Report of Investigation into the Collision Between the Container Ship TS Pusan and Fishing Vessel M63514A on 1 February 2006

Purpose of Investigation

This incident is investigated, and published in accordance with the IMO Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents promulgated under IMO Assembly Resolution A.849(20). The purpose of this investigation conducted by the Marine Accident Investigation and Shipping Security Policy Branch (MAISSPB) of Marine Department is to determine the circumstances and the causes of the incident with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and avoiding similar incident in future.

The conclusions drawn in this report aim to identify the different factors contributing to the incident. They are not intended to apportion blame or liability towards any particular organization or individual except so far as necessary to achieve the said purpose.

The MAISSPB has no involvement in any prosecution or disciplinary action that may be taken by the Marine Department resulting from this incident.

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Table of Contents

Page

Summary 2

Description of the Vessels 3

Sources of evidence 6

Outline of events 7

Analysis of evidence 14

Conclusions 19

Recommendations 20

Submissions 20

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1. Summary

1.1 At about 1536 on 1 February 2006, an Antigua & Barbuda registered container ship TS Pusan collided with a locally licensed fishing vessel M63514A at the inbound lane of East Lamma Channel at approximate position 22 ° 14.66’N, 114 ° 07.97’E, about 0.27 nautical mile (n.m.) westsouthwest of Magazine Island. TS Pusan was under pilotage and proceeding to Pun Shan Shek Anchorage. At the time of the accident, the weather condition was fine, the wind was easterly at force 3 and the visibility was about 4 n.m. Both the port bow and port quarter of TS Pusan sustained some paint scratches of about 10-15 metres in length (Figure 1) whilst M63514A sank shortly after the collision. The Master and Engineer of M63514A were rescued by a passing fishing vessel. No casualties and oil pollution were reported.

1.2 The investigation revealed that the following causes contributed to the collision:

1.2.1 The Master and the Pilot of TS Pusan being the give-way vessel had contravened the Collision Regulations (COLREGS) by not slackening her speed or taking all way off by stopping or reversing her means of propulsion, in order to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation.

1.2.2 The Master of M63514A being a stand-on vessel in a crossing situation had failed to comply with COLREGS by altering course to port to avoid collision with a give-way vessel on her own port side.

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2. Description of the vessels 2.1 TS Pusan Port of Registry : St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda Call Sign : V2OT7

IMO No. : 9318773 Type : Container Vessel Built : Qingshan Shipyard, Wuhan, China Year of Built : 2003 Gross Tonnage : 9,701 Net Tonnage : 3,972 Length Overall : 140.39 metres Breadth : 22.80 metres Maximum Draft : 8.68 metres Main Engine : MAN B & W 5S 50MC-C MK7 Engine Power : 7,900 kW

Service Speed : 18.0 knots

Figure 1 – Photograph showing the paint scratches on port bow of TS Pusan

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TS Pusan is a container ship classed with Germanischer Lloyd. The accommodation and the main machinery space are situated aft. She has totally 5 cellular cargo holds and has a maximum container carrying capacity of 296 TEU below deck and 660 TEU on deck. The navigational equipment consists of a magnetic compass, a gyrocompass, an electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS), an automatic identification system (AIS), a voyage data recorder (VDR), a course recorder, two radars with Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA), a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and an echo sounder, etc.

TS Pusan is presently engaged in a run between Japan, China including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand.

Figure 2 - Photograph of TS Pusan

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Licence No. : M63514A Type : Western Wooden Deep Sea Trawler Length : 30.3 metres Breadth : 7.1 metres Thames Measurement : 219.52 tons Net Registered tons : 153.66 Length Overall : 30.3 m Engine/Engine Power : 1 x 6 cylinders “Cummins” Diesel/300 H.P. 1 x 6 cylinders “Cummins” Diesel/425 H.P. 1 x 6 cylinders “Cummins” Diesel/350 H.P.

2.2 M63514A

M63514A was a western wooden deep sea trawler fishing vessel. She had 2 cargo holds. The navigational equipment consisted of a magnetic compass, a gyro-compass, a GPS, an auto-pilot, a radar and an echo sounder. It was engaged in fishing within a range of 300 n.m. from Hong Kong.

