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Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

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Page 1: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Page 2: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Democracies and non democratic regimes

Rousseau and the general interest ( against Arrow theorem results)

Schumpeter: “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.

Downs , Sartori and the effects of the competition

Page 3: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Dahl (5 requirements for Democracy) :1. Effective participation:Before a policy is adopted by the

association, all he members must have equal and effective opportunities for making their views known to the other members as to what the policy should be

2. Equality in voting:When the moment arrives at which the decision about policy will finally be made, every member must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote, and all votes must be counted as equal

3. Gaining enlightened understanding: Within reasonable limits as to time, each member must have equal and effective opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative policies and their likely consequences

4. Exercising control over the agenda: The members must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how and, if they choose, what matter are to be placed on the agenda

5. Inclusion of adults: All, or at any rate most, adult permanent residents should have the full rights of citizens that are implied by the first four criteria

Democracies and non democratic regimes

Page 4: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Democracies and non democratic regimes

Przeworski and the democratic stability: even if losers and winners were not determined by a competition but by a lottery, under certain conditions the losers in an “election” may prefer to wait until the next round rather than to revolt against the system .

Page 5: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Presidentialim and Parliamentarism

Stepan & Skach: A pure parliamentary regime in a democracy is a system

of mutual dependence: 1. The chief executive power must be supported by a majority

in the legislature and can fall if it receives a vote of no confidence.

2. The executive power (normally in conjunction with the head of state) has the capacity to dissolve the legislature and call for elections.

A pure presidential regime in a democracy is a system of mutual independence:

1. The legislative power has a fixed electoral mandate that is its own source of legitimacy.

2. The chief executive power has a fixed electoral mandate that is its own source of legitimacy.

Page 6: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and democratic stability Linz: “while parliamentarism imparts flexibility to the political

process, Presidentialism makes it rather rigid” 1. In the Parliamentarisms once elections are held either there is a

majority party that forms the government, or the different parties enter into negotiations about government formation. The result of these negotiations is a government that is supported by parliament and anytime this support is undermined or challenged, a confidence vote resolves the issue.

2. In presidential systems however, there is no mechanism for the resolution of conflicts between the executive and the legislative ““Replacing a president who has lost the confidence of his party or the people is an extremely difficult proposition. Even when polarization has intensified to the point of violence and illegality, a stubborn incumbent may remain in office. By the time the cumbersome mechanisms provided to dislodge him in favor of a more able and conciliatory successor have done their work, it may be too late.”

Page 7: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Presidentialism, Parliamentarism ,democratic stability and other features Shugart & Carey: “strong presidential powers (both legislative

and non-legislative) are more likely to lead to breakdown”.Regimes with legislatively strong presidents have one additional veto player, so policy stability increases. As a result of increased policy stability the regime may be unable to provide policy changes when needed, which may lead to breakdown.

Strom:“parliamentary regimes may be better equipped to deal with problems of adverse selection… at the expense of another [problem], moral hazard”

Diermeier & Federsen :”it is the confidence relationship, the threat of being voted out of office and losing agenda setting powers that makes parties more cohesive in parliamentary than in presidential systems; in fact interparty cohesion in parliamentary systems should be greater than intra party cohesion in presidential systems.”

Page 8: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

The Veto players Angle In order to understand the differences not only between

democratic and non-democratic regimes, but also between presidentialism and parliamentarism, one has to focus on the process of law production:

1. -How are veto players selected?2. -Who are the veto players? (who needs to agree for a change of

the status quo)?3. -Who controls the legislative agenda? (who makes proposals to

whom and under what rules)?4. -If these players are collective, under what rules does each one

of them decide (simple majority, qualified majority, or unanimity)?

Democratic and non democratic regimes: What distinguishes democratic fron nondemocratic regimes is whether the veto players are decided by competition between elites for vote or by some other process, and there is no necessary distinction in terms of representation or in terms of the actual number of veto players.

Page 9: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Who are the veto players: Institutional veto players: individual or collective veto players

who are specified by the constitution. The number of these veto players is expected to be constant but their properties may change. For example, they may be transformed from collective to individual (if one institution, deciding by simple majority, is controlled by a disciplined party) and vice versa. Also, their ideological distances may vary, and one or more of them may be absorbed.

