Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy Volume 13, Number 3, Fall 1995

REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF

RATIONAI,.EMOTIVE THERAPY

Michael J. Mahoney University of North Texas and Center for

Cognitive Psychotherapy, Rome

ABSTRACT. Three basic contentions of RET are briefly discussed, with par- ticular emphasis on their implications for psychotherapy. Personal respon- sibility is seen as a prime directive and the cornerstone of the other two con- tentions, which involve emphases on the present and on action. The philosophical and dialectical emphases of rational emotive behavior therapy are acknowledged as important aspects of its continuing evolution.

When I first began working on this article I assumed that it would take shape around some comparisons of the first and second versions of Albert Ellis's (1962, 1994) classic work, Reason and Emotion in Psy- chotherapy. With 32 years separating these two volumes, I was sure that there would be differences worth reflecting upon. Over several months of percolation, my ideas for organizing my reflections first moved in the direction of a content analysis. I planned to electronically scan both texts (which are sizeable) and to then search for shifts in word frequencies, verb choices, and so on. My inclination toward that strategy was probably multiply determined. I have recently finished an archival study of how representatives of different theoretical orien- tations use language, graphics, and references to legitimize their knowledge claims (Mahoney, 1995b). I am also interested in narrative methods and their enactment in both science and service (Mahoney, 1991, 1995a; Neimeyer & Mahoney, 1995). And, as much as I like to

Address correspondence to Michael J. Mahoney, Department of Psychology, University of North Texas, Denton, TX 76203-3587.

1 7 1 �9 1995 Human Sciences Press, Inc.

172 Journa l of Rat ional-Emotive & Cognit ive-Behavior Therapy

criticize naive notions of objectivity in science, I still like to ground my conjectures with numbers gleaned from systematic observations.

As I came closer to actually putting pen to paper (actually fingers to keyboard), however, the idea of comparing the two volumes receded in attractiveness. For a while I contemplated an alternate theme of re- sponding to and remarking upon the uses of "constructive" terminol- ogy in the revised edition. True to his form of almost half a century of professional writing, A1 does not mince his words. 1 He challenges my distinction between "rationalist" and "constructivist" camps in the cog- nitive psychotherapies, and he argues tha t - -were such a distinction to make sense-- I have still been mistaken in classifying him as a ra- tionalist. His point is elaborated in Chapters 8 and 14 of the 1994 volume. Not only does A1 consider himself a constructivist, but he be- lieves he is more of a constructivist than Vittorio Guidano or myself, whom he jabs as being on the verge (if not over the edge) of being psychoanalytic.

Those challenges and jabs certainly landed some hooks in me, and I spent some time underlining, rereading, and half-consciously respond- ing to them. I didn't "awfulize," however, and the hooks felt more play- ful than upsetting. Several more weeks passed, and yet a third theme began to emerge--perhaps a dialectical resultant of the first two. I entertained the idea that I might best communicate my reflections on the continuing evolution of RE(B)T by means of a condensation and brief commentary on Al's basic message. What exactly is tha t mes- sage? He has said it in many different ways over the years, but it has been an underlying continuity in his work on psychotherapy. It is well put in the final two pages of his 1994 volume:

The three major insights of RET, as noted above, are: (1) Take much responsibility for disturbing yourself and do not cop out by mainly blaming others. (2) Face the fact that your early distur- bances do not automatically make you disturbed today. Rather, your still strongly held irrational Beliefs and unhealthy feelings and actions do. (3) No magical forces will change you, but only your own strong and persistent work and practice--yes, work and prac- tice (pp. 400-401).

My commentary below is organized around these three points.

1Professional rituals being what they are, I am supposed to use the more formal reference of "Albert Ellis" or "Dr. Ellis." However, I invoke our long friendship and his own affection for nonconformity in hereafter referring to him as "Al.~

Michael J. Mahoney 173

ACCEPTING PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

The assertion that one "take much responsibility" for disturbing one- self reminds me of Al's longstanding respect for the philosopher Epic- tetus and his observation that people are not disburbed by ~things" in themselves so much as they are disturbed by the views tha t they hold about those things. The message here is clear: take responsibility for the fact that you are an active participant in your own emotional life. A corollary message is tha t one is well-advised to pay close attention to the views one holds.

