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Role conflicts of family members in family firmsEsra Memili a , Erick P. C. Chang b , Franz W. Kellermanns c d & Dianne H. B. Welsh aa Marketing, Entrepreneurship, Hospitality and Management, Bryan School of Business andEconomics , University of North Carolina at Greensboro , Greensboro , NC , USAb Department of Management and Marketing , Arkansas State University , State University ,AR , USAc Department of Management , University of North Carolina–Charlotte , Charlotte , NC , USAd INTES Center for Family Enterprises, WHU (Otto Beisheim School of Management) ,Vallendar , GermanyPublished online: 25 Sep 2013.

To cite this article: Esra Memili , Erick P. C. Chang , Franz W. Kellermanns & Dianne H. B. Welsh , European Journal ofWork and Organizational Psychology (2013): Role conflicts of family members in family firms, European Journal of Work andOrganizational Psychology, DOI: 10.1080/1359432X.2013.839549

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Role conflicts of family members in family firms

Esra Memili1, Erick P. C. Chang2, Franz W. Kellermanns3,4, and Dianne H. B. Welsh1

1Marketing, Entrepreneurship, Hospitality and Management, Bryan School of Business and Economics, University ofNorth Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, USA2Department of Management and Marketing, Arkansas State University, State University, AR, USA3Department of Management, University of North Carolina–Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA4INTES Center for Family Enterprises, WHU (Otto Beisheim School of Management), Vallendar, Germany

The existence of role conflict among organizational members tends to create tensions inside organizations worldwide. However,in the context of family firms, having a dual role of being a member of a family and a member of the firm can representinteresting differences that make family firms an important form of organization to study. Following the tenets of thestewardship theory, our article develops a model where reciprocal altruism represents an antecedent to role conflict amongfamily members. We further argue that perceptions of collective efficacy among family members have a moderating effect onthe relationship between reciprocal altruism and role conflict. Last, we propose that role conflict in family firms reduces thefamily firm performance. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.

Keywords: Family firms; Role conflict; Reciprocal altruism; Collective efficacy.

Family-owned and/or -managed businesses dominate theeconomic landscape worldwide (Morck & Yeung, 2004).Yet, little is known about the particular challenge thatfamily firms encounter due to the distinctive nature ofrole conflict among family members who work in theorganization. Family members are faced with multipleroles and activities that emerge from acting as membersof the family and members of the family business (e.g.,Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997; Katz &Kahn, 1978), resulting in role conflict (for recent meta-analyses, see Schmidt, Roesler, Kusserow, & Rau, inpress; Tubre & Collins, 2000).

Role conflict is defined as “the degree of incongruityor incompatibility of expectations associated with therole” (Croci, Doukas, & Gonenc, 2011, p. 474). Roleconflict occurs when at least one role expectation isincompatible with at least one other (Beehr, Drexler, &Faulkner, 1997). Fulfilling the demands of one rolemight undermine the second role and the tension asso-ciated with one role can extend into the other one(Stoner, Hartman, & Arora, 1990). For family firms,managing role conflict among the working family mem-bers is critical because of the dual roles of being a familymember and a family business employee (e.g., Barton &

Gordon, 1988). In addition to highlighting the impor-tance of role conflict in family firms, we explore howreciprocal altruism affects role conflict among familymembers (e.g., Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007).Indeed, the nature of family members’ role conflictworking in the family business is expected to be differ-ent from role conflict among employees in nonfamilyfirms owing to the unique mix between the family, thebusiness, and idiosyncrasies such as reciprocal altruismthat are rooted in the family, but affect the family firmbehaviour as well.

In order to address the gap in the literature, wedevelop a theoretical framework that highlights the roleconflicts that emerge among family members workingfor the family firm.1 Our model draws on stewardshiptheory as this theory deals with the sociopsychologicalfactors that determine members’ intentions and beha-viours in the family business (Davis, Allen, & Hayes,2010; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).Moreover, the stewardship perspective is useful in thefamily firm context because family members place highvalue on the attainment of the goals of the family busi-ness (e.g., Davis et al., 1997, 2010). Our theoreticalframework is driven by two research questions: (1)

Correspondence should be addressed to Esra Memili, Marketing, Entrepreneurship, Hospitality and Management, Bryan School of Business andEconomics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402-6170, USA. E-mail: e_memili@uncg.edu

1Family members not working in the family firm are also exposed to role conflict. This group of family members, however, is beyond the scope ofour article.

