Resilience in UK counter-terrorism

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Resilience in UK counter-terrorism

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Resilience in UK counter-terrorism

Keiran HardyUniversity of New South Wales, Australia

AbstractResilience describes the capacity of an individual, community or ecosystem to mitigate the impact of a shock or disturbance and then to recover in its aftermath. In recent years, resilience has become the favoured solution for a range of contemporary policy problems including natural disasters, mental health issues and terrorism. However, the concept is understood far less in criminology and counter-terrorism than in other fields such as psychology and natural hazards studies. This article compares resilience-building measures in the Prepare and Prevent strands of CONTEST, the UK government’s national strategy for countering terrorism. Its aim is to explore the benefits and dangers of resilience according to how the concept is defined and applied across different contexts.

KeywordsCONTEST, counter-terrorism, natural hazards, pre-emption, Prepare, Prevent strategy, resilience, risk, vulnerability

Introduction

The concept of resilience developed in the ecological sciences in the 1970s, but it is fast becoming the favoured solution for a range of contemporary policy problems including natural disasters, mental health issues and terrorism. Resilience describes the ability of an individual, community or ecosystem to overcome adversity—to absorb the impact of a shock or disturbance and then to recover effectively (Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 255; Manyena, 2006: 438). The concept has been described as ‘very much the current political buzzword’ (Joseph, 2013: 253), a ‘central organising metaphor within the

Corresponding author:Keiran Hardy, Law Building, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052, Australia. Email: [email protected]

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2 Theoretical Criminology

(urban) policymaking process’ (Coaffee, 2013: 240), and an ‘integral part of the govern-ment of advanced liberal societies’ (Ball, 2011: 97). The UK Cabinet Office has pub-lished a range of strategies describing how government agencies can build a more ‘resilient society’—such as by publishing risk assessments, developing emergency response procedures and teaching communities how to respond to crisis (Cabinet Office, 2013a, 2013b, 2014). Given these diverse applications, it is unsurprising that there is ‘considerably less agreement on what “resilience” actually refers to’ (Brassett et al., 2013: 221). As Brassett et al. (2013: 221) point out, the concept ‘seems to carry a produc-tive ambiguity that both resists exact definition and allows for a spectrum of interactions’.

While the academic literature on resilience is extensive in natural hazards studies and psychology (see, for example, Berkes, 2007; Harvey and Delfabbro, 2004; Hufschmidt, 2011; Manyena, 2006), criminologists have only recently begun to develop a body of research on the concept and its attendant benefits and dangers. On the one hand, some criminologists believe it to be an empowering doctrine which can benefit marginalized groups (Mason and Pulvirenti, 2013; Walklate, 2011). On the other hand, Foucauldian approaches stress that governments are inculcating self-discipline and legitimizing the expansion of their own power (Ball, 2011; O’Malley, 2010). These contrasting views within criminology mimic divisions in the wider literature (see, for example, Coaffee, 2006; Walker and Cooper, 2011).

In particular, the concept has not been addressed in the criminological literature on counter-terrorism, which to date has focused on how the concepts of risk, security, pre-caution and pre-emption have shaped coercive legal responses to terrorism (see McCulloch and Pickering, 2009; Zedner, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). This literature on ‘pre-crime’ has proved crucial to understanding and critiquing western responses to terrorism since 9/11, but it does not address more recent developments in which social policy has operated alongside coercive legal measures as a core component of counter-terrorism strategy. Indeed, some have argued that resilience is now ‘subsuming and surpassing the logic of security’ (Neocleous, 2013). This may be putting the point too strongly, as pre-emptive criminal offences and other coercive legal powers continue to play the lead role in counter-terrorism practice, but it is nonetheless clear that resilience has become increasingly important to national security policy (see Walker and Cooper, 2011: 152–154). To the extent that the concept has been examined in counter-terrorism, this has taken place within geography and political science rather than criminology (Coaffee, 2006, 2009, 2013; Joseph, 2013; Walker and Cooper, 2011).

This article examines the concept of resilience in the UK government’s responses to terrorism. In doing so, it asks the following question: given the various definitions of this concept and its range of applications and effects, what can be said about the circum-stances in which resilience-building efforts either benefit or harm communities? Put another way, is it possible to identify any patterns as to which definitions or applications of the concept are the most problematic?

The article considers this question by examining resilience-building measures in the UK government’s national strategy for countering terrorism, known as ‘CONTEST’. CONTEST has officially existed since 2003, but it was first published by the Blair gov-ernment in 2006 (Home Office, 2006). It was updated by both the Brown government



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(Home Office, 2009) and the Coalition government (Home Office, 2011a). Across all three versions, CONTEST has comprised four policy strands: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare, each of which describes a different response to the threat of terrorism. Pursue largely corresponds with the UK’s counter-terrorism laws, including policing and intelligence-gathering, although it includes an international dimension such as training foreign police and security services (see Home Office, 2011a: 44–56). Prevent is a national strategy for countering terrorist ideology and religious radicalization. It com-prises interventions for ‘at risk’ individuals and other community-based strategies for countering extremism (see Home Office, 2011a: 58–76). Protect focuses on defending the UK population and critical national infrastructure against terrorist attacks (see Home Office, 2011a: 78–87) while Prepare refers to emergency response procedures, primarily for the emergency services but also for communities and businesses (see Cabinet Office, 2013b; Home Office, 2011a: 92–102).

