RISK ASSESSMENT - environmentclearance.nic.inenvironmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/RiskAssessment/... · 1.2.2 Mr. Subhash Bonde of M/s. Bonde Technical Services, Thane

RISK ASSESSMENT

(QRA)

At

DEEPAK NITRITE LIMITED

(APL DIVISION) PLOT NO. 1 TO 7 & 26 TO 31, MIDC DHATAV,

DIST.:- RAIGAD, MAHARASHTRA, INDIA.

JANUARY 2017

2

CONTENTS SECTION DESCRIPTION PAGE NO.

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. 03

2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION. 23

2.1 Site Overview. 23

2.2 Process Description. 23

2.3 List Of Materials. 23

2.3.1 Finished Products. 23

2.3.2 Raw Materials. 23

2.4 Inventory Analysis. 23

2.5 Classification Of Hazardous Chemicals. 23

2.6 MSDS. (Highlights). 24

2.7 Mond Index Assessment. 27

2.8 Dow F & E Index. 54

2.9 Preliminary Hazard Analysis. 64

2.10 HAZOP Study. (Report enclosed separately). 64

3. FAILURE FREQUENCY ANALYSIS. 65

3.1 Failure Frequency. 65

3.2 Event Tree Analysis. 66

4. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS. 67

4.1 Introduction. 67

4.2 Accidental release of BTF. 68

4.3 Accidental release of Cumene 69

4.4 Accidental release of Furnace oil 70

4.5 Accidental release of HSD 72

4.6 Accidental release of Hydrogen Bromide 74

4.7 Accidental release of Hydrogen 75

4.8 Accidental release of MEK 77

4.9 Accidental release of Nitric acid

4.10 Accidental release of Nitrogen oxide

4.11 Accidental release of Toluene.

5. IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PROBIT). 78

5.1 Thermal Radiation Impact. 78

5.2 Over Pressure Impact. 79

5.3 Toxicity Impact. 80

6. RISK ESTIMATION. 81

6.1 Individual Risk Isopleths. 81

6.2 Societal Risk (F – N Curve). 82

7 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES. 82

LIST OF ANNEXURE SECTION DESCRIPTION PAGE NO.

1. GLOSSARY. 83

2. ABBRIVATIONS. 86

3. REFERENCES. 87

3

SECTION 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.1.1 M/s. Deepak Nitrite Ltd., is existing manufacturing facility located at Plot No.

1 to 7 & 26 to 31, MIDC Dhatav, Roha, District: Raigad, Maharashtra.

1.1.2 There is proposal for rationalizing the product mix is as follows;

TABLE NO. 1.1: LIST OF PRODUCTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

CLEARANCE

SN NAME OF THE PRODUCT

Product Capacity MT/M

Existing Addition/

Deletion Final

1.1 Para Cumidine(PC)

OR

200 200

1.2 2 Ethyl Hexy Nitrite

OR

200 -200

1.3 3 Amino BenzotriFlouride (3ABTF) - +200 200

2.1 Ortho Anisidine(OA)

OR

75 -25 50

2.2 Tri Methyl Hydro Quinine(TMHQ 75 -25 50

3.1 2,4 Xylidine and 2,6 Xylidine

OR

250 250

3.2 Nitrobenzene

OR

250 -250

3.3 2,3 Xylidine and 3,4 Xylidine

OR

250 250

3.4 2,5 Xylidine and 2,3 xylenol , 2,4 and

2,5 Xylenol

+250 250

4.1 Meta Cholro Aniline

OR

50 -50

4.2 Diphenyl Amine Derivatives 50 50

5.1 Crystal Diethyl Meta Amino Phenol(

DEMAP) OR

55 -15 40

5.2 Dibutyl Para Phenylene Di amine (DBPPDA

) OR

50 -10 40

5.3 3 NAP (3 Nitro AcetoPhenone)/

OR

+40 40

5.4 3AAP(3Amino AcetoPhenone)

OR

+40 40

4

5.5 3 HAP (3 HydroxyAcetoPhenone) +40 40

6.1 TFMAP(3-(trifloromethyl)acetophenon 55 +25 80

6.2 MePPDA Sulphate (2 Methyl P-

phenyleneDiamine Sulphate) OR

50 +10 60

6.3 1,3 CHD(1,3 Cyclohexane dione)

OR

22 +38 60

6.4 4-NAX (Benenamine,N-(1-ethyloropy)-3-

4-dimethyl)

10 -10 10

7.1 Pilot Plant Products 1,3 CHD(1,3

Cyclohexane dione) OR

5 -5

7.2 SMIA(synMethoximino(2 furanyl)acetic acid 5 -5

8.1 Pilot Plant Products ( synthetic Organic

Chemicals)

+10 10

TOTAL 822 -82 740

BYPRODUCTS

Sr.

no.

Name of the

by Product

By Product

from the

product

byproduct Capacity

MT/M

Existing

Addition

/deletion

Final

1 Ortho Nitro Cumene p- cumidiene 150 150

2 PPO (Poly phenylene

Oxide)

tri methyl

hydro quinine

201 -66 135

3 2 NBTF(2 Nitro BTF)

or

3 Amino BTF +41 41

4 2 ABTF(2 Amino BTF)

or

3 Amino BTF +41 41

5 4 ABTF (4 Amino BTF) 3 Amino BTF +41 41

6 Ortho Toluidine(OT) 2 MePPDA

Sulfate

20 +5 25

7 OHBTF

or

TFMAP +20 20

8 OA BTF TFMAP +20 20

Total 371 371

1.2 THE ASSIGNMENT

1.2.1 In compliance to the TOR for synthetic organic chemicals, this QRA report is

prepared.

1.2.2 Mr. Subhash Bonde of M/s. Bonde Technical Services, Thane is “EIA

Functional Expert – Risk Assessment and Hazard Management (RH)”

5

undertook this study in compliance with requirements of EIA report

preparation which is prepared by M/s. Goldfinch Engineering Systems Private

Limited, Thane.

1.3 SCOPE OF WORK

The scope of the report covers the proposed site activities of manufacturing. The

battery limits of this study are restricted to the installations indicated over the

proposed site plan.

1.4 METHODOLOGY

Methodology followed in preparation of this report is as per Technical EIA Guidance

Manual for Synthetic Organic Chemicals, prepared for the Ministry of Environment

and Forests Government of India.

The major steps are as outlined below;

Hazard Identification.

Failure Frequency Analysis.

Consequence Analysis.

Impact Assessment.

Protective System & Hazard Analysis.

Risk Mitigation Measures.

DMP.

FIGURE NO. 1.1: RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY.

6

1.5 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

PRODUCT WISE RAW MATERIALS

S.n. RM NAME ↓ \ product no. → 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

1 2,3 xylidine √

2 2,5 xylidine √

3 3 AAP ( 3- amino acetophonone ) √ √

4 3 NAP √

S.n. RM NAME ↓ \ product no. → 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

5 3 –nitro BTF ( 3- Nitro Benzotrifluoride )

√

6 Acetaldoxime √

7 Acetic acid √ √

8 Acetophonone √

9 Acretanilide √

10 Ammonia Soln √

11 Anisole √

12 BTF √

13 Butanol √

14 catalyst √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

15 Charcoal √ √

16 MEK √

17 PNA √

18 Copper sulphate √

19 Cumene √

20 Cuprous chloride √

21 Di methyl sulfate (DMS) √

22 DOST √

23 Ethyl acetate √

24 Sodium di thionite √ √ √

7

25 Hydrochloric acid √ √

26 Hydrogen √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

27 Hydrogen bromide √

28 Hydrogen peroxide 50% √

29 2,4 xylidine √

30 Hyposupercell √ √

31 Iodine √

32 Iron powder √

33 M cresol √

34 Methanol √ √ √ √ √

35 MIBK √ √

36 M-Xylene √

37 Nitric acid 72% √ √ √ √ √

38 Nitric acid 98% √ √

39 Ortho Xylene √

40 P xylene √

41 PNC √

42 Potassium hydroxide √

43 Resorcinol √

44 Soda Soln √ √ √ √ √ √ √

45 Sodium bicarbonate √ √

46 Sodium bromide 36% √

47 Sodium hydro sulfate √

48 Sodium hydroxide /Caustic soda √ √ √

49 Sodium nitrite √ √ √ √ √

50 Sulfamic acid √

51 Sulfuric acid 98% √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

52 TMP 80% √

53 Toluene √ √ √ √

54 Water √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

Where product no.s are as pre following table . Sr.no. product no. Sr.no. product no.

