Redefining FAPE: Implications of Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District

Erin Biolchino, J.D., Ed.D.

Assistant Professor of Educational Leadership

California State University, Long Beach

Submitted for the Education Law Association’s 63rd Annual Conference

November, 2017 - San Diego, California

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Introduction

The landmark Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School

District, Westchester County v. Rowley (Rowley) U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1982

clarified the legal standard for school districts to provide a free appropriate public

education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by

holding, in part, that a student’s educational program must be “individually designed to

provide educational benefit” (p. 201). In the years since Rowley, a split developed

between the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding this issue. In a majority of Circuits

(including the 10th Circuit), this legal standard morphed into “some educational benefit,”

which was interpreted as a minimal standard that viewed IDEA and Rowley as providing

a “basic floor of opportunity” (Rowley, 1982, p. 200). In other parts of the nation, the

legal standard became “meaningful educational benefit” (Polk v. Central Susquehanna

Intermediate Unit 16, 3rd Cir. 1988; Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Independent

School District, 5th Cir. 2003; Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education, 6th Cir.

2004). Sometimes, as in the 9th Circuit, decisions alternated between using the “some”

and “meaningful” educational benefit standards (Gregory K. v. Longview School District,

1987; Adams v. State of Oregon, 9th Cir. 1999; R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified School

District, 9th Cir. 2007; N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary School District, 9th Cir. 2008; Blake C.

v. Department of Education, 9th Cir. 2009). This semantic distinction in the substantive

definition of FAPE—“some” versus “meaningful”—resulted in a difference in how IDEA

was being applied to students across the nation.

According to the KeyCite feature in the Westlaw database, Rowley has been

cited in almost 3,000 subsequent court cases. The frequent yet disparate use of the

Rowley standard made the difference between “some” and “meaningful” educational

benefit an urgent national equity issue for students with disabilities. What appeared to

be a mere difference in wording had enormous legal implications as families, school

districts, hearing offices, and courts across the nation attempted to somehow quantify

how much educational benefit was sufficient to meet the legal requirements of IDEA.

Since IDEA is a federal statute, it should be applied equally across the nation to

students with disabilities; however, an equitable application of the law was not the

reality of special education in the United States in the years since Rowley. School

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leaders saw this chasm between “some” and “meaningful” educational benefit at work in

their schools in every Individualized Education Program (IEP) meeting. The way many

Circuit Courts interpreted Rowley to mean a lower level of educational benefit by

inserting the word “some” automatically positions schools against families in the IEP

process. After all, what family wants only “some” educational benefit for their child?

A legal battle between the family of Endrew F. (Drew), a student with autism, and

the Douglas County School District began in 2010 when Drew stopped making progress

in public school as a fourth-grade student. Drew’s parents unilaterally changed his

placement to a specialized private school where he began making progress, and the

parents sought reimbursement for tuition (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District,

2017). The legal case against the district began with a 2012 IDEA complaint with the

Colorado Department of Education, which was denied, so the parents appealed to the

Federal District Court in Colorado, then to the Tenth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, and

ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District,

2017). The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case during its 2016 term and

issued a unanimous decision on March 22, 2017 (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School

District, 2017).

At the heart Endrew F. is the struggle of families fighting for their children to

reach their full potential in a system where the law only requires some lesser,

unquantified amount of educational benefit. The Court in Rowley specifically stated that

IDEA “generates no additional requirement that the services so provided be sufficient to

maximize each child's potential” (p. 198). Of course, families come to the IEP meeting

seeking to maximize their child’s full potential, yet this is not what IDEA requires. This

difference in goals—school districts seeking to meet the “some” educational benefit

standard and families pursing a higher standard—makes a process that is supposed to

be collaborative inherently adversarial. More precision in defining the educational

benefit standard—and perhaps a more clearly quantifiable standard of FAPE—is what

stakeholders were seeking from the Endrew F. decision.

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The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Endrew F.

FAPE in Exchange for Funding

Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for a unanimous court, opened the opinion in

Endrew F. with a quick mention of the fact that the IDEA provides states with federal

funding for special education. As Roberts explained, “In exchange for the funds, a State

pledges to comply with a number of statutory conditions. Among them, the State must

provide a free appropriate public education—a FAPE for short—to all eligible children”

(Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 993).