European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 2013

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1359432X.2013.839549

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What factors mitigate/elevate role conflict in familyfirms? and (2) How does family business members’role conflict impact firm performance?

Our theoretical development implies that family andnonfamily firms differ in role conflicts due to the dualityof family members’ roles (Gersick et al., 1997), familyfirm-specific psychodynamic effects, such as marital dis-cord (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001), highlevels of dependence on human and social capital thatare family business employees with kinship ties andfamily’s social networks (e.g., Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, &Very, 2007), long-term orientation (e.g., Zellweger,2007), and, ultimately, transgenerational sustainability(Kotlar & De Massis, 2013; Zellweger, Kellermanns,Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). We suggest that reciprocalaltruism in family firms represents an integrativemechanism reducing role conflict in these types of busi-nesses. Particularly, this relationship is moderated byperceptions of collective efficacy (Bandura, 2000), suchas shared belief in the family’s capabilities to attainfamily business goals. Studies suggest that a strongsense of collective efficacy can facilitate a positive inter-personal climate, greater cooperation, and helping beha-viour among group members. These characteristics areconsistent with family members engaging in stewardshipbehaviour. Indeed, Chen and Bliese (2002) also suggestthat perceptions of collective efficacy can act as a bufferin mitigating negative effects of work stressors on groupmembers’ psychological well-being. Finally, our modelsuggests that if role conflict exists in family firms, thefirm performance will be negatively affected.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Stewardship theory and the family firm

Stewardship theory examines relationships in organiza-tions where members have a collectivist orientation andare aligned with the interests of the organization (Daviset al., 1997, 2010). It is built on a different set ofassumptions for predicting managers’ (referred to asstewards) motivations towards goal attainment(Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang, 2007) thatdeparts from agency theory, the dominant theoreticalperspective, which suggests conflicts between the

interests of the owner (principal) and the manager(agent) (for a review of agency theory, see Eisenhardt,1989). Indeed, it is the focus on the intrinsic motivationof the manager that tries to further the common good,which represents the key distinction between steward-ship and other theoretical perspectives (Davis et al.,1997).

Davis et al. (1997) argue that motivation, identifica-tion, and use of power are the key psychological ele-ments influencing the relationships among stewards.Intrinsic rewards, such as career growth, achievement,self-actualization, affiliation, etc., motivate family busi-ness members to put their individual objectives aside andwork towards attaining the goals of the family business(e.g., Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Family business mem-bers also identify themselves with their organization byaccepting the family firm mission and objectives andchoose to behave in congruence with their family firmidentity (Zellweger, Eddleston, & Kellermanns, 2010).Stewards, who do not have to be the owners of familyfirms (e.g., relatives of the owner employed by thefamily business), may develop a sense of psychologicalownership and behave as quasi-owners of the familyfirm. Furthermore, the use of personal power derivingfrom family business members’ personalistic and parti-cularistic tendencies, which can fully develop in familyfirms (Carney, 2005), can facilitate stewardship beha-viours in family firms.

In our article, we see stewardship behaviour,reflected by reciprocal altruism, as a key element toreduce the occurrence of role conflict in family firms.We present our theoretical model in Figure 1. First, wesuggest that reciprocal altruism is a family firm specificdeterminant of role conflict among family businessmembers. In the absence of a clear strategy and struc-ture that is furthered by reciprocal altruism, familymembers can deviate from a stewardship behaviourdue to lack of clear collective goals fostering self-cent-redness, individualistic goals, and behaviours. As such,the perceptions of employees affect the attitudinal andbehavioural outcomes in family firms (e.g., Barnett &Kellermanns, 2006). Our model also explores the mod-erating role of family members’ perceptions of collec-tive efficacy (e.g., Bandura, 2000) on the relationshipsbetween (1) reciprocal altruism and (2) family

Reciprocal Altruism among Family

Business Members

Family Business Members’

Role Conflict

Family FirmPerformance

Perceptions of Collective Efficacy among

Family Business Members

P1-

P2

P3-

Figure 1. Family members’ role conflict in family firms.