Figure 3 - Photograph of M63514A

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3. Sources of Evidence

3.1 Report of Marine Accident and ship’s documents were provided by the Master of TS Pusan;

3.2 Report of Marine Accident was provided by the Master of M63514A;

3.3 Pilot’s Accident Report was provided by the Pilot of TS Pusan;

3.4 Statements provided by the Master of TS Pusan;

3.5 Statements provided by the Master of M63514A;

3.6 Statements provided by the Pilot of TS Pusan;

3.7 The Vessel Traffic Centre (VTC), Marine Department; and

3.8 The Hong Kong Observatory.

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4. Outline of events

4.1 Account of TS Pusan

4.1.1 At about 1524 on 1 February 2006 the Pilot boarded TS Pusan at Ngau Chau pilot boarding station. After exchanging information with the Master and assessing the surrounding circumstances, the Pilot ordered the vessel to steer on course 309°T and engine speed was increased to full ahead to proceed inbound to Pun Shan Shek Anchorage. The maximum draft of the ship was 8.90 metres. Visibility was good between 4 and 5 n.m. On the bridge with the Pilot were the Master, Second Officer and a Helmsman.

4.1.2 At about 1533, the ship’s course was adjusted to 307°T. At about 1534, a westbound fishing vessel was observed coming out north of Magazine Island at a distance of about 0.3 n.m. At about 1535, the relative bearing of the same fishing vessel was about 3 points on starboard bow of TS Pusan. Although the Pilot opined that the fishing vessel would marginally cross ahead of his vessel, he ordered the Helmsman to put the wheel on 10 degrees to starboard in order to pass astern of her with more sea room. However, the fishing vessel suddenly altered course to port. Noting that a close quarters situation was developing, the Pilot immediately sounded 1 short blast and gave an order to put the helm to hard to starboard in order to keep clear of the fishing vessel. As the Pilot found that the fishing vessel still altered course to port and at a greater turning rate, he ordered the engine to go full astern and both bow and stern thrusters were also used in assisting to turn the vessel to starboard.

4.1.3 Despite the above avoiding actions, at about 1536, the port bow of TS Pusan contacted with the starboard side of M63514A. At about 1542, M63514A sank and the Pilot ordered TS Pusan to drop both anchors to prevent the vessel from running into shallow water ahead. A pilot boat was instructed to render assistance to the Master and Engineer of M63514A who were found to have been rescued by a passing fishing vessel.

4.1.4 Diagram of collision tracks of TS Pusan and M63514A prepared by the Pilot of TS Pusan is shown in Figure 4.

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Figure 4 : Diagram of collision tracks of TS Pusan and M63514A i.e. Fishing Boat prepared by the Pilot of TS Pusan

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4.2 Account of M63514A

4.2.1 At about 1500 on 1 February 2006, M63514A departed from Aberdeen Typhoon Shelter to proceed to Gui Shan Dao. She was on a course of 260°T with a speed of 5 knots heading towards north of Magazine Island. When Magazine Island was abeam to port, the Master observed a container vessel i.e. TS Pusan bore 4 to 6 points on her port bow at a distance of about 1 n.m. and was proceeding inbound at East Lamma Channel on a northwesterly course. The weather was fine with good visibility of 5 n.m.

4.2.2 When TS Pusan was about 0.3 n.m. from M63514A, the Master of M63514A found that the bearing of TS Pusan had not changed and there was a risk of collision. In order to pass the stern of TS Pusan, the Master of M63514A took immediate avoiding action by sounding two short blasts on the whistle and altered course to port as well as stopping port engine while starboard engine was still going ahead.

4.2.3 In the course of altering course to port, the Master heard that TS Pusan sounded one short blast and then made a broad alteration to starboard. At about 1546, the port bow of TS Pusan contacted the starboard bow of M63514A and the Master stopped the engine instantly. After collision, the engines of M63514A were broken down and the vessel sank shortly after the collision.

4.2.4 The Master and the Engineer of M63514A were rescued by a passing fishing vessel.

4.2.5 Diagram of collision tracks of M63514A and TS Pusan prepared by the Master of M63514A is shown in Figure 5.

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Figure 5: Diagram of collision tracks of M63514A and TS Pusan prepared by the Master of M63514A

4.3 VTC radar records

4.3.1 Observations on the VTC radar records revealed that between 1524 to 1534 on 1 February 2006, TS Pusan was steaming on a course of about 307°T to 308°T and her speed was increased steadily from 8.0 knots to 14.5 knots. At 1535 she altered course to starboard to 335°T . After swinging to starboard, her course was on 355°T at 1536 and 037°T at 1537. Her speed was reduced from 14.5 knots to 8.5 knots during the period from 1535 to 1537 when the vessel was swinging to starboard.

4.3.2 At 1534, a raw echo on the VTC radar records which was believed to be M63514A was seen proceeding on a westerly course of about 264°T at a speed of about 6.5 knots. At 1535, her course was initially on 260°T at a speed of about 7.0 knots. Shortly after altering course to port, her course became 209°T at a speed of 3.5 knots. The echo disappeared from the VTC radar record after 1536.

