TWO HUNDRED THIRTIETH REPORT

(

( aid on the Table of Lok Sabha on 21st December, 2015)

Presented to the Rajya Sabha on 21st December, 2015)

L

Issues related to Security at Airports in India

Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New DelhiDecember, 2015/Agrahayana, 1937 (Saka)

PARLIAMENT OF INDIARAJYA SABHA

REPORT NO.

230

DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEEON TRANSPORT, TOURISM AND CULTURE

PARLIAMENT OF INDIARAJYA SABHA

DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ONTRANSPORT, TOURISM AND CULTURE

TWO HUNDRED THIRTIETH REPORTIssues related to Security at Airports in India

(Presented to the Rajya Sabha on 21st December, 2015)(Laid on the Table of Lok Sabha on 21st December, 2015)

Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi December, 2015/ Agrahayana, 1937 (Saka)

Hindi version of this publication is also available

Website : http://rajyasabha.nic.in

E-mail : rsc-tt@sansad.nic.in

C O N T E N T S

PAGES

1. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMI TEE............................................................................. (i)⎯(ii)

2 . INTRODUTION............................................................................................ (iii)

3. ACRNYMS........................................................................................................(iv)⎯(v)

4. REPORT................................................................................................... ....... 23

5. RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATION/CONCLUSIONS-AT A GLANCE....................................24⎯28

6. MINUTES ........................................................................................................ 29⎯36

7. ANNEXURES...................................................................................................... 37⎯41

COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE

(Constituted on 1st September, 2015)

1. Dr. Kanwar Deep Singh ⎯ Chairman

RAJYA SABHA

2. Shri Ritabrata Banerjee

3. Dr. K. Chiranjeevi

4. Shri Narendra Kumar Kashyap

5. Shri Avinash Rai Khanna

6. Dr. Prabhakar Kore

7. Shri Kiranmay Nanda

8. Kumari Selja

9. Shri Rajeev Shukla

10. Vacant

LOK SABHA

11. Shri Ram Charitra Nishad

12. Shri Vinod Chavda

13. Shri Rajeshbhai Naranbhai Chudasama

14. Kumari. Arpita Ghosh

15. Shri Rahul Kaswan

16. Shri P. Kumar

17. Shri Faizal P.P. Mohammed

18. Yogi Aditya Nath

19. Shri Kristappa Nimmala

20. Shri Rajesh Pandey

21. Shri Rajesh Ranjan

22. Shri P. Srinivasa Reddy

23. Shri Ram Kumar Sharma

24. Shri Prathap Simha

25. Shri Dushyant Singh

26. Shri Kunwar Haribansh Singh

27. Shri Rakesh Singh

28. Shri Shatrughan Sinha

29. Shri Dasrath Tirkey

30. Shri Manoj Tiwari

31. Shri K.C. Venugopal

(i)

SECRETARIATShri J. G. Negi, Joint Secretary

Shri Swarabji B., Joint Director

Shri Arun Kumar, Assistant Director

Smt. Catherine John L., Assistant Director

Shri P. P. Raumon, Committee Officer

(ii)

INTRODUCTION

I, the Chairman, Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tour-ism and Culture, having been authorized by the Committee, do hereby present on its behalf thisTwo Hundred Thirtieth Report on “Issues related to Security at Airports in India”.2. The violent incident which occurred at Karipur International Airport at Kozhikode on 10th

June, 2015 involving the employees of Airports Authority of India and Central Industrial SecurityForce was an eye opener regarding the security system available at Indian airports. With thisbackdrop, the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism andCulture decided to take up the Issues related to Security at Airports in India for examination andReport.3. The Committee heard the views of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Home Affairs,Airports Authority of India, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, Central Industrial Security Force andIntelligence Bureau during its meeting held on the 10th July, 2015. The Committee visited the DelhiInternational Airport to have on-the-spot study of the security arrangements at the Delhi Airport on31st August, 2015 and heard the security agencies, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Home Affairs, andGMR on various aspects of security at Delhi Airport. The Committee, during its study visit toMumbai and Kochi in October, 2015 also heard the views of MIAL, GVK and CIAL, the Airportoperators as well as various agencies involved in providing security to these airports.4. The Committee wishes to express its thanks to the officers of Ministries of Civil Aviation,Home Affairs, Airports Authority of India, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, Central IndustrialSecurity Force, Intelligence Bureau, Government of Maharashtra and other stakeholders for placingbefore the Committee, the material and information desired in connection with the subject and forclarifying the points raised by the Members.5. The Committee considered and adopted the Report at its meeting held on the18th December, 2015.

DR. KANWAR DEEP SINGHNEW DELHI; Chairman,

18th, December, 2015 Department-related Parliamentary StandingAgrahayana 27, 1937 (Saka) Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture,

Rajya Sabha.

(iii)

ACRONYMS

AAI : Airports Authority of IndiaACP Assistant Commissioner of PoliceAEP : Airport Entry PassesAFRRO : Assistant Foreigners Regional Registration OfficerAOC : Airline Operators CommitteeAPSC : Air Port Security CommitteeARC : Aviation Research CentreASG : Aviation Security GroupAVSEC : Aviation SecurityBCAS : Bureau of Civil Aviation SecurityBDDS : Bomb Detection and Disposal SquadBIAL : Bangalore International Airport LimitedCCS : Cabinet Committee on SecurityCCTV : Closed-Circuit TelevisionCIAL : Cochin International Airport LimitedCISF : Central Industrial Security ForceCoS : Committee of SecretariesCOSAH : Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft HijackCOSCA : Commissioner of Security, Civil AviationCRPF : Central Reserve Police ForceCSIA : Chhatrapati Shivaji International AirportCTCP : Counter-Terrorism Contingency PlansDFMD : Door Frame Metal DetectorsDG : Director GeneralDGCA : Director-General Civil AviationDIAL : Delhi International Airport LimitedDIG : Deputy Inspector GeneralETD : Explosive Trace DetectionENC : EncroachmentGHA : Ground Handling AgentsGMR : Grandhi Mallikarjuna RaoGoM : Government of MaharashtraGVK : Gunupati Venkata KrishnaHDIL : Housing Development and Infrastructure LimitedHHMD : Hand-held Metal DetectorsHIAL : Hyderabad International Airport LimitedIB : Intelligence BureauIBSS : In-line Baggage Screening SystemICAO : International Civil Aviation OrganizationIEDs : Improvised Explosive DevicesIG : Inspector General

(iv)

IGI : Indira Gandhi InternationalIGIA : Indira Gandhi International AirportIRB : India Reserve BattalionLEI : Lack of Effective ImplementationMCA : Ministry of Civil AviationMCGM : Municipal Corporation of Greater MumbaiMHA : Ministry of Home AffairsMIAL : Mumbai International Airport LimitedMIHAN : Multi-Modal International Cargo Hub and AirportMMRDA : Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development AuthorityMoCA : Ministry of Civil AviationNCASP : National Civil Aviation Security ProgrammeNSG : National Security GuardsOMDA : Operation, Management and Development AgreementP.S. : Police StationPAPs : Password Authentication ProtocolPCR : Police Control RoomPIDS : Perimeter Intrusion Detection SystemPSF : Passenger Security FeeQRT : Quick Reaction TeamREM : RemovalRGI : Rajiv Gandhi InternationalSOPs : Standard Operating ProceduresSRA : Slum Rehabilitation AuthorityUT : Union TerritoryVHF : Very High FrequencyXBIS : X-ray Baggage Inspection System

(v)

Printed at : Bengal Offset Works, 335 Khajoor Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005.

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REPORT

Airport Security is integral part of National Security. The objective of providing security toairports is to safeguard the passengers, crew, ground personnel, the general public and the airportinfrastructure against unlawful acts as per International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)Standards and Recommended Practices laid down in Annexure-17 to the Chicago Convention.Annexure – 17 (Security) of International Civil Aviation Organization requires that all ContractingStates shall establish and implement a written National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP);shall have a designated appropriate authority to be responsible for development, implementation andmaintenance of NCASP; shall allocate tasks and co-ordinate activities related to aviation security.

2. The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) is the designated agency for providingsecurity in accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations. Thebroad security architecture is laid down by the BCAS in terms of codified five documents. Theyare called National Civil Aviation Security Programme, National Civil Aviation Security TrainingProgramme, National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme and Bomb ThreatContingency Plan to deal with hijacking.

3. Airport security in the country is looked after by specialized Police agencies, State Policeand airport security organizations, depending on the security conditions prevalent in a particulararea. Bureau of Civil Aviation Security co-ordinates the working of the various agencies to ensurethat all security norms are followed by them.

4. The violent incident which occurred at Karipur International Airport at Kozhikode on 10th

June, 2015 involving the employees of Airports Authority of India and Central Industrial SecurityForce was an eye opener regarding the security system available at Indian airports. With thisbackdrop, the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism andCulture decided to take up the Issues related to Security at Airports in India for examination andReport.

5. The Committee heard the views of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Home Affairs,Airports Authority of India, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, Central Industrial Security Force andIntelligence Bureau during its meeting held on the 10th July, 2015. The Committee visited the DelhiInternational Airport to have on-the-spot study of the security arrangements at the Delhi Airport on31st August, 2015 and heard the security agencies, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of HomeAffairs and GMR on various aspects of security at Delhi Airport.

6. The Committee, during its study visit to Mumbai and Kochi, also heard the views of MIAL,

GVK and CIAL, the Airport operators as well as various agencies involved in providing security

to these airports.

7. The issues dealt with by the Committee on the issues related to Security at Airports in India

and the response of the Ministries of Civil Aviation and Home Affairs and other agencies thereon

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and the observations/ recommendations of the Committee have been enumerated in the succeedingparagraphs.Policy on security at airports

8. The Committee was informed that the Commissioner of Security, Civil Aviation(COSCA), Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) is designated by Ministry of Civil Aviation(MCA) as appropriate authority for development, implementation and maintenance of NationalCivil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) of India in line with Annexure 17 of ChicagoConvention of International Civil Aviation Organization. COSCA has been empowered to issuedirections under Section 5A of Aircraft Act, 1934 with respect to civil aviation securitymatters. He is also empowered to exercise all powers and duties conferred under the Aircraft(Security) Rules 2011. Ministry of Civil Aviation is the nodal Ministry for all matters relatingto Civil Aviation.

9. The Advisory Committee for Civil Aviation Security is headed by the Secretary (CivilAviation) which meets every year. This Committee is responsible to advise Government on mattersrelating to Civil Aviation Security, recommend and review the effectiveness of security measuresand procedures, and suggest enactment of such legislation as is found necessary and provide forco-ordination, at the national level, of all matters relating to the security.

10. Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) lays down Aviation Security (AVSEC) norms inaccordance with ICAO Annex-17 for Airport Operators, Aircraft operators, Regulated Agents,Caterers, Ground Handling Agents, Central Industrial Security Force/Aviation Security Group andState/Union Territory Police personnel.

11. It was further informed that implementation of security rules and regulations is monitoredby BCAS through Quality Control activities (security audits and inspections, security surveys andsecurity tests to check professional efficiency and alertness of security staff and mock exercisesto test efficacy of contingency plan and operational preparedness). AVSEC training is imparted tosecurity personnel of all agencies concerned with civil aviation. BCAS also carry out planning andco-ordination of AVSEC matters.Present status of security at airports

12. On the matter of present status of security at Indian airports, the Committee wasinformed that major threats (acts of unlawful interference) are hijacking – unlawful seizure ofaircraft; hostage taking on board aircraft / aerodromes; forcible intrusion on board aircraft /aerodrome / aeronautical facility; sabotage of airport / aircrafts; and terrorist attack on airport.

