rewriting social

Re-writing the Social, Re-writing Sociology: Donzelot, Genealogyand Working-Class Bodies

Nob Doran

The Canadian Journal of Sociology, Volume 29, Number 3, Summer2004, pp. 333-357 (Article)

Published by University of Toronto PressDOI: 10.1353/cjs.2004.0036

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Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 29(3) 2004 333

Re-writing the Social, Re-writing Sociology:Donzelot, Genealogy and Working-ClassBodies*

‘Nob’ Doran

Abstract: A generation ago, Dorothy Smith’s groundbreaking work (1974) inspired numeroussociological neophytes to not only prioritise their own embodied experience, but also to questionthe hitherto taken for granted methodological conventions of the then current sociology. Yet forsome students growing up on Smith’s Marxist-influenced “nourishment,” worrying problems re-mained. Fortunately, with “textual maturity” some resolution of these problems can now be pro-posed. Thus, this paper introduces readers to Donzelot’s genealogical analysis of the “social”(Donzelot 1984) in order to show that Smith’s original critique of conventional sociology must nowbe re-evaluated. Specifically, it will suggest that Smith’s unquestioning usage of Marxist discourseneeds to be subjected to critical analysis, because Marxism itself was heavily implicated in theoriginal “invention” of sociology, and the “social” more generally.

Résumé: Il y a une génération, les travaux révolutionnaires de Dorothy Smith ont inspiré un grandnombre de socio-neophytes à non seulement privilégier leurs expériences intériorisées du monde,mais aussi à questionner les conventions méthodologiques, prises pour acquis jusqu’ici dansl’acceptation de cette version théorique de la sociologie. Cependant, pour certains étudiants del’école de pensée de Smith, dont la théorie se nourrit de l’influence marxiste, des problèmes inquié-tants restent à être résolus. Heureusement, grâce au “textual maturity” certaines solutions à cesproblèmes peuvent maintenant être suggérées. Ainsi, cet article propose aux lecteurs les analyses

* This is a revised and re-written version of a paper originally presented at the “Post-Structural-ism: its reception in Francophone and Anglophone Canada,” Ottawa, May 1984. Subsequentdrafts were presented at conferences and colloquia in Fredericton (1997), York (1997, 2003),Halifax (2003) and Saint John (2003). My thanks to all the participants at these sessions for theirhelpful comments and feedback. Thanks are also extended to Nico Stehr, Virginia Hill, FamLoutfi, three anonymous CJS reviewers and the following people who have helped metremendously with my comprehension of Donzelot’s writings: Rachel Jones, Fauz Malik,Delphine Dardillat, Helene Caquineau, Marc Wagg, Angelique Wojic, Helene Cuilland, the lateJohn Fortin and Clive Gour.

Derek Young

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334 Canadian Journal of Sociology

1. A socialization which benefitted tremendously from the fledgling “social studies of science”school which extended the ethnomethodological critique to the natural sciences, eg Woolgar1976, Latour and Woolgar, 1979, Mulkay 1979, 1984, Mulkay and Gilbert 1982, 1986.

2. Although that is not to say that ethnomethodology/conversation analysis did eventually cometo analyse such a phenomenon. See Zimmerman and West (1975) for an early, albeit inadequateattempt at such work

3. Thus her earliest “feminist” work is very much concerned with linking up women’s experienceswith Marxism’s understanding of ideology and governing (Smith 1974a, 1974c, 1974d, 1975)

4. Foucault’s work was attractive not just because of his critique of Marxism (1970, 1980a) butalso because his genealogy of “criminology” (1977a) suggested a more widespread applicabilityto other modern ‘social sciences’.

5. Fortunately, others were alerting me, at this time, to the inadequacy of such a concept. Cohen1989, Melossi 1990, Chunn and Gavigan 1988.

généalogiques de Donzelot sur le ‘social’ (Donzelot 1984), tout en démontrant que la critiqueoriginale de Smith sur la sociologie conventionnelle doit faire maintenant l’objet d’une ré-éxami-nation. En effet, cet essai émettra l’hypothèse que l’usage inconditionnel du Marxisme chez Smithdoit se prêter aux analyses critiques, car le Marxisme lui-même était lourdement impliqué dansl’invention originelle de la sociologie, et, par extension, du “social” en général.

I was weaned on ethnomethodology/conversation analysis (Wootton 1975,Atkinson and Drew 1978, Drew 1978, Benson and Drew 1978) and simulta-neously exposed to Dorothy Smith’s early articles (1974a, 1978), as she begandeveloping what would later become her institutional ethnography (1987), herfeminist textual analysis (1974b, 1990a, 1990b) and, more recently, her“intertextual” concern with “writing the social” (1999a). In this intellectualinfancy, the ethnomethodological critique of sociology (Garfinkel 1967, Zim-merman and Wieder 1970, Blum 1970a, 1970b Mehan and Wood, 1975,Filmer et al, 1972) and its associated “methods” (Cicourel 1964, Atkinson1971, McHugh 1970) was absolutely foundational for my later development,1

while the attraction of Smith’s work was that it pushed this critique of conven-tional sociology further, so as to explore those everyday relations of powerwhich remained rather marginal in the ethnomethodological literature of thattime.2

