Radicalisation,Extremism

& 'Islamism'Realities and Myths in the 'War on Terror'

A report by Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain

3

Hizb ut-Tahrir (meaning The Party of Liberation) is a global Islamic political party that was established in 1953 under the lead-ership of its founder - the scholar, political thinker and judge in the Court of Appeals in al-Quds (Jerusalem), Taqiuddin an-Nabhani. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s global leadership is currently headed by Ata’ abu Rishta.

In the Muslim world, Hizb ut-Tahrir works at all levels of society to bring the Muslims back to living an Islamic way of life underthe shade of the Khilafah (Caliphate) State following an exclusively political method.

Hizb ut-Tahrir adopts the methodology employed by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) when he established the firstIslamic State in Madinah. The Prophet Muhammad limited his struggle for the establishment of the Islamic State to intellectualand political work. He established this Islamic state without resorting to violence. He worked to mobilise public opinion in favourof Islam and endeavoured to sway the political and intellectual elites of the time. Despite the persecution and boycott of theProphet Muhammad and the early Muslims, they never resorted to violence. Hence, its commitment not to be involved in anyviolent or militant activity is based on its faith and understanding of the revelation of God. No person can join Hizb ut-Tahriruntil he or she adopts this political and intellectual methodology and approach.

The party is therefore proactive in disseminating the Islamic intellectual and political thoughts widely in Muslim societies so asto challenge the oppressive and declined situation that exists there. The party presents Islam as a comprehensive way of life thatis capable of managing the affairs of state and society, as well as expressing its views on political events and analyses them froman Islamic perspective. It disseminates its thoughts through discussion with the masses, study circles, lectures, seminars, leafletdistribution, publishing books and magazines and via the Internet, actively encouraging people to attend our demonstrations,marches, conferences and vigils.

In the West, Hizb ut-Tahrir does not work to change the system of government, but works within the boundaries of the system toencourage the Muslim community to live by Islam in thought and deed, adhering to the rules of Islam and preserving a strongIslamic identity. It argues that this is the most productive and sound basis for Muslims to engage outside of their own communi-ties.

The party also works to project a positive image of Islam to Western society and engages in dialogue with Western thinkers, poli-cymakers and academics. Western governments, under the banner of the War on Terror, are currently working to present Islamas an ‘evil ideology’. At the heart of their campaign is the effort to malign the Islamic ideology as an alternative to Western liberalcapitalism in the Muslim world. Because of this propaganda aspect to the War on Terror, Hizb ut-Tahrir works to counter negativepropaganda about Islam in the Western countries, and present Islam’s beliefs and also its political ideas as an alternative for theMuslim world.

Email: press@hizb.org.uk Web: www.hizb.org.uk

4 - Contents

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Section 1 - Challenging the Narrative: Radicalisation, Extremism & ‘Islamism’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Part I: The Use, Misuse and Abuse of Language in the Politics of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Part II: Politicisation not 'Radicalisation' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Section 2 - 'Unspinning' the Accusations of Violence Against Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Part I: Decoupling Political Violence from Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Part II: Poll Evidence Refutes the Alleged Link between Islam's Political Tenets and

Violence as a Means of Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Part III: Ends do not Justify Means, but Means do not Invalidate Ends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Section 3 - The Caliphate, Islamic Governance & the Myth of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Part I: Maligning a Popular & Orthodox Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Part II: The Significance of the Caliphate at the Time of its Demise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Part III: The Caliphate will Bring Stability to the Muslim World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Part IV: The Caliphate is an Islamic System of Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Section 4 - Mapping a Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Part I: The Failure of Calls for a 'Moderate', Reformed Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Part II: Understanding the Causes of the Political Crises in the Muslim World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Part III: Allowing the Muslim World to Shape its own Political Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Forward - 5

It is often said that the first casualty in war is the truth. In the case of the global War on Terror it is its central premise that wasthe first lie - the claim that this is a war in defence of security.

It is impossible to imagine that any government would not develop some type of security response to the attacks such as those inNew York in September 2001 or the bombs in London in July 2005. This is what happened in the case of terrorism related toNorthern Ireland. There, we also saw, after many years, the development of a political response. But the launch of a 'war' upon apremise for which there is no agreed definition has made many in the world, Muslim and non-Muslim, uncomfortable.

The construct of the case for war started after the attacks in New York, arguing that those behind the perpetrators were inAfghanistan. Other similar international crises - for example the Lockerbie bombing of a Pan Am aircraft - led to diplomatic pressureto secure an extradition. In the case of the 9/11 attacks, what followed was the invasion and occupation of the country said to behosting the perpetrators, retrospective excuses generated to add to the case for invasion and large scale illegal detention and torturein Bagram airbase, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. Other states started to claim their own 'terrorism' problems; most notably dicta-tors in the Muslim world, Israel and authoritarian regimes such as those in Russia and Central Asia. The violations of basic normsand rights committed in these places in the name of the War on Terror were recognised as an excuse to undertake otherwise unac-ceptable actions. Surprisingly, however, similar scrutiny was not applied to the actions of the UK or US until much later.

In the US, the Patriot Act gave the administration unprecedented powers. In Britain draconian anti-terror laws were introducedand strengthened at every opportunity, even causing conflict between the judiciary and the government.

It was perhaps the illegal war in Iraq, unpopular amongst a sceptical domestic audience, exposed as being founded upon lies andmore to do with regime change than security, that became the single biggest factor that made increasing numbers of peopleuncomfortable about what was being done in their name. The lies underpinning the Iraq occupation were compounded byhumanitarian abuses, the continued support for tyrants every bit as bad as Saddam Hussein and the worsening security threat andcommunity cohesion in the West due to the war.

In this report we expose how the narrative of the War on Terror has many inconsistencies and manipulates understandablesecurity fears to attack political ideas that carry considerable support in the Muslim world. We do this by:

1. Exposing the statements of politicians that show it is not the violent means that is their only concern, but the legitimate polit-ical ends that an overwhelming majority in the Muslim world subscribe to. In keeping with its colonial history, Westerngovernments have constructed a case for intervention to secure their economic and political interests in the Muslim world,with little regard for the consequences on the people in that part of the world.

2. Illustrating the way that language and arguments are manipulated to make the false claim that Islamic political ideas are theroot cause of the problem.

3. Providing evidence from credible research which contradicts the Bush-Blair argument that Islam's political ideas inherentlycause violence and insecurity.

4. Decoupling these myths of violence from the Caliphate and other Islamic political ideas y explaining exactly what these ideas represent.

5. Mapping a way forward, out of the mess and growing chaos created by the War on Terror.

It is difficult to deny that the War on Terror has greatly exacerbated the chaos and instability caused by the chronic politicalproblems in the Muslim world. Furthermore, a declaration of war against political ideas held by over 70 per cent of people in theMuslim world will be perennial, ceaseless and destabilising.

There is an urgent need to engage in dialogue to explain Islam, the Caliphate and Shariah to people in Britain and the West, whohear these aspirations for the Muslim world continually demonised as part of the propaganda in the War on Terror.Given thecurrent climate of suspicion and fear it is necessary that now more than ever people try to understand the legitimate political aspi-rations of many in the Muslim world, rather than simply falling for a reductionist Manichean dialectic, that paints everyone whoseeks Islamic change in that region as extremists and supporters of terrorism.

We urge everyone to study our report and realise that there is an urgent need to discuss and understand these ideas, as well under-stand the political feeling in the Muslim world. There is a need to understand the Caliphate, not only the fact that it is not linked toviolence as alleged by the leaders of the War on Terror, but also how it will be a powerful force for bringing stability to the Muslim world.

In the corridors of Washington and Westminster, Islam's political ideas are seen as a potential threat - not to security - but to thecontrol, exploitation and interference that has continued for decades. Yet on the 'Muslim street' these ideas mean liberation fromtyranny and oppression, a connection to their beliefs and history and the ability to shape their own political destiny.

Abdul Wahid Chairman UK Executive Committee Hizb ut-TahrirJuly 2007

Forward

A Monumental Change Draws Closer

It is not often the opportunity arises towitness monumental political changeson the scale of the fall of the Berlin walland the collapse of Communism or theend of apartheid in South Africa. Yetthese have occurred in our generation'slifetime. Now an even greater politicalchange is creeping ever closer in theMuslim world. The dismantling of yearsof oppressive rule presided over byforeign hegemons is slowly but surelyunravelling. For decades movementshave called for the re-establishment ofthe Islamic political system, theCaliphate, such that it now representsthe only credible alternative to thetyrannies and dictatorships that litterthe Muslims world. False arguments anddistortions have attempted to cast ashadow over the Islamic politicalsystem, but these attempts have been invain. There is growing evidence of awidespread public opinion for thereturn to the rule of law under Islam.Despite the unwelcome attention ofthose wishing to maintain an appallingstatus quo in the Muslim world, aninescapable momentum has beenestablished for the return of theCaliphate.

Certainly a global political movementsuch as Hizb ut-Tahrir, active in over 40countries, touching all corners of theglobe has a good finger on the pulse ofMuslim public opinion and develop-ment of the call for political change inthe Muslim world. Similarly, the US

State Department, the British ForeignOffice and American and British intelli-gence agencies study intently develop-ments in a world they have come toyield great influence over. Bothmeasures of public opinion indicate thereturn of an Islamic state, or Caliphate.The National Intelligence Council of theCIA issued a planning report inDecember 2004 setting out options for aresurgent China and a potentially strongCaliphate by the year 2020.

Constructing New Enemies:Demonising the Caliphate & Islamicpolitics

Senior politicians, however, includingGeorge Bush are now 'warning' of theconsequences of its re-establishment.Bush, in a speech to the Americannation on the 8th of October 2005stated:

"The militants believe that controllingone country will rally the Muslimmasses, enabling them to overthrow allmoderate governments in the region,and establish a radical Islamic empirethat spans from Spain to Indonesia."

On December 5th 2005, the then USSecretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeldin remarks pertaining to the future ofIraq at John Hopkins University said

"Iraq would serve as the base of a newIslamic Caliphate to extend throughoutthe Middle East and which wouldthreaten the legitimate governments in

Europe, Africa, and Asia. This is theirplan. They have said so. We make aterrible mistake if we fail to listen andlearn".

Tony Blair after 7/7 also referred to theneed to confront an "an evil ideology"that included "the establishment ofeffectively Taliban States and Shari'ahlaw in the Arab world en route to oneCaliphate of all Muslim nations". Mostrecently General David Petraeus, whenasked about his priorities in the 'surge'operation, in an interview with theTimes published on June 20th 2007,said: "It is to disrupt al-Qaeda and itsability to conduct sensational attacksand to try to continue the cycle ofviolence, which they have been trying todo all along. In addition, they areattempting try establish a real al-Qaedasanctuary in Iraq, a caliphate."

These arguments, amongst numerousother arguments, have been forwardedin an attempt to discredit and divertefforts towards the re-establishment of aCaliphate, particularly through seekingto associate it exclusively with terrorism.The effort has been extended to malignthe goals of Islamic politics more gener-ally, as Blair did after 7/7 by attemptingto move the focus away from the acts ofterror to an 'evil ideology'. Suchattempts have failed to convinceMuslims and are met with scepticism bythe world more generally, given the USand Britain's track record in forwardingfalse claims in the War on Terror, suchas over Iraq.

IntroductionThe 'War on Terror': Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace

6 - Introduction - The ‘War on Terror’: Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace

Our report deconstructs such false asso-ciations between the Caliphate andIslamic politics and violence in sections2 and 3. But more importantly, it alsoargues that the anxiety expressed overthe establishment of the Caliphate hasnothing to do with terrorism or security.It is a perceived threat to theirhegemony and primacy over a region ofthe world that former Director of theUS State Department's Policy PlanningDivision, George Kennan, wrote afterWWII in reference to the oil wealth ofthe Middle East: "that the United Stateshad just acquired the greatest materialprize in world history".

Rebirth of a Colonial Age

Indeed, current foreign policy towardsthe Muslim world, including the occu-pation of Iraq, invasion of Afghanistan,support for unrepresentative tyrants,and pressure towards Iran and Syriaamongst other actions by the US andBritain, cannot be considered recent orisolated actions. They must beobserved as part of a colonial traditionof occupation, intervention and regimechange.

The former British Foreign SecretaryLord Curzon remarked in almostjubilant tones at the end of the Caliphatein 1924 that, "The situation now is thatTurkey is dead and will never rise again,because we have destroyed its moralstrength, the Caliphate and Islam". Buthe also warned that the chapter ofIslamic rule was not completely closedwhen he stated "we must put an end toanything which brings about any Islamicunity between the sons of the Muslims".Curzon's remarks were recently echoedand reaffirmed by the then BritishHome Secretary Charles Clarke in aspeech to the Heritage Foundation onOctober 6 2005 when he said:

"...there can be no negotiation about there-creation of the Caliphate; there canbe no negotiation about the impositionof Sharia (Islamic) law..." Muslims havebeen warned not to go down that pathagain.

The parallels with Iraq are equally perti-nent. Almost ninety years ago, theBritish commander Lieutenant GeneralStanley Maude issued a proclamation tothe people of Baghdad, whose city his

forces had just occupied, saying:"Our armies do not come into yourcities and lands as conquerors orenemies, but as liberators. Your wealthhas been stripped of you by unjustmen... The people of Baghdad shallflourish under institutions which are inconsonance with their sacred laws".