13. India is amongst the most terrorism affected countries. Latest threat inputs includesurgically implanted explosives for unlawful interference in civil aviation operations, ImprovisedExplosive Devices (IEDs) hidden in printer ink and toner cartridges, inputs like Terrorists lookingto hijack aircraft from airports using trained pilots and inputs point to increasing sophistication interrorist Modus Operandi and the threat to hijack aircrafts / forcible intrusion at smaller airports.India has been rated highly in terms of aviation security in the last ICAO audit in 2011. Theparameter, Lack of Effective Implementation (LEI) for India stood at 10.75% against global averageof 34.01%.

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Security arrangements at airports

14. On the subject of existing security arrangements at the airports in the country, theMinistry informed the Committee that Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have been issued byBCAS in the form of AVSEC Circulars/ Orders regarding some important issues like procedure ofpassengers and carry-on baggage screening, items banned for carriage on-board the aircraft, dealingwith cases of detection of arms and ammunition during screening of passengers or baggage,screening of hold baggage, security of cargo, courier and mail, access of vehicles up to the aircraftand the list of persons exempted from pre-embarkation security checks.

15. Categorization of airports, on the basis of intelligence inputs as well as threat and risk,has been made for the 98 airports (Hyper-sensitive – 26, Sensitive –56 and Normal – 16).

16. It was also informed that in the aftermath of hijacking of IC-814 in December 1999 fromKathmandu, the Committee of Secretaries took a decision to deploy CISF at the airports. Thesecurity of Airports is covered by the State/Union Territory Police, Central Industrial Security Force(CISF) and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)/ India Reserve Battalion (IRB). CISF wasinducted into airports consequent to IC-814 hijacking (24th December, 1999) as decided byCommittee of Secretaries in a meeting held on 7th January, 2000. CISF was first inducted at JaipurAirport on 3rd February, 2000. As on date, Central Industrial Security Force (Aviation SecurityGroup) has taken over the security of 53 airports of Airports Authority of India and 06 JointVenture/ Private Airports. The airports at Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, etc. are covered by StatePolice with the support of CRPF/IRB and rest of the airports are manned by Local Police.

17. In view of potential security threats and current aviation security scenario, State/UT Policehave been requested to ensure that all operational airstrips/aerodromes in their jurisdiction includingthose belonging to flying clubs are properly guarded and all necessary measures are taken to ensurethat no unlawful interference takes place with civil aviation operations, especially with regard tohijacking and operation of rogue aircrafts which may be used as weapons. Also to ensure that allthose airstrips/aerodromes which are not in use currently are actually made non-operational so thatno rogue aircraft can make use of the same.

18. The security infrastructure is provided by the Airport Operators. Some security functionsare allocated to Airport Operators (in-line hold baggage screening), Aircraft Operators (screening ofregistered baggage, cargo, mail, catering, company stores and security of aircraft) and RegulatedAgents (screening of cargo/courier/mail).

19. All authorized persons, employees, casual labour, passengers and vehicles while gainingentry into airside from any gate(s) are subject to security checks/frisking, baggage search, if any,by the Airport Security Personnel manning those gates.

20. Screening of passengers, staff and visitors at the entry gates of the airport through DoorFrame Metal Detectors (DFMD)/Hand-held Metal Detectors (HHMD) and physical frisking onrandom basis are carried out depending on local situation and inputs received from the intelligenceagencies. In case of suspected baggage, additional measures like screening through X-ray BaggageInspection System (XBIS) and Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) may also be taken.

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21. It was further informed that Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) is mandatory at alloperational airports. Monitoring of CCTV is to be done by all agencies concerned at unified CCTVControl Room. It is the responsibility of Airport Security Unit of State Police and ASG (CISF)to monitor CCTV covering all areas of the airport. Other agencies like AAI, Customs, Immigrationand Airline operators are authorized to depute their representatives in the Control Room formonitoring activities in their respective areas. The recorded cassettes are retained for a period ofone month to allow any concerned agencies to review later.

22. Perimeter wall of 8" with 1½” overhang fencing has been prescribed around the airport.Watch towers are to be installed every one km or as per the local survey keeping in view thethreat to a particular airport. Similarly, perimeter lighting and perimeter roads are prescribed formobile and foot patrolling to prevent any unauthorized entry/intrusion into the airports.Perimeter Intrusion Detection System is also prescribed for installation.

23. Manpower for surveillance in and around the airports is also provided on the basis ofrequirements assessed by joint security survey team.

24. All authorized personnel working with Ground Handling Agents (GHA) while leaving airportfrom any gate(s) are subject to security checks (frisking/baggage search) by the airport securitypersonnel manning those gates. Similarly, all staff when exiting the security restricted area ofairports is to be frisked on random basis so that any element of preparation of an unlawful actcan be detected.

25. Airport Operators, Airline Operators, GHAs and other agencies are required to have securityclearance and approved security programme before operation.

26. All persons operating in the aviation environment need to undergo Aviation Security(AVSEC) awareness training. Security related personnel need to qualify in AVSEC Basic Training.Screeners are mandated to qualify in screener training. Refresher courses are prescribed forvarious training programme.

27. The Ministry submitted that the following is the mechanism existing to deal with hijackingsituations:

(i) Aerodrome Committee at airport level;(ii) Central Committee at National level;(iii) Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH); and(iv) Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS): Apex Body.

28. The Cabinet Secretary is the Chairman of COSAH. DGCA is the Chairman of CentralCommittee with COSCA as the Convener.

29. The Quick Reaction Team (QRT) of State Police / CISF / CRPF is responsible forcordoning of hijacked aircraft till the arrival of NSG, strengthening of perimeter and crowdmanagement. Counter Terrorism Contingency Plan including various agencies i.e., CISF, NSG,Local Police, etc. are in place at Airports.

Role of Ministry of Home Affairs in Civil Aviation Security

30. When asked about the role of the Ministry of Home Affairs on the issue of Security atIndian airports, the Committee was informed that the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has an

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important role in ensuring civil aviation security in the country. Whereas BCAS frames the rulesand regulations for civil aviation security, Central Industrial Security Force, which is functioningunder MHA, act as the implementing agency for the guidelines framed by BCAS, CISF is alsoentrusted with dawing up airport-wise Counter-Terrorism Contingency Plans (CTCP) and is at theforefront of activities in this regard. Currently CTCP is available only at Delhi and Mumbai airportswhere CISF has been entrusted with security of the city side area. CISF also has its ownintelligence wing and is part of the multi-agency centre which disseminates intelligence andco-ordinates action at the airports.

31. The Intelligence Bureau also plays an important role in providing intelligence inputs related

to civil aviation security. Further, Bureau of Immigration under Intelligence Bureau screensincoming and outgoing passengers from and to other countries.

32. It was further informed that the National Security Guard (NSG) under MHA is involved inCivil Aviation Security through deployment of Sky Marshals on aircrafts operating on sensitivesectors for prevention of and to act as first responders to any incident involving hijacking of anaircraft. NSG is also the primary Contingency Response Force for anti-terrorist operations atairports. NSG maintains a Task Force for this purpose ready to move at 30 minutes notice.

Role of other agencies in Civil Aviation Security

33. As per the status note furnished by the Ministry of Home Affairs on the subject, thefollowing agencies are involved in civil aviation security:-

(i) Airlines - Airlines are responsible for screening of registered baggage and cargo.Airlines are also responsible for security of their aircraft.

(ii) Airport Operators- Airport Operators are responsible for provision of securityinfrastructure such as In-line Baggage Screening Systems at the airports and also forco-ordination of various security related activities at the airports.· Airports Authority of India (AAI) operates 125 airports (including non-operational).· Six JVC Airports i.e. Delhi (DIAL), Mumbai (MIAL), Nagpur (MIHAN), Cochin

(CIAL), Hyderabad (HIAL) and Bangalore (BIAL).· One airport is under Civil Administration Diu.· Air Traffic Services at all Airports in India are provided by the AAI.

(iii) State Police- State Police is responsible for law and order and crime control relatedissues at the airports. Apart from this, at certain airports where CISF is yet to bedeployed, State Police Force is the primary security agency for security relatedfunctions such as pre-embarkation security checks, protection of airport premises andintelligence/surveillance.

(iv) Defence- Deployment of Quick Reaction Teams at Civil enclaves for anti-hijack cordon.

Threat perception and Security categorization of airports

34. When asked about the threat perception and the provision of adequate security at theairports in the country, the Committee was informed that threat perception to all operational airportsin the country is reviewed by BCAS in consultation with the Intelligence Agencies and based on

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the inputs received, airports are categorised into three categories viz., Hypersensitive, Sensitive andNormal. Currently, out of 98 operational airports in India, 26 airports are categorised asHypersensitive (18 under CISF security cover), 56 categorised as Sensitive (37 under CISFsecurity cover) and 16 are categorised as normal (4 under CISF security cover). Table showingcategory-wise list of airports under CISF security cover is at Annexure-I.

Background on Induction of CISF at Airports

35. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in its Status Note furnished to the Committee on the subject,has stated that before induction of CISF at airports, different State Police Forces used to providesecurity at airports. Despite the fact that the BCAS was the regulator framing policies andguidelines for uniform implementation across the States, the set up lacked semblance of uniformity.In the backdrop of hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 from Kathmandu on December 24,1999, airport security matters were reviewed by the Government and it was decided that airportssecurity should be entrusted to a single dedicated Force instead of different State Police Forceswith divergent work culture and practices. The Committee of Secretaries (CoS) in its meeting heldon the 7th January, 2000 decided to assign the task of aviation security at Indian airports to theCISF. The dedicated CISF contingent earmarked for aviation security has been notified as AviationSecurity Group (ASG). The first Airport Security Unit of CISF was inducted at Jaipur Airport onFebruary 3, 2000. Presently, CISF is deployed at 59 operational airports out of 98 operationalairports with a total strength of around 22000 personnel.

Role of CISF

36. The Aviation Security Group of CISF is responsible for all the areas of airport security including

Perimeter Security, Access Control, Terminal Building Security, Apron Security, Surveillance, anti-hijacking

pre-embarkation checks, Passenger Handling etc.

37. The role of CISF is categorized in the following three operational units:-

(i) Anti-hijacking Unit dealing with Pre-embarkation security check of passengers and cabin

baggage; and Access control of passengers, visitors, staff of various agencies, catering

personnel, cargo and courier into the airport;

(ii) Protection Unit dealing with the Protection of airport and perimeter; Quick Reaction Team;

and Cordoning of aircraft during contingencies (except civil enclaves); and

(iii) Intelligence and Surveillance Unit dealing with the Surveillance at airports for security.

Measures taken to strengthen the security arrangements

38. The Committee was informed by the Ministry that the following measures have been taken

to strengthen the security arrangements at airports:-

Perimeter Security – This is ensured through perimeter wall of standard height as specified by

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BCAS specifications. At metro airports, automatic Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) hasbeen installed at IGI Airport, New Delhi and RGI Airport, Hyderabad.

