9, and this seems to be the part of the future nuclear deterrent programme that will appear most prominently in future MPRs (the warhead will presumably be funded within an ongoing contract to run the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), and the cost of the US-produced missiles is a continuing maintenance cost rather than a ‘project’ [that is, capital cost]). The submarine cost announced is the cost estimate made when the project was funded for its formal Assessment Phase and passed Initial Gate10 last year – by the time the Assessment Phase finishes in 2016, experience suggests that it will have grown somewhat.

In particular, there is some risk of undue optimism here, given the impact of reality on the affordability of the defence budget. In any event, the suc-cessor submarine programme seems likely to account for one-third to half of the total cost of projects to be reported in MPRs towards the end of this decade (the sum of the projects in MPR 2011 is about £60 billion, spread over multiple years – the total later in the decade may, of course, be less or more than this).

It follows that the MoD’s future performance in controlling project costs reported in those MPRs beyond 2016 is likely to depend disproportionately on the successor submarine project, after it has passed Main Gate. How well can we expect the MoD to do in controlling the cost of the successor project? In announcing the cost of the project, then Secretary of State for Defence Liam Fox specifically referred to the MoD’s intention to spend about 15 per cent of the total project cost before Main Gate11. Assuming that this money is spent on thoroughly de-risking the project prior to Main Gate, this would accord with the good-practice framework referred to earlier, and should avoid what we believe to have been one of the

Not all of the cost increases incurred in the Queen Elizabeth-class carrier programme can be laid at the project’s door

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28 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

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causes underlying the sharp rise in project costs seen prior to 200512. In addition to this, the Astute programme has been extended in order to keep skills fresh in the industrial workforce that will eventually build the successor submarines, and it is to be hoped that as much as possible of the technology and skills will be carried over from Astute to the successor project. Thus, the prospects for the cost stability of this dominant project, after it passes Main Gate in 2016, appear good (although, as noted earlier, a once-for-all cost increase at Main Gate also seems likely13.)

What other projects might join it in a future Major Projects portfolio? One of particular significance is the JCA. Most of this project is beyond UK con-trol, but the signs are not good. It has the potential to be the second biggest project in the Major Projects portfolio, after the successor submarine, and will be scrutinised in closer detail below. Other apparently substantial proj-ects that have passed Initial Gate are the Global Combat Ship (T-26); the SV; the Multi-Role Vehicle (Protected) (MRVP); and the Family of Complex Weapons (FCW)14, which may well provide the air-defence capability for T-26 as well as the future Indirect Fire Precision Attack (IFPA), and air-to-surface attack capabilities for all three services. Of these, the SV has also passed Main Gate, but the others have not.

It is difficult to know what this sub-portfolio might cost, but it is hard to see it exceeding £10 billion. However, it all has the potential to go signifi-cantly wrong and to test whether the MoD’s project management really has improved. This includes whether Main Building has provided adequate financial provision for pre-Main Gate de-risking. The MPR identifies about £0.5 billion of Assessment Phase spending on these projects, which looks too low – especially in view of the 15 per cent spend on pre-Main Gate de-risking recommended by the Smart Procurement report15, and actually provided for the successor submarine. This sub-portfolio looks to be the biggest risk area, but it seems unlikely to have got far enough down the road to put severe upward pressure on the budget before 2016, even if things do go significantly wrong.

Returning to the JCA, what was originally billed as a ‘low-cost’ stealth aircraft is proving to be anything but. Part of the cost growth can be attributed to poor management of the de-risking and technical develop-ment programme in the US, and although the signs are that new managers are trying hard to grip these, no end is yet in sight. According to recent reports16, unit costs seem likely to be around £80 million, but with strong upward pressure and the potential for further delays. If the UK were to procure numbers similar to the current Tornado fleet, the project would likely cost around £10 billion.

But in the light of financial pressures on the MoD, powerful arguments can be made that the UK is more likely to buy only around 50 aircraft, rather than the 134 in the Tornado fleet, leading to a cost of around perhaps £5 billion17. But whatever number of aircraft is eventually purchased, the unit cost will be largely determined by what happens in the US, and will be beyond the power of the UK to influence much. Note, finally, that the MPR 2011 does not reveal the full cost of this project, because purchase of the actual fleet is being treated as a separate project, and has not yet passed its Main Gate. The figures of £5 billion-£10 billion for the fleet would be in addition to the £2.5 billion shown in the MPR 2011.

The potential benefits from the demography of ageing projects carry a hidden cost to the defence industrial base

F-35 costs will largely be determined by what happens in the United States

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How should we sum this up? But for the cost growth generated as a consequence of the MoD reshaping the budget to deal with the mismatch between financial provisions and commitments, the cost of the acquisi-tion programme has been stable for several years; the last big upward surge attributable to the individual projects, rather than decisions made in Whitehall, was prior to 2005 (see Figure 3). This reflects the fact that the MoD portfolio of Major Projects is now quite mature and beyond the ‘dangerous years’, when cost growth and timescale slip usually occurs. In other words, this stability reflects the ‘demographic dividend’. It may also reflect the fact that big projects seem more likely to overrun than smaller ones (and there have been few of the former launched recently), or that MoD project management has got better, or both. This situation is unlikely to change before about 2016, thus implying little or no cost growth and slippage in that period, save on the JCA, about which the UK can do little.

Beyond 2016, the Major Projects portfolio seems likely to be dominated by the successor submarine project, which has the potential for large cost overruns beyond its Main Gate in 2016. But the MoD seems to have made adequate financial provision for de-risking work prior to Main Gate, and if this money is spent wisely, we should expect to see costs kept under control post Main Gate. Nevertheless, we still think it likely that the costs announced at Main Gate for the submarine project will be higher than the £20 billion-£25 billion outlined in May 2010. That, however, will not count as an increase in MPR terms, which counts increases only after Main Gate.

That leaves the handful of ‘big’ Major Projects (successor submarine, Astute and JCA) and some smaller ones (listed above). The latter do not seem to have been adequately funded to allow thorough de-risking pre Main Gate, and are most likely to generate overruns. But they are unlikely to have got far enough for the overruns to emerge before 2016 and, when and if they do, the blame may well lie with Main Building for underfunding the Assessment Phase. If the precedent of the ‘pre-2005 portfolio’ is fol-lowed, this sub-portfolio could be expected to increase in cost by about 20 per cent, before stabilising.

Added to all these will be some projects that have reached their In-Service Date (ISD) by 2016, but are still delivering equipment. These count as live projects, but those with stable costs. There could be £10 billion or more of these. To set against this source of stability are some new projects that Secretary of State Philip Hammond announced on 14 May this year18, which appear to include a new Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV), a Warrior upgrade (see page 48), new complex weapon and ISTAR projects, and an Apache Life-Extension programme. On the scant information available, these may cost around £10 billion eventually. They have yet to pass Initial Gate or start their Assessment Phases, and their prospects for cost escalation are hard to assess. But on past experience they may increase in cost by about 20 per cent when they become part of the Major Project Portfolio (MPR), although they seem unlikely to reach their “dangerous years” of cost escalation until towards the end of the five years beyond 2016, or perhaps even later.

Drawing this together suggests that around one-third of the MPR may be vulnerable to cost escalation of around 20 per cent in the five years from 2016, excluding the cost increases in JCA, which are beyond MoD control.

What does this mean for acquisition reform?The MoD has struggled to deliver major projects to cost and time over the years. But the current portfolio is relatively mature and its cost growth is mainly in the past. Unless Whitehall deliberately delays ongoing projects because of affordability issues with the overall equipment pro-gramme, and thereby generates cost increases, there should be relative stability in terms of total cost and schedule. The success of acquisition reform, whether this consists of changes in the DE&S, in Whitehall or in

both, will therefore need to be judged against this more stable base, taking the maturity of the portfolio into account, and there seems to be limited scope to further improve stability by reform in the near term.

Under current arrangements, cost growth and timescale slip across the MP portfolio is likely to be roughly flat until 2016, except for the JCA. Beyond 2016, in addition to any further cost growth in JCA, new projects, many of which have been underfunded pre-Main Gate, and amounting to perhaps a third of the portfolio, seem likely to increase in cost by about 20 per cent in

Figure 1: In-Service Date delay per quarter (MG-ISD)

Source: NAO MPR 2008 Fig 9

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Figure 2: Cost increase per quarter (MG-ISD)

Source: NAO MPR 2008 Fig 10

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q40%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Source: NAO MPR 2011 Fig 9

Figure 3: Percentage increase in major project costs since Main Gate

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Figure 4: MoD spend on the “D” part of “R&D”

Source: SETS Statistics 2011 Table 2.2 (£ million, 2009-10 prices)

£3,000m

£2,500m

£2,000m

£1,500m

£1,000m

£500m

£0m00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10

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the five years to 2021: suggesting approximately six to seven per cent cost growth in the whole portfolio out to 2021. That is the ‘do nothing’ yardstick against which the success of acquisition reform should be judged.

Potential benefits and hidden costsBut these potential benefits from the demography of ageing projects carry a hidden cost to the defence industrial base. As projects move to matu-rity, the component of challenging technical work within them declines. Historically, this is work on which UK defence industries have depended to extend their capabilities, maintain their skills and simply keep up to date.

The extent to which such work is declining is indicated by data published by the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills in their Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics (SETS)19, showing the MoD’s spend on ‘Experimental Development’ – otherwise known as the ‘D’ in ‘R&D’. This is the part of the R&D process in which it is necessary to design, test, rede-sign then test again – in order to produce an equipment design that can be produced to cost on the production line, and subsequently perform reliably and deliver the required capability into the hands of the armed services. Not all of this development expenditure comes from the equipment acqui-sition budget, and not all of it is spent between Main Gate and In-Service Date, but most does get spent in this way.

Figure 4 (see previous page) is based on the SETS and shows how the MoD’s ‘Experimental Development’ spend has declined since 2000-01. As a footnote to the SETS makes clear20, at least part of the decline is due to projects tapering off their development programme as they get to the manufacturing stage and closer to their In-Service Date.

This decline in the MoD’s development spend seems set to continue, although it may climb upwards for a while as significant development work is carried out on the successor submarine. To set against this, it seems that UK development work on the JCA will taper off. It is doubtful that the aggregate effect will produce a sustained rise in development spend and, in any event, there seems likely to be a significant shift from aerospace to a highly specialised section of maritime technology that has little or no export potential – no country exports nuclear submarines.

Unless some new technology programme is started, separate from equip-ment acquisition, the ability of the UK defence industrial base to offer new equipment that delivers the demanded capability, or to modify or upgrade existing equipment, seems likely to decline. The possible implications of this lie beyond the scope of this article. n

Graham Jordan has been a RUSI associate fellow in defence technology since 2004. From 1997 to 2003, he was the UK MoD’s science and technology director. The author is grateful to John Dowdy, a director at McKinsey & Company in London and leader of its global aerospace and defence practice, for his invaluable contribution to this article

Footnotes

1. StevenDLevittandStephenJDubner,Freakonomics: a Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden

Side of Everything(London:AllenLane,2005),Ch4,‘WhereDidAlltheCriminalsGo?’

2. A‘MajorProject’isonecosting£200millionormoreandsubjecttospecialNAOmonitoring

3. MainGate is the point atwhich themain decision to invest funding ismade. TheNa-

tionalAuditOffice’sMajor Projects Report focusesmainly on the cost and timescale of

15majorprojectspostMainGate.Betweenthem,theserepresentaround90percentof

thetotalvalueofpost-MainGateequipmentprojectscurrentlybeingfundedbytheMoD.

Typically,85-95percentofprojectfundsarespentafterMainGate.The15MajorProjects

rangeinvaluefrom£339millionto£15,583million.SeeNationalAuditOffice,Ministryof

Defence:The Major Projects Report(London:TheStationeryOffice,2011),p6,andFig2on

p11.NotethatthemainnarrativeaboutMoDprojectcostandtimescaleincreasescontained

intheNAOMPRsreferstoincreasesthatoccurafterMainGate.Itisgenerallyacceptedthat

costandtimescaleestimatesmadebeforethispointareimpreciseandsubjecttorevision,but

thatMainGateisthepointatwhichtheseestimatesbecomefirm;furtherchangesarethen

subjecttoclosescrutiny.Seealsonote10,abouttheprojectphasesbeforeMainGate

4. TheIn-ServiceDateisthedateatwhichenoughoftheequipmentorsystemisworkingand

inthehandsofthearmedservicesforamilitarycapabilitytobegintoexist

5. Thepercentageofprojectspastthehalfwaypointwascalculatedintermsoftotalprojectcost

pasthalfway,usingthedatainNationalAuditOffice,opcit,Fig2onp11,Fig12onp25,and

(forsomeMainGatedatesnotincludedinFig12)theindividualProjectSummarySheetsin

Vol2.Theprojectsarethoselistedinnote3.Anallowancewasalsomadeforthelikelyscale

oftheJCAcostsyettobedeclared

6. SeeNationalAuditOffice,opcit,Fig8onp20

7. GrahamJordanandJohnDowdy,‘AcquisitionandTechnology:theProblemThatWon’tGo

Away’,RUSI Defence Systems(Vol10No2,October2007);GrahamJordan,‘TheProblem

withDefenceTechnology’,RUSI Defence Systems(Vol13,No1,June2010)

8. TheJCAisastealthycombataircraftbeingdevelopedintheUSwithasubstantialUKinput.

TheSpecialistVehicle(SV)isafamilyofmedium-trackedcombatvehiclesforarangeof

purposesyettobefullydefined

9. Hansard,HouseofCommonsdebates,18May2011,Col352

10. InitialGateisthepointatwhichapprovalisgiventospendmoneyonaformalAssessment

Phase,aimedatdoingthetechnicalworknecessarytoresolvethemainrisksthatpotentially

affectthetime,costandperformance,andsoachievereliableestimatesoftheseasthebasis

fortheprincipalinvestmentdecisionatMainGate.SeeReview of Acquisition for the Secretary

of State for Defence: an Independent Report by Bernard Gray,MinistryofDefence,October

2009,Section7.3.1onp122,andalsoFig7-2,onp123

11. Hansard,opcit

12. Seenote7

13. Seenote10

14. SteveWadey,‘ProgressingTeamComplexWeapons’,RUSI Defence Systems(Vol13No1)

15. ‘Transforming the UK’s Defence Procurement System’, Private communication from

McKinsey&CompanytotheSecretaryofStateforDefence,February1998;citedbyvarious

sources,suchasMinistryofDefence,The Acquisition Handbook,4thEdition,2002,p15,and

Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence,opcit,p122,andJonathanCave,

DavidSCChuandMarkALorell,Smart Procurement: Report on Procurement Reform and

Acquisition Reorganisation in the United Kingdom,RANDCorporation,1998,p9

16. Aviation Week, ‘PentagonSlicesF-35Buy toPay forOverruns’,31October2011;Aviation

Week,‘USAFtoExtendF-16stoCoverF-35Delays’,9November2011;Aviation Week,‘F-35

LRIP4Jets7%overTargetCost’,2December2011

17. MalcolmChalmers,‘LookingintotheBlackHole:IstheUKDefenceBudgetCrisisReally

Over?’,RUSIBriefingPaper,September2011,p13

18. Hansard, House of Commons debates, 14May 2012, Col. 261-264;MoD Press Release

061/2012,dated14May2012

19. DepartmentforBusiness,InnovationandSkills,SET Statistics 2011,Table2.2,www.bis.gov.uk/

policies/science/science-funding/set-stats

20.Ibid.Footnote21toTable2.1

The decline in the MoD’s development spend is set to continue, but may climb with work on the successor submarine

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32 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

Defence Acquisition

FINAL PROOF

Both the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in the United Kingdom and the Democratic administration of President Barack Obama in the United States are in the process of substantial

defence reorganisation, reflecting exceptionally severe current budgetary pressures, but also other considerations. In consequence, comparing and contrasting policy and political developments related to national security on both sides of the Atlantic can prove insightful and revealing.

The most visible features of the policy and political debates in the UK and the US overshadow fundamental realities that differ from the surface appearance. Recent apparent policy continuity in the US contrasts with pro-found organisational and doctrinal shifts over the longer term. By contrast, the UK’s greater historic continuity provides not only essential stability to strategies, but also insights useful for its ally across the Atlantic Ocean. This in turn offers an opportunity to encourage cooperation at a time of limited resources, and perhaps also revive the Anglo-American alliance more widely.

Immediately after taking office in May 2010, the UK’s coalition govern-ment announced a comprehensive three-month defence policy review, which resulted in the planning document Future Force 2020. The govern-ment and the military services faced an overall shortfall of £38 billion in the Ministry of Defence budget.

Dramatic reduction in numbersIn response, drastic cuts have been planned. In the Royal Navy, reductions included 5,000 sailors, 10 warships and the Harrier jet aircraft fleet, as well as the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal. The government does plan to con-tinue the construction of two new aircraft carriers, reflecting the priority of the maritime dimension in overall military priorities.

Furthermore, the British Army is to be reduced to 82,000 regulars, while the Royal Air Force will also see its size cut to 31,500 by 2020. That said, former UK defence secretary Liam Fox declared that spending on military equipment will increase by approximately £3 billion between 2015 and 2020.

Defence Debates and Developments in the UK and the US – the Long-Term PerspectiveThe UK and the US can still learn from each other when making vital decisions about their respective defence postures and organisational structures. To make this point, Arthur I Cyr from the US Foreign Policy Research Institute compares and contrasts UK and US defence policy changes since the end of the Second World War

At the same time, the Levene Report has proposed organisational changes to foster inter-service cooperation, similar to American innovations of recent decades, and greater authority for individual service chiefs.

Not surprisingly, the impending cuts have resulted in intense debate. A report from the Defence Select Committee of the House of Commons has expressed concern about the anticipated levels of force reductions. Labour Party shadow defence spokesman Jim Murphy declared there will be a “strategic shrinkage by stealth”, using a pun related to advanced aircraft camouflage technology to accuse government officials of being less than forthcoming. He also emphasised the unemployment that will result from cutting projected shipbuilding projects, notably on the Clyde in Scotland1.

By contrast, apparently there has been more continuity in the United States regarding defence. In an unprecedented move, President Barack Obama retained the Bush-administration defense secretary Robert Gates in place. This is a departure from American party-political practice regarding not just the Pentagon, but cabinet-level positions generally.

Not surprisingly, the impending UK defence cuts have resulted in intense debate

38_Defence_Debates_UK_and_US_ka.indd 32 26/7/12 16:06:29

33

Defence Acquisition

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Gates has considerable prestige across partisan lines, and over many years has demonstrated remarkable effectiveness at building coalitions of support in Congress, both at the Pentagon and as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Obama’s decision to retain Gates also reflects Democratic Party political weakness regarding national security. Leading up to the 2008 presidential election, the Democratic Party led the Republican Party among the public at large in perceived effectiveness almost across the board, including the economy, education, healthcare and alleviating poverty. The one exception was defence policy, where the Republican Party was preferred consistently.

In a highly partisan political era, compounded by great pressures to reduce the Federal fiscal deficit, Gates proved adept at maintaining biparti-san support, even while implementing painful budget cuts. He fought hard, with mixed success, to reduce weapons programmes that were behind schedule or over budget. Prime targets included the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor fighter, Boeing’s C-17 transport and the programme to arm Boeing 747 aircraft with laser weapons (YAL-1), the Army’s Future Combat Systems operation and the Missile Defense Agency2.

Following up quickly on these specific decisions, he announced an across-the-board freeze on hiring, a 10 per cent per year cut in spending on civil-ian contractors and the elimination of the Joint Forces Command, created for inter-service cooperation. This last move generated intense heat from politicians in Virginia, where the Command has been based.

European allies also face hard choices with regard to spending. In short, while Gates’s continuation in office represented continuity, he also spear-headed spending and policy shifts.

The YAL-1 airborne laser – the programme to arm Boeing 747 aircraft with laser weapons – was cancelled in December 2011

Former US defense secretary Robert Gates executed a number of painful programme cuts

38_Defence_Debates_UK_and_US_ka.indd 33 26/7/12 16:06:40

34 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

Defence Acquisition

FINAL PROOF

This introduces the wider point that American strategic debate over the long term, in some contrast to that of the UK, has been characterised by considerable alteration in both policies and more fundamental strategic doctrines. Arguably, in the UK, defence policies are the reflection of rela-tively long-term considerations, including fundamental strategic premises.

The contrasts in the approaches of London and Washington to national security reflect basic, if subtle, cultural contrasts. In reality, the UK approach has been the one more characterised by continuity and incrementalism, while the US has been more given to clear demarcations and sometimes sudden, sharp reversals of policy paths.

With the beginning of the 1960s, the new Kennedy administration both substantially expanded defence spending and gave emphasis to quantita-tive analysis, especially the employment of econometric statistical tools. At the same time, the government of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in Britain continued to maintain more strategic consistency about the employ-ment of military forces, generally avoiding the increasingly pronounced American propensity to engage in relatively abstract conceptual exercises.

New priorities of the Reagan eraDuring the 1980s, the Reagan administration, at least during its first term, provided a stark contrast with priority emphasis during the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations on negotiation and détente with the Soviet Union and China. There was once more a substantial expansion of mili-tary spending and capabilities across the board, including strategic nuclear weapons, reflecting the earlier Kennedy administration and a pronounced shift in public concern about the long-term Soviet strategic buildup. This was followed, during Reagan’s second term, with a renewed emphasis on possibilities for arms control agreements, especially with the Soviets. Likewise, during the last year of his brief administration, John F Kennedy gave emphasis to arms control negotiations, culminating in the 1963 partial nuclear-test ban treaty3.

In keeping with American practice, these years were characterised by a range of conceptual and organisational innovations, not always coor-dinated or sustained. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act brought about the greatest military reorganisation since the Department of Defense was established in 1947. The President and Secretary of State for Defense were given direct authority over new unified military commands, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff moved to advisory and training missions.

The Quadrennial Defense Review further represented preoccupation with organisation and doctrine. Mandated by Congress in 1997, the statute requires thorough evaluation and planning for structure of forces, mod-ernisation and budgeting. Hailed as usual as a dramatic departure from the past, and clearly part of the effort to cope with a security environment drastically changed by the end of the Cold War, in reality the new reviews were continuous with the American propensity for doctrinal redefinitions married to bureaucratic reorganisation. The annual “State of the World”

reports of the Nixon administration, with their heavy military security emphasis, come to mind as precedents.

To describe differences is not to deny similarities or mutual influences. As political scientist Samuel Huntington pointed out, at times the UK has led the way in strategic shifts that were later adopted by American ana-lysts and planners. The Eisenhower administration’s ‘New Look’ of 1954, which underscored the importance of the nuclear deterrent, was preceded by a similar change in doctrine by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his government. The reduction of levels of reserve forces in Britain in 1955 foreshadowed a US decision to do the same two years later. The abolition of military conscription in the UK in 1960 anticipated the American move to an all-volunteer military a little over a decade later4.

Contrasting approachesNevertheless, this general similarity in broad movements in military policy has been accompanied by a large number of contrasts in emphasis and approach. The American ‘New Look’ stressed the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons, with a complementary drastic reduction in conventional forces. A comprehensive report issued by defence minister Duncan Sandys of the Macmillan government was not characterised by the complex conceptual discussion of strategic theory that characterised the American debates.

Moreover, UK military security policies during the early 1960s reflected nothing like the sharp American reversal from a formal commitment to “massive retaliation” to an equally explicit adoption of “flexible response”. The very substantial build-up of US conventional military forces and strate-gic nuclear missiles beginning in the early 1960s contrasts with the contin-ued steady, if slow, reduction in British military force levels. In 1961, the UK was able to address the Berlin crisis only by extending the terms of service of conscripts who remained in the forces.

At times, the UK has led the way in strategic shifts that were later adopted by American analysts and planners

US defense secretary Leon Panetta has criticised European military inadequacies

38_Defence_Debates_UK_and_US_ka.indd 34 26/7/12 16:06:48

35

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These historically contrasting strategic security policy styles are generally congruent with different practices in recruitment to line and staff policy positions in the United Kingdom and the United States. In the US, there has been greater movement of business executives, scientists and others into and out of government. Greater turnover in personnel below the top posts has encouraged greater unpredictability in policy prescriptions.

Same direction, different outcomesIn both countries, the 1960s witnessed efforts to employ modern manage-ment tools to provide greater control over defence spending and the direc-tions of military and strategic policies. Systematic quantitative analysis, termed Planning Programming Budgeting (PPB), was introduced to the Pentagon by US defense secretary Robert S McNamara in 1961.

Soon thereafter, the UK went through a similar reform. In broad terms, techniques for guiding defence policy were moving in the same directions in both countries, but the outcomes were different. In the United States, emphasis on formal centralisation led to increasing conflicts between the secretary and the services. In the UK, on the other hand, a much more cen-tralised system of control was actually achieved.

Generally the greater centralisation, coordination and unity of the UK government have facilitated long-term effective cooperation with the military and continuity of policies, with less short-term disruption of these trends. The role of the Treasury in decisions on annual budgetary expendi-ture is of primary importance. The position of this distinctive department of government, and the unitary of the UK national government overall, which effectively fuses Cabinet and Parliament, has permitted much greater cen-tralisation in relative terms5.

The extensive political experience of Robert Gates’s successor, Leon Panetta, is already being tested as the administration confronts intense budgetary stresses within the already intense US presidential campaign.

In this regard, Gates’s criticism of alleged European alliance inadequacies in his June 2011 farewell address may prove to be a blessing in disguise. During the 1970s, General Alexander Haig, as NATO Europe commander, made great progress in coordinating logistics and supply, and by so doing strengthened his initially weak professional standing within the US military, as well as in Europe

A similar initiative today could prove beneficial at the levels of strategy as well as materiel. Practical collaboration could mitigate the US tendency to intellectualise strategy, while reminding UK leaders that logistics “…was at the heart of British defence doctrine at the beginning of this century6”. n

Footnotes

Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence Secretary Unveils Blueprint for Defence Reform’, www.mod.uk/ 1.

DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/DefenceSecretaryUnveilsBlue-

printForDefenceReform.htm; Newsnet Scotland, newsnetscotland.com, 10 August 2011, p1

‘Pentagon Pushes Weapon Cuts’, 2. The Wall Street Journal, 7 April 2009, online.wsj.com/article/

SB123903026250593091.html

See, for example, Herbert Nicholas, 3. Britain and the USA, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-

sity Press, 1963; Nicholas Thompson, The Hawk and the Dove – Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and

the History of the Cold War, New York: Picador – Henry Holt and Company, 2009; Andrew

J Bacevich, The Long War – a New History of National Security Policy Since World War II, New

York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp190 ff and passim

Samuel P Huntington, 4. The Common Defense, New York: Columbia University Press,

1962, p118

See, for example, Richard Burt, 5. Defense Budgeting: the British and American Cases, London:

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 112, 1975, p33

John Louth, ‘Leadership, Industrial Licence and Logistics – the Search for Some New Think-6.

ing’, RUSI Defence Systems, Autumn/Winter 2011, p42

The F-22 Raptor fifth-generation fighter has seen its numbers cut, but a substantial upgrade package has been agreed

38_Defence_Debates_UK_and_US_ka.indd 35 26/7/12 16:06:54

36 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

Defence Acquisition

FINAL PROOF

Operational requirements, in combination with decreasing defence budgets, put defence acquisition systems in Western states under severe pressure to provide the armed forces

with affordable and operationally effective equipment and services in time and on budget. Accordingly, acquisition structures and process have been under severe scrutiny as they have, more often than not, accounted for significant increases in costs, time delays and less than satisfactory quality in the provision of new equipment. Therefore, the reform of defence acquisition has become an key element of the wider reform of defence in many Western states. In the UK, government plans to reform the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) organisation are at the centre of this effort1.

In addition to the reform of national acquisition structures and processes, changing acquisition approaches within NATO and the European Union – in combination with bilateral cooperations such as the British-French Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty from 2010 or the Declaration of Intent on

Assessing the Reform of German Defence AcquisitionDr Henrik Heidenkamp of RUSI’s Defence, Industries and Society Programme provides his assessment of the reform of the German Federal Armed Forces’ defence procurement and in-service process

the Perspectives of German-French Armaments Cooperation from June 2012 – add further layers to the new defence acquisition reality of Western states.

This article takes a closer look at the reform of the German acquisition system. It assesses the new acquisition structure, examines the revised procurement and in-service process and highlights future challenges for the reform of German defence acquisition2. As Germany is one of the UK’s major allies, these aspects are also of particular relevance for the UK debate of defence acquisition reform.

The need for fundamental changeThe urgent need for a fundamental change in the German acquisition system has been highlighted by the Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr, General Volker Wieker, in his report on the review order resulting from the closed cabinet meeting on 7 June 2010: “For quite some time, freedom of action has been limited due to the procedures and processes in place, distributed

Reforming the German Defence Acquisition System has become a priority for the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg)

39 - Reform of German Defence Procurement_ka.indd 36 26/7/12 16:15:22

CentralAffairs

Project Coordination and Strategy

Land Combat Air Sea

Land Support

Information Technology

Federal Office for Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw)

IT SupportSpecial

Organisation HERKULES

Quality/Logistics

Purchasing

Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support Directorate (AIN)

Central Tasks division

Research and Technology and

International Affairs division

Modernisation and Government

Participation Issues division

Information Technology and IT Director division

Equipment and In-Service

Support division

DtVStRü USA/Ka

MArsITZBwWISWiWeB6

WTDs

The Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support Structure

Figure 1 Source: Heidenkamp 2012 (based on BMVg February 2012)

37

Defence Acquisition

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responsibilities, external influences and insufficient funding. In addition to this, all major armaments projects are characterised by three properties: They exceed the cost frame. They exceed the time frame. Frequently, they do not provide the required capability spectrum... Without a substantial reform of the procurement process, it cannot be guaranteed that the armed forces will continue to be appropriately equipped3.”

These shortcomings of the German acquisition system had already been identified more than 10 years ago by the external commission ‘Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr’ in May 2000. In its final report, the commission – under its chairman, the former Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker – made some far-reaching recommendations to reform the German defence procurement process, including the ‘central meeting of demand’, the ‘reduction of Main Gate decisions’ the ‘introduction of an agency solution’ and the ‘establishment of Integrated Project Teams’4. Unfortunately, the report was not able to generate enough political momentum, leaving the shortcomings of the German acquisition system more or less unaddressed for another decade.

When a new commission chaired by Frank-Jürgen Weise, chairman of the Federal Employment Agency, was asked by the then minister of defence, Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, to provide recommendations for the reform of the Bundeswehr in 2010, its recommendations in the area of defence acquisition made strong references to its predecessor commission5. However, this time, in light of the profound pressures from the changing strategic environment outlined above, the political environment was far more permissive, as reflected by the speech of minister of defence Thomas de Maizière in the German Parliament on 7 September 2011: “It is not a secret that the procurement process must be improved substantially. The processes take too long, delays and postponements bind equipment, which is potentially not required anymore at all or only in reduced numbers6.”