He went on to say, "…your lands havebeen subject to the tyranny of strangers,your palaces have fallen into ruins, yourgardens have sunk in desolation, andyour forefathers and yourselves havegroaned in bondage." Within threeyears of the invasion, over ten thousandhad died in an Iraqi uprising against theBritish, a conflict in which 'Bomber'Harris referred to dropping "a bomb inevery village that speaks out of turn"and Winston Churchill encouraged theuse of mustard gas admitting, "there isno doubt that we are a very cruelpeople". On the eve of the 2003invasion of Iraq, Lieutenant ColonelTim Collins echoed Maude in a speechto British troops, saying "We go toliberate, not to conquer". The colossalloss of life and destruction in the after-math has exposed this neo-colonialmyth.

Replacing the Muslim World's FailedPolitical Architecture

Meyrav Wurmser, the Director ofMiddle East Studies at the HudsonInstitute, characterised the Muslimworld as having failing or failed autoc-racies, repression, weak and deteriorat-ing economies and double-digit unem-ployment. The problems, Wurmsercited, are the regimes in the region -unpopular with their own populationsand viewed as backed by Westernpowers. The alternative to this failedpolitical architecture has increasinglycentred on a greater role for Islam inthe politics of the Muslim world.Elections in the Muslim world nowinvariably go to Islamic parties, despiteconstitutions and other obstacles toIslamic political representation, like theovert restrictions the Mubarak regimein Egypt placed on Islamic parties suchas arrests and strict quotas.

As our report will go on to highlight insection 3, opinion surveys too areoverwhelmingly pointing to supportfor the return of Islamic rule. TheCenter for Strategic Studies at theUniversity of Jordan undertook acomprehensive survey of the keyMiddle Eastern countries in a 2005report, finding that two thirds ofrespondents in central Arab countriesfelt that Shariah should be the solesource for legislation (a key require-ment for an Islamic State) and theremaining third felt that Shariah shouldbe a source of law. A recent study bythe University of Maryland publishedin April 2007 also confirmed this trendtowards Shariah, with the reportstating: "Large majorities in most coun-tries support the goals of requiring astrict application of sharia, keeping outWestern values, and even unifying allIslamic countries into a single Islamicstate." Interestingly, in addition togreater than 70 per cent support forShariah and a unifying Caliphate therespondents overwhelmingly rejectedthat the change would come viaviolence: "Large majorities in all coun-tries oppose attacks against civilians forpolitical purposes and see them ascontrary to Islam. Attacks on civiliansare seen as hardly ever effective.Politically motivated attacks againstcivilian infrastructure are also rejectedas not justified".

Responding to Changes in the MuslimWorld

Of great interest will be how Westerngovernments respond to these politicalchanges as they evolve in the Muslimworld. Despite posturing for domesticacceptance citing WMD, and thenregime change, Tony Blair finallyadmitted that the war in Iraq was allabout changing values. That values arenot changing in the Muslim worldbrings new challenges to Westernthinking not least of which is the wide-spread opposition in the UK to theaggressive imposition of values whichare poorly defined and for which thereis little trust in the politicians suppos-edly leading the charge.

Introduction - The ‘War on Terror’: Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace - 7

six years on, the battle for the hearts and minds ofMuslims has been lost“ ”

The key point to note is that the Blairnarrative of simply changing a fewunpopular governments and setting outa vision for effectively sidelining Islamvia 'religious tolerance' within a secularframework completely lacks credibilityin the Muslim world. The other plank ofthis policy which attempts to equate theCaliphate and the desire for politicalchange with terrorism, lacks intellectualcredibility when measured against thepublic opinion that poll after poll areindicating. In fact the war mongering ison the other foot. The long war whichBush/Blair have attempted to set up willbe a perpetual war if they think thatthey can so easily change the core beliefsand aspirations of more than 70 per centof the Muslim world. Yet Muslims arestill tarnished as the aggressors when itis only a tiny element that have usedviolence against civilians; a violencewhich has been nothing like the shockand awe tactics of Bush/Blair and is alsowithout the support of Muslim publicopinion.

The 'Battle for Hearts and Minds'

The West's Cold War experience anddefeat of communism has shaped muchof the rhetoric and policy regarding theMuslim world, particularly the successcredited to the cultural dimension of theCold War. The US think tank the RANDCorporation, for example, in its mostrecent report about the Muslim world,'Building Moderate Muslim Networks',describes how, "the propaganda andcultural-infiltration efforts of the UnitedStates and Britain during the early yearsof the Cold War hold valuable lessonsfor the Global War on Terrorism". Theperceived success of these "cultural-infil-tration efforts" has fostered the beliefthat a battle for hearts and minds mustbe fought alongside the War on Terrorto bring Muslims on side.

Under the banner of this cultural war, asuite of McCarthyite labels such as'extremist', 'radical', 'fanatic' and'militant' have become commoncurrency. Their definitions are danger-ously loose and ever-broadening andmanipulate the fact that there is noconsensus on the definition of terrorismto brand Muslims as more violenceprone. This use of language is exten-sively explored in Section 1 of ourreport.

In 2002, Lieutenant Colonel Jack R.MacClanahan Jr of the United StatesArmy wrote a paper for the US ArmyWar College about 'Winning Hearts andMinds in the Muslim World.' At thattime, a mere six months after the onsetof the global War on Terrorism, hewrote that: "The US may win themilitary fight on terrorism but is thus farlosing the public opinion fight inMuslim countries."

Former British Prime Minister TonyBlair also remarked after the attacks thatrocked London in July 2005: "It is not aclash of civilisations -- all civilizedpeople, Muslim or other, feel revulsionat it. But it is a global struggle. It is abattle of ideas and hearts and minds,both within Islam and outside."

Even the Conservative leader DavidCameron jumped on the band wagon inNovember 2006, saying, "We mustremember that we are engaged in abattle for the hearts and minds of allMuslims in our country."

More recently in January 2007, Blair'ssuccessor as Prime Minister, GordonBrown said in regards to the Iraq warand 'terrorism': "But you will not winagainst extreme terrorist activities andparticularly the propaganda activities,unless you have this battle of hearts andminds that is won. And that makes methink of the same cultural war that hadto be fought against communism fromthe 1940s and 50s onwards, is in a sensethe model for what we've got to dohere."

Brown acknowledged the need for prop-aganda when, on 1st July 2007, he said:

"And that's why the cultural effort -almost similar to what happened in theCold War in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s,when we had to mount a propagandaeffort, if you like, to explain to peoplethat our values represented the best ofcommitments to individual dignity, toliberty and to human life being takenseriously. And I think that's what we aregoing to have to talk about in the nextfew years".

However, the Cold War propagandaeffort was not only about explainingWestern values but also about denigrat-ing the Soviet Union and creating an

8 - Introduction - The ‘War on Terror’: Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace

Despite the unwelcomeattention of those

wishing to maintain anappalling status quo in

the Muslim world, an inescapable momentum has

been established for the return of the Caliphate

"Large majorities in mostcountries support the goals of

requiring a strict application ofsharia, keeping out Westernvalues, and even unifying all

Islamic countries into a singleIslamic state."

(University of Maryland, 2007)

“

”

atmosphere of suspicion and threat. TheCold War was, as much as for anythingelse, used as an excuse by Westerngovernments to further their interestsaround the world.

However, six years on, the battle for thehearts and minds of Muslims has beenlost. Very few believe that the War onTerror, or any related domestic orforeign policy, is premised on a sincereor legitimate desire to maintain Britain'ssecurity. The killing, torture and abuseof people in the name of spreadingdemocracy and liberalism to a part ofthe world plagued by instability andtyranny has overshadowed any attemptsat intellectual persuasion. Western stateshave today lost their moral authority. In1989, when the Berlin Wall collapsed,Western states had not needed to fire ashot in anger and were considered shinybeacons by the oppressed citizens ofEastern Europe. Today, in the aftermathof Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture,'extraordinary rendition' (or illegalkidnapping and torture), secret deten-tion facilities, the genocide of 650,000civilians in Iraq, the wanton use ofwhite phosphorous and depleteduranium and the reversal of HabeasCorpus through draconian securitylegislation, Western nations are consid-ered more a part of the problem thanpart of the solution. The West's foreignpolicy has illustrated not just the unac-ceptable face of Western imperialismbut the true face of Western states withthe indomitable pursuit of profits, rawmaterials and cheap labour driving theinhumane policies of debt and politicalsupport for dictators and tyrants aroundthe world.

A recent Zogby/University of Marylandpoll of citizens in six Middle Easternstates found that finding oil (76%),protecting Israel (68%), domination ofthe region (63%) and weakening theMuslim world (59%) were cited as themain objectives of America in theMiddle East by respondents, comparedto only 6% who agreed with PresidentBush and former Prime Minister Blair'sview that their objectives are to merelyspread human rights and democracy.This distrust is not confined to theMuslim world but is found globallyfrom Caracas to Beijing with people inall continents looking at new models ofgovernance and rule.

Indeed, the policies of Western govern-ments in the War on Terror have beenso brutal and unprincipled that theyhave struggled to win over their ownpopulations. Ironically, the real battlefor hearts and minds is with ordinarypeople in the West, who have beenrepeatedly lied to by their politicalleaders. As discredited politicians eachtry to convince their people that Iraqand Afghanistan simply need moretroops or more time, the general publicbecomes ever wearier with failedpolicies. Furthermore, although the Iraqwar proved that the justifications for theWar on Terror were riddled with falla-cies and inaccuracies, there has been noeffective explanation to the public forwhy Western countries have beenplunged into these conflicts by theirleaders.

Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace

What Charles Beard described asPerpetual War for Perpetual Peace, thetitle of Gore Vidal's most recent book isan oxymoron that will never work,except as a lie to keep civilian popula-tions from realising the reality ofshameful corporate-driven governmentpolicies. There will be neither a wide-spread values change nor peace fromcarpet bombing, Guantanamo orFallujah. Values driven more by corpo-rate greed and strategic positioning willnever win out over creedal principlesand the yearning for a return to a civili-sation which led the world in toleranceand personal and societal developmentwithin a strong and consistent rule oflaw. The Caliphate may soon becomethe defining debate of our age; theemerging prospect of its arrival must bemet with a willingness to understand asystem that would undoubtedly usher ina new era of stability for the Muslimworld.

Introduction - The ‘War on Terror’: Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace - 9

The killing, torture andabuse of people in the

name of spreading democracyand liberalism to a part of theworld plagued by instability andtyranny has overshadowed anyattempts at intellectualpersuasion

The Caliphate may soonbecome the defining debate ofour age; the emerging prospectof its arrival must be met witha willingness to understand asystem that would undoubtedlyusher in a new era of stabilityfor the Muslim world

“

”

The Muslim community in Britain hasbeen under a continuous spotlight sincethe events of 7/7. The bombings trig-gered a wide-ranging debate that soughtto understand the processes at workwithin the Muslim community, map itschanges, scrutinise the influences it issubject to and identify events in itsrecent history that may explain whyMuslim British citizens would want toturn on Britain.

This post 7/7 debate has blamed anumber of different factors forcontributing to this heightened terrorthreat, but has been offset by sensation-alist claims and alarmist comments thathave only acted to obscure an accuratepicture and to entrench stereotypes inan already polarised debate. It hassought to discredit legitimate Islamicpolitical ideas by suggesting theyincrease the Muslim community'ssusceptibility to using violence. To date,the debate has lacked an honest, dispas-sionate assessment of the forces at playwithin the Muslim community, theimpact of which has been dangerouscharacterisations of Islam and theMuslim community, misinformed publicfear and misguided government policy.

In this section, we argue that:

• The language used in the securitydebate has become politicised tocounter dissenting voices and falselybrand the Muslim community asmore violence prone

• The view that there is a processleading to violence because of theassociation of Islam and politics iswrong and is built on a false charac-terisation of the relationship betweenIslam and politics

• There has, over many years, been aprocess of a general politicisation ofthe Muslim community and subse-quent Islamicisation of Muslimpolitics in Britain rather than 'radical-isation'

PPaarrtt IIThe Use, Misuse and Abuse ofLanguage in the Politics of Terrorism

The language used post 7/7 has fosteredthe belief that the Muslim community ischanging in a way that is de facto prob-lematic and that the growing influenceof Islam has been detrimental and is tobe treated with suspicion. It has createdthe false premise that such changesmade 7/7 inevitable and, as a result, arestudied as if they are the cause ofviolence and terrorism. This hasspawned a phenomenon in which ideasthemselves are treated as the key suspectin what are essentially security matters.

The Political Manipulation ofTerminology

The predominant narrative hasdescribed a community increasingly

'radicalised', subject to 'extremism' andunder the growing influence of'Islamism'. These terms suffer from aninherent ambiguity that allows them tobe used in a number of different waysoften with only a tenuous connectionwith their dictionary meanings. As aresult, the political climate post 7/7 hasmost influenced the use of these termsand allowed them to become danger-ously broad in the behaviours theycapture and label. For example, JohnEsposito in his forthcoming book 'WhoSpeaks for Islam?' defines a 'politicalradical' as someone who believes "the9/11 attacks were completely morallyjustified", whilst a report by the PolicyExchange titled 'Living Apart Together'equates 'radical' Islam with a desire foran Islam-based society, an idea thatactually carries mainstream supportamongst Muslims.

Historically, however varied their appli-cation, these terms have been consis-tently used to discredit political idealsand goals through associating them withviolence or irrationality. There has beenlittle responsibility to ensure thephenomena they are used to describeactually fit the terms, but instead theyhave been used to declare as beyond thepale, legitimate non-violent politicalideas and goals.