39. The Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation while deposing before the Committee informed thatout of the requirement of 580 km boundary wall for covering Indian airports, 547 km is available.26 kms of boundary wall has been constructed so far and work is going on for construction ofanother 4 kms. He also informed the Committee that 538 watch towers are functioning againstthe requirement of 629 watch towers in the airports. Works have already been started for theconstruction of 62 watch towers and for the remaining 29 watch towers, works have to start.

40. On the issue of installation of Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) in Indianairports, the Secretary apprised the Committee that PIDS has been installed at the DelhiInternational Airport. A portion of the perimeter of the airport has been placed under PIDS on pilotbasis. The imported PIDS is not functioning properly in the Indian conditions and the Ministryof Civil Aviation is looking out for a technology to suit the Indian conditions which is cost effectiveas compared to the construction of watch towers and manning the towers through CISF.

1. Access Control – Entry at airports is regulated by Airport Entry Passes (AEP) ofdifferent categories issued by the BCAS. Entry of passengers is through boarding tickets.

2. Anti Hijacking Measures – These include frisking and checking of passenger andtheir baggage through electronic aids. Passengers are also subjected to surveillance andprofiling. Further measures taken include Behaviour Detection Training for randomscreening, deployment of Dog Squads and Bomb Detection and Disposal Squads, ClosedCircuit Television (CCTV) etc.

3. Anti Sabotage Measures – Aircrafts are subjected to anti sabotage checks atoriginating station and guarded till take off. Baggage is supervised from check-in countertill loading into the aircraft by airlines security staff and is subjected to X-ray examinationand/or physical check. In-line Baggage Screening System (IBSS) is being installed at Metroairports in India and consists of five levels of detection wherein suspicious baggage issuccessively sent to the higher levels, depending upon the results of checks at the lowerlevels.

4. Measures against terrorist attacks – Approach roads to airports are manned byarmed guards and Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs). QRT is also deployed at the TerminalBuilding to thwart any armed intrusion. QRT of CISF/ State Police are to hold the situationtill the arrival of NSG QRT in case of an armed attack.

5. Training – CISF trains its personnel in tune with the National Civil Aviation SecurityTraining Programme. Its personnel are also trained specially for counter-terrorism,surveillance, Quick Reaction Team, courtesy and behaviour, dog handling, bomb detectionand disposal, etc. CISF personnel undergo Basic Aviation Security Course with 17 variedtraining modules as per International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards. CISFpersonnel also undergo soft skills training and behaviour detection training.

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6. Mock Drills – Mock drills, decoy checks etc. are conducted at all airports regularlyto check the efficacy of various plans and to fine tune the efficiency of thesecurity agencies to meet any sudden eventuality.

Kozhikode Airport Incident

41. There was a fight between Fire Service Officials of Airports Authority of India andCISF personnel at the Kozhikode airport on the 10th June, 2015 in which one CISF official waskilled. The issue got media coverage worldwide. There was widespread damage of airportproperty and the runway was blocked for some time. As a result, the airport was closed forsix hours and four flights were diverted.

42. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in the Status Note furnished to the Committee on the issue,has stated that apart from the recent incident of violence at Kozhikode International Airport on the10th June, 2015 there has been no major security related incident at any airport since the inductionof CISF in the airport sector.

43. The Home Secretary informed the Committee that cases have been filed and thatinvestigation is going on and let us wait for the conclusions. The Home Secretary further statedthat there is a disconnect amongst multiple agencies that are involved in ensuring security at theairports. Lack of co-ordination between them is one of the biggest problems this country facestoday. Therefore, there is absolutely a case to improve intra-agency co-ordination at the airports.

44. The Secretary, Civil Aviation submitted before the Committee that the Kozhikode incidentwas essentially due to the perception that the death of CISF constable had been caused by the fireservice personnel of Airports Authority of India. It was this mistaken impression that led to theunfortunate incidents and certainly, it should not have happened. Steps have already been takento ensure unity of command at the airport level wherein the Airport Director will now be overallin-charge of the Airport including the CISF personnel and their deployment.

45. The Committee, during its deliberations, asked the Ministry of Civil Aviation as well as theMinistry of Home Affairs about the steps taken to avoid such incidents in future.

46. The DG, CISF apprised the Committee about the measures taken in the wake of the violentincident that happened at Karipur Airport on 10th June, 2015 as follows:-

(i) All Chief Airport Security Officers have been directed that it is their bounden dutyto ensure that there is no source of friction amongst the stakeholders and that theyshould take proactive and corrective measures, if there is any problem;

(ii) Supervisory officers have been directed to visit all airports with a view toascertaining and resolving any inter-agency friction;

(iii) Special drive to have refresher courses in soft skill training for CISF personnel toensure courtesy and good behavior;

(iv) It has, however, been reiterated to all formations that there shall be no slacknessin implementation of security measures to ensure safety and security of theairports; and

(v) A Board of Officers has been constituted to examine the duty point-wise holdingof weapons by CISF personnel at the airports.

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47. Further, the Ministry of Civil Aviation has intimated that subsequent to the KozhikodeAirport incident, a meeting was held between Regional Executive Director (Southern Region),Airport Director - Calicut of Airports Authority India and Additional DG, IG, DIG Southern Zoneand Commandant of CISF with emphasis on mutual co-operation and confidence building measuresas well as long term procedural and technical solutions needed for preventing re-occurrence ofsuch unfortunate incidents. Similar meetings have also been held at all the major airports to createharmony among the agencies for smooth operations of the Air Services.

48. The Ministry of Home Affairs vide their communication dated the 14th December, 2015informed the Committee that the four cases registered on the Kozhikode airport incident arestill being investigated by the local police and charges are yet to be filed.

49. The Committee condemns the violent incident at Kozhikode Airport. The Committeedemands that the Government should ensure that such incidents do not occur in future. TheCommittee notes that six months is more than sufficient time to complete the investigation.The Committee recommends that the investigations may be completed at the earliest andthe guilty may be punished. Findings of investigations may be shared with this Committeeas soon as it is submitted.

Co-ordination mechanism at the airports

50. The Home Secretary informed the Committee that he has already mooted the idea of aco-ordination mechanism at the airport level wherein the Airport Director who is an officer of theAirports Authority of India and the Chief Security Officer who comes from the CISF meet moreoften. They should have structured interactions and a dialogue with all the wings of the airportmanagement.

51. Another level of co-ordination can be between DG, CISF and Commissioner BCAS whichas a standing co-ordination mechanism would meet once in three months along with the airportoperator i.e., Airports Authority of India and CISF officers. They can discuss the gaps in securityinfrastructure.

52. The Home Secretary further assured the Committee that he is going to constitute anotherstanding mechanism at Home Secretary level wherein he, the Secretary, Civil Aviation, DG, CISFand the Chairman, Airports Authority of India would meet once in three months to look at the gapsin security infrastructure and also look at what is happening at the airports and suggest remedialand corrective measures for the problems.

53. The Secretary, Civil Aviation while deposing before the Committee submitted that as per theStandard Operating Procedures, the Airport Director may supervise the operational functioning ofCISF in so far as the deployment on airport security duties is concerned.

54. The Committee noted the suggested co-ordination mechanisms and hope that it willbe implemented soon to prevent any loopholes in the security apparatus.

Security concerns in Civil Aviation Security

55. As per the earlier Committee of Secretaries’ decision, the airport security at all airports wasto be taken over by CISF gradually. So far, CISF has been deployed at 59 airports. However,

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considering the high cost of deployment of CISF and the low scale of operations at many airportsmaking CISF deployment further unviable, a proposal to reduce CISF deployments and insteadgoing for State Police, etc. is under consideration.

56. BCAS is in acute need of restructuring to fulfil its mandate. A proposal to increase itsstrength to 970 has been submitted.

57. The Ministry also stated that the list of persons exempted from frisking and the list ofvehicles permitted access to airside is very long, creating problems in the security architecture.

1. Cargo Security – Security of Cargo is a major cause of concern due to the followingreasons :-

Private security guards are deployed for access control duties.Involvement of multi agencies i.e., Security Guards of Airport Operators, Securitypersonnel of Cargo handling agents and CISF.

The CCTV surveillance cameras are generally not installed from the point of viewof security and the feed from those cameras is also not available at the CISFControl Room.

In the backdrop of the attack at Karachi Airport, a fresh survey of the CargoComplex at various airports would be desirable so that this weak link in the aviationsecurity may be addressed.

2. Perimeter security - Perimeter Security is a weak link at most airports. At presentthere is a gap of 1 kilometer between two watch towers. It is humanly not possiblefor sentries to have a clear ‘line of sight’ at such a distance. Operationally, forfoolproof security, a ‘line of sight’ distance of 300 meters should be the optimumdistance. There is no alternative mode of communication at watch towers which is ahindrance to quick communication. The present Walkie-Talkie system is a one waysystem and can be jammed during any contingency. Hence, there is a need forintercoms at each watch tower along the perimeter.

3 . Need for uniform format of e-ticket or provision of machine readable barcoded tickets - At present, there is no uniformity in the format of e-tickets. CISFhas detected 36 cases in the year 2014 in which printouts of fake/cancelled e-tickets were used for gaining entry into the terminal building.

4. Augmentation of CISF staff- While the number of flights has increased, the strengthof CISF at airports has not kept pace with the changing requirements. Augmentationproposals of CISF strength at 13 airports are pending with the Ministry of CivilAviation, while similar proposals in respect of 08 other airports are pending with theBureau of Civil Aviation Security for approval since long.

During the deliberations of the Committee, the issue of shortage of CISF staff for airportsecurity was raised. It was informed that out of the required strength of 24,333 CISF personnelfor manning 59 Indian airports which are controlled by the CISF, the current deployment is 22,411only. DG, CISF while deposing before the Committee accepted the shortage of strength in theAviation Security Group of CISF and assured the Committee that necessary steps will be taken tomaintain the vacancies level to a minimum.

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5. Deficiency of Security Gadgets- There is shortfall in Random Screening Equipment(X-BIS, DFMD, HHMD & ETD), Communication Equipment (VHF, walkie-talkie andhands free), BDDS equipment etc.

6 . Installation of CCTV Cameras & clearance of shadow zonesInstallation of CCTV system does not exist at 06 airports (Dimapur, Jorhat,Lilabari, Silchar, Tezpur & Khajuraho).Full coverage of CCTV not available at 33 airports – blind spots remain.Provision of digital Video recording system for 30 days does not exist at 20airports.Video Analytic Features need to be activated at all airports.

7 . Dog Squads not available at 6 airports (Coimbatore, Agra, Gwalior, Porbandar,Portblair and Diu).

8. Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan (CTCP) by CISF at approach roads availableonly at Delhi and Mumbai. The same needs to be put in place at 20 more internationaland hyper-sensitive airports.

9. Deficiency of Family & Barrack accommodation for ASG personnel

60. It was further informed that out of the requirement of 13241 barracks accommodation,only 10951 are available at present. The deficient 2290 barracks are spread over 26 airports. Asfar as the family accommodation is concerned, 3807 units are available against the requirement of11020. The deficient 7213 units are spread over 56 airports in the country.

Security at Delhi Airport

58. The Committee, during its visit to Indira Gandhi International Airport, Delhi on 31st August,2015 heard the views of the Ministries of Civil Aviation and Home Affairs, Central IndustrialSecurity Force, Delhi Police and Delhi International Airport Limited on the security related issuesof Delhi Airport. The Airport operator, Delhi International Airport Limited briefed the Committeeon the existing security system available at the airport – both at the city side and the airport side.

