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Recommendation Smartgrids

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    SmartGrid

    Improved Power Qu

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    Flaws in Existing S

    Less Efficienc

    Less Reliability

    Pollution & Hence Globle w

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    -

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    Energy Independent Consumer

    Bidirectional Power Flow Use of Conve

    Invertors & D

    Controlling Appliances - Load ControlSmart Meters (Act acc to Ta

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    w r u y

    Bi est

    Nightmare Of Smar

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    Parameters Pow

    Quality

    Continuity of service Variation in voltage mag

    Harmonics and inter-hcontent in the waveform

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    Equipment like Inverters,

    char ers ener savinalso reason of bad power

    Potential disturbance soube found on both, generat

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    By using of good a

    with IGBT power semicond

    transmission and distribut

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    -

    Monitoring Method

    Event Tri ered P rec

    monitor sudden voltagea network

    Continuous Measurem

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    -Low Volta e Level

    - Dedicated PQ Meters

    Medium & High Voltage

    Integrated measuremen ,

    Relays Via WAM

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    Commodit

    ev ces

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    PQ Devices according t

    - -

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    PQ Devices

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    PQ Device-Quality

    g y accura e vo age ancurrent Source as per IEC

    - -Magnitude, frequency,phase angle and signal

    shapes, as per standardPossibility to synchronize

    ur vcalibrator - -

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    mar r prom ses mprove

    Quality.

    Power Quality can be seen on

    equipment & methods av

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    Thanks For Your Kind Atte

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    Security

    Smart Grid and Security

    ,

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    Why Secure

    Interoperability among six aspects of the electricpower industry

    Power generation, transmission and distribution(all things that are physical)

    Command, control and communications

    sensing, collection,

    analysis and

    interpretation of all source operational data intoinformation, and

    Transfer of such information to facilitate

    commerce and

    safe and reliable operation of power systems;

    Include such things as scheduling and dispatching thepower and control of the whole power system

    If Man in middle, impact is slow/local/partial;

    Everything auto, impact swift/widespread/total

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    IEEE POWER & ENERGY Magzine 2009

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    STRUCTURE

    o What need to be secured,o How it can be secured

    o Who will secure what and how

    o Operational systems which can be facing

    cyber vulnerability

    o Security System requirement

    o Security practices

    o Security audit

    o Continual Improvement perspective i.e. we

    need to plan, build processes to do, check

    effectiveness of the two and act for

    improvement.

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    SECURITY

    Firewalls and security zoning Separation among application

    SCADA/EMS

    ISR

    STOA

    Scheduling

    Metering and settlement

    Web access

    Corporate access

    Competing Objective

    Maintaining Model/values exchange

    Single sign on for users v/s individual

    application v/s zonal boundaries

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    To Secure

    Malware Careless Employees (Password robustness

    etc)

    Exploited vulnerabilities

    Zero-day exploits

    Application robustness against known

    exploits such as buffers overflow/RPC

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    SECURITY

    Utility companiesCritical-infrastructure custodiansLikely targets of cyber terrorism

    Government regulations

    Historically DCS/ SCADA/ EMS/ DMS

    Protected by proprietary technology

    Isolated from enterprise IT

    Cost and Skill Issues led to:

    Standard operating systemsexposure of internet connectivity

    Remote access

    Has Exposed these networks to 21st-century cyber threats

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    LD&C_SCADA

    Approach

    A holistic approach based on standards of goodpractices (e.g., ISO 27002)

    to achieve and maintain compliance with the

    regulations and applicable standards

    Plan-Do-Check-Act

    security gap analysis risk based prioritization of remediation requirements

    implementation of controls

    periodic assessment of implemented controls

    Implementing an information security management

    system based upon standard to demonstrate highstandard of security

    business partners,

    customers, and

    regulators

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    LD&C_SCADA

    REGULATION

    Discuss regulatory landscape CERC,

    IT Act

    List security implications for utilities

    Recommended approach for compliance To achieve

    To maintain

    Evaluate The Rules

    implications requirements

    approach for compliance

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    LD&C_SCADA

    Possible incident scenario

    An employee has a company laptop on the internetat his home office, connected to the control

    network through a VPN (Virtual Private Network)

    A hacker from overseas infects the laptop with a

    virus over the Internet

    The virus then propagates over the VPN connectioninto the control network and infects another

    Windows PC located right in the heart of the

    control system

    Is this just a hypothetical situation? It couldn't

    happen to you? The bad news is that this is a realincident that actually happened to the water

    supply system in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 2006

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    LD&C_SCADA

    Communication

    General IssuesComplacency

    Not a concern since not attacked

    Institute a security process/team building

    exercise that includes consequence analysis/

    ramifications of a successful security attack Utility do not assess any value to the information

    being communicated, except in the case of control

    actions Unbundling may change this attitude???

    Dial-Up Modem Usage

    use of auto-answer modems is of concernTCP/IP

    increasing dependence on TCP/IP as a transport for

    critical information ICCP; Exchange; schedule

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    LD&C_SCADA

    Communicationcontd

    Some information exchanged (e.g. schedule)is using the Internet instead ofIntranets. The trend may continue, sinceconnectivity options using the Internetrepresent a low cost option.

    security threats eavesdropping,

    spoofing,

    denial of service,

    Replay

    number of people/entities attached

    Appropriate security measures should bedeployed based upon an appropriateconsequence analysis

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    LD&C_SCADA

    Internet Connectivity

    infrastructure connectivity point to theInternet needs to be isolated through a

    screening router/firewall combination from

    the rest of the corporate LAN/Intranet

    personnel need to be assigned to audit/monitor this connectivity for any security

    attacks that occur

    Given sufficient audit trail, prosecution

    of every attacker should be strongly

    considered

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    LD&C_SCADA

    FIREWALL

    Firewall represent a valid security countermeasure typically validate a remote connection/ user to

    use a given transport -TCP/IP or OSI

    make application service requests - FTP, HTTP, RFC-1006, DNP

    Limited to a set of well defined nodes/applications

    However, once authenticated and connected,firewall is not sufficient to enforceaccess/service privileges to information on thedestination application

    Internet applications e.g. FTP, Telnet - have theability to be configured for user authentication(usually passwords) upon which access privileges

    (e.g. read, write, etc.) will be granted. However, protocols (e.g. DNP/870-5) are inadequate in

    this regard

    Active work is ongoing to address the issue ofauthentication and security within several protocolsby TC 57

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