1 3 AAP ( 3- amino acetophonone ) 10 P cumidine

2 3 HAP 3- hydroxyl acetophonone ) 11 2,4 Xylenol

3

3 NAP ( 3- nitro acetophonone )

12 2 MePPDA sulfate ( 2 methyl p- phylene di amine

sulphate

4 3 –ABTF ( 3- Amino BENZOTRIFLUORIDE ) 13 MMDPA ( 4 methyl di phenyl Amine

5 Cyclohexadione ( 1,3 CHD ) 14 Ortho anisidine

6 2,3 Xylenol 15 2,3 xylididene and 3,4 xylidene

7 2,4 xylidine & 2,6 xylidine 16 3‟ ( trifluoromethyl ) –acetophenone 9 TFMAP)

8 2,5 Xylenol 17 TMHQ

9 2,5 xylidine 18 DBPPDA (Di-Dibutyl para phenylene Diamine)

1.5.4 INVENTORY

No. Material location Existing Addition

proposed

Final Mode of

storage

1 MEK ‟A‟ Class Tank farm 24 24 Storage tank

2 Methanol* ‟A‟ Class Tank farm 10 10 Storage tank

3 Toluene* ‟A‟ Class Tank farm 10 10 Storage tank

4 BTF ‟B‟ Class Tank farm 100 100 Storage tank

5 Cumene* ‟B‟ Class Tank farm 60 60 Storage tank

6 M-Xylene* ‟B‟ Class Tank farm 100 100 Storage tank

7 Ortho Xylene* ‟B‟ Class Tank farm 90 90 Storage tank

8 PNC Column Tank farm 25 25 Storage tank

9 Nitric acid *72% Cont. Nitration Tank 50 50 Storage tank

8

farm

10 Nitric acid* 98%

Cont. Nitration Tank

farm

40 40 Storage tank

11 Acetaldoxime

DEMAP plant Tank

Farm 16

29 45 Storage tank

12 Sulfuric acid *98% DEMAP Tank farm 50 50 Storage tank

13

3-nitro BTF (3-

NitroBenzotrifluoride ) HP Tank farm

50

50

Storage tank

14 Hydrogen * Hydrogenation plant

1500

Nm3

1500

Nm3

Cylinder

Trolley

15 Di methyl sulfate (DMS)

MMDPA plant Tank

farm

35 35 Storage tank

16

Sodium hydroxide* /Caustic

soda

MMDPA plant Tank

farm

16 16 Storage tank

17 Hydrochloric acid*

ONA plant Tank

farm

16 16 Storage tank

18 2,3 xylidine * Ware house 5 5 Drum

19 2,5 xylidine * Ware house 5 5 Drum

20

3 AAP ( 3- amino acetophonone

)

Ware house

10 10 Bags

21 3 NAP Ware house 10 10 Bags

22 Acetic acid * Ware house 1 1 Drums

23 Acetophonone (50%) Ware house 1 1 Bags

24 Acretanilide Ware house

10

10 Bags

25 Ammonia Soln. Ware house 5 5 Drum

26 Butanol Ware house 4 4 Drum

27 catalyst Ware house 0.01 0.01 Drum

28 Charcoal Ware house 0.01 0.01 Drum

29 PNA Ware house 10 10 Bags

30 Copper sulphate* Ware house 1 1 Bags

31 Cuprous chloride * Ware house 1 1 Bags

32 DOST ( Catalyst ) Ware house 0.01 0.01 Drum

INVENTORY

Sr. No.

Material Existing Addition

Final Mode of storage

33 Ethyl acetate * Ware house 1 1 Drum

34 Hydrogen bromide* (36%) Ware house 9 9 Drums

35 Sodium dithionite Ware house 0.025 0.025 Bags

36 Hyposupercell Ware house 0.025 0.025 Bags

37 Iodine * Ware house 0.1 0.1 Bags

38 Iron powder Ware house 0.05 0.05 Bags

39 M cresol Ware house 16 16 Drums

40 MIBK * Ware house 0.24 0.24 Drums

41 P xylene * Ware house 5 5 Drums

42 Potassium hydroxide* Ware house 5 5 Bags

43 Resorcinol Ware house 5 5 Bags

44 Soda Ash Ware house 16 16 Bags

45 Sodium bicarbonate Ware house 1 1 Bags

46 Sodium bromide Ware house 2 2 Bags

47 Sodium hydro sulfate Ware house 1 1 Bags

48 Sodium nitrite Ware house 10 10 Bags

49 Sulfamic acid Ware house 0.1 0.1 Bags

9

50 TMP 80% Ware house 5 5 Bags

1.5.5. SAFETY PROPERTIES part I

Sr.

No.

NAME CAS LEL UEL F.P B.P.

NFPA

HAZARD

INDEX

N h Nf Nr MF

1 Acetic acid 64-19-7 5.4 16 39 118 2 2 0 10

2 Ammonium hydroxide 1336-21-6 - - 3 1 0 4

3

Acetaldoxime tech. solid 107-29-9

<22 115

dec.

2 3 0 16

4 BTF 98-08-8 12 101 3 3 1 16

5

Coal *

355

0

1 1 0

4

6 Cumene 0.9 6.5 36 152 2 3 1 16

7

Diesel 68476-34-

6

0.6 7.5 32 -

62

>150 0 2 0 10

8 DMS 4 2 0 10

9 Ethyl acetate 141-78-6 1 3 0 16

10

Furnace oil HC Mixture 0.7 5 >65 175-

325

1 2 0 10

11 Hydrochloric acid 7647-01-0 - 53 3 0 1 14

12 Hydrogen 1333-74-0 4 76 Gas - 0 4 0 21

13

Hydrogen bromide 10035-10-

6

- - - - 3 0 0 1

14 Hydrogen chloride 7647-01-0 -85 3 0 1 14

15 Hydrogen peroxide 50% 7722-84-1 - 141 2 0 3 29

16 Iodine 7553-56-2 - - - 184 - - - -

17 Methanol 67-56-1 6 36 11 64.7 1 3 0 16

18 MIBK 108-10-1 1.4 7.5 14 117-118 2 3 0 16

19 Nitric acid 98% 7697-37-2 - 121 4 0 1 14

20 Ortho Xylene 95-47-6 1 7 32 144 2 3 0 16

Sr.

No.

NAME CAS LEL UEL F.P B.P.

NFPA

HAZARD

INDEX

N h Nf Nr MF

21 Potassium hydroxide 1310-58-3 - - - - 3 0 1 14

22 Sodium hydroxide 1310-73-2 - - - - 3 0 1 14

23 Sodium Sulphide 1313-82-2 3 1 1 14

24 Sulfuric acid 98% 7664-93-9 - - - 340 3 0 2 24

25 Toluene 108-88-3 1.2 7 12.7 110.4 2 3 0 16

10

26 m Xylene 108-38-3 1.1 7 27 139 2 3 0 16

27

Xylidine (mix isomer ) 1300-73-8 1.5 - 96 213-

226

28

Xylinol (mix isomer ) 1300-71-6 145 - 61-95 203-

225

* Explode able conc. 0.140 g/l ;CAS 3,4Xylinol ( 95-65-8) , 2,5 Xylinol ( 95-87-4) , 2,4 Xylinol ( 105-67-9), 2,3 Xylinol (526-75-0) 2,6Xylinol ( 576-26-1)

1.5.5. SAFETY PROPERTIES part II

Sr.

No. NAME CAS

tlv stel idlh

toxicity

oral

lD50

dermal

lD50

inhalation

LC50

Ppm ppm ppm mg/kg. ml/kg. mg/m3

1 Acetic acid 64-19-7 10 15 3310 1.06gm 5620

2

Ammonium

hydroxide

1336-21-6

0.35 250ug -

3

Acetaldoxime

tech.(s)

107-29-9

4 BTF 98-08-8

5 Coal 0.1mg/m3

6 Cumene

7 Diesel 68476-34-6 5 10-15 - 7.5 - -

8 DMS

9 Ethyl acetate 141-78-6

10 Furnace oil HC Mix 200 >500

11 Hydrochloric acid 7647-01-0 5 50 3124 900

12 Hydrogen 1333-74-0 asphyxiant SA - SA

13 Hydrogen bromide 10035-10-6 3 PEL 10 2858

14 Hydrogen chloride 7647-01-0 5 5 2810

15

Hydrogen peroxide

50%

7722-84-1

16 Iodine 7553-56-2 0.1

17 Methanol 67-56-1 250

18 MIBK 108-10-1 100 300

19 Nitric acid 98% 7697-37-2 2 0.430 244

20 Ortho Xylene 95-47-6 150

21 Potassium hydroxide 1310-58-3 2mg/m3

22 Sodium hydroxide 1310-73-2 2mg/m3

23 Sodium Sulphide 1313-82-2

24 Sulfuric acid 98% 7664-93-9 1mg/m3 3mg/m3 100-330mg/m3

25 Toluene 108-88-3 50 150

26 m Xylene 108-38-3 100 150

27

Xylidine(mix isomer

)

1300-73-8 0.5

28 Xylinol (mix isomer ) 1300-71-6 -

1.5.6 HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

Chemicals stored or handled at site are Hazardous chemicals which

satisfies; any of the following criteria.

11

1. Criteria laid down in part I or is listed in Column 2 of Part II Schedule I

appended to “Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals

Rules, 1989” and

2. Criteria laid down in part I or is listed in Column 2 of Part II Schedule I

appended to “The Maharashtra Factories (Control of Industrial Major

Accident Hazards) Rules, 2003” or

3. Listed in Column 2 of Schedule 2 appended to these rules or

4. Listed in Column 2 of “The Second Schedule appended to the Factories

Act, 1948”.

5. “The Hazardous Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989”

Amended 2000 and 2003.

1.5.7 MSDS

MSDS of BTF, Hydrogen and Toluene are enclosed in Section No. 2

and MSDS for others are maintained at site.

1.5.8 CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

TABLE NO. 1.3: HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS CLASSIFICATION

Sr.

No.

Location Material Max.

Storage

capacity

Group Thres

hold Qty.