FAPE as Appropriate Progress

Perhaps one of the most striking features of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision

in Endrew F. is their unanimous condemnation of the school district’s interpretation of

Rowley that limits the level of educational benefit required under IDEA as “some” or

“minimal” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 998). The school

district relied heavily on this language when arguing that the legal standard required by

IDEA was that an IEP need only “be reasonably calculated to provide some educational

benefit, as opposed to none” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p.

998). The court dismissed this focus on the passages from Rowley using the modifier

“some” as an unwarranted focus on semantics, stating that “the district makes too much

of them” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 998). Instead, the court

in Endrew F. (2017) opted for an interpretation of Rowley that relies on an individual

student’s circumstances and progress:

While Rowley declined to articulate an overarching standard to evaluate the

adequacy of the education provided under the Act [IDEA], the decision and the

statutory language point to such a general approach: To meet its substantive

obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to

enable the child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s

circumstances (p. 998-999).

The court emphasized that an IEP is, by definition, a highly individualized process, so

they declined to articulate a universal standard of “appropriate” progress (Endrew F. v.

Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 1001). The court clarified that the phrase

“reasonably calculated” implies that school district personnel and parents work together

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to “craft” a “reasonable” IEP (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p.

999). As part of this process of crafting an IEP, the IEP team must carefully consider

“the child’s present levels of achievement, disability, and potential for growth” (Endrew

F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 999). Further, a school district should be

able to “offer a cogent and responsive explanation for their decisions that shows the IEP

is reasonably calculated to enable the child to make progress appropriate in light of his

circumstances” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 1002).

More than “De Minimis”

If progress is viewed on a spectrum from minimum to maximum, the court in

Endrew F. clearly articulated that the legal requirement under IDEA is for the needle on

educational benefit to move beyond minimum, but they failed to convey a sweeping

standard that would decide precisely where the needle must land in every case. The

court clearly held that the “maximum” is not required under the law: “Any review of an

IEP must appreciate that the question is whether the IEP is reasonable, not whether the

court regards it as ideal” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 999).

The court further explained that “reasonable” means that the IEP provides for more than

minimal progress. “When all is said and done, a student offered an educational

program providing ‘merely more than de minimis’ progress from year to year can hardly

be said to have been offered an educational at all” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County

School District, 2017, p. 1001). Accordingly, for those seeking to quantify the

educational benefit standard, the post-Endrew F. standard for “how much” educational

benefit under IDEA requires is not much clearer than the previous standard under

Rowley. The only new concrete piece of information is that “merely more than de

minimis” is off the table. Rowley had already articulated that “maximum potential” or an

“ideal” IEP were not legally required.

Least Restrictive Environment

In Endrew F., the court pointed to the Rowley decision to add some additional

clarification on defining appropriate progress while reminding school districts that the

statutory preference under IDEA is for students to be in “regular” classrooms to the

extent possible. The court defined appropriate progress in a general education setting to

be a student advancing from one grade level to the next (i.e., “advancement through the

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general curriculum”) (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 1000).

Along this line of reasoning, when a student’s needs determine that he is placed in a

more restrictive setting, the definition of appropriate progress changes from “grade-level

advancement” to an educational program that is “appropriately ambitious in light of his

circumstances” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 1000).

Legal Impact of Endrew F. on the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal

The Endrew F. case has become a significant piece of special education

jurisprudence in the seven months since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision. At

the time the final draft of this paper was submitted on October 1, 2017, the Westlaw

KeyCite feature identified 52 cases that examined, discussed, mentioned, or cited

Endrew F. in their decision (see Appendix A). Of those 52 cases, 13 were U.S. Circuit

Court of Appeals cases citing Endrew F. Each of these cases except one (from the 4th

Circuit) gave a merely superficial discussion of the Endrew F. decision. A circuit-by-

circuit discussion of these cases follows.