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4.3.3 From the VTC radar records, an unknown target (3188) was observed and manoeuvred in an almost parallel course to TS Pusan at a distance of about 200 metres to the starboard of TS Pusan.

4.3.4 TS Pusan and M63514A were on converging courses. TS Pusan had altered course to starboard with reduced speed whilst M63514A had altered course to port before the collision occurred at about 1536.

4.3.5 VTC Radar Plot showing the collision tracks of TS Pusan, M63514A and the track of the unknown target (3188) is shown in Figure 6 and VTC Track Report of the above vessels is shown in Figure 7.

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Figure 6 : VTC Radar Plot showing the collision tracks of TS Pusan and M63514A and the track of the unknown target (3188)

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Figure 7: VTC Track Report of TS Pusan (c_dTS PUS), M63514A (1739) and unknown target (3188)

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5. Analysis of Evidence

5.1 Certification and Experience of Personnel

5.1.1 The Master of TS Pusan holds a valid Croatian certificate of competency as master and has about 18 years in a commanding position. The Pilot on board TS Pusan holds a Class 2C Hong Kong Pilot license and has about 1.5 years of working experience as a pilot.

5.1.2 The Master of M63514A is holding a People’s Republic of China’s Master Certificate enabling him to take charge of a fishing vessel under 200 GT. Based on his PRC master certificate an endorsement was issued by Hong Kong Marine Department to enable him to take charge of M63514A. He has served as master of fishing vessels for about 16 years.

5.2 Conditions of weather and visibility

5.2.1 It was reported that the weather was fine with visibility of about 4 n.m. The wind was easterly with force 3. The weather conditions were not considered contributory factors to the accident.

5.3 Navigation bridge visibility

5.3.1 TS Pusan carried containers up to only 2-tier high on deck at the time of collision and the stowage of containers on deck did not impair the proper lookout from the bridge before the collision.

5.3.2 There were 6 windows in front and 3 windows on each side of the wheelhouse of M63514A. It appears that lookout would not be impaired as there were so many windows in the wheelhouse.

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5.4 Actions taken by TS Pusan

5.4.1 From the engine revolution log of TS Pusan, it indicated that the vessel’s engine was increased steadily from dead slow ahead to full ahead when the Pilot boarded the vessel at 1524 (Figure 8). From the VTC track report (Figure 7), it can be seen that speed of TS Pusan was increased from about 7 knots at 1524 to 14.5 knots at 1535. Her course during this period was about 307°T to 308°T.

5.4.2 At about 1534, the Pilot observed a westbound fishing vessel i.e. M63514A coming out from the north of Magazine Island. From the VTC radar plot (Figure 6), the distance between TS Pusan and M63514A at this time was about 0.38 n.m. The Master gave 1 long blast on the whistle to attract the attention of M63514A.

5.4.3 At about 1535 the Pilot of TS Pusan observed that the relative bearing of M63514A was about 3 points on his starboard bow and it would cross ahead and pass clear of his own vessel. However, he ordered a 10° starboard helm with a view to allowing more sea room for M63514A to pass ahead. From the VTC radar plot (Figure 6), at 1535 the distance between TS Pusan and M63514A was about 0.21 n.m. Shortly after sighting that M63514A had altered course to port, the Pilot of TS Pusan ordered hard-a-starboard helm. Full astern engine and both bow and stern thrusters were ordered to assist the vessel to turn to starboard when pilot observed that M63514A was still turning to port and at a greater rate of turning. Despite the above avoiding actions, at 1536 port bow of TS Pusan contacted with the starboard side of M63514A. From the VTC track report (Figure 7) at 1536, the heading of TS Pusan changed to an almost north northeasterly course and her speed was reduced to about 8.5 knots.

5.4.4 When the Pilot boarded TS Pusan at about 1524 at Ngau Chau pilot boarding station, he ordered the engine to full ahead and the vessel proceeded at a speed of about 14.5 knots before the Pilot ordered the engine to go full astern to avoid collision. The Pilot sighted M63514A at 1534 at a range of about 0.38 n.m. and the collision took place at 1536 i.e. only after 2 minutes. The Pilot should slow down, stop or reverse the engine when sighting M63514A in order to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation. At a speed of about 14.5 knots, TS Pusan would not have enough time to assess the situation

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and to take proper and effective action to avoid collision. In this connection, the Master and the Pilot of TS Pusan had failed to comply with COLREGS.