For example, the suggestion that'extremist' and 'radical' appropriatelydescribe the views taking root withinthe Muslim community demonstrates a

10 - Section 1 - Challenging the Narrative: Radicalisation, Extremism & ‘Islamism’

Section 1Challenging the Narrative:Radicalisation, Extremism & ‘Islamism’

failure to understand ideas that restoutside of the prevailing politicalassumptions. Calls for Shariah, Islamiceducation, dress, and other social andpolitical beliefs that break with theaccepted secular liberal order and areincreasingly used to characterise thedemands of extremists and radicals, ashighlighted in the conclusions of thePolicy Exchange report. But althoughdifferent to the west's secular tradition,they articulate orthodox and longstand-ing, not marginal, Islamic beliefs. Theseideas may be unfamiliar to a secularwest but instead of considering themalternative approaches, they are oftenconsidered problematic and, as a result,are addressed through a security frame-work and new security legislation ratherthan through engagement. This reflectsa failure to understand Islam and there-fore to position its ideas within a secularpolitical system. The depiction has aprofound impact on assessing theMuslim community and subsequentlysuggesting their vulnerability to the useof violence.

The Failure to Understand theRelationship Between Islam andPolitics

At the heart of much of the problemwith the current debate has been howWestern commentators have chosen tounderstand Islam's relationship withpolitics and the role this has played insubsequently supporting the belief that athreatening radicalising undercurrent isalive in the Muslim community. AsIslam plays a greater role in the politicsof both the Muslim community inBritain and the wider Muslim world,Western commentators have chosen todescribe this as abnormal and a manipu-lation of Islam.

The term 'Islamism' has been used toencapsulate this view. The PolicyExchange report referred to earlierdescribes 'Islam' as "a religion practicedby Muslims worldwide" but 'Islamism' as"a political ideology that aims to create astate and society in strict conformitywith religious doctrine." A report titled'The West, Islam and Islamism' by thethink-tank Civitas, describes how theLatin suffix 'ism' refers to the politicisa-tion of its prefix, in this case 'Islam'. Theterm is therefore used to imply that theuse of Islam in politics is a 'politicisa-

tion' of Islam, as opposed to Islam beinginherently political, and an aberrationbecause it employs Islam beyond itsnatural role as a personalised religion.

Confronting the Myths: 'Islamism' and'Political Islam'

To such distinctions, a report by theInternational Crisis Group, entitled'Understanding Islamism', challenges thefailure of commentators to understandthe relationship between Islam andpolitics. It refers to the:

"…dichotomy, often taken for grantedby Western leaders, between on the onehand, Islam qua religion and its adher-ents - 'ordinary decent Muslims' forwhom 'Islam' is a matter of personalpiety, not political commitment - and,on the other hand, 'Islamism' or 'politi-cal Islam' - by implication an affair of aminority of agitators exploiting the faithof their fellow-Muslims for politicalends, stirring up resentment, constitut-ing a problem for Western interests and'friendly' Muslim states alike. Thisdichotomy is misleading for severalreasons…"

The distinction is born out of an impo-sition of a secular framework on Islam.An honest assessment of orthodoxIslamic literature demonstrates thisdistinction is false and that Islam natu-rally forms the basis of political life as itdoes moral and spiritual. Islamic historytoo is dominated by the role of Islam inpolitics, with the Caliphate - the Islamicpolitical system - ending only at thebeginning of the twentieth century in1924 after thirteen centuries, dominat-ing some 94 per cent of Islamic history.Even since its demise, political debatesin the Muslim world have stronglyfeatured Islam in all but a few decades.The ICG's report goes on to describehow:

"…the conception of 'political Islam'inherent in this dichotomy is unhistori-cal as well as self-serving. The term'political Islam' is an American coinagewhich came into circulation in the wakeof the Iranian revolution. It implied orpresupposed that an 'apolitical Islam'had been the norm until Khomeiniturned things upside down. In fact,Islam had been a highly politicisedreligion for generations before 1979. It

Section 1 - Challenging the Narrative: Radicalisation, Extremism & ‘Islamism’ - 11

To date, the debate haslacked an honest,

dispassionate assessment ofthe forces at play within theMuslim community, the impactof which has been dangerouscharacterisations of Islam andthe Muslim community,misinformed public fear andmisguided government policy

the suggestion that 'extremist'and 'radical' appropriatelydescribe the views taking rootwithin the Muslim communitydemonstrates a failure tounderstand ideas that restoutside of the prevailingpolitical assumptions

"…the conception of 'politicalIslam' inherent in thisdichotomy is unhistorical aswell as self-serving... In fact,Islam had been a highlypoliticised religion forgenerations before 1979. It onlyappeared to have becomeapolitical in the historicallyspecific and short-lived heydayof secular Arab nationalismbetween 1945 and 1970"(International Crisis Group)

"the much laboured distinctionbetween 'moderates' and'Islamists' ... tends to gettranslated into the distinctionbetween those who aresusceptible to co-optation andthose who take their beliefs inearnest". (International

Crisis Group)

“

”

only appeared to have become apoliticalin the historically specific and short-lived heyday of secular Arab national-ism between 1945 and 1970".

Labelling Views that Challenge theInterests of Western Governments,'Extremist'

Maintaining a false distinction betweenIslam and Islamic politics has servedpolitical purposes by attempting toisolate elements of Muslim society thatare assumed to threaten western inter-ests. The ICG report describes how "theconcept of 'political Islam' and its defini-tion as a problem only occurred whenIslamic politics began to articulate anti-Western or, more specifically, anti-American attitudes" and that "'Islam'was only seen to be political when it wasseen to be a threat." Likewise, the muchlaboured distinction between 'moder-ates' and 'Islamists' that follows fromthis distinction "usually boils down todistinguishing between those withwhom Western governments feel theycan 'do business' (the moderates) andthose with whom they cannot or willnot. This tends to get translated into thedistinction between those who aresusceptible to co-optation and thosewho take their beliefs in earnest".

Furthermore, a Gallup poll taken inNovember 2006 of nine Muslim coun-tries, featured in John Esposito's bookreferred to earlier, found that the impor-tance of religion and attendance of reli-gious service was near identical betweenso-called 'moderates' and 'politicalradicals', if not slightly more so in thecase of moderates.

PPaarrtt IIIIPoliticisation not 'Radicalisation'

How Best to Describe Changes in theMuslim Community?

The insistence of some commentators tomaintain a distinction between Islamand politics has provided false evidenceof Muslims becoming 'radical': asMuslims move from benign religiouspractice to using Islam in their politics,according to these terms, they movefrom Islam to Islamism. This trend isdescribed as one towards radicalisation

but is essentially academic. It is born outof a distinction that lacks credibility inthe phenomena it is describing. A trendtowards using Islam in politics is consis-tent with Islamic orthodoxy and not anaberration. The terms construct falsemilestones on a path to 'radicalisation'.It has acted to inflate the belief thatMuslims are becoming more radical.

The question that needs to be asked iswhether such terms are appropriate indescribing events and changes takingplace in the Muslim community, or ifthey are tenuous extrapolations thatloosely use events to conjure up a falsepicture of the processes at work. Theseterms are sufficiently vague and areliable to expand in their meaning toprovide false evidence that orthodoxIslamic changes in the Muslim commu-nity represent threatening undercur-rents. It is important to pierce throughthe terms to understand the underlyingevents, not to understand them throughthe prism of the current language.

A Brief History of Political ChangeAmongst Britain's Muslims

The Muslim community in Britain ischanging and has been for a while, butwhen this process started, why and whatit represents is widely contested.Importantly, we must ask if it is accurateto use 'radicalisation' to describe thosechanges.

For some, the process started during thefurore that surrounded the publicationof the Satanic Verses. The subsequentresponse from Britain's Muslim commu-nity and mosque elders, from bookburning to large-scale demonstrations,demonstrated, it is argued, the first signsof a mobilised Muslim mass in defenceof religion. This mobilisation repre-sented a departure from a predominantAsian identity with which Muslims hadassociated during the waves of immigra-tion of the 60s/70s, to a religiousdistinction and increasingly assertive

religious identity. In the period thatfollowed, a litany of crises in the Muslimworld were marked by the first Gulf Warin Iraq, the persecution of Muslims inBosnia, Somalia, the impact of sanctionson Iraq, a number of confrontationsbetween the West and the Muslimworld, to current hostilities inAfghanistan and Iraq following theonset of the War on Terror. These allimpacted Muslim thinking in Britain,but how?

These events have acted to awaken aconsciousness in the Muslim commu-nity, triggering concerns about Muslimsfrom either their countries of origin orthose to whom they have a sense of reli-gious affiliation. However, the triggerhas not - as some have alleged - beenorganisations falsely sensationalisingthese events, but images of westerninterference, injustice and double stan-dards in the Muslim world and thefailure of leaderships in both the Westand the Muslim world to act againstthese perceived injustices. The prolifera-tion of information through the globali-sation of the media has been instrumen-tal in bringing these events to the atten-tion of both Muslim and non-Muslimaudiences and with it alternative anduncensored news streams that havechallenged state sponsored and tradi-tional media reporting.

An Awakening Political Consciousness

This heightened sense of concern hasnot determined the nature of the subse-quent response from the Muslimcommunity. In fact, responses have beenin a multitude of different directions notall of which have been religious orIslamic.

Overall, it led to an increasingly politi-cally active Muslim community. Forsome, it involved involvement withmore conventional British politics suchas with the Labour party, the Left ororganisations fighting for social justice,

12 - Section 1 - Challenging the Narrative: Radicalisation, Extremism & ‘Islamism’

the trigger has not - as some have alleged - been organisa-tions falsely sensationalising...events, but images of western

interference, injustice and double standards in the Muslim worldand the failure of leaderships in both the West and the Muslimworld to act against these perceived injustices.

“”

particularly amongst universityeducated Muslims. This was not only forpragmatic reasons but also throughassimilating more generally into theideology of these organisations, as it sawa widening of the campaigns with whichthey associated as not restricted to theMuslim world, taking up causes in LatinAmerica or the Third World moregenerally.

Likewise, some assessed the issues ashaving a particular Muslim bearing.With talk of a green menace replacingthe Soviet threat, a clash of civilisationsand the depiction of Muslims and Islambeing the common denominator ofmost of the key global crises followingthe fall of the Berlin wall, a number ofMuslims mobilised around defendingMuslim interests, Islamic values orresponding to injustices specificallyperpetrated against Muslims.

In the first instance therefore, thechange in the Muslim community was agrowing politicisation, both religiousand non-religious.

An Islamic Revival

Over time, this politicisation has movedto take on a more Islamic form andrepresents what one may describe as asubsequent 'Islamicisation' of Muslimpolitics. Flirtations with various politicalexperiments, movements and associa-tions has changed over time eitherbecause of a failure of these movementsto respond adequately to the perceivedproblems or because the sense of theproblem as having a particular Muslimor Islamic bearing has developed. Thisincreasing 'Islamicisation' of Muslimpolitics or Islamic political practice canbe perceived through levels of religious

practice, affiliation with and member-ship of Islamic organisations, from localmosque associations to global Islamicpolitical parties, to more vocal demands,all of which now stand at record levelsamongst second and third generationMuslims in the UK.

On the whole, therefore, the processeshave responded to a heightened sense ofpolitical injustice through first 'politici-sation' and subsequent 'Islamicisation' ofthe Muslim community. Politicians andsome commentators have insteadpreferred to use 'radicalisation' todescribe these changes and trendtowards Islam, in an attempt to malignthem at the outset.

Revisiting Thinking on'Radicalisation'

The trend towards greater Islamic politi-cal practice is consistent with Islamicorthodoxy and a long-standing histori-cal Islamic political experience that haslasted centuries. It represents a legiti-mate non-violent political approach thatmay contrast with secular politics, butcannot be equated with a violent threatfor merely being so. Radicalisation,extremism and other similar terms,amongst them militant, fundamentalistand fanatic, denigrate Islamic politicalchange through mere labelling, butmore importantly fail to explain eventsaccurately. This would have only been ofacademic interest if it hadn't resulted inthe growing polarisation betweencommunities in Britain through prolif-erating ignorance about Islam and theMuslim community.

In taking this debate forward, it isessential that Western commentatorsand policymakers revisit their attitudetowards Islam and politics. If theycontinue to insist they are separate andstructure policies on this assumption,they will simply encourage what will beperceived as more extreme measurestowards the Muslim community becauseMuslims simply consider themselvesmoving to a more orthodox not extremeform of Islam. If on the other hand theyacknowledge this relationship is intrin-

sic to Islam, honest and forthrightengagement becomes a possibility andpresents an opportunity for a moreconstructive relationship.

Taking Account of Globalisation andImpact of Western Policies in theMuslim world

More broadly, a discussion on Muslimsin the UK should be understood in thecontext of the Muslim world. Thechanges experienced within the UKmirror changes occurring more gener-ally in the Muslim world that predatedthe Salman Rushdie affair, particularlythe move away from secular, nationalis-tic politics to Islamically based politicalactivity. The advent of globalisationparticularly through the movement ofinformation and human populations hasmade it less possible to understandtrends purely in the boundaries ofnational borders; globalisation hasbrought changes occurring in theMuslim world to the shores of Britain'sMuslim community and it is unlikely tobe divorceable as the world continues toshrink. As a result, responding to orunderstanding processes at work withinthe Muslim community in the UK willcontinue to require a more astute under-standing of the processes at work withinthe Muslim world more generally.

To this end, it is naïve to ignore theimpact of Britain's engagement in theMuslim world on attitudes of Muslimsin this country, information aboutwhich can no longer be tightlycontrolled given the rise of alternativeinternational news agencies, such asthose which broadcast from the Muslimworld, or the huge networks of informa-tion made possible through the internet.