59. The Delhi Police, during the deliberations, apprised the Committee on their role in providingsecurity to Delhi Airport. They also highlighted the grey areas, where the existing system needs tobe strengthened. The representatives of Delhi Police flagged the below-mentioned requirements/lacunae :-

(i) Bullet-Proof Vehicles are required;

(ii) Inadequate CCTV coverage;

(iii) The old building of P.S. Domestic Airport was acquired and demolished by theDIAL and no land was allotted in lieu of the same;

(iv) A five floor new building has been erected but only a portion of the ground floorhas been given for the police station and ACP/Sub-Div office is insufficient forsmooth functioning. Either an additional floor or separate land may please beallotted for the same;

(v) No space allotted for Aerocity police post;

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(vi) Rent is levied by DIAL for the domestic police station building and the landallocated for the T-III P.S.;

(vii) Electricity charges are being charged by DIAL which are significantly higher incomparison to BSES rates;

(viii) Jungle area around T-3 is vulnerable place from security point of view. Privateland of DIAL has neither boundary/fencing nor is protected by guards. It can beused by anti-social elements;

(ix) DIAL was asked to erect all weather ‘Machans’ in the said area and no decisionhas been taken as yet;

(x) Clearing shrubs and bushes not done on a regular basis;

(xi) Three vulnerable villages viz., Mahipalpur/ Rangpuri, Shahbad Mohamadpur andMehram Nagar adjoining IGI Airport cause security threat; and

(xii) Watch towers at 300 mtrs distance required.

60. Regarding the systemic loopholes in the prevention of human trafficking, the Committeewas told that the following are the areas of concern:-

(i) Checking and segregation of arriving International and domestic passengersfrom International side is not done near Transit Area;

(ii) Procedure of issuing boarding cards to international passengers in transit is not foolproof;

(iii) No immigration counter in transit Area;

(iv) No system to monitor conduct/behavior of airlines staff; and

(v) Ticketing counters on International side of Transit Area are not covered with CCTVCameras.

61. In this regard, the point- wise response of DIAL is given as follows:-

(i) The Delhi Police has been making various security arrangements outside theterminal area, including putting up barricades, posting manpower and upgradingmobile patrolling through extra deployment of PCR vans and Motor-cycles. IfDelhi Police considered it as an essential security measure to deploy Bullet-proofvehicles around the city side area and approach road of IGI Airport, they can doso. DIAL welcomes these steps, if it is so needed to upgrade security;

(ii) With regard to rental charges, it was informed that the following areas/buildings atthe IGI Airport are in occupation of Delhi Police as on date:

(a) Ground Floor of G+5 Building (Built up area-520 Square Meters) oppositeTerminal-IB for Police Station;

(b) Traffic Inspector’s office opposite Terminal-1B at G+5 Building;

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(c) Land and built up space of 1200 sq. m (250 sq. m. built-up & 950 sq. m land)opposite CISF barracks, Mahipalpur for Airport Police Station. This PoliceStation was shifted to a location near the Terminal-2. However, even after theshifting, the building and land at Mahipalpur has not been handed back to DIALtill date. Surprisingly, the issue has been raised by Delhi Police in front of theCommittee even though it was never discussed with DIAL before the resolution.The said premises were handed over to Delhi Police more than 5 years back;

(d) 1600 sq. m (built-up 1165 sq. m & 450 sq. m. land) near Terminal 2 for AirportPolice Station, this was earlier operating from the accommodation mentioned at(c) above;

(e) Traffic Inspector’s office at T2 near pass section;

(f) 500 Sq. m land near ARC Hanger for storage of vehicles;

(g) 2960 Sq. m land near T-3 for a new Police Station building;

(h) Space inside Terminal-3 (16 Sq. m) for courtesies by Delhi Police.

62. DIAL informed that neither any agreement has been signed nor any license fee/ rentalshave been received from Delhi Police till date for any of the above mentioned premises.Despite repeated reminders, Delhi Police is skipping the matter. Even with respect to the landprovided for new police station near Terminal-3, Delhi Police says that the matter of paymentof license fee for this land has been forwarded to the Ministry of Home Affairs and will bepaid on the basis of the decision of MHA. The matter is pending with MHA for long withoutany decision communicated to DIAL despite repeated requests. It is imperative for Delhi Policeto at least sign the License Agreement for legalizing their occupational rights on the land and builtup spaces at IGI Airport. DIAL also submitted as follows:

(i) the Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) has been made serviceable and isworking satisfactorily. This has been verified by CISF and they are operating thesystem;

(ii) there are a total of 41 watch towers at IGI Airport which are more than therequirement mandated by BCAS vide BCAS circular No.18/2002. All the watchtowers are being manned by the CISF on a round-the-clock basis. The watchtowers are located all around the perimeter and have been placed after completesurvey by the CISF which is tasked for protecting the airport;

(iii) matter regarding installation of Body scanners and Cargo scanners for the Airportsin India is under consideration of MoCA and BCAS;

(iv) immigration authorities of Government of India may like to keep a ComplaintRegistration book in the office of the AFRRO and passengers can lodge theircomplaints there. The telephone number of the AFRRO could also be given widepublicity. The presence of a very senior officer like the AFRRO in the Airport ona round-the-clock basis itself is a huge inbuilt advantage of immigration to controlthe activities in the premises;

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(v) with regard to the replacement of damaged scan machines, it is informed that thescan machines are regularly maintained. As and when any machine is found to bemalfunctioning, it is immediately attended to and rectified/replaced;

(vi) Air Port Security Committee (APSC) meeting is held regularly on a monthlybasis. As mandated by BCAS, it is held on the 3rd Thursday of every monthand the minutes of the meeting are circulated to all participants and the BCAS.The meeting is attended by all the concerned stakeholders including DIALSecurity team, DIAL Operations Team, DIAL maintenance Team, Airlineroperators, AOC Chairman, CISF, Immigration, Customs, Delhi Police etc. Inaddition, in case of specific alerts received from our intelligence agencies/HomeMinistry etc., a special APSC meeting is convened at short notice; and

(vii) DIAL is extremely conscious of security in and around the airport and constantlyreviews its Security and Contingency plans. Any grey areas identified/observed areimmediately looked into and addressed. Last week we conducted a walkthroughwith the AOC Chairman and representatives of airlines, through the BaggageHandling System and CCTV coverage thereof to identify, if there are any greyareas that need to be plugged.

63. The Committee expresses its serious concern over the grey areas and securityrelated problems as mentioned by Delhi Police. It is equally appalled to see the existinginterface between the Delhi Police and DIAL in respect of security related issues at theAirport. It reflects a lack of mutual confidence in one another as well as required co-ordination between the two. Otherwise, Delhi Police, instead of taking up these issueswith the Parliamentary Committee and DIAL giving point-wise clarification before it,the two should have mutually resolved them. BCAS and the Ministries of Civil Aviationand Home Affairs also appeared to have remained unconcerned in this regard. IGIAirport, being one of the most sensitive Airports in the existing security scenario, suchgaps are sure to lead to any disaster at any time.

64. The Committee notes the various concerns expressed by the Delhi Police as regardsthe security at Delhi International Airport. The Committee observes that the issues arevery serious and need immediate attention of the Ministries of Civil Aviation and HomeAffairs and various other stakeholders involved. The Committee recommends that all theissues need to be considered for immediate redressal and status note be submitted to theCommittee containing steps taken in these regards.

65. As regards payment of rent and electricity charges by Delhi Police to DIAL for thespace occupied by them and signing of License Agreement, the Committee recommends thatthe Ministry of Home Affairs may take immediate decision in those matters as the DelhiPolice is under that Ministry, discharging sovereign function of maintenance of security inand around the IGIA.

66. As regards providing space to the Delhi Police in the Delhi International Airport, theCommittee directs the Ministry of Home Affairs to find out a workable solution inconsultation with the Ministry of Civil Aviation and BCAS to provide an adequate space todischarge their sovereign duty of security at the International Airport in Delhi.

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Security at Mumbai Airport

67. As regards the Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport, Mumbai, the Committee, duringits study visit to Mumbai on 13th October, 2015 was informed that :-

(i) Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport, Mumbai is one of the busiest airports inIndia;

(ii) CSIA handled 36.63 million passengers in the year 2014-15 and is expected tohandle 40 million passengers in the current fiscal year 2015-16;

(iii) MIAL has been mandated to undertake operations, management and development ofthe CSIA, pursuant to the Operation, Management and Development Agreementdated April 4, 2006 (the “OMDA”) entered into between MIAL and AAI.

68. The Committee, during its visit to Mumbai on 13th October, 2015, heard the views ofMumbai International Airport Limited, Airports Authority of India, Central Industrial Security Force,Mumbai Police, State Government of Maharashtra and the Ministry of Civil Aviation on the Issuesrelated to security at Mumbai International Airport.

69. The Mumbai International Airport Limited also raised the issue of deployment of 3797 CISFpersonnel as against the sanctioned strength of 3996. They have also placed a demand ofadditional 882 persons for the domestic operations from T2, which is pending approval from theMinistry of Civil Aviation. Various police agencies and stakeholders have expressed the view thatthe airport security is adequately provided with all the modern equipments with the activeinvolvement of the airport operator i.e., MIAL.

70. The Committee was informed that cargo operations inside the airport is another cause ofconcern as far as security of the airport is concerned. The cargo complex is accessed by morethan 5000 casual employees daily for their work. These employees do not have validated entrypasses and have an easy access to apron side also. The security agencies expressed theirapprehension over the issue and requested the Committee to look into the matter.

71. During the meeting, the issue of presence of slums in the vicinity of the airport area whichare posing a security threat to the safety, security and operations of the airport was raised. TheCommittee decided to take up the matter in detail and requested the Housing Department and SlumRehabilitation Authority of State Government of Maharashtra and Mumbai International AirportLimited to submit the necessary information on the issue.

72. The Mumbai International Airport Limited, in their written submission, informed theCommittee that 308.95 areas of airport land is encroached and around 4 lakh people are stayingthere. Slums at Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport have been existing for the past severaldecades and that it was part of the Demised Premises when the Airport was handed over to theJoint Venture Company. Major concentration of these 35 slum pockets is on the eastern side ofthe airport site area, particularly along Airport’s operational area boundary wall. Slums are asecurity threat to the Airport and rehabilitation of slum dwellers is essential to release land forAirport development and to ensure security of the CSIA.73. The Mumbai International Airport Limited has further submitted the details of projectsproposed to be constructed in the area occupied by the slums. Aeronautical area of CSIA is to be

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expanded and airport operational facilities are to be constructed in the part of land currentlyoccupied by slums. Aircraft parking stands (apron), taxiway extension, airside perimeter road,perimeter security wall, airport maintenance compound, general aviation parking, aircraft hangersare some of the works to be taken up in the land under encroachment.