Yet, throughout this scholarly socialization, I constantly experienced “afeeling of uneasiness ... some disquiet” (Smith 1999a:8 –9) about Smith’s own(apparently straightforward) use of Marxism to ground her feminist career.3 Nodoubt influenced by my own working class upbringing, and the apparentinability of Marxist discourse to explain that embodied experience, I initiallyattempted to go beyond Smith’s sociology as “ruling apparatus” (Smith1981a:3) thesis, by using Foucault and his (novel, at the time) conceptuali-sation of power/knowledge.4 Not surprisingly, perhaps, in those formativeyears of my sociological education, my attempted “genealogy” of sociology,focussing on the “social control”5 element within contemporary sociology, as

Donzelot, Genealogy and Working-Class Bodies 335

6. Of course, my intellectual ‘socialization’ continued regardless, and I found myself turningtowards more empirical, genealogical research (albeit still implicitly informed by theseformative ethnomethodological and institutional ethnographic insights). In my case, I focusedon documenting the “subjugation” (Foucault 1980b:81–83) of working class “experiential”voices and their transformation into the discourse of “calculated risks” exemplified by themodern workers’ compensation system (Doran 1986).

7. Nor was I alone in this uneasiness. Lemert’s (1992) concern with “fractured identities,” Hill-Collins’s (1992) with the entrapment of Smith within the “inner circle” of sociology, Connell’s(1992) with Smith’s elevation of “individualism,” Clough’s (1993) with Smith’s lack ofattention to “unconscious desire” have been concerns raised by fellow sociologists. Harding(1986), of course, was responsible for bringing Smith’s work to the sustained attention offeminist philosophers.

8. In Smith’s case, she resolved her dilemma, after some years of acting like a “secret agent”(1990b:191–202) within sociology (Smith 1959, 1965) by becoming textually active in 1974.In that year, she articulated, almost simultaneously, both a theoretical framework for analysis,inspired by her “naive and happily untutored reading” (Smith 1990a:200) of Marx; as well asa self-reflective awareness of her embodied self; one which had been transformed and inspiredby how “the women’s movement has given us a sense of our right to have women’s interestsrepresented in sociology” (1974d:7). And having found this voice, she has been “writing thesocial” (1999a) from this specifically feminist perspective, ever since. In my case, it has alsotaken me until now to resolve my dilemma.

9. Of course, I had already discovered Donzelot’s (1979a) work on the policing of families as thisentire book was available in translation, but his explicit work on the “social,” although buildingon this early work, represents a significant departure in his thinking.

well as the subjugation of both Comte’s and Garfinkel’s thought in its theo-retical development (Doran 1984), was rather rudimentary. As a result, thatparticular project remained unfinished for some considerable time.6

Nevertheless, that initial theoretical uneasiness with Smith’s work stayedwith me7 along with the reservations about my own early attempts at “genea-logical” analysis. And although I went on to become “competent” within thediscourse of sociology, I still struggled to resolve this “line of fault” (Smith1987: 47) between my own embodied experience and (both the “conventional”and the “political economy” versions of) the discipline.8 During this period, Isearched for other Foucauldian scholars who might be of some help in thisquest. Smart (1982, 1990), Procacci (1989, 1991), Osborne and Rose (1997),and Rose (1999) have all published Foucauldian-inspired analyses of“sociology”; but as I have now discovered, it is Donzelot’s (1984) work whichmost clearly shows the inadequacy of Smith’s use of a Marxist theoreticalframework. This is not just because he offers a sophisticated genealogicalunderstanding of sociology combined with a detailed analysis of how thisdiscipline targeted working class bodies, but, it is also because he situates theeffects of Marxist discourse itself within the analysis.

And even though I had originally discovered one segment of Donzelot’swritings on the “social” (1988) some time ago,9 as most of this book remained


10. Moreover, Donzelot’s own summaries of some of this work (1991a, b) failed to demonstrate thebreadth of his theorizing. However, other Donzelot scholars (Burchell 2000, Minson 2000),familiar with his work in French, have helped me to persevere with this, at times, daunting task.

11. Yet, it must also be acknowledged that my manner of working follows closely upon Smith’sopenly acknowledged methodology — with regard to starting analysis with “a sense of aproblem ... of something that could be explicated” (1999a:9). But, in addition, it also followsSmith’s own backgrounded and tacit methodology with regard to her only becoming “textuallyactive” as a feminist sociologist after the “reshaping of self” (1994:55) which resulted from hertaking seriously the “line of fault” (1987:49) between embodied experience and sociological(and other similar types of) discourse. However, as can be seen throughout this paper, I ammuch more attentive than Smith ever was, to the actual temporal process of “assembling a self”first, before one can become “textually active” (cf Blum and McHugh 1984, McHugh et al1974).

12. For the resolution of a similar sense of disquiet with Smith’s (tacit) methodological use ofMarxism within her “institutional ethnography” see Doran 1993a, 1993b.

13. Although this paper is principally concerned with explicating the emergence of the “social” (andits related power/knowledge technologies), Donzelot’s work since 1984 (Donzelot and Estèbe1994, Donzelot 1996, Donzelot and Wyvekens 1998, Donzelot and Mével 2001) is increasinglyconcerned with its transformation into “le social du troisième type” (Donzelot, 1991c). Inaddition, he also focuses on documenting the changing technologies which accompanied thismutation. Thus, as a result of the “crise de l’État providence” (Donzelot 1984:180) technologiessuch as “contractual integration” and “community mediation” begin replacing the social’stechniques of”normalization,” “insurance” etc. See Donzelot and Jaillet 1997a, b for an over-view (the latter in English) of these developments.

untranslated, it remained difficult for me to use.10 However, now that I havelearnt “how to mean” (Smith 1990b:109) in Donzelot’s preferred language ofcommunication, I have profited from his writings, and am now in a position tosatisfactorily resolve my original disquiet with Smith’s theoretical use ofMarxism.11 Of course, such a critique is directed only at Smith’s macro-theo-retical framework. Its focus is not, at all, on Smith’s ethnomethodologically-inspired “institutional ethnography”12 or her textual analysis.