Partisan veto players: the veto players who are generated inside institutional veto players by the political game. For example, the replacement of a single party majority by a two party majority inside any institutional veto player transforms the situation from a single partisan veto player to two partisan veto players. Both the number and the properties of partisan veto players change over time. Parties may lose majorities, they may split, and they may merge and such transformations may have an effect on the number of partisan veto players.

Page 10: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Who are the veto players:

Institutional veto players: examples Eduskunta Bundestag e Bundesrat Camera e Senato House of Representatives, Senate, President

Page 11: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

State Lower Chamber Upper Chamber Bicameralism (Lijphart, 1999)  

Austria Nationalrat Bundesrat 2,0  

Belgium Chambre des Représentants Sénat 3,0  

Denmark Folketinget 1,0 after 1953

Finland Eduskunta 1,0  

France Assemblée nationale Sénat 3,0  

Germany Bundestag Bundesrat 4,0  

Greece Vouli Ton Ellinon 1,0  

Iceland Althingi 1,0 after 1991

Ireland Dáil Éireann Senate 2,0  

Italy Camera Senato 3,0  

Luxembourg Chambre des Députés 1,0  

Netherlands Tweede Kamer Eerste Kamer 3,0  

Norway Stortinget 1,5  

Portugal Assembleia da Republica 1,0  

Spain Congreso Senado 3,0  

Sweden Riksdagen 1,0 after 1970

Switzerland Nationalrat Ständerat 4,0  

UK House of Commons House of Lords 2,5  

Page 12: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Five party parliament in a unicameral parliamentary system. According to theconstitution, legislation is enacted when a majority of this parliament agrees to replace the statusquo. Assume that the five parties are cohesive and that any three ofthem control a majority. The situation specified by the constitution is a single institutional collective veto player.The status quo SQ we can identify the (majority) wincircle. This is the lightly shaded circular area in the figure. We can also identify the exact set of pointsthat defeat SQ (the darker shaded area W(SQ)).

Page 13: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Now consider that not all coalitions are possible but that three of the parties A, B, and C form a government. This alliance makes sure that none of them enters into coalitions with parties D or E. This additional information alters the number of partisan veto players as well asthe expectations of the feasible solutions. The only points that can defeat SQ are located in the deeply shaded lens. Therefore, the new information transformed the analysis of the politicalsystem from one collective veto player to three individual ones and reduced the winset of the status quo.

Page 14: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Steps to analyze specific political situations 1) we locate institutional veto players in a

multidimensional space. 2) we proceed to disaggregate them into the partisan

players they are composed of in order to identify the individual or collective veto players inside each one of them.

3) we apply the absorption rules to this system: if some of the veto players are located in the unanimity core of the others, we can eliminate them because they do not restrict the winset of the status quo.

Page 15: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

15

A new (not influential) veto player

SQ

D

B

CA E

Since D is inside the core of A,B e C, the core does not increase, and the winset does not reduce

Same for E

These veto players are absorbed

Page 16: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Number and nature of the vetoplayers depend on :

The constitutions the political circumstances the kind of law making under observationExamples1. U.S. law making process2. German Bundesrat role3. French laws and French government

decrees

Page 17: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Who controls the legislative agenda? With respect to financial bills, the initiative belongs to the executive in

both presidential and parliamentary systems. With respect to non financial bills however, as a general rule: 1. In parliamentary systems the government makes a proposal to

parliament to accept or reject.2. In presidential systems, parliament makes a proposal to the

executive to accept or veto. the roles of agenda setting are reversed in the two systems. The

names used for each one of these systems do not reflect the legislative reality: one expects presidents to be powerful in presidential systems, and parliaments in parliamentary. However:

1. if parliament is strong in parliamentary systems it is not because of legislation; it is because it can withdraw its support from the government and replace it.

2. If the president is strong in presidential systems it is not because of his power to legislate, but because of executive decrees and the power to make decisions on foreign policy and other matters.