74. Regarding the steps taken by different authorities to rehabilitate the slum dwellers, theCommittee was informed by GVK (MIAL) that in the past, Municipal Corporation of GreaterMumbai (MCGM) had taken up slum rehabilitation of some hutments located in Kranti Nagarslum area, on the eastern side of CSIA located near Mithi River. This was done by MCGMfor widening of existing Mithi River Channel. In 2007, MIAL appointed Housing Developmentand Infrastructure Limited (HDIL), as an agency for taking up slum rehabilitation on its behalf.In 2009, Government of Maharashtra appointed Mumbai Metropolitan Region DevelopmentAuthority (MMRDA) as Special Planning Authority for CSIA, HDIL, with collector (MumbaiSuburban District), had taken up survey of some of the slums at CSIA to initiate slumrehabilitation. However, this work was not completed and the process was stopped midway.In 2011, MMRDA had taken up rehabilitation of approximately 600 slum hutments inBamanwada area of CSIA for construction of Sahar Elevated Road. Since 2013, MIAL hasbeen requesting Government of Maharashtra for formulation of appropriate slum rehabilitationscheme for Airport to enable feasible resolution of slum rehabilitation issue of CSIA.

75. In 2014, the Minister of Civil Aviation, requested Hon’ble Chief Minister of Maharashtrato prepare and implement Airport Specific Slum Rehabilitation Scheme for CSIA.

76. The Committee was further informed that as part of the proposed Airport Specific SlumRehabilitation Scheme (and also as per the current Slum Rehabilitation Authority Scheme ofGovernment of Maharashtra), a constructed tenement of 25 sq. mtrs. (269 sq.ft) of carpet areais to be given against each hutment (based on eligibility), along with related community levelinfrastructure like balwadis, health clinics, roads, open area, parking etc. The slum rehabilitationscheme also provides for rehabilitation of existing shops/commercial establishments.

77. There is a hillock near runway 27 end of CSIA, along with Mithi River, which overlooksthe operational area of CSIA. The hillock is completely covered by slums with a clear view ofAirport operations and aircraft. In view of this, the hillock and the slums on it are a serioussecurity concern. The slums on the hillock are to be rehabilitated and the hillock itself is to beremoved for construction of taxiway extension for runway 27. This is a priority project for CSIAand has been included in MIAL’s priority list of critical slum pockets requiring immediate slumrehabilitation, submitted to Government of Maharashtra. Currently, Mumbai Police and CISFpersonnel keep constant vigil on the slums on this hillock and ensure security of airport operations.

78. The Housing Department of State Government of Maharashtra has submitted the details ofaction taken by them on the relocation of slums of CSIA, steps that are needed to be taken tomake settlement of the slums to relocate to some other areas and also the present status of slums.As stated in the agreement between the Mumbai International Airport Limited and the MumbaiMetropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) dated the 12th December, 2006approximately 80,000 families were expected to be living on the airport land. They have furtherstated that the slum dwellers are demanding rehabilitation on the same land. The airport land isowned by Airports Authority of India. The policy in this regard has to be finalized by the Airports

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Authority of India and the Ministry of Civil Aviation. There is no concrete plan of rehabilitationproposed or submitted by Mumbai International Airport Limited. A large number of hutments andhuge area of encroachment has made the issue complicated and sensitive, which needs specificsolution and policy intervention.

79. It was also informed that the State Government and Mumbai International Airport Limitedhave signed a State Support Agreement on the 27th April, 2006 according to which the StateGovernment has to provide support to Mumbai International Airport Limited and Airports Authorityof India in clearing the encroachments. The Government of Maharashtra has stated that theMumbai International Airport Limited is duty bound to relocate the slums with the assistance ofMumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority. Mumbai International Airport Limited has notprovided a comprehensive and concrete plan of rehabilitation and resettlement of all concernedproject affected persons on the entire airport land.

80. As regards the agencies responsible for rehabilitation of the slum dwellers, the Governmentof Maharashtra informed the Committee that prime responsibility of rehabilitation is of MIAL as perthe agreement between MIAL and AAI (OMDA Agreement). MMRDA is a nodal authority appointedby State Government of Maharashtra to assist MIAL in the airport slum rehabilitation. HousingDepartment, Government of Maharashtra, Slum Rehabilitation Authority, the Additional Collector andDy. Collector ENC (REM) are also responsible for the rehabilitation of slum dwellers.

81. The Government of Maharashtra (Housing Department) has further informed the Committeethat so far, seven slum rehabilitation schemes are under implementation at different locations in thearea of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai viz., at Kurla, Mahul, Bhandup, Mulund andAndheri (Annexure-II).

82. The Committee was further informed by the Government of Maharashtra that as per theagreement between MIAL and MMRDA, MIAL shall bear the entire project cost including incidentalexpenditure and will pay the agency charges to MMRDA as determined under Article III.

MIAL shall procure the land and tenements required and handover to MMRDA forrehabilitating the Password Authentication Protocols.

MIAL shall make available to MMRDA necessary funds for providing temporarytransit accommodation including any out of pocket expenses required by MMRDA.

MIAL will procure the tenements under four different options.

Procure the Government or private land and build the tenements through thecontractors.

Procure the tenements through private developments under SRA scheme.

Procure the tenements by assigning the developmental rights to private developerson their land.

Purchase of tenements from the Government agencies or from the market. MIALshall pay fees concurrently with the reimbursement of cost to MMRDA inaccordance with Article III.

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83. The entire cost of procurement of tenements, developing of on-site infrastructure and off-site infrastructure shall be borne by MIAL. After procuring the tenements in consultation withMMRDA, MIAL shall handover the tenements in good condition with all the physical and socialamenities to MMRDA for shifting the PAPs. MMRDA shall shift the families as per the priority areagiven by MIAL.

84. The Committee finds it pertinent that the issue of encroachment of airport landand adjoining hillock by slum dwellers is settled at the earliest. In this regard, theCommittee took note of the replies furnished by MIAL and the Housing Department,Government of Maharashtra on various aspects of the encroachment.

85. The Committee observes that the 35 pockets of slums in the airport and the slumson the hillock along the Mithi River are potential threat to the aircrafts and the CSIAairport. The problems are persisting for the last so many years. The Committee feels thatthe Governmental agencies, both at the Centre and the State level, could not rationallyjudge the menace of slums inside the airport area as a potential security threat. Mumbaiis the commercial capital of the country. Any breach of security at the airport will havefar reaching consequences. The threat is perennial and no amount of policing could provideadequate security to the airport if the slums are allowed to exist and flourish inside theairport. The Committee feels that the Government agencies are happily unconcerned aboutthe airport security at CSIA, Mumbai. In Mumbai International Airport, a disaster iswaiting to happen at any moment in view of these dangerously placed encroachmentsoverlapping operational areas, of the Mumbai Airport. The Committee calls upon all theagencies such as AAI, Ministry of Civil Aviation, BCAS, State Government of Maharashtraand MIAL to wake up from their slumber and see the danger looming large on the MumbaiAirport. The Committee expresses its serious concern on this and strongly recommendsthat all the slums must be removed and relocated from the airport area. There is nojustification for allowing encroachers inside the airport area and the Committee is of theview that so long as this area is occupied by the slum dwellers, the Mumbai airport is sittingon a ticking bomb until it is relocated. Therefore, the Committee recommends that MIALalong with Government of Maharashtra should come forward immediately with adequateproposals to rehabilitate the slums taking support of various Governmental agencies.

86. The Committee understands that MIAL has been pursuing with the Government ofMaharashtra (GoM) for rehabilitation of hutment dwellers at CSIA since taking overoperations of CSIA in 2006. The Committee hopes that the Government of Maharashtrawill expedite its approval for the Airport Specific Slum Rehabilitation Scheme for CSIA, toenable the slum rehabilitation process quickly.

Security at Cochin Airport

87. The Committee, during its visit to Cochin, heard the views of the Cochin InternationalAirport Limited, Airports Authority of India, Central Industrial Security Force, Kerala Police, StateGovernment of Kerala and the Ministry of Civil Aviation on the Issues related to security at CochinInternational Airport.

88. The representatives of the Cochin International Airport Limited briefed the Committee onthe measures taken by various agencies including the airport operator, airlines operators and the

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Central Industrial Security Force for strengthening the security of the airport. The stakeholdersinvolved in providing security to the Cochin Airport had expressed their satisfaction with thefacilities and instruments provided by CIAL⎯the airport operator. The CISF and the securityagencies informed the Committee that the Cochin Airport has all the modern equipments to provideadequate security to the airport.

89. The representatives of the Cochin International Airport Limited, during the deliberations ofthe meeting, placed the demand for deployment of 917 CISF personnel based on the new surveyconducted on the basis of increase in passenger flow which stands at 61 lakh per annum as on1st April, 2015. The current deployment of 494 CISF personnel is based on the 2007 survey for25 lakh passengers’ inflow at that time.

90. The Committee compliments the CIAL, CISF and other security agencies forproviding security to the Cochin Airport.

Security of the Airports a Sovereign Function

91. The Committee noted that the CISF is providing service to the airports on the basis ofpayment made to them. The Home Secretary, while deposing before the Committee, informed thatCISF is a zero cost force. It is deployed for security of airports, vital installation and GovernmentBuildings on payment. Therefore, resources have to be raised and there is no way of deploymentof CISF without the payment. The Home Secretary further stated that due to this reason, presentlyCISF is deployed only in 59 airports and 39 airports are still not with the CISF, which means thatthey are with the State Police. From the national security perspective, the Home Ministry wouldlike all these airports to be covered under CISF.

92. The Secretary, Civil Aviation while deposing before the Committee, submitted that since theyear 2000, `130 is levied on every departing passenger as security component of the PSF. Thesecurity expenditure is met from the PSF security component. For the year 2014-15, totalcollection of PSF Security component is `1132 crores and the expenditure on security is around`1319 crores. Besides, some amount is collected from cargo side also. So, there is a deficit ofaround `200 crores. Thus the fund available is less than the fund required for security purposes.

93. The Home Secretary submitted to the Committee that he is not really very sure as to howmuch of the PSF security component is really being spent on security or is it being spent onsomething else. It is also not clear whether there was a concurrent audit of this amount beingspent on security by the airport operator. He suggested that the entire PSF security componentshould be put on an escrow account so that it is not spent for any other purpose.

94. The Secretary, Civil Aviation submitted to the Committee that when providing security atairport is, actually a sovereign function, it does not and should not matter whether we fully meetthe requirement of funds or not. If there is a security requirement which has to be met, it shouldbe met by the Ministry of Civil Aviation or the Government of India, the sovereign. The Secretaryfurther informed the Committee that CISF is providing security cover to Delhi Metro consideringit as a sovereign function. The Delhi Metro does not pay a single paisa for the CISF which isdeployed in various metro stations. Payments and salaries for CISF are met by the Ministry ofHome Affairs, Government of India. The Secretary, Civil Aviation further stated that since it isa sovereign function, Government has no option to depute private firms to provide security to the

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airports. The Secretary emphasized that sovereign function must be discharged by the Governmentand fund constraint should not be seen as an obstacle.

95. The Committee observes that National Security cannot be compromised. CivilAviation Security is a very integral and important element of national security. Airportcomplex is a crucial infrastructure. Any large scale damage/terrorist attack on theairport complex will be catastrophic with far reaching grave implications for the citizensand the economy. Investments flowing into the country depends on the state of thesecurity and safety. The Committee further notes that the airports have beencategorized as hyper-sensitive, sensitive and normal. Operational airports in hyper-sensitive categories are 26 out of which only 18 airports have been provided with CISFsecurity cover. Which means that eight hyper-sensitive airports are not provided thesecurity cover of CISF. In sensitive category, there are 56 airports, out of which 37 arecovered by CISF and 19 are not covered. In the normal category of 16 airports, only4 are provided with CISF security and 12 are not covered. Thus, out of 98 functionalairports, only 59 are covered with CISF security cover and 39 are not under CISF.Explanations given to the Committee was lack of funds for providing CISF securitycover at all the 98 airports.