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(Dead Slow Ahead)

(Slow Ahead)

(Half Ahead)

(Full Ahead)

Figure 8 : Engine Revolution Log of TS Pusan

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5.5 Actions taken by M63514A

5.5.1 According to the Master of M64514A, after departing Aberdeen Typhoon Shelter his vessel proceeded on a course of 260°T with a speed of 5 knots. When Magazine Island was abeam to port, the Master observed a container vessel i.e. TS Pusan bore 4 to 6 points on her port bow at a distance of about 1 n.m. and was proceeding inbound at East Lamma Channel on a northwesterly course. At 1534 M63514A was detected by VTS radar system (Track No. 1739) at a range of 0.44 n.m. from TS Pusan and VTC track report (Figure 7) indicates that she was on a westerly course between 264°T and 267°T and her speed was about 7.5 knots.

5.5.2 When TS Pusan was about 0.3 n.m. from M63514A, the Master of M63514A found that the bearing of TS Pusan had not changed and there was a risk of collision. In order to pass the stern of TS Pusan, the Master of M63514A took immediate avoiding action by sounding two short blasts on the whistle and altered course to port. In order to increase the turning rate of his vessel to port, the Master of M63514A stopped the port engine and maintained the starboard engine to go ahead. From the VTC track report (Figure 7), at 1535 she altered course to port to 209°T and her speed was reduced to 3.5 knots. At about 1536 the port bow of TS Pusan contacted with the starboard side of M63514A. After the collision, the engines of M63514A were broken down and the vessel sank shortly. The track of M63514A on VTC radar plot was lost at 1536 and it is believed that she had sunk after the collision.

5.5.3 Due to the size and turning rate of TS Pusan, her alteration of course to starboard by putting the helm on 10° starboard might not be apparent to M63514A due to close range i.e. about 0.2 n.m. between the 2 vessels. The Master of M63514A thus took avoiding action by altering course to port with a view to passing the stern of TS Pusan. As TS Pusan had altered course to starboard, alteration of course to port by M63514A caused a close-quarters situation and subsequently a collision between the two vessels. According to the VTC radar plot, had M63514A maintained her course and speed, she would have passed clear of TS Pusan. As the unknown target (3188) was at a distance of about 500 metres from M63514A at 1534, whatever avoiding actions taken by M63514A would not be affected by the former vessel.

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5.6 Probable Causes

In this crossing situation, TS Pusan was the give-way vessel and M63514A was the stand-on vessel. In accordance with COLREGS, the stand-on vessel should keep her course and speed and in a crossing situation, she should not alter course to port when taking action to avoid collision with another vessel on her own port side. The main cause for the collision was the failure of Master of M63514A to comply with COLREGS by alteration of course to port to avoid collision with a give-way vessel i.e. TS Pusan on her own port side. Had she maintained her course and speed, the collision could have been avoided.

6. Conclusions

6.1 The time of the collision was about 1536 on 1 February 2006. The approximate position of the collision was 22° 14.66’N, 114° 07.97’E.

6.2 At the time of the accident, the weather condition was fine, the wind was easterly at force 3 and the visibility was about 4 n.m. The weather conditions are not considered to have contributed to the accident.

6.3 The port bow and port quarter of TS Pusan sustained some paint scratches whilst M63514A sank shortly after the collision. No casualties and oil pollution were reported.

6.4 The investigation revealed that the following causes contributed to the collision: -

6.4.1 The Master and Pilot of TS Pusan have contravened COLREGS by not slackening the vessel’s speed or taking all way off by stopping or reversing her means of propulsion, in order to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation.

6.4.2 The Master of M63514A has failed to comply with COLREGS in altering course to port to avoid collision with a give-way vessel on her own port side in a crossing situation. Had she maintained her course and speed, the collision could have been avoided.

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7. Recommendations

7.1 A copy of the report is to be sent to the owners and Masters of TS Pusan and M63514A and the Hong Kong Pilots Association drawing their attention to comply with COLREGS at all times whilst navigating in the waters of Hong Kong.

8. Submissions

8.1 In the event that the conduct of any person or organization is criticized in an accident investigation report, it is the policy of the Marine Department that a copy of the relevant parts of the report is given to that person or organization so that he can have an opportunity to rebut the criticism or offer evidence not previously available to the investigating officer.

8.2 The relevant parts of the final draft of the report were sent to the following:

Master of TS Pusan

Pilot of TS Pusan

Master of M63514A

8.3 Submissions were received from the Master of TS Pusan and the Master of M63514A. The text of the draft was amended as appropriate according to the submissions. No submission was received from the Pilot of TS Pusan.