Accordingly, many of the recommendations of the Structural Commission’s report entitled ‘Focus on Operations – Concentration, Flexibility, Efficiency’ were incorporated into the BMVg’s (Federal Ministry of Defence’s) approach to reform the acquisition structure and to revise the procurement and in-service process. Some recommendations, however, were rejected7, such as the call for an ‘agency solution’, which would see the procurement organisation transformed into a private organisation, with more freedom regarding its organisational structure, human-resource approach and budget.

The new acquisition structureThe procurement and through-life management of armed forces equipment will be conducted by the newly created Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support Directorate (AIN) of the BMVg8. The director-ate has assumed the acquisition roles of the single services and merges the armament and information technology sectors of the armed forces.

The shortcomings of the German acquisition system had already been identified more than 10 years ago by an external commission

39 - Reform of German Defence Procurement_ka.indd 37 26/7/12 16:15:26

Capability and Functional Requirement (FFF)

Selection Decision (AWE)

Proposed Solutions

Analysis of materiel solutions

In-Service Authorisation (GeNu)

Target AgreementRealisation and In-Service (ZV)

1 1 2

3

Part Integrated Planning Process

ResponsibilityArmament

Central meeting of demandRealisation / In-Service Management as Project

IPT IPT IPT IPT

Chief of Staff Bundeswehr■■

Director of Equipment, Information Technology and ■■In-Service Support or President Federal Office of Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support

1. Potential user/operator ■■2. Future user/operator 3. Commander/Chief of Staff

Industry (shaded: participation if permitted by law)

Key

Figure 2 Source: BMVg 2012 (translation by the author)

Revised Procurement and In-Service Process

Preliminary Analysis Realisation DisposalAnalysis In-Service

38 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

Defence Acquisition

FINAL PROOF

Its core mission is to plan, coordinate and control all national and inter- national acquisition activities of the German Armed Forces9 (see Figure 1).

Subordinated to the ministerial AIN directorate will be the Federal Office for Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw), established out of the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement (BWB), the Federal Office for Information Management and Technology (IT-AmtBw), and will take over the in-service elements of the single services. It is envisaged to be operational by 1 January 2013 with around 9,500 posts – including approximately 1,000 military personnel10.

The BAAINBw controls the Armed Forces Technical Centres (WTD), Research Institutes (WIS/WiWeB) and Centre for Information Technology (ITZBw), as well as the Naval Arsenal (MArs), which carries out all mainte-nance activities above unit level for units afloat, as well as shore facilities of the Navy, and the German Liaison Office for Defense Materiel, USA/Canada (DtVStRü USA/Ka), which represents the German position in matters of defence technology or armaments when dealing with US or Canadian gov-ernment agencies or industry.

The revised procurement and in-service process The revised procurement and in-service process11 comprises three phases: Analysis, Realisation and In-Service. Each is conducted by Integrated Project Teams (IPT), which consist of representatives from AIN, potential and future users/operators from the armed forces and – as far as is legally permitted and functional – industry. The composition varies according to the demands of each phase of the acquisition and in-service process (see Figure 2):The Analysis phase In the first part of the analysis phase, the IPT, under the direction of the Office of Planning Bundeswehr (PlgABw), drafts the

Capability Gap and Functional Requirement (FFF) document. The FFF com-prises the project-related purpose, a description of the functional require-ments within a weighted requirements catalogue, as well as information on the budgetary and time conditions. The PlgABw representative – as IPT head – carries sole accountability for the FFF and submits it through the PlgABw to the Chief of Staff Bundeswehr for his authorisation12.

The authorisation of the FFF then initiates the acquisition and in-service process and triggers the transfer of responsibility from the PlgABw to the AIN directorate within the BMVg. Accordingly from the second analysis phase onwards the direction of the IPT switches from the PlgABw represen-tative to the BAAINBw representative (civilian or military personnel), who takes on the role of a Project Leader (PL)13. No further changes of direction will be made to ensure continuous accountability through the whole life cycle of the project and to prevent loss of know-how.

Based on the FFF, the IPT generates at least three alternative materiel solutions to fill the identified capability gap. Proposed solutions – ranging from commercial off-the-shelf solutions (COTS) to new product develop-ment – make reference to the quality and quantity of the requirements’ fulfilment, time and budgetary demands for the realisation phase and costs for the in-service phase, as well as to the integration into the overall planning of the Federal Armed Forces and the defence budget. In parallel, the possibility of binational or multinational procurement cooperation is assessed. Every solution is analysed and evaluated against its potential per-formance, time, costs and risks.

Again, the IPT head carries sole accountability for the proposed solu-tions. He presents to the Director AIN, who then forwards them with his own defence industrial/political evaluation to Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr. Co-signatures by other IPT members or military organisational areas

39 - Reform of German Defence Procurement_ka.indd 38 26/7/12 16:15:30

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FINAL PROOF

are specifically prohibited. The Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr has to make his selection from the proposed solutions. His selection is documented in the ‘Selection Decision’ (AWE), which, in combination with the industry con-tracts, is the basis for the ‘Target Agreement’ (ZV) between the Director AIN and the President of the BAAINBw regarding the realisation and in-service phase of the project14. The Realisation phase The signing of the ZV marks the separation between ministerial control and office-side realisation of the project15. The Director AIN and the President of the BAAINBw mutually determine the project’s time and cost framework and, as far as possible, the targets for the ‘Life Cycle Cost Management’ (LCCM). Whereas the Director AIN affirms the provision of the necessary resources from his area of responsibility, the President of the BAAINBw ensures the provision of services within the time and cost framework set by the AWE.

As the proposed and, subsequently, authorised solution has been gen-erated under the direction of the BAAINBw representative as IPT head, the President of the BAAINBw basically cannot refuse to sign the ZV. At the same time, realistic cost and risk assessments, as well as their communication in the second part of the analysis phase, are promoted. Furthermore, the ZV codifies a ‘design freeze’ to prohibit a dilution of the agreement through subsequent changes and amendments, which would increase the risk of cost overruns and delays. Lifting the design freeze requires the approval from the ministry’s executive level to reopen and modify the ZV.

Based on the verification that the supplied equipment fulfils the require-ments stated by the FFF and AWE, the PL issues the ‘Authorisation for In-Service’ (GeNu), which encompasses the approval of transfer by the user/operator, as well as the declaration of the technical operational safety. With the delivery of the first kit to the BAAINBw, its President assumes the materiel responsibility for the operational maturity. With the delivery of the first kit to the single services, the chiefs of staff take over the operational and support responsibility. Once the last piece of kit has been delivered, the realisation phase ends and the IPT head ends his realisation responsi-bility and takes on the responsibility for in-service control.The In-Service phase The In-Service phase begins with the delivery of the first piece of kit and ends with the disposal of the equipment. Accordingly, the realisation phase and in-service phase routinely overlap. The PL keeps his responsibility for all management tasks associated with the preserva-tion and renewal of the kits’ operational viability. Using the IPT structures, he initiates and coordinates measures to modify introduced equipment, as well as the provision of supplement and replacement orders.

To ensure that the BAAINBw gains experience from the in-service man-agement and is able to derive necessary actions from lessons learned, the tasks and expertise of the single services in-service leaders are relocated into the BAAINBw.

The single service chiefs of staff/commanders exercise the operational and support responsibility for the materiel part of the products utilised in their service to ensure their operational capability and viability.

Mission accomplished?The reorganisation of the German acquisition structure in combination with the revision of the procurement and in-service process is certainly a necessary step to address the existing shortcomings in the provision of affordable and sufficient quality equipment and services. Large cost over-runs, severe delays and insufficient quality of projects are just not accept-able anymore in a time of austerity and operational commitments.

The reform decisions, outlined above, appear to be a well-reasoned answer to the pressures of the new acquisition reality. However, much

will depend on the BMVg’s/BAAINBw’s ability to translate the abstract framework into effective procedural regulations for the determination and meeting of the Bundeswehr demand, based on the revision of the 2010 Customer Product Management (CPM) document that is expected to be released in January 2013.

Key issues to be addressed by the revised CPM are the actual degree and boundaries of industry’s involvement in the procurement process, the organisational and budgetary competencies of the IPT heads, the BAAINBw President’s position and competencies in the AIN structure, the relevance of research and development in the procurement process, as well as the concrete obstacles to lift the design freeze of the ZV. In addition, the impact of the new Urgent Operational Initiative instrument, which will replace the current Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process, on the revised procurement process should be examined16.

Moreover, how far the drafting of proposed ‘solutions’ to close identified capability gaps is limited to technical aspects needs to be clarified, and whether a solution will address the nature of the procurement approach, be it off-the-shelf, domestic or collaborative.

Furthermore, the debate surrounding the ‘agency solution’ for the BAAINBw is far from over. There are still many advocates for this solution, who regard it as a vital requirement for the overall success of the German acquisition reform, as it would arguably allow for a more economic and effective approach to organisational restructuring, human-resource man-agement and budgetary control17.

Of course, the reform of the German acquisition system cannot solve the fundamental problem that exists for German defence acquisition: a significantly decreasing defence budget with an investment share that has already committed 95 per cent to existing projects, leaving little room for new projects18.

Although it is worthwhile and necessary to take a bold approach to defence acquisition reform, policymakers should be reminded that effi-ciency gains through improved acquisition and in-service processes can only mitigate the lack of strategic funding – a fundamental requirement in defence – to a limited extent, if at all.

In conclusion, it is certainly too early to declare ‘mission accomplished’ for the Federal Ministry of Defence. Instead, the initiated reform process needs to be advanced consequently, based on a realistic assumption of what it can contribute to the overall reform of German defence policy, which has to provide a sensible framework for the defence acquisition structure, as well as the procurement and in-service processes. It would be misleading to assume that the new structure and revised processes can substitute for a lack of policy. n (See overleaf for footnotes)

The reform of the German acquisition system cannot solve the fundamental problem: a significantly decreasing defence budget

39 - Reform of German Defence Procurement_ka.indd 39 26/7/12 16:15:33

40 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

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FINAL PROOF

Footnotes

See Deborah Haynes, ‘MoD ready to “take brave pills” and go private for procurement’, 1. The

Times, 22 June 2012, and ‘Acquisition Focus Group and the Defence White Paper’, in RUSI

Defence Systems (Vol 14, No 3, March 2012), pp14-17

This article is based on publically available documents, particularly by the German Ministry 2.

of Defence and its external commissions and expert councils, as well as on interviews by the

author with senior acquisition experts

‘Report of the Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr, on the Review Order Resulting from the Closed 3.

Cabinet Meeting on 7 June 2010’, Berlin, p40

See Bericht der Weizsäcker-Kommission, ‘Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der 4.

Bundeswehr’, 23 May 2000, pp109-118

See Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, ‘Vom Einsatz her denken: Konzentra-5.

tion, Flexibilität, Effizienz’, October 2010, p88

See ‘Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung Thomas de Maizière vor dem Deutschen 6.

Bundestag zum Etat des Bundesverteidigungsministeriums am 7 September 2011’ (transla-

tion by the author)

See BMVg, ‘Konzentration und Verantwortung: Die prozessorientierte Neuausrichtung der 7.

Bundeswehr’, 7 February 2011, Berlin, and BMVg, ‘Hintergrund und Sachstand zur Feinaus-

planung des Bereichs Ausrüstung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung (AIN)’, 17 February

2012, Berlin

List of German abbrevations: Ausrüstung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung (AIN), 8.

Auswahlentscheidung (AWE), Bundesamt für Ausrüstung, Informationstechnik und

Nutzung (BAAINBw), Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung (BWB), Bundesmin-

isterium für Verteidigung (BMVg), Deutsche Verbindungsstelle des Rüstungsbereiches

USA/Kanada (DtVStRü USA/Ka), Fähigkeitslücke und Funktionale Forderung (FFF),

Genehmigung zur Nutzung (GeNu), Integrierte Projektteams (IPT), Marinearsenal

(Mars), Planungsamt der Bundeswehr (PlgABw), Projektleiter (PL), Wehrtechnische

Dienststelle (WTD), Wehrwissen-schaftliches Institut für Schutztechnologien-ABC-

Schutz (WIS), Wehrwissenschaftliches Institut für Werk- und Betriebsstoffe (WIWeB),

Zielvereinbarung (ZV)

See Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung, ‘Auftraggeber Bundeswehr: Organisa-9.

tion, Auftragsvergabe, Vertragsgestaltung‘, April 2012, p7

See BMVg, ‘Hintergrund und Sachstand zur Feinausplanung des Bereichs Ausrüstung, Infor-10.

mationstechnik und Nutzung (AIN)’, 17 February 2012, Berlin

This paragraph is based on the description of the acquisition and in-service process by the 11.

‘Council of External Defence Industrial Experts’, reporting to the Federal Ministry of Defence.

See ‘Bewertung des neuen Ausrüstungs- und Nutzungsprozesses der Bundeswehr durch das

Gremium externer sachverständiger Rüstungsexperten’, 23 May 2012, Berlin, pp12-15

The submission of the FFF may be seen as the breaking point for industry’s involvement 12.

in the first part of the analysis phase as the authorisation should be taken by the Chief of

Staff Bundeswehr without influence by industry (see Council of External Defence Industrial

Experts, 23 May 2012, p16)

Gerhard Heiming, ‘Novelliertes Beschaffungsverfahren CPM kommt’, in Online-Dienst 13.

Wehrwirtschaft (Vol 15, No 2, January 2012), p2

The breaking point for industry’s involvement in the second part of the analysis phase should 14.

be the actual requirement specification, which leads directly to the tendering process. Also,

the AWE may be taken without industry involvement (see Council of External Defence

Industrial Experts, 23 May 2012, p16)

Gerhard Heiming, ‘Novelliertes Beschaffungsverfahren CPM kommt‘, in Online-Dienst 15.

Wehrwirtschaft (Vol. 15, No. 2, January 2012), p2

See Thomas Steinmann, ‘Bundeswehr darf schneller Geräte kaufen‘, 16. Financial Times Online,

22 November 2011, www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland/:truppenausruestung-bundeswehr-

darf-schneller-geraete-kaufen/60132864.html

See Council of External Defence Industrial Experts, ‘Bewertung des neuen Ausrüstungs- und 17.

Nutzungsprozesses der Bundeswehr’, 23 May 2012, Berlin, p7

See ‘Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung Thomas de Maizière vor dem Deutschen 18.

Bundestag zum Etat des Bundes-verteidigungsministeriums am 7 September 2011’

The German Armed Forces contribute troops to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan

39 - Reform of German Defence Procurement_ka.indd 40 26/7/12 16:15:39

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42 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

Defence InDustry

FINAL PROOF

The RUSI Defence, Industries and Society Conference, held at the end of June, had as its theme: ‘The Defence Industrial Base – a Critical Component of Military Capability.’ In exploring this proposition,

senior officials, industrialists and academics engaged with speakers and delegates via topics such as the government-defence industrial relation-ship, the contribution of the industrialist to military operations, the future skills required for a successful industrial sector in defence, and notions of risk management and returns on investment. The keynote speaker was Peter Luff MP, minister for defence equipment and support.

An interesting and important issue arose. In a thought-provoking, sincere and far-ranging speech, Mr Luff argued for the rejection of the notion of a defence industrial base within the United Kingdom. He preferred, instead, to conceptualise the defence and national security effort in this country as being underpinned by market forces directing a global, private-sector supply base to the needs of the military, but with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – from the UK – at the heart of innovation and problem-solving.

The argument seemed to be that smart British SMEs positioned within global supply chains, corralled by market forces, and topped by the most effi-cient prime contractor would provide future capabilities while also deliver-ing value for money to the taxpayer. Consequently, according to the minister,

The Defence Industrial Knowledge Base – the Core Capability?Dr John Louth, deputy director and senior research fellow for defence, industries and society at RUSI, discusses the implications of the contention by Peter Luff, minister for defence equipment and support, that there is no longer the need for analysts to think in terms of a domestic defence industrial base

there was no need to think about a British defence industrial base as a com- ponent of military capability, let alone to consider it as the critical element.

This has caused me to ponder long and hard. I frequently use the idea of a national defence industrial base as something that forms an important element of the military instrument, seeing it as a useful building block of national capability and the capacity for independent – some may say, sov-ereign – action. Has this been a mistake and should I rethink this practice?

Stating a clear positionIn many ways, the position of both the minister and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is articulate and well rehearsed. The February White Paper, National Security through Technology: Technology, Equipment and Support for UK Defence and Security, was very clear in the direction of travel it sought for both the practice of defence acquisition and businesses engaging with the MoD. The government’s priority was to secure capabilities through open competition (where appropriate) and, when possible, to buy off-the-shelf equipment from the best-placed, most efficient and economic provider, while at the same time being cognisant of the needs for the security of supply and the maintenance of any UK technological advantage.

The White Paper also emphasised the importance of science and technol-ogy to the government with this element of defence given an investment

Peter Luff MP, minister for defence equipment and support, speaking at the RUSI Defence, Industries and Society Conference in June

09_Knowledge base_ka.indd 42 26/7/12 11:48:27

43

Defence InDustry

FINAL PROOF

‘floor’ of 1.2 per cent of the UK defence budget year on year. Moreover, the importance of SMEs within the UK to the country’s defence and security effort was emphasised. The government is smart, of course, to focus on this issue. With more SMEs in UK providing defence and security products and services than found in France, Germany, Spain and Italy combined, their economic as well as national security significance to the country is high – some might say especially so at a time when it is national policy to reduce the UK’s budget deficit.

Indeed, policies to unpack bureaucracy within the defence acquisition process, combined with specific measures to engage more SMEs through-out the defence procurement cycle, have been well-received by commen-tators and industrialists alike. This, though, makes it surprising that the notion of a UK ‘defence industrial base’ should be treated with such toxicity by government, especially as below the prime-contractor level these criti-cal SMEs are almost exclusively locally owned, managed and resourced.

In an effort to better understand, I talked to colleagues from MoD, academia and industry. It seems that the minister and his advisors reject the narrative of a national defence industrial base because it is flavoured with notions of protectionism, inefficiency and unwieldy historical commercial and industrial practices. Such a British defence industrial base, conceptually at least, com-prises large, inflexible, ex-public-sector businesses at the prime-contractor level. Potential policies and practices to reinforce the dominant position of such businesses are thought to be old-fashioned and out of date, igno-rant of the dynamics and benefits of globalisation and singularly focused on maintaining barriers to market entry. As a consequence, such a policy preference would be both inherently inefficient and woefully suboptimal, in that British forces could be denied the best, most affordable equipment and support – possibly found off-shore via responsive global technology businesses, international manufacturers and broader service providers.

Knowledge underpins national capabilityIf these are the images that come to mind when politicians and senior offi-cials in Whitehall and Westminster hear and read of the idea of a British defence industrial base, I can well understand the recoil and paranoia gen-erated by the phrase. For me, however, the idea is not so much a call for protectionism, but more a recognition that knowledge underpins national capability, and that much of this knowledge now resides in companies oper-ating from, and providing products and services to, the UK. Irrespective of where these companies are headquartered, their ownership arrangements or the nature of the contracts that bind them to our armed forces, these businesses play an integral part in our physical protection and national secu-rity. Thus, the idea of a defence industrial base becomes associated with the development, application and retention of knowledge – for military effect – not the economic protectionism of British-registered businesses.

By way of an example, let us consider defence test and evaluation services in the UK. These are provided to the armed forces in part through the long-term partnering agreement (LTPA) between the MoD and QinetiQ. Under the contract, QinetiQ offers real-time and simulated test and evaluation ser-vices for the armed forces’ platforms, systems, weapons and components.

The objective of this arrangement is the provision of accurate and timely assessments of capabilities throughout their respective life cycles to aid integration and reliability. It is a collection of services, in many ways, built around the skills developed by QinetiQ staff over the years, thereby enabling the UK to push equipment and components right to the edge of their capabilities. The existence of a forward test and evaluation pro-gramme, combined with the skills and competencies of the QinetiQ practi-tioners, collude to ensure that deep knowledge is generated, refreshed and retained within industry in direct support to frontline operations.

The LTPA is a long agreement, running until 2028, with an MoD option to extend to 2053. The certainty provided by this long-term enabling contract allows the company to plan appropriate recruitment, training and develop-ment activities to keep these skills polished, thereby providing real knowl-edge solutions to the department.

The long-term submarine programmes for Astute and ‘Successor’, like-wise, allow for a portfolio of skills and competencies to be framed within a forward programme of research, development, manufacturing and main-tenance workstreams that stretch out to the middle of the century. This work has the large businesses of BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce and Babcock at its heart, but also hundreds of specialist SMEs and individuals from the UK contributing essential skills and know-how, so that with ‘Successor’ close to 1,200 people are booking their time to this programme even before ‘Main Gate’, due in 2016, is reached. Consequently, the defence industrial knowledge base – built on a long-term future programme and hard-won industrial, commercial and project-management competencies – can be said to overtly underscore national defence and security capabilities. I, for one, do not see this as a contentious or extreme proposition.

Rejecting industrial protectionismWithin the examples offered, government plays a key role – as customer, but also as programme sponsor. This is not protectionism, as any reason-able economist would recognise it, but rather is the sound and proper husbandry of critical national knowledge, harnessed and informed by international businesses, to safeguard the British national interest. So there is mileage in conceptualising a British defence industrial base – a base that is built on competencies, skills and commitments, rather than ideas of ownership or corporate listing.

The minister is right, of course, to reject the idea of industrial protec-tionism in a complex and interdependent world. But within a country that aspires to be a major global actor we must protect and enhance the knowl-edge and capabilities that enable our military effort, with much of this residing, out of necessity, within commercial organisations. So I concur: let’s put the notion of a defence industrial base to one side and embrace the idea of the necessity of a national defence industrial knowledge-base, drawn from wherever critical skills reside. This should be the focus of defence poli-cies and practices, recognising that knowledge has a sharp military edge. n

QinetiQ’s Dragon Runner robot is an example of niche capabilities required for operations

09_Knowledge base_ka.indd 43 26/7/12 11:48:33

44 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

defence capability programmes – land

FINAL PROOF

Medium-weight forces are those that are deemed to be air-portable, and therefore faster to deploy than heavy forces and yet more capable than light forces. This characterisation

is highly simplistic, relative and fails under rigour.What is, or is not, air portable is defined by the performance of a specific

aircraft. For example, the C-17, of which the UK has a fleet of seven, can lift 77 tonnes, which accounts for every A-vehicle currently in UK service. Provably, the Challenger 2 is air-portable. Some open sources suggest that with a payload of 72 tonnes, the C-17 has an unrefuelled range of approxi-mately 2,400 nautical miles. The A400M, of which the RAF may receive 22, has a maximum payload of 30 tonnes with a roughly comparable range to the C-17. This means the A400M is unable to lift the Challenger 2 or any of the combat engineer vehicles based on a main battle tank (MBT) chassis, including armoured-vehicle-launched bridges (AVLB). Of particular note is the fact that the UK could only deploy the 105mm towed light gun using A400M, but could deploy the AS-90 self-propelled gun system using C-17.

Essentially, an A400M-deployed force may well be limited to 30-tonne vehicles, with only towed guns and no capable combat engineer support. If, for example, the UK was to introduce a 34-tonne vehicle and A400M is really limited to 30 tonnes, then the whole issue of ‘medium forces’ is moot and irrelevant. While it is technically possible to deploy armoured vehicles

The Medium MythCurrent thinking has led the British Army to define forces as light, medium and heavy. William F Owen explains why the concept of medium forces is problematic at best and dangerous at worst

by air, the question of how realistic it is to sustain such forces by air is deeply debatable. And, while it may be possible to obtain fuel in theatre, rations, ammunition and spares would have to be flown in.

A 70-tonne-plus Challenger 2 has a fuel consumption unit (FCU)1 of 265 litres, while a 25- to 30-tonne tracked vehicle would seem to have an FCU of about 116 litres – about 57 per cent less. However, combat vehicle reconnaissance-tracked (CVR-T) type vehicles of about 13 tonnes in weight have FCUs as low as 67 litres, which is 43 per cent less than a 25- to 30-tonner. Again, diesel could almost certainly be obtained in the-atre. Rations, ammunition and technical stores are mostly unaffected by the weight of the vehicle, bar major automotive components. Furthermore, in relative terms, the 120mm main gun, 12.7mm and 155mm artillery ammu-nition all weigh the same regardless of the platform that employs them.

Lessons of previous warsUK forces in Afghanistan are currently fighting irregular forces with a very low level of capability compared to what is known to be possible. As the Viet Cong, Khmer Rouge and Hezbollah have all shown, irregular forces can be equipped with very capable weapons. Regular light forces, such as those trained and equipped along the lines of specialist North Korean or Chinese formations, might combine good equipment with high degrees of training.

The Israeli Defence Force’s new APC, the Namer, is reported to weigh in at 60 tonnes

11 - Medium MythLP.indd 44 26/7/12 11:51:13

45

defence capability programmes – land

FINAL PROOF

Despite the Northern Ireland experience, the British Army’s failure to study the lessons of Angola, Chechnya, Lebanon, Rhodesia and many other conflicts has meant that, in common with the US, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) came as a near complete surprise, in that as of 2003, UK forces had chosen not to equip themselves with effective pro-tected mobility. This has now largely been corrected. Ridgeback, Mastiff and Wolfhound are all currently under 30 tonnes and thus deployable by A400M. None of these vehicles should require the amount of technical and logistic support required by turret-equipped fighting vehicles. In terms of trades and manning required to support a stabilised turret with a capable weapons system, weight would seem not to be a factor. A Challenger 2 could well require the same-sized light aid detachment as a vehicle one third its weight, with the same basic systems. Based on a limit of 30 tonnes, the UK can deploy infantry forces with effective protected mobility that might address a low level of enemy capability and an IED threat.

However, the ‘medium force’ concept assumes being able to compete against an enemy force with vehicles and capabilities not limited by 30-tonne air portability, while possessing only towed guns, and with no capable combat engineer support. Such a force would probably not be capable of operating in a contested urban environment against even a moderate degree of threat. This being the case, the UK government would not see such a force as fit to deploy without giving every possible advan-tage – and that would mean MBTs, and the so-called heavy force equip-ments required. Beyond almost anything else, the Second Lebanon War showed how even a moderately skilled and equipped irregular force such as Hezbollah forced the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) to employ every com-ponent of the combined arms formation.

Flawed reasoningThe UK military needs to beware that the idea of a medium force having comparable mobility protection and firepower to what is currently termed ‘heavy forces’ is deeply flawed. While John Matsumura’s seldom-read classic, Lightning over Water, presented a compelling case of light forces equipped with highly capable, fibre-optically guided, anti-tank guided mis-siles (ATGMs), the UK simply lacks that capability or the force structure that could employ it2. It seems that the UK would be more likely to employ attack helicopters to address the need for a rapidly deployable light force to slow or blunt a capable enemy’s combined arms formation. In that regard, it seems fair to ask if the UK’s AH-64 Apache has the ability to rapidly deploy by air and in numbers that allow for their effective operation while being sustained by the proposed fleet of A400M or the existing C-17 capability.

As incredible as it may seem to those obsessed with military technology, thick, heavy, passive packs are still required to defeat the 152-155mm frag-mentation explosively formed penetrator (EFP) bomblets and the 100mm tungsten armour-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) rounds that almost any T-55 tank in the world can fire. While active protection systems may help defeat some ATGMs and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), the need for capable, thus heavy, passive armour packs cannot yet be dismissed.

This would seem to set capable MBTs and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) within the 35-65 tonne region. Some Israeli industry estimates strongly suggest that the amount of armour needed to effectively protect a tracked APC capable of carrying eight infantrymen, with a crew of two to three, would require a vehicle close to 45 tonnes and probably more. Indeed, the German army’s new Puma infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) is reported as being 43 tonnes with its most capable armour pack, and the IDF’s new APC, the Namer, is reported as being 60 tonnes.

Capable precision-guided weapons may well give a medium or even light force the ability to kill enemy vehicles, but that force can only survive if it can

If air deployment is not a factor, then the need for medium ceases to have any relevance

withstand the kinetic effects that will almost certainly be coming the other way. Moreover, the critical question as to how many vehicles could actually be deployed by air, and to what actual purpose, remains unanswered.

Making heavy lighter?Quite obviously, there is a compelling case to make better use of vehicle weight in relation to platform performance. It may well be that the UK’s Challenger 2 is too heavy, and lacks an effective gun in comparison to that employed by other MBTs. However true or not that may be, it does not make the case for medium forces. The requirement and utility of air deploy-ment is extremely debatable, especially in terms of the size and capability of force that may be required to fight a competent and well-equipped enemy. It may well be technically possible to develop an MBT, 155mm self-propelled gun, AVLB and combat engineer vehicles for less than 30 tonnes. This would require substantial investment for a very doubtful capability. Beyond anything else, if air deployment is not a factor, then the need for medium ceases to have any relevance. Yes, newer vehicles may have better levels of mine protection than some in-service MBTs. That speaks to design expertise and materials, not the merits of medium forces. Given the same design skills and materials, a 60-tonne MBT will have superior protection compared to a lighter vehicle.

The developing world’s infrastructure is not so limited that it cannot accept vehicles in excess of 30 tonnes – China’s Type-99 tank is 58 tonnes, the Russian T-90 is 48 tonnes. The T-55 is actually 36 tonnes and has been for over 60 years, when infrastructure was substantially less developed. If the mostly likely threat is someone with a capable RPG-type weapon, being less than 30 or even 35 tonnes gains you no advantage.

One size will never fit all. UK forces are most likely to require a capable MBT and a well-protected APC of equal or comparable mobility in order to conduct effective combat operations. A lighter multi-role vehicle chassis will be needed for the many other roles that modern armies require, and this may well include lighter APCs as the basis for a multi-role vehicle. What will have to be resisted is the desire to employ such vehicles beyond their capability or attempts to forge new types of forces for which we have little or no evidence of their effectiveness. History has dealt a powerful blow to vehicles whose light weight promised many good things and yet turned out to be too light to fight. n

Footnotes

The FCU is a staff planning tool defined as the average amount of fuel required to move 1.

100km by road

Lightning over Water2. was published by RAND in 2000. Based on simulation studies, it showed

the disproportionate effectiveness of precision-guided indirect fire weapons, fired from light

vehicles. While the work gained great prominence among those interested in the study of

military effectiveness, some of its insights arguably remain under-recognised

11 - Medium MythLP.indd 45 26/7/12 11:51:19

46 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

Defence capability programmes – lanD

FINAL PROOF

Depending how you count, central and eastern European coun-tries constitute six former Warsaw Pact member states: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

Four of these six countries’ arms manufacturing strategies focus mainly on exports as, apart from Poland, their domestic markets are rela-tively small. But even in Poland, the government has an export-growth strategy for the defence sector. As per the artillery/surface-to-surface missile ammunition market, five of these six countries manufacture mortar bombs, high-explosive shells for self-propelled howitzers (SPH) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).

Furthermore, none of the companies in central and eastern Europe is capable of designing and developing ATGMs from scratch. Bulgaria has managed to modify former Soviet ATGMs and then redesign them. Moreover, Polish-based ZM Mesko SA manufactures Spike-extended range (ER) anti-tank guided missiles under Israeli licence.