96. The security must be adequate and in proportion to the threat perception. Fundsshould not come in the way of providing security. The Committee recommends that thesecurity component of PSF needs to be enhanced to commensurate with the securityexpenditure and ensure that security is not compromised at all the airports in India and thePSF security component must be deposited in the Consolidated Fund of India.

97. The Committee recommends that Airport Security should be absolute. TheCommittee observes that Security of the Airports is an integral part of National Securityand therefore, recommends that providing security should be a sovereign function. Adequacyof PSF Security component collection should not be the criteria for providing security. IfCISF security cover can be given to the Delhi Metro, why cannot all the operational airportsbe provided with CISF security cover?

98. The Committee feels that ideally, the CISF security cover should be provided to allthe 70 odd airports which are having normal scheduled operations. But to begin with, theCommittee recommends that all the Airports rated hyper-sensitive from security angle begiven to CISF as soon as possible followed by the sensitive airports. In view of shortage ofmanpower and logistics available with CISF, security of normal airports can continue withState Police for the time being. But these airports also be given all modern equipment,training etc.

Dedicated Security Force

99. The Civil Aviation Ministry had a proposal for a dedicated Security Force i.e., Civil AviationSecurity Force for manning the security affairs of the Airports in India. While deposing beforethe Committee, the Home Secretary submitted to the Committee that the Ministry of Home Affairsis not in favour of that. He submitted that there is no need of having another dedicated Forcewhen there is already a dedicated Force. In 2000, it was so decided after the hijacking of IC-814 that CISF would cover all the airports. CISF has a huge force of 1,45,000. Twenty two

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thousand officials of CISF have been specially earmarked for airport security. They are called theSecurity Aviation Group. CISF is able to rotate these officials and make sure that the age profileis also maintained.

100. On the issue of Civil Aviation Force, the Secretary, Civil Aviation stated that corecompetency of the Ministry of Civil Aviation or the Airport Authority of India is not to raiseForce and run a security agency. It is the core competency of the Ministry of Home Affairsand CISF. It is better that the civil aviation security remains with a specialized agency suchas CISF. He did not support the idea of Civil Aviation Security Force.

101. The Committee noted the arguments of Home Secretary and Secretary, CivilAviation and observes that there is no need for a separate Civil Aviation Force at thisjuncture and that Airport Security can remain with the CISF and Ministry of Home Affairsespecially in view of the fact that the IB, NSG and other Police Forces who have asubstantial role to play in airport security are also under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

102. The Committee, after examining the papers/documents submitted to it and hearingthe arguments of various stakeholders on the subject, could understand that there aremultiple agencies involved in providing security at Indian airports.

103. The Committee notes that Bureau of Civil Aviation Security is responsible for layingdown the standards for pre-embarkation security and anti-sabotage measures in respect ofcivil flights and ensuring their compliance through regular inspections and security audits.Commissioner of Security, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security has been empowered to issueDirections under Section 5A of Aircraft Act, 1934 with respect to civil aviation securitymatters.

104. The Committee also notes that whereas BCAS frames the rules and regulations forcivil aviation security, the Central Industrial Security Force which is functioning under theMinistry of Home Affairs acts as the implementing agency for the guidelines framed byBCAS. The Intelligence Bureau plays an important role in providing intelligence inputsrelated to civil aviation security. National Security Guard (NSG) under the Ministry ofHome Affairs is also the primary Contingency Response Force for anti-terrorist operationsat airports.

105. The Committee was at a loss to find that the post of the Commissioner of Security,BCAS, the Appropriate Authority for the development, implementation and maintenance ofNational Civil Aviation Security Programme of India, is lying vacant for the last two-and-a-half years. The Committee would like to know the reasons for keeping this importantand sensitive post vacant for more than two years. The Committee may also be apprisedon the steps taken to fill up the post on priority.

106. The Committee finds that the violent incident involving employees of AirportsAuthority of India and the Central Industrial Security Force at Karipur Airport inKozhikode on 10th June, 2015 raises a question mark over the effectiveness of the existingco-ordination mechanism between various agencies involved in providing security at Indianairports. When the issue was raised during the deliberations, both the Home Secretary andCivil Aviation Secretary assured the Committee to look into the matter and to address the

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shortcomings in the system. The Committee hopes that apart from conducting variousmeetings to address the issues related to airport security with agencies involved in theprocess, both the Ministries will have a periodical review of the performance of the co-ordination mechanism so that any grey areas identified could be addressed immediately.

107. The Committee also feels that the issue of deficiency of security gadgets andinstallation of CCTV cameras and clearance of shadow zones at various airports shouldbe taken up on priority so that such deficiencies do not become a cause for concern inthe Indian airport security system. As it is said that the performance in the battlefieldis obviously known before hand if we are not fully equipped with the modern equipmentsto fight with the enemy. The Committee, therefore, hopes that PDIS which is currentlyoperating on pilot basis at Delhi Airport should be reviewed and efforts should be madeto remove the flaws found in the system. The Ministry of Civil Aviation should alsolook out for such PDIS technology which could function properly in the Indianconditions.

108. The Committee desires that the areas of concern on providing security to DelhiAirport, expressed by the Delhi Police should be given due consideration. The Ministry ofCivil Aviation and Delhi International Airport Limited are urged to look into the problemsfaced by the Delhi Police on the city side as well as within the T-3 terminal building ofDelhi Airport.

109. The Committee also hopes that the issue of relocation and rehabilitation of slumdwellers from the vicinity of Mumbai International Airport will be settled as soon aspossible so that the encroached land is brought within the control of airport operator andthe necessary expansion works of Mumbai Airport are commenced shortly. Upon that, thepresent security threat to the Mumbai Airport will automatically wither away. TheCommittee, after cross examination of the Governments and concerned organizations, hascome to the conclusions that the Ministry of Civil Aviation, State Government ofMaharashtra, Mumbai International Airport Limited and Airport Authority of India shouldsit together to sort out the long pending issues which have presently become the majorissue of threat to Mumbai airport. The Committee also requests the Ministry of CivilAviation and Government of Maharashtra to take a lead in settling the issues with no lossof time.

110. The Committee desires that vacant posts in the Aviation Security Group of CISFwhich is manning the Indian airports through the length and breadth of the country arefilled up at the earliest so that the existing security apparatus is strengthened.

111. There is an involvement of multiple agencies in providing Security at Indian airportsand the Committee has found a lack of proper co-ordination between the agencies. TheCommittee, therefore, recommends that a think tank may be created to bring out a properco-ordination involving all the stakeholders to help the Commissioner of Security, BCAS toperform his duties satisfactorily.

112. The Committee finds it quite scary to know that the security of 8 of our hyper-sensitive and 19 of our sensitive airports are not covered by the CISF which has now

23

become the only specialized force for aviation security; now question is who is thenguarding these airports and how secure these airports are? In these existing threatsperceptions at our airports, the country can ill-afford such a situation to continue any more.The Committee finds that aviation security has not received the attention and importancethat it deserves. The Committee feels that in view of several gaps and lack of unifiedcommand and control for the multiple agencies involved, there is an urgent need for havingan Aviation Security policy in the country for ensuring fool proof security at our airportsbefore a major untoward incident takes place in the country.

RECOMMENDATIONS /OBSERVATIONS/CONCLUSIONS-AT A GLANCE

Kozhikode Airport Incident

The Committee condemns the violent incident at Kozhikode Airport. The Committeedemands that the Government should ensure that such incidents do not occur in future. TheCommittee notes that six months is more than sufficient time to complete the investigation. TheCommittee recommends that the investigations may be completed at the earliest and the guiltymay be punished. Findings of investigations may be shared with this Committee as soon as it issubmitted. (Para 49)

Co-ordination mechanism at the airports

The Committee noted the suggested co-ordination mechanisms and hope that it willbe implemented soon to prevent any loopholes in the security apparatus. (Para 54)

Security at Delhi Airport

The Committee expresses its serious concern over the grey areas and securityrelated problems as mentioned by Delhi Police. It is equally appalled to see the existinginterface between the Delhi Police and DIAL in respect of security related issues at theAirport. It reflects a lack of mutual confidence in one another as well as required co-ordination between the two. Otherwise, Delhi Police, instead of taking up these issues withthe Parliamentary Committee and DIAL giving point-wise clarification before it, the twoshould have mutually resolved them. BCAS and the Ministries of Civil Aviation and HomeAffairs also appeared to have remained unconcerned in this regard. IGI Airport, being oneof the most sensitive airports in the existing security scenario, such gaps are sure to leadto any disaster at any time. (Para 63)

The Committee notes the various concerns expressed by the Delhi Police as regardsthe security at Delhi International Airport. The Committee observes that the issues arevery serious and need immediate attention of the Ministries of Civil Aviation and HomeAffairs and various other stakeholders involved. The Committee recommends that all theissues need to be considered for immediate redressal and status note be submitted to theCommittee containing steps taken in these regards. (Para 64)

As regards payment of rent and electricity charges by Delhi Police to DIAL for the space occu-pied by them and signing of License Agreement, the Committee recommends that the Ministry of HomeAffairs may take immediate decision in those matters as the Delhi Police is under that Ministry, dis-charging sovereign function of maintenance of security at and around in IGIA. (Para 65)

As regards providing space to the Delhi Police in the Delhi InternationalAirport, the Committee directs the Ministry of Home Affairs to find out a workablesolution in consultation with the Ministry of Civil Aviation and BCAS to provide anadequate space to discharge their sovereign duty of security in the InternationalAirport at Delhi. (Para 66)

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Security at Mumbai Airport

The Committee finds it pertinent that the issue of encroachment of airport landand adjoining hillock by slum dwellers is settled at the earliest. In this regard, theCommittee took note of the replies furnished by MIAL and the Housing Department,Government of Maharashtra on various aspects of the encroachment. (Para 84)

The Committee observes that the 35 pockets of slums in the airport and the slumson the hillock along the Mithi River are potential threat to the aircrafts and the CISAairport. The problems are persisting for the last so many years. The Committee feels thatthe Governmental agencies, both at the Centre and the State level, could not rationallyjudge the menace of slums inside the airport area as a potential security threat. Mumbaiis the commercial capital of the country. Any breach of security at the airport will havefar reaching consequences. The threat is perennial and no amount of policing could provideadequate security to the airport if the slums are allowed to exist and flourish inside theairport. The Committee feels that the Government agencies are happily unconcerned aboutthe airport security at CSIA, Mumbai. In Mumbai International Airport, a disaster is waitingto happen at any moment in view of these dangerously placed encroachments overlappingoperational areas of the Mumbai Airport. The Committee calls upon all the agencies such asAAI, Ministry of Civil Aviation, BCAS, State Government of Maharashtra and MIAL to wakeup from their slumber and see the danger looming large on the Mumbai Airport. TheCommittee expresses its serious concern on this and strongly recommends that all the slumsmust be removed and relocated from the airport area. There is no justification for allowingencroachers inside the airport area and the Committee is of the view that so long as this areais occupied by the slum dwellers, the Mumbai airport is sitting on a ticking bomb until it isrelocated. Therefore, the Committee recommends that MIAL along with Government ofMaharashtra should come forward immediately with adequate proposals to rehabilitate theslums taking support of various Governmental agencies. (Para 85)