The Second Circuit

Three cases coming out of New York were decided in the two months following

the Endrew F. decision. In two of the three cases, the Second Circuit opinions quoted

the opinion from Endrew F. about the substantive requirements of FAPE, saying that the

IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress in light of the

child’s circumstances” (D.B. v. Ithaca City School District, 2nd Cir, 2017, p. 783; R.B. v.

New York City Department of Education, 2nd Cir. 2017, p. 51, citing Endrew F. v.

Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 999). This is the most frequently quoted

portion of the Endrew F. opinion to date.

In D.B. v. Ithaca City School District (2nd Cir., 2017), the court also cited Endrew

F. when emphasizing that the legal requirement for an IEP as “reasonable” rather than

“ideal” (p. 783). Further, the Second Circuit interpreted Endrew F. as saying that the

“IEP need not bring the child to grade-level achievement, but it must aspire to provide

more than de minimis educational progress” (R.B. v. New York City Department of

Education, 2nd Cir. 2017, p. 51). The Second Circuit addresses the Endrew F. ruling in

a footnote of J.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro School District (2nd Cir., 2017), explaining that

they did not delve into an analysis of “whether Endrew F. raised the bar for FAPE or left

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Second Circuit precedent intact” since the school district in that case failed to provide

the student with FAPE under the existing Second Circuit standard (p. 56). In a

parenthetical comment with this footnote, the Second Circuit said, “the Supreme Court’s

decision [in Endrew F.] certainly did not reduce the force of the [FAPE] requirement”

(J.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro School District, 2nd Cir., 2017, p. 56). In summary, it

remains to be seen whether Endrew F. raised the bar or kept the bar level related to a

school district’s requirement to provide FAPE in the Second Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit

The ruling in a significant case from the Fourth Circuit was delayed until after the

Endrew F. opinion so that the Fourth Circuit could incorporate the new U.S. Supreme

Court ruling into the decision (M.L. v. Smith, 4th Cir., 2017). The Fourth Circuit noted

that their pre-Endrew F. FAPE standard was similar to the Tenth Circuit, which was the

circuit of origin for the Endrew F. case (M.L. v. Smith, 4th Cir., 2017). Because the

Endrew F. decision rendered the Tenth Circuit’s definition of FAPE inadequate, the

status of the Fourth Circuit’s definition of FAPE is also in question. The Fourth Circuit

did not yet resolve this issue, saying in M.L. v. Smith (4th Cir., 2017): “For the purposes

of the case at bar, though, we do not need to delve into how Endrew F. affects our

precedent because the IDEA does not provide the remedy the Plaintiffs want,

regardless of the standard applied (p. 496).

The Fourth Circuit did offer a discussion of how the Endrew F. decision fits into

the history of special education jurisprudence, noting that the previous Tenth Circuit

standard of “merely more than de minimis” had been replaced by the Endrew F. holding

that “an IEP must be reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress in light of

the child’s circumstances” (M.L. v. Smith, 4th Cir., 2017, p. 495, citing p. 999 of Endrew

F.). This is the same phrase from Endrew F. that was quoted in two of the recent 2nd

Circuit decisions.

The Fifth Circuit

In C.G. v. Waller Independent School District (5th Cir., 2017), the parents of a

student with autism sought reimbursement for private school placement after rejecting

the school district’s offer of FAPE in the IEP. These facts are similar to the facts in

Endrew F. The Fifth Circuit compared its standard for IEPs with the standard from

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Endrew F. and found that the Fifth Circuit standard was already more demanding than

that of the Tenth Circuit and thus was left intact after the Endrew F. decision. The Fifth

Circuit emphasized Endrew F.’s holding that the legal standard for educational benefit

must be more than de minimis (C.G. v. Waller Independent School District, 5th Cir.,

2017, p. 2).

The second case from the Fifth Circuit was yet another case about a parent

seeking reimbursement for private school placement. In Dallas Independent School

District v. Woody (5th Cir., 2017), the court quoted the popular excerpt from the Endrew

F. decision: “the IEP ‘must be reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress

appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances’” (p. 309, citing Endrew F. at p. 999).

The Fifth Circuit also emphasized Endrew F.’s explanation that the IEP “is constructed

only after careful consideration of the child’s present levels of achievement, disability,

and potential for growth” (Dallas Independent School District v. Woody, 5th Cir., 2017, p.