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Purpose of Investigation

This incident is investigated, and published in accordance with the IMO Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents promulgated under IMO Assembly Resolution A.849(20). The purpose of this investigation conducted by the Marine Accident Investigation and Shipping Security Policy Branch (MAISSPB) of Marine Department is to determine the circumstances and the causes of the incident with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and avoiding similar incident in future.

The conclusions drawn in this report aim to identify the different factors contributing to the incident. They are not intended to apportion blame or liability towards any particular organization or individual except so far as necessary to achieve the said purpose.

The MAISSPB has no involvement in any prosecution or disciplinary action that may be taken by the Marine Department resulting from this incident.

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Table of Contents

Page

Summary 2

Description of the Vessels 3

Sources of evidence 6

Outline of events 7

Analysis of evidence 14

Conclusions 19

Recommendations 20

Submissions 20

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1. Summary

1.1 At about 1536 on 1 February 2006, an Antigua & Barbuda registered container ship TS Pusan collided with a locally licensed fishing vessel M63514A at the inbound lane of East Lamma Channel at approximate position 22 ° 14.66’N, 114 ° 07.97’E, about 0.27 nautical mile (n.m.) westsouthwest of Magazine Island. TS Pusan was under pilotage and proceeding to Pun Shan Shek Anchorage. At the time of the accident, the weather condition was fine, the wind was easterly at force 3 and the visibility was about 4 n.m. Both the port bow and port quarter of TS Pusan sustained some paint scratches of about 10-15 metres in length (Figure 1) whilst M63514A sank shortly after the collision. The Master and Engineer of M63514A were rescued by a passing fishing vessel. No casualties and oil pollution were reported.

1.2 The investigation revealed that the following causes contributed to the collision:

1.2.1 The Master and the Pilot of TS Pusan being the give-way vessel had contravened the Collision Regulations (COLREGS) by not slackening her speed or taking all way off by stopping or reversing her means of propulsion, in order to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation.

1.2.2 The Master of M63514A being a stand-on vessel in a crossing situation had failed to comply with COLREGS by altering course to port to avoid collision with a give-way vessel on her own port side.

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Figure 1 – Photograph showing the paint scratches on port bow of TS Pusan

2. Description of the vessels 2.1 TS Pusan Port of Registry : St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda Call Sign : V2OT7

IMO No. : 9318773 Type : Container Vessel Built : Qingshan Shipyard, Wuhan, China Year of Built : 2003 Gross Tonnage : 9,701 Net Tonnage : 3,972 Length Overall : 140.39 metres Breadth : 22.80 metres Maximum Draft : 8.68 metres Main Engine : MAN B & W 5S 50MC-C MK7 Engine Power : 7,900 kW

Service Speed : 18.0 knots

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TS Pusan is a container ship classed with Germanischer Lloyd. The accommodation and the main machinery space are situated aft. She has totally 5 cellular cargo holds and has a maximum container carrying capacity of 296 TEU below deck and 660 TEU on deck. The navigational equipment consists of a magnetic compass, a gyrocompass, an electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS), an automatic identification system (AIS), a voyage data recorder (VDR), a course recorder, two radars with Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA), a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and an echo sounder, etc.

TS Pusan is presently engaged in a run between Japan, China including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand.

Figure 2 - Photograph of TS Pusan

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Licence No. : M63514A Type : Western Wooden Deep Sea Trawler Length : 30.3 metres Breadth : 7.1 metres Thames Measurement : 219.52 tons Net Registered tons : 153.66 Length Overall : 30.3 m Engine/Engine Power : 1 x 6 cylinders “Cummins” Diesel/300 H.P. 1 x 6 cylinders “Cummins” Diesel/425 H.P. 1 x 6 cylinders “Cummins” Diesel/350 H.P.

2.2 M63514A

M63514A was a western wooden deep sea trawler fishing vessel. She had 2 cargo holds. The navigational equipment consisted of a magnetic compass, a gyro-compass, a GPS, an auto-pilot, a radar and an echo sounder. It was engaged in fishing within a range of 300 n.m. from Hong Kong.