Page 18: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Who controls the legislative agenda?

If the Government moves first GP as final outcome. If the Parliament moves first then PG as final outcome.

PGP PG

SQ

G

Page 19: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Who controls the legislative agenda?

However the power of agenda setter does not nullify the role of other veto players…

PGP PG

SQ

GG1PG1

Page 20: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

yolk

winset

Radius= d+2r

wincircle

Wincircle

Page 21: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Cohesion of collective veto players

Radius r of the yolk indicates the level of cohesion of the collective veto player – i.e. how much the majority is represented by the point Y

As the wincircle grows with r :

Conjecture : Policy stability increases as the m-cohesion of a collective veto player increases (as the radius of the yolk decreases)

Page 22: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Veto Players cohesion in Presidentialism and Parliamentarism1. Parties are more disciplined in parliamentary

systems than in presidential ones, above all if the electoral system does not allow the preference vote. (open list)

2. The internal cohesion of collective veto players affects the size of the area within which the winset is located. The lower the party cohesion, the lower is policy stability.

3. Coeteris paribus presidential systems have lower policy stability. This is a very strong ceteris paribus clause because it is probably impossible to keepeverything else equal.

Page 23: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Effects of many veto players

Page 24: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Differences in classifications between regimes, party systems, and veto players

Page 25: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation (Strom)

Why Delegate?

1. Capacity (time, transaction costs, namely costs in reaching, implementing and enforcing policy decisions )

2. Competence

3. Social Choice and Collective Action problems (i.e. the problem of the Commons)

Page 26: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

The principal-agent framework

Assumptions behind the model

1. The Political Community is given and bounded

2. The Preferences of principals and agents are exogenously given

3. Principals face information scarcities and information is critical.

Agents may “misbehave” in different ways:

1. Policy divergence

2. Leisure-shirking

3. Rent seeking

Page 27: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Political accountability

An agent is accountable to his/her principal if 1. He/She is obliged to act on her/his behalf2. He/She is empowered to reward or punish

him/her for his/her performance Accountability implies that principals have to

kind of rights:1. Right to demand information2. Capacity to impose sanctionsa) Veto (or amend) powerb) Deauthorize the agentc) Impose specific penalties

Page 28: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Delegation and accountability under Presidentialism and Parlamentarism(ideal types)

DistrictMedianvoter

RepresentativesPrime minister& Cabinet

Ministry Head

Ministry Head

Civil Servant

Civil Servant

Civil Servant

Civil Servant

StateMedianvoter

DistrictMedianvoter

NationalMedianvoter President

Upper house

Lower house

Secretary

Secretary

Civil Servant

Civil Servant

Civil Servant

Civil Servant

Civil Servant

Civil Servant

Civil Servant

Civil ServantDelegation

Accountability

Page 29: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Features of a parliamentary democracy (Westminster ideal type)

Indirect Delegation: few agents are directly elected by (and accountable to) the citizens

Singularity: each principal employs a single agent.

The length of the delegation chain and the impossibility to rely on agents to check one another (the singularity) increase the risks of agency loss. To counteract these dangers the Parliamentarim relies on the Party government, namely centralized, cohesive, policy oriented political parties

Page 30: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Political Parties in the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation

Page 31: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Political Parties: what are and under which conditions they work Political parties are complex collaborative devices

for mutual gain, useful for both the candidates for public offices and for the voters.

Two incentive conditions must be satisfied:1. Parties have to provide sufficient inducements for

political office holders to submit to the discipline (policy cohesion) they impose

2. This policy cohesion (discipline) must be sufficient for the voters to find party label informative and useful.

Page 32: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Consequences of Partisanship (in the Westminster ideal type)

Powerful device of ex ante screening pratically in each ring of the delegation chain.

..but ineffective ex post Oversight : 1. Ex post accountability depends almost entirely on

electoral competition and the election dates can be partially manipulated.