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members’ role conflict. Last, we propose a linkbetween levels of role conflict and performance.

Role conflict

Role conflict has been investigated in various academicdisciplines (Schmidt et al., in press). Because organiza-tions are “open systems of roles” where individuals playtheir parts with their interdependent behaviours in theformation of a social system (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p.172), the potential for organizational members to experi-ence role conflict is highly dependent on the expectationsabout the occurrence and/or compliance with two ormore roles (e.g., House & Rizzo, 1972; Katz & Kahn,1978). Particularly, role conflicts emerge when indivi-duals cannot fulfil the demands of one role withoutstepping over a second or third role (Stoner et al., 1990).

From the social exchange perspective (Shore &Barksdale, 1998; Wayne, Shore, & Liden, 1997), roleconflict represents a prevalent challenge in organizationsas it can create imbalance in the employee–employerrelationship. Researchers have focused on the individualoutcomes of role conflict such as intensified internalconflicts, anxiety, higher tension related to the job,lower job satisfaction and job involvement, less confi-dence in supervisors and in the organization, propensityto leave an organization, absenteeism, work–family con-flict, and lower commitment to the organization (e.g.,Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000; Tubre & Collins, 2000).Hence, role conflict is not only a micro-level personalmatter, but also an interpersonal issue leading to macro-level organizational consequences, such as low perfor-mance, depression, and higher turnover (e.g., Good,Sisler, & Gentry, 1998; Schmidt et al., in press) thatare costly to organizations.

Role conflict within the context of familyfirms

Unlike employees in nonfamily firms, family memberswho work in the family firm have the dual role of being afamily member and a family firm employee, complicat-ing the responsibilities of fulfilling both family and busi-ness expectations (Gersick et al., 1997). Due to theinterface between the family and the business (Arregleet al., 2007), the potential for generating role conflictswithin family members tends to have a direct influenceon the family business, as expectations and behaviourscannot be separated so easily.

Indeed, the individual’s social identity, such as beinga family member and a family employee, can impose aninconsistent and complex array of demands upon theperson (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). This is particularlychallenging for family members as roles become morecomplex when they require an individual to be simulta-neously involved in at least two subsystems (Katz &Kahn, 1978). Thereby, the expectations of family and

business subsystems are combined to become the role ofthe family business member who will have a hard time toset his/her own priorities. If role pressures from work orfrom the family are incompatible, fulfilling both roleexpectations becomes an impossible task (Stoner et al.,1990). For example, if the parent-manager promotes anunqualified child, he/she meets the demands of a familialrole by caring for the offspring; however, he/she is atconflict with the managerial role that requires an objec-tive evaluation and judgement and would prohibit thedisplay of nepotism in the business (e.g., Jaskiewicz,Uhlenbruck, Balkin, & Reay, 2013; Kidwell,Kellermanns, & Eddleston, 2012). In addition, suchactions may also generate a set of unintended conse-quences that can negatively affect other organizationalmembers (Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007; Wayneet al., 1997).

In sum, there is a higher potential for role conflict infamily firms than in nonfamily firms due to the dual rolesof family members of being a member of the family andworking for the business. In the next section, we focusour attention to the situations that can mitigate and/orelevate role conflict in family firms and the familyfirms’ performance implications. For our theoreticaldevelopment, we rely on stewardship theory for threereasons: (1) sociopsychological factors play an importantrole in shaping the managers’ dedication (Davis et al.,1997, 2010), (2) family business members are morededicated to achieving firm goals than achieving perso-nal goals (Chrisman et al., 2007), and (3) the perspectiveprovides specific elements for family firms to managethe family members’ relationships (Eddleston &Kellermanns, 2007).

Reciprocal altruism

Altruism is “a moral value that motivates individuals toundertake actions that benefit others without any expec-tation of external award” (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino,2002, p. 252). The literature on altruism is rooted in avariety of fields and multiple subdimensions have beendeveloped (for a comprehensive typology of altruism infamily firms, see Lubatkin, Durand, & Ling, 2007). Forthe purpose of the article, we focus on reciprocal altru-ism, which is defined as the exchange of goods andservices that are costly acts between individuals suchthat one individual benefits from an act of the other,and then the other individual benefits in return(Brosnan & de Waal, 2002). Although the notion ofreciprocal altruism has been expanded to family-orientedand paternalistic forms (see Lubatkin et al., 2007), thedominant conceptualization of reciprocal altruismassumes that family members work towards the greatergood of the organization (Eddleston & Kellermanns,2007).