Country capabilitiesBulgaria: The country’s arms manufacturing strategy is based on export orders, while domestic orders are very few and far between as a result of defence-budget constraints. The future forecast is for export orders to con-tinue to dominate. The level of technical capability of Bulgarian ammuni-tion companies is thought to be sufficient for the niche they occupy.

Of the 18 members of the Bulgarian Defence Industry Association (BDIA), just four companies engage in the production of artillery ammunition and ATGMs. Privately owned company Arcus produces mortar bombs, with about 120 engineers from its workforce of 2,800 working on research and development (R&D) projects. The Arsenal 2000 joint-stock company ( JSC) produces ammunition for air-defence systems, multi-shot under-barrel grenade launchers, anti-tank grenade launchers and mortars. It has about 7,000 employees, with 93 per cent of its military products being exported.

The Vazovski Machine-Building plant (VMZ) manufactures fragmentation/high-explosive (HE) shells, high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) artillery shells and Fagot, Faktoria, Konkurs, Malyutka and Metis ATGMs. It employs about 3,700 workers. Finally, the Dunarit public limited company produces artil-lery and mortar rounds, as well as high-explosive howitzer ammunition.

All four companies are known for the quality of their products. They no longer produce goods under licence, but have modified the original prod-ucts made in the former Soviet Union, introducing new designs, sometimes in collaboration with national R&D organisations. They mainly export their products to Africa, some Latin American countries and the Middle East.

Czech Republic: Almost all of the Czech Republic’s arms-producing facto-ries/companies are private entities, with the notable exceptions of the LOM and VOP concerns. As in Bulgaria, the majority of manufactured goods are for export as the domestic market is, again, small. Key ammunition

East and Central European Artillery and Anti-Tank Guided WeaponsEugene Kogan presents a market overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the artillery ammunition and anti-tank guided weapons sector across eastern and central Europe

producers include the VOP-026 state-owned company, whose 1,400 work-ers produce, among other things, weapons and ammunition (both mortar and special ammunition). Thanks to its technical expertise and weapons production capacity, VOP-026 is considered a national strategic asset. The Czech Republic’s Military Technical Institute for Weapons and Ammunition was incorporated into VOP-026 in 2003. It produces mortar bombs, ammu-nition and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) thermobaric ammunition.

Hungary: The country no longer manufactures artillery ammunition or ATGMs, having ceased production for 152mm howitzers about 45 years ago. It also used to produce artillery instruments, such as optical target-ing and fire-control systems. The new Hungarian Ministry of Defence is attempting to restore artillery-system production, but this is likely to prove challenging, as over the past five years Hungary has sold almost all of its heavy weapons, including artillery systems, and has never had any signifi-cant heavy weapons and ammunition production facilities.

The Hungarian Ministry of Defence is attempting to restore artillery-system production, but this is likely to prove challenging

Poland: As an exception to the rule, Poland’s arms manufacturing strategy is based primarily on meeting domestic requirements. That said, the Polish government is attempting to increase weapons exports. Prime manufac-turing capabilities are based around Centrum Produkcji Wojskowej (or Military Production Centre/CPW), a division of the Huta Stalowa Wola (HSW) company, which manufactures the AHS Krab, a 155mm NATO-compatible tracked SPH, and the Rak 120mm self-propelled, auto-reloaded mortar system. It remains, for now, a state-owned company. Several years ago CPW faced serious financial problems, but today expects orders for about PLN 2 billion ($584 million) to be placed within the next few years.

Mesko SA’s Bumar Ammunition Division manufactures guided and unguided rockets for defence against land, aerial and surface vessels as well as Spike-ER ATGMs. The second most important company in the same division is ZM Dezamet SA, which manufactures grenades as well as mortar, cassette and RPG ammunition.

12 - East EuropeanLP.indd 46 26/7/12 11:53:25

47

Defence capability programmes – lanD

FINAL PROOF

Romania: The Romanian domestic market provides limited opportunities for artillery ammunition. Nevertheless, Romarm, a state-owned hold-ing company, produces high-explosive incendiary and armour-piercing ammunition for 152mm towed howitzers, mortar systems and anti-tank guns. Romarm’s Special Products Manufacturer, Dragomiresti SA, manufactures 20mm cannon ammunition, 60mm, 81mm and 82mm mortar bombs and smoke mortar bombs.

Since 2009, exports have increased by over 70 per cent and now account for about 90 per cent of output. The main markets are Asia, the Middle East and the United States. The company has attempted to revitalise relationships with a number of African states, such as Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa, which were traditional customers before the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Slovakia: The country’s arms industry capacity has always been greater than its domestic needs. Its ammunition companies are capable of manu-facturing and/or modifying some of their traditional products. Konstrukta-Defence AS is a member of the Trencin-based DMD Group (also called

DMD Holding). It is more of a design house than a manufacturer, and is the design authority for a variety of defence systems, including the Zuzana 155mm self-propelled howitzer and a family of 155mm artillery ammuni-tion. It also designs and develops 81mm mortar bombs.

Dubnica nad Váhom-based ZVS Holding AS, a member of the DMD Group, has some design capabilities in the field of medium- and large-calibre ammunition, and has been working very closely with Konstrukta-Defence AS on R&D projects.

As a result of the domestic budget constraints and limited orders for military goods for the national armed forces, excluding Poland, countries in eastern and central Europe maintain consistent export policies that are unlikely to change in the coming years. But lack of investment in research and development may hamper their ability to hang on to their technical capabilities and, therefore, their export markets. n

The author would like to thank colleagues from central and eastern Europe for their assistance in the preparation of this article

A Polish soldier attends a joint weapons class at FOB Ghazni in Afghanistan

12 - East EuropeanLP.indd 47 26/7/12 11:53:33

48 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

Defence capability programmes – lanD

FINAL PROOF

Warrior has been in continuous service with the British Army for over 20 years and WCSP will extend the vehicles’ lives into the 2040s. The initial contract is for a demonstration

phase. This will be followed by the manufacture phases, which will pro-ceed on successful completion of the initial element.

The demonstration phase scope is to design and build the demonstration vehicles and demonstrate compliance with the WCSP System Requirements Document (SRD). To achieve this, Lockheed Martin UK (LMUK) is to build 11 demonstration vehicles, covering all Warrior variant types. These vehi-cles will undertake performance proving and reliability growth trials with system acceptance scheduled for 2016.

Prior to the WCSP contract award in October 2011, over £25m of industry Private Venture (PV) investment has been made in maturing the capability improvement system and reducing risk.

A key element of the WCSP solution is to increase firepower by fully integrating and stabilising the Cased Telescoped Ammunition International (CTAI) CT40 cannon with a modern digital fire-control system. This pro-vides increased hit probability against key targets. A fire-control system has been developed for Warrior, sharing elements with the UK Scout and the US Ground Combat Vehicle (GVC) programmes. This integrated stabilised solution has been demonstrated through PV- and risk-reduction-funded live-fire trials in 2009 and 2010.

An improved sighting solution is achieved by reusing and upgrading the current Thales Battle Group Thermal Imager (BGTI) sight. This results in a stabilised BGTI+, coupled with a Laser Rangefinder (LRF), which are linked through the new Electronic Architecture to the Fire Control System providing an integrated fightability solution.

The Warrior Capability Sustainment ProgrammeThe Lockheed Martin UK-led Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP) Transformation Team will deliver a system with major upgrades to lethality, fightability and survivability. WCSP IPT platform manager Bob Armstrong explains the process for keeping the AFVs in service for another three decades

The stabilised CT40 cannon, integrated with Curtiss-Wright servo systems, and BGTI+, provides an accurate ‘fire-on-the-move’ capability, increasing the fightability and lethality of the Warrior system.

The primary (CT40) and secondary (coaxial machine gun) weapon systems can be operated by a single person. Using the new hand control-lers, target-tracking and firing on the move against stationary or moving targets can be achieved. The Human Machine Interface (HMI) provides an integrated threat-management display for target cueing. The fire-control computer is designed to manage the inputs from the user control handles and provide the necessary auto-stabilisation control for the servo system, as well as computing the ballistic solution for weapon firing. Fire rates and nature type are set via a new fire-control panel.

Proving the new CT40 stabilisation system performance was seen as a key element of the capability improvement. To de-risk this issue prior to contract award, a series of PV-funded stabilisation trials, using a standard Aberdeen Proving Ground ‘Bump Course’, were conducted at the Millbrook proving grounds. The trials verified cannon stabilisation and increased con-fidence in meeting accuracy requirements.

LMUK’s open Electronic Architecture (EA), developed in conjunction with SciSys, allows for rapid insertion of new technologies to ensure that Warrior is not only relevant to the future needs of the Army, but also flexible enough to meet evolving threats.

Fundamental to the improvement in local situational awareness is the new EA. The EA enables images from all vehicle sensors, including Local Situational Awareness (LSA) cameras, driver’s vision devices or BGTI, to be distributed for viewing by the commander and gunner in the turret and the driver and infantry section in the hull, using dedicated display screens providing multiple views from all sensors.

Improving survivabilityIncreased soldier survivability is one of the cornerstones of the Warrior capability upgrade. The LMUK WCSP solution includes a modular appliqué armour system for the turret and a modular armour-mounting system for the hull. This enables flexibility in fitting armour solutions to improve sol-dier protection against specific threats and to ensure upgrades in armour technology are easily accommodated.

Other areas of overall survivability are being addressed either through tri-als or the application of sound design principles, which shall be fully quali-fied during the demonstration phase. A mine blast-resistant seat subsystem has been integrated in a Warrior vehicle by LMUK and was successfully tested in a full-scale Ministry of Defence mine-blast test in April 2010. The auto loader feeding the CT40 gun is supplied by Meggitt Defense Systems; this Ammunition Handling System (AHS) is located behind armour and physically separated from the crew. In conjunction with Dstl (Defence

The Lockheed Martin UK Warrior upgrade programme will keep the vehicle in service beyond 2040

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Science and Technology Laboratory), the protection-solution physical architecture was successfully tested against the required ballistic and blast threats in July 2010.

Although the main areas of capability improvements relate to the turret systems, there are survivability improvements to the hull. LMUK has integrated a Warrior Modular Protection System (WMPS) solution based on a system developed by Dstl. This system permits the modular fitting of a variety of armour options to address specific missions and protec-tion upgrades. The system consists of lightweight vehicle hull fixings and standardised mounting plates for modular appliqué armour solution, including passive armour, Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) and bar armour. These armour systems can be rapidly fitted, replaced or entirely removed by the vehicle crew using simple tools. Consequently, the armour solution can be tailored for each mission profile.

The WCSP Transformation Team has been constructed to maximise the industrial participation and capability from key UK and overseas suppliers. This de-risks the programme through shared capability across an established and experienced Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) supply base. This approach also maximises the value to the UK AFV sector with 90 per cent UK content and over 600 jobs created and/or sustained over 11 years.

LMUK concluded that coherence with the UK Base Overhaul (BOH) pro-gramme, managed by the Defence Support Group (DSG), was the most cost-effective way to achieve delivery of the WCSP upgrade. This strategy combines LMUK’s expertise in system integration and supply-chain man-agement with DSG’s proven repair and overhaul of Warrior vehicles, to deliver a low-risk, cost-effective, integrated manufacturing approach.

This approach will be deployed during the demonstration phase of the programme by building the demonstration vehicles at DSG. WCSP hardware will be integrated into the vehicles during the planned BOH programme at

Armour systems can be rapidly fitted, replaced or entirely removed by the vehicle crew using simple tools

DSG Donnington, with LMUK’s systems integration and production teams co-located at Donnington during the demonstration phase.

WCSP has been contracted for a conventional support package to com-plement the in-service support package in place for Warrior. This includes initial spares, technical publications and maintainer training.

LMUK has also studied an alternative support strategy that has been developed with minimal impact on the user’s current practices. This could be integrated with the existing Warrior support infrastructure to provide an increased level of contractor logistic support and attendant efficiencies and savings to the MoD. This alternative support strategy is planned to offer a commitment of 90 per cent spares availability at Purple Gate, while mini-mising the level of stock required for battalion and training unit stores.

WCSP will make Warrior a vital element of the future Army. As General Sir Peter Wall, Chief of the General Staff, commented: “Warrior will continue to be at the heart of combat capability for at least another 25 years with state-of-the-art firepower and electronics. Wherever the Army deploys, our infantry will depend on its superior protection, mobility and lethality.” n

FightabilityUpdated crew space (HMI and HCI)■n

Fire-on-the-move functionality■n

Section/driver display■n

New turret seating■n

Mordern electronic architecture■n

Modular design for technology updates■n

SuvivabilityWMPS for hull and turret■n

Advanced armour■n

Advanced spall liner■n

Mine-blast-resistant seats■n

Cannon rounds separated from ■n

crew compartmentDesign flexibility for technology updates■n

LethalityCTAI 40mm cannon■n

Ammunition-handling system■n

Different natures of ammunition■n

L94A1 coaxial machine gun■n

Dual-axis stabilisation■n

Modern, flexible fire-control dystem■n

Situational awareness360-degree day and low-light situational ■n

awareness (SA) shared by all crewSection dismount access to all SA■n

Mine-blast-resistant seats■n

Driver’s forward and reverse cameras■n

Re-use of improved driver’s vision ■n

hatch UOROpen architecture accommodating ■n

future data streams

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According to UK engineering and design house Supacat, the SPV400 is a ‘clean-sheet’ design that is ready to meet the objective of providing British troops with higher levels of

protection against improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It is one of only two vehicles to have met the stringent requirements of the Minsitry of Defence (MoD) for its Light Protected Patrol Vehicle programme. It offers high levels of mobility and protection in a light patrol vehicle in the 7.5-tonne class. Moreover, it delivers blast-protection levels only previously available in vehicles of twice the weight, but with the agility and off-road mobility to negotiate narrow streets and avoid predictable routes.

Since 2010, Supacat has continued with an intensive development pro-gramme to mature the prototype design of the SPV400 to a production-standard vehicle. The programme has focused particularly on improved levels of reliability and handling.

Design philosophySupacat’s SPV400 design philosophy is for a modular and future-proofed design to allow the vehicle to be upgraded and up-armoured to meet evolving threats and requirements. Appliqué armour can, for example,

Supacat SPV400 Delivers Improved Ride and Impressive ReliabilityAn insider’s view of the latest status of the SPV400 light patrol vehicle development programme, which is delivering increased blast-protection measures plus better mobility and off-road agility

be added to rapidly reconfigure the vehicle to meet new threat levels. The modular approach also includes mounting the axle assemblies in sacrificial sub-frames at each end of the vehicle. These are designed to absorb a blast away from the crew pod and blow off in the event of the vehicle running over a mine. This approach also enables the SPV400 to be repaired in the-atre following mine-blast incidents by replacing the damaged module.

The vehicle has an integrated blast and ballistic protection system, includ-ing a protected composite crew pod, which is mounted on an armoured, steel V-shaped chassis. Supacat teamed with NP Aerospace to design the crew pod using its advanced composite and ceramic armour systems. It is constructed as a separate module, sealed off from potential secondary pro-jectiles, to protect the six crew – commander, driver and four dismounts. All items of kit, including electronic devices, are housed in a separate rear compartment. The seats are mine-blast protected and the windows are also bullet- and splinter-proof.

The V-shaped hull protects the crew in the event of an under-belly mine strike and is designed to deflect the blast outwards and upwards, away from the crew pod. To verify the vehicle design and that the armour system met the UK MoD’s user requirements, the SPV400 has been comprehensively

The SPV400’s V-shaped hull is designed to deflect blasts from mines and improvised explosive devices away from the crew pod

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blast-trialled at high levels. The SPV400’s all-terrain, high-mobility perfor-mance is comparable to that of the Supacat-designed Jackal, which has already been operating in Afghanistan. A Cummins diesel engine – deliv-ering 183hp, coupled to an Allison automatic transmission – powers the vehicle, which is capable of speeds of up to 80mph on the desert plain. Air suspension provides troops with a smooth ride, reducing crew fatigue, while twin rear doors provide for rapid exit. The integrity of the composite materials allows for roof hatches or a remote-controlled weapons station to be positioned according to user requirements.

Improved reliability and handlingSupacat has identified future demand for this type of vehicle in both military and civil markets and has invested in a rapid continuous develop-ment programme to mature the SPV400 design to production standard. According to the company, significantly improved reliability, ride and han-dling has been achieved over the past 18 months, during which the SPV400 has completed over 21,000km of trials. Consequently, the production stan-dard platform is now achieving 96 per cent reliability levels. It also features enhanced maintainability, a revised driver interface and new styling.

The SPV400’s all-terrain, high-mobility performance is comparable to that of Supacat’s Jackal, which has already been operating in Afghanistan

The design improvements were demonstrated at the Millbrook Proving Ground in Bedfordshire, UK, as recently as March 2012, where the vehicle put in an impressive performance in pre-feasibility trials for the MoD’s Multi-Role Vehicle – Protected (MRV-P) requirement. Commenting on the trials, Supacat managing director Nick Ames was eager to point out that, “the new production-standard SPV400 is a significantly improved vehicle from the early prototypes and we’re proud of the progress we’ve made.”

Key enhancements cover ride and handling, which has been optimised to increase responsiveness and improve ‘driver feel’. This has been achieved by developing refined suspension geometry with a new spring and damper set-up, coupled with a high-pressure pneumatic system that improves sus-pension response times and also minimises the space required for air-stow-age. In addition, the vehicle is fitted with a Hydro-Max™ hydraulic-boosted brake system with separate anti-lock braking system (ABS). To ease the driver burden, Supacat has trialled an ‘automatic torque-sensing’ centre differential, which adjusts torque to each axle depending on the terrain.

The interior has also undergone a number of refinements, including improved lighting. The driver interface has been revised with a new instru-ment panel and driver control layouts, with a new driver display designed to incorporate generic vehicle architecture (GVA) and vehicle diagnostic systems. Maintainability has been improved by integrating the cooling and hydraulic pipework and the cooling pack into a single module, thus allow-ing easier access to inspect or replace engine components. A dashboard-controlled central tyre-inflation system (CTIS) has also been fitted. Other enhancements to the pre-production SPV400 are the development of a vehicle controller area network (CAN) system, including a battery manage-ment system, automatic parking brake release, driveline control, cruise control and intelligent lighting system.

“In the production-standard SPV400, Supacat has achieved new levels of reliability, handling and overall usability in the automotive design that now surpass those required by LPPV. It is proving itself as a highly robust light protected patrol vehicle and is consequently attracting interest in a number of markets,” Nick Ames confirms. n

A breakaway graphic of the SPV400 reveals its design features

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Close Air Support (CAS) from both manned and unmanned aircraft has become a vital component in the ground force armoury. The accurate and effective employment of CAS depends on the link

between the Forward Air Controller (FAC) on the ground, who has selected and is indicating the target, and the crew of the aircraft, whether they are on board or providing remote control. Formerly, this direction was achieved purely via voice communications, but much has been introduced into the process during the past decade. A combination of full-motion video (FMV), data communications (providing messages such as the Nine-Line Brief and other formats) and voice communications for real-time guidance provides a flexible, responsive system that promotes mutual understanding between what is now known as the Joint Tactical Air Controller ( JTAC) and pilot.

In particular, shared FMV helps to overcome situational awareness mis-understandings between air and ground, and provides a common under-standing of target identity. This is important in a coalition environment, where language problems can be exacerbated by poor communications conditions and the stress of combat – particularly for the FAC, who may be under fire. It can also make the legal, political or military clearance of targets

JTAC ROVERDelivering fast and accurate targeting information to pilots is an art form that is practised by the Forward Air Controller (FAC), and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have driven rapid technology advancement. Giles Ebbutt takes a look at the ROVER and other offerings currently on the market

– which in the current operational environment may be a requirement depending on the particular circumstances – a practical proposition.

Early experience of FMV in CAS was gained by US Special Forces in 2002 in Afghanistan with the use of the Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) II to provide a shared picture from a Hellfire-armed Predator UAV between the FAC and the Predator operator. ROVER IIs were subsequently used by FACs in Iraq in 2003-04, and the potential of the system was obvious.

The evolution of ROVER In 2004, L-3 Communications – Communication Systems-West (L-3 CSW) produced the multiband ROVER III air-ground receiver system. This included a multiband (C-band analogue, C-band digital, Ku-band digital and L-band analogue) radio receiver unit, a C/L-band antenna, a Ku-band antenna and a Panasonic CF19 Toughbook laptop for system control and video display. The complete equipment weighed 22kg. This version of ROVER, which was unencrypted, remained in production until 2007 and more than 2,000 were fielded, including to the UK and other coalition forces.

Self-defence flares are dropped during a coalition aircraft bombing run near Now Zad, Afghanistan

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ROVER IV appeared in 2007. This added S-band communications, but more importantly was an encrypted system. It had improved display soft-ware that can be mapped to the FalconView geographic display software, enabling both the user and the airborne platform positions to be displayed, together with the sensor direction.

The next iteration, which appeared as a prototype in 2008 with produc-tion starting in 2009, was the ROVER 5. This is a software-defined trans-ceiver with Type-1 encryption covering the same frequencies as ROVER IV, but adding a UHF transmit-and-receive capability. It is a single, handheld terminal with a 5.5-inch display; FalconView can be run on an associated laptop or tablet. It was followed, in 2010, by the ROVER 5i, which is the export version with AES256 encryption. At this point, approximately 1,000 ROVER 5 units had been fielded, mainly to the US Air Force.

The most recent version in this development stream, the ROVER 6, has a form factor more akin to ROVER IV, while adding transmission and encryp-tion as in ROVER 5, with options for either Type 1 or AES256.

L3-CSW has also produced the Soldier ISR Receiver (SIR) Tactical ROVER, which was originally designed to be included as part of a soldier-system ensemble. It comprises a vest-worn one-way video receiver system, fully compatible with ROVER 5i, having AES encryption and a five-band (Ku, C, S, L and UHF) data-reception capability.

Alternatives to ROVERROVER terminals are not the only ones in use by JTACs. In mid 2009, Harris launched its Falcon III RF-7800T-Handheld (HH) ISR Remote Video Terminal Receiver, based on the JTRS software communications architecture (SCA), which allows emerging datalink software waveforms to be applied to it. It operates in L, S and C bands, and the imagery is presented on a handheld monocular display or eyepiece, or on a tablet computer. This was adopted almost immediately by the US Marine Corps for its ANGLICO (Air Naval

Gunfire Liaison Company) units. In 2011, Harris added the Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Digital Data Link (SUAS-DDL) waveform, allowing it to receive AES video feeds simultaneously from multiple small UAS. Among other countries to have procured the equipment is Sweden, in 2011.

L-3 CSW supplied a quantity of its CDL-compatible Common Multiband Data Link (CMDL) to the French Air Force and Navy to enable Mirage 2000, Rafale and Super Etendard aircraft fitted with the Thales Damocles target-ing pod to downlink FMV to the various ROVER-compatible digital and analogue receiver terminals issued to French as well as to other coalition ground forces in Afghanistan. These include the Sagem End Reception Station – Remote Video Terminal (ERS-RVT) which incorporates a backpack tri-band (C, S and UHF) and an associated Panasonic Toughbook chest-worn tablet computer, first fielded to French forces in 2009. However, on exercise in UK recently, French JTACs were equipped with ROVER 5i terminals.

The UK incorporated an FMV receiver into the Forward Air Controller and Forward Observation Officer (FAC/FOO) system it procured from Rockwell-Collins as an Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) in 2007, as part of the Improved Targeting Geolocation Accuracy (ITGA) programme. This was originally a single, C-band system, but was rapidly upgraded to tri-band. Marketed as the FireStorm system, its core is a StrikeHawk Tactical Video Downlink Receiver together with a tablet computer running Rockwell-Collins’s Rosetta Joint Fires software.

As well as a laser rangefinder, FireStorm is also integrated with an azimuth augmentation system that neutralises magnetic interference and provides a claimed targeting accuracy of five metres at five kilometres. More than 100 systems have been fielded, to Belgium, Estonia, Germany and Norway, as well as the UK. Furthermore, at the Eurosatory exhibition in Paris in June, it was announced that Rockwell Collins had been selected as the prime contractor to deliver 152 systems for the Australian Digital Terminal Control Systems programme, with a solution based on FireStorm. n

A NATO air strike on a highway leading into Benghazi, Libya

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Much of terrorism is a ‘knowledge’ product – and that doesn’t only include the communication of a group’s ideology. It is also the practical knowledge that is required to conduct sur-

veillance, counter-surveillance, make or use weapons, resist interview and more. Another advantage to terrorists of using such knowledge is that we have yet to develop a means of preventing people smuggling it out of one area and into another – there are no ‘mind police’.

This is why personnel exchanges from one group to another can lead to a benefit in terms of a transfer of knowledge. One of the greatest examples of this was at the end of the Afghan/Soviet war. With hostilities concluded, many Mujahideen fighters were returning to their countries of origin with a working knowledge of how to conduct attacks. Equally, we have seen the transfer of mortar-building technology from the Provisional IRA to the FARC rebels in Colombia – a transfer most likely to have been facilitated by both groups’ relationship with the nationalist and separatist group ETA in the Basque region of Spain, previous providers of other methodologies.

This knowledge transfer continues, and it is feared that British citizens fighting alongside groups such as al-Shabab in Somalia could return to

The International Nature of Terrorism – Why We Need to Listen to CassandraChief Inspector Ken Pennington of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) explains why the West needs to keep up with the wide range of networks being used by terrorist groups to exchange specialist knowledge, build contacts with weapons suppliers in other organisations and even to ‘outsource’ attacks

Britain to conduct attacks, as in the case of Mohammed Merah, a self-styled al-Qaeda jihadist, who was believed to have killed seven people in a recent rampage in Toulouse, France, following his return from Afghanistan.

Outsourcing and subcontractingThis scenario is different from a group communicating an ideology to encourage attacks. In this case, the attacking group or individual does not have to share the ideology of the sponsoring group, but is simply prepared to carry out the attack. Here, the terrorist groups are not recruiting fol-lowers, they are accessing expertise – applying the same concept that a multinational company might when seeking an ‘expert’.

Examples of this could include the allegation that Hezbollah used approx-imately $50 million to establish military training camps for multiple terrorist organisations, including al-Qaeda (not natural bedfellows, given their sec-tarian tensions). Some groups have used deception to persuade another group to carry out attacks, such as the South African plot in 1991, which duped the Loyalist Ulster Defence Association (UDA) into attempting to assassinate Adrian Guelke using falsified ‘police intelligence documents’

Colombian soldiers patrol the streets of Toribio following a FARC attack on the police station

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claiming he had links with the IRA. This outsourcing is also not limited to terror groups, but can involve organised crime, hence the October 2011 allegation that Iranian assets were attempting to employ members of a Mexican cartel, Los Zetas, in the assassination attempt on the Saudi Ambassador in Washington.

Weapons procurementOn 21 October 2011, Real IRA member Michael Campbell was convicted following a brilliant MI5 sting. Receiving a 12-year prison sentence in Lithuania, his operation to build contacts with external weapons sup-pliers is nothing new to Ireland. Previously, huge shipments of weapons have been interdicted, mostly from Libya. These included the Claudia in 1973, Marita Ann in 1984 and the Eksund in 1987. Despite these successes, in 1986-87 it is believed that four shipments before the Eksund were not intercepted. It is estimated these included six tonnes of explosives and more than 1,500 AKM rifles. Such ‘procurement’ missions are fraught with risk for the terrorist group involved; however, the potential for rich pickings continues to lure groups such as Hezbollah, who allegedly receive missiles and drones from Iran.

FundingInternational links with outside groups can facilitate funding. This can include heroin production and export by the Taliban or the expansion of the Real IRA into counterfeit cigarettes. Equally, the sums that can be made through ‘consulting’ work are not to be sneezed at. It has been esti-mated that FARC paid PIRA a ‘consulting’ fee of $20 million for expertise in improvised explosive devices and other technical know-how. PIRA not only gained this financial advantage, but also secured a safe area of operation within which, unfettered by UK surveillance, they could develop new meth-ods of attack. It is important to note that the knowledge being exchanged does not just include ‘attack’ methodologies – it may also include ‘funding’ secrets or access to illicit trading routes.

‘Narc’ submarinesIn Colombia, home-made submarines have been discovered in the jungle. Essentially intended for the transportation of cocaine, they are actually very sophisticated machines reportedly capable of travelling 2,000 miles, under human or remote control and with a capacity of up to 14 tonnes. Use of Google Maps is now virtually universal, but a brief browse of Google Trends allows the user to see over time whether and how often a particular phrase is being searched for, how interest is changing and which areas, geographically, in the world are interested. Type in ‘Narc Sub’ into Google Trends and it becomes apparent that virtually all interest in this search item is generated by one city on earth – Monterrey, Mexico. The city is the base of the Los Zetas cartel, that which was allegedly being recruited by Iranian assets to assassinate high-value targets in the US. Now imagine that the narc sub isn’t carrying 14 tonnes of cocaine, but instead 14 tonnes of high explosive. What damage could this cause in a major port?

Libya – where have the weapons gone?With the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, many sophisticated weapons sys-tems have been lost, including man-portable SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. Libya is believed to have purchased 20,000 SA-7s, but the number missing is unknown. What this means for North Africa, with its emerging al-Qaeda-in-the-Maghreb (AQIM) problem or al-Shabab in Somalia (with links to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – AQAP), or indeed the emergent Boko Haram of Nigeria, remains to be seen. What is clear is that their knowledge capability will increase as a result of contact with other freshly blooded

The West needs to share knowledge rapidly and be more innovative than terrorist groups – the building blocks are there

militants, as will their operational capability through access to sophisti-cated weaponry. Of course, we also have to consider how these people and their newly acquired weaponry might get back to the UK.

Assassinations – the proliferation of ‘magnetic bomb’ technologiesOn 11 January 2012, Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, 32, a scientist working at Iran’s uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, died after two unidentified men on a motorbike fastened a magnetic bomb to his vehicle outside a university in east Tehran. Mr Roshan was the fourth Iranian scientist to have been killed by a car bomb in the capital since early 2010. The current head of Iran’s atomic organisation, Fereydoun Abbasi, narrowly escaped another such incident in November 2010, when he managed to get out of his car with his wife just before the attached bomb exploded.

The Iranian authorities have consistently blamed Israel for these covert attacks. On 13 February 2012, there were attacks on Israeli diplomatic personnel in Tbilisi, Georgia, and Delhi, India. While the Tbilisi attack

The fall of the Gadaffi regime has seen vast quantities of arms, including SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, disappear in Libya

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FARC guerrillas in Colombia leave their calling card on an abandoned vehicle

within communities, we must maintain old standards such as ethics and proportionality while embracing emerging and innovative ways to get our message across to communities.Out-network their network This is a ‘Red Queen race’ – named after the character in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, who said: “In this place it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.” There is no such thing as winning a Red Queen race: the best you can ever do is run faster than the competition. These terrorist groups are capable of moving knowledge quickly between theatres and, if we are to live in a safer world, our expertise in saving lives needs to arrive ‘in country’ before their expertise in taking lives.