It is important to note also that Westernpolicies in the Muslim world have had asimilar impact in terms of politicisationon many non-Muslims in the Arabworld. We highlight later in the reporthow polls conducted of non-Muslimopinion in the Muslim world also showheightened politicisation and oppositionto Western policies in the Muslimworld.

Section 1 - Challenging the Narrative: Radicalisation, Extremism & ‘Islamism’ - 13

it is essential that Western commentators and policymakersrevisit their attitude towards Islam and politics.“ ”

responding to orunderstanding processes

at work within the Muslimcommunity in the UK willcontinue to require a moreastute understanding of theprocesses at work within theMuslim world moregenerally.

“

”

As discussed in the previous section,some commentators have asserted thatthe trend towards greater Islamicpractice combined with politicalconcerns over events in the Muslimworld has made the Muslim communitymore vulnerable to the use of violenceto counteract perceived injustices.

The Policy Exchange report describeshow "Islamism is not only a securityproblem…" implying that it is at leastthat. Tony Blair's recent announcementto make Islamic studies 'strategicallyimportant' to the British nationalinterest, arguing it will help prevent'violent' extremism, demonstrates thatthe study of Islam by the Muslimcommunity is thought to be associatedwith an increased threat from violence.As a result, the logic requires thisIslamicisation of Muslim politics to betreated with suspicion and, at somelevel, stymied and prevented fromgrowing in influence.

It is important to reiterate that while ina secular framework politicisation maybe supported, a growing awareness ofIslam and its use in politics is seen bysome to stand at odds with secular, irre-ligious politics. In this sense the trend isunconventional and outside the prevail-ing political culture in the West whichhas led some to describe it with termsthat undermine their credibility. Theterms 'radical' and 'extremist' misrepre-sent the changes in the Muslim commu-nity, and misrepresent the phenomenaof Islamicisation, but have a powerfulimpact in the manner in which the

argument is extended to include thepossibility of violence.

In this section, we argue that:

• The trend towards greater Islamicpolitical practice, far from being aprecursor for violence, often providespeople with an alternative.

• Politically motivated violence is awider issue most often occurring as aresponse to political oppression andinjustice rather than because ofideology or theology. Hence, the asso-ciation of Islam with political violenceis misleading.

• There is little support for violence as ameans of change as demonstrated byrecent polls of Muslim opinion, whichalso show increasingly levels ofsupport for Islamic politics.

• It is important to separate goals frommeans so as to not to link widely heldlegitimate political ideas withviolence.

PPaarrtt IIDecoupling Political Violence from Islam

Violence is Driven by Political notTheological Factors

Violence cannot be treated as an exten-sion of the trend towards greaterIslamic political practice within theMuslim community. The history of

political violence demonstrates that it iscross-cultural, cross religion andideology and is driven by a number offactors often born out of a sense ofpolitical injustice, occupation orinvasion. An academic study byProfessor Robert Pape, an AssociateProfessor at Chicago University,published in his book 'Dying to Win:The Logic of Suicide Terrorism',demonstrates that the advent of suicidebombers is not unique to Muslims butis rather a generic cross-humanphenomena driven by a number ofpolitical factors rather than theologicalbeliefs.

The study included the first completedatabase of every suicide attack aroundthe world from 1980 to early 2004 andconducted in native-language sources -Arabic, Hebrew, Russian, and Tamil, andothers - that allowed it to gather infor-mation not only from newspapers, butalso from products of the perpetratingorganisations . The study found that:

• The world leader in suicide attackswas the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka - aMarxist, secular group.

• Two thirds of Muslim 'suicidebombers' have been from countrieswhere US forces have or are stillmaintaining military forces.

• The presence of US forces is creatingsuicide attackers in Iraq which was acountry that had never previouslyhad a suicide attack in its historyprior to the 2003 invasion.

14 - Section 2 - 'Unspinning' the Accusations of Violence against Islam

Section 2'Unspinning' the Accusations ofViolence against Islam

Political injustice provides oxygen forthe proponents of such attacks to justifysuch actions. It is therefore crucial thatacts of political violence are analysed asa separate phenomena based upon theindividuals who choose to engage inthem, their justifications and the role thatlocal and foreign political injustice has inproviding oxygen to justify such acts.

Foreign Policy and Political Injustice

Regarding the July 2005 bombings inLondon, as is now common knowledge,the British government was forewarnedthat its involvement in the catastrophicUS invasion of Iraq had increasedBritain's vulnerability to the threat of aretaliation attack. The leaked reportfrom the UK's Joint Terrorism AnalysisCentre (JTAC), which predated theattacks, warned:

"Events in Iraq are continuing to act asmotivation and a focus of a range ofterrorist related activity in the UK".

In April 2005, a report drawn up by theJoint Intelligence Committee (JIC)entitled "International Terrorism:Impact of Iraq" was even more explicit,stating:

"We judge that the conflict in Iraq hasexacerbated the threat from interna-tional terrorism and will continue tohave an impact in the long term. It hasreinforced the determination of terror-ists who were already committed toattacking the West and motivated otherswho were not."

Amongst numerous other voices, areport in July 2005 by the foreign affairsthink-tank Chatham House, also effec-tively expressed the view that theinvasion of Iraq had made the world amore dangerous place. In their view,there was "no doubt" that the invasionof Iraq had: "given a boost to the al-Qaida network" in "propaganda, recruit-ment and fundraising". Also that "ridingpillion with a powerful ally has provedcostly in terms of British and USmilitary lives, Iraqi lives, military expen-diture and the damage caused to thecounter-terrorism campaign."

It is essential to understand andacknowledge therefore the role thatforeign policy has played in exacerbat-

ing the sense of political injustice and indriving individuals to undertake acts ofpolitical violence against those theyperceive as aggressors, whether therhetoric of legitimisation is religious orotherwise, following the conclusions ofProfessor Pape's study. This is particu-larly important given the Muslim worldis a region already at the mercy ofdespotic rulers and tyrants. Rather thanblame a whole community or itsleanings towards Islamic politics gener-ally, it is important to understand thepolitical nature of the factors that drivesuch acts as opposed to solely attribut-ing them to Islamic theology or ideas,which does not take account of thehistory of political violence acrosscultures, religions and ideologies.

Islamic Politics is an Alternative toViolence as a Means of Change

The phenomenon of Muslims usingviolence on Western soil is a relativelyrecent phenomenon and brought to thefore by 9/11. Non-violent calls for apolitical vision of a Muslim worldgoverned by an Islamic political system- or Caliphate - have been heard eversince the Caliphate was formally abol-ished at the beginning of the twentiethcentury. These calls and this visiontherefore predate this modern phenom-enon by more than fifty years. Talk ofestablishing an Islamic political systemhas continued to feature across thespectrum of political debate in theMuslim world even after its demise.

For numerous organisations, the goal ofreturning Islam to state and societyfeatures at the root of their politicalactivity. The means they employ differ,as does their vision of the Islamic politi-cal system's exact workings. Some optfor a gradual reform of the politicalsystem using existing structures andmechanisms. Others encourage individ-ual reform, whilst others, like theIslamic political party Hizb ut-Tahrir,opt to operate through a different modelof political activity. Most such organisa-tions are non-violent, have not endorsedattacks such as those in New York orLondon, and do not advocate violenceas a methodology for change. Indeed,amongst those Islamic organisationsthat seek to establish a Shariah-basedgovernment the overwhelming majority

do not advocate violence and haverefused to endorse the attacks on civil-ians in Western capitals.

Regarding the use of violence moregenerally, the ICG report on Islamismmakes a clear distinction betweenIslamic political activity and violence.The report concludes that while hostilityto Western policy is widespread thisdoes not necessarily translate intosupport for violence:

"Suspicion of, if not opposition to, thebehaviour of al-Qaeda and its imitatorsis widespread within Islamist circles andall but unanimous among politicalIslamists…at the same time, hostility toWestern and especially U.S. policy isvery widespread but does not translateinto support for, let alone participationin, al-Qaeda's global jihad except for atiny minority."

Islamic Political Activism is anAlternative to Violent Expression

Islamic political organisations haveplayed an influential role in directingMuslim concerns towards non-violentpolitical activity. Some organisationshave chosen the democratic process,while others have advocated non-violentpolitical expression outside of existingpolitical structures.

For example, Hizb ut-Tahrir has been atthe forefront of working for a Caliphatein the Muslim world since 1953 throughurging Muslims to engage in a non-violent political struggle against therulers of the Muslim world. Its literatureand behaviour prepare its members onlywith the political means for change. Infact, globally, it remains a fact that largenumbers of people who joined Hizb ut-Tahrir left armed militancy after beingconvinced of Hizb ut-Tahrir's politicalmethodology on the basis of Islamicevidences. In Uzbekistan, for example,the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, agroup that has advocated armed struggle,witnessed a large turnover from its ranksto Hizb ut-Tahrir. The commitment ofHizb ut-Tahrir not to be involved in anyviolent activity is based on its faith andunderstanding of the revelation of God,which makes its involvement in anyterrorist or violent activity impossible,either in theory and practice. No person

Section 2 - 'Unspinning' the Accusations of Violence against Islam - 15

can join Hizb ut-Tahrir until he or sheadopts this political and intellectualmethodology and approach.

PPaarrtt IIIIPoll Evidence Refutes the Alleged Linkbetween Islam's Political Tenets andViolence as a Means of Change

The findings of a number of recent pollsconducted across the Muslim worldrefute the assertion that there is a neces-sary association between Islamic politi-cal ideas and violence as a means ofchange or the argument that Islamicpolitical ideas inevitably lead toviolence. The evidence from these pollsshows that whilst support of Islamicpolitical ideas - including a greater rolefor Shariah in the governance of theircountries - has steadily grown amongstMuslim populations, support forviolence and its use in political changehas dropped. We are therefore presentedwith an inverse relationship betweenstrengthening Islamic politics and theuse of violence, rather than the directrelationship some Western commenta-tors and politicians propagate.

Of these polls, we will consider thefindings of three of the most compre-hensively conducted surveys carried outby leading pollsters.

Program on International PolicyAttitudes (PIPA), University ofMaryland, April 2007

The recently issued report by theUniversity of Maryland entitled 'MuslimPublic Opinion on US Policy, Attacks onCivilians and al Qaeda' is one of themost recent and revealing polls ofopinion in the Muslim world. Thereport found strong support for estab-lishing a single Islamic state, keeping outWestern values, rejection of the notionof inevitable violence between theMuslim world and the West, and therejection of attacks on civilians in theWest or elsewhere.

Some of the report's key referenceswhich illustrate these points aresummarised below:

• "Most respondents express strongsupport for expanding the role of

Islam in their countries - consistentwith the goals of al Qaeda - but alsoexpress an openness to outsidecultural influences. Large majorities inmost countries support the goals ofrequiring a strict application of sharia,keeping out Western values, and evenunifying all Islamic countries into asingle Islamic state."

• "On the other hand, majorities in allcountries regard the increasing inter-connection of the world through tradeand communication as positive"

• "Majorities or pluralities also rejectthe idea that violent conflict betweenMuslim and Western culture isinevitable and say that it is possible tofind common ground."

• "Large majorities in all countriesopposes attacks against civilians forpolitical purposes and see them ascontrary to Islam. Attacks on civiliansare seen as hardly ever effective.Politically motivated attacks againstcivilian infrastructure are also rejectedas not justified"

• "Consistent with the opposition toattacks on civilians in principle, and incontrast to the significant support forattacks on US troops, majorities in allcountries disapprove of attacks oncivilians in the United States as well ascivilians in Europe. Nearly as manydisapprove of attacks on Americansworking for US companies in Islamiccountries."

Centre for Strategic Studies, Universityof Jordan, February 2005

The Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS) atthe University of Jordan published asurvey entitled "Revisiting the ArabStreet" in February 2005 in which theyinterviewed numerous populationsamples (national representative sample,university students, media elites andbusiness elites) in Egypt, Jordan, Syria,Palestine and Lebanon. The report wasbased on interviews conducted betweenMarch and June of 2004.

In addition to findings that showedsupport for a greater role of the Shariahand Islamic scholars in the politics andgovernance of their countries, thefindings also suggested that hostility

16 - Section 2 - 'Unspinning' the Accusations of Violence against Islam

Rather than blame awhole community or its

leanings towards Islamicpolitics generally, it is

important to understand thepolitical nature of the factors

that drive such acts as opposedto solely attributing them to

Islamic theology or ideas, whichdoes not take account of the

history of political violenceacross cultures, religions

and ideologies

The findings of a number ofrecent polls conducted across

the Muslim world refute theassertion that there is a

necessary association betweenIslamic political ideas and

violence as a means of changeor the argument that Islamic

political ideas inevitably leadto violence

“Large majorities in mostcountries support the goals of

requiring a strict application ofsharia, keeping out Westernvalues, and even unifying all

Islamic countries into a singleIslamic state”

(PIPA, University of Maryland, April 2007)

The vast majority ofrespondents across Egypt,

Jordan, Palestine, Syria andLebanon believed that Shariah

should be a source oflegislation, with a strong

majority in many of thecountries stating that it

should be the only source

“

”

towards the West was largely down topolitical reasons, such as the foreignpolicy of the US and Britain towards theMuslim world, rather than religious ortheological arguments. Some of thereport's findings were:

• The vast majority of respondentsacross Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Syriaand Lebanon believed that Shariahshould be a source of legislation, witha strong majority in many of thecountries stating that it should be theonly source.

• Strong adherence to the precepts ofIslam was not found to necessarilyequate with hostility or negativitytoward the West. The tension betweenthe Arab world and the West is notperceived in either religious orcultural terms.