Although this paper cannot serve as a general introduction to Donzelot’stheorizing on the emerging nature of the “social” (nor can it outline his equallyimportant writings on the late twentieth century’s mutation in the “social”), itcan suggest how “sociology” might be better understood within the Foucaul-dian paradigm of power/knowledge13 rather than the Marxist framework ofideology. As a result, this will allow us to go beyond Smith’s theoretical cri-tique of sociology as a rather straightforward tool of “governing” (Smith1974d:8) under late capitalism (Smith 1999b:71; 1974c:53; 1999a:93;1990a:7–8, 1987:77).

Specifically, I will demonstrate why one should understand (Durkheim’s)sociology in a way similar to Foucault’s understanding of criminology. In fact,following Donzelot himself (1991c:17), I’ll suggest that his genealogy ofsociology complements Foucault’s (1977a) work in certain quite specific ways,


14. Although my analysis should be sharply differentiated from Kroker’s (1984) argument whichstressed certain underlying similarities between Parsons and Foucault, with respect to theirconceputalisation of power. My point is rather to stress the similarities between Foucault’s andDonzelot’s work in terms of the targets on whom this power/knowledge is aimed.

15. Smith’s general position here has changed very little since her early work (1974d). Andalthough her 1996 (also see 1999:73–95) article does provide a historical analysis of the growthin the “textual mediation of capital,” sociology is only implicitly situated within this analysis.This is not to say, however, that Smith ignores historical analysis (see Smith 1981b, 1985), butrather that she has rarely subjected sociology to this empirically specific historical gaze.

16. It is Donzelot’s specific attention to mutations in discursive fields and the role that conflict andresistance plays in constituting these transformations that separates his work most clearly fromother “governmentality” scholars (Procacci 1989, 1991, Osborne and Rose 1997, Rose 1999)in this area.

and that these discourses emerge almost as mirror images14 of each other. Inother words, I will argue that instead of following Smith’s understanding ofsociology as one feature of a more general development of textual “rulingrelations” under capitalism15 we need to situate it within its precise social andhistorical context, or more precisely, to start seeing it within an emerging fieldof power/knowledge16 in which the “working class” are the prime targets foreach discipline’s emergence.

And when one carries out such a genealogy, as Donzelot has done, one seesDurkheimian sociology appearing at a very specific historical juncture — itemerged, as part of a profound mutation in governance, aimed at providing astrategic third way “solution” to the impasse reached between Marxist thoughtand liberal/conservative thought over the future of French society and the state.In other words, Durkheim’s sociology emerged out of a precise historical con-flict in which Marxism itself was heavily implicated.

Relatedly, Donzelot also suggests ways in which one can advance beyondSmith’s original critique of the “methods” typically associated with sociology.Thus whereas she understood the type of quantification routinely suggested bysome sociologists as quite straightforwardly representing the “ideological”methods which sociology uses (1974c:46); and the generation of “social facts”by administrative agencies as constructing a world already ideologically struc-tured upon which “sociological work appears as almost parasitic” (1974c:53),Donzelot, in contrast, allows us to understand these techniques and methods interms of power/knowledge rather than ideology.

Consequently, Donzelot’s discussion of the techniques of “statistics” (whichform the basis of the technology of insurance) and of “social facts” (whichform the foundation for “social rights”) complements Foucault’s discussion ofhow techniques of surveillance and discipline were targeted at certain types ofbodies during the nineteenth century. And when one performs a genealogicalanalysis, as Donzelot has done, one sees that these “statistical counts” and


17. At least, we were told we were still working class, by sociologists like Goldthorpe, Lockwoodet al (1968a, 1968b, 1969) who analyzed families like the one in which I was brought up.

18. There was, however, one significant exception within this Marxist tradition. The work comingout of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham seemed very attentive to thecontemporary features of “growing up working class” in the late welfare state era (Willis 1977,McRobbie 1980, Hebdige 1979, Hall et al 1978), but their perspectival starting point, in Alt-husser, Gramsci and others, made it difficult for me to insert myself into this discourse with ease.

“social facts” were introduced and applied to resolve problems of class conflictendemic in late nineteenth century France; but in ways which eschewed notonly the proposed Liberal solution, but the Marxist one, as well.

But before demonstrating the specific and unique contributions that Don-zelot’s work can provide for any contemporary analysis of the emergence ofsociology and the social, it is first necessary to re-trace the general develop-ment of the Foucauldian “genealogical” contribution, as well as the more spe-cific contributions that later scholars have made when applying Foucault’sinsights to the discipline of sociology.