The West needs to share knowledge rapidly and be more innovative than these groups – and the building blocks are already there. This publication is an example of rapid information-sharing. Similarly, we have the innovative work of groups such as Ineqe, who are combining emerging technologies and operational experience to get effective training in theatre quickly and to assist with the ‘battle of ideas’ within communities.

Finally, back to the title of this article: who was Cassandra? Well, accord-ing to Greek mythology, she was a daughter of Priam, King of Troy. In awe of her beauty, Apollo provided her with the gift of prophecy, but when Cassandra refused Apollo’s romantic advances, he placed a curse ensuring that nobody would believe her warnings. Cassandra was left with know-ledge of future events, but could neither alter these events nor convince others of the validity of her predictions. We need to listen to Cassandra. n

The views expressed here are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Police Service of Northern Ireland

reportedly involved an explosive device (which was defused) being placed under the vehicle, the Delhi attack, in which the explosive device deto-nated, is believed to have involved a motorcycle and a magnetic device attached to the side of the vehicle. The occupants in both vehicles were fortunate to escape. Israeli sources have blamed Iran. It was noted that the twin bombing attempts came one day after the fourth anniversary of the assassination of Hezbollah’s deputy leader, Imad Mughniyah.

On 15 May 2012, an unidentified assailant attached an explosive device to the car of former interior minister Fernando Londono in Colombian capital Bogota. The blast killed his driver and a bodyguard, but Londono, 68, was not seriously injured. Colombian sources have blamed the terrorist group FARC for the attack. This modus operandi appears suspiciously similar to the attacks mentioned above. If this has involved a transfer of knowledge from Hezbollah or other parties to FARC then we should be alert to the possibility of this knowledge reaching ETA and their cohorts.

What action is necessary?We must work at a strategic level to prevent ‘ungoverned’ areas emerging. These really are the ‘petri dish’ of terrorist groups, where they can grow and develop faster than elsewhere. This means that the West will have to work on the ground to develop robust and human-rights-compliant gov-erning structures, including policing:Sting operations We must continue to interdict those terrorist groups attempting to access weapons or funding. This is the weak point of their procurement chain.Engage with communities early It will be communities that provide the intelligence we need to thwart these groups. This is where the ‘battle of ideas’ will be played out. To be successful in this struggle for legitimacy

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A jet-fighter programme provides an invitation to the interna-tional media and military cognoscenti to pile on the pressure by highlighting issues of design inconsistencies, technical

failure, delay, political indecision and rising costs. The F-35 Lightning II is no exception. In common with other Western fighter programmes, particularly the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Panavia Tornado, it has suffered from all of the above.

F-35 – Getting the UK’s Largest Defence Export Opportunity on TrackSimon Michell reviews the latest progress on the F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation multi-role fighter and highlights its economic importance to the UK in terms of its export value and job-creation potential

Paradoxically, while the ability of transatlantic nations – led by the US – to produce a fifth-generation multi-role aircraft is constantly questioned, attempts by Russia and China to develop their own fifth-generation aircraft – Sukhoi T-50/PAK FA and the Chengdu J-20 respectively – are met with a disproportionate sense of foreboding. Their setbacks are accepted as par for the course – even if the warfighting capabilities of those aircraft may not be a match for Lockheed Martin’s F-22 fighter and F-35 multi-role jets.

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Two countries outside the nine-nation F-35 partnership – Japan and Israel – have agreed to buy the aircraft

After a decade of programme rescheduling and cost revisions, 2011 was “a very good year”

Of course, public and private scrutiny of a programme as vital as the F-35 is an essential element of maintaining a transparent defence procurement process in a democracy. The lack of such criticism would perhaps be more alarming to the taxpayer than an overabundance.

Following almost a decade of programme rescheduling and cost revisions, 2011 was, in the words of Steve O’Bryan, Lockheed Martin’s vice president for programme integration and business development, “a very good year”. In fact, according to him it was probably “the best year of the programme”. Flight tests were completed 15 per cent ahead of plan, the F-35B Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant deploy-ment to the USS Wasp resulted in 72 vertical landings at sea out of a total of over 200 land-/sea-based landings for the entire year – in comparison to a mere 10 landings in 2010.

O’Bryan points to other highlights: “We took the aircraft to the edge of the envelope – up to 1.6 Mach and out to 9g. We carried ordnance on the aircraft and we delivered 13 airplanes.” Other notable events were the standing up of the F-35 training and test squadron at Eglin Air Force Base. Additional squadrons will be stood up during 2012 at Nellis and Edwards Air Force Bases and at the US Marine Corps’ Yuma Air Station.

Furthermore, the unproven F-35 won an open competition against the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet and Eurofighter Typhoon to be selected by the Japanese government as the successor to its McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom IIs. The 42 aircraft to be supplied to the Japanese will join another 20 aircraft that the Israeli government agreed to buy (with an option for a total of 75) when it signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance back in 2010. The fact that these two countries are not in the nine-nation industrial part-nership (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, UK and US) that are developing and producing the aircraft make them addi-tional units beyond original estimates. That is, if you discount the fact that Israel, like Singapore, has signed up as a Security Cooperation Participant (SCP), giving it a lower status than Lockheed Martin’s eight partners, but nevertheless a significant foothold in the programme.

Frustratingly for the aircraft programme office, it always seems that for every two steps forward, there frequently follows one step back. And this export success is no exception. Both Japan and Israel have voiced concerns about the effect of production rescheduling on the delivery and cost of their aircraft, and Israel is reported to be looking into possible stopgap solutions to bridge the potential void between F-35 deliveries and the decommis-sioning of its current fighter fleet.

That said, the F-35 programme does seem to be building on the progress made in 2011. According to O’Bryan, testing has made a solid start. Turkey has committed to its first operational jet. Norway’s minister of defence, Espen Barth Eide, reaffirmed his country’s commitment to 52 F-35As and revealed that a recent Norwegian Defence White Paper of March 2012 has suggested the possibility of taking delivery of the first two of four test air-craft a year early in 2015. However, once again, for every bit of good news there is some bad. In this instance, it is that Giampaolo Di Paola, the Italian defence minister, announced in February 2012 that he was cutting Italy’s F-35 procurement by 30 per cent from 131 to 90 aircraft as part of a number of measures to reduce the defence budget.

US reprieve for the STOVL variantCrucially, the start of 2012 saw the F-35B STOVL version escape possible termination after US defense secretary Leon Panetta lifted the aircraft off probation in recognition of the successes in the test programme and other engineering advances over the course of 2011.

While visiting the Naval Air Station at Patuxent River, where many of the F-35B tests are taking place, he told an expectant crowd of military and civilian F-35 workers: “As a result of your hard work and the hard work of JSF’s [F-35] government and industry team… the STOVL variant has made, I believe and all of us believe, sufficient progress so that as of today, I am lifting the STOVL probation.”

This early reprieve – the former US defense secretary, Robert Gates, had placed the STOVL variant on probation for two years – was welcomed by Vice Admiral David Venlet USN, the programme executive officer for the F-35 joint fighter programme office, as a “hard-earned and rewarding

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announcement for the entire DoD/industry team that worked very hard last year.” Again, as one might suspect, there was a counterbalance of dis-approval. In February 2012, the chairman of the US Senate Committee on Armed Services, Carl Levin, along with a ranking member, John McCain, wrote a harsh letter in which they expressed their disappointment in the way that the lifting of probation had been announced and the criteria on which that announcement had been made.

Whatever the outcome of that spat, the UK government’s announcement on 10 May 2012 that it was reversing its U-turn on the F-35B STOVL variant has a raft of implications, not just for the F-35 programme office. It raises more questions than it answers and brings the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) back under the microscope. It should also mean that the UK will not be without a carrier strike capability for as long as had been previously envisaged under the plan to install catapults and arrester gear for the coalition’s selection of the F-35C conventional variant.

The F-35 programme is not unique in facing problems, many of which are beyond the control of the programme office. Reductions in order numbers are political decisions made to save money, and there has rarely been a period when so many countries are trying to cut back on expenditure at the same time. Even so, that is not new – from the late 1990s through to the present day, the Eurofighter programme has grappled with the impacts of order cuts. That has not meant that the Typhoon programme is a failure – far from it. It has pioneered the sort of collaborative teaming that offered a template of sorts for the F-35 industrial partnership.

An opportunity to expand UK exports and jobsDespite all the problems associated with the programme, one critical ele-ment should not be overlooked – for the UK, the F-35 programme represents a vital opportunity to grow exports as well as to create and sustain UK jobs. “What’s key to understand is that the UK will build parts and components

not just on the 130-plus aircraft that it buys for the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, but also for more than 3,100 for the rest of the F-35 orders. That is because the deal that the UK has is to provide approximately 15 per cent of each aircraft that is sold. That equates to some 25,000 highly skilled aerospace jobs in the United Kingdom,” O’Bryan explains. The vast majority of these jobs are in the north-west of the country, with the south-west and East Midlands sharing a similar number, followed by the south-east with slightly fewer. However, almost all parts of the country are impacted by the programme, including Scotland and Wales.

That represents over 120 UK companies the length and breadth of the country. BAE Systems is the hub of the UK-based effort, but other well-known UK firms are also involved. These include Cobham, GE Aviation Systems, Martin-Baker, Rolls-Royce and Ultra Electronics. Each of these companies is linked to their own supply chains consisting of a network of small and medium-sized enterprises throughout the country.

An example of the potential value is clearly seen against the backdrop of the Japanese order for 42 aircraft. According to Paul Livingston, UK aeronautics director for Lockheed Martin, the Japanese order is worth in the region of £700 million to the UK. In addition, there is potential for a significant number of new export orders to be gained from other countries,

The UK takes delivery of its first F-35 Lightning II aircraft on 19 July 2012 during a ceremony at Fort Worth, Texas

There is potential for a significant number of new export orders to be gained from other countries

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particularly those who currently operate F-16s, for which the F-35 is an obvi-ous replacement. The scale of this phenomenally successful programme is evident in the delivery of the 4,500th F-16 (Block 52) aircraft by Lockheed Martin in April 2012 to the Moroccan Air Force.

Even before production of the F-35 ends, there is the other huge opportu-nity for the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) that were involved in the System Design and Development (SDD) and production phases to benefit from the overhaul, repair and maintenance work for an aircraft that may well still be flying in 2060.

To reinforce this point, Steve O’Bryan told RUSI: “What’s different about the F-35 programme is the OEMs being involved in the sustainment of the aircraft. This means those 120-plus UK companies, and it is important to realise that, generally speaking, about 80 per cent of the lifetime costs of a system like the F-35 come in the sustainment element.” n

UK F-35 industrial participants

BAE Systems: Lead work share for: aft fuselage; vertical and horizontal tails; CV wing tips; fuel system; crew escape; life support; prognostics health-management integration and UK aircraft-carrier integration support. Support work share for UK weapons integration; vehicle management systems; mission systems; structural testing; autonomic logistics and global sustainment (support). Major subcontractors: Martin-Baker, Denham (seat); Honeywell, Yeovil (life support); Goodrich, Wolverhampton (uplocks); MBDA, Stevenage (weapons); Raytheon, Harlow (weapons); Cobham, Wimborne (fuel probes); RLC, Accrington; JME, Blackpool; SPS, Nottingham; Hyde, Stockport; Inflite, Stansted; Cytec, Wrexham; Brookhouse, Darwen; CML, Birkenhead; GKN Aerospace, Isle of Wight; Technicut, Sheffield; ATG, Lancashire; Wesco, Huddersfield (consumables); Aeropia, Crawley (Privacy Observant Location Systems – POLS); Morsons, Manchester (engineering).Cobham: Cobham Mission Equipment is engaged in the design, qualification and manufacture of the F-35 air refuelling probe. Major subcontractor: Lymington Precision Engineers (LPE), Hampshire.GE Aviation Systems: Electrical Power Management System (EPMS); Back Stop Battery Charger (BSBC); Remote Input Output (RIO); Standby Flight Display (SFD); Prognostics and Health Management (PHM); Full-Life Management (FLM). Major subcontractors: Hypertac, London (interconnection); RE Thompson, Whitchurch, Hants, (machining); Aero Stanrew, Barnstaple (wound magnetics); Glenair, Mansfield (connectors); Harlow Group, Harlow (fabrication); Invotec, Tamworth (Printed Circuit Boards – PCBs); MCE, Newmarket (displays); eXception PCB, Tewkesbury (PCBs).Goodrich Actuation Systems: Development of the complete drive system for the JSF weapons-bay door, including electronic control unit, hydraulic motors, a power-drive gearbox, multiple rotary-geared actuators and door uplocks. Company also involved in the supply of actuators for the flight and propulsion system on the F-35B Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) version. Major subcontractors: Eaton Aerospace, Bedhampton, Hampshire; Pattonair, Derby; SS White, Milton Keynes; Penny & Giles, South Wales.Honeywell Normalair-Garrett: Cockpit life-support system.

Martin-Baker Aircraft Company: Contracted to manufacture and supply the US16E ejection seat for all F-35 variants. Major subcontractors: Advanced Composites, Airborne Systems, AmSafe Bridport Technical Fabrics, A One Precision, Chemring Energetics, Clayton Engineering, Dereham Designs, Deutsch, Doig Springs, Double M Engineering, FGP Engineering, FHL Claverham, Foam Engineers, Gase Marine Engineering, Goss Components, Hardigg UK, Hydramec, Interface Artworks, Icon Polymer, Itel Electronics, James White Engineering, KCB, Langford Lodge Engineering, Leemark Engineering, Loftlock Engineering, Manufactured Engineering Plastics, Micro Metalsmiths, Missiles & Space Batteries, Parker Chomerics (Parker Hannifin), PBH, Piddington Engineering, Precision Aircraft (Proof-of-Concept work, machining), Robert Stuart, Ronaldsway Aircraft Company, Saint Engineering, Superform Aluminium, Techtest (HR Smith), Technology International (Europe), Telelogic UK, WG Jones Engineering, Whiddon Engineering and Wilsons.MBDA: MBDA is under contract within the System Design and Development (SDD) programme for the integration of the Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM) for the UK F-35. The company is also offering a number of advanced weapon systems for the F-35 partnership, including: Selectable Precision Effects at Range (SPEAR) Capability 3; Meteor – Next-Generation Beyond Visual Range air-to-air Missile; Storm Shadow – long-range, deep-strike cruise missile and dual-mode Brimstone – air-to-surface precision strike weapon. Major subcontractor: Roxel (motor manufacturer), Summerfield, WorcestershireRFD Beaufort: Design, manufacture and distribution of the F-35 Lightning II Pilot Flight Equipment, including a fully integrated, modular and interchangeable solution designed to maximise protection and optimise pilot performance.Rolls-Royce: STOVL lift system. Major subcontractors: MOOG, Wolverhampton; CW Fletcher, Sheffield; Doncasters Bramah, Sheffield; MJ Sections, Dudley, West Midlands; Nicholsons, Durham.Ultra Electronics: Manufacture of engine ice-protection system used on the main JSF engine (F-135) and the lift fan engine. Major subcontractors: Foundation Technology Ltd, Milton Keynes; MTI 1998 Ltd, Watford.

The F-35 Lightning II undergoes static testing

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The financial uncertainty in Europe and the US and the reticence by various governments to invest heavily in defence budgets should not detract from the fact that there are contracts to be won and

relationships to be built with countries looking to develop and modernise their air-power capabilities. The emergence of China, both in robustly developing the PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) and its own emerging niche export market is worth taking heed of.

This year has so far been characterised by prudence in the current eco-nomic climate and the shrinking of European and US defence expenditure. The competition for India’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract, however, has aptly demonstrated the pulling power of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), as well as the Gulf states.

The Eurofighter consortium, although beaten in the commercial bids by Rafale, is still hopeful of returning the Typhoon fighter jet to the forefront of Indian thoughts and has expressed its keenness to quote an improved price if requested. This indicates a shift in the Eurofighter consortium’s export strategy, with a greater emphasis placed on competitive pricing and making the Typhoon commercially attractive to potential buyers, rather

Airborne Kinetic EffectAvnish Patel, military science project manager at RUSI, offers an assessment of some of the latest fighter-jet contract bids, including the way forward for Eurofighter and recent developments concerning China’s capabilities and its emerging export market

than relying on (and placing a heavy reliance on) the political power and weight the consortium can bring to bear on trying to seal deals. To comple-ment this, efforts to enhance the capabilities of the Typhoon to match it with its rivals (and to also make it a more viable option) are under way, and there remain the plans to develop an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar to be operational by 2015, as well as test-firing the new MBDA air-to-air missile as part of the Phase 1 Enhancement (P1E) programme, which will provide greater capability to undertake simultaneous air-to-air and air-to-ground engagements.

Opportunities in the Middle East Disappointment over the MMRCA deal has been balanced somewhat by Oman coming close to an agreement for 12 Typhoon jets, in a sale that is worth close to $2 billion. Eurofighter also hopes to circumvent Dassault in supplying as many as 60 Typhoon jets to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as offering competitive industrial off-set and technology trans-fer terms in bidding for the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) MiG-29N replacement contract.

Boeing’s F/A-18E Super Hornet is a major contender in international fighter-aircraft bid competitions

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Recent intrigue, arguably characteristic of the Indian procurement pro-cess, has seen a delay in finalising the winning bid by Dassault for the Rafale fighter jet. The Indian government has sought to re-evaluate the bidding process, and cost negotiations with Dassault are still ongoing, but there is confidence that a conclusion will be reached soon. The Rafale has yet to be exported outside of France, but its integration into the Indian Air Force (IAF) would undoubtedly act as a major catalyst for further interna-tional sales and would significantly influence the selection choice for other countries such as Brazil and its own F-X2 fighter competition.

Brazil, like India, is seeking to acquire a fourth-generation fighter, with Boeing’s F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, the Eurofighter Typhoon, Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Block 60, Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen NG, and Sukhoi’s SU-35 all up for selection, with the Gripen, Rafale and Super Hornet having been shortlisted as finalists. The intention is to acquire 36 fourth-generation fighters for the Força Aérea Brasileira (FAB), which is currently dependent on Super Tucano/ALX surveillance and light attack turboprops, AMX subsonic light fighters, modernised F-5BRs and a squad-ron of 12 Mirage 2000s. Similarly, the winning contract has to be linked generously to technology transfers and the enhancement of the aircraft industry and defence capabilities.

Another BRIC country, China, is seeking to balance its domestic commit-ments to modernise its air-power capabilities, while also seeking further outlets for exports and foreign sales. The state-owned China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC) is busy with its remit of selling China’s military aircraft overseas. Business is presently being conducted in a low-key manner, with small numbers of different types of aircraft being sold, including the joint collaboration regarding the Chengdu/Pakistan Aeronautical Complex JF-17 Thunder fighter, the Hongdu L-15

China is seeking to balance its commitments to modernise its air-power capabilities, while seeking further export outlets

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RAF Typhoons helped to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya from Italian air base Gioia Del Colle

lead-in fighter trainer and Guizhou FTC-2000 advanced jet trainer, MA-60 and H425 utility helicopters and Y-8 transport aircraft. Rather than making inroads in the higher echelons of the export market, the Chinese have had rather more significant success penetrating the lesser end of the market, and noticeably with countries detached from other suppliers by consider-ations of political sensitivity, with Pakistan and Sudan being cases in point.

China hopes to export 300 JF-17s over the next five years, but Pakistan is presently the only buyer (while also being a partner), with it looking to buy up to 200. These acquisitions would replace the component of Dassault Mirage III/Vs in the Pakistani Air Force (PAF), as well as variants of the F-7, which is the export equivalent of the Chinese J-7 and itself a derivative of the MiG-21 and the A-5C/Q-5 Ground Attack Aircraft.

Taking on European rivals Pakistan and China are collaborating to promote export sales of the JF-17, with the intention to target potential (cash-strapped or budget-conscious) countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. By way of incentivising any potential deals to countries on low budgets, Beijing will look to offer innovative sale packages to include a range of financing options, training and through-life support and maintenance infrastructures

to mark it out from its US and European competitors. To further create momentum, China must assuage concerns over the reliability of its indig-enously produced engines, as well as finding greater political leverage in some regions to attract clients who might already have invested in geo-strategic relationships with closer neighbours.

Concerns over quality regarding its export products will continue to linger as Chinese military aircraft production capacity and the country’s industrial base is primarily dedicated to modernising the PLAAF, this itself emblematic of China’s emergence as a formidable military player and regional hegemon. China continues to test and evaluate prototypes of its J-20 stealth fighter, set to rival Lockheed Martin’s F-22 Raptor and the Indo-Russian fifth generation T-50 stealth fighter, as well as the fourth-generation Chengdu J-10B multirole fighter (powered by Russian Salyut AL-31 FN engines).

As a consequence, this maturation and growing emergence of China’s air-power capabilities has triggered anxiety in the region with a number of countries looking to invest in and improve their air-power capabilities. Taiwan is also looking to the US to end the stalemate over selling it the latest Lockheed Martin F-16A/Bs. When assessing the wider strategic picture, these developments are set against the backdrop of a US foreign policy shift under President Obama towards the Asia-Pacific region. n

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Recent engagements in Libya have demonstrated that UK bunker buster capability is vital to strategically neutralise high-value and hardened targets. The 2010 UK Strategic Defence and

Security Review’s (SDSR) future force doctrine reiterates their signifi-cance by including1 the Storm Shadow cruise missile carried by current and future fast jets – a state-of-the-art capability to strike ground targets at medium to long range.

UK and Allied countries’ understanding of the concept of penetrating high-value, deeply buried or tunnelled targets – coupled with a modern need for precision effects and, thus, minimal civilian casualties – brought to fruition a new family of weapons that was aptly demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War (Operation Iraqi Freedom) – bunker busters. Since these engage-ments, bunker busters have been improved (Libya – Operation Ellamy) and now provide an indispensable capability for the UK and Allied air forces.

Bunker Busters – an Indispensable Strategic CapabilityAs an increasing number of the UK’s adversaries shelter their high-value military and industrial assets underground or in rocky terrain, RUSI research analyst Adam Smith considers the importance of developing ever more effective missiles to strike what are known as ‘hard and deeply buried’ targets

Current international focus is on the accessibility and penetration viability of the Iranian underground nuclear facilities; bunker busters will play an important strategic role if the kinetic option on the regime is approved.

UK adversaries worldwide are reinforcing, strengthening and protecting leaders, military personnel, equipment and other high-value assets using what are known as ‘hard and deeply buried’ targets (HDBTs). Historically, it was the emergence of concrete-hardened surface shelters that posed the problem. However, facilities now range from hardened, surface bunker complexes to tunnel facilities deep underground. HDBTs are typically large, well concealed and often resilient to conventional weaponry, and put an additional reliance on intelligence and surveillance capabilities to charac-terise the structure, geology, information systems, equipment and status in order to optimise any precision kinetic effects. It is estimated that around 10,000 HDBTs exist worldwide, guarding countries’ highly prized assets.

A satellite image of the nuclear complex at Natanz, about 150 miles south of Tehran, Iran. Similar pictures have indicated the presence of three underground caverns

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The UK’s reliance on fast jet aircraft to deliver bunker-buster strike capa-bility infers a dependence on technology innovation to meet weight and size restrictions of the armament to deliver the desired effect. This places huge importance on optimisation of the warhead design, demonstrated by the MBDA-built Storm Shadow’s Bomb Royal Ordnance Augmented Charge (BROACH) capability. The emergence of the 2,700lb MBDA Storm Shadow and 2,000lb Raytheon Enhanced Paveway III missiles in the recent Libya campaign confirmed and validated the importance of a precision bunker buster capability as the ‘first night of war’ weapon against strategic targets. Currently, the Storm Shadow missile is undergoing a midlife upgrade that is expected to solidify its place as the UK’s go-to bunker buster.

In comparison to the UK’s push for relatively light armament capability on fast jets, the USAF still pursues larger and more devastating weaponry – the Massive Ordinance Penetrator (MOP). This 30,000lb bomb, built by Boeing, breaches the gap between nuclear and conventional capability, demonstrating similar kinetic and damage effects without the nuclear fall-out and associated geopolitical ramifications. The B2 stealth bomber can only carry two of the gigantic weapons, and with the only other aircraft capable being the B-52 Stratofortress, the USAF has complete autonomy over the delivery of the MOP capability, thought to have been built with one eye on the underground Iranian nuclear facilities. US Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle describes the weapon as having “great capability and we are continuing to make it better.”2

The US Congress recently approved a request by the Pentagon for an $81 million (£51.9 million) upgrade to the weapon. Being so large and potentially devastating, it is the largest bunker-buster capability currently in active operation. With the focus on international political tensions regarding Iranian nuclear interests, it is also important to note that Israel is improving

The bunker buster will have an increasingly prominent role in future battlefield strategies and engagements

The Fordow and Esfahan facilities, however, remain an enigma. Without credible intelligence on the internal layout, structures and depths of the tunnels, the penetration feasibility remains unclear. However, without the MOP, any unilateral attack would inflict only superficial damage to the Iranian nuclear regime. Even with the MOP, the USAF is rushing through plans to upgrade the weapon; highlighting American concern at Iranian bunker technologies, including the mastery of ‘ultra-high-performance concrete’ to protect its facilities.

It is also important to note that bunker-buster missiles are typically tested against concrete targets. The Fordow and Esfahan facilities are tunnelled into the side of rocky terrain, which makes penetration assessments more difficult and less accurate. Bunker-buster capability would be advised as a final resort after all political and economic discussions are exhausted. Even if deployed, they are not guaranteed to entirely neutralise Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but would be expected to delay technology development by between five and 10 years.

What is certain, however, is that bunker-buster capabilities remain an important strategic asset for the UK and Allied armed forces. As the enemy constructs facilities ever deeper, under further-reinforced materials, the bunker buster will have an increasingly prominent role in future battlefield strategies and engagements. The need for sovereign capability coupled with ever-decreasing defence budgets will place a reliance on innovative technologies to ensure the UK’s ability to seriously hinder HDBTs. n

Footnotes

HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, October 20101.

Tony Capaccio, ‘Bunker-Buster Bomb Eyed for Possible Iran Use, General Says’, 2.

www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-08/biggest-bunker-buster-bomb-eyed-for-potential-

iran-use-general.html, accessed March 2012

D Albright and C Hinderstein, ISIS, 20033.

its bunker-buster capability – growing its qualitative military capability with the development of the MPR-500 in 2012, a 500lb bunker-buster weapon, and the approval of the sale of GBU-39 bunker busters from the US in 2011. Operation Opera in Iraq (1981) and Operation Orchard in Syria (2007) are two prominent examples of Israeli air strikes on nuclear facilities, indicating that Israel is not reluctant to impose force when potentially adversarial nations explore nuclear weapons capability. However, Iranian facilities pose a different strategic and operational proposition due to their under-ground characteristics.

Iranian nuclear facilitiesThree of the vast number of Iranian nuclear facilities are known to exhibit underground characteristics: the uranium-enrichment facilities in Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan. Available satellite imagery of the Natanz facility3 sug-gests that it possesses three large underground caverns, most probably to facilitate the uranium centrifuges. These concrete-covered rooms are well within the capability of current, conventional, bunker-buster technology.

A Dassault Rafale carrying a full load of ordnance, including the MBDA Storm Shadow long-range cruise missile

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The devastation wreaked by anti-ship missiles during the Falklands conflict in 1982 highlighted the need for a step change in how naval ships counter aerial threats. Prior to the conflict, the main

threat was considered to come from high-flying strike aircraft from the Warsaw Pact nations, operating in the mid-ocean area. However, the Argentine Navy moved the goal posts considerably with its air strikes against British ships (Atlantic Conveyor and HMS Sheffield) using the French-built Dassault-Breguet Super Etendard jets equipped with AM-39 Exocet (flying fish) missiles, also French-built.

County-class destroyer HMS Glamorgan was also struck by an Exocet as she patrolled the Falklands shoreline, but this attack was prosecuted from a makeshift, land-based AM-38 installation – flown in from Argentina – and cobbled together in situ.

Although the Royal Navy Sea Dart missile scored some notable successes during the Falklands conflict, the sea-skimming missile threat became a matter of significant urgency. So, after unsuccessful attempts to design a next-generation Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) vessel as a member of the eight-nation NFR-90 consortium, and then as part of the Horizon Project with France and Italy, the United Kingdom decided to go it alone and develop the Type-45 Daring-class destroyer.

Originally, the Royal Navy had planned on building 12 Type-45 destroyers, but financial constraints have conspired to bring this figure down to six. Only time will tell if this is enough. However, with concerns over numbers taken as read, the Type 45 is a remarkable ship that far exceeds anything of which the Type 42s are capable in terms of air defence. The combination of the Sea Viper (MBDA Aster 15 and 30 anti-missile and local/medium-range

Evolving the Royal Navy’s Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) CapabilitySimon Michell reviews how the Royal Navy is addressing the aerial threat, while also enhancing its ship-to-shore strike capability

area defence missiles), the Sampson multi-function radar system (devel-oped by Roke Manor and BAE Systems) and a highly developed C2 system make it the most advanced AAW vessel available.

The Sampson radar, mounted inside a spherical housing at the top of the foremast, is claimed by its makers to be unjammable and capable of searching and tracking 1,000 targets up to a distance of 250nm. The Sea Viper missile can be fired in salvoes of up to eight against multiple targets and, thanks to a digital uplink, can be redirected in flight. The main differ-ence between the Aster 15 and 30 is range – Aster 15 is effective up to 30km and the Aster 30 is capable of destroying a target as far out as 120km. This sophisticated system-of-systems approach offers immense capability. One of the Daring-class destroyers could, if need be, provide air defence and air-cover command and control for the entire London airspace.

The Type 45 is a remarkable ship that far exceeds anything of which the Type 42s are capable in terms of air defence

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When HMS Duncan, the sixth and final class Type 45 destroyer, launched in October 2010, all of the Daring-class destroyers had entered the water, marking the end of the shore-based phase of the build programme. The first, HMS Daring, entered service on 31 July 2010 and began her initial operational deployment in January 2012.

HMS Dauntless, the second of class, was accepted into service on 16 November 2010, and became the first of the Type 45s to fire the Sea Viper missile. Dauntless set off on her maiden deployment in April 2012, heading for the South Atlantic.

The third of class, HMS Diamond, began her first deployment in June 2012, setting off to replace HMS Daring in the Gulf. Just before she left, she supplied crews to man the escorts for the royal barge as she made her way down the Thames during the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations.

HMS Dragon, the fourth of class, was commissioned into the fleet in April 2012 and is scheduled to start operational service in early 2013. HMS Defender, the fifth of class, received the third and final tranche of her crew in June 2012 and will enter service in 2014.