This article focuses on resilience-building measures in Prepare and Prevent. Prepare has been chosen because resilience is the key guiding principle of that strand (see Home Office, 2011a: 93), and because the development of emergency response procedures is consistent with the existing literature on resilience in the context of national security (see Coaffee, 2006; Walker and Cooper, 2011: 152–154). Protect is also consistent with this existing lit-erature, although others have previously examined resilience in that context (Coaffee, 2009). Pursue is not addressed, despite its crucial role in counter-terrorism practice, because it focuses on coercive and pre-emptive approaches in the UK’s counter-terrorism laws.

The Prevent strand has been chosen because resilience is a key organizing principle of that strategy, yet little if any attention has been paid to what the concept means and how it operates in the context of countering extremism. As the voluminous literature on the Prevent strategy shows, efforts to counter extremism have become a crucial aspect of counter-terrorism policy and practice, both in the UK and in other western countries (see, for example, Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Heath-Kelly, 2012; Kundnani, 2009; Thomas, 2010; with regard to Australia, see Sentas, 2014). More importantly, efforts to counter extremism raise some unique issues with regard to resilience which do not arise in the context of emergency response procedures. As such, Prepare and Prevent provide two contrasting case studies of resilience that illuminate the benefits and dangers of the concept as it is defined and applied across different contexts.

This article contributes to the growing literature on resilience and supplements the existing criminological literature on pre-crime by examining aspects of counter- terrorism policy which operate alongside the UK’s counter-terrorism laws. It proceeds in four parts. Part one explores definitions of resilience as well as unresolved issues such as how these definitions relate to risk and vulnerability. Part two explores the potential benefits and dangers when resilience is used as an organizing principle for government policy. Parts three and four consider the contrasting approaches found in Prepare and Prevent and their attendant benefits and dangers.

What is resilience?

Resilience describes the ability to absorb the impact of, and then recover from, a shock or disturbance. Commentators in natural hazards studies distinguish two main types:




engineering resilience and ecological resilience. The former describes the ability of a material or substance to ‘bounce back’ to its original form, like a rubber band or a flexi-ble piece of metal (Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 256; Walker and Cooper, 2011: 146). The latter is generally attributed to ecologist CS Holling and refers to the ability of an ecosystem to transform in response to an external disturbance without losing its core identity or functions (Holling, 1973; see also Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 256, 258; Walker and Cooper, 2011: 146). A resilient ecosystem can absorb the impact of an exter-nal disturbance, such as a flood or other disaster, and then recover from that disturbance without changing into a qualitatively different state. This process requires the persistence of certain key relationships within the ecosystem, as well as the capacity to develop new structures and behaviours as an adaptive response (Holling, 1973: 17; Walker and Cooper, 2011: 146).

Whereas engineering resilience implies that a system has one equilibrium or state of rest, ecological resilience proposes that a system has multiple equilibria and can trans-form from one relatively stable state to another (Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 256; Walker and Cooper, 2011: 146). In either case, resilience is typically distinguished from stability because it describes the capacity to adapt or transform rather than the capacity to reach a new stable state. Somewhat counter-intuitively, then, a system can be in con-stant flux but still be highly resilient (see Holling, 1973: 17).1

A key aspect of Holling’s theory is the idea that disturbances to the system cannot be predicted. He wrote that resilience implies ‘not the presumption of sufficient knowledge, but the recognition of our ignorance; not the assumption that future events are expected, but that they will be unexpected’ (Holling, 1973: 21). For example, in the context of farming, the expectation of a fixed yield each season might lead to practices which reduce the capacity to recover should a rare event or disaster occur (see Holling, 1973: 21; Walker and Cooper, 2011: 146). By contrast, a more complex ‘management approach’ (Holling, 1973: 21) would account for natural fluctuations in yield size as well as the likelihood of unexpected events occurring. Walker and Cooper (2011: 149) liken this view to Hayek’s critique of the Keynesian market, in the sense that Hayek also develops an epistemology based on ‘limited knowledge and uncertain futures’.

In this respect, resilience as an organizing principle for government policy may be usefully distinguished from pre-emption, as both suggest different responses to the pres-ence of risk and uncertainty. Pre-emption implies that risks are knowable and capable of being intercepted – or where threats are uncertain, that precautionary action should be taken to avert a risk to security (see McCulloch and Pickering, 2009: 629; Zedner, 2007a: 265, 2007b: 187–188). By contrast, resilience-based policies teach individuals to live with uncertainty and to expect that harm will occur. In O’Malley’s (2010: 505–506) words, this approach involves ‘embracing risk’ rather than attempting to minimize it; individuals are encouraged to be ‘innovative, adaptive, and responsible’ in an uncertain world. A resilient individual is one who expects the unexpected – one who accepts that shocks and disturbances will occur, and is capable of responding to them.

On the other hand, resilience similarly encompasses the idea of ‘foresight and prepar-edness’ (Coaffee, 2013: 242, emphasis in original), suggesting that it is difficult to draw a clear line between resilience on the one hand, and pre-emption and precaution on the other. Anderson (2010) describes all three concepts as part of a spectrum of ‘anticipatory



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action’. As such, it may be more accurate to say that precaution, pre-emption and resil-ience ‘are all means of guiding action once the future has been problematized in a certain way’ (Anderson, 2010: 791).