• Arabs believe that their societal valuesstand in sharp contrast to the West.They associate Western societies withliberalism, individual liberty, democ-racy and technological progress, butalso with increased levels of societalproblems. In contrast, they see theirsocieties as maintaining strongervalues of tradition and family, and asbeing less plagued with socialproblems. The exception to this is thatArabs believe financial and adminis-trative corruption is more prevalent inArab societies than in the West.

• Arab reactions to Western, and mostspecifically US, foreign policy in theregion were identified as being thesingle most important factor influenc-ing Arab attitudes. When asked if theanti-American attitude was a result ofAmerican values or American policyin the Muslim world, 90 per cent ofEgyptians, 79 per cent or Moroccans,76 per cent of Jordanians and 80 percent of Lebanese said that it wasbecause of American policy. Mostbelieved that America and Britain wereselfish and insincere in their foreignpolicy and that America attempts todominate countries, violates humanrights and rather than approach coun-tries with dignity and respect tries toimpose its policies on other countries.As the survey cites, these findingswere not specific to the Arab worldbut were similar to findings in SouthKorea, Russia and Brazil.

PEW Global Attitudes Project

A number of Pew Global Attitudessurveys undertaken over the past fewyears also support the findings of theabove mentioned reports with regards tothe increasing support for the role ofIslam in politics and governance and astrong decline in support for violence.

A Pew Global Attitudes Survey carriedout in February 2005 entitled ‘Iraqi VoteMirrors Desire for Democracy in theMuslim World’ states:

• "…while Muslims are generally recep-tive to democracy and supportive ofbasic freedoms, they also believe thatIslam should have a prominent role inpolitics. Pew surveys found majoritiesof Muslims in nine of the 14 countriessurveyed favored a "very large" or"fairly large" role for Islam in politicallife. In Pakistan, 86% of Muslimrespondents expressed that view, asdid large majorities of Muslims inIndonesia (82%) and Jordan (73%).In Turkey, however, far fewer Muslims(41%) think that Islam should play amajor role in the nation's politicallife."

• "Other surveys have shown thatMuslims take a nuanced view ofreligion and politics. Shibley Telhami,a professor at the University ofMaryland, polled in six predomi-nantly Muslim countries last June -including Egypt and Saudi Arabia -and found that while most respon-dents favored a stronger role for theclergy in politics, few expressed admi-ration for religious leaders."

It is important to highlight here thatPew have evaluated a desire for democ-racy by assessing support for ideals suchas allowing open criticism of govern-ment, greater participation in the politi-cal process and media reporting withoutcensorship. These all relate to empower-ing the citizenry with greater powers ofaccountability notably absent in theMuslim world, but such rights are notexclusive to democracy. Within Islamicliterature there are detailed discussionson the mechanisms for political partici-pation and accountability

A Pew Global Attitudes Surveypublished in July 2005 entitled ‘Islamic

Section 2 - 'Unspinning' the Accusations of Violence against Islam - 17

“Pew surveys foundmajorities of Muslims in

nine of the 14 countriessurveyed favored a "very large"or "fairly large" role for Islam inpolitical life. In Pakistan, 86%of Muslim respondentsexpressed that view, as didlarge majorities of Muslims inIndonesia (82%) and Jordan(73%). In Turkey, however, farfewer Muslims (41%) think thatIslam should play a major rolein the nation's political life”(PEW Global Attitudes Project, 2005)

The Centre for StrategicStudies...found that of thosepolled, most disagreed with theUS definition of terrorism andsaw violence and the groupsthat engage in it as legitimateif they were part of a strategyto counter the perceivedoccupation policies of the USand Israel… Even 74 per centof Lebanese Christians viewedHezbollah as a resistanceorganisation

“

”

Extremism: Common Concern forMuslim and Western Publics’ states:

• "The balance of opinion in predomi-nantly Muslim countries is that Islamis playing a greater role in politics -and most welcome that development.Turkey is a clear exception; the publicthere is divided about whether agreater role for Islam in the politicallife of that country is desirable."

• "The importance of Islam in the polit-ical life of many countries where it isthe predominant religion is under-scored by the large percentages inthese countries saying that they thinkof themselves first as a Muslim, ratherthan as a citizen of their particularcountry."

• "Large majorities of Muslims in mostpredominantly Muslim countriessurveyed think that it is very impor-tant that Islam play a more importantand influential role in the world thanthat religion now does. In Morocco,84% of Muslims subscribe to thisview, as do 73% in Jordan, 70% inPakistan and 64% in Indonesia. Evenin Lebanon and Turkey, where feweramong the Muslim population placehigh importance on a larger globalrole for Islam, pluralities in bothcountries do so."

A Pew Global Attitudes Surveypublished in June 2006 entitled ‘TheGreat Divide: How Westerners andMuslims View Each Other’ highlightsthat the supposed conflict betweenmodernisers and fundamentalists thewest eagerly promote, is a narrative thathas very low traction in the Muslimworld. The report states:

• "In most Western countries, theprevailing view among non-Muslimsis that there is a conflict betweenbeing a devout Muslim and living in a

modern society. But Muslims gener-ally disagree - including Muslims wholive in major European countries."

• "In a similar vein, the Pew GlobalAttitudes survey asked people in fivepredominantly Muslim countrieswhether or not they believe there is astruggle between groups who want tomodernize their country and Islamicfundamentalists. The responses aremixed. In Turkey, 58% say there is astruggle between modernizers andIslamic fundamentalists, and nearly asmany Indonesians (50%) agree. Butsolid majorities in Jordan and Egyptsee no such struggle; in Pakistan, arelatively large number (50%)declined to offer an opinion."

Attitudes Towards Terrorism andLegitimate Resistance

The Centre for Strategic Studies pollcited earlier found that of those polled,most disagreed with the US definition ofterrorism and saw violence and thegroups that engage in it as legitimate ifthey were part of a strategy to counterthe perceived occupation policies of theUS and Israel. Actions against thesenations are largely seen as legitimateresistance and acts committed by Israeland America are viewed as true acts ofterrorism. Most considered attacksagainst US troops in Iraq or againstIsraeli settlements as not being terroristacts. Most viewed organisations likeHamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah aslegitimate resistance organisations. Even74 per cent of Lebanese Christiansviewed Hezbollah as a resistance organi-sation.

The War on Terror has manipulated thefact that there is no consensus on thedefinition of terrorism. The issue hasbeen debated nationally and interna-tionally, including attempts at theUnited Nations, but an agreed definition

remains elusive. Britain and the US havetaken advantage of this ambiguity tobrand resistance to their military occu-pation by indigenous populations inIraq and Afghanistan as terrorism, eventhough the right to resist foreignmilitary occupation has broad support,historical precedent and is part of theGeneva Convention (Protocol 1,Additional to the Geneva Conventions,1977, Part IV, Section 1, Chapter 1,Article 49, Point 4).

Attitudes Towards Violence Directedat Civilians: Comparing the US withIran

The Muslim world finds itself having torepeatedly clarify its position onviolence because of the climate createdby the War on Terror, whilst non-Muslim societies are spared suchscrutiny. A recent poll, however,compares American and Iranian publicopinion regarding attacks on civiliansand demonstrates how the obsessionwith Muslim opinion has alloweddangerous attitudes in Western societiesto go overlooked.

The poll, published in January 2007 bythe Program on International PolicyAttitudes (PIPA) of the University ofMaryland, compares attitudes amongIranians and Americans on a host ofpolitical issues. Participants in bothcountries were asked whether bombingand other attacks intentionally aimed atcivilians was often, sometimes, rarely ornever justified.

In response 80 per cent of the Iranianparticipants said that violence targetingcivilians is never justified, while only 46per cent of American expressed similaropposition to such attacks. 11 per centof Iranians supported violent, deliberateattacks on civilians, with 3 per centsaying that such violence is often justi-fied and 8 per cent arguing that it issometimes justified. In sharp contrast,twenty four per cent of Americanparticipants supported violent, deliber-ate attacks on civilians, with 5 per centsaying deliberate attacks on civilianswere often justified and 19 per cent saidthey were sometimes justified. The pollappears to suggest that there is a muchgreater willingness among Americans tocountenance the use of violence againstcivilians to achieve political goals.

18 - Section 2 - 'Unspinning' the Accusations of Violence against Islam

Pew have evaluated a desire for democracy by assessingsupport for ideals such as allowing open criticism of

government, greater participation in the political process and mediareporting without censorship...such rights are not exclusive todemocracy. Within Islamic literature there are detailed discussionson the mechanisms for political participation and accountability

“”

Whether it is the bombing and subse-quent occupation of Iraq in 2003, or theyears of sanctions that preceded it,Americans seem to have become accus-tomed to their government employingextreme violence in the name of loftypolitical goals, and may partlycontribute to explaining these statistics.

PPaarrtt IIIIIIEnds Do not Justify Means, but Meansdo not Invalidate Ends

It is important to separate goals frommeans so as to not to tarnish legitimatepolitical grievances and goals withviolence. The polls referred to previ-ously reflect the fact that whilst Muslimsmay share concerns about politicalinjustices, occupation and invasion ofthe Muslim world, they have on thewhole rejected the use of violence as ameans to achieve their political goals.

Despite this, some Western commenta-tors and politicians have continued toinsist that the goals of Islamic politicsare inherently linked to violence. In theaftermath of 7/7 Tony Blair sought todiscredit Islamic political goals as anatural extension of terror itself - refer-ring to their "inherent" violence - andattempted to intimately connect theviolence of 7/7 with a set of politicalgoals that demanded a Middle East freefrom Western occupation, the formationof a Shariah-based political system - theCaliphate - and an end to the occupationof Palestine. Zeyno Baran, of the HudsonInstitute, first suggested that the Islamicpolitical party Hizb ut-Tahrir was a'conveyor belt' to terrorism, but sincethen the argument has been used moregenerally to tarnish those who engagewith Islamic political parties or politics.

Applying the Arguments used AgainstIslamic Politics to the West's OwnHistorical Experience

A) The Enlightenment

For those who insist on a supposed linkbetween means and goals, despite all theevidence to the contrary, it is necessaryto pose a broader question. Is it soundto discredit a set of political goalsbecause of the means employed by someto achieve them? If this logic held true,

some of the most celebrated historicalevents in the West should be recast astriumphs for political violence. Thefounding pillars of the 'enlightenment'should be held responsible for motivat-ing violent upheaval on the continent ofEurope and North America and thusshould remain under the shadow of -and scarred by - the means of terror.

More acutely, if the juxtaposition ofmeans and goals promoted by the likesof Blair is credible, the ideas of theenlightenment must be deemed inher-ently violent, for they represented theideals of the violent and bloody strug-gles that were the French and Americanrevolutions.

John Locke, one of the most prominentfigures in the Enlightenment, advancedthe case that a violent uprising againsttyranny was necessary and just, only tocorrect the imbalance in natural affairscreated by that oppression. As heexplained in ‘Two Treatises ofGovernment’, by indulging in tyranny,despots were "liable to be destroyed bythe injured person and the rest ofmankind, that will join with him in theexecution of Justice, as any other wildbeast, or noxious brute with whomMankind can have neither society norsecurity".

Thomas Paine, the thinker whosewritings assisted America's struggle forindependence, articulated the case foran American revolution in his highlyinfluential pamphlet ‘Common Sense’in a similar vein. "We view our enemiesin the characters of Highwaymen andHousebreakers, and having no defencefor ourselves in the civil law; areobliged to punish them by the militaryone, and apply the sword, in the verycase, where you have before now,applied the halter".

Thomas Jefferson also acknowledgedthat violence would feature in the pathto America's independence, his wordssuggesting that although 'unfortunate'the focus should be on the biggerpicture: "It is unfortunate that the effortsof mankind to recover the freedom ofwhich they have been so long deprived,will be accompanied with violence, witherrors, and even with crimes. But whilewe weep over the means, we must prayfor the end."

B) National Liberation Struggles

Equally, national liberation strugglesthat used violence as a means shouldrender the goal of independence fromforeign control violent and immoral.However this is a far cry from theglowing endorsements they selectivelyreceived from Western powers. On theAfghan effort to force out the Soviets,former US President Ronald Reagancommented,

"Self-determination, the right to freelychoose one's own destiny, has been thecentral point of the Afghan struggle…We are proud to have supported theirbrave struggle to regain their freedom,and our support for this noble cause willcontinue as long as it is needed".

The struggle of the ANC againstapartheid represented a noble cause.However, Nelson Mandela admitted in1963 that "without violence there wouldbe no way open to the African people tosucceed in their struggle" although he"planned it as a result of a calm andsober assessment of the political situa-tion". None of this rendered the fightagainst racism in South Africa wrongand Mandela eventually left prison,rebranded as a freedom fighter, to takehis place on the stage of internationalpolitics.

C) Contemporary Social and PoliticalSituations

The use of violence to achieve a politicalend is still a point of debate in Westerncircles. Opinions range from those whobelieve it is never justified to those whobelieve that some situations necessitate

Section 2 - 'Unspinning' the Accusations of Violence against Islam - 19

More acutely, if thejuxtaposition of means

and goals promoted by the likesof Blair is credible, the ideas ofthe enlightenment must bedeemed inherently violent, forthey represented the ideals ofthe violent and bloody strugglesthat were the French andAmerican revolutions

“

”

it. Gary Younge, a columnist for theGuardian, wrote regarding the rioting inParisian suburbs last year that "incertain conditions rioting is not justjustified but may also be necessary, andeffective" because "when all non-violent,democratic means of achieving a justend are unavailable, redundant orexhausted, rioting is justifiable". ThomasPaine's view that "having no defence forourselves in the civil law; are obliged topunish them by the military one" alsomoves to justify the use of violencewhen no alternative is available.