317, citing Endrew F. at p. 999). In Dallas Independent School District v. Woody (5th

Cir., 2017), the parent was ultimately reimbursed for a portion of the private school

tuition.

The Eighth Circuit

Two cases decided by the Eighth Circuit in the summer of 2017 have cited

Endrew F. but offer only a superficial mention. In Special School District No. 1,

Minneapolis Public Schools v. R.M.M. (8th Cir., 2017), the court merely cited Endrew F.

when explaining that the IDEA contains a substantive right to FAPE (p. 772). In I.Z.M.

v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public Schools (8th Cir., 2017), the Eighth Circuit

once again quoted Endrew F.’s description of educational benefit required by IDEA:

“requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make

progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances” (p. 971, citing Endrew F. at p.

999).

The Ninth Circuit

Two recent rulings of the 9th Circuit have affirmed Endrew F.’s place alongside

Rowley as a landmark special education ruling. The court’s accessible, user-friendly

language in Endrew F. was subsequently used by the Ninth Circuit to explain the legal

requirements for both the procedural process of creating an IEP and the substance of

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the IEP. In M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High School District (9th Cir., 2017), the court

articulated the importance of including school personnel and parents in providing input

into the IEP (p. 1194). In Rachel H. v. Department of Education, Hawaii (9th Cir. 2017),

the Ninth Circuit joins the circuits above in stating that an IEP must be “reasonably

calculated to enable the child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s

circumstances” (p. 1088, citing p. 999 of Endrew F.).

The Eleventh Circuit

One case from the Eleventh Circuit has cited Endrew F., but is a criminal case

with no connection to the substantive, IDEA-related portions of Endrew F. The Eleventh

Circuit case cites Endrew F. as warning against using language from a U.S. Supreme

Court decision “in isolation” (United States v. Vail-Bailon, 11th Cir., 2017). The Eleventh

Circuit’s use of Endrew F. here is ironic as the language (two words) from Endrew F. is

taken out of context and used in isolation, the very sin against which the Eleventh

Circuit is warning.

The D.C. Circuit

Two D.C. Circuit cases offer superficial references to Endrew F. In K.P. v.

District of Columbia (D.C. Cir., 2017), the D.C. Cir., in a very brief opinion, cited Endrew

F. when explaining that an IEP is designed by parents and the school district to provide

FAPE to a student with a disability (p. 11). In D.L. v. District of Columbia (D.C. Cir.,

2017), the D.C. Circuit cited several portions of Endrew F. Most notably, the D.C.

Circuit did not quote the frequently-used passage from Endrew F. and instead cited

obscure portions of the ruling. For example, the D.C. Circuit used Endrew F.’s

language when defining related services: “related services are the support services

required to assist a child in benefitting from special education” (D.L. v. District of

Columbia, D.C. Cir., 2017, p. 727, citing Endrew F. at p. 994).

Implications for School Leaders

Implications for school leaders have begun to emerge from the Endrew F.

decision, although it will take several years before the full impact of the decision is

known. Any time a landmark case dealing with an aspect of K-12 education is decided,

particularly a case dealing with a special education issue, school leaders face a

renewed urgency to seek opportunities to become informed about the pending legal

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changes. Presently, there are three broad implications for school leaders stemming

from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Endrew F.

Crafting an IEP

The U.S. Supreme Court in Endrew F. reinforced the provisions of the IDEA that

make the IEP process a collaborative venture between families and school districts.

The opinion in Endrew F. clearly stated that creating an IEP is a “fact-intensive

exercise” that is informed by “expertise of school officials” and “the input of the child’s

parents” (p. 999). For FAPE to occur, neither parents nor school administrators can

come up with a plan (placement, goals, or services) in isolation that they then force on

the other side. The IEP document should also be “crafted” through a careful, deliberate

process that involves discussing a student’s “present levels of achievement, disability,

and potential for growth” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 999).