Extending Genealogical Analysis: From Criminology to Sociology

In many ways, when Foucault’s work on power/knowledge was first importedinto the English-speaking world, it introduced an entirely new paradigm for thecritical theorising of “knowledge” in contemporary social theory. And forworking class students,17 like myself, who found it hard to fit one’s developingself within the (outdated) categories which the Marxism of my formal educa-tion was providing, Foucault’s theoretical direction seemed much more pro-mising.18 By severing himself from the French Marxist tradition (Althusser1969, 1972, Althusser and Balibar 1977, Poulantzas, 1973, 1978) with its em-phases on the “ideological state apparatuses” and the superstructural workingsof the state, as well as distancing himself from the predominantly German“ideology-critique” of the Frankfurt school (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972,Marcuse 1964, Geuss 1981), Foucault promised a critical stance on knowledgeproduction which transcended his own twin heritages of Marxism andphenomenology (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983), and instead found resonanceswith such unfashionable thinkers as Nietsche (Foucault 1977b), Bentham(Foucault 1977a) and Clausewitz (Foucault 1980b).

i. Power/knowledge and Criminology

Perhaps his most influential contribution (especially for my self-construction)was his dogged empirical investigations of the “human sciences” and especiallytheir relationship to power. Thus, although in his early works, his “archeo-


logical” approach focussed on the “epistemelogical conditions of emergenceof the human sciences” (Smart 1985: 19), the “mature” Foucault turned to thecomplex relationship between knowledge and power. For example, he was thefirst to introduce us to the problem of “normalization” (Patton 1979, Donzelot1988, Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, Smart 1985, Garland 1990); that is, withhow certain “social scientific” discourses produced categories of knowledgewhich, when combined with the legal framework in which they operate,succeeded in displacing earlier “rights” based discourses (Foucault 1980c).Thus these nineteenth century sciences produced a whole panoply of micro-powers (Foucault 1977a) which sought to observe, judge and examine“bodies.” These constituted the “dividing practices” (Foucault, 1983:208)which worked to objectify the subject; in part by dividing the social world intothe mad and the sane, the healthy and the sick, etc. Foucault’s most explicitillustration of these “microtechniques” is contained in his classic, “Disciplineand Punish.” There, he showed in some detail the “disciplinary” constructionof the “delinquent” as an individual identity during the nineteenth century(Foucault 1977a). This figure, both “pathological” and “individualised,” wasthe result of the interaction between the modern prison and the nascent scienceof criminology. Whereas criminal law had previously punished acts whichtransgressed the law, in the nineteenth century it became necessary to “know”the criminal’s identity, not just to punish an infraction (Foucault 1978).

Although Foucault himself first elaborated his theory of power/knowledgewith primary reference to this emergence of criminology (1977a), and as aresult inadvertently instigated a flood of literature (Cohen and Scull 1983,Cohen 1985, Melossi 1990, Ignatieff 1978) seeking new insights into Westernforms of social control, he quickly understood the wider ramifications of this“genealogical” form of analysis. As important as it was to articulate the prac-tices which produced “docile bodies” in the nineteenth century, Foucault alsorealised that this was part of a broader historical development, the fusion ofknowledge and power regarding the “governance” of bodies, whether they beindividual bodies or the social body. And others began to use this theoreticalarticulation of “biopolitics” and “anatamopolitics” to examine aspects of thebroader nature of productive power within the “welfare state” (Arney andBergen 1984, Armstrong 1983, Figlio 1982). Hewitt’s (1983) work was one ofthe first studies in English to explicitly extend these concerns of Foucault intothe arena of social policy, and was followed by others which demonstrated howthe welfare state was not simply involved in guaranteeing the individual rightsof its citizens but it was also concerned with producing the docile bodiesneeded within an industrializing society (Donzelot 1979a, Polsky 1991, Pas-quino 1991, Procacci 1991, Garland 1981, Meyer 1983, Burchell 1979).

Since these initial “genealogical” analyses however, later work has movedin a significantly different direction. For example, the current governmentality


19. In contrast, the human science of psychology has been subjected to a significant amount ofgenealogical scrutiny. See Rose 1985, 1988, 1990, 1996b.

school is not so much concerned with furthering Foucault’s work on power/knowledge, but instead suggests the emergence of a “new game of power ... thecommunity-civility game” (Rose 1999:188). Basing itself, primarily, on two(largely unpublished) series of lectures given at the “college de France,” andone published lecture by Foucault on “governmentality,” this school seeks toshow the utility of these lectures for both the contemporary analysis of theforms of neo-liberalism which emerged (at least in Britain and certain otherwestern nations) after the demise of the social; and for the historical analysisof its discursive origins (see, for example, Gordon 1991, Burchell 1991, 1996,Rose 1996a, Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996).

ii. Sociology and Foucauldian analysis

Yet despite Foucault’s undeniable success in encouraging sustained analysisof the human sciences, little was originally said about the role that sociologyplayed in this Foucauldian field. Foucault himself said very little about either“sociology”19 or the “social.” Moreover, the early Foucauldian-inspired discus-sions of “sociology” generally tended to play down its relationship to power/knowledge (Smart 1982). More recently, however, “governmentality” scholarshave begun to situate “sociology” within Foucault’s genealogical theorising.But whereas Gordon (1991:27–36) used Donzelot’s work to suggest that“sociology” was a strategic intervention within the political class struggles ofmid nineteenth century France, Osborne and Rose (1997) and Rose (1999)have tended to see “sociology” as simply a technology of government withinthe “political rationality” of the nineteenth century “social.” As a result,sociology, and perhaps the “social” itself, tends to be seen in “ideal typical”forms as another instalment in the “insular and episodic vision of rule”(O’Malley, Weir and Shearing 1997:512) which constitutes a certain govern-mentality view of “liberalism” (cf Foucault 1991, Burchell 1996, Rose 1999).