Type 45 Daring-class destroyer – update

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Royal Navy Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield after she was struck by an Argentine Exocet missile during the Falklands conflict

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The Royal Navy contribution to Operation Unified Protector

The NATO-led campaign to protect Libyan civilians under attack from Gaddafi forces highlighted the need for a range of naval capabilities, and accentuated the value of naval strike. The lack of a UK aircraft carrier was compensated for, to some extent but not entirely, by the other tasks that the Royal Navy ships involved in the operation were able to fulfil.

For example, it went largely unnoticed that this campaign saw the most extensive use of naval gunfire since the Falklands campaign. Some 254 shells were fired (134 high-explosive and 120 illumination rounds. The Trafalgar-class attack submarines, Triumph and Turbulent, fired a number of TLAM cruise missiles (somewhere above 12 and below 20 between them).

Moreover, British Army Air Corps Apache helicopters used HMS Ocean as a base from which to attack onshore targets. In all, they made 50 sorties and fired 95 Hellfire missiles, 16 CVR-7 rockets and 4,085 cannon rounds. Apart from attacking tanks, command nodes and checkpoints, the Apache helicopters also destroyed small boats that Libyan forces were using to resupply an artillery battery that was shelling civilians in Misrata.

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The Type 45s are also capable of firing Tomahawk missiles. This was one of the requirements that eventually led to the UK pulling out of the multi-national design effort. Other reasons included the Royal Navy’s aspirations to be able to defend large task groups far out at sea. This was something for which the Italian Navy, in particular, did not have a requirement as it is more concerned with operations in the Mediterranean in which land-based air cover can be used to supplement the Horizon frigates.

Equipped for a wide variety of tasksBeyond the missile capability, however, Daring-class ships are equipped with a number of other weapons systems and capabilities that make them suitable for a range of tasks – disaster relief, evacuation and naval bom-bardment. They can take on board a complement of up to 60 marines. They have a landing spot large enough to handle a helicopter as big as an AgustaWestland Merlin or even a Boeing CH-45 Chinook. They are fitted with two 30mm machine gun systems, two Phalanx short-range anti-air machine- gun systems and a Mk 8 114mm (4.5-inch) medium-calibre naval gun.

As far as their ability to deliver kinetic effect in a variety of forms is concerned, the Daring class is undoubtedly beyond equal for a ship of its size. The Ministry of Defence has, however, accepted considerable risk by choosing to build just six of them. The same argument that is used to explain the requirement for four Vanguard nuclear-deterrent submarines would also appear to be applicable here. What would happen once the maintenance, training and refit cycle has begun and a Type 45, or perhaps even two, are lost to enemy action? n

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The Royal Navy remains one of the most capable navies in the world – one of a handful to retain significant capacity to conduct high-end warfighting operations. It continues to wrestle with the strategic

and operational implications of reducing numbers – a process of reduction under way since the end of the Cold War, the consequences of which have been thrown into sharper relief by the financial crisis, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and growing debates about the direc-tion of SDSR 2015. Yet one consequence of repeated delays to major Royal Navy equipment programmes since the end of the Cold War is that, today, the impact of these perennial cuts is offset to a degree by the fact that almost an entirely new frontline navy is coming online at the same time.

The arrival of one (or perhaps two) Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers with their short take-off and vertical landing F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters, seven Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarines and six Daring-class Type 45 destroyers, when added to an amphibious capability recapitalised prior to SDSR 2010, will provide a navy that, while smaller in size, will have unprecedented capability comparable even to that of the United States Navy (USN). The last piece of this jigsaw will be the Type 26 Global Combat Ship (GCS), which will replace the 13 Duke-class Type 23 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigates. A surface ship remains at the core of naval operations, providing forward presence, international engagement, sea control and freedom of access.

The strategic context for future surface-ship operationsThe arrival of this new navy, when set against an emerging geostrategic and geopolitical focus on the use of the sea as the UK and wider interna-tional politico-strategic consciousness moves on from Afghanistan, has left the UK’s maritime community appearing more upbeat than in the imme-diate wake of SDSR 2010. This emerging shift in strategic consciousness was encapsulated by the 2011 Libya campaign, in which the international maritime contribution to the coalition campaign was widely noted.

Libya witnessed what was, arguably, a strategic renaissance in naval operations – particularly in those conducted by surface ships. Of the 16 UK

The Type 26 Global Combat Ship – a Renaissance Warship?The next piece in the Royal Navy build-programme jigsaw is the Type 26 surface combatant. It is to be affordable, exportable and flexible. Dr Lee Willett, senior research fellow, maritime studies at RUSI outlines how partnerships are key to this project

ships, submarines and auxiliary assets deployed, six of the Royal Navy’s 19 destroyers and frigates were present at some point1. Royal Navy ships and submarines contributed across the spectrum of operations – from high-end, day-one strikes ashore with Tomahawk cruise missiles, to maritime inter-diction and tactical fires, to acting as a sea base for the deployment ashore of representatives of other government departments and international agencies, to providing access for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Most notably, Libya demonstrated that the requirement for high-end operations persists, even if it is – at least in that instance – on a relatively small scale.

New powers appear to perceive a significant role for maritime presence in regional and global issues, and are building navies with the ability to sup-port national interests in these circumstances. To a number of these navies, a submarine capability not only supports such presence but, more broadly, provides a strategic step-up in naval and wider national capability. With the global strategic debate more focused on ensuring freedom of access

24 – Global Type 26 72 26/7/12 17:24:47

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to areas of interest such as maritime choke points and sea lines of com-munication, the Iranian decision to relocate its three Kilo-class submarines to a new base at Jask, at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz and perhaps to deny access to its waters, demonstrates the enduring need for an ASW capability provided by a Type 26 GCS. With the Royal Navy required to sup-port a range of global interests at distance, thinking smarter today about how to equip and operate the Type 26 GCS in the future will be critical if the Royal Navy is able to offset some of the results of reducing force levels.

First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope told the 2012 RUSI Future Maritime Operations Conference that the UK’s ability to be smart in this context was fundamental to matching the spec-trum of capabilities with the spectrum of uncertainty2. Key to such smart power, he argued, was keeping capability options open while also finding the right balance between hard and soft power in the capabilities provided by a platform such as the Type 26 GCS. Maximising the versatility, effect

Graphic depicting the stern of the Type 26 Global Combat Ship (GCS)

and influence of the Type 26 GCS through providing a range of capabilities and the ability to act in a timely manner in a range of circumstances would enable it to conduct full-spectrum operations, from constabulary tasks to warfighting. The high-end capability would maximise the credibility of its deterrent effect, to prevent what the First Sea Lord referred to as the “most dangerous” challenges, while its strategic influence could be further strengthened by maximising its utility to respond to more likely circum-stances, such as humanitarian and disaster-relief scenarios.

Partnering to deliver flexibility in the Type 26 GCSSince the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) published its Green Paper prior to SDSR in February 2010, there has been a significant strategic emphasis on the development of partnerships as a means of reinforcing interna-tional security interests at a time of growing global political and economic turbulence. Such partnerships can take a number of forms – between

24 – Global Type 26 73 26/7/12 17:25:00

74 RUSI DEFENCE SYSTEMS SUMMER 2012

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organisations, between national governments and their own armed forces, between governments and the commercial industries that supply them, and between nations themselves. The aim of such partnerships is common: to increase military effectiveness at a time of austerity.

From the UK’s perspective, the Type 26 GCS programme is a key example of the importance of such partnerships. Minister for international security strategy Gerald Howarth MP told the RUSI conference that the Type 26 GCS programme is a “great example” of the partnership idea3.

It is clear what the UK wants from the Type 26 GCS – a flexible, adapt-able, multipurpose capability set that adds maximum value in support of UK Government policy as a whole, but also a ship still able to deliver sig-nificant warfighting effect. The most immediate challenge is to set up the programme in such a way as to deliver this. Reflecting the more positive mood in the Royal Navy itself, the Royal Navy, the MoD and industry have developed an increasingly cooperative partnership to deliver the Type 26 GCS. As the UK Government’s 2012 defence technology White Paper stated, work on the programme “is demonstrating the value of linkages between [government] and industry at the earliest stages of a programme”4.

While the programme currently is developing well, the challenges it faces remain clear. Despite being built on a known financial foundation, the rising number of government statements relating to how the financial crisis will impact upon UK spending plans until perhaps as far as 2020 – an entire parliament beyond the 2015 end-date initially predicted – demonstrate that the Royal Navy, the MoD and industry together have much to do to ensure that programme affordability remains on track within a budget that may still decrease. Given, too, that SDSR 2015 will see the Royal Navy faced with three core affordability challenges – relating to the deterrent, the carrier and the Type 26 GCS – the risk remains that the ever-increasing squeeze on public finance may spark difficult internal MoD debates about priorities.

There is also a prominent international dimension to the partnering debate. While the UK retains a national sovereign need to be able to design and build complex warships in the UK, the Type 26 GCS programme has

been put forward by the government as an opportunity to develop ships in partnership with other nations, enabling commonality that can reduce costs in development, build, operation and support. Of critical appeal to interna-tional navies here may be the UK’s demonstrated ability to develop ground-breaking naval technological innovation and state-of-the-art warships – as it has done, arguably, with the carriers, Astute and the Type 45.

Affordability and numbersDeveloping international partnerships through defence programmes increases international defence and wider engagement opportunities for the UK5. Partnering with international navies also opens up opportunities

for the UK to leverage new transformational technologies to add value and reduce cost. While budgets continue to decline, the Royal Navy, arguably, has reached the limit of the force-level reductions it can swallow without stretching its global coverage to breaking point. Maintaining a force level of 13 Type 26 GCS platforms will be critical both for the Royal Navy and for the UK, particularly through defining a warfighting head mark for the Royal Navy and the UK as a whole. Moreover, a force level of just 19 ships (consisting of six Type 45s and 13 Type 26 GCS) is, it could be argued, as

The Type 26 GCS programme has been put forward as an opportunity to develop ships in partnership with other nations

Uniquely, the Type 26 GCS is being built to cost, rather than capability

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close to the minimum number from which the UK can sustain a sovereign maritime industrial base in complex warship building.

The Type 26 GCS programme is unique in that it is designed to cost, not capability. As a result, any risk of cost increase will see capability lost if savings cannot be found elsewhere. Thus, partnerships with other navies offer tangible potential benefits, with options for providing savings through sharing equipment, training, support and other pipelines. Once the ships are in service, they will need to be able to draw on a well-developed plan to maximise their availability based around greater reliability and main-tenance performance built into the design. To achieve this, the MoD and industry will need to develop a plan that delivers such value in the long term without adding cost today6.

In another unique development, when the Type 26 GCS programme moves through Main Gate – the procurement milestone at which the deci-sion is taken on whether to proceed into full production – the business case will include together an assessment of all issues relating to develop-ment, build and support. What is clear from current discussions is that all partners involved in building the Type 26 GCS programme understand that affordability is the core message, and that this must be considered today in all aspects of the programme as it goes forward into tomorrow. Should the Type 26 Global Combat Ship continue to develop in a positive way, it will deliver an interoperable, adaptable and affordable capability to the UK that is both expeditionary and exportable.

Footnotes

1. Thesurfaceshipspresentwere:theType42destroyerHMSLiverpoolandhersistership

York, the Type 22 Broadsword-class frigate HMS Cumberland and the Type 23 Duke-

classfrigatesHMSIron Duke,SutherlandandWestminster.

ForfurtherdiscussionofthecontributionofsurfaceshipstotheLiyacampaign,see:RUSI,

Short War, Long Shadow: the Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign, pp41-49.

Availableonlineatwww.rusi.org/downloads/assets/WHR_1-12.pdf

2. AdmiralSirMarkStanhopeGCBOBEADC(FirstSeaLordandChiefoftheNavalStaff).

Keynote address to RUSI Future Maritime Operations Conference, 4 July 2012. Tran-

script available online at: www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4ECCC0E0A8EE9/info:public/

infoID:E4FF45A11205F4

3. GeraldHowarthMP(MinisterofStateforInternationalSecurityStrategy),keynoteaddress

toRUSIFutureMaritimeOperationsConference,4thJuly2012

4. UKMinistryofDefence.NationalSecuritythroughTechnology:Technology,Equipment,

and Support forUKDefence and Security. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of

State for Defence, by Command of Her Majesty. February 2012, p54 para 184.

Available atwww.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/4EA96021-0B99-43C0-B65E-CDF3A9EEF2E9/0/

cm8278.pdf

5. AndyThorp,portfolioprogrammedirector,MBDA.PresentationtoRUSIFutureMaritime

OperationsConference,4July2012

6. Brian Johnson, business development director UK, BAE Systems. Presentation to RUSI

FutureMaritimeOperationsConference,4July2012

Type 26: tasks and capabilities

The Type 26 is a multi-role surface combatant. Little detail is publicly available on its precise capabilities at this stage. The programme remains in the design phase, and the Royal Navy, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and industry are working together to ensure the development of a ship that is built to cost and on time. In an April 2012 interview in Defence Management Journal, Brian Johnson of BAE Systems stated that final design decisions would not be made until the Main Gate investment decision point, which is scheduled for the middle of this decade.

What is known, however, is that the Type 26 GCS is being designed to support three variants – force anti-submarine warfare (ASW); anti-air warfare (AAW); and general purpose. While yet to be confirmed, each will be fitted for, or with, a selection of capabilities, including.

Artisan three-dimensional, medium-range ■■

target-indication and fire-control radarHull and (for the ASW version) towed sonars■■

Sea Ceptor air defence system■■

Vertical-launch silos■■

Medium-calibre gun■■

Close-in weapons systems■■

Lightweight torpedoes■■

Rigid Inflatable Boats (RIBs)■■

Unmanned vehicles (air, surface and sub-surface)■■

The ability to embark Merlin, Lynx Wildcat and, ■■

possibly, Chinook helicoptersCapacities to support humanitarian and ■■

disaster-relief operations

All variants will be flexible at a conceptual level, to enable a degree of capability adaptation to meet the required role. Options to maximise this flexibility remain under consideration, including plug-and-play approaches and a flexible mission space. This flexibility will permit the use of modular approaches to meeting operational requirements, as well as the addition of through-life capability upgrades. A number of new capabilities are already being brought into service as part of the Type 23 sustainment programme, and some of these will be cross-decked into the Type 26 GCS, providing the capacity to prove and de-risk capabilities.

Based on information available in the public domain, the Type 26 GCS will is likely to have a top speed of around 28 knots, approximately 60 days’ endurance and a range of around 7,000 miles at 15 knots – each attribute vital in enabling the ship to support the government’s stated expeditionary posture.

Sources: BAE Systems, ‘Global Combat Ship’. www.baesystems.com/product/BAES_020346/global-combat-ship?_afrLoop=370676192839000; Defence Industry Daily, ‘Britain’s Future Frigates’, 12 July 2012, www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Britains-Future-Frigates-06268Defence Management Journal, ‘Type 26: the Future Backbone of the Royal Navy’, 5 April 2012, www.defencemanagement.com/ feature_story.asp?id=19558; Ministry of Defence, ‘New Sea Ceptor Missiles to be Developed for the Royal Navy’, 30 January 2012, www.mod.uk/ DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/NewSeaCeptorMissilesToBeDevelopedForRoyalNavy.htm; Naval Technology, ‘Type 26 Global Combat Ship Programme’, www.naval-technology.com/projects/global-combat-ship-gcs-programme

24 – Global Type 26 75 27/7/12 16:38:46

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As efforts continue to make export-led growth the centrepiece of UK foreign and economic policy, emerging economies across Latin America are becoming increasingly important as

potential new export markets for Britain’s defence and security industry. Nowhere has this been more evident than in Brazil, where BAE Systems has recently secured a contract worth £133 million for the sale of three Ocean Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to the Brazilian Navy, marking the British defence giant’s most recent maritime deal in the region.

Weighing in at around 2,200 tonnes and capable of reaching speeds in excess of 25 knots, the OPVs were purchased in January as part of Brazil’s current surface-ship acquisition plan (PROSUPER)1. In addition to the three 90m vessels, which come equipped with a 30mm cannon, two 25mm guns, a helicopter flight deck and a rigid inflatable boat, the contract also contained ancillary support services and a manufacturing licence enabling further vessels of the same class to be constructed in Brazil. Speaking about the contract, Andrew Davies, managing director of BAE Systems’ maritime business, said: “This is a significant step forward in our relationship with Brazil… We are looking forward to working together and hope this will be the start of a long-term partnership with Brazil in the maritime sector.”2

Brazil recently overtook the UK to become the sixth largest economy in the world, and is currently undergoing a major naval modernisation programme following the release of its 2008 national defence strategy3.

Latin America: the Land of Opportunity for Britain’s Defence and Security Industry?Matt Ince, project manager for International Studies at RUSI, highlights recent successes for UK defence companies in Latin America, and assesses the challenges facing them in meeting government targets to double the amount of business that the country’s firms are conducting in the region

The strategy, which will be reinforced later this year by the release of a defence white paper, established the need to develop strategic capabili-ties in cybernetics, space and nuclear technology, and is aimed at bringing Brazil’s military capabilities in line with its newfound economic standing. As well as the acquisition of the OPVs, Brazil is also interested in building frigates, and it has been invited by BAE Systems to be a partner in develop-ing the next generation of its warships4.

Target for boosting UK tradeThis major deal with Brazil chimes with broader efforts currently being made across government to re-energise British relations throughout Latin America and meet the target of doubling British trade with Brazil by 2015. This goal has also been set for both Colombia and Mexico. In the defence and security sector, such efforts are being led, first and foremost, by the UK Trade and Investment Defence and Security Organisation (UKTI DSO), which is offering British companies specialist advice and support to help them break into new export markets. Other recent successes have included Griffon Hoverwork Ltd winning a contract in January 2012 to supply the Peruvian Navy with five Griffon 2000TD hovercraft – in addition to the two that they have already sold to the Peruvians5 – and Anglo-Italian helicopter company AgustaWestland, which secured a deal in March to supply the Carabineros de Chile with their fifth AW109 Power light twin helicopter6.

The Brazilian procurement of BAE Systems Offshore Patrol Vessels cements the company’s long-standing relationship with the country

Copyright© 2010 BAE Systems.

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Throughout the past decade, security continued to move up the political agenda across Latin America, placing political leaders and security forces under increased pressure to confront the region’s diverse range of secu-rity challenges. As a result, in addition to the UK’s traditional defence exports, recent openings for Britain’s defence and security industry have also spread to a growing number of other sectors, including the rule of law, corporate and domestic security, infrastructure protection and the region’s booming extraction industries. This has led to an increase in defence- and security-related spending and the rapid growth of defence and security markets, particularly in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru, creating a range of new opportunities for foreign firms to export goods and services to the region.

This is a trend that has significantly increased the regional business prospects of Britain’s defence giants, security-sector solution-providers, defence and security consultancies, and small and medium-sized enter-prises alike; especially those with niche expertise in areas such as critical national infrastructure protection, cyber security, undercover surveillance equipment, explosive-detection equipment and communications.

As Latin American growth continues apace, and countries across the region attempt to enact their ambitious future plans, the UK is in a good position to offer expertise and respond to the opportunities being created – particularly following the 2012 Olympic Games in London. The UK will be

The UK is in a good position to offer expertise and respond to the opportunities being created

For example, firms must establish an initial route to market; a prospect made more daunting by the fact that Latin America is not as accessible to the UK as other parts of the world, due to the lack of direct commercial flights to a number of the region’s key cities, including Colombia’s capital, Bogota, and Peruvian capital Lima. Barriers in this regard are also per-haps created by the perception that Latin America is still a comparatively hostile environment in which to do business – a mindset fuelled by the excessive levels of corruption, violence and criminal complicity that is historically associated with some Latin American countries.

Yet, perhaps the biggest challenge for British companies is the fact that they now have to compete with a growing number of other countries that are similarly increasing their defence and security sector engagement with Latin America. High on the list is France, which is set to help Brazil realise its ambitions of owning a nuclear-powered submarine. This is a reality also made tougher by the fact that off-the-shelf UK products are often more expensive to purchase than those of its competitors – most notably China, whose arms conglomerate, NORINCO, has continued to move up the value-added chain in Latin America over the past few years. Notable sales to the region include K-8 aircraft and JYL-1 radars to Venezuela, WMZ-551 armoured personnel carriers to Argentina, and the leasing of an MA-60 transport aircraft to Bolivia9.

Nevertheless, despite there being some hurdles, a growing number of British companies are showing that it is possible to secure major export deals in Latin America with the help of the UKTI DSO, growing ministe-rial support, and the strong reputation that the UK’s defence and security sector has for quality, reliability, effectiveness and value for money10. As the UK’s defence and security industry are increasingly having to look abroad to counterbalance the UK’s own shrinking domestic defence spending, the good news is that, for the immediate future, a number of openings for UK companies should occur in countries across Latin America.

While future contracts are by no means guaranteed, the UK can at least count itself lucky that it is both competitive and well placed to benefit from the range of opportunities that are currently available throughout the Latin American region. n

Footnotes

BAE Systems, Brazil Buys Ocean Patrol Vessels, 2 January 2012, www.baesystems.com/ 1.

product/BAES_027244/offshore-patrol-vessels?_afrLoop=8268375823000

UK Trade and Investment, ‘BAE awarded £133m Brazil contract’, 6 January 2012, 2.

www.invest.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/export/countries/americas/caribbean/barbados/

news/238660.html

The National Defence Strategy of Brazil3. , December 2008, www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/

estrategia/arquivos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_ingles.pdf

BBC News, ‘BAE Systems sells patrol vessels to Brazil’, 2 January 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/4.

uk-scotland-scotland-business-16383765

www.griffonhoverwork.com/posts/63 5.

www.agustawestland.com/news/carabineros-de-chile-expand-their-aw109-power-fleet6.

Foreign Office Minister Lord Howell, ‘Making the most of our relations with Latin America’, 7.

Comments made at the Latin America Investment Forum, London, 22 March 2012,

www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=745047882

Ibid8.

R Evan Ellis, 9. China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, And Strategic

Position, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2011, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/

pdffiles/pub1077.pdf

Ministry of Defence, 10. National Security through Technology, Cm 8278, February 2012,

www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/4EA96021-0B99-43C0-B65E-CDF3A9EEF2E9/0/cm8278.pdf

able to share its experience of hosting a major international sporting event with Brazil, which is preparing to host the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016.

Colombia plans to invest $54 billion (£34.7 billion) in its infrastructure over the next three years, while Brazil has scheduled investment worth $350 billion (£224.8 billion) in this sector over the next four years. Along with Venezuela’s plans to invest more than $200 billion (£128.5 billion) to develop its oil and gas reserves and infrastructure by 20307, such investment may enable British companies to forge closer ties with Latin America in the near future through the sharing of expertise on infrastructure construction, protection issues and managing public-private partnerships. In addition, the fast-expanding offshore oil and gas industries in both Colombia and Brazil are also likely to present a wealth of future opportunities for UK suppliers to provide high-value machinery and consultancy services.

The challenges of doing business in Latin AmericaWith 20 sovereign republics, a combined GDP of more than $5 trillion (£3.2 trillion) and rising, and a population of almost 600 million people8, Latin America currently stands out as an easier place for UK companies to do business than many other emerging markets as it contains the largest group of democracies outside western Europe. However, despite these conditions and the region’s current security landscape, which has been markedly improved over the last decade, there are still a number of challenges that UK companies must overcome if they are to make the most of the diverse range of opportunities currently on offer.

26 - Latin AmericaLP.indd 77 26/7/12 14:34:24

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The transfer, movement and stowage of equipment, from muni-tions to stores, boats, or specific mission modules, represent critical logistic processes that can define a surface ship’s fighting

capability. These activities are typically labour-intensive and function-ally complex, with associated operational safety issues to consider since moderate sea states can pose significant additional challenges.

Traditionally, navies have relied heavily on manpower for the movement of equipment on vessels, from the handing of 4.5-inch shells or torpedoes to boats and UXVs, and although mechanisation of certain processes has ensured that equipment can be moved faster and more safely, there has been little development in terms of game-changing technological innova-tion that will radically change at-sea handling capability.

Over the past 20 years, however, with an ever more intense focus on the importance of cost of ownership over the initial capital cost of surface-ship platforms, there is a growing move towards increasing levels of automation, with valuable improved safety, efficiency and cost benefits. The specific nature of naval logistics and lack of system technology capable of operating in the challenges of a marine environment has meant that, to date, existing land-based fully automated logistics systems have not been transferred on anything like the same scale to naval platforms. Recent developments in ship-based handling systems are starting to shift this position.

Automated weapons-handlingThe UK’s new Queen Elizabeth-class (QEC) aircraft carriers are a prime example of where Babcock’s Highly Mechanised Weapons Handling System (HMWHS) provides an extremely efficient, high-density automated

Automation at SeaDavid Wright, surface ships key account manager at Babcock, looks at the move towards the automation of payload handling to improve the flexibility of future surface ships’ launching systems and equipment that is capable of fulfilling a wide range of missions at sea

stowage and retrieval system, as well as improving on-board safety (in comparison to manual handling) and reducing through-life costs.

Representing the first maritime application of shore-based commercial warehousing processes using automated systems with all-electric control, adapted for safe transport and stowage of munitions in a warship envi-ronment, the system provides mechanical handling facilities for moving palletised munitions around and between the deep magazine and weapon-preparation areas, with a series of dedicated lifts to connect the magazines, hangar, weapons-preparation area and flight deck.

Munitions can be delivered, in bulk, to the point of use at rates that could not be achieved with manual or mechanised processes, and the minimised manpower requirement delivers reduced through-life cost (as well as a saving in on-board living accommodation requirements). The automated system negates the need for forklift access aisles, and an intelligent con-trol system facilitates access to all storage locations, for increased stowage flexibility and density, while minimising human error in inventory manage-ment. Various system configurations were considered during the concept phase to ensure that the system is sufficiently flexible and space adaptable to accommodate current and future scenarios.

The design consists of a network of prime movers or ‘moles’ that traverse by rack-and-pinion drive in the forward and aft or port and star-board directions. Each mole is capable of lifting and moving pallets to a location within its predefined area of travel. Large payload lifts facilitate inter-deck transfer between the stores and usage areas, and a unique mechanism has been developed to enable the moles to access the lift without needing to engage/disengage the pinion from the rack. Pallets

The Queen Elizabeth-class carriers being built for the Royal Navy will feature Babcock automation technology

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are primarily loaded into the system from the hangar deck into the auto-mated magazine complexes via dedicated magazine complex lift access points. Strike down may also be achieved via the flight deck, with weapons handled on trolleys to the preparation areas, where system pallets may be loaded before being struck down to the magazines.

Stores data is managed by a Babcock-developed Inventory Management System (IMS). The centrally managed system uses radio frequency iden-tification technology to track pallets into and around the system. Pallets then carry with them memory of what has been stored on them, as well as important information for the ship, such as pallet Net Explosive Quantity and stores life information. This provides the system and magazine opera-tors with readily available critical stores information.

The IMS facility formed the basis for the functional mission software developed for the system, which allows the operator to input a specific mission requirement. The software contains algorithms that analyse weapon delivery requirements and automatically calculate the most efficient means with which deliver the required munitions. This includes suggested shuffling of the magazine stores from a ‘safe’ stow to a ‘mission- specific’ stow arrangement. The algorithms are dynamic and adapt contin-ually to changing mission requirements, suggesting magazine rearrange-ments when they are required.

The system has been verified by design analysis and availability mod-elling, and validated by both land-based factory testing and full-scale dynamic testing to simulate maximum operating sea states.

Predicting the future trendThe Queen Elizabeth-class automated weapons-handling system represents a step change in the approach to payload handling on naval surface ships, and a number of drivers and enablers indicate that automation levels are likely to increase further still in future.

Key drivers in this move include flexibility, manning, cost and safety. Designers of next-generation surface fleets, for example, are striving for improved on-board handling and logistic capability and the flexibility to cater for changing mission roles and unknown future operational require-ments, placing considerable demand on sea-based handling and logistic systems, which greater automation can help to meet.

Moreover, dramatic reductions in ship staff for new platforms means systems need to operate with fewer personnel, to allow a focus on high-value jobs and functions rather than low-level tasks. Further, the number of staff required to operate a platform is one of the most fundamental measures of a platform’s cost of ownership (costs including salary, living accommodation, training and turnover, among others). And from a safety perspective, with manual handling being the most common injury type on board surface ships, automation is a practical solution for improving safety, by removing personnel from the handling process.

There is also a growing requirement for modular capability. This is particularly relevant for smaller, mission-focused ships, such as frigates, where a minimal crew is desired for ‘move and defend’ capability, with mission or role capability involving additional equipment configuration and accommodation – potentially requiring handling of significant mission packages, with logistical challenges.

Certain enabling factors are also contributing to the growing move to automation, including changing ship design, with greater consideration of the whole operational life of modern warships leading to flexible con-figurations. Ship functions are often centralised or zoned, where system spaces are located in functional blocks to improve efficiency, with the ability to upgrade them easily over the life of the platform. Automating a function space or complex has a number of advantages over the

A number of drivers and enablers indicate that automation levels are likely to increase further

automation of discrete and dispersed compartments, where technology and systems can be focused in one, often central, area of the ship. Greater space allocation lends itself to greater flexibility and better storage density, and the maintenance and operation of the system are also located in one area, driving further operational efficiencies.

Further enablers include use of internationally recognised standard con-tainers, making automation increasingly practical, and the technological capability now exists (as the QEC automated system demonstrates), with marine-capable heavy payload technologies increasingly emerging.

Handling and launch for future vesselsSignificantly, not only is automation on surface ships likely to increase sub-stantially over the next 20 years, but it is not confined to larger platforms. Despite fundamental differences between large logistic support ships and smaller platforms, such as frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), it is

Diagrams of an automated mission bay area (above) and a ‘mole’ outside lift (below)

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also true that the same underlying drivers of performance, cost and safety are equally valid to both, and may, be addressed by increased automation.

For large platforms, such as aircraft carriers or large support vessels with significant handling and logistics functions, the benefit of automation is evident, but for smaller vessels the ability to handle large payload ‘mis-sion modules’ in one or several configurations of standard ISO container would give valuable increased operational flexibility. The designers of future smaller naval vessels are now typically considering and designing for flexible functional requirements and incorporating flexible mission spaces where vessels, under functional and cost pressures, will be required to perform multifunction roles from anti-submarine and mine countermea-sure to humanitarian and anti-piracy roles. The ability for future platforms to be able to handle containerised mission modules and launch systems (from rigid-hulled inflatable boats to unmanned surface or undersea vehi-cles) from these spaces will be a key driver to any navy’s future ability to respond to operational pressures with limited resources.

What is clear is that these mission spaces need to be extremely flexible to be able to handle, launch and recover the wide range of boats, unmanned vehicles and supporting mission equipment that will be required over the life of the platform. Standardisation of payload and recovery systems will be critical in achieving the universality of such systems.