Indeed, reciprocal altruism can be regarded from asocial exchange perspective in which both parties reap

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the rewards of their mutually beneficial exchange rela-tionship. For example, there is a sense of trustworthinessgenerated from parents’ belief that their offspring willnot betray them (Weibel, 2007). Accordingly, reciprocalaltruism is often associated (although not synonymous)with stewardship behaviours, as governance inefficien-cies are more prone to develop in case of asymmetricalaltruism, where one party acts opportunistically(Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Schulze et al., 2001).

Furthermore, reciprocal altruism can be facilitated bya successful transfer of norms and values by the parentsto the offspring, which can lead to a strengthening offamily ties and promotes reciprocity among family mem-bers (Lubatkin et al., 2007). When family business mem-bers behave in a reciprocal altruistic way (Chua,Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009), their interests tend to bealigned with the interests of the family firm (Corbetta &Salvato, 2004). Those family business members tend tohold business objectives above their personal objectives(Zahra, 2003). When there is a sense of trust in theexchanges among the family members, this can reducethe need for engaging in controls and formalization thattend to occur in nonfamily firms (e.g., Mellewigt et al.,2007; Weibel, 2007). In that regard, following the stew-ardship perspective, reciprocal altruism facilitates bond-ing through trust, communication, respect, and love(Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005) and thus fosterscollectivistic behaviours in family firms (Corbetta &Salvato, 2004), which can turn short-term goals intolong-term outcomes (Eddleston, Kellermanns, &Sarathy, 2008). However, not all family relations cangenerate positive outcomes as problems of adverse selec-tion, moral hazard, or nepotism providing a wide rangeof scenarios for generating role conflicts among familymembers (e.g., Jaskiewicz et al., 2013; Kidwell et al.,2012).

Thus, with family firms that are characterized bystewardship tendencies, reciprocal altruism enhances col-lectivity in family firms (Karra, Tracey, & Phillips, 2006)by “increasing communication and cooperation, andthereby reducing information asymmetries” (Schulzeet al., 2002, p. 253). Pro-organizational individualsplace objectives of the collective higher than their perso-nal goals, value long-term relationships and harmony,and avoid conflict and confrontations via direct commu-nication (Davis et al., 1997). When communicationchannels are open and information asymmetries are low-ered (Davis et al., 1997), individual roles are expected tobe clearer for family business members and unrealisticrole expectations can be prevented or reconciled withopen communication. Therefore, reciprocal altruism canreduce role conflict among family members.Consequently,

Proposition 1: Reciprocal altruism is negativelyassociated with role conflict among family mem-bers working at family firms.

Collective efficacy as a moderator

Collective efficacy is a group’s shared belief in its groupcapabilities to organize and execute actions necessary forattainment (Bandura, 1997). Self-efficacy affects indivi-duals’ choice of settings, activities, skill acquisition,effort levels, taking the initiative, and persistence incoping with challenges and stressful situations (e.g.,Bandura, 1982). At the individual level, self-efficacy is“believing in one’s capability to perform a task”, influen-cing one’s levels of “task effort, persistence toward chal-lenges, expressed interest, and the degree of preferredgoal difficulty” (Gist, 1987, p. 472). In that regard,individuals with high levels of self-efficacy define theirroles differently because of their different beliefs aboutpersonal competencies and proactively define situationsthemselves even though their roles in organizationsmight be prescribed (Jones, 1986). At the group level,Bandura (2000) considers two particular methods ofmeasuring collective self-efficacy: Either each individualwill add his/her personal capability to the entire group orthe entire group is assessed as a whole. Studies generallytreat collective efficacy as the aggregate of individualefficacy (e.g., Jex & Bliese, 1999). Accordingly, empiri-cal results highlight the importance of collective efficacyin predicting motivation and performance and moderat-ing the impact of work-related stressors on strains (Jex &Bliese, 1999).