The Oxford academic Timothy Garton-Ash argues that, "We may want touphold the universal principle 'noviolence', but we all know that these are,in political fact and in moral content,very different things, and some violentpolitical actions are - shall we say - lessunjustified than others". Other varia-tions debate whether the maxim 'theend justifies the means' can pragmati-cally justify the use of political violenceto overcome an obstacle that obstructscritical human progress, as Jefferson'searlier remarks on the American revolu-tion may lead one to conclude.

Islamic Political Goals Cannot beDiscredited Through FalseAssociations

The purpose here is not to justify theuse of violence as a tool for politicalchange. Rather, it is to demonstrate thatthe goals of Islamic politics, particularlythe demand for a Caliphate cannot besummarily dismissed by claiming thatacts of violence are the sole means ofachieving it. The Caliphate, for example,has a long track record of ruling quitediverse communities, ethnicities,regions and religions with success,bringing stability to previously war-ravaged territories, engaging popula-tions and earning strong loyalties fromthe communities and religions itgoverned.

Historic Parallels: DemonisingPolitical Objectives and Ideas

It has long been the case that thedissemination of any ideas of politicalchange can be tarnished with the samebrush, whether or not their advocatesemploy violence. Many political move-ments of the twentieth century andmany going even further back wereaccused of being a conveyor belttowards terrorism just by disseminatingideas that conflicted with the status quo.

The American Independence struggleitself was characterised in this way.Thomas Paine's pamphlet 'CommonSense', published in January 1776, waslabelled seditious. The British govern-ment viewed Paine as a traitor for thecrime of calling for a declaration ofindependence based, not upon the privi-leges of land or birth, but uponthoughts:

"Can we but leave posterity with asettled form of government, an inde-pendent constitution of its own; thepurchase at any price will be cheap."

Paine goes on further to suggest "wehave it in our power to begin the worldover again. We are not insulting theworld with our fleets and armies, norravaging the globe for plunder. Beneaththe shade of our own vines are weattacked; in our own houses, and on ourown lands, is the violence committedagainst us."

Though Paine was referring to thesuffering of Americans under Britishcolonialism, Muslims in Fallujah,Baghdad, Najaf, Ramallah or Gaza couldthink that he was writing about them.Had the conveyor belt existed at thattime then no doubt internationalexperts and law-enforcement agencieswould have labelled his theories as such.

20 - Section 2 - 'Unspinning' the Accusations of Violence against Islam

the goals of Islamic politics, particularly the demand for a Caliphate cannot be summarilydismissed by claiming that acts of violence are the sole means of achieving it. The Caliphate,

for example, has a long track record of ruling quite diverse communities, ethnicities, regions andreligions with success, bringing stability to previously war-ravaged territories, engagingpopulations and earning strong loyalties from the communities and religions it governed

Though Paine wasreferring to the

suffering of Americans underBritish colonialism, Muslims inFallujah, Baghdad, Najaf,Ramallah or Gaza could thinkthat he was writing about them.Had the conveyor belt existed atthat time then no doubtinternational experts and law-enforcement agencies wouldhave labelled histheories as such

“

”

“”

Many commentators on the War onTerror have failed to notice statementsby senior politicians that effectivelydeclare that a Caliphate and Shariah lawin the Muslim world are unacceptableobjectives. On September 5th, 2006President George W. Bush said, whenreferring to people that share theideology of al-Qaida:

"They hope to establish a violent politi-cal utopia across the Middle East, whichthey call caliphate, where all would beruled according to their hatefulideology".

President Bush's comments werepreceded by Tony Blair in the immedi-ate aftermath of the attacks in Londonon 7/7. At a press conference on 16thJuly 2005, he said that Britain mustconfront "an evil ideology", defining thisas "their barbaric ideas." whichincluded, "the establishment of effec-tively Taliban States and Shari'ah law inthe Arab world en route to oneCaliphate of all Muslim nations." TonyBlair sought to shift the focus away fromthe terrorists' methods to bring intofocus the need to challenge a set ofpolitical goals that centred on theformation of a new Caliphate in theMuslim world, saying this was “a battlenot just about the terrorist methods buttheir views"

In October 2005, the then British HomeSecretary, Charles Clarke, made aspeech to the right wing neo-conserva-

tive US think-tank the HeritageFoundation saying:

"What drives these people on is ideas.And, unlike the liberation movementsof the post-World War II era, these arenot political ideas like national inde-pendence from colonial rule, orequality for all citizens without regardfor race or creed, or freedom of expres-sion without totalitarian repression.Such ambitions are, at least in principle,negotiable and in many cases haveactually been negotiated. However,there can be no negotiation about there-creation of the Caliphate; there canbe no negotiation about the impositionof Sharia law".

Such pronouncements have attemptedto discredit one of the central goals ofcurrent Islamic political activity in theMuslim world: the establishment of anindependent Islamic political system inthe Muslim world, or Caliphate. Just aswith Islamic politics more generally, ahost of arguments have been forwardedto suggest that the Caliphate would bean unwelcome prospect and that itsemergence should be opposed. Includedin this are attempts to link its realitywith violence as some of the above state-ments attempt to do.

In this section, we address failures in theWestern discourse of the Caliphate, therole of the Caliphate in Islamic ortho-doxy, the Caliphate as a distinct andalternative political system, and discuss

how the Caliphate will be a stabilisingforce for the Muslim world.

PPaarrtt IIMaligning a Popular & Orthodox Call

The propaganda of the War on Terrorhas taken a political vision that centredon the formation of a new Caliphate andattempted to scar it with the horrors ofterrorism. The construct has sought toconstrue the Caliphate as some violentthrowback that would usher in a newdark age, characterised by sectarianconflict, persecuted minorities and fearbecause, the argument is, these are thehallmarks of the terrorists' campaign tocreate it. Blair's post 7/7 thrust aimed toweld terrorism onto the goal for aShariah-based political system, aconstruct that the US administrationwas equally eager to brandish: PresidentBush also referred to confronting a"violent political vision" which repre-sented "the establishment by terrorism,subversion and insurgency of a totalitar-ian empire that denies all political andreligious freedom". The attempt hasbeen to cast the Caliphate as an al-Qaida preserve giving its mere mentionan "almost instinctive fearful impact" inthe words of Zbigniew Brzezinski,President Jimmy Carter's nationalsecurity adviser.

Remarks from senior US and Britishofficials demonstrate the Caliphate is

Section 3 - The Caliphate, Islamic Governance & the Myth of Violence - 21

Section 3The Caliphate, Islamic

Governance & the Myth of Violence

also finding its way into the language ofthe Iraq conflict. American officials havereferred to it as part of a pretext forcontinuing US involvement in Iraq. ForEric Edelman, US Under Secretary ofDefence for Policy, "Iraq's future willeither embolden terrorists and expandtheir reach and ability to re-establish aCaliphate, or it will deal them a crip-pling blow. For us, failure in Iraq is justnot an option".

Challenging the Campaign to Malignthe Caliphate

Attempting to discredit a political visionfor the Muslim world that challengestheir own by using the language ofterrorism fundamentally misconstruesIslamic politics and acts to malignanyone associated with it. The strategyappears largely in vain however - anindependent Shariah-based system nowfeatures in the vision of most of thelargest and best supported organisationsin the Muslim world that are neitherviolent nor part of al-Qaida, as high-lighted earlier in the report.

While recent polls go some way tosuggest a depth of feeling for Islamplaying a greater role in the governanceof the Muslim world this has not beenmapped across in the current discussionin the West about Islam. Unfortunately,this means discussion on Islam suffersfrom pernicious attempts to frameIslamic political aspirations in a newlight, without a credible politicalelement and inherently linked toviolence.

Efforts to malign the Caliphate must bechallenged with an understanding ofexactly what it would represent.Equating it with, and making it insepa-rable from, the violence that has struckcertain Western capitals is a false associ-ation that lacks historical, political andintellectual credibility particularly in theMuslim world. It can only be a stabilis-ing force for the region to replace unrep-resentative, unaccountable rulers with apolitical system that is neither, andwhich draws on strong ideologicalcommonalities with its people. TheCaliphate represents an alternative polit-ical vision for the Muslim world and apolitical system that draws on a stronghistorical record, arguably the home of aleading civilisation for many centuries.

Reframing a Discussion on theCaliphate

A discussion on the Caliphate must liein a broader context: there is a need foralternatives to the failing political lead-erships in the Muslim world. Autocratic,authoritarian regimes litter the Muslimworld and represent the single biggestobstacle to progress. Consent is notori-ously absent from the processes thatlegitimated presidents, kings andpremiers. Staged elections have neverchanged this fact, conducted as they arein a climate of fear and intimidationpreventing public expression of anyorganised opposition. Ruling elites owetheir status to acts of foreign installa-tion and often represent striking depar-tures from the demographics of thelands they govern. Joseph Lieberman,former Vice Presidential candidate forthe US Democrat Party, once describedthe Caliphate as a 'new evil empire'. Butif it is of an evil empire that we shouldfear, then surely the Muslim world’scurrent reality is it: entrenched primi-tive and thoroughly repressive politicalstructures aggregated to represent oneof the most poorly governed regions inthe world.

Successive UN Arab HumanDevelopment Reports make similarobservations regarding the failing politi-cal architecture in the Arab world, thecrisis in governance, authoritarian andtotalitarian government, the lack oftransparency and accountability, repres-sion, corruption, and a broad crisis oflegitimacy that faces Arab govern-ments. But repressive governments havelong characterised the region andsignificantly pre-date the report'sfindings.

It is in mapping a way out of thismalaise that the Caliphate is presentedas an alternative political model for theMuslim world. For the authors of theAHDR, the template is a Western model,democracy, liberty, and the institutionsand assumptions that underpin theWestern liberal political philosophy areits benchmarks for reforming Arabgovernments. To address the plight ofMuslims living under repressive regimes,however, the emergence of a Caliphate isforwarded as an alternative to a cultur-ally adjusted secular liberal democraticsolution.

22 - Section 3 - The Caliphate, Islamic Governance & the Myth of Violence

the Islamic political systemhas its own independent

configuration and a distinctconstellation of political

principles and ideas

"The Imams (scholars of thefour schools of thought- Shafi'i,

Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali)- mayAllah have mercy on them-

agree that the Imamah(Leadership) is an obligation,

and that the Muslims mustappoint an Imam who would

implement the deen's rites, andgive the oppressed justice

against the oppressors" (Al-Jaziri)

It can only be a stabilising forcefor the region to replace

unrepresentative,unaccountable rulers with a

political system that is neither,and which draws on strong

ideological commonalities withits people. The Caliphaterepresents an alternative

political vision for the Muslimworld and a political system

that draws on a stronghistorical record, arguably thehome of a leading civilisation

for many centuries

“

”

Failings in the Current Discourse onthe Caliphate

The current consideration of theCaliphate as an alternative politicalmodel to Western liberalism, however,suffers in too many ways, and iscompounded by errors in Westerndiscourse on Islam in general andIslamic political thinking in particular.'Orientalist' writers who draw on sociol-ogist Max Weber's reading of Islam, forexample, regard it as a pre-modernpolitical system that collapsed becauseof the challenges of modernity. Theyconsider it a closed system, total innature; unable to address Europe's inno-vations in industry and politicalthought, and that it is the principleimpediment to progress unless Islam isable to reform; a primitive politicalsystem whose literature on governmentis concerned only with the piety of rulerand subject.

Apart from their particular critique ofIslam, these - among many other -Western writings are premised on thebelief that the liberal political model isbuilt on a series of values deemeduniversal, and currently provides themost economically efficient and ethicallydesirable form of governance. Thisassumption creates the problematicframework in which the Caliphate isstudied because the approach typicallyfollows the route of comparison, one thattakes as its norm the Western state andits form of politics, and measures againstprovisions in the liberal political model.

Where such comparisons fall short isthe failure to acknowledge that theIslamic political system has its ownindependent configuration and adistinct constellation of political princi-ples and ideas. While overlooking thisdistinct and different configuration ofpolitics, comparisons that impose onesystem as the norm act only to highlightdifferences between the two systemswithout, importantly, questioning the

original configurations of both. In thiscase, it merely highlights the lack ofliberal ideas in Islamic politics - whichsays no more than that they are different- but does not question whether liberal-ism should be taken as the norm; theapproach is relative and offers nouniversal merit to the discourse.Measuring through a filtered prismobscures an objective picture of theIslamic political system and miscon-strues a thoroughly distinct assemblageof political ideas. The Islamic politicalsystem must be understood according toits original texts and meanings, not inrelation to the Western state.

Increasing demands amongst Muslimspopulations for the rule of law, transpar-ent, accountable and representativegovernment, and an independent andefficient judiciary are often interpretedby Western commentators as a call fordemocracy. These provisions are not themonopoly of liberal political philosophy,however; the Islamic political systemaddresses each of these but through amodel that understands society, theindividual, the goal of government andthe role of the state differently. TheIslamic political system - rather thaninherently deficient - is characterised byits own relationship between ruler andsubject, authority and sovereignty, law,property and power.

The Caliphate's Position in OrthodoxIslam

Amongst the attempts to malign theCaliphate have been those which haveargued the Caliphate is not an instru-mental part of Islam, but rather a histor-ical institution whose usefulness in thetwenty-first century has been inventedby the imagination and idealism oftwentieth century political Islamists.Such arguments have attempted tofoster the belief that the Caliphate is infact an aberration of Islam itself and itscall largely a modern phenomena bornout of a reaction to colonialism.