Another definitional problem is that resilience can take on different meanings in a variety of contexts (for a list of different definitions, see Manyena, 2006: 437). The idea of recovering from adversity can be relevant to ecosystems, as described in the work of Holling (1973), as well as communities (Berkes, 2007: 288) and individuals (O’Malley, 2010). In psychology, individuals are considered resilient if they can overcome negative life events and stressors (such as divorce and unemployment) without suffering harm to their physical or mental health:

When referring to people, the essence of resilience centres on quick recovery from shock, illness or hardship. One who is resilient may be considered irrepressible, buoyant, enduring, flexible; the person who bounces back—unchanged—from exposure to stresses and shocks.

(Manyena, 2006: 438)

The relationship between these different kinds of resilience also remains uncertain. In his work, Holling (2001: 392) refers to the ‘panarchy’, a total system that encompasses the human and natural worlds:

Panarchy is the hierarchical structure in which systems of nature (for example, forests, grasslands, lakes, rivers, and seas), and humans (for example, structures of governance, settlements, and cultures), as well as combined human-nature systems (for example, agencies that control natural resource use) and social-ecological systems (for instance, co-evolved systems of management), are interlinked in never-ending adaptive cycles of growth, accumulation, restructuring, and renewal.

In some instances, the capacity of a community to overcome adversity may directly improve the capacity of an ecosystem to regenerate. As Berkes (2007: 288–289) notes, communities have a capacity for social memory which means that they can learn how better to protect the natural environment from subsequent disasters. Equally, however, it is possible to conceive of scenarios in which social and ecological resilience are unre-lated. A community may psychologically recover from a natural disaster but the sur-rounding ecosystem may be unable to regenerate or a community may have little capacity to recover but the surrounding ecosystem regenerates of its own accord.

Another unresolved issue is how resilience relates to vulnerability (see Miller et al., 2010). In natural hazards studies, vulnerability ordinarily describes the extent to which a population or environment is exposed to a risk of harm – such as that caused by floods, hurricanes or other natural disasters (see Berkes, 2007: 284; Turner et al., 2003: 8074). According to this definition, vulnerability and resilience are related but independent: a community that is exposed to large numbers of hazards (i.e. high vulnerability) could possess either a high or low capacity to respond to them. On the other hand, some com-mentators include the capacity to recover in definitions of vulnerability (see Manyena, 2006: 441). According to these definitions, resilience is a component of vulnerability: that is, the extent to which a population or ecosystem is capable of recovering from




adversity should factor into an assessment of the extent to which the population or eco-system is exposed to risk.

Resilience is therefore a complex and contested concept, although there are some common features across different definitions. Most fundamentally, the concept describes the capacity of an individual, community or ecosystem to survive an external shock or disturbance by maintaining its fundamental characteristics through a process of change and transformation. As Aranda et al. (2012: 550) note, ‘core to any definition of resil-ience is the ability to react and adjust positively when things go wrong; that is, resilience occurs in the presence of adversity’. The next section considers the potential benefits and dangers of using this idea as an organizing principle for government policy.

Benefits and dangers of resilience

It appears that the revival of resilience in contemporary policy should be welcomed, that recovering from adversity implies an ‘inherent good’ (Ball, 2011: 108). After all, what could be wrong with teaching people how to respond more effectively to crisis? According to Helen Braithwaite OBE, the head of the Resilience and Emergencies Division of the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG), governments bring com-munities together by teaching them how to respond to a range of contemporary problems and hazards (Brassett and Vaughan-Williams, 2013: 232).

In criminology, some scholars have argued that the concept can improve current understandings about the impact of crime on marginalized groups. On this view, resil-ience is an empowering doctrine which emphasizes the capacity not merely to survive in the face of adversity but to triumph over it and recover effectively. Walklate (2011) shows how this idea might usefully inform feminist approaches to victimization, which to date have focused on the concepts of resistance and survival. She argues that a resil-ience-based approach could benefit female victims of crime because the concept ‘cap-tures more than resistance or survival and more than preoccupations with risk or safety’ (Walklate, 2011: 184). Mason and Pulvirenti (2013) take a similar approach with regard to refugee populations. According to Mason and Pulvirenti (2013: 401–403), the coping capacity of refugee women is ‘increasingly attributed to the protective strategies through which resilience is built at the community level’, such as programmes for combating domestic violence (Mason and Pulvirenti, 2013: 401, 404). These kinds of strategies are designed to maximize ‘the opportunity of all community members to cope with adver-sity, to respond positively to challenging life circumstances and, ultimately, to flourish’ (Mason and Pulvirenti, 2013: 402).