There are now real pressures being placed upon designers of next-gen-eration naval platforms to increase performance for reduced through-life cost, as well as to meet the demands for continual improvements in opera-tional safety, combined with a requirement for modular capability and exportability of platform designs. This, in turn, requires transformational approaches to platform system design, and automated systems – such as that to be used on the UK’s new aircraft carriers – demonstrate the validity of this approach for larger platforms. However, even for smaller vessels, automation on some scale is likely to be a key factor in the future for sustaining a mission-modular capability, reducing core complement and improving through-life cost. n

Standardisation of payload and recovery systems will be critical in achieving universality

Full-scale dynamic testing of ammunition-handling system under maximum operating sea states

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Europe has long been accustomed to the benefits of collective defence. In 2012, one of the most compelling threats to European civilian populations – as well as to NATO troops deployed overseas

– is that of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) being fired by rogue nations or by transnational terrorist groups. This emerging threat to Europe is being tackled with urgent dispatch.

In his remarks at the June 2011 RUSI missile defence conference, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen reinforced the importance of ballistic missile defence, stating: “The missile threat is real and our reac-tion must be real… NATO has 900 million citizens to protect and we must show that we will not be coerced. BMD [ballistic missile defence] is a core element of our capabilities… Missile defence has the potential to change the way NATO works1.”

The United States’ strong commitment to partner in European BMD was codified in the Obama Administration’s 2009 European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). In announcing the strategy in 2009, President Obama stated that the new approach will provide capabilities sooner, build on proven systems and offer greater defences against the threat of missile attack than the 2007 European missile defence programme2.

From the US perspective, this theme was echoed during the June 2011 RUSI missile defence conference by James Miller, DoD’s Principal Under-secretary for Policy, who noted: “The Lisbon Summit took unprecedented steps to protect Europe from ballistic missiles… The proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD will not go unmet3.” Since President Obama’s 2009 announcement, the EPAA is swiftly being implemented.

Ballistic Missile Defence for Europe: Now More Than EverCaptain George Galdorisi, US Navy (retired), and Dr Scott C Truver put a compelling argument for the need for a US/European Ballistic Missile Defence shield and show how the programme is moving at speed

European and American leaders have been united in their concerns regarding the danger posed by Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. There are many reasons behind these concerns, not least of which is the inflammatory rhetoric by Iran’s leaders, including recent threats to close the Strait of Hormuz4. Indeed, Iran’s rapidly advancing missile capabil-ity was one of the primary reasons that these threats generated urgent concerns among NATO allies and US officials5.

But it is the combination of Iran’s nascent pursuit of a WMD capability with a rapidly developing ballistic missile inventory that presents the most salient danger6. This threat was highlighted in a 2012 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies by Anthony Cordesman and Alexander Wilner. In their comprehensive report, Cordesman and Wilner provide a top-line assessment of the threat, and why it has received so much focus, especially in the past few months: “The most threatening form of… competition takes place in the military and security arena. The areas where this competition now gets primary attention are the nuclear and missile arena, and Iranian threats to ‘close the Gulf’. Tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme have grown steadily over the years. They now threaten to reach the crisis point as Iran produces highly enriched uranium and develops all of the technology necessary to produce nuclear weapons, and as US, European and UN sanctions become steadily stronger 7.”

Iran’s burgeoning nuclear capabilityIn 2011, an International Atomic Energy Agency report detailed dramatic improvements in the success achieved by Iranian uranium enrichment programmes, and other international observers have predicted Iran could produce a nuclear bomb as early as 20128. This is not surprising, as Iran has persisted in its efforts to obtain weapons-grade uranium even as the international community has made repeated and systematic efforts to destabilise the country’s nuclear programme through denial of technology and computer-virus penetration9.

Coupled with its continued determination to acquire WMD, Iran’s missiles pose an immediate threat both to US forces and America’s European allies

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stressed the importance of ballistic missile defence at a recent RUSI conference

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In 2011, Tehran launched dozens of ballistic missiles during its ‘Great Prophet’ exercise. Some of these were capable of striking US bases in the region, as well as Israel, the Arabian Gulf states and even Turkey. Iranian ballistic missile firings have continued, with several mid-range missiles launched over the past few years10. Coupled with its continued determina-tion to acquire WMD, Iran’s missiles pose an immediate threat both to US forces and America’s European allies11. Iran’s strategic intent, demonstrated in the government’s strident reaction to international economic sanctions, makes Iranian ballistic missiles an existential threat12.

More recently, as Defense News reported in March 2012, “Iranian officials – probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – have changed their calculus.” The article goes on to note: “Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, many of which are inher-ently capable of carrying a nuclear payload… Iran today boasts an exceed-ingly robust, well-staffed and well-resourced ballistic missile program and is making major headway toward an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) capability through long-range missile tests, a broad engineering base and significant work on missile survivability and range13.”

While Europe and the US must deal with many important issues, the imminence of the Iranian BMD threat compels an immediate, coordinated response. The EPAA is a crucial part of that immediate response equation.

The European Phased Adaptive Approach Europe has been moving out smartly in the area of BMD, principally with systems such as NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) network. European and American leaders are working vigorously to link this increasingly robust system with the EPAA. While the EPAA will be manifested in land-based sites later this decade, today this system is in operation with US Aegis BMD ships deployed to Mediterranean waters.

As US Army Lieutenant General Patrick J O’Reilly, program executive for programs and integration at the Missile Defense Agency, described at RUSI’s missile defence conference in June 2011: “ALTBMD provides the link between upper and lower tier, while sea-based systems add to the robust-ness of the network14.”

The decision to use Aegis BMD to enhance land-based European BMD led the US to terminate previous plans that would have placed ground-based midcourse defence (GMD) interceptors and missile-defence radar sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. These systems would have been focused almost solely on missile defence of the United States against potential rogue-nation ICBMs. Instead, the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) focused more heavily on defeating existing threats to US forces and allies posed by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. President Obama’s decision to make this major shift in US ballistic missile policy in favour of Aegis BMD systems both afloat and ashore was a direct and rapid response to the

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspects the Natanz nuclear-enrichment facility, 350 km (217 miles) south of Tehran

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growing danger of Iranian ballistic missiles carrying WMD. Importantly, the critical seaborne “leg” of the PAA was already operational and on station when the new plan was announced15.

The decision to alter course and use Aegis BMD as the foundation of the PAA was not a surprise to knowledgeable defence observers and was, in many respects, the most viable option. As defence analyst Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute observed: “[Aegis BMD] is also the most politi-cally palatable response to the proliferation of ballistic missile technology among potential aggressor nations. In 2009, the Obama Administration killed plans to build a European version of the ground-based missile defence system already deployed in California and Alaska because of political controversy – including threats against host nations from Russia.

“It opted instead to use Aegis technology for a defence of European and other regional allies against the ballistic missiles Iran is fielding. The USS Monterey’s foray into the Mediterranean Sea is the first Navy mission implementing the revised plan, one that will be followed by a continuous sea-based missile defence capability in the region and shore-based deploy-ment of Aegis technology in Romania beginning in 2015. The White House plan, referred to as the Phased Adaptive Approach, calls for protecting an increasingly broad swathe of Europe in four successive stages through 2020 as Aegis missiles, computers and radars become more capable16.”

Implementing the planAs part of the EPAA decision, the US will deploy SM-3 interceptors using the sea-based Aegis BMD system, and then deploy improved SM-3s in 2015, both on ships and on land17. Rather than the 10 ground-based inter-ceptors originally envisioned in Poland under the previous plan, the new ‘Aegis Ashore’ approach will deploy 40 to 50 SM-3 missiles on land, with more aboard Navy BMD ships operating in nearby waters.

More advanced SM-3 versions will be deployed in 2018, and yet another still more advanced generation in 2020, the latter based on the US-Japan cooperatively developed SM-3 Block IIA, which promises significantly more capability to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September 2009, US Undersecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy described the rationale behind the President’s decision, and explained the now-crucial link that Aegis BMD plays in national and international ballistic missile defence, noting: “The new approach in Europe would also rely on a distributed network of sensors and proven SM-3 interceptors, which can be fired from

both Aegis ships and from land. This means greater geographic flexibility, greater survivability and greater scalability in response to an evolving threat. That’s exactly what we mean by a phased, adaptive approach.18”

An early indication of how the Administration is fast-tracking Aegis Ashore came in August 2010, when the Missile Defense Agency announced plans to allocate $428 million (£274 million) to an Aegis Ashore test site at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii19. In September 2011, the Missile Defense Agency completed ground tests involving several distributed elements of the BMDS PAA Phase I capabilities and the NATO ALTBMD system20. And in October 2011, in preparation for NATO’s Chicago Summit in May 2012, the Atlantic Council hosted the Transatlantic Missile Defense Conference to solidify the United States and NATO’s commitment to the EPAA21.

Moving forward with European BMDEPAA is moving ahead quickly in 2012, often in spite of strident protests from Russia22. The US announced in February 2012 that four BMD-capable US Navy Arleigh Burke destroyers – USS Ross (DDG-71), and USS Cook (DDG-75) – will arrive at their new home port in Rota, Spain in FY-14, and USS Carney (DDG-64) and USS Porter (DDG-78) will follow in FY-1523.

Indeed, it is clear that the US Congress intends to continue to monitor the Navy’s commitment of Aegis ships to the EPAA. In hearings on the Navy’s FY 2013 budget request in March 2012, committee chairman Carl Levin questioned both the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations regarding the Navy’s ongoing commitment to provide Aegis BMD ships in the eastern Mediterranean, with Secretary Mabus reaffirming that commitment, while adding that the Navy also intended to make more Aegis ships BMD-capable24.

Beyond the US BMD contribution, and perhaps more importantly, NATO countries are exploring new ways to have their ships participate in the EPAA via the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. For example, in October 2011 Spain announced that an Aegis-class frigate of the Alvaro de Bazan class would enter service in 2012, and in December 2011 the Netherlands announced its intention to deploy four naval vessels as part of this missile shield25. Additionally, in February 2012 NATO announced that it will base a command centre for the European missile shield in Ramstein, Germany, and that land-based interceptors will be placed in Romania by 2015 and in Poland by 201826. Ballistic missile defence for Europe is moving forward – smartly. n

Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Monterey under way in the Mediterranean Sea

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Footnotes

See www.rusi.org for coverage of the 12th RUSI missile defence conference, 15-16 June 2011, 1.

London, UK, including a keynote address by the NATO Secretary General

White House Press Release, White House Fact Sheet, Fact Sheet on US Missile Defense 2.

Policy: A ‘Phased, Adaptive Approach’ for Missile Defense in Europe, 27 September 2009

See www.rusi.org 3.

For examples of coverage see David Axe, ‘Navy’s Tiniest Warships Could Lead Assault 4.

on Iran’, Danger Room (Wired.com), 22 March 2012, Adam Entous and Julian Barnes,

‘US Bulks Up Iran Defenses’, The Wall Street Journal, 25 February 2012, Michael Rubin, ‘Dire

Straits’, Weekly Standard, 16 January 2012

Uzi Rubin, ‘Iran’s Missiles Complicate Hormuz Picture’, 5. Defense News, 4 March 2012

Joby Warrick and Brad Plumer, ‘US Is Putting Squeeze on Iran’, 6. Washington Post, 31 March

2012, and Carol Lee and Jay Solomon, ‘Tehran Is Warned Window Is Shrinking’, The Wall

Street Journal, 15 March 2012

Anthony Cordesman and Alexander Wilner, Iran and the Gulf Military Balance – I: The 7.

Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and

International Studies, 20 February 2012), p5

See, ‘Tehran’s Ambitions’, 8. New York Times (editorial), 17 September 2011, and Christina

Lamb, ‘Iran Could Have Nuclear Bomb “Within Six Months”’, Sunday Times, 25 September

2011, for two reports describing this dramatic progress

Ray Takeyh, ‘Are Sanctions Helping Build Iran’s Bomb?’, 9. Washington Post, 4 August 2011, p17.

See also ‘Iran, Undeterred’, Washington Post, 22 July 2011, p18

See Mark Thompson, ‘The Pentagon Prepares for a Missile Attack from Iran’, Time.com, 10.

17 December 2009, for one of the earliest open-press reports detailing this threat

By late 2010, while the international and defence media were focused on the success of 11.

the NATO Lisbon Summit and the ratification of “New-START” (Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty), many articles and op-eds pointed out the “clear and present danger” posed by Iran

See Alexander Wilner and Anthony Cordesman, US and Iranian Strategic Competition: 12.

Iran’s Perceptions of International Sanctions and their Implications for Strategic Compe-

tition with the US in the Gulf, September 2010-April 2011 (Washington, DC: Center for

Strategic and International Studies, July 2011)

Ilan Berman, ‘Could Iran Threaten US?’, 13. Defense News, 12 March 2012

See www.rusi.org for coverage of the 12th RUSI Missile Defense Conference, 15-16 June 14.

2011, London, UK, including a keynote address by Lieutenant General O’Reilly

The Phased Adaptive Approach is described in a number of reports, publications and brief-15.

ings, chief among them: White House Fact Sheet, Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy:

A “Phased, Adaptive Approach” for Missile Defense in Europe, 27 September 2009

Loren Thompson, ‘Missile Defense Becomes a Navy Mission,’ 16. Forbes blog, 21 March 2011

See ‘Lockheed: Aegis Ashore Will Use Same Technology as Aegis Afloat’, 17. Inside the Navy,

2 November 2009, and ‘Obama’s Missile Plan Clears Hurdle’, National Journal’s Congress

Daily PM, 24 November 2009

‘Cartwright: Navy May Station Six Aegis BMD Ships Near Europe’, 18. Inside The Navy, 28 Sep-

tember 2009. See also Walter Pincus, ‘GAO: Missile Site Costs Likely to Rise’, Washington

Post, 15 August 2009, for an early article revealing the GAO report regarding Army and Air

Force US ballistic missile sites in Europe substantially exceeding original cost estimates

See, ‘MDA Awards Lockheed Contract for Aegis Ashore Hawaii Test Site’, 19. Inside the Navy,

30 August 2010 and ‘Aegis Ashore Test Site Construction in Hawaii Should Begin “Very

Soon”’, Inside the Navy, 29 August 2010

See George Seffers, ‘NATO and the United States to Test Missile Defense Link’ 20. Signal Con-

nections, 16 May 2011 for a comprehensive description of the nature of these tests. See also

‘More Options Needed’, Defense News (Editorial), 19 March 2012, for recent commentary on

the importance of integrating the EPAA and NATO ALTBMD systems

Details of this event are available on the Atlantic Council’s website: www.acus.org 21.

See Alexandra Odynova, ‘Lavroc, Rogozin Rap Missile Shield’, 22. Moscow Times, 9 December

2011, Karen DeYoung, ‘NATO Rebuffs Russian Missile Defense Threats’, Washington Post, 8

December 2011, and Thom Shanker and David Herszenhorn, ‘US Official Says Missile-De-

fense Shield Will Move Forward’, NYTimes.com, 2 December 2011. Russian concerns have

been the subject of articles and op-eds in the mainstream media, eg Jon Kyl, ‘What’s at Stake

in the Missile Defense Debate?’, The Wall Street Journal, 3 April 2012, and Mac Thornberry,

‘Obama Plans Double Cross on Missile Defense’, Washington Times, 30 March 2012

See ‘Bound for Spain’,23. Inside the Navy, 20 February 2012 and ‘Spain agrees to Port US Aegis

BMD Ships’, Inside the Navy, 10 October 2011

Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearings on the Navy’s FY 2013 Budget Request, 24.

15 March 2012

See Lajos Szaszdi, ‘Spain’s Aegis Frigates Could Join Europe’s Missile Defense Shield’, 25.

The Heritage Foundation blog, 13 October 2011 and ‘Netherlands to Participate in NATO

Missile Shield’, NIS News Bulletin, 29 September 2011

Agence France-Presse, ‘NATO to Base Missile Shield Command in Germany’, Yahoo.com, 26.

2 February 2012

An SM-3 Block IB interceptor is launched from USS Lake Erie during a test in the mid Pacific

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How much should nations be spending on cyber-security, how much responsibility should governments be taking, and how far should privacy considerations be relaxed to help in securing

crucial data and critical infrastructure?In a US news report of 30 May, Benjamin Friedman of the CATO Institute

said the economic and security dangers posed by an internet-based attack were “wildly overblown”. This stood in sharp contrast to comments made in mid May by the House Intelligence Committee chairman, Mike Rogers, that he expected a major cyber-attack on the US in the near future.

Whoever turns out to be right (and indications may be seen from the progress of the US Cybersecurity Act of 2012), cyber-security is an increas-ingly important market for government, IT firms and the defence majors.

Global cyber-security market sizeThe global cyber-security market was estimated to be worth about $60 billion (£38.5 billion) in 2011, with growth rates of 10 per cent being predicted for the next three to five years, according to a November 2011 PricewaterhouseCoopers report. Global Industry Analysts Inc put a head-line figure on the sector of $80 billion (£51.3 billion) by 2017. Visiongain also estimates around $60 billion (£38.5 billion) for the 2012 market, and esti-mates the more limited cyber-warfare sector at $15.9 billion (£10.2 billion).

The US market for cyber-security solutions is by far the largest, represent-ing over 50 per cent of global sales, with Japan and the UK coming next,

The Growing Cyber-Security MarketAs traditional defence expenditures continue to decline, many companies are looking to fresh markets. Cyber-security offers significant new opportunities in both the government and commercial sectors. Chris Aaron explains how major defence contractors have developed their capabilities to take advantage

but several companies in the sector are targeting expansion in Brazil, India and other countries in the Middle East and Asia. In the US, federal spending accounts for around half the total demand, in stark contrast to most other countries, where the market is dominated by corporate spending. This structural difference may have an impact on how the solution providers evolve in the coming decade, particularly with regard to the position of the defence majors relative to ‘civilian’ providers, such as Intel or Symantec.

Global aerospace and defence markets are worth around $450 billion (£288.5 billion), but revenues in the traditional defence sector are not expected to show much growth over the next decade at least, so the cyber-security field represents a significant opportunity for the defence majors.

Many have grasped this opportunity through acquisition as well as build-ing on, and pulling together, their own in-house security solutions. BAE Systems purchased Detica for $1 billion (£640.8 million) and Boeing has picked up a range of specialist providers, such as Narus Inc and SMSi. BAE and Safran shared a purchase of L-1 Identity Solutions, and Raytheon has spent over $1 billion on a range of companies over the past four years. QinetiQ, an important player in Europe, has also made several acquisitions.

The Lockheed Martin perspectiveHowever, acquisitions are not the only way forward: Charles Croom, vice-pres-ident of Cyber Security Solutions for Lockheed Martin Information Systems & Global Solutions, told RUSI: “It’s clear that the market for cyber-security

Cyber-security is an increasingly important market for government, IT firms and major defence companies

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acquisitions is an active one, and [we] would expect Lockheed Martin to be a participant in that market when an acquisition target offers both a strong strategic advantage and a compelling business case. We build on our in-house strengths, which are broad and deep in cyber-security, and we look to fill strategic gaps externally where it makes sense, [which] can be accomplished through a broad spectrum of strategic alternatives that may include joint marketing agreements, partnerships, joint ventures, equity investments or acquisitions.”

At the same time as the defence companies have been building their capabilities, there have been larger purchases by IT companies such as Intel, Dell, and HP, who have acquired McAfee, SecureWorks and ArcSight respectively, and the pure play Symantec Corp that bought VeriSign.

The direction of these deals suggests a difference between providers aiming at the consumer/corporate market and those targeting corporate/government clients. As things stand, that makes sense – the markets and requirements have been, and probably still are, rather different – but the future economic importance of networks, intellectual property and legis-lation regarding cyber-security are likely to drive convergence, raising the possibility of some major crossover acquisitions in the next five years.

Croom notes that Lockheed Martin “already has significant experience in helping both UK Government and private-sector clients” and that as “the threat escalates we believe that more defence companies will get involved in securing the private sector.” He sees this being driven by eco-nomics, as defence budgets contract and providers “must look outside government for continued growth opportunities”, but also by the com-mon threat vectors: “We map all individual cyber-attacks into campaigns according to how attacks relate to one another; eg same weaponiser, same delivery mechanism, same exploit, same command and control infra-structure etc... Through discussions with other industry sectors, we are now seeing the same adversaries that are targeting Lockheed Martin and government attack other industry sectors.”

Boeing: a key player Back in December 2007, Boeing launched an Intelligence and Security Systems (I&SS) division, with 2,000 staff catering to the homeland secu-rity and intelligence sector. Within I&SS, a project to explore and exploit the diffraction of cyber security systems and skills that were spread across Boeing’s entire organisation gave rise to a new unit called Cyber and Information Solutions (CIS). On 9 June 2008, CIS showed off its first solu-tions with its Integrated Cyber Operations Demonstration (ICOD). Stephen Oswald explained that ICOD was the result of I&SS’s work developing “capabilities to protect our own networks and to meet customer needs. Clearly, information assurance and cyber security have become integral to most of our products across our customer base, as well as becoming an important line of business itself.”

ICOD introduced customers to parts of the CIS toolkit, such as its net-work security monitoring software (SMIS) and a training and learning tool (CORE). CIS vice-president Barbara Fast said in 2008 that the two tools “provide customers [with] situational awareness to defend their own network today, while collecting the information necessary to prepare and rehearse in order to better defend future cyber-operations.” Fast also noted that “the best response is not just technical, such as blocking a virus, but in finding the individual or group behind the attack.”

In 2008 and 2009, I&SS acquired Digital Receiver Technology (DRT), RavenWing, Kestrel Enterprises and eXMeritus. All were quite small com-panies, with specialised skills and products, serving the security and intel-ligence communities. Significantly, perhaps, DRT and RavenWing brought expertise in mobile communications technologies, not just fixed networks.

The future economic importance of networks, intellectual property and legislation are likely to drive convergence

Then in 2010 Boeing acquired the C4ISR firm, Argon ST, for $775 million (£496.6 million) and Narus Inc for an undisclosed sum. Argon had about 700 staff and specialised in RF sensors. Narus was reported to have just 150 employees, but had developed real-time network traffic and analytics software complementary to that shown in ICOD, and already had business in India. The purchases reflect two ends of the spectrum in the netspace – the almost conventional, yet cutting-edge, C4ISR tools of Argon, and the cyber-situational awareness and defence tools of Narus.

This brief history gives a flavour of the developments that led to the launch of Boeing’s Cyber Engagement Center (CEC) in October 2011. That facility serves to protect Boeing’s own networks and those of its customers, providing real-time situational awareness of network events and anomalies, and the tools to track and identify infiltrators. It also provides a space for sharing threat information within Boeing and with external customers, and to experiment with advanced solutions in the fixed network and mobile network space.

Lockheed Martin has a similar facility in its NexGen Cyber Innovation Technology Centre, but it arguably goes further than CEC in providing an environment where Lockheed engineers can work alongside their Cyber Alliance Partner technologists as well as customers, to design solu-tions for government and commercial clients. Croom sees its advantage as offering a space for “full collaboration to bring the best technology and ideas together… Much of our cyber R&D is made real in this facility [and it] resides on a Lockheed Martin global cyber range connected to like facilities in the UK and Australia.”

Information sharing is paramountProvisions in the US Cybersecurity Act of 2012, if they are approved, will facilitate the operation of centres such as NexGen and CEC by formalising the legal basis for the sharing of threat information. The Act “authorizes private entities to disclose or receive lawfully obtained cybersecurity threat information to protect an information system [and] allows a non-federal entity to disclose lawfully obtained cybersecurity threat information to an exchange.” As Charles Croom notes, “a key pillar of [Lockheed Martin’s] cyber-security strategy is delivering an integrated, end-to-end solu-tion… When a solution cannot solve an entire problem, a team approach is required, as is visible with the Lockheed Martin Cyber Security Alliance of 18 current partners.”

For Croom, the challenges include “information exchange and shar-ing cyber-attack information with partners across all sectors. Lockheed Martin believes that cyber-defence is a team sport and by securely shar-ing actionable intelligence at a pace we can all enjoy more resilient cyber defences… Getting more organisations to buy into this collaborative con-cept is a challenge that we are looking to actively support UK Government with through our own experiences, lessons learned and evolution from a reactive to intelligence-driven security organisation.” n

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Cyber-security is now one of the biggest challenges currently facing a broad range of actors across society, including policy-makers, academia, industry and the general public. Historically,

this attention was fuelled by concerns of a major malware outbreak that would systematically infiltrate computers throughout the globe, leaving disruption and disaster in its wake. Although this is certainly one aspect of the threat, it has become increasingly multifaceted. For example, one in every 358 emails comprises some form of phishing attack, one in 274 emails contains a virus threat and an average of 2,305 websites each day harbour malware and other potentially unwanted programs, including spyware and adware.

As a result, governments are now left trying to develop policies and put processes in place that reconcile and, ultimately, address the menace. Speaking last year, UK prime minister David Cameron lamented that cyber-crime costs the UK economy £27 billion each year alone. However, steps are being taken to reduce this figure. Just as the online threat environment continues to evolve, investment in cyber-security seems to be increasing, as seen in the UK’s £650 million outlay.

The UK government formally recognised the degree of danger that exists in the cyber realm in its 2010 National Security Strategy, which elevated cyber-security to a tier-one-level threat – on a par with the challenges of international terrorism, the impact of a natural disaster and the escalation of a military crisis between states. It has since released a Cyber Security

A Fast-Evolving ThreatIlias Chantzos, senior director, government affairs at Symantec Corporation, assesses the extent of the cyber-threat and the difficulties that cyber-attacks present in terms of proportionate, legitimate response

Strategy, which outlines a National Security Programme of work made to address continuously evolving cyber risks, such as e-crime, as well as threats to national security.

Other nations, including the United States and transnational bodies including the European Union, are also escalating the importance of install-ing robust cyber-defences and developing strategies to ensure that they remain resilient to the threat. NATO, in its next-generation defence policy, described a number of threats that require consideration by strategists and policymakers and the cyber threat features prominently among these.

Striving for international consensusThe UK government has been determined to drive the international agenda on the topic and hosted an international conference last year that invited countries to come together and discuss what constitutes acceptable behav-iour in cyberspace and how nations can support each other in addressing the inherent risks and threats. Considering that many countries are already looking at ways to elevate the importance of cyber concerns to an issue of national security, and given the interdependent nature of the menace, it is becoming increasingly clear that a cross-border strategy is required. The very fact that discussions are taking place on acceptable norms of behaviour in cyberspace and the development of cyber-defence units dem-onstrate that the issue is being taken seriously by governments around the world and that mechanisms are being introduced to combat the threat.

Symantec’s headquarters in Mountain View, California

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Information and communication technologies are a key component of national critical infrastructure, and any major cyber-security incident could cause significant disruption, potentially affecting the strategic assets of a country and thus threatening national security. This type of activity, which can take many different forms – including, for example, a massive denial-of-service attack – can be very damaging during a time of national crisis. Incidents involving computer worms such as Stuxnet, Duqu and, even more recently, Flamer have demonstrated that the threat is not only at the level of information access but that critical systems can suffer serious physical damage or can be used to collect vital intelligence through the use of cyber means. This is one of the key reasons why governments are increasingly understanding the necessity to tie cyber-security to national security considerations. This is, in part, driven by the belief that networks and the internet have become another dimension of the battlefield, in a similar way to ground, sea, air and space. It is also driven by the increased reliance of our society and critical infrastructure on computers and the internet, particularly during times of crisis.

Applied on the battlefield, information is power, and effective commu-nication technologies are a key force-multiplier in any combat situation. Maintaining the confidentiality, integrity and availability of communicating vital information remain key operational requirements. If one looks at his-tory, effective communication has often played a decisive role in combat effectiveness and the survival of units. Similarly, insecure information and communication technology can have devastating effects on its user and partners connected to them. The impact of a sustained and successful cyber-attack on a military could render its capabilities seriously damaged or prevent it from conducting operations.

UK government ministries that contain sensitive information, such as the Minsitry of Defence (MoD) and the security services, will also find themselves subject to attacks, which, if successful, could provide an enemy with a huge tactical advantage. The director of the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Iain Lobban, has warned that attacks against gov-ernment ministries are at a ‘disturbing’ level, and that last summer the Foreign Office and other departments were targeted by those looking to exploit secret information. He added that national defences are continually being tested, and that cyber-attacks that vary in scale are being launched on government departments on a daily basis.

The threat to industryIt is, of course, not only the military and the public sector that are targets. GCHQ has highlighted that attempts are also being made to steal ideas, designs and patents from leading UK companies in an attempt to gain com-mercial advantage or benefit from knowing secret contractual agreements. The purpose of a targeted attack can be the collection, altering, suppression or destruction of sensitive information, or even the infrastructure on which the information resides. Given that the private sector drives growth, any harm done can have wider implications for the state.

Evidently, this threat is elevated for those industries that support the state in areas such as defence, energy, infrastructure and security. According to press reports, one defence company in the US lost over 24,000 files last March due to an intrusion, and it is estimated that US companies have lost $1 trillion (£639.7 billion) in stolen intellectual property, competitiveness and damage in recent years.

An example of the threats that industry is facing and that could also have national security implications is the Stuxnet attack, which occurred in 2010. It was deliberately aimed at energy companies and has shown that such targeted, organised threats do exist where external actors – per-haps motivated by organised crime or terrorism – or even hostile nations

It is not only the military and the public sector that are targets. Attempts are being made to steal ideas from leading UK companies

are designing, developing and deploying malware in an attempt to gain control of industrial processes and then place that control in the wrong hands. Therefore, it is imperative that organisations are aware of where their critical information assets reside and have information-management policies and procedures in place to ensure that information is protected, appropriately based on an assessment of the level of risk. It should be noted that after the discovery of Stuxnet in 2010, Duqu – which had similar intelligence-collection properties to Stuxnet and shared most of its attack code – was uncovered the following year.

The value for cyber-attackers of collecting intelligence about sensi-tive financial, technological, political or military information cannot be overestimated. A well-deployed cyber-attack can yield information that compromises communications and encryption ciphers. It can also offer a clear insight into the motivation, plans, strengths and weaknesses of the victim. Attacks on information are more difficult to detect and can be used to generate revenue for those stealing the information, or may enable them to gain valuable political, economical, technological or military advantage. The implications of such attacks for governments and industry alike could be very harmful.

Proactively combating the threatAt government level in the UK, more and more departments are looking to procure information technologies and adopt a posture that links cyber-secu-rity with national security. Policymakers are, however, aware of their own limitations in tackling cyber threats due to the sheer scale of the challenge, and have been calling on increased cooperation between governments, industry and society to take an active role, if any resistance is to prove suc-cessful. As UK foreign secretary William Hague emphasised in the opening remarks to last year’s London Conference on Cyberspace, “a secure, safe digital environment cannot be developed by governments alone”. A con-certed approach must be established, and even then, one must recognise that systems will be attacked and inevitably penetrated, given the scale of the threat. Therefore, it becomes a case of prioritising the information that is most sensitive, avoiding the trap of “he who defends everything defends nothing” and putting in place mechanisms and counter-cyber-crime strate-gies that deter enemies looking to exploit information.