However, even a cursory look at theposition of classical Islamic Scholarsthroughout the ages demonstrates thatthe Islamic political system has alwaysbeen regarded as a vital matter for theMuslim community (Ummah) and itsexistence to be protected, even a pre-requisite for enacting numerous Islamicrulings.

According to the Mufassir (exegete) Al-Qurtubi, when referring to verse 30Chapter 2 of the Quran, "This Ayah(verse) is a source in the selection of anImaam, and a Khaleef (Caliph), he islistened to and he is obeyed, for theword is united through him, and theAhkam (laws) of the Caliph are imple-mented through him, and there is nodifference regarding the obligation ofthat between the Ummah, nor betweenthe Imams except what is narratedabout al-Asam, the Mu'tazzili." He alsosaid: "The Khilafah (Caliphate) is thepillar upon which other pillars rest."

For Imam an-Nawawi: "(The scholars)consented that it is an obligation uponthe Muslims to select a Khalif ".According to the Imam al-Ghazali,when writing of the potential conse-quences of losing the Caliphate, "Thejudges will be suspended, the Wilayaat(provinces) will be nullified, ... thedecrees of those in authority will not beexecuted and all the people will be onthe verge of Haraam (commitingunlawful acts)". For the reputed Juriston Islamic governance Imam al-Mawardi: "The contract of the Imamah(leadership) for whoever is standingwith it, is an obligation by Ijmaa'a(consensus)".

One of the founders of the four majorschools of Sunni thought, Imam Ahmedibn Hanbal, said; "The Fitna (mischiefand tribulations) occurs when there isno Imaam established over the affairs ofthe people". Al-Jaziri, an expert on theFiqh of the four great schools ofthought said regarding the four Imams:"The Imams (scholars of the fourschools of thought- Shafi'i, Hanafi,Maliki, Hanbali)- may Allah havemercy on them- agree that the Imamah(Leadership) is an obligation, and thatthe Muslims must appoint an Imamwho would implement the deen's rites,and give the oppressed justice againstthe oppressors".

Section 3 - The Caliphate, Islamic Governance & the Myth of Violence - 23

even a cursory look at the position of classical IslamicScholars throughout the ages demonstrates that the Islamic

political system has always been regarded as a vital matter for theMuslim community (Ummah) and its existence to be protected,even a pre-requisite for enacting numerous Islamic rulings

“”

The subject of the Caliphate has alsobeen addressed in numerous, detailedworks throughout Islamic history and bysome of the most eminent jurists.Amongst such writings are those thatdetail only aspects, such as Mohammedal-Shaybani's works on internationalrelations (Kitab as-Siyar), Qadi AbuYusuf 's works on taxation (Kitab al-Kharaj), and Imaam Abu Ubayd al-Qaasim bin Salaam's works on statefunds (al-Amwaal), through to morecomprehensive works that address thesystem as a whole, such as ImamMawardi's treatise on Islamic rule (al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah) and works byImam Aamidi (al-Imamah). The twenti-eth century's most elaborate works onthe Caliphate are arguably those by Taqiud-Din an-Nabhani (d. 1977), in hisNidham al-Hukm fil Islam (the RulingSystem in Islam) and ShaksiyyahIslamiyyah volume 2 (the IslamicPersonality), who also went on topublish a draft constitution for anIslamic state, with detailed explanationsof each article, in his book Nidham al-Islam (the System of Islam) in the 1950s.

For the Shi'a too, who have broadly beenhistorically quietist in a political sensesince the onset of the ghaybah (occulta-tion of the twelfth Imam), calls forIslamic governance have gained promi-nence following the decline of Islam inthe political sphere. The formulation ofthe concept 'Wilayat al-Faqih' - thegovernance of the jurist - amongst Shi'ascholars is now extensively taught in theschools of Qom, in Iran. In the words ofone Shi'a marjah, "The ratio of Qur'anicverses concerned with the affairs ofsociety to those concerned with ritualworship is greater than a hundred to one.Of the approximately fifty sections of thecorpus of had?th containing all the ordi-nances of Islam, not more than three orfour sections relate to matters of ritualworship and the duties of man towardhis Creator and Sustainer. A few moreare concerned with questions of ethics,and all the rest are concerned with social,economic, legal, and political questions-in short, the gestation of society". Also,that, "after the death of the Most NobleMessenger, none of the Muslims doubtedthe necessity for government. No onesaid: 'We no longer need a government'.No one was heard to say anything of thekind. There was unanimous agreementconcerning the necessity for government.

There was disagreement only as to whichperson should assume responsibility forgovernment and head the state.Government, therefore, was establishedafter the Prophet, both in the time of thecaliphs and in that of the Commander ofthe Faithful; an apparatus of governmentcame into existence with administrativeand executive organs."

PPaarrtt IIIIThe Significance of the Caliphate at theTime of its Demise

The words of Lord Curzon, the BritishForeign Minister at the time of theCaliphate's end, appear to have bestcaught the Caliphate's significance whenhe announced to the House of Commons:

"We must put an end to anything whichbrings about any Islamic unity betweenthe sons of the Muslims. As we havealready succeeded in finishing off theCaliphate, so we must ensure that therewill never arise again unity for theMuslims, whether it be intellectual orcultural unity"

The fall of the Caliphate in 1924 was anevent of monumental significance forMuslims as it represented the end of a1350 year-old institution that hadexisted since the time of the ProphetMuhammad himself. Albert Houranidescribes how its loss had a "deep effecton the way in which politicallyconscious Arabs thought of themselves".In the immediate aftermath, individualsand movements from all quarters of theIslamic political spectrum emerged,advocating the restoration of some formof Shariah-based political system.Demands were not restricted to Turkey,though it was the last home of theCaliphate and then subject to harsh,anti-religious Kemalist policies.

In Egypt, even prominent reformists ledcalls for its immediate re-establishment.For example, in the magazine 'al-Manar'Rashid Rida wrote: "All Muslims willremain in a state of sin until they selectanother caliph and pledge allegiance tohim" and by 1928 a populist Islamicmovement had emerged which heldIslamic government as a central goal. Hassan al-Banna, founder of the MuslimBrotherhood said:

24 - Section 3 - The Caliphate, Islamic Governance & the Myth of Violence

“…based on publicopinion surveys and

recent elections in the Arabworld, the advent of democracy

there seems likely to producenew Islamist governments thatwould be much less willing to

cooperate with the UnitedStates than are the current

authoritarian rulers” (F. Gregory Gause III, associate professor

of political science at the University

of Vermont)

"It is difficult to anticipate theexact effect the 'abolition' of

the Caliphate will have on theminds of the Muslims of India.But so much I can safely affirm- that it will prove a disaster toboth Islam and civilisation. The

suppression of the timehonoured institution, which was

throughout the Moslem worldregarded as the symbol of

Islamic Unity, will cause thedisintegration of Islam as a

moral force. It had knit togetherover 250 million of the

followers of the faith belongingto the Sunni communion by one

common ideal."(Syed Ameer Ali, Aligarh Muslim

University and Muslim League, Times

newspaper, 5th March 1924)

“

”

"When asked what is it that you call,reply that it is Islam, the message ofMuhammad, the religion that containswithin it a government".

In its dying days, attempts to salvage itwhere directed from as far away asIndia by such likes as the KhilafatMovement, a movement which left asignificant and lasting impact onMuslim political thought throughoutthe subcontinent, forming the ideologi-cal underpinnings of later demands fora separate Muslim homeland - Pakistan.According to Syed Ameer Ali, of theAligarh Muslim University and MuslimLeague, in the Times newspaper on the5th March 1924:

"It is difficult to anticipate the exacteffect the 'abolition' of the Caliphate willhave on the minds of the Muslims ofIndia. But so much I can safely affirm -that it will prove a disaster to both Islamand civilisation. The suppression of thetime honoured institution, which wasthroughout the Moslem world regardedas the symbol of Islamic Unity, willcause the disintegration of Islam as amoral force. It had knit together over250 million of the followers of the faithbelonging to the Sunni communion byone common ideal."

Even those who had conspired todestroy it, such as Hussein of Meccawho fought the Ottomans with Britishsupport, tried to assume its titleknowing the regard it held in theMuslim world. Other political leadersalso tried to take advantage. King FouadI of Egypt, for example, "set his sights onthe lofty religious position that had beenvacated in Istanbul after Turkey abol-ished the Caliphate in 1924" accordingto Egypt's al-Ahram newspaper in 1925.This is not to mention conferences heldin Cairo in 1926 and throughout Indiaduring the early 1920s that addressedvarious questions of support for theCaliphate.

After the Caliphate: DebatingGovernance in the Muslim world

Since the furore that followed thedemise of the Caliphate, the question ofIslam in politics and Shariah-basedgovernment has arguably confrontedevery Islamic movement in the Muslimworld, regardless of how they resolved

to answer that question. Undoubtedly,some argued there must be no suchthing. The reformer Ali Abdul Razaq forexample challenged the likes of RashidRida by demanding a separation ofreligion from state, saying of theCaliphate "In reality, the religion ofIslam is innocent of the Caliphate whichMuslims have come to know".

Clearly, a branch of the post-Caliphatedebate did not reference Islam, drivenby other ideological drifts. But afterfailed experiments with nationalism -Arab or otherwise - communism,socialism during the 50s and 60s, secu-larism and bitter experiences withregimes that forcibly kept religion out ofsight, not just out of government, organ-isations seeking to introduce Shariahand Islam into the political system arenow arguably the biggest force in theMuslim world.

Any opening in the authoritarian archi-tecture of the Muslim world is nowlikely to yield Islamic government. F.Gregory Gause III, associate professor ofpolitical science at the University ofVermont and director of its Middle Eaststudies program, points to the increas-ing paradox of democratising theMiddle East for US policymakers inForeign Affairs in October 2005:

"…based on public opinion surveys andrecent elections in the Arab world, theadvent of democracy there seems likelyto produce new Islamist governmentsthat would be much less willing to coop-erate with the United States than are thecurrent authoritarian rulers"

Lord Curzon's warnings that "we mustput an end to anything which bringsabout any Islamic unity between thesons of the Muslims" where appendedby his remarks about the end of theCaliphate: "The situation now is thatTurkey is dead and will never rise again,because we have destroyed its moralstrength, the Caliphate and Islam".The fact that less than eight decadesafter the British government announcedits death, demands for the Caliphate'sre-establishment clearly challenges LordCurzon's forecasts bringing his warningsto the fore. The growing prospect of theCaliphate's re-emergence is likely tobecome one of the defining debates ofour time and must therefore be met with

Section 3 - The Caliphate, Islamic Governance & the Myth of Violence - 25

The Caliphate ...engages voices of

dissent through the politicalsystem by providing extensivechannels for accounting allparts of the states' apparatusas well as a consultativeassembly made-up of electedrepresentatives with significantpowers.

Accountability lays firstly in thegeneral right - and sometimesobligation when the excess isflagrant - of every citizen totake the state to task, secondlyin institutions that guaranteethe process of accountabilitycontinuously takes place, andthirdly in a general requirementfor political parties

Unlike monarchies andauthoritarian governments whoplace a monarch or premierbeyond the constitution withthe sole right to interpret oralter it, no individual in theIslamic state's apparatus, fromclerk to Caliph, is above the law

Older orientalist writing maysometimes have distortedIslam, but Islam was notrecreated in the image ofsecularism. Whether praising orcondemning Islam, orientalistsmade the political nature ofIslam the theme ofdiscussion

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”

a willingness to understand a systemthat would undoubtedly mark a new erafor the Muslim world.

PPaarrtt IIIIIIThe Caliphate will Bring Stability theMuslim World

Contrary to the prophecies of doomWashington and London are so eager toforward, the Caliphate will be a stabilis-ing force for the Muslim world. Fewdoubt that it will threaten foreign inter-ests in the lands it governs if those inter-ests resemble current behaviour towardsthe Muslim world. That may partlyexplain why the West is so eager tomalign it. But asserting independencedoes not render a state unstable. Indeed,part of the Caliphate's appeal forMuslims is that it will stand up toforeign aggression and wrestle backwhat they believe is rightfully theirs.The Caliphate will bring stability to theMuslim world in numerous ways.

The Caliphate is an Accountable,Representative Political System

Firstly, the Caliphate is a political systemwhose head is only legitimised throughpopular consent. It will, therefore, bemost unlike the regimes that currentlylitter the Muslim world, which are bothunrepresentative and unaccountable,and inherently fragile and unstable as aresult. With no means of recoursewithin these regimes and no channels toexpress dissent or criticism, peoples'concerns have become threateningpolitical undercurrents, even threats ofrebellion and overthrow, a reality exas-perated by the widespread use of brutal-ity by security services to deal withopposition. The Caliphate, in strikingcontrast, engages voices of dissentthrough the political system by provid-ing extensive channels for accounting allparts of the states' apparatus as well as aconsultative assembly made-up ofelected representatives with significantpowers.