The U.S. Supreme Court’s choice of words like “crafting” and “careful” is not accidental;

these words connote the meticulous, challenging, hands-on work that must go into

creating an IEP that truly provides FAPE for a student. Additionally, these words stand

in direct contrast to the experience of Drew and his family in the Douglas County School

District as his IEP goals were merely recycled from one year to the next. An IEP

document template that is pre-filled with boilerplate language and passed from student

to student within a school district does not meet this requirement of parents and school

personnel meeting together to “craft” the IEP. Crafting an IEP implies that the school

district will bring a complete IEP team of appropriate personnel to the table and that the

parents will be completely and meaningfully involved in the process. Of course, Endrew

F. did not discuss the IDEA’s procedural requirement about inviting parent to the

meeting; however, the significance of parent attendance at the IEP meeting is implied

from Endrew F.’s explicit mention of input from parents and/or guardians (p. 999).

Endrew F. also did not discuss the procedural requirements of which school district

personnel must attend an IEP meeting; however, the court’s use of the word “crafting”

implies that everyone with meaningful information to contribute about a student’s

performance should be present during the IEP meeting. When assessing whether a

student’s IEP is providing FAPE, school administrators should ask if the IEP was

carefully crafted with the individual student in mind.

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The General Education Setting

The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have not yet emphasized the language from

Endrew F. reiterating that the general education setting is the least restrictive

environment (LRE) for students with special needs and, to the extent possible, students

should be placed in a “regular” classroom (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District,

2017, p. 1000). The statutory preference under IDEA has always been for students to

be placed in the LRE (20 U.S.C. §1412). Endrew F. highlights another reason why the

general education classroom is the best placement, when possible: in a general

education setting, educational benefit can be easily defined as making progress

(earning passing grades) in the grade-level curriculum and moving from grade to grade

(p. 1000). It is much more difficult to measure educational benefit/a student’s progress

when a student is removed from the general education setting. This is where the

confusion about “how much” educational benefit is required comes into play—the more

restrictive the environment, the more difficult it is to quantify or identify how much

educational benefit is sufficient to constitute FAPE. School leaders will have an easier

time demonstrating that students are receiving an educational benefit when these

students are included in the general education setting.

In the case of Endrew F., Drew is a student with autism who, despite being

characterized as a sweet child, had behavioral outbursts while attending public school

(Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 996). A finding from a recent

study of teacher perceptions of inclusion for students with autism was that teachers are

resistant to inclusion in the general education classroom, especially when students have

problems with behavior or social skills (Sansotti, 2012). Sansotti (2012) found that

teachers’ lack of experience and training in working with students with autism was a

primary factor in their reluctance for inclusion. Results from this study also indicated

that teachers generally perceived the general education classroom to be the most

rigorous academic placement possible, yet their concerns about student behavior were

the dominant factor shaping their beliefs on inclusion (Sansotti, 2012). Drew’s behavior

changed for the better when he began attending the private school, which had a

specialized focus on autism (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p.

997). Drew also made academic progress in this environment (Endrew F. v. Douglas

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County School District, 2017, p. 997). The details of teacher training at Drew’s new

school are not known; however, it is likely that the teachers at a school specializing in

autism had experience and/or training in working with children with autism. If the public

school teachers who worked with Drew did not have this same experience and training,

this could have contributed not only to Drew’s behavioral challenges but also to his lack

of academic progress. If the school leaders in the Douglas County School District had

provided public school teachers with training on inclusion of students with autism, would

Drew have had a better experience in public school? The answer to this question would

be purely speculative; however, it is critical for school leaders to provide training for all

teachers in the inclusion of students with special needs, including these students’

academic, behavioral, social, and sensory needs (Friedlander, 2009; Sansotti, 2012).

Fiscal Considerations

A curious issue of federal funding for IDEA is raised by the opening language of

the court’s decision in Endrew F. where it is implied that a deal was struck between the

states to provide special education services in exchange for federal funding:

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act) offers States

federal funds to assist in educating children with disabilities. . .In exchange for

the funds, a State pledges to comply with a number of statutory conditions.

Among them, the State must provide a free appropriate public education—a

FAPE, for short—to all eligible children (p. 993).