Mt. for

MAH

(Sch. 2)*

1 Hydrogen

shed

Hydrogen <1 T 3 Highly reactive chemicals 2

2 A class Methanol 10 Kl 5.3 Very Highly Flammable

Liquids.

1500 T.

Tank Toluene 10 Kl 5.3 Very Highly Flammable

Liquids.

farm MEK 24 Kl 5.3 Very Highly Flammable

Liquids.

BTF 100 T 5.3 Very Highly Flammable

Liquids.

3 B class M-Xylene 100 T 5.5 Highly Flammable Liquids. 2500 T

Tank O-Xylene 100 T 5.5 Highly Flammable Liquids.

farm Cumene 150 T 5.5 Highly Flammable Liquids.

4 FO Tank

farm

Furnace

oil

50 Kl 5.6 Flammable Liquids. 5000 T

*Criteria used: “Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous

Chemicals Rules, 1989”

12

1.5.9 The inventory of hazardous chemicals does not exceeds the threshold

quantity to qualify as Major Accident Hazards installation

(MAH).There is no change in the status due to the proposed addition.

1.6 DOW F&E INDEX

Identification of hazardous units and segments of plants and storage units based on

“relative ranking technique,” such as Fire and Explosion Index. F & EI, is a method

universally adopted for classifying/ categorizing/ indexing of chemicals based on their

reactivity and instability. The more widely used hazard index is the F & EI developed

by DOW Chemical Company. Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) serve as a guide

to the selection of fire protection methods. Methodology adopted is described in

Section No. 2.8.

TABLE NO. 1.5: DOW F & E INDEX

Sr.

No.

Installation DOW

F&E

Index

The

Degree

Of

Hazard

Radius

Of

Exposure

(m)

Damage

Factor

Area Of

Exposure

(m2)

Toxicity

Index

Toxicity

Category

1 Hydrochloric

acid

2 Light - - - 7.3 II

2 Hydrogen 59 Light 15 0.58 706 - -

3 Toluene 38 Light 9.7 0.35 295 4.4 I

4 Cumene 38.6 Light 9.7 0.35 295 4.38 I

5 Furnace oil 19.2 Light 4.91 0.15 76 - -

6 O xylene 41.3 Light 10.5 0.37 346 4.48 I

1.7 MOND INDEX ASSESSMENT

1.7.1 The MOND Index is a rapid hazard assessment method for use on chemical

plant or in plant design. The use of this technique puts the hazard of a plant on

a numerical scale, where the comparative pictures of all subdivisions of the

plant form emerge. The assessment is carried out as per MOND INDEX

Manual 1993. Methodology adopted is described in Section No. 2.7.

TABLE NO. 1.4: MOND INDEX ASSESSMENT

SR. NO. MATERIAL EQUIVALENT

DOW INDEX

FIRE INDEX INTERNAL

EXPLOSION INDEX

AERIAL

EXPLOSION INDEX

OVER ALL

HAZARD RATING

1 Cumene 143 3.7 3.25 32.43 1197

13

Low Moderate Moderate High Group II

2 Furnace oil 65 7.5

Moderate

2.85

Moderate

9.4

Light

380

Moderate

3 HSD 71 2.25

Low

2.6

Moderate

0.3

Light

102

Moderate

4 Hydrogen 173 0.35

Light

5.02

High

11.17

Low

518

High Group I

5 O xylene 155 4.35

Low

3.6

Moderate

26.47

Low

1354

High Group II

6 Toluene 159 0.54

Light

3.6

Moderate

5.31

Light

352 Moderate

1.7.2 It is reasonable to assume that a unit assessed at this level can be operated in a

satisfactory manner by providing adequate off setting measures, giving full

regard to the hazards indicated by the assessment provided adequate depends

heavily upon the maintenance of the hardware and of the management

procedures; neglect of either will lead to loss of protection and the rating will

rise.

1.8 COMPATIBILITY/ REACTIVITY HAZARD

TABLE NO. 1.6: COMPATABILITY /REACTIVITY HAZARD MATRIX

Chemicals Mixing

With → Ethyl

Acetate

Hydrobromic

Acid, Solution

Hydrogen

Peroxide

Iodine Potassium

Hydroxide

Sodium

Sulfide

1 Ethyl Acetate

2 Hydrobromic

Acid, Solution N

3 Hydrogen

Peroxide N N

4 Iodine C C C

5 Potassium

Hydroxide N N N C

CHART LEGEND

Y Compatible - No hazardous reactivity issues expected

N Incompatible - Hazardous reactivity issues expected

C Caution - May be hazardous under certain conditions

SR Self reactive - Potentially self reactive e.g. polimerizable

1.9 HAZOP STUDY

(Enclosed separately).

1.9.1 Identification of hazards by HAZOP study is carried out, the thrust area being

the environmental issues in the proposed activities. The report is “Enclosed

separately”. The methodology adopted is described in the report.

1.9.2 HAZOP COMMITTEE

14

HAZOP committee was formed under the chairmanship of Project Proponent

with members of the project team and Mr. Subhash Bonde as Moderator.

1.9.3 UNIT PROCESS AND UNIT OPERATIONS

TABLE NO. 1.7: PRODUCT WISE UNIT PROCESSES & OPERATIONS

S

r

.

N

o

.

Unit

Processes/

Unit

Operations

Product number in which the corresponding

process/operation is used.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1

0

1

1

1

2

1

3

1

4

1

5

1

6

1

7

1

8

1

Centrifugin

g

√ √ √ √ √ √ √

2

Charcoal

treatment

√ √

3

Condensati

on

√

4 Coupling √

5

Crystallizat

ion

√ √ √ √ √ √

6

Decarboxyl

ation

7

Diazotizati

on

√ √ √ √ √

8 Dissolution √ √ √ √ √ √ √

9 Distillation √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

10 Drying √ √ √ √ √ √ √

11 Filtration √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

12 Fulfation √

15

13

Halogenatio

n

√

14

Hydrogenat

ion

√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

15 Hydrolysis √ √ √ √ √ √

16

Isolation

by acid

√

17

Methylatio

n

√

18 Mixing √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

19 Nitration √ √ √ √ √ √

20 Oxidation √

21 Quenching √

22

23

Reduction

iron acid

√

24 Settling √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

25

Solvent

recovery

√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

26 Washing √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

Reaction Exotherm.

Critical To Control Moderate Mild

1.9.4 NODES

TABLE NO. 1.7: NODES FOR HAZOP STUDY

Node 1 Tank farm.

Node 2 Nitration

Node 3 Halogenation

Node 4 Hydrogenation

Node 5 Oxidation

Node 6 Hydrolysis

Node 7 Condensation

Node 8 Reduction

Node 9 Solvent Recovery

Node 10 Effluent Treatment Plant.

16

Node 11 All Other Unit Processes And Operations.

1.9.5 MODES

Mode of operation is batch wise.

1.9.6 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS

1.9.6.1 HAZARD RATING

Probability of each hazard according to its likelihood of

occurrence and the severity of each hazard according to its

potential for harm was estimated on 1 to 5 scale. By

multiplying these two factors i.e. probability and severity, a

range of risk ratings between 1 to 25 is obtained.

1.9.6.2 Identified hazards/ events having risk rating in 16 to 25 range

summezised as follows;

STORAGE AND HANDLING

Solvent handling Toxicity hazard

Fire/ explosion /toxicity hazard at tank farm.

Reactivity/ compatibility hazards at warehouse.

PROCESS OPERATIONS

Fire /Explosion hazard at reactor due to uncontrolled

exothermic reactions.

Health hazard due to vapors emissions at work place.

Toxic gas release at vent in case of scrubber failure.

Fire explosion hazard due to Static charge as source of

ignition in handling of solvents.

1.9.6.3 Following accident scenario is considered for Consequence

Analysis.

Accidental Release of solvent followed by

fire/explosion/toxicity hazard

Accidental Release of Hydrogen followed by fire/explosion

Release of NOx at vent of the scrubber

1.10 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

1.10.1 The potential consequences from the hazardous scenarios identified are

determined and the impact zones modeled using ALOHA and PHAST

software tools. The primary consequence types are pressure wave, thermal

radiations and toxic gas release. The stable atmospheric stability conditions

17

and ambient temperature of 30 oC, wind speed was 1.5 m/s. and humidity

(50%) used for Consequence Analysis.

1.10.2 RESULTS

TABLE NO. 1.9: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS

Downwind Affect Distance (m)

Sr.

No

.

Accident

Scenario Toxic vapor cloud

Flammable

vapor cloud

LEL

Blast Over

Pressure psi

Thermal

radiation

(KW/m2)

ERPG

3

ERPG

2

ERPG

1 IDLH 60 % 10 % 8 3.5 1.0 10 5 2

1 BTF 32 94 486 - <10 11 - - - 16 25 41

2 Cumene 10 10 27 10 10 10 - - - 43 62 98

3 Furnace oil - - - - - - - - - 9 13 18

4 HSD 11 12 13.

5

5 Hydrogen

Bromide

PAC 3

21

PAC 2

45

PAC 1

379 - - - - - - - - -

6 Hydrogen

Jet fire

- - - - - - - - - <10 <10 <10

7 Hydrogen

line leak

- - - - 30 73 24 27 45 18 25 38

8 MEK PAC 3

<10

PAC 2

<10

PAC 1

<10 13 <10 <10 - <10 11 <10 <10 <10

9 Nitric acid <10 25 64 13

10 Nitrogen

oxide

54 75 305 66

11 Toluene

pool fire

<10 <10 <10 <10 <10 <10 - - - 10 13 17

DISPERSION POOL FIRE EXPLOSION. TOXIC GAS RELEASE.