Given these positive accounts, it is striking that other commentators remain fervently opposed to the idea of improving resilience. There are four main critiques that have been levelled at the concept and how it shapes government policy, much of which overlaps with critiques of neoliberalism and some of which is informed by a governmentality approach (see Ball, 2011: 105, 108; Joseph, 2013: 259; Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 262–263). First, some argue that undue responsibility is placed on communities at the expense of government accountability (Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 263). That is, by encouraging communities to take joint responsibility for managing risks, the govern-ment is to some degree shirking its own responsibility to protect the population. Second,



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by focusing on those who are capable of responding to adversity, governments are simul-taneously framing others as ‘deficient or lacking’ in this respect (see Aranda et al., 2012: 551). Individuals who are ‘conceived in opposition to this psychological norm’ can then become the target of psychological interventions (Aranda et al., 2012: 551). Third, resil-ience-based policies are said to be inherently conservative as their purpose is to maintain existing social structures in the face of external challenge (Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 259). This reinforces existing social inequalities because some individuals are bet-ter placed than others to respond to crisis and adversity. According to Mackinnon and Derickson (2013: 258):

Resilience is fundamentally about how best to maintain the functioning of an existing system in the face of externally derived disturbance. Both the ontological nature of ‘the system’ and its normative desirability escape critical scrutiny. As a result, the existence of social divisions and inequalities tends to be glossed over when resilience thinking is extended to society.

Lastly, resilience-based policies are viewed as yet another attempt to inculcate self- discipline as a method of government control (Ball, 2011). For this reason, Ball (2011: 108) argues that they ‘ought to remain … the concern of “a hyper- and pessimistic activ-ism” among those concerned with power relations and the formation of subjectivity’. In these four respects, commentators have warned of the dangers of therapeutic discourse which presents these policies as normatively desirable (Aranda et al., 2012: 551; Ball, 2011: 108; Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 259; O’Malley, 2010).

Similar divisions pervade the literature on resilience in counter-terrorism. Coaffee (2006: 397–399) gives four reasons why resilience is preferable to a risk-based approach to counter-terrorism: it encourages greater preparedness should a terrorist attack occur; it broadens the emergency planning agenda beyond terrorism to other important national security threats (such as natural disasters and the outbreak of deadly viruses); it empha-sizes coordinated responses to terrorism across government; and it reappropriates emer-gency planning policies for everyday civil use, which can help to maintain economic activity by protecting local businesses (Coaffee, 2006: 397–399). Kent Roach, one of the leading commentators on domestic counter-terrorism laws, does not deploy the same terms as Coaffee, but he makes a similar argument in advocating the benefits of an ‘all risks’ approach to national security (Roach, 2011: 14). The implication is that, by focus-ing more broadly on a range of potential national security threats, governments can avoid the expansions of executive power and abuses of rights associated with a narrow focus on preventing terrorist acts.

On the other hand, some commentators argue that resilience is problematic when used as an organizing principle for counter-terrorism. This is for two main reasons. First, according to Walker and Cooper (2011: 154), governments are securitizing civil relief efforts by raising them to the level of national security. The implication is that natural disasters and other emergencies will be viewed as exceptional (even existential) threats to the nation, thereby justifying similar expansions of government power to those previ-ously seen in counter-terrorism (see, for example, McCulloch and Pickering, 2009; Roach, 2011; Zedner, 2007b). Second, by ‘integrating emergency preparedness into the infrastructures of everyday life and the psychology of citizens’, governments may be




inculcating a state of permanent civil anxiety (Walker and Cooper, 2011: 154). In other words, civilian populations are placed on a permanent war footing, which in counter-terrorism is precisely the kind of psychological victory that terrorists hope to achieve. As Walker and Cooper (2011: 154) ask, ‘[w]hat is resilience, after all, if not the acceptance of disequilibrium itself as a principle of organization?’

Despite its apparent benefits, then, resilience is a contested and divisive concept in criminology and in counter-terrorism. The next two sections examine the extent to which these benefits and dangers are reflected in the Prepare and Prevent strands of CONTEST, the UK’s national strategy for countering terrorism.

Resilience in the Prepare strand of CONTEST

The Prepare strand of CONTEST closely reflects the concept of ecological resilience, as it describes the ability of the UK government and population to mitigate the impact of and then recover from terrorist attacks (see Home Office, 2011a: 93). This comprises three broad policy categories that reflect the elements of resilience as defined in the theo-retical literature. First, the strategy focuses on maintaining essential services in the after-math of a terrorist attack (Home Office, 2011a: 94), a recommendation consistent with the idea of maintaining core functions in the face of adversity (Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 256, 258; Walker and Cooper, 2011: 146). Second, it emphasizes developing and improving emergency response procedures, such as public warning systems and proce-dures for containing hazardous materials (see Cabinet Office, 2014; Home Office, 2011a: 98–102), and includes educating communities so that they can ‘help themselves … in a way that complements the local emergency services’ (Cabinet Office, 2013b). Such approaches are consistent with definitions that emphasize ‘quick recovery’ (Manyena, 2006: 438). Third, the strategy recommends that organizations in the private, voluntary and community sectors develop business continuity arrangements (see Cabinet Office, 2013b), reflecting the idea of ‘sustaining productivity even under conditions of extreme instability’ (Walker and Cooper, 2011: 146; see also Holling, 1973: 21).

One key difficulty in reconciling these policy strategies with the theoretical literature is that they emphasize recovery more than transformation. Holling’s theory is based on the idea that ecosystems can adapt and transform in response to external shocks and disturbances. For example, certain species might fluctuate in population size or undergo physiological changes (see Holling, 1973: 18). By contrast, the UK government is not conceding that a terrorist attack will fundamentally change the size or composition of the UK population—indeed, this should surely be avoided, as the strategy is designed to ‘save lives’ and ‘reduce harm’ (Home Office, 2011a: 93). Rather, the primary objective is for the UK population to ‘recover effectively’ (Home Office, 2011a: 93) and return to life as it was before the terrorist attack occurred (i.e. the status quo ante). In this respect, the strategies outlined above may in fact emphasize stability more than resilience (see Holling, 1973: 17).