Not surprisingly such attention is often motivated by instances of emotional upset. That is, most people do not automatically spend large amounts of time and energy thinking about their thinking. They do spend considerable time thinking, however, and particularly thinking about what they are feeling. And this is where RET earns its stripes as a bonafide reflective system. It explicitly invites its practitioners to exercise their ability to shift their attention from emotional distress to the symbolic foundations for that distress, and then to make deliberate changes in those basic beliefs. The message here is strikingly parallel to other disciplines of applied reflection (e.g., Epstein, 1995).

What may be less apparent is the invitation to exercise personal freedom. The paragraph I quoted was part of the concluding chapter of the 1994 volume--a chapter devoted to "happier living" and the pur- suit of self-actualization. In his discussion of the latter, A1 explicitly encourages unconditional self-acceptance, enlightened self-interest, and self-directedness. Said in different words, I believe he is encourag- ing self-love, self-reliance, and personal freedom. As he notes, this message is consistent with themes in humanistic psychology. The self- love component is one that I had not previously associated with RET, however, and it bade me return to readings in one of my favorite works on the topic. In his classic volume on The Heresy of Self-Love, Paul Zweig (1980) discussed the recurrent revival of the Narcissus myth in the l i teratures of morality:

Over and over again (Narcissus) became the figure of a powerful longing for inward autonomy, a sort of spiritual Robinson Crusoe, as in the fantastic poems of the Gnostic sects which competed with early Christianity; or else, a grim figure of warning: a starved lover staring into cold water; a woman gazing into a mirror, representing the Medieval sin of luxuria . . . .

Narcissus was the failure of love, the fray in the social bond. He stood for a danger that has fascinated as well as repelled us for

174 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

centuries: the danger that the individual will become so enamored of his mind and flesh, that society will to untended and God go unloved; or, perhaps more secretly, that each of us will go unloved. For Narcissus is never ourselves, he is alway the other one who cannot see us (p. vi).

What Zweig elaborates and RET echoes is that self-love in Western civilizations has long required an ongoing act of individual courage.

The second half of this first contention of RET is an admonition to neither "cop out" nor blame. Although the blaming of others can serve as a form of avoiding responsibility, Al is also careful to note that self- blame is no better. He makes an important distinction between the value of a person (which he maintains as unconditional) and the merits (or faults) of any particular performance. I believe that this is an extremely important point, and it is one that bears repeating.

It may be unfortunate that RET's message about personal respon- sibility is most often cast as a prohibition--"do not disturb yourself ' - - rather than as a positive prescription (e.g., "be gentle with yourself," "forgive yourself," or "love yourself."). Still, it is an important message and it moves toward the same realm of actionmnamely, paying atten- tion to and revising the private assumptions that both structure and reflect feelings and actions.

THE PAST IN THE PRESENT

The second point emphasized by A1 is that past events are past. The implication is that only present beliefs and behaviors can cause pres- ent feelings. The basic message here is also clear: focus on present beliefs and actions. Ever since his hard-work transformation from a practicing psychoanalyst to a rational-emotive therapist, A1 has had little patience for systems that dwell on developmental history or the childhood origins of adult distress.

This is a point on which we may differ, and I suspect that Al's com- ment about Guidano and I being almost psychoanalytic has to do with the fact that Vittorio and I share a strong regard for the central signif- icance of developmental history and unconscious processes in con- straining an individual's range of immediately-possible experience (Guidano, 1987, 1991; Mahoney, 1991). My commentary here is brief, but I hope that it helps to clarify my own views on the significance of temporal focus and historicity in helping people break new psychologi- cal ground.

Michael J. Mahoney 175

The philosopher in me is drawn toward an excursion into the role of time in philosophical accounts of knowing. The psychologist and psy- chotherapist have things to say about the temporal continuity of all biological development. The past is always present; likewise the fu- ture. Indeed, I think one can launch a seaworthy argument tha t the cognitive processes we associate with past and fu ture- - the ones we call memory and anticipat ion--are virtually identical. Throughout our lives, we repeatedly lean into the next moment with a decided bias formed by the momentum of the just-passing moment. Hence, we liter-

a l l y remember our futures by anticipating our pasts. This was, I be- lieve, a central point in Plato's mimetic theory of knowing. But the past and the future meet in the present, which is where the living occurs.

I concur with A1 on the importance of recognizing the fact that we live our lives in the ever-present n o w . Here again his views reflect some striking parallels with several spiritual philosophies. He has re- peatedly emphasized the extent to which individuals contribute to their own unhappiness by dwelling on either the pains of their past or the possible tragedies in their future. Indeed, this same spirit of being present-focused is again emphasized in the third major insight that he notes (see below).