BTF TOLUENE. HYDROGEN. NITRIC ACID

1.11 FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT

1.11.1 Event trees begin with an initiating event and work toward a final result. This

approach is inductive. The method provides information on how a failure can

occur and the probability of occurrence.

18

1.11.2 Frequency of the incident is estimated by Event Tree.

S.N. EVENT EVENT FREQUENCY/ YR

1. Release of flammable solvent

followed by pool fire.

1.0 × 10-4

2. Hydrogen gas accidental fire/

explosion

4.4 × 10-3

3. Toxic gas release at scrubber vent. 1 × 10-3

1.12 IMPACT ASSESSMENT

1.12.1 Effect models are used to determine how people are injured by exposure to

heat, overpressure and toxic load. Effect models make use of a probit function.

In probit function a link exists between the load and percentage of people

exposed who suffer particular type of injury.

1.12.2 RESULTS

TABLE NO. 1.10: PROBIT CORRELATION RESULTS

Event Level Of Concern Affect

Distance

Impact Probit Correlation *Fatality

%

Toluene Pool Fire. 10.0 KW/m2 10 m Thermal Radiations. Pr = –14.9+ 2.56 ln [(t×I4/3)] 0

Toluene evaporating Pool 1000 ppm -ERPG3 <10m Toxicity. Pr = –6.794 + 0.408 [ln (C 2.5×T)] 0

Hydrogen Explosion. Over pres. 3.5 psi 27 m Lung Hemorrhage. Pr = –77 + 6.91 ln (Po) 54

Hydrogen Explosion. Over pres. 3.5 psi 27 m Ear Drum Rupture. Pr = –15.6 + 1.93 ln (Po) 5

Hydrogen Explosion. Over pres. 3.5 psi 27 m Fatality. Pr = –46.1 + 4.82 ln (Po) 0

Hydrogen Fire 10.0 KW/m2 18 m Thermal radiations. Pr = –14.9+ 2.56 ln [(t×I4/3)] 0

Furnace Oil. 10.0 KW/m2 9 m Thermal radiations. Pr = –14.9+ 2.56 ln [(t×I4/3)] 0

Cumene Pool Fire. 10.0 KW/m2 43 m Thermal Radiations. Pr = –14.9+ 2.56 ln [(t×I4/3)] 0

Nitrogen di oxide IDLH 20 ppm 66m Toxicity. Pr = –13.79 + 1.4 [ln (C2.0×T)] 0

* Assuming escape time from fire to safe place exceeds 90 seconds and for toxic gas 10 minutes.

1.13 RISK ESTIMATION

1.13.1 VULNERABLE ZONE

19

Contour No.

Chemical Color Code

Level Of Concern Impact

1 Nitric acid IDLH concentration Toxicity

2 Toluene. 10 KW/m2 - Thermal Radiations. Thermal Radiations.

3 Hydrogen. 3.5 psi Overpressure

4 Hydrogen. 10 KW/m2 - Thermal Radiations. Thermal Radiations.

5 Hydrogen. DOW damage 35% damage

6 O Xylene DOW damage 37% damage

7 Cumene DOW damage 35% damage

8 Cumene DOW damage 35% damage

9 BTF 10 KW/m2 - Thermal Radiations. Thermal Radiations.

10 Furnace Oil. DOW damage 15% damage

1.13.2 INDIVIDUAL RISK

INDIVIDUAL RISK - FATALITY CRITERIA. Individual Fatality Individual Fatality Criteria

1 × 10-4 per yr This contour remains on-site.

1 × 10-5 per yr This contour extends into industrial developments only.

1 × 10-6 per yr This contour extends into commercial and industrial developments only.

INDIVIDUAL FATALITY QRA RESULTS. Individual Fatality Downwind

Affect

Distance (M)

Remarks

4.4 × 10-4 per yr. 35 This contour remains on-site.

4.4 × 10-5 per yr. 58 This contour extends in to notified industrial area only.

4.4 × 10-6 per yr. 70 This contour extends in to notified industrial area only.

20

1.13.3 SITE SURROUNDING : MIDC - NOTIFIED AREA

CONTOUR NO. RISK LEVEL

1 4.4 × 10-4 per yr.

2 4.4 × 10-5 per yr.

3 4.4 × 10-6 per yr.

1.13.5 SITE SURROUNDING POPULATION

SITE SURROUNDING.POPULATION

Sr.

No.

Name of

Village

Distance

(km)

Population Sr.

No.

Name of

Village

Distance

(km)

Population

1 Asthami 6 79 5 Talaghar 6.4 1207

2 Dhatav 1.5 2817 6 Warse 1.8 1909

3 Kholad 6.4 1836 7 Udavanne 1.3 778

4 Killha 2.65 2571

1.13.6 SITE SURROUNDING STATUS

Google image Wind rose

21

1.13.7 Societal risk

QRA RESULTS. F – N CURVE.

R.

NO. EVENT

EVENT FREQUENCY

PER YR

NO. OF

FATALITY

CUMULATIVE

FREQUENCY

1. Hydrogen Gas Fire/

Explosion.

4.4 10-4 1 4.4 10-4

2 Solvent Tank Pool

Fire.

1.0 10-3 0 5.4 10-4

1.14 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES SUGGESTED.

6. Provide Dyke for accidental spill containment for above ground storage

tanks.

7. Provide mobile pump arrangement to transfer the accidental spill

contained in Dyke to emergency spare tank.

8. Store chemicals considering the compatibility and reactivity hazards at

store/ warehouse.

11. Provide Hydrogen gas leak detectors and alarm at hydrogen trolley

location and hydrogenation plant

13. Provide wind direction socks.

14. Provide smoke detector at warehouses.

15. Provide suitable arrangement at storm drain to avoid any organic

contaminated water/ spill/ fire water going out of the site.

22

16. Revise “DMP” based on MCLS Analysis for the site with dove tailing data

for offsite disaster control plan.

A Hydrogen leak detector

B Hydrogen chloride leak detector

1.16 We thank the staff and the management for positive approach shown and excellent co-

operation extended throughout the studies to complete the studies in scheduled time

frame.

23

SECTION 2: HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

2.1 SITE OVERVIEW

2.1.1 M/S.

2.1.2 Products for environmental clearance

Refer Table No. 1.1 in Section No. 1.

2.1.2 LIST OF PRODUCTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLEARANCE


2.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

Refer HAZOP Study report for process, flow chart, material balance and plant

equipment details.

2.3 LIST OF MATERIALS

2.3.1 FINISHED PRODUCTS


2.3.2 RAW MATERIALS


2.4 INVENTORY ANALYSIS

HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

Chemicals stored or handled at site are Hazardous chemicals which satisfies; any of

the following criteria.

1. Criteria laid down in part I or is listed in Column 2 of Part II

Schedule I appended to “Manufacture Storage and Import of

Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989” and

2. Criteria laid down in part I or is listed in Column 2 of Part II

Schedule I appended to “The Maharashtra Factories (Control of

Industrial Major Accident Hazards) Rules, 2003” or

3. Listed in Column 2 of Schedule 2 appended to these rules OR

4. Listed in Column 2 of “The Second Schedule appended to the

Factories Act, 1948”.

5. “The Hazardous Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989”

Amended 2000 and 2003.

24

Properties of the chemicals are checked to classify the hazardous chemicals.


2.5 CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS


25

2.6 MSDS

BTF

26

27

28

2.7 MOND INDEX ASSESSMENT

2.7.1 METHODOLOGY

The MOND Index is a rapid hazard

assessment method for use on

chemical plant or in plant design.

The use of this technique puts the

hazard of a plant on a numerical

scale, where form the comparative

pictures of all subdivisions of the

plant emerges. (For details refer

MOND INDEX Manual 1993). The

plant installations having significant

inventory of flammable/

combustible materials are

considered and plant is sub divided

accordingly. MOND INDEX

ASSESSMENT (without offsetting) for

these installations is summerised. FIGURE NO. 2.1:

THE MOND INDEX PROCEDURE.

FIRE INDEX (F):

The Index concentrates on the amount of flammable material in the unit, its energy

release potential and the area of the unit. The expression is;

N

KBF

And descriptive categories can be derived from the table below.

TABLE NO. 2.4: FIRE INDEX CATEGORY.

FIRE INDEX CATEGORY

0 – 2 Light.

2 – 5 Low.

5 – 10 Moderate.

10 – 20 High.

20 – 50 Very High.

50 – 100 Intensive.

100 – 250 Extreme.

29

> 250 Very Extreme.

EXPLOSION INDICES (E):

Separate indices have been developed to indicate the potential of the unit for an

internal explosion an aerial (vapor cloud) explosion.

Internal Explosion Index (E) this is expressed as follows,

1001

SPME

And gives a measure of the potential for explosion within the unit. Corresponding

descriptive categories are given below.

TABLE NO. 2.5: INTERNAL EXPLOSION INDEX CATEGORY.

INTERNAL EXPLOSION INDEX CATEGORY

0.0 – 1.5 Light.