The Committee understands that MIAL has been pursuing with the Government ofMaharashtra (GoM) for rehabilitation of hutment dwellers at CSIA since taking overoperations of CSIA in 2006. The Committee hopes that the Government of Maharashtrawill expedite its approval for the Airport Specific Slum Rehabilitation Scheme for CSIA, toenable the slum rehabilitation process quickly. (Para 86)

Security at Cochin Airport

The Committee compliments the CIAL, CISF and other security agencies forproviding security to the Cochin Airport. (Para 90)

Security of the Airports a Sovereign Function

The Committee observes that National Security cannot be compromised. CivilAviation Security is a very integral and important element of national security. Airportcomplex is a crucial infrastructure. Any large scale damage/terrorist attack on the airportcomplex will be catastrophic with far reaching grave implications for the citizens and theeconomy. Investments flowing into the country depends on the state of the security andsafety. The Committee further notes that the airports have been categorized as

25

26

hyper-sensitive, sensitive and normal. Operational airports in hyper-sensitive categories are26 out of which only 18 airports have been provided with CISF security cover. Which meansthat eight hyper-sensitive airports are not provided the security cover of CISF. In sensitivecategory, there are 56 airports, out of which 37 are covered by CISF and 19 are not covered.In the normal category of 16 airports, only 4 are provided with CISF security and 12 arenot covered. Thus, out of 98 functional airports, only 59 are covered with CISF securitycover and 39 are not under CISF. Explanations given to the Committee was lack of fundsfor providing CISF security cover at all the 98 airports. (Para 95)

The security must be adequate and in proportion to the threat perception. Fundsshould not come in the way of providing security. The Committee recommends that thesecurity component of PSF needs to be enhanced to commensurate with the securityexpenditure and ensure that security is not compromised at all the airports in India and thePSF security component must be deposited in the Consolidated Fund of India. (Para 96)

The Committee recommends that Airport Security should be absolute. TheCommittee observes that Security of the Airports is an integral part of National Securityand therefore, recommends that providing security should be a sovereign function. Adequacyof PSF Security component collection should not be the criteria for providing security. IfCISF security cover can be given to the Delhi Metro, why cannot all the operational airportsbe provided with CISF security cover? (Para 97)

The Committee feels that ideally, the CISF security cover should be provided to allthe 70 odd airports which are having normal scheduled operations. But to begin with, theCommittee recommends that all the Airports rated hyper-sensitive from security angle begiven to CISF as soon as possible followed by the sensitive airports. In view of shortage ofmanpower and logistics available with CISF, security of normal airports can continue withState Police for the time being. But these airports also be given all modern equipment,training etc. (Para 98)

Dedicated Security Force

The Committee noted the arguments of Home Secretary and Secretary, Civil Aviationand observes that there is no need for a separate Civil Aviation Force at this juncture andthat Airport Security can remain with the CISF and Ministry of Home Affairs especially inview of the fact that the IB, NSG and other Police Forces who have a substantial role to playin airport security are also under the Ministry of Home Affairs. (Para 101)

The Committee, after examining the papers/documents submitted to it and hearingthe arguments of various stakeholders on the subject, could understand that there aremultiple agencies involved in providing security at Indian airports. (Para 102)

The Committee notes that Bureau of Civil Aviation Security is responsible for layingdown the standards for pre-embarkation security and anti-sabotage measures in respect ofcivil flights and ensuring their compliance through regular inspections and security audits.Commissioner of Security, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security has been empowered to issueDirections under Section 5A of Aircraft Act, 1934 with respect to civil aviation securitymatters. (Para 103)

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The Committee also notes that whereas BCAS frames the rules and regulations forcivil aviation security, the Central Industrial Security Force which is functioning under theMinistry of Home Affairs acts as the implementing agency for the guidelines framed byBCAS. The Intelligence Bureau plays an important role in providing intelligence inputsrelated to civil aviation security. National Security Guard (NSG) under the Ministry ofHome Affairs is also the primary Contingency Response Force for anti-terrorist operationsat airports. (Para 104)

The Committee was at a loss to find that the post of the Commissioner of Security,BCAS, the Appropriate Authority for the development, implementation and maintenanceof National Civil Aviation Security Programme of India, is lying vacant for the last two-and-a-half years. The Committee would like to know the reasons for keeping thisimportant and sensitive post vacant for more than two years. The Committee may alsobe apprised on the steps taken to fill up the post on priority. (Para 105)

The Committee finds that the violent incident involving employees of AirportsAuthority of India and the Central Industrial Security Force at Karipur Airport in Kozhikodeon 10th June, 2015 raises a question mark over the effectiveness of the existing co-ordinationmechanism between various agencies involved in providing security at Indian airports. Whenthe issue was raised during the deliberations, both the Home Secretary and Civil AviationSecretary assured the Committee to look into the matter and to address the shortcomingsin the system. The Committee hopes that apart from conducting various meetings to addressthe issues related to airport security with agencies involved in the process, both the Ministrieswill have a periodical review of the performance of the co-ordination mechanism so that anygrey areas identified could be addressed immediately. (Para 106)

The Committee also feels that the issue of deficiency of security gadgets andinstallation of CCTV cameras and clearance of shadow zones at various airports should betaken up on priority so that such deficiencies do not become a cause for concern in the Indianairport security system. As it is said that the performance in the battlefield is obviouslyknown before hand if we are not fully equipped with the modern equipments to fight with theenemy. The Committee, therefore, hopes that PDIS which is currently operating on pilotbasis at Delhi Airport should be reviewed and efforts should be made to remove the flawsfound in the system. The Ministry of Civil Aviation should also look out for such PDIStechnology which could function properly in the Indian conditions. (Para 107)

The Committee desires that the areas of concern on providing security to DelhiAirport, expressed by the Delhi Police should be given due consideration. The Ministry ofCivil Aviation and Delhi International Airport Limited are urged to look into the problemsfaced by the Delhi Police on the city side as well as within the T-3 terminal building ofDelhi Airport. (Para 108)

The Committee also hopes that the issue of relocation and rehabilitation of slumdwellers from the vicinity of Mumbai International Airport will be settled as soon aspossible so that the encroached land is brought within the control of airport operator andthe necessary expansion works of Mumbai Airport are commenced shortly. Upon that, the

present security threat to the Mumbai Airport will automatically wither away. TheCommittee, after cross examination of the Governments and concerned organizations, hascome to the conclusions that the Ministry of Civil Aviation, State Government ofMaharashtra, Mumbai International Airport Limited and Airport Authority of India shouldsit together to sort out the long pending issues which have presently become the majorissue of threat to Mumbai Airport. The Committee also requests the Ministry of CivilAviation and Government of Maharashtra to take a lead in settling the issues with no lossof time. (Para 109)

The Committee desires that vacant posts in the Aviation Security Group of CISF whichis manning the Indian airports through the length and breadth of the country are filled upat the earliest so that the existing security apparatus is strengthened. (Para 110)

There is an involvement of multiple agencies in providing Security at Indian airportsand the Committee has found a lack of proper co-ordination between the agencies. TheCommittee, therefore, recommends that a think tank may be created to bring out a properco-ordination involving all the stakeholders to help the Commissioner of Security, BCAS toperform his duties satisfactorily. (Para 111)

The Committee finds it quite scary to know that the security of 8 of our hyper-sensitive and 19 of our sensitive airports are not covered by the CISF which has nowbecome the only specialized force for aviation security; now question is who is thenguarding these airports and how secure these airports are? In these existing threatsperceptions at our airports, the country can ill-afford such a situation to continue any more.The Committee finds that aviation security has not received the attention and importancethat it deserves. The Committee feels that in view of several gaps and lack of unifiedcommand and control for the multiple agencies involved, there is an urgent need for havingan Aviation Security Policy in the country for ensuring fool proof security at our airportsbefore a major untoward incident takes place in the country. (Para 112)

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MINUTES

XVIII

EIGHTEENTH MEETING

The Committee met at 3.00 P.M. on Friday, the 10th July, 2015 in Committee Room ‘D’, GroundFloor, Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi.

MEMBERS PRESENT

1. Dr. Kanwar Deep Singh ⎯ Chairman

RAJYA SABHA

2. Shri Rajeev Shukla

3. Shri Narendra Kumar Kashyap

4. Shri Avinash Rai Khanna5. Dr. Prabhakar Kore6. Shri Kiranmay Nanda7. Kumari Selja8. Shri Ritabrata Banerjee

LOK SABHA

9. Mohammed Faizal

10. Kumari Arpita Ghosh

11. Shri Rahul Kaswan

12. Shri Nirmala Kristappa

13. Shri Ram Kumar Sharma

14. Shri Rajesh Pandey

15. Shri Srinivasa Reddy Ponguleti

16. Shri Kunwar Haribansh Singh

17. Shri Shatrughan Sinha

18. Shri Dasrath Tirkey

19. Shri Manoj Tiwari

20. Shri K. C. Venugopal21. Shri Ram Charitra Nishad

SECRETARIAT

Shri N.K. Singh, Additional Secretary

Shri Swarabji B., Joint Director

Shrimati Catherine John L., Assistant Director

Shri T. Kennedy Jesudossan, Committee Officer

Shri P. P. Raumon, Committee Officer

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32

WITNESSES

Ministry of Home Affairs

1. Shri L.C. Goyal Secretary2. Shri Jaideep Govind Additional Secretary3. Shri V. Vumlunmang Joint Secretary (PM)4. Shri Sailesh Joint Secretary (P. II)5. Shri Harish Chander Director6 Ms. S. Chowdhury Director

Central Industrial Security Force

7. Shri. Surender Singh Director-General8. Shri R.K. Pachnanda Additional Director-General9. Shri Ajay Kumar Assistant Director-General

Intelligence Bureau

10. Shri P.K. Bharadwaj Joint Director

Ministry of Civil Aviation

11. Shri Rajiv Nayan Choubey Secretary12. Shri Arun Kumar Joint Secretary13. Shri G. Asok Kumar Joint Secretary14. Shri Suyash Narain Director

Bureau of Civil Aviation Security

15. Shri. B.B. Dash Jt. Commissioner of Security16. Shri R.N. Dhoke Addl. Commissioner17. Shri M.T. Baig Asstt. Commissioner

Airports Authority of India

18 Shri R.K. Srivastava Chairman19. Shri G.K. Chaukiyal Member (Operation)20. Shri Pankaj Jain E. D. ICID21. Smt. Neera Rawat Director (Security)22. Shri R.K. Malik GM (Security)

II. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed the Members of the Committee and informed thatthe representatives of Ministries of Home Affairs and Civil Aviation have been called to discuss theissues related to Security at Airports in India. The Chairman also informed the Committee that thesubject could not be taken up for discussion during the last meeting since the Home Secretary wasnot able to attend the meeting on that day.

III. Thereafter, the Chairman welcomed the Home Secretary, Director-General, CISF andother officials and asked the Home Secretary about the arrangement the CISF has for providing

33

security at the airports, existing interface between all the agencies involved in the operation ofairports, proposed creation of dedicated security force for guarding the Indian airports by theMinistry of Civil Aviation, staff strength and organizational capabilities of CISF in providingsecurity at airports and special training given to the CISF for handling hi-tech equipment asalso for the development of soft skills to deal with the passengers with required etiquette anddiscipline. The Committee also expressed concern about the incident that took place atKozhikode International Airport, Karipur on 10th June, 2015.