Figure 3 - Photograph of M63514A

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3. Sources of Evidence

3.1 Report of Marine Accident and ship’s documents were provided by the Master of TS Pusan;

3.2 Report of Marine Accident was provided by the Master of M63514A;

3.3 Pilot’s Accident Report was provided by the Pilot of TS Pusan;

3.4 Statements provided by the Master of TS Pusan;

3.5 Statements provided by the Master of M63514A;

3.6 Statements provided by the Pilot of TS Pusan;

3.7 The Vessel Traffic Centre (VTC), Marine Department; and

3.8 The Hong Kong Observatory.

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4. Outline of events

4.1 Account of TS Pusan

4.1.1 At about 1524 on 1 February 2006 the Pilot boarded TS Pusan at Ngau Chau pilot boarding station. After exchanging information with the Master and assessing the surrounding circumstances, the Pilot ordered the vessel to steer on course 309°T and engine speed was increased to full ahead to proceed inbound to Pun Shan Shek Anchorage. The maximum draft of the ship was 8.90 metres. Visibility was good between 4 and 5 n.m. On the bridge with the Pilot were the Master, Second Officer and a Helmsman.

4.1.2 At about 1533, the ship’s course was adjusted to 307°T. At about 1534, a westbound fishing vessel was observed coming out north of Magazine Island at a distance of about 0.3 n.m. At about 1535, the relative bearing of the same fishing vessel was about 3 points on starboard bow of TS Pusan. Although the Pilot opined that the fishing vessel would marginally cross ahead of his vessel, he ordered the Helmsman to put the wheel on 10 degrees to starboard in order to pass astern of her with more sea room. However, the fishing vessel suddenly altered course to port. Noting that a close quarters situation was developing, the Pilot immediately sounded 1 short blast and gave an order to put the helm to hard to starboard in order to keep clear of the fishing vessel. As the Pilot found that the fishing vessel still altered course to port and at a greater turning rate, he ordered the engine to go full astern and both bow and stern thrusters were also used in assisting to turn the vessel to starboard.

4.1.3 Despite the above avoiding actions, at about 1536, the port bow of TS Pusan contacted with the starboard side of M63514A. At about 1542, M63514A sank and the Pilot ordered TS Pusan to drop both anchors to prevent the vessel from running into shallow water ahead. A pilot boat was instructed to render assistance to the Master and Engineer of M63514A who were found to have been rescued by a passing fishing vessel.

4.1.4 Diagram of collision tracks of TS Pusan and M63514A prepared by the Pilot of TS Pusan is shown in Figure 4.

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Figure 4 : Diagram of collision tracks of TS Pusan and M63514A i.e. Fishing Boat prepared by the Pilot of TS Pusan

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4.2 Account of M63514A

4.2.1 At about 1500 on 1 February 2006, M63514A departed from Aberdeen Typhoon Shelter to proceed to Gui Shan Dao. She was on a course of 260°T with a speed of 5 knots heading towards north of Magazine Island. When Magazine Island was abeam to port, the Master observed a container vessel i.e. TS Pusan bore 4 to 6 points on her port bow at a distance of about 1 n.m. and was proceeding inbound at East Lamma Channel on a northwesterly course. The weather was fine with good visibility of 5 n.m.

4.2.2 When TS Pusan was about 0.3 n.m. from M63514A, the Master of M63514A found that the bearing of TS Pusan had not changed and there was a risk of collision. In order to pass the stern of TS Pusan, the Master of M63514A took immediate avoiding action by sounding two short blasts on the whistle and altered course to port as well as stopping port engine while starboard engine was still going ahead.

4.2.3 In the course of altering course to port, the Master heard that TS Pusan sounded one short blast and then made a broad alteration to starboard. At about 1546, the port bow of TS Pusan contacted the starboard bow of M63514A and the Master stopped the engine instantly. After collision, the engines of M63514A were broken down and the vessel sank shortly after the collision.

4.2.4 The Master and the Engineer of M63514A were rescued by a passing fishing vessel.

4.2.5 Diagram of collision tracks of M63514A and TS Pusan prepared by the Master of M63514A is shown in Figure 5.

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Figure 5: Diagram of collision tracks of M63514A and TS Pusan prepared by the Master of M63514A

4.3 VTC radar records

4.3.1 Observations on the VTC radar records revealed that between 1524 to 1534 on 1 February 2006, TS Pusan was steaming on a course of about 307°T to 308°T and her speed was increased steadily from 8.0 knots to 14.5 knots. At 1535 she altered course to starboard to 335°T . After swinging to starboard, her course was on 355°T at 1536 and 037°T at 1537. Her speed was reduced from 14.5 knots to 8.5 knots during the period from 1535 to 1537 when the vessel was swinging to starboard.

4.3.2 At 1534, a raw echo on the VTC radar records which was believed to be M63514A was seen proceeding on a westerly course of about 264°T at a speed of about 6.5 knots. At 1535, her course was initially on 260°T at a speed of about 7.0 knots. Shortly after altering course to port, her course became 209°T at a speed of 3.5 knots. The echo disappeared from the VTC radar record after 1536.