1.5 – 2.5 Low.

2.5 – 4.0 Moderate.

4.0 – 6.0 High.

Above 6.0 Very High.

AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX (A):

Important features in assessing aerial explosion risk include the quantity of material

available and its heat of combustion, the likelihood of release, the rate and height of

release and the mixing characteristics of the gas. All of these factors have been

considered to give an aerial explosion index according to the expression. Where, B is

material factor, characteristic of the material.

ptQHEm

BA

1

300

273

10001001

Corresponding descriptive categories are given below;

TABLE NO. 2.6: AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX CATEGORY.

AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX CATEGORY

0 – 10 Light.

10 – 30 Low.

30 – 100 Moderate.

100 – 400 High.

400 – 1700 Very High.

30

Above 1700 Extreme.

OVERALL HAZARD RATING (R):

As it is often necessary to compare units having different types of hazard, an overall

hazard index has been developed based upon the indices described above. The

combination adopted is, with the descriptive categories as given below.

AFEDR 2.01

TABLE NO. 2.7: OVERALL HAZARD RATING CATEGORY.

OVERALL HAZARD RATING CATEGORY

0 – 20 Mild.

20 – 100 Low.

100 – 500 Moderate.

500 – 1100 High (Group 1).

1100 – 2500 High (Group 2).

2500 – 12,500 Very High.

12500 – 65,000 Extreme.

Above 65,000 Very Extreme.

EQUIVALENT DOW INDEX:

1001

1001

1001

TLQSPMBD

2.7.2 SUB – DIVISION OF PLANT IN UNITS

Storage tank installations.

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

2.8 DOW F & E INDEX

HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION BY USE OF DOW INDEX:

By Dow's Fire and Explosion Index Method:

Fire and Explosion Index, F & EI, is a method universally adopted for classifying/

categorizing/ indexing of chemicals based on their reactivity and instability. The more

widely used hazard index is the F & EI developed by DOW Chemical Company.

1. Identification of equipment within a process plant that would contribute to the

initiation or escalation of an incident.

2. Qualification of the expected damage potential of fire and explosion incident

in realistic terms.

3. Determination of area of exposure surrounding the process unit.

The quantitative methodology relies on the analysis based on historical loss

data, the energy potential of the material under study and the extent to which

loss prevention measures are already taken.

F & EI = MF F3

Where,

MF = Material factor which represents in flammability and Reactivity of substance.

F3 = Hazard Factor.

= F1 × F 2

Where,

F1 = Process Hazard.

F2 = Special Process Hazard.

Deviation of MF

MF is a measure of intrinsic rate of potential energy release from fire or explosion

produced by combustion or any other chemical reaction. The National Fire Protection

Agency of U.S.A. (N.F.P.A.) has specified standard values of MF for many

substances. It is calculated from Flammability (Nf) and Reactivity (Nr) indices

provided in NFPA 325 M or NFPA-49. Knowing Flash Point (FP) and Boiling (B.P.)

Flammability can be determined.

50

General Process Hazard (F1)

Six operations, process units or processing conditions which contributes to a

significant enhancement of potential for fire and explosion have been identified and

numerical values of penalties to be added for obtaining the values of F1 are given.

These includes exothermicity and endothermicity of reactions, method of handling,

accessibility and facilities to drainage and spill control.

Special Process Hazards (F2) are factors that contribute primarily to the probability of

occurrence of a loss accident.

Evaluation of F & EI

The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of F & E as

per the criteria given below:

TABLE NO. 2.8: F&EI RANGE & DEGREE OF HAZARD.

F & EI Range Degree of Hazard

0 – 60. Light.

61 – 96. Moderate.

97 – 127. Intermediate.

128 – 158. Heavy.

159 – and above. Severe.

51

DOW FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX WORKSHEET.

PLANT: FURNACE OIL tank farm

MATERIALS AND PROCESS: FURNACE OIL.

MATERIAL FACTOR: 10.

PENALTY FACTOR

RANGE PENALTY FACTOR USED

1. GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS

Base Factor. 1.0 1.0

A. Exothermic Chemical Reactions. 0.30 to 1.25 0.0

B. Endothermic Process. 0.20 to 0.40 0.0

C. Material Handling & Transfer. 0.25 to 1.05 0.2

D. Enclosed or Indoor Process Unit. 0.25 to 0.90 0.0

E. Access. 0.20 to 0.35 0.0

F. Drainage and Spill Control. 0.25 to 0.50 0.0

General Process Hazards Factor (F1). 1.2

2. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS


A. Toxic Materials. 0.20 to 0.80 0.0

B. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure. 0.50 0.0

C. Operation in or Near Flammable Range Inerted. – –

1. Tank Farm Storage Flammable Liquids. 0.0 –

2. Process Upset or Purge Failure. 0.3 –

3. Always in Flammable Range. – 0.0

D. Dust Explosion. 0.25 to 2.0 0.0

E. Pressure Operating atmospheric; – 0.0

F. Low Temperature. 0.20 to 0.50 0.0

G. Quantity of Flammable/ Unstable Material Quantity

50 T., Hc = 18.7 103 BTU/Lb.

– –

1. Liquid or Gases in Process. – –

2. Liquid or gases in Storage. – 0.4

3. Combustible Solids in Storage. – –

H. Corrosion and Erosion. 0.10 to 0.75 0.1

I. Leakage – Joint and packing. 0.10 to 1.50 0.1

J. Use of fired heaters. – 0.0

K. Hot Oil Heat Exchange system > 210 ft. 0.15 to 1.15 0.0

L. Rotating Equipment. 0.5 0.0

Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) 1.6

Unit Hazards Factor (F1 F2 = F3). 1.92

Fire and Explosion Index (F3 MF) (F & IE). 19.2

THE DEGREE OF HAZARD LIGHT.

RADIUS OF EXPOSURE 4.91 meter.

DAMAGE FACTOR 0.15

AREA OF EXPOSURE 76 m2

52


PLANT: Tank farm

MATERIALS AND PROCESS: HYDROCHLORIC ACID.

MATERIAL FACTOR: 1

PENALTY FACTOR




A. Exothermic Chemical Reactions. 0.30 to 1.25 00

B. Endothermic Process. 0.20 to 0.40 00


D. Enclosed or Indoor Process Unit. 0.25 to 0.90 00

E. Access. 0.20 to 0.35 00

F. Drainage and spill control. 0.25 to 0.50 0.0

General Process Hazards Factor (F1). – 1.0




B. Sub – Atmospheric Pressure. 0.50 00




3. Always in Flammable Range. – –

D. Dust Explosion. 0.25 to 2.0 00

E. Pressure Operating atmospheric; Relief Setting - – 00

F. Low Temperature. 0.20 to 0.50 00

G. Quantity of Flammable/ Unstable Material Quantity;

10 Mt., Hc = 0 103 BTU/Lb.

– –


2. Liquid or gases in Storage. – –




J. Use of fired heaters. – 00

K. Hot Oil Heat Exchange system 0.15 to 1.15 00

L. Rotating Equipment. 0.5 00

Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) – 1.8


Fire and Explosion Index (F3 MF) (F & IE). 2

THE DEGREE OF HAZARD. LIGHT

RADIUS OF EXPOSURE. –

DAMAGE FACTOR. –

AREA OF EXPOSURE. –

Th 250 + 125 (1 + 1 + 1.8) = 725. T 7.3 Cat II.

53


PLANT: HYDROGEN CYLINDER SHED.

MATERIALS AND PROCESS: HYDROGEN.

MATERIAL FACTOR: 21

PENALTY FACTOR








E. Access. 0.20 to 0.35 00


General Process Hazards Factor (F1). 1.5







2. Process Upset or Purge Failure. 0.3 0.3



E. Pressure Operating 75 psig; Relief Setting + 10 %. – 0.39



80 cylinders, Hc 51.6 103 BTU/Lb.

– –


2. Liquid or gases in Storage. – < 0.1





K. Hot Oil Heat Exchange system > 210 ft. 0.15 to 1.15 00


Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) 1.89



THE DEGREE OF HAZARD MODERATE

RADIUS OF EXPOSURE 15 meter

DAMAGE FACTOR 0.58

AREA OF EXPOSURE 706 m2

54


PLANT: TANK FARM.

MATERIALS AND PROCESS: Cumene

MATERIAL FACTOR: 16

PENALTY FACTOR


1. GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS.






E. Access. 0.20 to 0.35 00



2. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS.









E. Pressure Operating atmospheric; Relief Setting. 00



75 t ., Hc = 18 103 BTU/Lb.

– –













RADIUS OF EXPOSURE. 9.7 meter

DAMAGE FACTOR. 0.35

AREA OF EXPOSURE. 295 m2

T = {125+75×(1 + 1.25 + 1.93)}/100 = 4.38 T Category I

55


PLANT: TANK FARM.

MATERIALS AND PROCESS: O –xylene

MATERIAL FACTOR: 16

PENALTY FACTOR








E. Access. 0.20 to 0.35 00















100 T ., Hc = 17.6 103 BTU/Lb.

– –














DAMAGE FACTOR. 0.37


T = {125+75×(1 + 1.25 + 2.06)}/100 = 4.48 T Category I

56


PLANT: TANK FARM.