Coordination between the public and private sectors on cyber-related issues needs to occur at many different levels of the internet community, depending on the sector involved in the specific type of threat or the level of seriousness of the threat or risk. For example, internet service providers, security providers, law enforcement, security services and national critical infrastructure protection authorities may be the first port of call and clearly have a role to play in dealing with an incident. As information on the threat becomes more clear and attributable, it is likely that at some point, in some cases, military organisations such as the MoD and NATO will also become increasingly active from a national security and national defence

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standpoint. This move is recognition of the fact that as soon as the threat becomes military in nature, there is a role for military involvement and appropriate response. However, industry will continue to play an important role in working alongside the defence sector, given that it is estimated that industry owns around 90 per cent of the critical national infrastructure. In addition, industry often holds real-time information, awareness and intel-ligence in relation to the current online threat environment or a particular incident affecting a sector or a company’s infrastructure.

Having the right information at the right time is, of course, key in iden-tifying and addressing cyber-threats. Symantec believes that information sharing is a fundamental component of a modern cyber-security strategy and that the development of trusted information-sharing networks and sys-tems is a key element in the development of successful public and private cooperation. This is why the importance placed on the role of public-private partnership in addressing cyber-security issues is so important and must continue to be a long-term overarching public policy objective through the work of the UK’s National Cyber Security Programme and beyond to future strategies and initiatives in this area.

In terms of determining a policy for the role of the MoD and the armed forces, there are a number of significant challenges that planners and policymakers would need to address. The development of doctrines, rules of engagement and the overall policy of how a military organisation needs to plan and act to handle cyber-attacks against its own infrastructure, as well as the nation, can be a daunting task.

One of the biggest challenges in a crisis scenario, given the stealth and asymmetric nature of cyber-attacks, would be to determine the moment at which a security incident becomes ‘military’ in nature and justifies the involvement of the military. Is an attack on a defence contractor, for example, enough to justify the involvement of the military on the basis that the compromise is likely to impact sensitive information of military interest? What would be the ‘rules of engagement’ that would trigger the involvement of the military? Would their participation be linked to a particular political context – for example, escalating tensions with a par-ticular country and the possibility of military confrontation when cyber-attacks are attributed to that country? What would be the burden of proof that would suffice in making an attribution decision?

Equally, in a discussion about proportionate response to an incident, one would need to try to determine what constitutes an ‘act of aggression’ that would justify military action – and what would considered be a propor-tionate military action against that aggression – versus, for example, acts of espionage or acts of cybercrime that in themselves do not, in international law, justify the use of armed force. Distinguishing between ‘acts of aggres-sion’ and espionage online is particularly difficult and complex because often the use of malware as an attack tool will combine capabilities that can be used for multiple purposes.

In addition, even if it is possible to determine the motives of the attacker, the attribution of the attack to a particular country with any degree of cer-tainty is a significant challenge. The decision to attribute a certain attack is a highly politicised decision that is dependent on the quality of intelligence that can be made available during the time that the decision needs to be taken. An additional difficulty could also be in linking attacking individu-als to the particular government that called for the attack. Obviously, the attacker will take steps in order to cover its tracks. Even in a case of attacks against a backdrop of mounting political tensions between two countries, one cannot exclude the possibility that the attack is mounted by a third country for its own purposes.

In a scenario of political tensions, the use of cyber as an escalation tool is another interesting aspect of the debate. What kind of cyber attack indi-cates an intention to escalate? Are the cyber-attacks happening because they are driven by the other side, or is it a case of ‘patriotic hacking’ that is not coordinated by the adversary?

Could it be part of a misinformation campaign caused by a third party that would benefit from the tension in the region? Are the cyber attacks happening because the adversary is trying to collect as much intelligence as possible, or is it a definitive escalation indication? Is the use of cyber an indication that the other side is preparing for a kinetic conflict, and that cyber, in this case, serves as a preparatory step? If convinced that the other side will follow the escalation path leading eventually to conflict, should cyber be used as a first strike?

It is not surprising that the discussion of proportionate response and, ultimately, deterrence is riddled with similar challenges. What constitutes proportionate response to a cyber-attack that is primarily intelligence-driven? Is it happening in the context of mounting tensions or while relations are good? Would a cyber-sabotage incident have a catastrophic impact significant enough to justify a kinetic counter-attack? Similarly, how can you effectively deter when many countries will choose not to publicly disclose their capabilities? In an early indication of how countries intend to address these challenges, US defence chiefs stated last year that they would “use all necessary means” in response to a cyber-attack, and did not rule out conventional military options.

The continuing search for answersIt is evident that there are no easy answers to any of these questions and that these are points with which strategy planners and policymakers will be struggling for a while as technology develops. Some of the answers will be provided by the development of doctrine and capabilities, both across government departments and within those units tasked with com-bating the threat, such as the military. Continually evolving technology will serve to complicate matters and necessitate an agile and proactive response. In other cases, the answers will be provided following practical experience of responding to a threat or ongoing attack, as lessons are learnt along the way. The next round of talks following the London Conference are scheduled to take place in Budapest in October, and it will be pertinent to note any progress made in addressing the issues discussed. n

Vast arrays of servers form the backbone of Symantec’s operations

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The two decades since the end of the Cold War have seen signifi-cant changes to both the civilian and defence aerospace sectors. The civilian market has become dominated by the US-based Boeing

Corporation and the European consortium of Airbus, while the defence market, although slower with regard to its pace of consolidation, has seen both mergers and acquisitions. For example, Lockheed and Martin Marietta merged in 1995, while McDonnell Douglas merged with Boeing in 19972. The defence sector is still dominated by companies such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Thales and BAE Systems, but this rationalisation,

The UK and the Joint Strike Fighter: an Acquisition Programme in Crisis?Peter D Antill and Pete Ito from Cranfield University’s Centre for Defence Acquisition (CfDA), based at the Defence Academy of the UK, examine the progress of the F-35 programme and suggest that the UK Government still has some difficult decisions to make in the future

in conjunction with the ‘peace dividend’ sought by most countries in the West, has resulted in a diversion of resources away from defence.

On top of that, weapons systems have become ever more sophisticated, and therefore expensive, meaning smaller and smaller numbers from each successive generation can be afforded. Within this environment, both countries and companies have been looking at opportunities to cooperate and/or collaborate, with the US Joint Strike Fighter ( JSF) programme hav-ing eight partner countries, at least three export opportunities and a wide range of national defence-industry participation. This article looks at the UK’s involvement, the problems that have been encountered, the difficul-ties in predicting the JSF programme development with regard to cost and schedule, the risk inherent in UK Minsitry of Defence (MoD) decisions, and the policy options available to the UK going forward.

The F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation fighter offers both opportunities and risks for those involved in the programme

“The Joint Strike Fighter will be the world’s premier strike platform beginning in 2008 and lasting until 2040.”1

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The broader origins of the JSF lie in the NATO studies conducted during the 1950s and 1960s, which posited that its airfields in western Europe would be major targets for any Warsaw Pact attack, meaning that any airfield so hit could well be put out of action until substantial repair and clearance work could be effected. Thus, there was a drive to develop an aircraft that could land and take off using very short distances or vertically, therefore being able to use almost any flat piece of ground. The major problem was cost3, with only the two generations of Harrier and the Yak-38 being brought into service.

The JSF’s immediate origins lie in a number of programmes that arose during the 1980s and 1990s that were designed to replace a large number of legacy systems operated by the US Air Force (USAF), US Navy (USN) and US Marine Corps (USMC), and, by extension, a large number of allies who also operated these systems. These programmes included the Advanced Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (ASTOVL, 1983-94), Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) Strike Fighter (1987-94), Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF, 1993-94), Multi-Role Fighter (MRF, 1990-93), Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA, 1983-91), Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF, 1990-91), Advanced-Attack/Advanced/Fighter-Attack (A-X/A/F-X, 1992-93) and the Joint Advanced Strike Technology ( JAST) programme4. It was found that the objectives behind the ASTOVL, CALF and JAST programmes were

well aligned (the eventual production of a high-tech, STOVL strike fighter useable by all three services that use fast jets), and so the programmes were amalgamated in October 1994 to become the JSF programme. The UK, being involved in both the ASTOVL and CALF programmes in order to find a replacement for the Harrier, remained involved with the project.

The JSF programme takes shapeThe programme was set up with a tough mandate – to develop a highly capable, supportable and affordable aircraft that would be used by all three services to nominally replace aircraft originating in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the F-15, F-16, A-10, F-117, A-6 and AV-8B5. Requests for Proposals (RfP) were issued to three of the four teams that had been involved with the CALF studies, these being led by Boeing, Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas, on 22 March 1996. The three teams put forward three different, innovative designs and submitted bids for the $2.2 billion Concept and Development Phase (CDP)6, but it was Boeing and Lockheed Martin that were selected to go forward on 16 November 1996, receiving $718 million and $667 million respectively to build two full-scale flying demonstrators over a period of 51 months.

A $96 million multi-year contract was awarded to a team led by General Electric (including Allison Engines and Rolls-Royce) to develop an alterna-tive engine, as Congress was concerned over the lack of competition in that area (Pratt & Whitney had been selected to build the primary engine7). Finally, on 26 October 2001, it was announced that Lockheed Martin had

Not only was the JSF programme designed to be multi-service, it was also international in character

won the CDP and would go onto the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase – later renamed the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) Phase.

Not only was the programme designed to be multi-service, it was also international in character, as it not only enhanced the programmes overall chances of survival, but was also important for both operational (enhanc-ing the interoperability of equipment with allies) and economic (increased foreign sales would lower the aircraft’s unit costs) reasons8. International participation in the programme has not varied greatly until recently, with the eight partner nations being at either Level I (UK), Level II (Italy and the Netherlands) or Level III (Turkey, Australia, Norway, Denmark and Canada), which also determines the amount of influence that a country has within the programme itself. Countries are also able to join as a Security Cooperation Participant (SCP) and buy the aircraft as foreign military sales, and these include Singapore, Israel and Japan9. The UK is the only Level I participant in the SDD Phase, contributing over $2 billion10.

Early problemsGiven that the programme involves cutting-edge technology, multi-service and multinational collaboration, on top of international industrial involve-ment, problems were always going to emerge. One of the earliest difficul-ties involved industrial work share. For smaller nations, such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, collaboration had already worked with the F-16 European Co-Production Contract, signed on 7 June 1975, in which the

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three countries collectively ordered 348 aircraft11, and many saw it as a way to break into the US defence market, something that has been difficult in the past12. However, while all the partner nations had signed up to the principles of best-value resourcing, it quickly became apparent that many were unprepared for what that meant in practice. Even though the whole reason behind the programme was to reduce development times, reduce unit costs and fully integrate industry into the supply chain, so that the latest Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology is incorporated into the design, it was quickly realised that many of the partner acquisition struc-tures (especially the European partners) were still rooted in defined work share agreements arranged at the inter-governmental level13.

During the first few years of the SDD Phase, it was clear that the JSF Program Office was sticking quite rigidly to the industrial participation rules and the concept of best-value resourcing. Even so, only a small percentage of the total contracts awarded had been to non-partner nations such as Japan, Germany and Israel, which worked out (by 2003, for example) at $44 million out of a total of $14 billion awarded14. Of the partners, the Canadians proved to be clear winners with a return of around 4,000%15, while the UK reaped 24.2 per cent of the contract awards with an outlay of 6.2 per cent of the developmental costs16.

As could be expected, such a huge disparity eventually led to complaints, especially from Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Turkey. Lockheed Martin, responsible for balancing partner expectations against programme goals, also had to ensure that the requirements of international politics

were met in order to secure continued support for the programme, and so resorted to an increasing use of ‘strategic best-value sourcing methodol-ogy’, which allows for a certain number of contracts to be placed in partner countries where contract awards have not met national expectations.

Secondly, there has been criticism of the US Government’s unwillingness to share sensitive technology – a promise that was made at the start of the programme17. Even Lockheed Martin commented that this was a major issue as it entered negotiations for the Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development (PSFD) Phase, which was backed by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO)18. For the UK, this was also linked to its access (or lack thereof) to the millions of lines of software coding that controls the aircraft. This issue first arose to prominence in late 200419, was suppos-edly settled after it was escalated to the Prime Minister-Presidential level in 2007 (which also saw the signing of the US-UK Defence Cooperation Treaty), but spectacularly reignited towards the end of 2009 when the Reuters news agency20 conducted an interview with Jim Schreiber, head of international affairs at the JSF Program Office, in which he revealed that the US would indeed keep the codes all to itself, saying that “nobody’s happy with it”, a situation that was also reported to Congress21 and as yet, has not been clearly resolved to the partners’ satisfaction.

Thirdly, and clearly linked to the above, has been the operation of the US Export Control and Technology Transfer Regime, embodied in the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR). While most countries expect the US to protect its most cutting-edge military technology, what

The Royal Navy has reverted to the F-35B variant, which requires ramps on the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, as seen in this illustration

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may not have been appreciated in Washington, DC (until recently) is the degree to which the regime has been harming other countries’ desire to collaborate with the US, for if “the United States and the UK, the two closest of allies, are unable to overcome the continuing obstacles to the efficient sharing of defence-related technologies, what hope is there for broader transatlantic defense industrial and technological cooperation?22”

The Pentagon itself has recognised the damage that is being done to US defence and security interests, calling the regime “a relic of the Cold War” that “must be adapted to address current threats”23. One study indi-cated that almost every interview conducted highlighted “US defense trade controls as a ‘barrier’ significantly impeding transatlantic cooperation24”. The problem generated four key concerns, these being the impact on operational sovereignty, any reliance on ITAR-controlled systems generat-ing risks of schedule delays and cost increases, re-export restrictions, and the complications that the regulations generate for multinational facilities. There was even evidence of a move to design around components subject to ITAR regulations starting to have an adverse impact on US subsystem and component suppliers25.

Stumbling onIn the move towards Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full-Rate Production (FRP), a major problem has turned out to be concurrent devel-opment. The US Department of Defense (DoD) could procure almost 400 aircraft, at a cost of around $54 billion, before the final phases of flight testing are complete in 201426. Compounding this risk is the move to speed up validation of F-35 components by replacing a large percentage of flight tests with simulations, desk studies and the use of a flying software test bed known as CATBird. Such a rush to build new aircraft before the test air-craft have flown a significant amount of test flights has led to cost increases as additional problems have been found and have had to be fixed over a larger and larger number of aircraft, rather than testing and modifying a small number of aircraft and then incorporating those solutions into a final production design.

Another factor that is likely to affect costs are changes to the planned quantities that customers decide to buy, which are dependent on any increases in unit cost. In a time of recession, pressure on the West’s defence budgets has been severe, along with (for some) a rise in operational com-mitments overseas. Given the rapid pace of production, any changes to the overall number to be manufactured could have a substantial impact. Despite the programme being set up to counter the effects of defence infla-tion that has plagued the procurement of major weapons systems since the Second World War, changes in the numbers to be produced between 2001 and 2009, as well as increases in the cost of labour and certain mate-rials and programme delays due to technical problems, contributed to a rise of 38 per cent in the JSF’s unit cost27.

Current estimates have increased even further to well over $100 mil-lion, with a total programme cost approaching $400 billion28. The result of this was that the DoD had to inform Congress on 26 March 2010 that the programme had committed a ‘Nunn-McCurdy’ breach, detailed in the yearly Selected Acquisition Report, released by the DoD on 1 April 201029. This relates to what is known as the Nunn-McCurdy Provision contained within the 1982 Defense Authorization Act that requires the DoD to certify to Congress that, once a programme has passed a certain cost threshold, it is still vital to national security. Such certification was signed by the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Ashton Carter, and passed to Congress on 1st June 2010.

It is this pressure on defence budgets, increased operational commit-ments and the inability of the US to halt the continual increase in the cost

of the aircraft30 that has seen murmurings across the partners, including the UK, about the total number of aircraft that may be procured. As it stands, the UK is still scheduled to procure three test aircraft (two in 2011 and one in 2012) and then start receiving small numbers of aircraft for training purposes as the programme moves through the LRIP Phase and gears up for FRP. While the UK is still looking at a final figure of 138 opera-tional aircraft, the PSFD Memorandum of Understanding (signed in 2006) did not contractually commit any nation to buying a specified number of aircraft31, leaving the door open for the UK under the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of October 2010, to change from buying the STOVL ‘B’ variant, to the conventional carrier ‘C’ variant.

This decision itself was under review for some time32, as the estimated costs of modifying the two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers to have ‘cats and traps’ had increased from £400 million to £1.8 billion with the (hopefully) final decision taken in May 2012 to move back to the ‘B’ variant33 with all the consequences that will have for through-life costs, the range, perfor-mance and in-service date of the aircraft, and interoperability with our key allies. In this age of austerity, a final figure of 138 aircraft is looking increas-ingly unlikely, especially with the current dispute between the MoD and the Treasury over who will pay for the replacement of the Trident nuclear submarines. Historical precedent has meant that that the initial procure-ment cost has usually come out of central funds, with the MoD covering the day-to-day running costs. The statement by the Chancellor, George Osborne, that the MoD should pick up the total bill has set the two depart-

ments against each other34. Italy, too, affected by the additional pressures brought about by the crisis in the eurozone, has decreased the number it plans to order by 4135, Canada has started to debate about reducing its planned order or even pulling out the programme altogether36, and Japan, which only recently selected the F-35 as the winner of its 42 aircraft F-X competition, has also been warning the US of that possibility if the cost of the aircraft increases substantially37.

A moving targetUpon receiving a 2011 DoD forecast reporting that the total cost of own-ing and operating a fleet of JSFs would be more than $1 trillion over 50 years, US Senator John McCain described the figure as “jaw-dropping”, particularly when compared with the costs of operating other aircraft38. For the other participating states, the increase in costs has come to dominate deliberations on the JSF, overshadowing issues such as jobs and interoper-ability with the US.

Ultimately, the primary concerns of the UK and all the other states con-templating acquisition of the F-35 are the twin factors of predictability and risk. Whether the issue is the final cost, the delivery schedule or even the ultimate performance of the JSF, there would appear to be serious ques-tions about whether the MoD is in a position to properly plan for and make cogent decisions regarding the acquisition of F-35s. In that regard, the

The primary concerns of states contemplating acquisition of the F-35 are the twin factors of predictability and risk

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20 March 2012 testimony to Congress of the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management of the US Government Accountability Office (the GAO, which is the US equivalent of the UK National Audit Office) indicates the extent of the uncertainty regarding the JSF programme.

The testimony notes that JSF restructuring is now into its third year, with a total cost increase from June 2010 of $15 billion, with increased costs of $5 billion on development and $10 billion on procurement39. The cost increases are obviously of serious concern to a cash-strapped MoD. It may be more unnerving, however, that the programme will undergo further changes, generating additional uncertainty. The GAO assessment is that “there will likely be additional changes when the Department of Defense approves a new program baseline, expected soon”40. Perhaps more critically for UK officials tasked with planning to bring the JSF into service, the GAO analysis indicates that “initial operating capability dates are now unsettled because of program uncertainties”41.

In light of the fact highlighted by the GAO that the US has reduced near-term F-35 procurement quantities for three consecutive years and that, since 2002, the Pentagon has reduced procurement quantities through 2017 from 1,591 to 365 F-35s (a reduction of approximately 75 per cent), there would appear to be cause for UK concern regarding changes in the timeline of the programme42. Moreover, an overarching political and finan-cial issue that could have an impact not just on the US, but also on the

UK, is how the Pentagon will fit future JSF funding within tightened DoD budgets. The GAO estimate is that, due to cost increases and delays, the projected annual funding level for the JSF is more than $13 billion annually through 203543. Despite the repeated claims of senior DoD officials about the centrality of the F-35 for US defence capabilities, it would appear to be a serious question whether the DoD can sustain that level of funding for the F-35 for such an extended period.

Programme challengesWith regard to the main causes of these problems, the GAO emphasises the significance of the DoD decision noted above to pursue concurrent devel-opment and production of the F-35. Frank Kendall, acting DoD procurement chief, stated on 6 February 2012 that putting the F-35 into production years before the first test flight was a serious mistake44. The GAO expresses its acceptance of that judgment by commenting that “most of the instability in the program has been and continues to be the result of highly concur-rent development, testing and production”45. This was underlined by Vice Admiral David Venlet, Program Executive Officer (PEO), for the F-35 admit-ting “fundamentally, that was a miscalculation”46. That decision obviously cannot be reversed at this juncture, but its impact is apparent in the GAO review of the current status of the programme. In 2011, that process gener-ated the result that the programme achieved six of 11 primary objectives47.

UK defence secretary Philip Hammond, taking delivery of the UK’s first F-35B Lightning II during a ceremony in July at Fort Worth, Texas

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Analysing those primary objectives in detail, the GAO notes that five of the objectives “were specific test and training actions tied to contractual expectations and award fees” while the other six objectives were “asso-ciated with cost, schedule, contract negotiations and sustainment”48. The programme successfully met two important test objectives: the STOVL vari-ant accomplished sea trials, and the carrier variant (CV) completed static structural testing49. However, two other test objectives were not met: the CV “did not demonstrate shipboard suitability because of problems with the tail hook, which requires redesign”, and “software was not released to flight test on time”50. The programme successfully completed objectives “related to sustainment design reviews, schedule data, manufacturing pro-cesses, and cost control”51. However, the GAO adds that the programme did not meet a training deadline or complete contract negotiations52.

Returning to the central issue of whether the F-35 programme is in a state which allows the MoD to make critical acquisition decisions, it is notable that the GAO emphasises that while developmental flight testing has moved ahead, it is only 20 per cent complete, with “the most challeng-ing tasks still ahead”53. Returning to an important caveat that is frequently cited by the GAO, it stresses its anticipation that there will still be more changes to aircraft design and manufacturing processes54.

It is notable that even where there has been progress in the programme, the GAO has been cautious in reporting results. That is particularly appar-ent concerning the critical issue noted above of the UK selection of the STOVL or CV version of the F-35. The GAO comments that the STOVL variant has improved to the point that it has been taken off probation, although it emphasises that “several fixes are temporary and untested”55. With regard to the specifics of that finding, the GAO makes the point that “while several technical issues have been addressed and some potential

solutions engineered, assessing whether the deficiencies are resolved is ongoing, and, in some cases, will not be known for years”56. The GAO goes on to note that, according to the Program Office, “two of the five specific problems cited are considered to be fixed, while the other three have tem-porary fixes in place”, and adds that “until the proposed technical solutions have been fully tested and demonstrated, it cannot be determined if the technical problems have been resolved”57.

The argument can be made that the difficulties facing the UK regard-ing JSF decisions have been encapsulated in the STOVL versus CV issue. Decisions need to be made by the UK regarding the construction of the aircraft carrier. Such decisions are obviously influenced by which version of the JSF that the UK elects to acquire. The fact that the STOVL version was on probation may have played an important part in the decision in the 2010 SDSR to change course and buy the CV version, and the fact it is no longer on probation may well have played an important role in the change of heart58 over which version of the F-35 to buy. However, if that decision regarding probation of the STOVL variant is not clear cut and is based on solutions that are not yet fully tested and demonstrated, the UK will have found itself having made a critical decision based on incomplete informa-tion punctuated with question marks.

Complexity and capabilityIt is important to note at this juncture the daunting complexity of the F-35, which reinforces the programme’s unpredictability and raises questions about the ultimate performance of the aircraft. The GAO highlights the fact that management and development of more than 24 million lines of software code “continue to be of concern” and “late software releases have delayed testing and training”59. The significance of the software code issue

A GR9 Harrier lands at RAF Cottesmore following a ceremony to mark the retirement of the long-serving aircraft

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is emphasised by a comparison with other US fighters. The GAO comments that it is not just that JSF requirements have grown to over 24 million lines of code, but that 9.5 million are on board the aircraft60. It then remarks that this is three times more on-board lines of code than the F-22A Raptor and six times more than the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet61. While supporters of the F-35 would certainly point to these numbers as an indication of the sophistication of the JSF, a fair case could be made that they also indicate the level of risk that is being accepted by the DoD, and, by extension, the MoD, with regard to such a technologically challenging fighter.

On the issue of performance and capabilities, the GAO provides a candid assessment, judging that development of the critical mission systems that give the JSF its core combat capabilities “remains behind schedule and risky62”. At this point, the GAO reports that “only four per cent of the mission system requirements for full capability has been verified”63. Critically for the UK as it makes long-term decisions and commitments, the testing of a fully integrated F-35 is now anticipated by GAO in 2015 at the earliest64 (although 2017 as the more likely schedule for testing is noted below).

With regard to the specific technological challenges facing the JSF, the GAO assesses that deficiencies with the Helmet Mounted Display (HMD), “integral to mission systems functionality and concepts of operation” are “most problematic”65. In addition, it judges that the autonomic logistics information system, which it describes as “a key ground system for improv-ing aircraft availability and lowering support costs” is “not yet fully devel-oped66”. Such caution and hesitation on the part of the GAO regarding such critical technology indicate the level of uncertainty faced by UK policy-makers at this important juncture. Indeed, the HMD is but one of five major issues, the other four being the Fuel Dump System, the Integrated Power Pack, the Arresting Hook System and the aircraft’s stealth signature67.

Returning to the theme of the unpredictability of the F-35 programme, the future as viewed by GAO provides more than enough reason for con-cern by UK decision-makers about whether its projections regarding cost and delivery schedule will prove to be accurate. The GAO stresses that the manufacturing process “is still absorbing a higher-than-expected number of engineering changes resulting from flight testing, which makes it dif-ficult to achieve efficient production rates”68. It also emphasises that “until engineering changes are reduced, there are risks of additional cost over-runs and retrofit costs”69.

Perhaps most critical for the MoD, the point at which the programme will achieve a measure of clarity and predictability appears to be still far off. The GAO view is that the “program now estimates that the number of changes will persist at elevated levels through 2019”70. Moreover, the Pentagon “is still investing billions of dollars on hundreds of aircraft while flight test-ing has years to go”71. The GAO assessment is that “the program has not yet demonstrated a stable design and manufacturing processes capable of efficient production. Engineering changes are persisting at relatively high

The F-35 decision may turn on the simple question of what the MoD can afford and how much risk it is willing to accept

rates and additional changes will be needed as testing continues”72. In that regard, it is important to note that “initial dedicated operational testing of a fully integrated JSF is tentatively scheduled to begin in 2017,”73 with a full rate production decision now expected in 201974.

ConclusionsThe history and background of the JSF indicate the extent to which a sensible policy decision taken decades ago (one common platform for a fighter to serve three US services) has become an example of an acquisition ‘hot potato’. Only in retrospect will academics and analysts determine whether the concept of a common platform was inherently flawed and ensured that the project would suffer cost overruns and delays. With regard to the decision to pursue concurrent development and production, the case could be made that a long-term perspective is not needed and the ques-tionable nature of that decision is already apparent. The GAO has concluded that most of the current JSF instability is a result of the attempt to pursue production without successfully completing development and testing, a point on which senior DoD officials have publicly expressed concurrence.

A review of the history of the JSF indicates that the decision of the UK and other states to participate in the F-35 programme had a solid rationale. There was every reason for governments to wish to participate in the development of a fifth-generation fighter with cutting-edge technology, and a reasonable basis for non-participating states to wish to acquire the JSF. There was the added attraction that as the US military was dependent on the success of the programme, the Pentagon was committed to ensur-ing that it would not fail and that it would commit the resources needed to bring a capable F-35 into service. There was also the added policy consider-ation for the UK and other states that acquisition of the JSF would enhance interoperability with the US. Finally, there was the prospect of new jobs, particularly for the UK, which was the only Level I participant in the JSF. Such new employment may still arise, but the economic benefit for the UK may now be greatly diminished by the cost of acquiring the F-35s.

If the problems in the JSF programme indicated above are indeed sig-nificant considerations for the UK and other governments, they are ampli-fied by the fact that virtually all defence budgets have taken a hit in recent years. Cost overruns and delays that might have been tolerable before 2008 have since became unacceptable. For the UK, all of these concerns come together at a particularly challenging time. Decisions about the aircraft car-rier are forcing decisions on F-35s at a point at which there is a shortage of good answers and solid data regarding programme cost and schedule.

As noted previously, the UK has yet to make a binding legal commitment regarding its purchase of F-35s. That decision will be influenced by a number of factors that go beyond cost and schedule. Interoperability with US forces is certainly a critical determination. That concern could be addressed by the acquisition of F/A-18 Super Hornets, but raises questions regarding the future production run by Boeing. Such a decision would also raise the issue of the impact of not acquiring the F-35 on possible work for BAE Systems, the largest subcontractor on the JSF, regarding JSF support arrangements.

In the current financial climate, the F-35 decision ultimately may turn on the simple question of what the MoD can afford and how much risk it is willing to accept with regard to future cost increases and programme delays. While the MoD would almost certainly wish to have the JSF in its inventory, acquiring such a capability involves taking a decision that the F-35s can be acquired on a schedule somewhat in alignment with the acqui-sition of the new carrier, and managed within a shrinking MoD budget, without stripping away other essential defence capabilities. As indicated above, such a UK decision carries a substantial amount of risk regarding a still-unpredictable JSF programme. n (See overleaf for footnotes)

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Footnotes

1. PeteAldridge,U.S.Under-SecretaryofDefenceforAcquisitionasquotedinThe Daily News,

LosAngeles,27October2001

2. See,forexample,www.globalsecurity.org/military/industry/mergers.htm

3. Keijsper,G.Joint Strike Fighter: Design and Development of the International Aircraft,Barnsley:

Pen&SwordBooks,2007,pp7-8

4. OfficialJSFWebsite,Historywebpage,www.jsf.mil/history

5. Mason,T.The Aerospace Revolution,London:Brasseys,1998,p139

6. Warwick,G.‘JointEndeavour’inFlight International,3-9July1996,pp25-28

7. Bolkom, C. Proposed Termination of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136 Alternate Engine,

18February2009,CongressionalResearchService(CRS)RL-33390

8. USGAO. Joint StrikeFighterAcquisition:ManagingCompetingPressures IsCriticalTo

AchievingProgramGoals,testimonyfromKatherineV.Schinasi,Director–Acquisitionand

SourcingManagement,21July2003,GAO-03-1012T,p4

9. Seewww.scramble.nl/sg.htm;www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lockheed-advances-f-35-

contract-talks-with-japan-israel-369506/.

10.OpCit.GAO,21July2003,p5

11. USCongress.ArmingOurAllies:CooperationandCompetitioninDefenseTechnology,Of-

ficeofTechnologyAssessment,OTA-ISC-449,USGPO:WashingtonDC,May1990,p41

12.Hewson, R. ‘Joint Strike Fighter –Happily Ever After?’ in Jane’s Defence Weekly, dated

13October2004,posted6October2004onwww.janes.com

13.Mulholland, D. ‘US Industry: Bucking the Trend?’ in Jane’s Defence Weekly, posted

18February2004onwww.janes.com

14. LaFrenchi,P.andTrimble,S.‘ShareDealing’inFlight International,13-19July2004,pp70-74

15.Mulholland,Detal.‘NotAllJSFPartnersAreReapingContractAwards’inJane’sDefence

Weekly,posted21May2004onwww.janes.com

16.OpCit.LaFrenchiandTrimble,13-19July2004,p71

17. HouseofCommonsDefenceCommittee.StrategicExportControls,HC145,London:TSO,

24March2005,pp49-51.