In family firms, collective efficacy is a critical ele-ment of “intrinsic motivation” within the stewardshiptheory (Davis et al., 1997). Perceptions of collectiveefficacy may be particularly important in family firms,as it is a source of encouragement and support (Chang,Memili, Chrisman, Kellermanns, & Chua, 2009;Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). Indeed, the family’sfinancial and emotional support can elevate persistenceand helps the family business members overcome obsta-cles. Higher levels of perceptions of collective efficacyamong family members are expected to strengthen themitigating effects of reciprocal altruism on role conflictthrough family members’ proactively extending effortsand activities beyond their self-interests towards theachievement of the family business goals. A strongsense of collective efficacy can facilitate greater attentionand effort to the demands of the situation. Family mem-bers’ perceptions of collective efficacy will strengthenthe relationship between reciprocal altruism and roleconflict through managing and suppressing (e.g., Taylor& Bryant, 2007) their negative thoughts and emotionsrelated with their personal role conflict for the sake of thecommon good.

Conversely, perceptions of low collective efficacy canelevate stress levels and impair performance by divertingattention from how to best proceed to concerns overfailings and mishaps and ceasing effort (Jex & Bliese,1999). Indeed, family members with low perceptions ofcollective efficacy will not benefit from reciprocally

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altruistic family firm environments that have the ten-dency to reduce role ambiguities and conflict(Eddleston et al., 2008). Their behaviour will likely bemore passive during challenging situations and diminishthe ability to benefit from reciprocal altruism.

Accordingly, we argue that perceptions of collectiveefficacy can strengthen the negative relationship betweenreciprocal altruism and role conflict as it facilitates afocus on overall goals and reduces the perceived con-flicting demands on the individual. Therefore, the inter-action effects of role conflict and perceptions ofcollective efficacy will be stronger in diminishing roleconflict than the independent effects of reciprocal altru-ism on role conflict. Formally stated:

Proposition 2: The negative relationship betweenreciprocal altruism and role conflict in family firmswill be moderated by the perceptions of collectiveefficacy of family members working at familyfirms. Specifically, higher levels of perceptions ofcollective efficacy will strengthen the negativerelationship between reciprocal altruism and roleconflict.

Role conflict and family firm performance

Last, we need to address the performance implications ofrole conflict in family businesses. In a recent study,Kotlar and DeMassis (2013) observed that family mem-bers may have divergences in setting goals, especially incases when intrafamily succession is imminent, that maylater generate social interaction processes where familymembers need to bargain towards collective agreementsto avoid potential conflicts. Nonfamily firm-based stu-dies (e.g., Matthews, Bulger, & Barnes-Farrell, 2010;Peterson et al., 1995) have associated role conflict withimportant organizational outcomes, such as low perfor-mance, through elevating negative feelings such as frus-tration, irritation, resentment, and worry. Hence, roleconflict can interfere with work by diverging effortfrom work to coping with role conflict. This problemmay be particularly acute in small- to medium-sizedfamily firms where firm performance primarily dependson the contributions of family members. If family mem-bers involved in the business cannot resolve or cope withtheir role conflict, they may not be able to focus on theattainment of family firm goals and are likely to under-perform. Furthermore, the performance of the familyfirm will suffer because of the tradeoffs betweenfamily-centred and business-centred goals (e.g.,Chrisman, Memili, & Misra, 2014; Kotlar & DeMassis, 2013) which will make family members setpriorities and make compromises if divergences becomeunsolved. This can consequently harm family firm per-formance, particularly when the family business relies ona relatively small labour pool primarily composed offamily members. Hence, we expect that:

Proposition 3: Role conflict among family mem-bers working at the family firm is negatively asso-ciated with family firm performance.

DISCUSSION

A study conducted in 21 countries shows that role con-flict experiences in work environments are widespreadworldwide (Peterson et al., 1995). In spite of these find-ings, role conflict in family firms, which are the mostpredominant organizational form worldwide, remains anunderresearched area that requires attention. Researchersneed to understand the importance that role conflict hason family business members and the implications it hasfor the family firm.