MATERIALS AND PROCESS: Toluene

MATERIAL FACTOR: 16

PENALTY FACTOR








E. Access. 0.20 to 0.35 00















10 kl ., Hc = 17.4 103 BTU/Lb.

– –














DAMAGE FACTOR. 0.35


T = {125+75×(1 + 1.25 + 1.95)}/100 = 4.40 T Category I

57

HAZOP STUDY

“Report Enclosed Separately”

PROPOSED EXPANSION PROJECT

At

DEEPAK NITRITE LTD.

(APL DIVISION ) PLOT NO.1TO 7,26TO 31, MIDC DHATAV ,

DIST.:- RAIGAD, MAHARASHTRA , INDIA.

JANUARY 2017

58

SECTION 3: FAILURE FREQUENCY ANALYSIS

3.1 FAILURE FREQUENCY

The frequency assessment stage of the analysis involved defining the potential release sources and

subsequently determining the likelihood (frequency) of the various releases. The failure frequencies

were determined using failure item counts for each of the failure items identified and publicly available

historical failure rate data. Ignition probability data was used to estimate the probability of a release

subsequently being ignited.

3.1.1 Flange gasket failure/ gland failure. An accident/ event for gasket leakage/ failure can be

termed as “quite probable”. The hole size in a gasket failure may be that due to complete

section between bolt holes or something much smaller. The hole size for a complete section

failure of a gasket is usually calculated.

3.1.2 Failure of transfer line. The possible route of hazardous material going out of containment in

open atmosphere is the rupture of a transfer line. The case of guillotine type failure of tanker

unloading hose / transfer line or bottom nozzle undergoing guillotine type of failure also are

rather low. Failure frequency as per published literature for such lines is low and such events

can be considered, “foreseeable”.

3.1.3 Accidental spill of flammable solvent and uncontrolled spreading pool followed by fire is

considered as Worst Possible Scenario. It is to be noted that loss caused due to this event is

very high but the probability is low; however, in case of neglect of maintenance or natural

calamities such as earthquake the possibility exists. Such events are unlikely to happen and are

not credible. Failure frequency of catastrophic rupture of such pressure vessel is very low i.e.

3 per million per year.

3.2 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

HYDROGEN GAS RELEASE

Fire/ Explosion frequency = 0.004 + 0.0004 = 0.0044, R = 0.9936, MTBF, 155 yrs.

*0.5 if distance to 50 % LFL falls within plant (with control of company) and

59

HYDROGEN GAS RELEASE

P = 0.0008 + 0.00072 = 0.00152, R = 0.99848, MTBF 657 yrs.

0.1 if distance to 50 % LFL falls inside electrically classified area.

FLAMMABLE SOLVENT RELEASE

Pool fire frequency = 0.0001 *0.1 if distance to 50 % LFL falls inside electrically classified area.

60

SECTION 4: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

4.1.1 LIKELY ACCIDENT SCENARIOS

TABLE NO. 4.1: LIKELY ACCIDENT SCENARIOS.

1 BTF release

2 Cumene release

3 Furnace oil release

4 HSD release

5 Hydrogen Bromide release

6 Hydrogen release

7 MEK release

8 Nitric acid release

9 Nitrogen oxide release

10 Toluene release

These accident scenarios are divided in two categories considering the consequence

seriousness and occurrence frequency.

MAXIMUM CREDIBLE LOSS SCENARIO (MCLS).

WORST POSSIBLE SCENARIO.

4.1.2 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE LOSS SCENARIO (MCLS)

Maximum Credible Loss Scenario (MCLS) is one of the methodologies

evolved to access the events in realistic and practical way. An MCLS can be

described as the worst “credible” accident or as an accident with a maximum

damage distance, which is still believed to be probable. The analysis, however,

does not include a quantification of the probability of occurrence of an

accident.

The MCLS aims at identifying undesirable and hazardous events causing the

Maximum damage to human beings environment around the industry under

the consideration.

Leak from hose/ piping failure are quite probable events. Accidental release of

flammable material e.g BTF is considered as MCLS.

4.1.3 WORST POSSIBLE SCENARIO

Worst Case Scenario/ MCA (Maximum Credible Accident) Accident Scenario

accidental release of Hydrogen gas and uncontrolled spreading followed by

fire/ explosion is considered as Worst Case Scenario/ MCA (Maximum

61

Credible Accident).

4.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 1: ACCIDENTAL SPILL OF BENZOTRIFLUORIDE

CHEMICAL NAME: BENZOTRIFLUORIDE

Mole Weight Ambient B.P. 102 oC VP. at ambient temp 0.063 atm

PAC -1 19 gm/cum PAC -2 220 gm/cum PAC -3 1300 gm/cum

LEL 16000 ppm UEL 84000 ppm

Ambient Saturation Concentration: 63,510 ppm or 6.35%

SOURCE STRENGTH

100 m3 tank Evaporating Puddle of Puddle dia : 4.4 meter, Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 1.11

kilograms/min

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 1.1

THREAT ZONE:

Model Run: Heavy Gas

62

THREAT ZONE

Red PAC -3 1300 mg/(cu m) 32 meters.

Orange PAC -2 220 mg/(cu m) 94 meters.

Yellow PAC -1 19 mg/(cu m) 486 meters.


THREAT MODELED: FLAMMABLE AREA OF VAPOR CLOUD

THREAT ZONE

Red 9600 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets. < 10 meters.

Yellow 1600 ppm = 10% LEL. 11 meters.


THREAT MODELED: OVER PRESSURE (BLAST FORCE), VCE

No explosion: no part of the cloud is above the LEL at any time.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 6.4: POOL FIRE

THERMAL RADIATION FROM POOL.

63

S. N. THERMAL RADIATION LEVEL EFFECT DISTANCE

1. Distance to 10.0 KW/sq.m (potentially lethal within 60 sec). 16 meters.

2. Distance to 5.0 KW/sq.m (2nd degree burns within 60 sec). 25 meters.

3. Distance to 2.0 KW/sq.m (pain within 60 sec). 41 meters.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 2: ACCIDENTAL SPILL OF CUMENE

CHEMICAL NAME: CUMENE

Mole Weight 120.19 g/mol Ambient B.P. 152.3 oC VP. at ambient temp 0.0081 atm

AEGL-1 (60

min): 50 ppm AEGL-1 (60

min): 300 ppm AEGL-3 (60 min): 730 ppm

IDLH 900 ppm LEL 8800 ppm UEL 65000 ppm

Ambient Saturation Concentration: 8,156 ppm or 0.82%

SOURCE STRENGTH

100 m3 tank Evaporating Puddle


THREAT ZONE:

Model Run: Heavy Gas

THREAT ZONE

Red PAC -3 730 ppm 10 meters.

Orange PAC -2 300 ppm 10 meters.

Yellow PAC -1 50 ppm 27 meters.

IDLH 900 ppm 10 meters.



THREAT ZONE

Red 5280 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets. 10 meters.

Yellow 880 ppm = 10% LEL. 10 meters.


64



ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 2.4: POOL FIRE






ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 3: ACCIDENTAL SPILL OF FURNACE OIL

Continuous release of Furnace Oil due to failure a pipe line having diameters of 40 mm at

storage tank in dyke.

THREAT MODELED: THERMAL RADIATION FROM POOL FIRE.

SR. NO. THERMAL RADIATION LEVEL EFFECT DISTANCE

1 10.0 KW/M2 (potentially lethal within 60 sec.). 9 meters.

2 5.0 KW/M2 (2nd degree burns within 60 sec.). 13 meters.

3 2.0 KW/M2 (pain within 60 sec.). 18 meters.

65

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 4: HSD RELEASE

Continuous release of Diesel due to failure if drum.


1. 10.0 KW/M2 (potentially lethal within 60 sec.). 11 meters.

2. 5.0 KW/M2 (2nd degree burns within 60 sec.). 12 meters.

3. 2.0 KW/M2 (pain within 60 sec.). 13.5 meters.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 5:HYDROGEN BROMIDE

RELEASE

CHEMICAL NAME: HYDROGEN BROMIDE 10035-10-6

Mole Weight 80.91 g/mol Ambient B.P. -66.7 oC VP. at ambient temp. >1atm

PAC -1 1 ppm PAC -2 40 ppm PAC -3 120 ppm

IDLH 30 ppm

Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%

SOURCE STRENGTH

Sustained release rate =0.1 kilograms/min

Model Run: Gaussian


Flammable chemical escaping from storage tank (not burning).

THREAT MODELED: TOXIC AREA OF VAPOR CLOUD

PAC IDLH

THREAT ZONE

Red PAC – 3. 120 ppm. 379 meters.

66

Orange PAC – 2. 40 ppm. 45 meters.

Yellow pac -1. 1 ppm. 21 meters.

IDLH 30 ppm. 53 meters.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 6: ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF HYDROGEN

CHEMICAL NAME: HYDROGEN.

Mole Weight 2.02 g/mol Ambient B.P. - 252.8 oC VP. at ambient temp > 1 atm.

TEEL-1 145000 ppm TEEL -2 280000 ppm TEEL -3 500000ppm

LEL 40000 ppm UEL 75000 ppm

Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0 %.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 6.1 (MCLS)

Hydrogen gas escaping from pipe (not burning), through pipe.



Red 24,000 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets. 30 meters.