School districts’ special education costs have never been fully funded by the federal

government, and the “assistance” from the federal government referenced by Chief

Justice Roberts falls far short of covering the financial burdens of IDEA (McAbee, 2017;

Strauss, 2017). If the court’s language about special education funding is taken at face

value, do states have a choice not to accept federal funding in exchange for not having

to provide any special education services? States must provide education and related

services to students with disabilities as a matter of federal and state law, but it should

be noted that the IDEA has never been fully funded (McAbee, 2017; Strauss, 2017).

The goal under IDEA is for the federal government to fund 40% of the cost of educating

students with special needs; however, the actual number hovers closer to 16%

(McAbee, 2017; Strauss, 2017).

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The precise fiscal implications of Endrew F. remain unclear and will be seen in

the coming years in the results of administrative hearings and court cases throughout

the nation. The only concrete information currently available is that by eliminating the

“merely more than de minimis” option for appropriate educational benefit, Endrew F.

maintains or raises (but does not lower) the previous standard set by Rowley (Endrew

F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017; J.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro School District,

2nd Cir., 2017). It seems that school districts within the jurisdiction of Circuits such as

the Ninth and Tenth that previously interpreted IDEA to require merely a minimal

educational benefit will see an increase in special education costs as IEPs are adjusted

to reflect the Endrew F. standard. An increase in the benefit that students must receive

will likely result in an increase in cost for school districts, at least in the short term while

new structures and service models are put in place to deliver IEPs that are “reasonably

calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s

circumstances” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 999).

Conclusion

Despite the buzz surrounding the Endrew F. decision, a final ruling on the facts of

the case is still pending. The U.S. Supreme Court’s order vacated the Tenth Circuit

decision and remanded the case for further proceedings (Endrew F. v. Douglas County

School District, 2017). Accordingly, Drew and his family still do not have a decision

about whether they will be reimbursed for the private school tuition they paid out of

pocket. While Endrew F. contained several pages of laudable language about the

significance of IDEA and IEPs, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately failed to specify a

remedy for Drew and his family. This is a reminder that each IEP (and each lawsuit

stemming from an IEP) is about a child with special needs whose family is advocating

for that child’s educational progress. While not remarkably clearer than the Rowley

standard, the expectation for FAPE from Endrew F. is that school districts must work

with parents to craft an IEP that is “challenging,” “appropriately ambitious,” and

“reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the

child’s circumstances” (Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 2017, p. 999-

1000).

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References

Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Independent School District, 328 F.3d 804 (5th Cir.

2003). Adams v. State of Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1999). Blake C. v. Department of Education, State of Hawaii, 593 F.Supp.2d 1199 (9th Cir.

2009).

Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).

C.G. v. Waller Independent Sch. Dist., No. 16-20439 (5th Cir. 2017). D.B. v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., No. 16-3491 (2nd Cir. 2017). D.L. v. District of Columbia, 860 F.3d 713 (D.C.Cir. 2017). Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woody, 865 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2017). Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education, 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004). Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 798 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2015). Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, 137 S.Ct. 988 (2017). Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1987). I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public Sch., 863 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2017). The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 20 U.S.C. §§1401 et seq. J.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., No. 16-1838 (2nd Cir. 2017). K.P. v. District of Columbia, No. 15-7120 (D.C.Cir. 2017). M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2017). M.L. v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2017). McAbee, G.N. (2017). U.S. Supreme Court decision may improve individual

educational programs for children with special needs. Journal of Child Neurology, 32(12), 973-974.

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McCann, C. (n.d.). IDEA funding. NewAmerica Ed Central online. Retrieved from http://www.edcentral.org/edcyclopedia/individuals-with-disabilities-education-act-funding-distribution/

N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary School District, 541 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2008). Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1988). R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified School District, 496 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2007). R.B. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., No. 16-1952 (2nd Cir. 2017). Rachel H. v. Dept. of Educ. Hawaii, 868 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2017). Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis Public Sch. v. R.M.M., 861 F.3d 769 (8th Cir.

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United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017). Wenkart, R.D. (2009). The Rowley standard: A Circuit by Circuit review of how Rowley

has been interpreted. Education Law Reporter, 1, 5-6.

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Appendix A

At the time the final draft of this paper was submitted on October 1, 2017, the Westlaw KeyCite feature identified 52 cases that examined, discussed, mentioned, or cited Endrew F. in the court’s opinion.

