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SmartGrid
Improved Power Qu
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Flaws in Existing S
Less Efficienc
Less Reliability
Pollution & Hence Globle w
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-
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Energy Independent Consumer
Bidirectional Power Flow Use of Conve
Invertors & D
Controlling Appliances - Load ControlSmart Meters (Act acc to Ta
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w r u y
Bi est
Nightmare Of Smar
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Parameters Pow
Quality
Continuity of service Variation in voltage mag
Harmonics and inter-hcontent in the waveform
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Equipment like Inverters,
char ers ener savinalso reason of bad power
Potential disturbance soube found on both, generat
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By using of good a
with IGBT power semicond
transmission and distribut
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-
Monitoring Method
Event Tri ered P rec
monitor sudden voltagea network
Continuous Measurem
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-Low Volta e Level
- Dedicated PQ Meters
Medium & High Voltage
Integrated measuremen ,
Relays Via WAM
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Commodit
ev ces
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PQ Devices according t
- -
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PQ Devices
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PQ Device-Quality
g y accura e vo age ancurrent Source as per IEC
- -Magnitude, frequency,phase angle and signal
shapes, as per standardPossibility to synchronize
ur vcalibrator - -
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mar r prom ses mprove
Quality.
Power Quality can be seen on
equipment & methods av
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Thanks For Your Kind Atte
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Security
Smart Grid and Security
,
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Why Secure
Interoperability among six aspects of the electricpower industry
Power generation, transmission and distribution(all things that are physical)
Command, control and communications
sensing, collection,
analysis and
interpretation of all source operational data intoinformation, and
Transfer of such information to facilitate
commerce and
safe and reliable operation of power systems;
Include such things as scheduling and dispatching thepower and control of the whole power system
If Man in middle, impact is slow/local/partial;
Everything auto, impact swift/widespread/total
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IEEE POWER & ENERGY Magzine 2009
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STRUCTURE
o What need to be secured,o How it can be secured
o Who will secure what and how
o Operational systems which can be facing
cyber vulnerability
o Security System requirement
o Security practices
o Security audit
o Continual Improvement perspective i.e. we
need to plan, build processes to do, check
effectiveness of the two and act for
improvement.
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SECURITY
Firewalls and security zoning Separation among application
SCADA/EMS
ISR
STOA
Scheduling
Metering and settlement
Web access
Corporate access
Competing Objective
Maintaining Model/values exchange
Single sign on for users v/s individual
application v/s zonal boundaries
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To Secure
Malware Careless Employees (Password robustness
etc)
Exploited vulnerabilities
Zero-day exploits
Application robustness against known
exploits such as buffers overflow/RPC
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SECURITY
Utility companiesCritical-infrastructure custodiansLikely targets of cyber terrorism
Government regulations
Historically DCS/ SCADA/ EMS/ DMS
Protected by proprietary technology
Isolated from enterprise IT
Cost and Skill Issues led to:
Standard operating systemsexposure of internet connectivity
Remote access
Has Exposed these networks to 21st-century cyber threats
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LD&C_SCADA
Approach
A holistic approach based on standards of goodpractices (e.g., ISO 27002)
to achieve and maintain compliance with the
regulations and applicable standards
Plan-Do-Check-Act
security gap analysis risk based prioritization of remediation requirements
implementation of controls
periodic assessment of implemented controls
Implementing an information security management
system based upon standard to demonstrate highstandard of security
business partners,
customers, and
regulators
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LD&C_SCADA
REGULATION
Discuss regulatory landscape CERC,
IT Act
List security implications for utilities
Recommended approach for compliance To achieve
To maintain
Evaluate The Rules
implications requirements
approach for compliance
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LD&C_SCADA
Possible incident scenario
An employee has a company laptop on the internetat his home office, connected to the control
network through a VPN (Virtual Private Network)
A hacker from overseas infects the laptop with a
virus over the Internet
The virus then propagates over the VPN connectioninto the control network and infects another
Windows PC located right in the heart of the
control system
Is this just a hypothetical situation? It couldn't
happen to you? The bad news is that this is a realincident that actually happened to the water
supply system in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 2006
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LD&C_SCADA
Communication
General IssuesComplacency
Not a concern since not attacked
Institute a security process/team building
exercise that includes consequence analysis/
ramifications of a successful security attack Utility do not assess any value to the information
being communicated, except in the case of control
actions Unbundling may change this attitude???
Dial-Up Modem Usage
use of auto-answer modems is of concernTCP/IP
increasing dependence on TCP/IP as a transport for
critical information ICCP; Exchange; schedule
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LD&C_SCADA
Communicationcontd
Some information exchanged (e.g. schedule)is using the Internet instead ofIntranets. The trend may continue, sinceconnectivity options using the Internetrepresent a low cost option.
security threats eavesdropping,
spoofing,
denial of service,
Replay
number of people/entities attached
Appropriate security measures should bedeployed based upon an appropriateconsequence analysis
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LD&C_SCADA
Internet Connectivity
infrastructure connectivity point to theInternet needs to be isolated through a
screening router/firewall combination from
the rest of the corporate LAN/Intranet
personnel need to be assigned to audit/monitor this connectivity for any security
attacks that occur
Given sufficient audit trail, prosecution
of every attacker should be strongly
considered
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LD&C_SCADA
FIREWALL
Firewall represent a valid security countermeasure typically validate a remote connection/ user to
use a given transport -TCP/IP or OSI
make application service requests - FTP, HTTP, RFC-1006, DNP
Limited to a set of well defined nodes/applications
However, once authenticated and connected,firewall is not sufficient to enforceaccess/service privileges to information on thedestination application
Internet applications e.g. FTP, Telnet - have theability to be configured for user authentication(usually passwords) upon which access privileges
(e.g. read, write, etc.) will be granted. However, protocols (e.g. DNP/870-5) are inadequate in
this regard
Active work is ongoing to address the issue ofauthentication and security within several protocolsby TC 57
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