Yellow 4,000 ppm = 10% LEL. 73 meters.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 6.2 (MCLS)


67

OVER PRESSURE (BLAST FORCE), VCE

Red. 8.0 psi: Destruction of buildings. 24 meters.

Orange. 3.5 psi: Serious injury likely. 27 meters.

Yellow. 1.0 psi: Shatters glass. 45 meters.


Flammable gas is burning as it escapes from pipe.

THREAT MODELED : JET FIRE MODEL


1. Distance to 10.0 KW/m2 (potentially lethal within 60 sec). < 10 meters.

2. Distance to 05.0 KW/m2 (2nd degree burns within 60 sec). < 10 meters.

3. Distance to 02.0 KW/m2 (pain within 60 sec). < 10 meters.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 6.4 (MCA).

Hydrogen cylinder rupture (involved in fire).

THREAT MODELED: FIRE BALL MODEL

68


1. Distance to 10.0 KW/m2 (potentially lethal within 60 sec). 18 meter.

2. Distance to 05.0 KW/m2 (2nd degree burns within 60 sec). 25 meter.

3. Distance to 02.0 KW/m2 (pain within 60 sec). 38 meter.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 7: RELEASE OF MEK

CHEMICAL NAME: ETHYL METHYL KETONE/ MEK.

Mole

Weight

72.11

g/mol

Ambient

B.P.

79.6 oC VP. at

ambient temp

0.15

atm.

PAC-3 4000 ppm PAC-2 2700

ppm

PAC-1 200

ppm

IDLH 3000 ppm LEL 18000

ppm

UEL 110000

ppm

Ambient Saturation Concentration: 153,584 ppm or 15.4 %.

Accidental MEK 180 liters release due to /transfer hose failure will form liquid pool in the

curb wall/ dyke of 1.5 sq.m. area.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 7.1: EVAPORATING POOL MODEL.

Model Run: Gaussian.

Max average sustained release rate: 374 grams/min

(averaged over a minute or more)

69

Total amount released: 17.2 kilograms


THREAT ZONE

Red PAC - 3 4000 ppm. < 10 meters.

Orange PAC - 2 2700 ppm. < 10 meters.

Yellow PAC - 1 200 ppm. 13 meters.

IDLH 2000 ppm. < 10 meters.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 7.2: FLAMMABLE AREA OF VAPOR CLOUD


THREAT ZONE


Yellow 1800 ppm = 10% LEL. < 10 meters.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 7.3: VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION

THREAT MODELED: OVER PRESSURE (BLAST FORCE)

VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION


ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 7.4: BURNING POOL – POOL FIRE MODEL.

POOL FIRE MODEL

Burn Rate = 5.17 Kg/min. Flame Height = 3 meters.

THREAT MODELED:

THERMAL RADIATION FROM POOL FIRE


1. Distance to 10.0 KW/sq.m (potentially lethal within 60 sec). < 10 meters.

2. Distance to 5.0 KW/sq.m (2nd degree burns within 60 sec). < 10 meters.

3. Distance to 2.0 KW/sq.m (pain within 60 sec). < 10 meters.

70

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 7.5: EVAPORATING POOL.

Whether F1 category likely in winter nights. Worst Possible Scenario.

THREAT MODELED: OVER PRESSURE (BLAST FORCE)

VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION

Red. 8.0 psi: Destruction of buildings. -

Orange. 3.5 psi: Serious injury likely. < 10 meters.

Yellow. 1.0 psi: Shatters glass. 11 meters.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO.8: NITRIC ACID RELEASE

CHEMICAL NAME: NITRIC ACID 98%.

Mole Weight 63.01 g/mol Ambient B.P. 90.5 oC VP. at ambient temp 0.087atm

ERPG-1 1 ppm ERPG -2 6 ppm ERPG -3 78 ppm

IDLH 25 ppm

Ambient Saturation Concentration: 87,311 ppm or 8.73%.

SOURCE STRENGTH

Evaporating Puddle (0.6 m dia.). Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 35.6 grams/min.

Warning: NITRIC ACID can react with water and/or water vapor. This can affect the evaporation rate and downwind dispersion. ALOHA cannot accurately predict the air hazard if this substance comes in contact with water.


71


THREAT ZONE

Red ERPG – 3: 78 ppm. < 10 meters.

Orange ERPG – 2: 6 ppm. 25 meters.

Yellow ERPG – 1: 1 ppm. 64 meters.

IDLH 25 ppm. 13 meters.

Note: Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion

predictions less reliable for short distances.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO.9: NITROGEN OXIDE RELEASE

CHEMICAL NAME: NITROGEN DIOXIDE.

Mole Weight 46.01 g/mol Ambient B.P. 21 oC VP. at ambient temp >1 atm


AEGL-1(60 min) 0.5 ppm AEGL-2

(60 min)

12 ppm AEGL-3(60 min) 20 ppm

IDLH 20 ppm

Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%

Maximum average sustained release rate = 0.00375 kilograms/sec

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 9.1 (MCA)

Nitrogen Di Oxide gas escaping from scrubber vent.


72

ERPG IDLH

TOXIC AREA OF VAPOR CLOUD.

THREAT ZONE

1. ERPG – 3 (30 ppm): Red. 54 meters.

2. ERPG – 2 (15 ppm): Orange. 75 meters.

3. ERPG – 1 (1 ppm): Yellow. 305 meters.

4. IDLH - 20 ppm 66 meters.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO.10: ACCIDENTAL SPILL OF TOLUENE

CHEMICAL NAME: TOLUENE.

Mole Weight 92.14 g/mol Ambient B.P. 110.5 oC VP. at ambient temp 0.048 atm


IDLH 500 ppm LEL 12000 ppm UEL 71000 ppm

Ambient Saturation Concentration: 48,470 ppm or 4.85%.

SOURCE STRENGTH

Evaporating Puddle of Puddle Area: 1 square meter.


THREAT ZONE

Red ERPG -3 1000 ppm. < 10 meters.

Orange ERPG -2 300 ppm. < 10 meters.

Yellow ERPG -1 50 ppm. < 10 meters.

IDLH 2000 ppm. < 10 meters.

73



THREAT ZONE


Yellow 1100 ppm = 10% LEL. < 10 meters.




ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 10.4: POOL FIRE AT PIT.



1. Distance to 10.0 KW/sq.m (potentially lethal within 60 sec). < 10 meters.

2. Distance to 5.0 KW/sq.m (2nd degree burns within 60 sec). < 10 meters.

3. Distance to 2.0 KW/sq.m (pain within 60 sec). < 10 meters.

ACCIDENT SCENARIO NO. 10.5 : POOL FIRE OF 3 M DIA.

THERMAL RADIATION FROM POOL FIRE.

74






4. Distance to 4.0 KW/sq.m (emergency action ). 13.5 meters.

75

SECTION 5: IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Effect models are used for the impact analysis. These models used to determine how people

are injured by exposure to heat, overpressure and toxic load. Effect models make use of a

probit function. In probit function a link exists between the load and percentage of people

exposed who suffer particular type of injury.

5.1 THERMAL RADIATION IMPACT

The effect of human exposure to a fire is a function of both the intensity of heat

radiation and the duration of exposure. The harmful effect can be characterized by a

thermal dose that is defined by the function

3

4

It .

Where,

Y = probit value,

I = heat radiation intensity, and

t = exposure duration.

The probit equation utilized is the Eisenberg equation.

3

4

ln56.29.14 ItY

A probit function has been used to evaluate the likelihood of fatality for different heat

flux exposures.

A radiation level of 12.5 KW/m2 will give 1 % fatalities for short exposure periods of

30 seconds and 50 % fatalities for exposures of over 80 seconds.

TABLE NO. 5.1: FATAL THERMAL RADIATION EXPOSURE LEVELS.

RADIATION LEVEL

KW/m2

SECONDS EXPOSURE FOR A % FATALITY LEVELS

1 % 50 % 99 %

1.6 500 1300 3200

4.0 150 370 930

12.5 30 80 200

37.5 8 20 50

76

TABLE NO. 5.2: EFFECTS OF THERMAL RADIATION ON UNPROTECTED SKIN.

RADIATION LEVEL

(KW/m2)

DURATION PERIOD SECONDS BEFORE

Pain is Felt Blistering Starts

22 02.0 03.0

18 02.5 04.3

11 05.0 08.5

08 08.0 13.5

05 16.0 25.0

2.5 40.0 65.0

Below 2.5 Prolonged exposure can. be tolerated.

Continued exposure to heat flux of 4.0 KW/m2 is considered sufficient to cause

injury. Hence, injury risk was assessed based on exposure to this level of heat flux or

greater. It is estimated that heat flux of 10.0 KW/m2 is likely up to 10 m distance from

the centre of the Toluene pool fire. It is assumed that any person near fire can take

shelter within 90 seconds.

5.2 OVER PRESSURE IMPACT

TABLE NO. 5.3: EFFECT OF BLAST PRESSURE WAVE.

OVER PRESSURE (bar) EFFECTS

0.01 Shattering of glass windows. Failure of panels.

0.03 Shattering of asbestos siding.

0.1 Collapse of steel framing panels.

0.3 Shearing of brick walls (8-12 inches).

5.2.1 Lung Hemorrhage

o

r PP ln91.677

Where,

Po is the Peak Over Pressure (Pa).

= 5.1 corresponds to 54 %.