Another difficulty relates to the relationship between resilience and pre-emption. On face value, Prepare reflects Holling’s (1973: 21) belief that shocks and disturbances can-not be predicted and prevented. The primary purpose of the strategy is to ‘mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where that attack cannot be stopped’ (Home Office, 2011a: 93,



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emphasis added). However, there are elements of the strategy that emphasize pre-emptive action. For example, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provides a framework of duties for organizations involved in emergency planning and response (see Cabinet Office, 2014). Section 2(1) creates a duty for those organizations to undertake regular risk assessments and to publish those assessments if doing so would help to prevent, control or mitigate an emergency. In this respect, the UK government is not aiming purely to recover from emer-gencies that cannot be predicted and prevented; it is also aiming to anticipate possible emergency scenarios, assess their potential effects, and attempt to control those scenarios in advance. This confirms that resilience-based policies are increasingly taking the form of ‘anticipatory action’ (Anderson, 2010; see also Coaffee, 2013: 242), and are not simply about accepting the presence of risk (O’Malley, 2010).

What, then, can be said about the benefits and dangers of these resilience-building measures? The strategy largely addresses the capacity of government agencies to respond to terrorist attacks, so it does not directly benefit marginalized groups such as female victims of crime or refugees (Mason and Pulvirenti, 2013; Walklate, 2011). However, the strategy can certainly benefit potential victims of terrorism by helping the emergency services to reduce the impact of successful attacks. Under CONTEST , ‘[a]n effective and efficient response will save lives, reduce harm and aid recovery’ (Home Office, 2011a: 93). This is evident in the strategy’s emphasis on preparing the health and emer-gency services for mass casualties (Home Office, 2011a: 96, 98). Overall, the strategy certainly reflects the idea that resilience in counter-terrorism encourages greater prepar-edness for serious harm (Coaffee, 2006: 397). Despite the best efforts of the police and security services to prevent terrorism, it is possible that an attack might succeed, and establishing emergency procedures to deal with this possibility is certainly a prudent approach.

The strategies outlined above also contribute to greater cooperation—both across government, and between government and communities (Brassett and Vaughan-Williams, 2013: 231; Coaffee, 2006: 397–398). This might not be considered an intrinsic good, but it can serve a beneficial purpose by helping to mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks. As CONTEST explains, effective cooperation is vital in the aftermath of an attack because terrorism creates emergencies that require the expertise of multiple agen-cies (Home Office, 2011a: 100). To draw on Holling’s theory, a population that can cooperate effectively in response to a terrorist attack is like an ecosystem that can main-tain key relationships in response to an external disturbance (Holling, 1973: 17).

Two additional points relate to the benefits raised by Coaffee (2006). First, by encour-aging businesses to develop continuity practices (Cabinet Office, 2013b), Prepare can help to maintain economic activity in the aftermath of a terrorist attack (Coaffee, 2006: 397). Lastly, the strategy certainly focuses on terrorism, but it stresses a ‘generic’ approach that is relevant to ‘all kinds of threats and hazards’, including floods and the spread of infectious diseases (Home Office, 2011a: 93; see also Cabinet Office, 2014). This reflects a broad awareness of national security threats other than terrorism, and contrasts with the narrowly coercive approaches favoured by western governments after 9/11 which led to significant expansions in government power (see generally Roach, 2011).

What about the potential dangers of resilience? It seems that Prepare creates few of the problems raised in the literature. To some extent, the strategy places additional




responsibility on communities by training them to respond to crisis and by encouraging local businesses to develop continuity practices (see Cabinet Office, 2013b). However, the strategy focuses heavily on providing emergency response procedures to the popula-tion (see Home Office, 2011a: 98–102), so there is at least an equivalent increase in the responsibility placed on government. The duty placed on government agencies to pub-lish risk assessments (Civil Contingencies Act 2004, s. 2) further suggests that govern-ment accountability is increased rather than decreased in this context. This makes it difficult to sustain Mackinnon and Derickson’s (2013: 263) claim that resilience-build-ing measures place undue responsibility on communities at the expense of government accountability.

Because of the emphasis on improving emergency response procedures, it is also dif-ficult to conceive of Prepare as framing individuals as ‘deficient or lacking’ in resilience, or reinforcing social inequalities in this respect (Aranda et al., 2012: 551; Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 259). Some communities may be better placed than others to recover from terrorist attacks, but the strategy does not in any way contribute to or reinforce these inequalities. The strategy could perhaps benefit from an explicit acknowledgement that greater resources will be directed to those communities which are less capable of responding to crisis. It seems, however, that this attitude already informs the UK govern-ment’s approach (see Brassett and Vaughan-Williams, 2013: 231). Because of the heavy focus on government agencies, there is also little reason to be suspicious of the discipli-nary logic identified by Ball (2011) and O’Malley (2010).