Case Name Date Court Delaina Barney v. Akron Bd. of Educ. September 22, 2017 N.D. Ohio

Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist. v. D.W. September 21, 2017 N.D.Cal.

Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.W. September 8, 2017 M.D.Pa.

K.D. v. Downington Area Sch. Dist. September 1, 2017 E.D.Pa.

Rachel H. v. Dept. of Educ. Hawaii August 29, 2017 9th Cir.

United States v. Vail-Bailon August 25, 2017 11th Cir.

J.R. v. Smith August 21, 2017 D.Md.

E.P. v. Howard County Public Sch. System August 21, 2017 D.Md.

G.D. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist. August 18, 2017 E.D.Pa.

F.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Great Neck U.F.S.D. August 15, 2017 E.D.N.Y.

M.L. v. Smith August 14, 2017 4th Cir.

Sean C. v. Oxford Area Sch. Dist. August 14, 2017 E.D.Pa.

Benjamin A. v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist. August 14, 2017 E.D.Pa.

J.R. v. New York City Dept. of Educ. August 10, 2017 E.D.N.Y.

Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Public Sch. V. Maez August 1, 2017 D.N.M.

Unknown Party v. Gilbert Unified School District July 31, 2017 D.Ariz

Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woody July 27, 2017 5th Cir.

Bey v. East Penn Sch. Dist. July 24, 2017 E.D.Pa.

Avaras v. Clarkstown Central Sch. Dist. July 17, 2017 S.D.N.Y.

I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public Sch. July 14, 2017 8th Cir.

G.S. v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ. July 7, 2017 D.Conn.

Parker C. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist. July 6, 2017 E.D.Pa.

Braden O. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist. July 5, 2017 E.D.Pa.

Albright v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist. July 5, 2017 W.D.Ark.

Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis Public Sch. v. R.M.M. June 29, 2017 8th Cir.

D.L. v. District of Columbia June 23, 2017 D.C. Cir.

C.G. v. Waller Independent Sch. Dist. June 22, 2017 5th Cir.

In re Hector H. June 20, 2017 Cal.App. 4 Dist.

E.R. v. Spring Branch Independent Sch. Dist. June 15, 2017 S.D.Tex.

I.L. v. Knox County Bd. of Educ. June 15, 2017 E.D.Tenn.

Santino P. v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Educ. June 15, 2017 E.D.Pa.

L.M. v. Willingboro Twp. Sch. Dit. June 12, 2017 D.N.J.

E.G. v. Great Valley Sch. Dist. May 23, 2017 E.D.Pa.

D.B. v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist. May 23, 2017 2nd Cir.

N.W. v. District of Columbia May 15, 2017 D.D.C.

Jackson v. Pine Bluff Sch. Dist. May 12, 2017 E.D.Ark.

Smith v. Cheyenne Mountain Sch. Dist. 12 May 11, 2017 D.Colo.

J.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist. May 9, 2017 2nd Cir.

In re I.V. April 28, 2017 Cal.App. 4 Dist.

R.B. v. New York City Dept. of Educ. April 27, 2017 2nd Cir.

T.M. v. Quakertown Community Sch. Dist. April 19, 2017 E.D.Pa.

N.G. v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist. April 13, 2017 E.D.Cal.

Harrington v. Jamesville Dewitt Central Sch. Dist. April 11, 2017 N.D.N.Y.

K.M. v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist. April 5, 2017 E.D.Cal.

Paris Sch. Dist. v. A.H. April 3, 2017 W.D.Ark.

E.D. v. Colonial Sch. Dist. March 31, 2017 E.D.Pa.

K.P. v. District of Columbia March 31, 2017 D.C. Cir.

M.M. v. New York City Dept. of Educ. March 30, 2017 S.D.N.Y.

Brandywine Heights Area Sch. Dist. v. B.M. March 29, 2017 E.D.Pa.

A.G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Arlington Central Sch. Dist. March 29, 2017 S.D.N.Y.

M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist. March 27, 2017 9th Cir.

Davis v. District of Columbia March 23, 2017 D.D.C.