Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

  • View
    219

  • Download
    1

Embed Size (px)

Text of Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary

  • Slide 1
  • Regimes: Non democratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary
  • Slide 2
  • Democracies and non democratic regimes Rousseau and the general interest ( against Arrow theorem results) Schumpeter: The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the peoples vote. Downs, Sartori and the effects of the competition
  • Slide 3
  • Dahl (5 requirements for Democracy) : 1. Effective participation:Before a policy is adopted by the association, all he members must have equal and effective opportunities for making their views known to the other members as to what the policy should be 2. Equality in voting:When the moment arrives at which the decision about policy will finally be made, every member must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote, and all votes must be counted as equal 3. Gaining enlightened understanding:Within reasonable limits as to time, each member must have equal and effective opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative policies and their likely consequences 4. Exercising control over the agenda:The members must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how and, if they choose, what matter are to be placed on the agenda 5. Inclusion of adults:All, or at any rate most, adult permanent residents should have the full rights of citizens that are implied by the first four criteria Democracies and non democratic regimes
  • Slide 4
  • Przeworski and the democratic stability: even if losers and winners were not determined by a competition but by a lottery, under certain conditions the losers in an election may prefer to wait until the next round rather than to revolt against the system.
  • Slide 5
  • Presidentialim and Parliamentarism Stepan & Skach: A pure parliamentary regime in a democracy is a system of mutual dependence: 1. The chief executive power must be supported by a majority in the legislature and can fall if it receives a vote of no confidence. 2. The executive power (normally in conjunction with the head of state) has the capacity to dissolve the legislature and call for elections. A pure presidential regime in a democracy is a system of mutual independence: 1. The legislative power has a fixed electoral mandate that is its own source of legitimacy. 2. The chief executive power has a fixed electoral mandate that is its own source of legitimacy.
  • Slide 6
  • Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and democratic stability Linz: while parliamentarism imparts flexibility to the political process, Presidentialism makes it rather rigid 1. In the Parliamentarisms once elections are held either there is a majority party that forms the government, or the different parties enter into negotiations about government formation. The result of these negotiations is a government that is supported by parliament and anytime this support is undermined or challenged, a confidence vote resolves the issue. 2. In presidential systems however, there is no mechanism for the resolution of conflicts between the executive and the legislative Replacing a president who has lost the confidence of his party or the people is an extremely difficult proposition. Even when polarization has intensified to the point of violence and illegality, a stubborn incumbent may remain in office. By the time the cumbersome mechanisms provided to dislodge him in favor of a more able and conciliatory successor have done their work, it may be too late.
  • Slide 7
  • Presidentialism, Parliamentarism,democratic stability and other features Shugart & Carey: strong presidential powers (both legislative and non-legislative) are more likely to lead to breakdown.Regimes with legislatively strong presidents have one additional veto player, so policy stability increases. As a result of increased policy stability the regime may be unable to provide policy changes when needed, which may lead to breakdown. Strom:parliamentary regimes may be better equipped to deal with problems of adverse selection at the expense of another [problem], moral hazard Diermeier & Federsen :it is the confidence relationship, the threat of being voted out of office and losing agenda setting powers that makes parties more cohesive in parliamentary than in presidential systems; in fact interparty cohesion in parliamentary systems should be greater than intra party cohesion in presidential systems.
  • Slide 8
  • The Veto players Angle In order to understand the differences not only between democratic and non-democratic regimes, but also between presidentialism and parliamentarism, one has to focus on the process of law production: 1. -How are veto players selected? 2. -Who are the veto players? (who needs to agree for a change of the status quo)? 3. -Who controls the legislative agenda? (who makes proposals to whom and under what rules)? 4. -If these players are collective, under what rules does each one of them decide (simple majority, qualified majority, or unanimity)? Democratic and non democratic regimes: What distinguishes democratic fron nondemocratic regimes is whether the veto players are decided by competition between elites for vote or by some other process, and there is no necessary distinction in terms of representation or in terms of the actual number of veto players.
  • Slide 9
  • Who are the veto players: Institutional veto players: individual or collective veto players who are specified by the constitution. The number of these veto players is expected to be constant but their properties may change. For example, they may be transformed from collective to individual (if one institution, deciding by simple majority, is controlled by a disciplined party) and vice versa. Also, their ideological distances may vary, and one or more of them may be absorbed. Partisan veto players: the veto players who are generated inside institutional veto players by the political game. For example, the replacement of a single party majority by a two party majority inside any institutional veto player transforms the situation from a single partisan veto player to two partisan veto players. Both the number and the properties of partisan veto players change over time. Parties may lose majorities, they may split, and they may merge and such transformations may have an effect on the number of partisan veto players.
  • Slide 10
  • Who are the veto players: Institutional veto players: examples Eduskunta Bundestag e Bundesrat Camera e Senato House of Representatives, Senate, President
  • Slide 11
  • StateLower ChamberUpper ChamberBicameralism (Lijphart, 1999) AustriaNationalratBundesrat2,0 BelgiumChambre des ReprsentantsSnat3,0 DenmarkFolketinget1,0after 1953 FinlandEduskunta1,0 FranceAssemble nationaleSnat3,0 GermanyBundestagBundesrat4,0 GreeceVouli Ton Ellinon1,0 IcelandAlthingi1,0after 1991 IrelandDil ireannSenate2,0 ItalyCameraSenato3,0 LuxembourgChambre des Dputs 1,0 NetherlandsTweede KamerEerste Kamer3,0 NorwayStortinget1,5 PortugalAssembleia da Republica 1,0 SpainCongresoSenado3,0 SwedenRiksdagen1,0after 1970 SwitzerlandNationalratStnderat4,0 UKHouse of CommonsHouse of Lords2,5
  • Slide 12
  • Five party parliament in a unicameral parliamentary system. According to the constitution, legislation is enacted when a majority of this parliament agrees to replace the status quo. Assume that the five parties are cohesive and that any three of them control a majority. The situation specified by the constitution is a single institutional collective veto player. The status quo SQ we can identify the (majority) wincircle. This is the lightly shaded circular area in the figure. We can also identify the exact set of points that defeat SQ (the darker shaded area W(SQ)).
  • Slide 13
  • Now consider that not all coalitions are possible but that three of the parties A, B, and C form a government. This alliance makes sure that none of them enters into coalitions with parties D or E. This additional information alters the number of partisan veto players as well as the expectations of the feasible solutions. The only points that can defeat SQ are located in the deeply shaded lens. Therefore, the new information transformed the analysis of the political system from one collective veto player to three individual ones and reduced the winset of the status quo.
  • Slide 14
  • Steps to analyze specific political situations 1) we locate institutional veto players in a multidimensional space. 2) we proceed to disaggregate them into the partisan players they are composed of in order to identify the individual or collective veto players inside each one of them. 3) we apply the absorption rules to this system: if some of the veto players are located in the unanimity core of the others, we can eliminate them because they do not restrict the winset of the status quo.
  • Slide 15
  • 15 A new (not influential) veto player SQ D B C A E Since D is inside the core of A,B e C, the core does not increase, and the winset does not reduce Same for E These veto players are absorbed
  • Slide 16
  • Number and nature of the vetoplayers depend on : The constitutions the political circumstances the kind of law making under observation Examples 1. U.S. law making process 2. German Bundesrat role 3. French laws and French government decrees
  • Slide 17
  • Who controls the legislative agenda? With respect to financial bills, the initiative belongs to the executive in both presidential and parlia