The biggest danger posed by Prepare, as noted by Walker and Cooper (2011: 154), is that resilience-building efforts can securitize civil relief efforts and inculcate a state of permanent civil anxiety. The strategy certainly raises the seriousness of floods and other civil emergencies by including them in a strategy which is otherwise directed towards preventing Islamist terrorism. This is made worse by some emergency planning meas-ures—such as hiding stockpiles of gas masks and antidotes throughout the country, and mass fatality planning—which have apocalyptic connotations (see Home Office, 2006: 26, 2011a: 97–99). It is worth being aware of these tendencies, so as to avoid any signifi-cant expansions in government power as a result and to encourage sober assessments of potential threats. For the most part, however, the strategy outlines a range of sensible procedures for responding to potential crisis scenarios, such as improving the capacity of emergency responders to detect and contain hazardous materials (Home Office, 2011a: 99). On balance, it seems that the potential benefits of resilience-building measures in Prepare far outweigh the potential dangers.

Resilience in the Prevent strategy

In the Prevent strand of CONTEST, resilience takes on a diametrically different meaning to that found in Prepare. The first version of Prevent (Home Office, 2006: 9–16) did not mention resilience, but the 2008 strategy listed ‘increasing the resilience of communities’ as one of five key goals (Home Office and DCLG, 2008: 5).2 The 2008 strategy did not define resilience, although it explained that projects funded under this objective would help British communities ‘to reject the views of violent extremists, to isolate apologists for terrorism and to provide support to vulnerable institutions and individuals’ (Home



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Office and DCLG, 2008: 31). This approach could be seen in a range of community projects, such as the Birmingham ‘Young Muslim Leadership Programme’, which focused on citizenship, civic engagement, building interfaith dialogue and techniques for rejecting violent extremism (DCLG, 2007: 11).

In 2011, the Coalition government published a review of Prevent that formally removed the goal of building resilient communities (Home Office, 2011b). There were two key reasons for this shift: funds had been used to support community projects that were not directly related to counter-terrorism, and many believed that the strategy blurred the lines between counter-terrorism and community integration (see Home Office, 2011b: 30). This blurring created significant problems because communities perceived Prevent as a pretext for ‘spying’ on potential terrorists (see House of Commons, 2010: 56–62).

This removal of resilience-building measures will not, however, be complete. The Home Office described the separation of counter-terrorism and community integration as a ‘general rule’ and not a strict requirement (Home Office, 2011b: 30). It stated that com-munity projects will still be funded under the strategy if they have a direct benefit to counter-terrorism, and 80 such projects were funded in 2012 (Home Office, 2013: 21). As such, and to remedy Labour’s failure to define the term, the Coalition government defined resilience as ‘the capability of people, groups and communities to rebut and reject propo-nents of terrorism and the ideology they promote’ (Home Office, 2011b: 108).

Resilience has therefore played a key role in shaping Prevent work, although it is not clear how this definition corresponds with the work of Holling (1973) and others (see Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013; Walker and Cooper, 2011). If there is a relevant shock or disturbance, it is not an isolated event such as a flood or terrorist attack, but rather a protracted exposure to political, religious and ideological views that the state considers to be harmful. In addition, because the danger posed by terrorist ideology is protracted rather than immediate and ephemeral, it is difficult to conceive of communities in this context as ever ‘recovering’ from adversity.

The closest analogy is perhaps to psychological resilience—as if the UK government is aiming to create mass psychological resistance to terrorist ideology. However, as noted above, psychological resilience ordinarily describes the capacity of individuals to recover from stressors such as divorce or unemployment without suffering harm to their mental or physical health (see Harvey and Delfabbro, 2004: 4; Manyena, 2006: 433–434; Radke-Yarrow and Brown, 1993: 581–582). As such, it is difficult to reconcile Prevent work with definitions of resilience available in the theoretical literature. A simple solution to this problem would be to suggest that the strategy is not in fact designed to build resil-ience, despite its frequent use of the term. The fact that Prevent encompasses coercive counter-terrorism laws (Home Office, 2011b: 26–27) and encourages interventions for individuals ‘at risk’ of radicalization (Home Office, 2011b: 55–62) suggests that pre-emption and precaution may have played a more crucial role in shaping the strategy. These difficulties might, however, suggest another possibility: that existing theories of resilience might usefully be amended to include protracted exposure to harm as well as isolated shocks or disturbances. As discussed below, the framing of extremist ideology as source of potential harm raises some unique and important issues.

In stark contrast to Prepare, the Prevent strategy raises few of the potential benefits of resilience and many of its dangers. On face value, counter-extremism measures are




designed to bring communities together and support marginalized groups—in this con-text, young Muslims at risk of radicalization. This gives some superficial support to the potential benefits of resilience-based policies (Brassett and Vaughan-Williams, 2013; Walklate, 2011), although several problems with this approach are evident. First, signifi-cant responsibility for preventing terrorism is placed on communities (see Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 263). As the 2008 strategy explained, ‘[l]ocal communities must be at the centre of the response to violent extremism, helping to develop and deliver the response to it’ (Home Office and DCLG, 2008: 31). The shifting of responsibility to communities is less obvious in the Coalition government’s approach, although this is partly because responsibility for community integration has been handed over to DCLG (Home Office, 2011b: 30). It is still broadly reflected in the training of public institutions (including schools, hospitals and charities) to identify individuals at risk of radicalization (see Home Office, 2011b: 63–94). The community and public sectors have become de facto extensions of the police and security services, helping to identify individuals who might become terrorists.