A point where A1 and I may differ is on the importance of under- standing a person's developmental history. I believe that such under- standing can be very helpful in improving our understanding of their inner l i fe-- their phenomenology. I also believe that self-awareness is an important component in self-acceptance, and I believe tha t an un- derstanding of one's past contributes to self-awareness. Moreover, I be- lieve tha t many clients find it easier to accept themselves and their personal vulnerabilities when they understand the historical and in- tergenerational contexts of their personal development. But there is also an issue of balance here. I have known clients and therapists who, in my opinion, spent far too much time and energy digging up and chewing on old bones rather than dealing with their fleshy present.

Finally, the timeless present has an appeal that resonates with exis- tential and phenomenological themes in philosophy and psychology. Many clients in psychotherapy do not have time for or interest in much other than what is (or is not) happening in their current life. Moreover, it is my opinion tha t their venture into psychotherapy will not have been optimally valuable if it does not ult imately lead to changes in their current patterns of experiencing. And this brings us to the third contention of RET.

176 Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy

LIVING A PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION

Were there any doubt about the action-focused aspect of RET, it should be put to rest by Al's expansion of its name to "rational emotive behavior therapy" (REBT). He has dropped the hyphen between "ratio- nal" and "emotive, ~ and, more significantly, he has added the word "behavior" to the title. The humorist in me could play with parodies on the psychoanalytic meaning of the hyphen or the frog-like sound of REBT. But I believe the basic message of this change and of the third contention is that activity lies at the heart of adaptation and change. Indeed, A1 concludes the final chapter and therefore the book with a crystalline statement to that effect:

In this manner, rational emotive behavior therapy not only strongly endorses a self-actualizing, action-oriented philosophy, but also actively posits some important ways in which it may be achieved. Above all, it stresses that the views outlined in this chap- ter are its current formulations that had better be experimentally tried and, when and if falsified, be quickly revised or abandoned (1994, p. 401).

His emphasis on activity and flexibility--a readiness to change in re- sponse to feedback from experience--is noteworthy. There is not only an explicit openness to change, but there is also an appreciation of the value of criticism and dialogue in fostering that change.

Dialectics involves an interaction of contrasts, out of which new forms emerge. Ars regard for dialectical processes is elaborated in his use of Ted Crawford's three-phase approach to reframing dichotomous thinking:

Ted's approach has three phases: (1) Identify the "either/or." (2) Re- frame the "either/or" into an "and/also." (3) Push beyond the "and/ also" toward an integrated whole that resolves the ambiguities, paradoxes, dilemmas, and logical inconsistencies of the "and/also" (p. 392).

On the last page of the book A1 concludes with a reminder that "'Ei- ther/or' denies some part of reality. 'And/also' acknowledges the reality that 'either/or' denies" (p. 401). Hence his recommendation to repeat- edly reframe and then integrate our dichotomies.

Michael J. Mahoney 177

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Has RET changed since its inception? I think so. There are clear continuities, of course, and they are well captured in the triad of per- sonal responsibility, a present focus, and an action focus. Besides be- ing a prolific writer, A1 has clearly been an active reader and thinker. He has openly invited criticism, and he has responded thoughtfully to those who have objected to his beliefs. The recent changes in the title and scope of this journal likewise reflect a spirit of openness and a sensitivity to the importance of diversity and dialogue in the develop- ment of our views and services in psychotherapy. I salute A1, RET, the Institute, and this journal in their continuing evolution.

REFERENCES

Ellis, A. (1962). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy. Secaucus, NJ: Citadel. Ellis, A. (1994). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy: Revised and updated.

New York: Birch Lane Press. Epstein, M. (1995). Thoughts without a thinker: Psychotherapy from a Bud-

dhist perspective. New York: Basic Books. Guidano, V. F. (1987). Complexity of the self. New York: Guilford. Guidano, V. F. (1991). The self in process. New York: Guilford. Mahoney, M. J. (1991). Human change processes. New York: Basic Books. Mahoney, M. J. (Ed.) (1995a). Cognitive and constructive psychotherapies.

New York: Springer. Mahoney, M. J. (1995b). Representations of knowledge: An analysis of differ-

ences related to theoretical orientations in psychology. Unpublished manuscript.

Neimeyer, R. A., & Mahoney, M. J. (Eds.). (1995). Constructivism in psycho- therapy. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.

Zweig, P. (1980). The heresy of self-love: A study of subversive individualism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.