18.Trimble,S.andWarwick,G.‘JointJourney’inFlight International,28June-4July2005;US

GAO.JointStrikeFighter:ManagementoftheTechnologyTransferProcess,March2006,

GAO-06-364,WashingtonDC.

19. OpCit.Hewson,dated13October2004

20.Wolf,J.‘UStowithholdF-35fightersoftwarecodes’,Reuters,24November2009

21.Gertler, J. F-35 Joint StrikeFighter (JSF)Program:Background and Issues forCongress,

22December2009,CongressionalResearchService,RL-30563

22.Chao,P.&Niblett,R.TrustedPartners:SharingTechnologywithin theUS-UKSecurity

Relationship,CSIS,26May2006

23.USDepartmentofDefense.QuadrennialDefenseReview2010,February2010,pp83-84

24.Bailos,J.,Fisher,C.andKoehl,S.FortressesandIcebergs:TheEvolutionoftheTransatlan-

ticDefenseMarketandtheImplicationsforUSNationalSecurityPolicy,December2009,

CenterforTransatlanticRelations,WashingtonDC,p37

25.Ibid.p2

26.Sullivan,M.StrongRiskManagementEssentialasProgramEntersMostChallengingPhase,

TestimonybeforetheSubcommitteeonAirandLandForces,CommitteeonArmedServices,

HouseofRepresentatives,GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,20May2009,GAO-09-711T.

27. Harrington,C.‘TheJSFBigBet:F-35JointStrikeFighterUpdate’inJane’sDefence Weekly,

postedon5June2009atwww.janes.com

28.Potter,M.‘JSFCostIncreasesMayImperiltheFighterProgram–andLockheed’,25May

2010,locatedathttp://industry.bnet.com;Grant,G. ‘JSFPriceTagNow$112MillionPer

Plane; Program $382 Billion’, 1 June 2010, www.dodbuzz.com/2010/06/01/jsf-price-tag-

now-112-million-per-plane/#comment-25859

29.US DoD. ‘Department of Defense Announces Selected Acquisition Reports’, News

Release No 248-10 at www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13425; Capac-

cio, T. ‘Lockheed F-35’s ProjectedCostNow$382Billion,Up 65 Percent’, 1 June 2010,

www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-01/lockheed-f-35-s-projected-cost-rises-to-382-

billion-update1-.html

30.Capaccio,T.‘LockheedF-35fighterestimateincreased9percentinayear’,30March2012,

www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-30/lockheed-f-35-fighter-estimate-increased-

9-percent-in-a-year-u-dot-s-dot-says

31. EmailfromDE&S,2August2010;JSFProgramOffice.JointStrikeFighterProduction,Sus-

tainment&Follow-OnDevelopmentMemorandumofUnderstanding,signedbytheUKon

12December2006,www.jsf.mil/downloads/down_documentation.htm

32.Hoyos,C.‘CostfearscauseMoDrethinkonfighterjets’,Financial Times,12March2012,

www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6f38d5e0-6b12-11e1-9781-00144feab49a.html#axzz1r3hfRDBc;

Quintana, E. Choosing Plan B: Reviewing the UK’s Choice of Joint Strike Fighter,

23March2012,www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C4F6C9D5A2F291

33.Kirkup, J. ‘About-turn on new variant of carriers’ fighter plane’, The Daily Telegraph,

9 May 2012, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9253377/about-turn-on-new-

variant-of-carriers-fighter-plane.html

34.Rayment, S. ‘Armed Forces Stunned By Trident Bill’, The Daily Telegraph, 31 July 2010;

Sieghart,M.‘WhatDeterrenceNeedsIsAmbiguity’inThe Independent,2August2010.

35.McGlaun,S.‘DoDSaysInternationalF-35LightningIISalesCrucial;ItalyCutsOrdersby41’,

www.dailytech.com/DoD+Says+International+F35+Lightning+II+Sales+Crucial+Italy+

Cuts+Orders+by+41/article24013.htm

36.McGlaun,S.‘Report:CanadaConsidersCuttingF-35LightningIIOrders’,www.dailytech.

com/Report+Canada+Considers+Cutting+F35+Lightning+II+Orders/article24231.htm

37.Waldron, G. ‘Japanwary of F-35 cost escalation’, Flight International, 28 February 2012,

www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/japan-wary-of-f-35-cost-escalation-368869

38.Hodge, N. ‘The $1 Trillion Fighter-Jet Fleet’ in TheWall Street Journal, 26May 2011,

online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303654804576345590857818106.html

39.Sullivan,M.JointStrikeFighter–RestructuringAddedResourcesandReducedRisk,but

ConcurrencyisStillaMajorConcern,TestimonybeforetheSubcommitteeonTacticalAir

andLandForces,CommitteeonArmedServices,HouseofRepresentatives,USGovern-

ment Accountability Office Report GAO-12-525T, dated 20March 2012, /www.gao.gov/

assets/590/589454.pdf,‘Highlights’page

40-43.Ibid

44.Majumdar,D. ‘Kendall:EarlyF-35Production ‘AcquisitionMalpractice’’ inDefense News,

6February2012,www.defensenews.com/article/20120206/DEFREG02/302060003/Kendall

45.OpCit.GAO,‘Highlights’page

46.George, S. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Congressional Report – Analysis, 11 January 2012,

www.phoenixthinktank.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/PTTSGF35CRPT.pdf,p14

47. OpCit.GAO,‘Highlights’page

48-57.Ibid

58.HopkinsN.andNorton-Taylor,R.‘GovernmentforcesintoU-TurnoverRoyalNavyfighterjets’,

Guardian,10May2012,www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/may/09/government-u-turn-fighter-jets

59.OpCit.GAO,‘Highlights’page

60-66.Ibid,p.11

67.OpCit.George,pp.8-9

68.OpCit.GAO,‘Highlights’page

69-74.Ibid

Three F-35A test aircraft fly over Edwards Air Force Base in California

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A high-school robotics team from Phoenix brings its underwater vehicle to San Diego to try and beat college teams from around the US and Canada at a Navy test facility. Young people participat-

ing in the 4-H programme in northern Minnesota test their programmable robots made from Lego against other teams on a cold day in December. University teams from around Europe hope their underwater vehicles can complete the challenge course at a NATO research centre in Italy. This all may seem like fun and games, but this is a serious proposition.

Collectively, these programmes come under the category of STEM educa-tion, which stands for science, technology, engineering and mathematics.

STEMming the tideSmall robots can engage students in a big way. Encouraging young people today to participate in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) programmes is of critical importance to the development of the high-tech workforce of tomorrow, reports Edward Lundquist

Some pretty smart people today have determined that the workforce of tomorrow will also need to be smart, and the time to interest kids in science and maths is now. The brilliant ideas in the next decades will be developed by innovators who have mastered these difficult academic sub-jects. The White House has instituted an “Educate to Innovate” programme to “increase STEM literacy so that all students can learn deeply and think critically in science, maths, engineering and technology”.

That is why the US Navy, for example, is strongly supporting STEM initia-tives, because it realises that the people who will design, maintain, repair and operate the fleet of the future will need to be well grounded in the

Gareth Griffiths of the University of the West of England at the 2012 Student Autonomous Underwater Challenge – Europe

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STEM disciplines. “In the fleet and in the operating services, sailors and marines are called upon every day to do a lot of really difficult things,” says the Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus. “They work on the world’s most com-plicated and best anti-air and anti-missile systems; they maintain avionics systems; they hang ordnance on aircraft heading out for combat missions; and they operate the nuclear power plants on subs and our carriers.” These technically challenging missions, he says, take more than intelligence; they require critical thinking skills received from a great education.

While the Navy may be altruistic in its efforts to help young people, it is also motivated by an ageing work force. More than 50 per cent of the Navy’s scientists, engineers and others in related disciplines will be eligible for retirement by 2020.

Sponsored underwater robotics programmeSeaPerch is an innovative underwater robotics programme, sponsored by the US Office of Naval Research and managed by the AUVSI (Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International) Foundation. The SeaPerch

programme trains teachers and provides a curriculum to instruct students on how to build an underwater Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) in an in-school or out-of-school setting. Students build their own ROV from a kit comprised of low-cost, easily accessible parts, following a curriculum that teaches basic engineering and science terminology and principles with an ocean and marine engineering theme.

Construction from everyday itemsThe robot is made of everyday materials such as PVC pipes, DC motors, film canisters, wires, and even toilet bowl sealant. It is powered by a battery and remotely controlled using a tether. The three motors allow it to manoeu-vre up and down, as well as left and right. “We use it as a teaching tool to convey principles such as buoyancy, stability, electricity and electrical and mechanical engineering,” says Ensign Natalya Aoki, who worked with SeaPerch as part of the US Naval Academy’s STEM Outreach Programme.

“Building the SeaPerch is awesome, powerful and empowering, but it’s just the beginning,” says Toby Ratcliffe, an engineer at Naval Surface

Edward Lundquist (right) helps students to customise their SeaPerch robots to enhance performance

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Warfare Center at Carderock, Maryland. “The kids see it as a final product, but they soon realise it can do other things. The cool thing is they learn trouble-shooting. But more than that, it’s the connection between students and engineers as role models.”

SeaPerch is part of the ‘4-H aquatic robotics’ programme in Minnesota. Building the robot is just the beginning of the process. Minnesota has 11,842 lakes, 6,564 natural rivers and 18.6 million acres of wetland, so water quality is important. The 4-H teams must use their vehicle to per-form a community service by monitoring water quality for regional lakes and watershed associations.

According to 4-H leader Curtis Nyegaard, the Clearwater County 4-H SeaPerch teams work with the River Watch programme for the Red River Valley, which drains north to Hudson’s Bay. “They collect sediment and water samples, and analyse for algae and micro-invertebrates.”

Northome teacher Jim Schneider says student STEM programmes such as First Lego League and SeaPerch support their curriculum. “It makes them think like an engineer. They’re solving problems without even realising it.”

High-school and middle-school teams from across America compete in the SeaPerch National Challenge. While they all use the same basic SeaPerch, they can innovate and optimise their ROVs. Camryn Yoshioka and Jennifer Loui from Highland Intermediate School in Pearl City, Hawaii, modified their robot’s tether, which contained the control and power lines as well as TV camera cables, all inside a bright yellow polypropylene braided line. “The polypropylene is buoyant, so the line doesn’t get tangled as easily,” says Loui.

Competition between studentsOn a larger scale, the Robo-Sub competition brings university and high-school teams to the Space and Naval Warfare Center’s test facility in San Diego where they compete to complete tasks such as retrieving objects or navigating a course in the best time. The teams must program their robots to operate autonomously once the run commences.

A similar competition called Student Underwater Autonomous Challenge-Europe (SAUC-E) brings university teams from around the world to the Mediterranean waters of the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation at La Spezia, Italy. The teams prepare for months to build a vehicle that is best able to meet the challenging requirements of the course in the best time, and require expertise in engineering, program-ming and troubleshooting.

The ESIEA Ryujin team from Paris returned to SAUC-E for their second year with their autonomous underwater vehicle that is a highly modified SeaPerch. According to Antoine Gademer, their 2012 version has many improvements, including better electronics and sensors for depth and iner-tial movement, a compass, camera and even a laser scanner. SeaPerch is ideal for new students starting out, says ESIEA’s Loica Avanthey. “You can give it to them to encourage them to study and work in science. It’s fun, so they don’t think of it as working.”

The ESIEA has a wide variety of robotic systems for land, sea and air, but they like SeaPerch because it is simple and inexpensive. Although it’s a small robot, they have big plans to build a fleet of underwater vehicles and get them to communicate with each other underwater. “We want to make them collaborate,” Avanthey says.

STEM programmes can open doors. The Falcon Robotics team of students from Carl Hayden Community High School in Phoenix, Arizona, travel the country competing against the best teams at both high-school and college levels. The team will again be travelling to San Diego for the Robo-Sub competition, hosted by the AUVSI Foundation and the US Navy, where they will be one of the few high-school teams competing against a field

of mostly university teams from the US, as well as Canada, China, Iceland, India, Japan, Russia, Spain and Turkey.

STEM programmes also broaden horizons. Space Camp Turkey is licensed by the US Space and Rocket Center at the Marshall Spaceflight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and is approved by NASA. Developer Kaya Tuncer built Space Camp Turkey for the young people, but he found that it also made a statement to potential tenants at his Aegean Free Zone business park in Izmir. “Investors and potential clients see Space Camp, and our commitment to education. This place has the kind of vision that makes them say, “we should locate here. It works both ways,” Tuncer added. “Kids come here for Space Camp, but see the high-tech opportunities and per-haps decide to come to work here in the future.”

There is a cost for STEM. These programmes require vision, effort, resources and commitment. But the people who will build the ships, design the combat systems and conduct research in 10 or 20 years’ time will need to be more than qualified. An investment in STEM now will deliver a smarter, more capable, more caring and compassionate generation for tomorrow. n

Those who design, maintain and operate the US Navy fleet of the future will need to be well grounded in the STEM disciplines

A student places his team’s Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) into icy water to test its survivability

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Since the early 1990s, and probably even before then, China has supplied Iran with anti-ship missile (AShM) know-how and hard-ware. The relationship between the two states has progressed to

the point where Iran is now assembling and operating a complete family of AShMs tailored to its national needs. All of these weapons have their roots in China, but Iran is not simply a customer for Chinese missiles – it is a full partner in their design, development and acquisition.

Iran’s first collaborative project with China involved the C-802 missile – an extended-range turbojet-powered development of the C-801 produced by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). The Iran Aerospace Industries Organisation (IAIO) began working with CASIC to produce the C-802 in Iran as the Noor (dawn). Through the Noor project, Iran took an existing, in-service Chinese weapon and developed a new national production capability for it. Iran now has 20 years’ experience with the C-802 design and appears to have followed the Chinese development path by extending the missile’s range (to at least 180 km) and improv-ing its onboard systems (such as the seeker). Iran has also made some unique achievements – most notably, adapting the missile for launch by the Mi-17 helicopter.

Development of a new missile variant During the second half of last year, Iran announced that it was mass producing and delivering a new variant of the C-802/Noor, known as Ghader (meaning capable, or able). Clearly a C-802 derivative, the Ghader appears to be longer than the standard Noor – pointing to a larger warhead and/or additional onboard fuel. Official Iranian sources claim a range of

That Sinking Feeling: Iran’s Anti-Ship Missile ArrayAt sea and on land, Iran has fielded a layered network of modern anti-ship missiles that can threaten the entire Persian Gulf and the waters far beyond. All of these weapons have been sourced from China, which has helped Iran to implement a well-conceived plan for maximum sea control. Robert Hewson reports

“more than 200km” for the Ghader, which also appears to be fitted with a new frequency-agile RF seeker.

The Noor/Ghader project was a great success for Iran and China that paved the way for a deeper industrial relationship between the two. Iran would now deliver a set of requirements to China (and perhaps even an outline design) for missiles that are then developed in China and returned to Iran (as export-only programmes) for series production (or, at the very least, assembly) there. Over the past 10 years or so, this process has seen the emergence in Iran of several distinct missile types – with each one first exhibited under a different name in China. Tracing this process is a com-plicated jigsaw, but, in essence, Iran’s various missile types are grouped under two family names, Kosar and Nasr.

In May 2004, Iran announced the manufacture of its first-ever anti-ship missile, the Kosar (a heavenly river in the Qu’ran). Given Iran’s experience

Iran is not simply a customer for Chinese missiles – it is a full partner in their design, development and acquisition

Iran has deployed truck-mounted mobile launchers for almost all of its modern anti-ship missiles, such as this Noor (C-802)

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with the Noor, this statement was confusing, but it perhaps pointed to a new level of involvement for the IAIO in the Kosar project. Initial IAIO data showed that the Kosar was a version of the missile displayed in China as the CASIC C-701. IAIO noted two variants, the Kosar 1 (equivalent to the EO-guided C-701T) and Kosar 3 (equivalent to the radar-guided C-701R).

Iran has another missile that it calls Kosar, but this is a very different design from a second source within China. This ‘third Kosar’ was designed by China’s Hongdu Aviation Industry Group and was first exhibited in China under the designation TL-10 (later TL-1).

The specifications and performance of Iran’s C-701-derived and TL-1-derived Kosar missiles are very similar (approximately 100kg all-up weight, with 30kg warheads and a range of 15-18km). It is unclear why Iran acquired this trio of equally matched weapons from alternative suppliers, nor is it possible to fully assess the operational and manufacturing status of the three designs.

There is evidence to show that the radar-guided Kosar 1 (C-701R) is in full frontline service. Iran deploys the weapon aboard ships and with mobile land batteries. According to a Hongdu representative speaking in 2004, the ship-launched TL-1 missile had already been delivered to a customer and was in service. A company brochure released that same year showed a missile being fired from an Iranian fast attack craft (FAC) and a missile impact on a barge target at sea during a live-fire test. Since then, Iranian state media has shown footage of what was claimed to be a Kosar (TL-1) assembly facil-ity, but evidence that the missile is in service has been harder to find.

Further sourcing from ChinaIran has not been shy to claim ownership of other missiles sourced via China. In March 2010, defence minister Ahmad Vahidi announced the start of local production of the Nasr-1 (Victory 1) anti-ship missile. It is based on the CASIC C-704 design, first shown publicly (in China) during 2006. Launched from a ship or from a coastal battery, the Nasr has a range of about 30km. During a recent series of exercises, Iranian press photographs showed a Nasr being fired that clearly wore ‘C-704’ titles on the nose – rather removing any ambiguity there might be about the missiles’ origins.

Iranian TV footage of General Vahidi’s 2010 visit showed components for another version of the Nasr, using TV guidance. This would be Iran’s equiv-alent to the C-704KD missile an air-launched version of the C-704 with two seeker options – using a TV/electro-optical camera or an infra-red sensor. The existence of a second version of the Nasr ties in with earlier Iranian press reports of a Nasr-2 variant that is yet to be officially acknowledged.

February 2012 saw another twist in the saga of Iran’s Chinese missiles when a new variant of the C-701 (Kosar) was unveiled with another name,

Zafar (meaning triumph, or victory). Clearly derived from the radar-guided C-701, the Zafar has a revised aerodynamic configuration with a modified wing shape not seen on earlier missiles.

A final item of note in the story of Iranian and Chinese missile develop-ment concerns the programme in which that cooperation probably began. In the early 1980s, Iran acquired Chinese-built HY-2 missiles (C-201, CSSC-3 ‘Seersucker’), which were themselves based on the elderly Soviet-era P-20M Termit (SS-N-2 ‘Styx’). Even then the 1950s-vintage design was con-sidered to be obsolete. However, Iran still maintains the HY-2 in service and regularly fires these missiles in its coastal battery exercises. Despite its age, the HY-2 is still capable of sinking any undefended vessel, and coordinated multiple launches could be part of a saturation attack that would challenge even the most modern warship.

There are now at least four distinct AShMs of Chinese origin in Iranian hands, and more are likely to follow. To a greater or lesser degree, Iran has the ability to build and modify all of its ‘Chinese missiles’ and has put them into service on land, at sea and in the air. The well-chosen overlap-ping capabilities of these missiles give Iran a layered combat reach that is effective out to at least 200km from the shoreline. This alone is a signifi-cant capability, as most of Iran’s launchers are fully mobile and therefore hard to detect and target. The deployment of more missiles on Iran’s FACs and smaller warships poses another problem entirely. With so much atten-tion and emotion devoted to Iran’s militarily irrelevant (and non-existent) nuclear weapons, the fact that Iran has, en masse, deployed missiles that really affect the regional balance of power has largely gone unnoticed. n

Robert Hewson is the editor of Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons

The Kosar 3 (C-701R) is the smallest of the Chinese anti-ship missiles acquired by Iran

The Nasr (C-704) is one of several lightweight AShMs that Iran has deployed aboard its growing force of small, fast attack craft

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In May 2011, eight of the nine global aerospace, defence and security (ADS) prime contractors assembled at chief technology officer (CTO) level at the Dynamixx/IHS Energy, Environment, Defence and Security

2011 (E2DS’11) conference in Washington, DC to discuss a market that, on the face of it, has little, if anything, to do with the ADS sector: energy and the environment. The logistical challenge of gathering these senior technologists – the collective science and technological brain-talent of an entire industry at its top-most tier – was considerable, but the effort was worth it. What emerged from E2DS’11 was a consensus that the ADS sec-tor has the wherewithal to play a key role in solving some of the world’s most fundamental ‘architectural’ problems – ranging from climate change and clean energy implementation to sustainable infrastructures, food and water security and humanitarian relief and response.

Of course, no industry will move into these kinds of adjacencies out of the goodness of its heart – there has to be money in it. The potential, how-ever, is clearly demonstrated by the fact that revenues derived from world-wide energy and environmental business far eclipse the $1.5 trillion annual global defence market; and while defence markets are waning, the need

Global Challenges – the ADS Sector’s New HorizonThe aerospace, defence and security (ADS) sector is slowly moving into the energy and infrastructure markets that have developed due to the effects of climate change. Nick Cook, CEO of Dynamixx, explains why the ADS community is well suited for tackling this next great global challenge

for energy, especially of the clean variety, is only ever going to increase. The CTOs also agreed that they had technology and know-how to offer in the solution of these challenges. So what is stopping them?

The need for new business modelsThe answer, it turns out, is nothing if not straightforward. To enter the Brave New World of ‘global challenges’, ADS companies need to have understanding and experience of fragmented, commercial markets. But, by and large, they don’t. Outside of commercial airline and executive-jet markets, they operate in a ‘monopsonistic’ business environment (one customer, many suppliers), a rarefied bubble in which they transact with governments via well-defined rules and processes. Doing business in com-mercial clean-energy markets and other global challenge areas requires a whole new way of thinking, as well as structural changes in the way that the sector conducts its commerce – in effect, whole new business models.

“We’re agreed on ‘the why’,” Mark Russell, vice president of Engineering, Technology and Mission Assurance, told the E2DS’11 audience, explaining the need to engage in markets ‘beyond defence’. “It’s ‘the how’ that’s now

The ADS sector recognises the importance of the adjacent markets that are emerging as a result of climate change, debated at the E2DS’11 conference in Washington, DC

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important.” Lockheed Martin CTO Dr Ray Johnson summed it up in much the same way: “The biggest challenge that we face is not the portability of the technologies, but the portability of the business model.”

Is this business worth fighting for? The answer has to be ‘yes’. The ADS sector is experiencing profound challenges in the face of severe defence budget cuts throughout the western hemisphere. Export markets in India, Asia and South America offer some respite, but will never compensate for the fall-off in revenues as the US and Europe face up to swingeing auster-ity measures that are likely to remain in place for years, if not decades. All of this presents ADS companies with a dilemma: to consolidate around the ‘core’, or pursue market adjacencies (or, indeed, do both). The last time that the industry pursued a meaningful adjacency was when it migrated capabilities from the pure defence arena into ‘civil security’ in the wake of the September 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington DC. Security was, and is, a natural fit, but what about energy and the environment?

At first sight, ‘E&E markets’ seem a long way from the traditional busi-ness of the aerospace and defence (A&D) sector, but dig a little deeper and the synergies pull into focus. The A&D industry has profound knowledge of the planet’s ecosystems, thanks to products – ‘platforms’ – that oper-ate in all areas of the environment, from subsea to space. For decades, governments have been investing in the science and technology (S&T) and research and development base of the ADS sector, the result evident in the platforms, weapons, systems and sensors that have emerged year on year from that investment. But a wealth of intellectual property, patents and inventions also resides in this S&T base that has not seen the light of day – much of it applicable to global challenges, especially in the E&E space. The industry hasn’t developed these capabilities, because it has never been tasked to do so by its government customer – tasking being its primary stimulus. Underpinning almost every global challenge – whether it is related to climate, energy, the environment, urban infrastructure or the provision of food and water to a growing world population – are the issues of stability and security. On this basis alone, it should be argued that global challenges are core and not adjacent markets for ADS companies.

There are other factors that ought to make governments look to these companies as the industrial partners of first choice in the pursuit of solu-tions to global challenges. ADS companies enjoy ‘strategic’ relationships with their government customers and operate on global scales. They also collaborate, as well as compete with their peers, giving them long-held experience of the development of cooperative solutions to large, architec-tural problems. There is also a clear need for them to reinvent themselves in the aftermath of the sector’s glory days that, some believe, culminated in its achievement of putting a man on the moon in 1969 – the last time that the ADS industry rose to a challenge that stretched its science, technology and systems-integration know-how beyond expectation. Indeed, without any macro-scale goals to test it anymore, the industry that once adopted

Doing business in commercial clean-energy markets requires a whole new way of thinking, as well as structural changes

‘higher, further, faster’ as its ‘Right Stuff’ mantra is now focused almost entirely on reducing risk, reducing cost and meeting shareholder expecta-tion – hardly the stuff of inspiration or legend.

This risk aversion, coupled with a demographic trend that is seeing fewer qualified engineering graduates emerging from universities in the US and Europe to replace the ‘Baby Boomer’ generation that has sustained it over the past four decades, is seeing new potential recruits turning to other engineering sectors where innovation and the rapid turnaround of products from design to production remain part of their DNA. In 2005, these defi-ciencies were cited by Jim Albaugh, who recently retired as head of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, as major threats to the ADS sector’s future health. The industry, he said, must make profound changes to remain “vibrant, robust and relevant” in the 21st century – and to attract a new generation of engineers. What better way of doing that, some are now arguing, than set-ting its sights on a new goal: fixing the planet’s fundamental challenges?

US Department of Defense clean energy policiesWithout much fanfare, most of the ADS prime contractors have moved into the spaces described above, many of them spurred by the policies of the US Department of Defense, which has been setting aggressive ‘energy independence’ targets to wean its forces off reliance on costly foreign oil. Lockheed Martin is deeply engaged in the delivery of clean energy solu-tions, as is Boeing, and not just for the DoD. Raytheon has already built the world’s largest eco-monitoring and protection system – the net-centric SIVAM surveillance and response architecture for the Amazon rainforest – and Northrop Grumman’s heritage in surveillance and command-and-control technologies offers it the strong potential to provide new ways of forewarning us about profound environmental threats. Europe’s ‘primes’ aren’t standing still either: EADS, Finmeccanica and Thales are all corralling their businesses and technologies to provide E&E solutions, while Saab is already offering ‘attractive city’ systems-integration know-how – and the technologies that go with it – to city mayors all over the world. Indeed, Saab has redeployed its security-derived systems-of-systems design skills to col-laborate with city architects, construction firms, clean tech providers and waste-management companies to offer a Swedish cross-sector ‘smart city’ package that has been boosted by a memorandum of understanding with the Inter-American Development Bank in which they will look at joint oppor-tunities for cooperation on smart, sustainable cities in South America.

But the crux issue of how ADS companies – steeped in one-customer government contracting models – can survive and thrive in the harsh and highly competitive world of energy and environmental business (for start-ers) hasn’t gone away. At E2DS’11, Dynamixx offered to cooperate with the ADS primes in developing and delivering business models that do just that. It is now working with Sustainable Development Technology Canada (SDTC), a C$1 billion foundation that invests Canadian government money into Canadian clean tech companies, to demonstrate that it is possible for ADS companies to integrate clean tech companies and their underpinning commercial practices into hybrid supply chains – part ADS-derived, part clean tech-derived – to deliver highly innovative solutions in non-trivial energy and environmental markets. In a demonstration of just how far the world has spun on its axis since the issue was first raised at E2DS’11, the next Dynamixx/IHS conference, E3DS’12, to be held in London on 13 and 14 November, will detail the progress of ADS companies in this Brave New World of commerce - and outline next steps in the ADS sector’s embrace of global challenges. The third ‘E’ – for ‘economics’ – is also testimony to the fact that E3DS’12 isn’t just a technology forum anymore, but a place where cross-sector economic models for a better future are discussed, analysed and, most crucially, increasingly being acted upon by the participants. n

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INDEX OF ADVERTISERS

FINAL PROOF

Babcock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

BMT Defence Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

EOD Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Eurofi ghter Typhoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

F-35 Lightning II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Green Hills Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Iveco Defence Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Marshall Land Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Nexter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Qioptiq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Roke Manor Research Limited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Steria Limited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Vislink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Adindex_RUSI 15.1 SUMMER 2012.indd 90 20/8/12 15:10:48

All Members’ Lectures are open to RUSI Members only.For more information on RUSI Membership please visit www.rusi.org/membership

For details on all forthcoming RUSI events please visit

www.rusi.org/events

FORTHCOMING RUSI CONFERENCES

Defence Information Superiority 2012 25-26 September 2012Church House, Westminster, LondonFreedom of Action in an

Information Age

2 October 2012RUSI, Westminster, London

Space and National Security Conference

Chief of the Air Staff’s Air Power Conference 2012

Strategic Partnership for Air Power in the Future

1-2 November 2012Church House, Westminster, London

www.rusi.org/DIS

www.rusi.org/spaceconference

www.rusi.org/airpowerconference

Exploring how the UK and its allies can develop agile and cost-effective capabilities to assure freedom of action in an information age.

As the UK develops its national space security policy, this conference will analyse how governments, insurers and the space industry are developing practical strategies to help build resilience in this burgeoning sector.

From bilateral co-operation to multilateral engagement with formal and ad hoc alliances, this conference will examine how partnerships can be applied to the air environment in support of national interests.

RUSI_placed.indd 1 7/8/12 15:34:18

Kenn UnderwoodManaging Director

Transportable Ammunition Destruction System (TRADS)

The Transportable Ammunition Destruction System (TRADS) has now been installed in Camp Bastion in Afghanistan to destroy small-arms ammunition of sizes up to and including 14.5mm in an environmentally benign manner. Depending on the type of ammunition, TRADS incinerates up to 45,000 rounds (which equates to one ton of ammunition) per hour. It was designed and built by EOD Soultions in association with Caldo Engineering, with whom the company has a long and trusted relationship.

TRADS is unique in that it requires no infrastructure and is ideally suited to theatre deployment due to its ability to be running within three days and because, once completed, the system can be moved to the next location. TRADS is simple in operation and only requires one technical operator and two labourers to work the system. Other labour may be required to unpack ammunition for destruction.

EOD Solutions Ltd is now building a smaller system, TRADS 20, which will destroy smaller amounts of small-arms ammunition and will be more transportable, in a 20-foot ISO container.

www.eodsonline.com

Postal Address: 14 Victoria Road, Finedon, Wellingborough, Northants, NN9 5JDUK Tel: +44 (0)121 288 4279 Mob: +44 (0)7973 219033Registered office: Philpot House, Station Road, Rayleigh, Essex, SS6 7HH

Explosive and Ordnance Demilitarisation Solutions Ltd –a company registered in England and Wales, Registration No. 5662513VAT Registration No. 877 3275 82 D.U.N.S. No. 348676961

Complex Problems, Simple SolutionsEOD Solutions Ltd

EOD solutions.indd 1 30/7/12 09:29:36