Outside this “Anglo-Foucauldian” (Valverde 1996:358) literature, howeverthere has been more attention paid to the politics, resistances and contestationswhich were instrumental in producing “sociology.” Procacci (1989) hasattempted to situate Comte’s sociology within the wider political conflicts ofnineteenth century France, and thus responds to another of O’Malley, Weir andShearing’s (1997:502) critique of the “governmentality” literature; that it haslost much of its understanding of politics as social relations, in favour of seeingpolitics as merely a “mentality of rule.”


20. For example, both Hunter (1996:154–5) and Osborne (1996:108–13) detail different aspectsof the construction of the social, but marginalise discussions of the politics of the time, in favourof a focus on the implementaton of specific governmental rationalities.

21. And unlike a number of governmentality theorists, he is not concerned with locating thisemergence as merely an evolution within Liberalism (cf Gordon 1991, Rose 1999, Osborne1996). Rather he wants to analyse its contours without reducing it to the gradual unfolding ofliberal governmentality.

22. In other words, Donzelot’s major concern is with accounting for these epistemic shifts whichtransformed previous discoursive fields, — what might be called “mutations.” Moreover, hisconcern is with how counter-discourses “problematise” existing situations, the contestationwhich results and the subsequent displacement of the discursive field.

23. It is Donzelot’s consistent concern with politics and mutation which is missing in Gordon’s,(1991) otherwise informative remarks on Donzelot (1984).

24. And contrasts sharply with the more conventional analyses of the rise of the welfare state, fromeither liberal, administrative or Marxist perspectives. For examples of these types of analysis,see Slater 1930, Fraser 1973, Webb and Webb 1929a, 1929b, Bruce 1966, Gough 1979.

Yet as I will argue, it is Donzelot’s (1984) work which perhaps best re-sponds to these criticisms raised by “critical governmentality theory” (Stenson1998:334). For not only does Donzelot analyse the mechanics of the“mutation” which produced the “social” (thus suggesting something quitedifferent than an episodic development of liberalism), but he takes pains topoint out how politics, contestation and resistances played central roles in this,and subsequent, mutations. In other words, his work goes beyond the earlyarcheological interpretations of sociology, without neglecting the importanceof acting, resisting bodies; an absence which marks some of the present gov-ernmentality literature.20

Donzelot’s (1984) work shares with Procacci (1989, 1991) a concern withthe politics of nineteenth century France, but goes beyond that work by notonly analysing the emergence of a new knowledge (sociology) but also itspractical implementation as a technology of government of the emerging“social.”21 And although not the focus of this particular paper, Donzelot is alsoconcerned with explicating the social’s demise and its subsequent mutation22

in the late twentieth century.23 As a consequence, his work should be of interestto a variety of social scientists (despite the fact that a full-length Englishtranslation is still unavailable), as it not only constitutes something of a parallelanalysis to Foucault’s genealogical work on criminology, but it also suggestsways of re-introducing questions of politics, resistances and mutations into theFoucauldian field.

iii. Inventing the social

Basically, Donzelot’s primary interest is the rise of the welfare state24 in Franceand its subsequent demise. As part of this interest in the “social,” however, is


25. And also contrasts with more standard analyses of sociology’s emergence eg Abrams 1968,Kent 1981.

26. And also goes beyond the more traditional analyses of the emergence of insurance, as well asthe more recent scholarship on “risk” influenced by Beck (1992).

27. In fact, his earlier work was very heavily influenced by Foucault’s work. See Donzelot 1979a,1979b.

28. And because he explicitly analyses the role that Marxist discourse played in the unintentionalproduction of the “social,” this allows us to see very clearly why Smith’s understanding needsto be rethought.

29. In other words, Donzelot’s concern is equally with the “how” of the emergence of the social,and not just with describing its characteristics. Moreover he shows the importance of “passionatepolitics” (Donzelot 1984) for this development, at this specific point in history.

the related concern with documenting the emergence of its associated knowl-edge of “sociology,”25 because Durkheim’s “sociology” leads to the wide-spread acceptance of the novel concept of “solidarity.” And this new discourse,with its practical application in terms of the coupling of “social rights” and thetechnology of insurance,26 was crucial in helping resolve the impasse whichhad resulted from the growing conflict between the French working class andthe defenders of the original republic.

And although Donzelot is undoubtedly a fervent proponent of the generalFoucauldian approach,27 in this work he also goes beyond Foucault by expli-citly discussing the specific contributions which the conflicts between Marxistand socialist discourses28 on the one hand, and liberal and conservative dis-courses on the other, made to this emergence of sociology and the “social.” Inparticular, his genealogical analysis demonstrates how the emergence of thewelfare state is intimately tied up with the empirical failure of the second re-public and its privileged discourse of “rights,” as well as the subsequent “prob-lematisation” of the state via Napoleon III’s coup d’etat, shortly afterwards.

The second republic’s immediate difficulties with concretising the notionof “rights,” especially the “right to work,” not only displayed to everyone thecontradictions inherent in the Rousseauian discourse of individual “sover-eignty,” but the subsequent coup d’etat illustrated quite starkly the inadequacyof Rousseau’s conceptualization of the state for the actual practice of politics.The subsequent confrontations and contestations between the newly mintedgroups of the left and right (amply aided by Marx’s and Toqueville’s con-temporary analyses of the republic’s dilemma) clearly illustrated this voidwhich had been produced by the fracturing of this Rousseauian notion of“rights” in 1848. And it is only with the 3rd republic’s invention of solidarityand the social that a way is eventually found to resolve this impasse.29

Beginning his analysis in the turbulent years of midnineteenth centuryFrance, Donzelot shows how the call for “rights” which had been used to uniteFrench society against despotism, under the banner of Rousseau in the first halfof the century, now operated to divide it.