We offer several contributions to the study of roleconflict in family firms. First, family business members’role conflict differs from that of employees in nonfamilyfirms due to duality of roles, heavy influence of familyfirm-specific sociopsychological factors, and high levelsof reliance on family members’ human and social capitalto achieve a competitive advantage and ensure the long-term survival of the firm. This is not to say that non-family firm members cannot experience role conflict(e.g., Floyd & Lane, 2000). However, role conflictamong family members has added levels of complexity.Second, we argue that reciprocal altruism mitigates roleconflict and that role conflict is negatively related toperformance in family firms. Third, we explain howfamily members’ perceptions of collective efficacy mod-erate the relationship between reciprocal altruism androle conflict. Finally, our article is one of the firstattempts in the family firm literature to explore familybusiness members’ role conflict.

However, it is important to note that although roleconflict in family firms is likely to occur more often andis more complex, it does not automatically suggest thatthe overall performance of family firms is going to beinferior to nonfamily firms. Indeed, family firm-specificinfluences, often referred to as familiness (e.g.,Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003; Zellwegeret al., 2010), can have both positive and negative effectson performance. Accordingly, family firm researchersneed to have a better understanding of the nature offamily influence as a dual edge sword to arrive at abetter understanding of family firm performance andthe potential performance differences between familyand nonfamily firms.

Limitations and future research

We also need to mention a few limitations of our articlethat can be addressed in future research. The proposedrelationships should particularly apply to smaller familyfirms with a larger degree of family involvement.

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However, family firms often also employ nonfamilyemployees who have their own complex roles and per-ceptions due to functioning in “a complex environmentin family firms” (Sharma, 2004, p. 23). In many cases,nonfamily employees may form a larger portion of totalemployees than family members. Therefore, role conflictstudies focusing on nonfamily employees in family firmswould be complementing this article’s contributions tothe literature.

It is also important to highlight that family firms areheterogeneous based on strategic orientations (Chrisman,Chua, & Steier, 2005), family business life-cycles(Gersick et al., 1997), noneconomic goals (Chrismanet al., 2014), internal factors such as size, generation incharge, and industry conditions. In addition, the socialprocesses among family members may vary and beaffected by several factors such as personality traits(e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991), perceptions of trust, con-trols, and behaviours (e.g., Mellewigt et al., 2007;Weibel, 2007), and social interactions (Kotlar & DeMassis, 2013). These idiosyncrasies of family firms,their members, and their teamwork might affect thedevelopment and consequences of role conflict amongfamily members. Our model specifically focused onfamily firm performance as the outcome variable.However, there may be additional outcome variables toconsider (for an overview, see Yu, Lumpkin, Brigham, &Sorenson, 2012), which would also likely be negativelyaffected by role conflict experienced by family businessmembers. For example, future research could investigatethe interplay of personality and cohesion (for a nonfam-ily firm example, see Van Vianen & De Dreu, 2001)paired with the interplay of family firm-specific influ-ences on family members’ role conflict on both eco-nomic and noneconomic performance, e.g., anxiety anddepression (for a recent meta-analysis, see Schmidt et al.,in press). Furthermore, cross-level effects on the pro-posed relationships (e.g., company structure, industry,or cultural effects) as well as related constructs to roleconflict, like role overload (e.g., Tordera, González-Romá, & Peiró, 2008) could be investigated.

Our model focused on family members working inthe family business. As we acknowledged early in thearticle, family members not working in the business mayalso experience role conflict (e.g., demands of the familybusiness they are not employed in and their regularcareer demands). Research has looked at role saliencein family firms (Barnett, Eddleston, & Kellermanns,2009), but strains and their effects on family membersnot working in the firm due to role conflict or othercauses are underresearched areas. In addition, howthese strains affect other family members who work forthe family firm also needs to be investigated.

Our model can also provide avenues for futureempirical testing. On one side, prior research has estab-lished scales for reciprocal altruism and firm perfor-mance to use in the context of the family firm

(Eddleston et al., 2008). In addition, researchers canadapt established scales for role conflict (Rizzo, House,& Lirtzman, 1970) and collective efficacy (Chen &Bliese, 2002). Also, a recent overview of scales utilizedin family firm research by Pearson and Carr (2014) mayserve as a valuable resource for future research.