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4.3.3 From the VTC radar records, an unknown target (3188) was observed and manoeuvred in an almost parallel course to TS Pusan at a distance of about 200 metres to the starboard of TS Pusan.

4.3.4 TS Pusan and M63514A were on converging courses. TS Pusan had altered course to starboard with reduced speed whilst M63514A had altered course to port before the collision occurred at about 1536.

4.3.5 VTC Radar Plot showing the collision tracks of TS Pusan, M63514A and the track of the unknown target (3188) is shown in Figure 6 and VTC Track Report of the above vessels is shown in Figure 7.

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Figure 6 : VTC Radar Plot showing the collision tracks of TS Pusan and M63514A and the track of the unknown target (3188)

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Figure 7: VTC Track Report of TS Pusan (c_dTS PUS), M63514A (1739) and unknown target (3188)

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5. Analysis of Evidence

5.1 Certification and Experience of Personnel

5.1.1 The Master of TS Pusan holds a valid Croatian certificate of competency as master and has about 18 years in a commanding position. The Pilot on board TS Pusan holds a Class 2C Hong Kong Pilot license and has about 1.5 years of working experience as a pilot.

5.1.2 The Master of M63514A is holding a People’s Republic of China’s Master Certificate enabling him to take charge of a fishing vessel under 200 GT. Based on his PRC master certificate an endorsement was issued by Hong Kong Marine Department to enable him to take charge of M63514A. He has served as master of fishing vessels for about 16 years.

5.2 Conditions of weather and visibility

5.2.1 It was reported that the weather was fine with visibility of about 4 n.m. The wind was easterly with force 3. The weather conditions were not considered contributory factors to the accident.

5.3 Navigation bridge visibility

5.3.1 TS Pusan carried containers up to only 2-tier high on deck at the time of collision and the stowage of containers on deck did not impair the proper lookout from the bridge before the collision.

5.3.2 There were 6 windows in front and 3 windows on each side of the wheelhouse of M63514A. It appears that lookout would not be impaired as there were so many windows in the wheelhouse.

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5.4 Actions taken by TS Pusan

5.4.1 From the engine revolution log of TS Pusan, it indicated that the vessel’s engine was increased steadily from dead slow ahead to full ahead when the Pilot boarded the vessel at 1524 (Figure 8). From the VTC track report (Figure 7), it can be seen that speed of TS Pusan was increased from about 7 knots at 1524 to 14.5 knots at 1535. Her course during this period was about 307°T to 308°T.

5.4.2 At about 1534, the Pilot observed a westbound fishing vessel i.e. M63514A coming out from the north of Magazine Island. From the VTC radar plot (Figure 6), the distance between TS Pusan and M63514A at this time was about 0.38 n.m. The Master gave 1 long blast on the whistle to attract the attention of M63514A.

5.4.3 At about 1535 the Pilot of TS Pusan observed that the relative bearing of M63514A was about 3 points on his starboard bow and it would cross ahead and pass clear of his own vessel. However, he ordered a 10° starboard helm with a view to allowing more sea room for M63514A to pass ahead. From the VTC radar plot (Figure 6), at 1535 the distance between TS Pusan and M63514A was about 0.21 n.m. Shortly after sighting that M63514A had altered course to port, the Pilot of TS Pusan ordered hard-a-starboard helm. Full astern engine and both bow and stern thrusters were ordered to assist the vessel to turn to starboard when pilot observed that M63514A was still turning to port and at a greater rate of turning. Despite the above avoiding actions, at 1536 port bow of TS Pusan contacted with the starboard side of M63514A. From the VTC track report (Figure 7) at 1536, the heading of TS Pusan changed to an almost north northeasterly course and her speed was reduced to about 8.5 knots.

5.4.4 When the Pilot boarded TS Pusan at about 1524 at Ngau Chau pilot boarding station, he ordered the engine to full ahead and the vessel proceeded at a speed of about 14.5 knots before the Pilot ordered the engine to go full astern to avoid collision. The Pilot sighted M63514A at 1534 at a range of about 0.38 n.m. and the collision took place at 1536 i.e. only after 2 minutes. The Pilot should slow down, stop or reverse the engine when sighting M63514A in order to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation. At a speed of about 14.5 knots, TS Pusan would not have enough time to assess the situation

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and to take proper and effective action to avoid collision. In this connection, the Master and the Pilot of TS Pusan had failed to comply with COLREGS.