5.2.2 Ear Drum Rupture

o

r PP ln93.16.15

Where,



77

5.2.3 Fatality Due To Impact

o

r PP ln82.41.46

Where,



5.2.4 However over pressure of 3.5 psi zone at tank farm persons are likely to take

safe shelter quickly avoiding any fatality.

5.3 TOXICITY IMPACT

5.3.1 HYDROGEN BROMIDE

HEALTH EFFECTS OF HYDROGEN BROMIDE EXPOSURE.

CONCENTRATION CONCENTRATION SYMPTOMS OF EXPOSURE

NOTE: Exposure to concentrations in excess of 1300 ppm may cause laryngeal spasms, resulting in death.

5.3.3 TOLUENE

Harmful if inhaled or absorbed through skin. Vapor harmful. Flammable liquid and vapor. May

affect liver, kidneys, blood system, or central nervous system. Causes irritation to skin, eyes

and respiratory tract.

78

SECTION 6: RISK ESTIMATION

6.1 INDIVIDUAL RISK ISOPLETH

6.1.1 Individual risk is defined by AIChE/ CCPS as risk to a person in the vicinity

of a hazard. This includes the nature of the injury to the individual, the

likelihood of the injury occurring and the time period over which the injury

might occur. Individual risk can be estimated for the most exposed individual,

for groups of individuals at particular places or for an average individual in an

effect zone. For a given incident or set of incidents, these individual risk

measures have different values.

6.1.2 Individual Risk due to incidence „I‟ at a geographical location x, y is given as;

iyxyx IR

NIR ,,,

1

Where,

N is number of persons in the affect zone.

Continued exposure to heat flux of 4.0 KW/m2 is considered sufficient to

cause injury. Hence, injury risk was assessed based on exposure to this level

of heat flux or greater.

6.1.3 RISK ISOPLETH

Average individual risk (exposed hours/worked hours) individual risk of

fatality at Assembly point is estimated. A broadly acceptable level of

individual risk as per the ALARP (As low as reasonably practicable) concept

of HSE, UK 10-6

/year.

6.2 SOCIETAL RISK (F-N CURVE)

Societal risk criteria are generally presented as curves on F – N plots. Mathematically,

the equation for an F – N criterion curve may be presented as; [Ball 19981].

aNkF

Where,

F = the cumulative frequency of N or more fatalities.

N = the number of fatalities.

a = aversion factor (often between 1 and 2).

k = constant.

79

The slope of the societal risk criterion (when plotted on a log – log basis) is equal to

„–a‟ and represents the degree of aversion to multi-fatality events embodied in the

criterion.

When the F – N curve slope is equal to -1, the risk criterion is termed „risk neutral‟. A

risk criterion for which the curve slope is more negative than -1 is said to be more risk

averse.

An anchor point along the curve (e.g. N=10 fatalities, F=10-3

/year) and a slope (e.g. -

1) is usually enough information to plot a risk criterion F – N curve. If any portion of

the calculated F – N curve exceeds the criterion line, the societal risk is said to exceed

that risk criterion.

In the present case any fatality unlikely in the surroundings and there is no situation

point above the criterion line indicating insignificant societal risk.

QRA RESULTS.

EVENT EVENT FREQUENCY

PER YR NO. OF FATALITY CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY

Hydrogen gas fire /explosion 4.4 10-4 1 4.4 10-4

Pool Fire of Solvent 1.0 × 10-4 0 5.4 10-4

F-N Curve

Refer Section 1.13.7

SECTION 7: RISK MITIGATION MEASURES

Refer Section 1.15

80

ANNEXURE 1: GLOSSARY

Acceptance

Criteria

(Risk).

: Defines the level of risk to which an individual is

exposed, as either tolerable (negligible risk), intolerable

or within the ALARP region.

Consequence : This is the severity associated with an event in terms

of toxic doses, fire or explosion etc., i.e. the potential

effects of a hazardous event.

ERPG : The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines.

ERPG 1: The maximum airborne concentration below

which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be

exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other

than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving

a clearly defined, objectionable odor.



exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or

developing irreversible or other serious health effects or

symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to

take protective action.



exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or

developing life-threatening health effects.

Frequency : This is the number of occurrences of an event

expressed per unit time. It is usually expressed as the

81

likelihood of an event occurring within one year.

Hazard : A physical situation with the potential for human

injury, damage to property, damage to the

environment or some combination of these.

Hazardous

Scenario

: The identified isolatable sections and/or those which

have been broken down into scenarios for specific items

of equipment.

IDLH : Immediately Dangerous To Life And Health.

The maximum concentration would not cause any

escape imparting symptoms or irreversible health

effects to a person exposed for 30 minutes.

Individual

Risk

: The frequency at which an individual may be expected

to sustain a given level of harm from the realization of

specified hazards.

Individual

Risk

Contours.

: As IR (Individual Risk) is calculated at a point,

calculating the IR at many points allows the plotting

of IR contours, these being lines that indicate constant

levels of risk. Most commonly used are the 1 chance

per million-year contour and the 10 chances per

million-year contour.

82

Individual

Risk

Of Fatality.

: Individual risk with “harm” measured in terms of

fatality. It is calculated at a particular point for a

stationary, unprotected person for 24 hours per day,

365 days per year. Normally measured in chances of

fatality per million years.

Individual

Risk

Of Injury.

: Similar to individual risk of fatality, however with

“harm” measured in terms of injury.

Isolatable

Section.

: A system of pipes or vessels containing the hazardous

materials that are bounded by specific isolation points.

Isolation

Point.

: A point in the process, which can be used to isolate

one part of the process from the rest of the system.

LEL. : Lower Flammability Limit.

Expressed as % by volume of flammable gas in air. This

is the minimum concentration of gas in air mixture

which can ignite. Gas air mixtures below this

concentration do not ignite.

Probability. : The expression for the likelihood of an occurrence of an

event or an event sequence or the likelihood of the

success or failure of an event on test or demand. By

definition, probability must be expressed as a number

between 0 and 1.

Quantitative

Risk

: A risk assessment undertaken by combining quantitative

evaluations of event frequency and consequence.

83

Assessment.

Risk. : The combination of frequency and consequences, the

chance of an event happening that can cause specific

consequences.

Risk

Reduction.

: The process of risk assessment coupled to a systematic

consideration of potential control measures and a

judgment on whether they are reasonably practicable to

implement.

TEEL : Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits.

TEEL-1: Maximum concentration in air below which it

is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed

without experiencing other than mild transient health

effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable

odor.



without experiencing or developing irreversible or other

serious health effects or symptoms that could impair

their abilities to take protective action.



without experiencing or developing life-threatening

health effects.

UFL : Upper Flammability Limit.

84

Expressed as % by volume of flammable gas in air. This

is the maximum concentration of gas in air mixture

which can ignite. Gas air mixtures above this

concentration do not ignite.

Vapor Cloud

Explosion

: An accidental release of flammable liquid or gas, there

is possibility that it may form a cloud which can spread

along the wind direction. Delayed ignition of the cloud

away from the source of release results in Vapor cloud

explosion (flash back) and associated blast/ over

pressure effects.

85

ANNEXURE 2: ABBREVIATIONS

AIChE. American Institute Of Chemical Engineers.

ALARP. As Low As Reasonably Practicable.

BTU. British Thermal Unit.

CCPS. Centre For Chemical Process Safety.

DMP. Disaster Management Plan

ECC. Emergency Control Centre.

EIA. Environmental Impact Assessment.

EMP. Environment Management Plan.

F & E I. Fire And Explosion Index.

HAZOP. Hazard Operability.

HSD. High Speed Diesel.

IDLH. Immediately Dangerous To Life And Health.

IPL. Independent Protection Layer.

KCal. Kilocalories.

lb. Pound.

LOC. Level Of Concentration.

LOPA. Layers Of Protection Analysis.

MCA. Maximum Credible Accident.

MF. Material Factor.

MIDC. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation.

MoEF. Ministry Of Environment And Forests.

MSDS. Material Safety Data Sheet.

MT. Metric Ton.

NFPA. National Fire Protection Association.

PFD. Probability Of Failure On Demand.

PHA. Preliminary Hazard Analysis.

86

QRA. Quantative Risk Assessment.

RH. Risk Assessment And Hazard Management.

SIF. Safety Integrated Function.

TEEL. Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits.

UK. United Kingdom.

87

ANNEXURE 3: REFERENCES

1. Technical EIA Guidance Manual for Synthetic Organic Chemicals,

prepared for the Ministry of Environment and Forests Government of

India.

2. MOND INDEX Manual 1993.

3. “TNO Yellow Book”. Method for calculation of the Physical Effects of

the escape of Dangerous Material (Liquid & Gases) Published by the

Directorate General of Labour, Ministry of Social affair, Netherlands

(1979).

4. Frank P. Lees – Loss Prevention in the Process Industries – Volume I.

5. Risk Assessment for Process Industries, Loss Prevention News April -

June 2001.

6. Techniques for assessing Industrial Hazards (World Bank Technical

Paper, ISSN 0253; No. 55).

7. Ref. Table 3.8 – Vapor Pressure of Organic Compounds, R. H. Perry,

C.C., Chemical Engineers Handbook, 5th Edition (1969) McGrow – Hill

Book co. (New York, London).

8. Guideline for Quantitative Risk Assessment “Purple Book”.

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