Le droit rassembleur de tous les citoyens contre les privilèges et le despotisme est mort sur lesbarricades de juin. A partir de cette date, le droit ne rassemble plus, il divise (1984:48).

In fact, it is the republic itself which now becomes the problem (1984:19),because of its contradictory understanding of “rights.” The “universal suffrage”which had been introduced in February 1848 (25) was quickly followed by anattempt at implementing the “right to work,” via the creation of National work-shops in Paris. Not surprisingly, as soon as this right was proclaimed, it set thepeople of Paris against the elected Assembly (36). And events quicklyescalated from there. By June, with the assembly suppressing the workshops(27) and the workers reacting by manning the barricades, the subsequent civilwar in the streets of Paris ended with the elected assembly ordering themassacre of these insurgent workers(32).

Obviously this new political sovereignty — universal male suffrage — hadnot solved the immense economic inequalities in French society(33), yet thesubsequent inability of the National assembly to resolve, within its walls, thisimmediate problem of conflicting rights (40–42); and the simultaneousemergence of a challenge to the republic itself from the left (46–47) quicklyresulted in the third act of this little play (26–28); the coup d’etat of NapoleonIII in 1851. And it this outright victory for the state (56) which now brings anempirical immediacy to the problem of the relationship between the state andsociety(56), not just the relationship between sovereignty and rights. On theone hand, Liberal thought now assaults Rousseau for his inability to theorisethe state in any meaningful and concrete fashion(57–62), whilst on the otherhand, Marx himself beginning from the same point of departure as Toqueville,Barrot and others, now sees the problem of the state as the fault of capitalism,rather than Rousseau (64).

Consequently, alliances now get forged around these diametrically opposedcritiques of the state. Liberals and traditionalists come together to resist anyextension of the state’s role, while Marxist thought and a certain sector of therepublican movement now combine together with the aim of ‘instrumentalis-ing’ the state for revolutionary purposes (66). In other words, the fundamentalambivalence within the Rousseauian notion of sovereignty and its inability toclearly articulate a legitimate role for the state now becomes a political andsocial problem, in which “civil war” (70) is a likely outcome.

For those on the left, the state as the

Incarnation de la souveraineté de tous, expression de la volonté générale, manifestation du `moicommun’ de la société, tout cela renvoie l’Etat à une conception illimitative de son role(1984:73)

had already led the people of Paris to deeply suspect the National Assembly.Whilst on the other side of the political spectrum, a quite different interpreta-tion was becoming prevalent.


30. For a recent overview of the importance of statistics within genealogical analyses, see Rose1999. For my own research in this field I found Hacking’s seminal work (1982) of tremendousimportance.

31. In time, of course, Durkheim did write on both the “state” (Giddens 1971:96–101, 1986:49–62)and the notion of “rights” (Lukes 1972:338–44). But the point of Donzelot’s analysis here is notso much with the content of Durkheim’s work, but rather with the specific effects of thepublication of “De la Division de la travail social” for the politics of the time.

La hantisse du socialisme d’Etat dans les classes aisées se nourrit de cette absence de frein apportéau pouvoir de l’Etat par sa nouvelle légitimité politique (1984:74)

However, into the void created by this polemic, there did emerge a strategicsolution to this problem; in the form of the “social:”

le social, à l’intersection du civil et du politique, médiatisant ces deux registres là où l’on avaitd’abord cru possible leur articulation immédiate, créant à partir de ces deux niveaux un genrehybride, dont la ligne de force pourrait bien être d’oeuvrer progressivement à leur communeextinction ... (1984:72)

And in his articulation of the component parts of this “social,” Donzelotidentifies the crucial roles which the terms “sociology” (79–83), “solidarity”(73–120), “social facts” (111, 127), “insurance” (128–133; 1988:399–403) and“statistics”30 (173; 1988:422) came to play in the strategic success of the social.

For Donzelot, the emergence of sociology (with its central concept ofsolidarity) in the late nineteenth century was no mere intellectual development.

L’idéal répubican se trouvait frappé d’une certain inconsistance, face à la montée des grandssystèmes rivaux qu’étaient le libéralisme et le Marxisme: la notion de solidarité pouvait-elle apporterà la théorie cohérente de l’ordre social qui semblait lui faire défaut? (1984:75)

In other words, Durkheim’s sociology promised a new theoretical foundationfor society; one which steered clear of the two existing, yet antagonistic“foundational principles” — that of the individual as the principle of intel-ligibility of social reality and that of the class struggle as the motor of his-tory(77). Moreover, it suggested a practical solution (77) to the continuingproblem of sovereignty. With its notion of solidarity (both organic andmechanical), Durkheim’s work not only avoided any focus on “rights” but italso introduced an evolutionary concern into the discussion of society andrelegated the individual to a distinctly subordinate position (81). Moreover italso introduced a new “art of governing”(85) and suggested a totally new rolefor the state, as its priest or its church, but definitely not its subject (86).31

Durkheim’s work was quickly taken up by legal philosophers such asDuguit and Hauriou, who both attempted to translate the notion of solidarityinto a theory of jurisprudence (94). Duguit’s work endeavoured to make the“scientific” notion of solidarity (92) the legitimate basis for law rather than theRousseauian sovereign individual (93), while Hauriou replaces Duguit’s rather


32. At least, that is, until the crisis of the welfare state emerged in the 1960's. As Donzelot(1984:185–224) shows, liberal and Marxist discourses returned with a vengeance to suggest newtrajectories for the “social.”