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(Dead Slow Ahead)

(Slow Ahead)

(Half Ahead)

(Full Ahead)

Figure 8 : Engine Revolution Log of TS Pusan

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5.5 Actions taken by M63514A

5.5.1 According to the Master of M64514A, after departing Aberdeen Typhoon Shelter his vessel proceeded on a course of 260°T with a speed of 5 knots. When Magazine Island was abeam to port, the Master observed a container vessel i.e. TS Pusan bore 4 to 6 points on her port bow at a distance of about 1 n.m. and was proceeding inbound at East Lamma Channel on a northwesterly course. At 1534 M63514A was detected by VTS radar system (Track No. 1739) at a range of 0.44 n.m. from TS Pusan and VTC track report (Figure 7) indicates that she was on a westerly course between 264°T and 267°T and her speed was about 7.5 knots.

5.5.2 When TS Pusan was about 0.3 n.m. from M63514A, the Master of M63514A found that the bearing of TS Pusan had not changed and there was a risk of collision. In order to pass the stern of TS Pusan, the Master of M63514A took immediate avoiding action by sounding two short blasts on the whistle and altered course to port. In order to increase the turning rate of his vessel to port, the Master of M63514A stopped the port engine and maintained the starboard engine to go ahead. From the VTC track report (Figure 7), at 1535 she altered course to port to 209°T and her speed was reduced to 3.5 knots. At about 1536 the port bow of TS Pusan contacted with the starboard side of M63514A. After the collision, the engines of M63514A were broken down and the vessel sank shortly. The track of M63514A on VTC radar plot was lost at 1536 and it is believed that she had sunk after the collision.

5.5.3 Due to the size and turning rate of TS Pusan, her alteration of course to starboard by putting the helm on 10° starboard might not be apparent to M63514A due to close range i.e. about 0.2 n.m. between the 2 vessels. The Master of M63514A thus took avoiding action by altering course to port with a view to passing the stern of TS Pusan. As TS Pusan had altered course to starboard, alteration of course to port by M63514A caused a close-quarters situation and subsequently a collision between the two vessels. According to the VTC radar plot, had M63514A maintained her course and speed, she would have passed clear of TS Pusan. As the unknown target (3188) was at a distance of about 500 metres from M63514A at 1534, whatever avoiding actions taken by M63514A would not be affected by the former vessel.

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5.6 Probable Causes

In this crossing situation, TS Pusan was the give-way vessel and M63514A was the stand-on vessel. In accordance with COLREGS, the stand-on vessel should keep her course and speed and in a crossing situation, she should not alter course to port when taking action to avoid collision with another vessel on her own port side. The main cause for the collision was the failure of Master of M63514A to comply with COLREGS by alteration of course to port to avoid collision with a give-way vessel i.e. TS Pusan on her own port side. Had she maintained her course and speed, the collision could have been avoided.

6. Conclusions

6.1 The time of the collision was about 1536 on 1 February 2006. The approximate position of the collision was 22° 14.66’N, 114° 07.97’E.

6.2 At the time of the accident, the weather condition was fine, the wind was easterly at force 3 and the visibility was about 4 n.m. The weather conditions are not considered to have contributed to the accident.

6.3 The port bow and port quarter of TS Pusan sustained some paint scratches whilst M63514A sank shortly after the collision. No casualties and oil pollution were reported.

6.4 The investigation revealed that the following causes contributed to the collision: -

6.4.1 The Master and Pilot of TS Pusan have contravened COLREGS by not slackening the vessel’s speed or taking all way off by stopping or reversing her means of propulsion, in order to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation.

6.4.2 The Master of M63514A has failed to comply with COLREGS in altering course to port to avoid collision with a give-way vessel on her own port side in a crossing situation. Had she maintained her course and speed, the collision could have been avoided.

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7. Recommendations

7.1 A copy of the report is to be sent to the owners and Masters of TS Pusan and M63514A and the Hong Kong Pilots Association drawing their attention to comply with COLREGS at all times whilst navigating in the waters of Hong Kong.

8. Submissions

8.1 In the event that the conduct of any person or organization is criticized in an accident investigation report, it is the policy of the Marine Department that a copy of the relevant parts of the report is given to that person or organization so that he can have an opportunity to rebut the criticism or offer evidence not previously available to the investigating officer.

8.2 The relevant parts of the final draft of the report were sent to the following:

Master of TS Pusan

Pilot of TS Pusan

Master of M63514A

8.3 Submissions were received from the Master of TS Pusan and the Master of M63514A. The text of the draft was amended as appropriate according to the submissions. No submission was received from the Pilot of TS Pusan.

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