Second, individuals who are conceived as ‘deficient or lacking’ in resilience become the target of psychological interventions (Aranda et al., 2012: 551). This can be seen in the Channel intervention programme, which provides support services such as counsel-ling and anger management sessions to individuals at risk of radicalization (see Home Office and ACPO, 2012). Between April 2007 and December 2011, 1120 individuals were referred to Channel, the vast majority of whom were young, Muslim males (Home Office, 2011b: 59–60). Of these, only one in four were assessed to be in need of support (Home Office, 2011b: 59). This shows how thinking about individuals as either resilient or vulnerable to radicalization can lead to stigmatizing interventions by the state, particu-larly for dependent youth. The large numbers of inaccurate referrals to Channel suggest that this approach may even prove counter-productive if it generates resentment among groups of young, Muslim males. In this respect, the Prevent strategy may not inculcate a state of civil anxiety with regard to terrorist attacks (Walker and Cooper, 2011: 154), but it may generate a different kind of fear which is potentially more damaging to the gov-ernment’s counter-terrorism efforts, as well as more problematic for notions of free speech and democracy. By reinforcing the idea of a psychological norm with regard to extremism, resilience projects in Prevent contribute to the evident fear in communities that expressing controversial ideas will lead to state interventions (see Dodd, 2009; House of Commons, 2010; Kundnani, 2009).

Third, the Prevent strategy reflects an inherently conservative approach which prior-itizes existing structures at the expense of social progress and critique (see Mackinnon and Derickson, 2013: 258). Several commentators have argued that the strategy is overly concerned with rejecting anti-western ideas and reinforcing ‘ill-defined values of Britishness’ (House of Commons, 2010: Ev 102; see also Dodd, 2009; Kundnani, 2009: 22). This can be seen in the resilience-building projects in particular, in which communi-ties were encouraged to adopt moderate forms of Islam that were consistent with western ideals. The Hounslow Asian and African Youth Group (HAAYA), for example, estab-lished a mentoring project that was designed to ‘articulate an interpretation of Islam that supports integration, citizenship and the adoption of democracy’ (DCLG, 2007: 11). Absent from this project was any meaningful critique of how existing social structures



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and practices—such as anti-Muslim prejudice, foreign policy choices or the dispropor-tionate use of counter-terrorism laws in Muslim communities—might be contributing to radicalization.

Lastly, the Prevent strategy clearly reflects the disciplinary logic of resilience as raised by Ball (2011) and O’Malley (2010). This can be seen in the Channel intervention programme in particular (Home Office and ACPO, 2012), but also more broadly in the training of communities and public officials to identify and support individuals at risk of radicalization (see Home Office, 2011b: 63–94).

In addition, the Prevent strategy raises three unique issues that are not discussed in the theoretical literature on resilience. First, resilience-building measures can stigmatize communities perceived as suspect and dangerous. It has been well documented that Prevent disproportionately targets Muslim communities and has generated much suspi-cion and resentment as a result (see House of Commons, 2010: 9–11; Kundnani, 2009: 23–27; Thomas, 2010: 445–448). This is similar to how the use of coercive counter-ter-rorism laws has constructed Britain’s Muslim population as a ‘suspect community’ (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). The Coalition government has fixed this problem to some degree by expanding the strategy to include forms of terrorism other than Islamist extremism, including extreme right-wing terrorism (Home Office, 2011b: 25). In prac-tice, however, this is unlikely to change. The Coalition government noted that it will continue to direct resources at Islamist extremism, because this continues to pose the greatest threat to UK security (Home Office, 2011b: 25).

Second, resilience-building measures in this context clearly restrict political and reli-gious choice. Such effects can be seen in the community projects noted above, which encouraged moderate interpretations of Islam. It is particularly evident with regard to the 2009 CONTEST strategy, which expanded the scope of the Prevent objectives to include ‘non-violent’ extremism (Home Office, 2009: 13). This move was heavily criticized for potentially branding thousands more British Muslims as extremists (Dodd, 2009; Kundnani, 2009: 22), but the Coalition government nonetheless adopted the same approach (Home Office, 2011b: 6). The targeting of non-violent extremism significantly reduces the capacity for individuals to choose and express their views on politics and religion—out of fear, for example, that they will be targeted under Channel. This approach is particularly problematic because it frames radical but non-violent interpreta-tions of Islam as a harm from which communities should learn how to protect them-selves. It is clear that certain speech acts—such as incitement to serious crime—can justify state intervention, but the targeting of non-violent forms of expression represents a dramatic expansion of the government’s counter-terrorism powers. Indeed, in attempt-ing to build resilience to non-violent Islamist extremism, the UK government comes dangerously close to framing Islam itself as a harm from which society should be protected.

Lastly, resilience-building measures in this context have significantly blurred the lines between coercive and non-coercive approaches to crime prevention. As noted above, the 2008 strategy generated significant suspicion and resentment because it included resilience-building projects in an otherwise coercive counter-terrorism agenda (House of Commons, 2010: 56–62). The Coalition government has fixed this problem to some degree by formally handing responsibility for these projects over to DCLG (Home




Office, 2011b: 30). However, it is likely that perceptions of spying will continue, as the Coalition government’s strategy still combines community-based approaches with the Channel programme and heavy police oversight (see Home Office, 2011b: 55–62, 99–100). Indeed, two-thirds of Home Office funding for Prevent in 2011/2012 was dedicated to ‘policing activities’ (Home Office, 2011b: 101). In each of these respects, the Prevent strategy suggests that resilience is a particularly problematic concept when used as a guiding principle for efforts to counter terrorist ideology and radicalization.