2. Between elections accountability is tenuous mainly for the following reason: Parties strongly help the alignment of policy preferences along the chain of delegation. However such alignment means that members of the parliamentary majority have no meaningful incentive to scrutinize the behaviour of their fellow party members in the executive branch

Page 33: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Parliamentary democracies different from the Westminster model Multiparty government can work differently

from the ideal type of parliamentarism Also the type of party system dynamic

makes the difference:

Pivotal party system versus Alternational party system

Even in the parlamentarisms is possible to find powerful institutional constraints

Page 34: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Policy divergence under different regime types and preference configuration (Strom 2004)

A1 A2 PChoose x 1

accept

reject

accept

rejectRP (reverse point or status quo

X

RP

A=AgentP=Principal

Parliamentary Democracy

Page 35: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

A1A2 PChoose

x 1

accept

reject

accept

reject RP

X

RP

Collegial Presidential Democracy

A2A1 PChoose

y 1

accept

reject

accept

reject RP

Y

RP

Delegateagenda

Delegateagenda

P

Page 36: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

A1

P

Choose x 1

Choose x X

Competitive Presidential Democracy

A2

Choose y 1

rejectRP

Y

Delegateagenda

Delegateagenda

P Choose y

Page 37: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

The policy divergence in this complete information model represents the so called agency loss. This loss is measured as the distance between the outcome and the principal’s ideal point.

Example

A1 A2 P 0 or SQ or RP

Parliamentary democracy:A1 propose 0P that is just marginally closer to P than 0. A2 accepts and also P.|P- | is the agency loss

0P

Page 38: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

The different democratic regimes make the difference even when the preferences are located in the same manner

A2 A1 0P

Parliamentary democracy:A1 propose its ideal point that is nearer to P and to A2 than 0. | P- parl. | is the agency loss

parl

Page 39: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

The different democratic regimes make the difference even when the preferences are located in the same manner

A2 A1 0P

Collegial Presidentialism:P delegates agenda to A2.A2 proposes 0A1 that is just nearer to A1 than 0. | P-pres.coll| is the agency loss.

| P-pres.coll|< | P- parl. |

pres.coll

0A1

Page 40: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Preference configuration Parl.

system

Competitive Presidential

Collegial Presidential

1 0.67 0.33 0

A1 A2 P RP 0.32 0.32 0.32

A1 P A2 RP 0.02 0 0.02

A1 P RP A2 0.34 0 0.34

A1 RP A2 P 0.67 0.33 0.67

A1 RP P A2 0.34 0 0.34

A2 A1 P RP 0.32 0.32 0.32

A2 P A1 RP 0.34 0 0.02

A2 RP A1 P 0.67 0.33 0.67

P A1 A2 RP 0.35 0.33 0.33

P A2 A1 RP 0.67 0.33 0.35

Policy divergence (agency loss) under different Regime types

Page 41: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

General results from a comparison among different regimes (games) Parliamentary regime is susceptible to

greater agency loss than either presidential model.

Competitive presidentialism generally minimizes policy divergence; collegial presidentialism is in between.

Page 42: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Other types of agency loss different from the policy divergence

Leisure shirking Rent seeking (Bribe, useless regulation

etc)

Page 43: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Advantages and disadvantages of Parliamentary systems (ideal type) Pro: 1. Efficiency (policy , administrative and

incentive) Against:1. Lack of transparency 2. Moral Hazard problems3. A singular chain of delegation is only strong

as its weakest link

Page 44: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Advantages and disadvantages of Presidential systems (ideal type) Pro:

1. Transparency, (more ex post oversight)

2. Stability in the outcomes

3. More Learning (because of higher level of heterogeneity)

Against:

1. Lack of efficiency

Page 45: Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

Regimes forms and agency lossForms of Agency Loss

Regime Form Policy Divergence

Leisure Shirking

Rent Seeking

Dominant Agency Problem

Westiminster Parl.

High Low Moderately High

Moral Hazard

Pivotal Parliamentarism

Moderately High

Moderately High

High Moral Hazard

Constrained Parliamentarism

Moderate Moderate Moderate Moral Hazard

Collegial Presidentialism

Moderately low High Low Adverse Selection

Competitive Presdientialism

Low Moderately low

Moderately low

Adverse Selection