33. And this coupling of the notion of “solidarity” with progress not only provided a principle ofarticulation between Duguit’s and Hauriou’s formulations,(108) but equally importantly, wasable to further marginalise both the Liberals’ and the Marxists’ negative interpretations of therelationship between progress and “solidarity” (112).

static picture (97) with one which stresses societal movement, history (98), andthe fact that individuals are not simply alone before the state but are typicallyentangled within existing “institutions”(99).

Unfortunately, although both of them based their theorising on the notionof solidarity, their proposals went in quite different directions. Duguit’s sug-gested a strongly interventionist role for a public service making decisionsbased on an objective rule of “solidarity;” while Hauriou’s went in the otherdirection, towards a recognition of the plurality of the existing institutionswhich made up the “solidarity” of society (103–04). As a result, the debateover the role of the state was not extinguished by these theoretical articula-tions. Whereas the notion of “solidarity” had initially been heralded as a meansfor transcending the Liberal/Marxist debate over “sovereignty,” this debatesimply became transposed into a more virulent form with the Liberal andMarxist critiques now becoming focussed on the notion of “solidarity”(105–106), rather than sovereignty. On the one hand, Marxists saw “solidarity”as an artificial mechanism for slowing down the course of history and retardingthe class struggle. On the other hand, Liberals saw “solidarity” as impedingprogress, of destroying the means of its realisation, which rested on freecompetition and personal intitiative (105–6).

And it was only with the writings of Léon Bourgeois that these counter-discourses of Liberalism and Marxism become finally subdued.32 He ac-complished this task with his political doctrine of “solidarism;” which not onlytranslated solidarity into a practical and workable application for the state, buteffectively marginalised Liberal and Marxist opposition. By introducing thenotion of a historical debt (110) pre-existing any understanding of rights, hewent beyond the Liberal/Marxist pre-occupation with “rights” and rights alone(108), and went on to argue that debts must first be paid before any rightscould be exercised (110).

As a result, state intervention was to be clearly and effectively demarcated.Its task was that of intervening where it was most needed for purposes ofsolidarity (110), and insuring its members against the risks that their interde-pendence gave rise to (111). The state thus would be authorised to cure thoseills created by its own organization, eg accidents, sickness, unemployment(111) ensuring social solidarity and the more general “progress” of society.33


Thus, finally at the end of the nineteenth century we see the successfulresolution of the “social question” through the dual implementation of the dis-course of solidarity and a new role for the state; as the “guarantor of society’sprogress” (1988:395). In effect, the discourse of solidarity gives a new basis forstate intervention with the technique of “social rights” as its modality forintervention (71–2). That is to say “social right presents itself ... as the prac-tical application of the theory of solidarity” (1988:396). But these social rightsmust not be confused with the classical notion of rights which caused so muchhavoc in 1848.

Social rights are “intended to promote the popular classes and the morefragile social categories generally” (1988:397). But unlike the “right to work”in 1848, these rights have no possibility of subversion within them. Instead, asthey are based on the concept of solidarity, they seek to “make up for theshortcomings of society, to compensate for the effects of poverty and reducethe effects of oppression”(1988:397). And through such a technique, the 3rdrepublic hopes to finally extinguish the antagonisms of the left and right whichhad haunted it since 1848. Thus, at the end of the nineteenth century, we seelegislation being passed in areas including “accidents, illness, old age,unemployment. Laws protecting women and children in the family” (1988:396). Finally, these “social rights” were not based on the legal and politicalmaxims given through philosophical or judicial discourses. Instead, they werebased on the “scientific credentials” (1988:398) given by experts like Durk-heim, who insisted that in order to “understand and act on social phenemonait is necessary to start — always and exclusively — from social fact” (1988:398).

The language of insurance is the other major technique used in this creationof the social. This governmental technology was instrumental in securing thepassage of several of these “social rights” by the end of the century (1988:396).For example, whereas the liberal school only saw accidents at work in termsof individual responsibility (1988:399), the discourse of insurance transferredthis responsibility to a collective level (1988:400) and removed any allocationof blame. In other words, compensation was now substituted for justice(1988:405) via a general socialization of risk (1988:396). Perhaps more im-portantly, this discourse was also able to homogenise the population rather thanpreserving it as a fundamentally divided one. In other words, it had a recog-nisably political function, it helped to unify a population which previously hadtoo often seen itself separated into the dichotomous and conflictual categoriesof capital and labour(1988:423). In fact, armed with these two techniques, of“social rights” and of insurance, the third republic is now able to defeat all ofits major rivals, the liberals, the traditionalists and the socialists (1988:399), onthis matter of the “social question.”


34. Although it is Donzelot, alone, who explicitly attends to the mechanisms by which the social“mutated” in the late twentieth century. See Donzelot 1984:179–263 for the details of thistransformation.

Conclusion

Although Donzelot’s work constitutes a masterful genealogy of “sociology”and the “social,” he himself is clear that his work needs to be understood inrelation to Foucault’s earlier undertaking.