IV. The Home Secretary apprised the Committee on the role of Ministry of Home Affairsand CISF in the aviation security of the country and the different agencies involved in thatprocess. The Secretary also assured the Committee that the incident which occurred atKozhikode Airport should be seen as stand alone incident, it was not a result of any gap inthe system that is in place. However, all the necessary action will be taken once investigationfindings come out. The Home Secretary was not in favour of creation of dedicated securityforce for airports under Ministry of Civil Aviation as it will not have the required expertise asthat of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) which was currently doing that job verywell. He requested the Committee to look into the issue of adequate budgetary allocation forairport security as the current allocation is meager. He also raised the issue of delay on thepart of Ministry of Civil Aviation for making payment to CISF for their services provided atthe airports. When asked about asking more funds for airport security by the Ministry ofHome on Gross Budgetary Support (GBS), Secretary argued that it may not be possible asaviation security was not treated as a sovereign function.

V. The Secretary accepted the lack of an effective co-ordination between CISF, Bureau ofCivil Aviation Security and all other agencies involved in ensuring airport security:- CISF, BCAS,airport operators, aircraft operators, ground handling agencies who are performing some veryimportant aspects of airport security. DG , CISF informed the Committee about the organizationalcapabilities and manpower of CISF in providing security to airports and also training facilitiesavailable to personnel of CISF at various levels.

VI. Then the witnesses withdrew.

VII. Thereafter, the Chairman welcomed the Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation and otherofficials to the meeting and expressed the Committee’s concerns over the recent violent incidentinvolving employees of Airports Authority of India and Central Industrial Security Force on 10th

June, 2015 at Calicut International Airport at Karipur which resulted in closure of Kozhikode Airportfor six hours. The Chairman in his opening remarks raised all the issues which were discussedwith the Home Secretary earlier.

VIII. The Secretary, in his presentation, informed the Committee on the existing securityarrangement at the Indian airports and the role of different agencies under the Ministry of CivilAviation, involved in that process. He also submitted that the incident which occurred at KozhikodeAirport may not be seen as a security lapse. He also informed the Committee on the StandardOperating Procedure used for providing security at airports in the county and also the variouslevels of co-ordination between inter-Ministerial agencies and intra-Ministerial agencies.TheSecretary also stressed on the need for enhancement of the security component of the PassengerService Fee on the air fares since the expenditure spent on security is more than what is collected

34

from the departing passenger under this head. The Secretary informed the Committee that creationof dedicated security force for Indian airports will complicate the security operations and that theMinistry will not proceed further on this matter. Neither the Ministry of Civil Aviation nor theAirports Authority of India has the core competency to raise a Force and run a security agency.It should rest with the Ministry of Home Affairs and CISF.

IX. The Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation suggested that the security at the airports maybe considered as a sovereign function and adequate security may be provided based on thethreat perception at various airports. The security component of the passenger fee collectedmay be directly credited to the Consolidated Fund of India. Sovereign function must bedischarged by the Government and the fund constraint should not affect the securitypreparedness.

X. The Commissioner, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) informed the Committee ontheir role in providing security at Indian airports and their co-ordination mechanism with varioussecurity agencies. He gave an overview of the operation of various agencies involved at airportson the basis of the broad security architecture laid down by the BCAS. He also informed theCommittee that all the airports in the country are subject to annual security audit followed byinspection by the officials of BCAS.

XI. Members also raised queries on various points to which the officials responded. TheCommittee directed the Ministries to furnish the replies to all the unanswered queries in writing atthe earliest.

XII. A verbatim record of the proceedings was kept.

XIII. The meeting adjourned at 5.15 P.M. to meet again on 17th July, 2015.

35

VII

SEVENTH MEETING

The Committee met at 3.00 P.M. on Friday, the 18th December, 2015 in Committee Room 67,First Floor, Parliament House, New Delhi.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

1. Dr. Kanwar Deep Singh ⎯ Chairman

RAJYA SABHA

2. Shri Narendra Kumar Kashyap3. Shri Avinash Rai Khanna4. Dr. Prabhakar Kore5. Shri Kiranmay Nanda6. Kumari Selja

LOK SABHA

7. Shri Ram Charitra Nishad8. Shri Rajeshbhai Naranbhai Chudasama9. Kumari Arpita Ghosh10. Shri Rahul Kaswan11. Shri Rajesh Pandey12. Shri Dushyant Singh13. Shri Kunwar Haribansh Singh14. Shri Shatrughan Sinha15. Shri Dasrath Tirkey16. Shri Manoj Tiwari17. Shri K.C. Venugopal

SECRETARIAT

Shri J.G. Negi, Joint Secretary

Shri Swarabji B., Joint Director

Shri Arun Kumar, Assistant Director

Shrimati Catherine John L., Assistant Director

Shri P.P. Raumon, Committee Officer

II. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed the Members to the meeting. Thereafter, theCommittee considered draft Report on the issues related to ‘Security at Airports in India’. Aftersome discussion, the Committee adopted the report with minor changes and decided to present theReport to the Parliament on 21st December, 2015.

III. The Committee, accordingly, authorized the Chirman and in his absence, Shri Kiranmay

Nanda, M.P. and in his absence Kumari Selja, M.P. to present the Report in Rajya Sabha. Shri RamCharitra Nishad, M.P. and in his absence, Km. Arpita Ghosh, M.P. was authorized to lay the Reporton the Table in Lok Sabha on 21st December, 2015.

IV. * * *

V. The meeting was adjourned at 3.30 P.M.

***Relates to other matter.

36

ANNEXURES

ANNEXURE -I(Vide Para 34 of Report)

LIST OF CATEGRIZATION OF AIRPORTS UNDER CISF COVER

Hyper-Sensitive Sensitive NormalS.No. Airport S.No Airport S.No. Airport S.No. Airport1. Amritsar 1. Agra 20. Bhopal 1. Gwalior2. IGI Delhi 2. Chandigarh 21. Bhuj 2. Madurai3. Jaipur 3. Indore 22. Goa 3. Rajkot4. Varanasi 4. Bhuntar 23. Nagpur 4. Bhavnagar5. Lucknow 5. Kanpur 24. Vadodara6. Agartala 6. Shimla 25. Calicut7. Bagdogra 7. Udaipur 26. Cochin8. Guwahati 8. Dehradun 27. Coimbatore9. Imphal 9. Khajuraho 28. Mangalore10. Kolkata 10. Dibrugarh 29. Tirupati11. Raipur 11. Dimapur 30. Trichy12. Bangalore 12. Gaya 31. Trivandrum13. Chennai 13. Jorhat 32. Vizag14. Hyderabad 14. Lilabari 33. Tezpur15. Mumbai 15. Patna 34. Shillong16. Pune 16. Ranchi 35. Bhubaneswar17. Jodhpur 17. Silchar 36. Diu18. Ahmedabad 18. Aurangabad 37. Portblair

19. Porbandar

Total 59 Airports under CISF cover

39

ANNEXURE-II(vide para 83 of Report)

Chart-I

(1) Premier project at Village Kurla, Kurla (West).

(1.A) Last revised Letter of Intent is issued on 01/07/2015 for 17346 Nos. of Rehab Residential &737 Nos. Rehab commercial tenements.

(1.B) IOA & Commencement Certificate for 30 Nos. of Rehab buildings are issued and work ofconstruction is nearing completion, the work of infrastructural facilities is under progress.

(2) Bhandari Project at Village Kurla, Kurla (East).

(2.A) Last revised Letter of Intent is issued on 16/10/2009 for 1834 Nos. of Rehab Residentialtenements.

(2.B) IOA & Commencement Certificate for all 4 Nos. of Rehab buildings were granted and work isnearing completion.

(3) Kilburn Project at Village Nahur, Nahur (West).

(3.A) Revised Letter of Intent is issued on 26/09/2012 for 2004 Nos. of Rehab Residential tene-ments.

(3.B) IOA & Commencement Certificate were granted to all 4 Nos. of Rehab buildings and workis in progress.

(4) Mahul-I project at Village Mahul, Chembur.

(4.A) Letter of Intent is issued on 16/06/2010 for 416 Nos. of Rehab industrial tenements.

(5) Mahul-II project at Village Mahul, Chembur.

(5.A) Letter of Intent is issued on 29/06/2010 for 451 Nos. of Rehab industrial tenements.

(6) Bombay Oxygen project at Village Nahur, Mulund (West).

(6.A) Letter of Intent is issued on 17/08/2010 for 2919 Nos. of Rehab residential tenements.

(6.B) IOA & Commencement Certificate were granted to all 3 Nos. of Rehab buildings and work is inprogress.

(7) Popular Car Bazar project at Village Mulgaon, Andheri (East).

(7.A) Last revised Letter of Intent is issued on 07/02/2013 for 1300 Nos. of Rehab residentialtenements.

(7.B) IOA & Commencement Certificate were granted to all 3 Nos. of Rehab buildings and work is inprogress.

40

Chart-2

Tenement details of 3.11 Projects of M/s. HDIL

Sr. Scheme No. of No. of No. of Balance No.No. Tenements Tenements Tenements of Tenements

Proposed as for which Handed over underper last LOI OCC granted to MMRDA construction

1. Premier ‘L’ Ward Kurla 18644 6139 697 12505

2. Bhandari ‘L’ Ward Kurla 1882 0 0 1882

3. Bombay Oxygen ‘T’ Ward Nahur 3009 0 0 3009

4. Kilburn ‘S’ Ward Bhandup 2064 0 0 2064

5. Popular Carbazaar K/E Andheri 1339 0 0 1339

6. Mahul Chembur CTS No. 611 456 0 0 0

7. Mahul Chembur CTS No. 604, 605 420 0 0 0

TOTAL 27814 6139 697 20799

41

ANNEXURE-III

List of Witnesses who appeared before the Department-related ParliamentaryStanding Committee on Transport, Tourism And Culture.

10th July, 2015

I. Ministry of Home Affairs

1. Shri L. C. Goyal Secretary

2. Shri Jaideep Govind Additional Secretary

3. Shri V. Vumlunmang Joint Secretary (PM)

4. Shri Sailesh Joint Secretary (P. II)

5. Shri Harish Chander Director

6 Ms. S. Chowdhury Director

II. Central Industrial Security Force

7. Shri. Surender Singh Director-General

8. Shri R. K. Pachnanda Additional Director-General

9 Shri Ajay Kumar Assistant Director-General

III. Intelligence Bureau

10. Shri P. K. Bharadwaj Joint Director

IV. Ministry of Civil Aviation

11. Shri Rajiv Nayan Choubey Secretary

12. Shri Arun Kumar Joint Secretary

13. Shri G. Asok Kumar Joint Secretary

14. Shri Suyash Narain Director

V. Bureau of Civil Aviation Security

15. Shri. B. B. Dash Jt.Commissioner of Security

16. Shri R. N. Dhoke Addl. Commissioner

17. Shri M. T. Baig Asstt. Commissioner

VI. Airports Authority of India

18. Shri R. K. Srivastava Chairman19. Shri G. K. Chaukiyal Member (Operation)20. Shri Pankaj Jain E. D. (KID)21. Shrimati Neera Rawat Director Security22. Shri R. K. Malik GM (Security)

42