Even though we limited our attention on reciprocalaltruism, it is important to consider alternative scenariosfor mitigating and/or elevating role conflict given theother types of altruism, particularly parental altruism(Lubatkin et al., 2007). While we focused on all familymembers, the specific effects of the different types ofparental altruism paired with the respective reciprocal orasymmetrical response from the offspring on role con-flict are worthy of further investigation. Future researchmay want to test this assumption and show if altruismamong family members can be influenced. Indeed, thisand other studies have suggested that reciprocal altruismamong family members is highly beneficial in familyfirms, and accordingly factors that could create thisdesirable form of altruism over time should be identified.

Moreover, based on stewardship theory, this articlegenerally views the family firm members as stewards(Davis et al., 1997, 2010) whose interests are alignedwith the interests of the family firm and family businessobjectives are held above personal objectives (Corbetta& Salvato, 2004). However, as Karra et al. (2006) pointout, stewardship behaviours in some family firms maygive way to agency behaviours over time. As the familybusiness becomes successful and well-established, com-placency might set in and some family members maystart free riding and shirking (Kidwell et al., 2012).Accordingly, family members’ role conflict may increaseand become sustained in a family firm environmentdominated by agency behaviours. Longitudinal studiesor a qualitative approach that can capture these types ofdifferent developments at various stages of the familyfirm life cycles will be highly desirable.

In addition, the relationship between role conflict andother types of conflict (for an overview, see McKee,Madden, Kellermanns, & Eddleston, 2014) deservesfurther investigation. One may expect that role conflictmay have differential impacts on relational, task, andprocess conflict. Hence, future research should investi-gate if role conflict can trigger the occurrence of theseconflicts. At the same time, these types of conflict mayalso serve as a trigger of role conflict. For example,existing relationship conflict may further highlight theduality of the family and family business roles that eachfamily member has to live up to. Thus, longitudinalstudies that investigate the interplay between conflictand role conflict are highly desirable.

Future research can also explore how role conflictamong family members might affect social identificationin family firms. Although social identity theory hasapplied the notion of role conflict in nonfamily firms,family business studies still lack this integration (for

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exceptions, see Zellweger et al., 2010). Hence, we do notknow whether role conflict affects social identificationdifferently in family firms compared to nonfamily firms.

We have proposed a parsimonious model to highlightthe complexities of role conflict in family firms.However, future research may want to expand on thefamily firm-specific antecedents of role conflict thatmight reduce the likelihood for role conflict to occur infamily firms. For example, family adaptability andfamily cohesion could be an interesting antecedent ofrole conflict in family firms. Furthermore, the complexityof the family, e.g., number of family members and gen-erations, as well as the ownership structure could beuseful extensions.

Last, family business members’ role conflict mightvary in different cultural settings. Future research canexplore how family business members’ role conflict isaffected by dimensions of culture that are power dis-tance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinityversus femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-termversus short-term orientation (Hofstede, 2001). Forexample, one can expect higher levels of family businessmembers’ role conflict in large power distance societiesbecause of greater inequalities in family and work envir-onments (Hofstede, 1994).

Implications for practice

Aside from the theoretical contributions and futureresearch directions, we provide the following practicalimplications for managing role conflict in familyfirms.

First, family firms represent arenas for understandinghow organizations can minimize role conflict thatemerges among organizational members. Particularly,when families are strong and cohesive towards attaininggoals and setting strategic directions for the future, itsmembers can understand their organizational position aswell as their expectations to perform and behave. This isimportant, because failing to reduce role conflicts canimply work dissatisfaction, and potentially accelerateturnover intentions and negative performance conse-quences. Engaging in stewardship behaviour can enableorganizational members to become more focused onvaluing their activities and reduce their conflicts becauseof kinship ties and altruism.

Although the distinctiveness of being a family busi-ness member can generate additional layers of complex-ity when analysing role conflict, role conflict should bemanageable if the business generates participationamong its members. This will facilitate the family mem-bers’ ability to manage the expectations that emergefrom their multiple roles. Particularly, as the familypursues the vision of retaining the business under familycontrol, it can be expected that shared values and group

cohesiveness generated from reciprocal altruism canenable the reduction of role conflicts among familymembers.

In conclusion, theory and practice can benefit fromour conceptual framework with a better understanding offamily members’ role conflict in family firms. Becauseof the complexity of being a family member, understand-ing of the nature, consequences, and determinants offamily members’ role conflict is critical in retentionand career development of family business memberswho play a key role in transgenerational survival andsuccess in family firms.

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