La nouveauté, à la fin du XIXe siecle, c’est que l’encadrement des marginaux trouve son conceptavec l’idée de dangerosité apportée par la criminologie naissante ... L’autre face du social se définità l’inverse de celle-ci. Il ne s’agit plus de défendre la société contre la menace potentielle ou avéréeque représente tel ou tel individu, mais de défendre celui-ci contre les préjudices que peut luioccasionner la société du fait de la division sociale du travail. (1991c:17)

In other words, Foucault and Donzelot, together, have displayed both sides ofthe nineteenth century emergence of the power/knowledge complex — the“social.”34 That is, they succeeded in producing genealogies of both the normaland the pathological within this episteme. Moreover, they both agree on therole that specific social sciences played in this development. It is also clear,however, that for both writers, these techniques are targeted at a specificgrouping in society; variously labelled the “working-class” (Foucault 1977a:275), the “poorer classes” (Foucault 1977a:278, 285, 287), the “lower classes”(Foucault 1977a:287, “les classes nécessiteuses” (Donzelot 1984:22), “unepopulation ouvrière” (Donzelot 1984:27), and the “peuple” (Donzelot 1984:25). For Foucault, the rise of criminology with its discursive creation of thepathological “delinquent,” and its associated technologies of discipline andsurveillance, was a means of dividing an otherwise dangerous working class.For Donzelot, on the other hand, the emergence of sociology, with itsassociated technologies of statistics and social rights, enabled the working classto be unified in a society which otherwise left them divided against theinterests of capital. As Donzelot (1991c:18) eloquently summarises the entireprocess;

Le thème du social correspond donc à l’institutionalisation depuis la fin du XIXe siecle de deuxdémarches symétriquement inverses, même si elles sont complémentaires: défendre la société contrel’individu qui la menace, protéger l’individu contre les risques que la société lui fait encourir.

Nevertheless, both these scholars provide analyses which are recognisablytop-down in their formulations. That is, they don’t attempt to situate their owncorporeal selves within this analytic framework. Smith, on the other hand,


35. Although such a maxim was common to all the ethnomethodologists, it was perhaps mostclearly stated by Turner (1974:204–5)

36. And although Smith herself has rarely acknowledged Foucault’s genealogical insights, otherfeminists, from the early 1980's onwards, began engaging in productive dialogues with this work(Martin 1982, Sawicki 1991, Ramazanoglu 1993) or displaying the empirical applicability ofhis insights (Ferguson 1984, Bartky 1988, Smart 1989, 1990, 1992).

37. The classic reference here is Thompson (1968), but interested readers might consult Palmer(1981, 1994), Kaye and McClelland (1990) Anderson (1980) for a range of commentaries onThompson’s own work. For exemplary analyses within this “history from below” tradition, onemight examine Hay et al 1975, Linebaugh 1992, Thompson 1975, 1991. For the more recentdebate concerning the death or otherwise of this tradition, see Joyce 1995, Eley and Nield 1995,2000

38. See Hall 1974, Hall 1977 for theoretical introductions to this type of work, and Hall et. al., 1978for an empirical demonstration.

following the lead of the ethnomethodologists,35 insisted, from the beginningof her feminist career, on the necessity of knowing the world from within(Smith 1974d:11), and that scholarly analysis had to start from embodiedexperience.36 Thus despite the insights garnered from these post-structuralistwriters, we still lack any sustained analysis of this “social” from the embodiedperspective of those on whom these techniques were implemented.

Of course, a whole tradition of scholarship has been concerned with docu-menting “the making of the (English) working class.”37 yet little attention, todate, has been focussed on the “unmaking” of that same class. Williams (1973)and his suggestions regarding working class cultural “incorporation” are, ofcourse, important in this regard, but his actual research concerns were farremoved from everyday, embodied working class culture. Hall was also veryattentive to this problem, but his work mainly concerned itself with “workingclass” political containment, rather than cultural “incorporation.”38 And noneof these scholars paid much attention to the theoretical necessity of explicitlybeginning analysis from one’s own cultural competence. In contrast, feministwork, and Smith in particular, has suggested a powerful way of combiningmicro and macro analyses, while simultaneously providing a foundation forthat analytic perspective, in lived experience.

Thus, I find myself returning to Smith’s work, but now with a definiteclarity about the utility of her work. That is to say, although this paper hasfocussed principally on the inadequacy of Smith’s theoretical usage ofMarxism, this does not mean that her entire corpus is now redundant. On thecontrary, Smith’s theoretical and methodological advancement of certainethnomethodological concerns, and especially her “textual analysis,” seemscapable of providing a powerful tool for the type of detailed, empirical analysisthat interests me; namely, the examination of working class cultural“incorporation,” — a process which both Foucault’s and Donzelot’s works


seem to identify, but not to document. In other words, just as Smith re-wroteand re-framed the ethnomethodological concern with the “social constructionof facts” into the framework of Marxism, so as to provide an analytic tool forcomprehending the “silencing” of women by contemporary sciences (includingsociology); the endpoint of this paper has been to try and clear the ground forthe re-framing of Smith’s textual analysis into the more encompassing theo-retical framework provided by Foucualt and Donzelot, such that the detailed,historical documentation of working class cultural incorporation might bebetter attempted. And although much of this theoretical synthesis remains tobe done; where empirical,’ albeit exploratory, analyses have been undertaken(Doran, 1994, 1996), they have suggested that the process not only “subordi-nates” (Smith 1990a:142), “supersedes” (Smith 1990a:187), “suppresses”(1990a:190), “revises and corrects” (Smith 1990b: 137), “discredit(s)” (Smith1999a:179), and “subdue(s)” (Smith 1999:195), but that it operates to “codify”embodied, cultural experience, as well.

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