Conclusion

Resilience has become a central pillar of the UK government’s approach to solving con-temporary policy problems, but the concept has received far less attention in criminology and counter-terrorism than in other fields such as psychology and natural hazards stud-ies. At its core, resilience describes the capacity to absorb the impact of a shock or dis-turbance and to recover in its aftermath. This is relevant to ecosystems, communities and individuals, although meanings of the term shift across these contexts, and the relation-ship between different kinds of resilience remains uncertain. Scholars in criminology and other fields have also offered dramatically contrasting views as to whether resilience should be used as an organizing principle for government policy. Some view it as an empowering doctrine that emphasizes positive outcomes in the face of adversity, while others view it as an attempt to control populations and to spare government resources by teaching communities how to respond to adversity on their own. These divisions are also evident in the national security context, where resilience is viewed as a cure for myopic counter-terrorism strategies, but also as having the capacity to securitize civil relief efforts and normalize a state of crisis.

In the Prepare and Prevent strands of CONTEST, the UK’s national strategy for coun-tering terrorism, resilience takes on two diametrically different meanings. In Prepare, resilience describes the capacity of the UK government and population to mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks and respond effectively in their aftermath. This closely reflects the concept of ecological resilience, although there are some tensions in reconciling the strategy with the theoretical literature, as its core purpose is to reinstate normality rather than transform in response to crisis. In Prevent, these difficulties are more apparent, as resilience describes the ability of communities to reject terrorist ideology and the indi-viduals who promote it, rather than recover from an isolated shock or disturbance. There is no relationship between these two types of resilience—except perhaps to the extent that a community which is more fervently opposed to terrorist ideology might have a greater determination to overcome the physical and psychological harm caused by a ter-rorist attack.

The contrast between these two strands of CONTEST is crucial to understanding how resilience may be deployed in different contexts. There is no pure, single meaning of the concept which has all of its positive or negative effects. Emergency response procedures in counter-terrorism reflect many of the positive qualities of resilience and few of its dangers. Counter-extremism measures reflect few of the positive qualities of resilience, many of its dangers and some additional problems which are not raised in the existing literature. In other words, Prepare-type resilience is relatively benign, whereas Prevent-type resilience



Hardy 15

is particularly problematic. This is further complicated by the question of whether these strategies are actually designed to improve resilience, or whether they invoke the term while in fact pursuing stability (Prepare) or the pre-emption of serious harm (Prevent).

What, then, can be drawn from these contrasting experiences? First, it is not possible to discuss the benefits and dangers of resilience in a general or abstract sense. Discussions about the meaning of the term and its attendant benefits and dangers need to be grounded in context – in the laws, policies, procedures and methods which determine the shape and operation of resilience-building efforts on the ground. Second, scholars should carefully inquire as to whether policy strategies are in fact designed to build resilience, or whether governments are invoking the term while in fact pursuing other objectives. Third, the concept appears to be particularly problematic when it shapes community responses to politics, religion and ideology, and less problematic when it helps communities respond to isolated harms. This is important because the existing literature has focused heavily on emergency response procedures (see Coaffee, 2006, 2013; Joseph, 2013; Walker and Cooper, 2011), whereas little if any attention has been paid to resilience in the context of countering extremism.

Lastly, resilience-based policies can generate ongoing fear in populations. In the con-text of emergency response procedures, they may contribute to ongoing civil anxiety about terrorist attacks. In the context of countering extremism, they contribute to an ongoing fear that individuals will be targeted with counter-terrorism interventions for expressing controversial ideas. In the latter case, these dangers could be avoided if com-munities were encouraged to adapt and transform in response to political and religious diversity, rather than isolate and exclude those whom the state considers to be a ‘shock’ or ‘disturbance’ to the community.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Lucia Zedner, Fiona de Londras, Ben Golder, George Williams, Vicki Sentas and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. I am also grateful for the support of the Sir Anthony Mason PhD Award in Public Law, which has partly funded my doctoral research.

Notes

1. I have followed Holling’s approach on this point, although even this is contentious in more recent literature: see Manyena (2006: 436–437) on whether resilience describes a process or an outcome. The difficulties in applying this aspect of Holling’s theory to the Prepare strand of CONTEST are considered below.

2. The 2008 Prevent strategy was published by the Brown government as a separate strategy document to CONTEST, and it is this 2008 strategy that has since been updated by the Coalition government (Home Office, 2011b). The other four objectives in the 2008 strategy were to counter violent extremist ideology, disrupt those who promote violent extremism, support vulnerable individuals and address social and political grievances.

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Author biography

Keiran Hardy is a PhD Candidate in the Faculty of Law, UNSW, Australia. He has lectured at UNSW in public law, national security law and advanced criminal law. His research interests include counter-radicalization, counter-insurgency, definitions of terrorism, security assessments of refugees and cyber-terrorism.



Documents

Resilience in UK counter-terrorism