The concept that ‘the authority lies withthe Ummah’ is a core principle of theIslamic ruling system. The Shariahplaces the original authority formanaging the affairs of the people in thehands of the people themselves, but

requires them to appoint a head of stateto do so on their behalf and so the headof state is legitimate only throughpopular consent. The process of directelections or an election by a representa-tive assembly consisting of individualselected to their respective positions canbe utilised to evaluate popular consent.Men and women over the age of fifteenare granted the right to vote and theprocess can be supported with the use ofany complimentary technologies,whether internet, mobile or postalvoting, provided their merit in improv-ing efficiency is proven. Once elected,the head of state is bound to an agree-ment with the people through the bayahcontract. It stipulates a number ofconditions for his leadership of the state,including the condition that he managesthe affairs of the people on their behalf,to do so exclusively according to theIslamic sources of legislation, and thenon-violation of the criterion of leader-ship. Authority is at no point transferredto the head of state through the bayahcontract and remains permanently withthe people. Thus, if the head of stateviolates any of the terms of the bayahcontract, the people can demand,through the independent judiciary, thathe vacate his post.

Following on from the discussion onauthority in Islamic political discourse,is the ability to ensure the head of statewill not violate the terms of the bayah towhich he is contracted by the people; inshort, architecture for effective account-ability (muhasabah). The Islamic politi-cal system enshrines mechanisms forbinding the Caliph to his agreement andprotecting citizens from state violationsand oppression (dhulm), and providesdirect and transparent channels foraccounting the executive, any stateofficial, policy, conduct, administration

and all other facets of governance. Theissue of accountability features veryprominently in the Shariah. Ruling isregarded as a form of guardianship(riayah) and a trust (amanah), and thecausing of oppression (dhulm) by thehead of state a grave crime - the corpusof Islamic texts refers to each of these inan unequivocally serious manner.Accountability lays firstly in the generalright - and sometimes obligation whenthe excess is flagrant - of every citizen totake the state to task, secondly in insti-tutions that guarantee the process ofaccountability continuously takes place,and thirdly in a general requirement forpolitical parties.

Additionally, an independent judiciarymonitors the Caliph's legal adoptionswith the power to demand revocation.The principle institution dedicated tothe task of accounting the state is aspecial component of the state's inde-pendent judiciary: the 'Court of UnjustActs' (Mahkamat al-Mudhaalim). It ispresided over by only the most eminentand qualified judges in the state andgranted extensive powers by theShariah. It has the power to remove anyofficial of state regardless of their role orrank, including, most importantly, thehead of state if he persists in pursuing apath that lies outside of the terms of thecontract with the people. Citizens whohave a complaint against the stateregister it with the Court, which haswide-ranging powers of investigationthat extend to all organs of the state'smachinery. Importantly however, theCourt does not rely on a plaintiff toregister a complaint before problems areinvestigated because it is tasked with thepermanent and continuous responsibil-ity of scrutinising state conduct. Inaddition to the Court of the Unjust Acts,the 'People's Assembly' (Majlis al-Ummah) is another important institu-tion that forms part of the Caliphate'saccountability architecture. It is a repre-sentative assembly whose members areelected directly by citizens and can befrom any ethnicity, creed or gender. Theassembly provides extensive consulta-tion (shura) on issues of state and publicpolicy but, importantly, it has the powerto scrutinise practically all mattersrelated to the state; it can oblige theCaliph in key areas such as in theremoval of state officials, regional budg-etary control and matters of public

26 - Section 3 - The Caliphate, Islamic Governance & the Myth of Violence

With this natural wealth,it is clear that the Muslim

world could becomeeconomically independent andchallenge pernicious economicpolicies it has had to suffer atthe hands of inept leadershipsand the developed world

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interest through consultation; and canscrutinise every cannon issued by theCaliph and, in some cases, reject them,once again binding the Caliph.

The Caliphate, however, does not relyon institutions alone to provide inherentchecks and balances but depends uponthe politicisation of its citizenry as itsfundamental layer. Holding the rulers toaccount is a duty - an obligation even -upon every Muslim, and citizens areencouraged to do so in a direct andopen manner. Examples from theCaliphs that immediately followed theProphet Muhammad - whose consensus(ijma) is a source of Islamic law -demonstrate that they proactivelyencouraged forthright accountability.This obligation is not restricted to theindividual, but stipulates a requirementfor the permanent existence of politicalparties tasked with 'enjoining the goodand forbidding the wrong', a politicalactivity designed to challenge error andincompetence. These civil bodies under-take activities without interference fromthe state and, as the Islamic politicalsystem has no concept of a 'rulingparty', neither do they have any associa-tion with the state; their purpose isprincipally to highlight inadequacies instate conduct and in the condition ofsociety. While various schools withinWestern political theory have longstruggled with the question of justifying'political obligation' - whether the utili-tarians, social contract theorists orothers - Islamic obligations such as'enjoining the good and forbidding thewrong' take on a unique dimension forthe Muslim citizen: they are consideredgood in their own right and an act ofworship, not measured by their expedi-ency or purely by the effect they yield.

From institutions, through politicalparties to individuals, the mechanismsfor accountability in the Caliphateprovide the backbone to what is aconsiderably rule-based society. TheCaliph is not beyond the law norprotected by special exemption thatprovides him immunity from prosecu-tion; if he commits a crime he will bepunished, if he transgresses the terms ofthe bayah he will be eligible forremoval. Unlike monarchies andauthoritarian governments who place amonarch or premier beyond the consti-tution with the sole right to interpret or

alter it, no individual in the Islamicstate's apparatus, from clerk to Caliph, isabove the law.

The Caliphate is Built on ValuesConsistent With the People of theMuslim World

Secondly, the Caliphate system is consis-tent with - not alien to - the values ofthe people in the Muslim world. Whilethe Caliphate is a representative bodyand authority rests with the people whoexercise it through electing a head ofstate, the law originates exclusively fromthe sources of Shariah. This provides itdeep roots and a better chance atworking in partnership with its popula-tions because it engages them on acommon point of reference and forcommon goals. But it also means theCaliphate acts as a guarantor for valuesconsidered most at threat since itsdemise by Muslim peoples. The secular,autocratic, even atheistic regimes thatemerged in the Caliphate's wake signifi-cantly curtailed Islamic practice andengineered new readings of Islamicvalues and history. They often imposedviews that broke with orthodoxy todemand loyalty to divisive and failedideologies from Arabism to commu-nism, or combinations of both. Theimport of foreign value systems too isoften associated with the threat oferoding deeply held Islamic values.Values deemed 'Western', for example,are tarnished by perceptions, rightly orwrongly, of Western moral and sexualdecadence. A political system thatcredibly protects and promotes Islamicvalues is key to securing public confi-dence and partnership.

The Caliphate will Address Poverty asa One of its Highest Priorities

Thirdly, the Caliphate will aggressivelyaddress the problem of poverty in theMuslim world that exists despite theMuslim world possessing colossalreserves of natural resources. With thisnatural wealth, it is clear that the

Muslim world could become economi-cally independent and challenge perni-cious economic policies it has had tosuffer at the hands of inept leadershipsand the developed world. In the Islamiceconomic system, ownership of naturalresources belongs to the people andtherefore revenues generated from theirsale would be used to develop vitalinfrastructure and facilitate economicgrowth. This is derived from the wordsof the Prophet Muhammad: "The peopleare partners in three things: water,pastures and fire [energy]."

Today, foreign aid has stifled economicgrowth in many states through theimposition of conditions that includemass privatisation, as well as otherliberal secular reform. The Islamiceconomic system has a defined frame-work and set of guidelines that governeconomic policy, which are not subjectto pernicious materialistic influences.The huge resource and wealth in theMuslim world is clearly better used ifinvested in education, health and infra-structure than to service interestpayments on foreign debt. Unlike capi-talist economics, which does not make adistinction between basic and luxuriousneeds when distributing wealth, theIslamic economy not only makes adistinction but also sets priorities insolving the needs of the people byensuring all the basic needs of the peopleare met. The Prophet Muhammad said:"The son of Adam has no better rightthan that he would have a house whereinhe may live and a piece of cloth wherebyhe may cover his nakedness and a pieceof bread and some water."

If this were central to economicthinking, millions would not be suffer-ing from malnutrition or starvation.The free market does not distinguishbetween the needs of the people andneither does it ensure that the basicneeds of people are satisfied, rather itleaves these to the forces of the market.To date, the problem of world povertyhas not been adequately resolved and is

Section 3 - The Caliphate, Islamic Governance & the Myth of Violence - 27

The Caliphate was the only institution able to provide credibleleadership on Islamic issues and which can hold a convincing

Islamic debate that denounces weak or erroneous understandingsthat threaten both Western and Muslim populations“

”

likely to be one of the major causes ofconflict and instability in the twentyfirst century.

The Caliphate will Provide CredibleLeadership for the Muslim World

Fourthly, the loss of the Caliphatebrought with it an unprecedented loss ofauthority and leadership on Islamicissues. The resulting vacuum allowedindividuals to become global figure-heads for merely speaking the rhetoricof anti-colonialism and standing-up toperceived aggressors. Conferences likethose held in the Jordanian capitalAmman in July 2005 which gatheredscholars from around the Muslim worldto denounce what they labelled extrem-ist thought carry little weight or credi-bility, organised under the auspices of aJordanian monarchy created on theashes of the Caliphate and which to thisday celebrates the Arab revolt, consid-ered by most a treacherous collusionwith British colonisers. The same is truefor declarations made by the OIC whoseconferences are characterised by uselessgestures and by ostentatious hospitalitythat isolates them from the suffering oftheir own people. This crisis in leader-ship after the Caliphate dangerouslyallowed its functions to be dismemberedand claimed by virtually anyone whowas willing to take them on, from taxcollection, to defending Muslim terri-tory (including deciding when andhow), to defining the relationshipbetween Islam and other peoples.

The Caliphate was the only institutionable to provide credible leadership onIslamic issues and which can hold aconvincing Islamic debate thatdenounces weak or erroneous under-standings that threaten both Westernand Muslim populations. The post-Caliphate period generated deficits oflegitimacy and of accountability thatstill exist today with little potential forresolution.

PPaarrtt IIVVThe Caliphate is an Islamic System ofGovernance

Islam is the antithesis to secularism; it isa political phenomenon that draws itslife from the spiritual and moral. GeorgeBernard Shaw once, writing quite sometime before the sharp polarisation ofthinking post 9/11, made a challengingprediction about Islam:

“I have prophesied about the faith ofMuhammad that it would be acceptableto the Europe of tomorrow as it isbeginning to be acceptable to theEurope of today.”

The world has changed drastically sincethese words were written. The commu-nist bloc has collapsed; the West hasassumed an unrivalled ascendancy anda new challenger to that ascendancy hasbeen named: Islam. Now that Islam is inthe spotlight Shaw's prediction for Islamto be 'acceptable' to Europe and theWest has never looked more misplaced,when factions in the political arena donot even consider it an option for theMuslim world.

The political aspects of Islam thatattracted some older writers, such asShaw, are often abstracted from thediscussion about Islam and placed in thecategory of mere 'militant' offshoots oranti-Western cultural interpretations ofIslam. With politics convenientlyexcised from the modern Western defi-nition, Islam might be viewed as anirrelevance to societal discussions, wereit not for the surging tide of politicalexpression voiced by Muslims through-out the world. This level of support inthe Arab and Muslim world has notprevented others from continuing toargue that these political aspirations arein someway illegitimate or even justmisplaced in the scheme of humandevelopment. Blair's speech to the LosAngeles World Affairs Council in 2006boldly stated:

“It's about modernisation within Islamand out of it. It's about whether ourvalue system can be shown to be suffi-ciently robust, true, principled andappealing that it beats theirs.”

The continual call for the need for Islamto modernise or undergo a reformationis an implicit accusation that its politicalvalues are part of an unreconstructedpre-enlightenment interpretation of areligion, resistant to a transition intomodernity.

Older orientalist writing may sometimeshave distorted Islam, but Islam was notrecreated in the image of secularism.Whether praising or condemning Islam,orientalists made the political nature ofIslam the theme of discussion. Thepolitical perception of Islam is clear, forexample, in Shaw's writing: Islam 'is theonly religion which appears to me topossess that assimilating capacity to thechanging phase of existence which canmake itself appeal to every age', andabout Muhammad he said:

“I believe that if a man like him were toassume the dictatorship of the modernworld, he would succeed in solving itsproblems in a way that would bring itthe much needed peace and happiness.”

Some idea of the Prophet Muhammad'sstatesmanship in addressing theproblems of his own day can be gainedfrom observing the terms of the treatyhe made with the tribes who cameunder his political authority in the earlydays of the Islamic state that he estab-lished. One of the articles of this treatystates: “The Jews of the tribe of Auf,who are a party to this agreement andare the supporters of the Muslims, shalladhere to their religion and the Muslimsto theirs. Excepting religious matters,the Muslims and Jews shall be regardedas belonging to a single party.”

Reconciling Religion with State

To admit the possibility of a state ofconflict with a religion as a whole isproblematic for the West in a way thatconflict with another ideology, such ascommunism, never was. This is becausesecularism's claim to success is that itallows full religious expression in therealm of both individual and socialactivity without conceding any politicalauthority to religion. The outcome ofthis in the West is that Catholics andProtestants, after religious wars hadplagued Europe for centuries, generallycame to accept this secular arrangementand live in peace with each other. The

28 - Section 3 - The Caliphate, Islamic Governance & the Myth of Violence

There is a tendency forWestern writers to equate andimpose upon the Muslim worldthe political paradigmsemanating from theirChristian history

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collapse of the former communist block,which had crudely tried, and failed, toobliterate religion entirely, furtheradded to the sense of moral ascendancyin the West on account of Westernliberal secular democracy. The Westtherefore perceived their strength to liein neither affirming nor denying reli-gious faith: to do so would be anunpalatable contradiction. For thisreason there is a motive to deny that apopular religion, with over a billionadherents, could pose a sustainableideological and political challenge toWestern political philosophy.

At this point it may be worthwhilemaking a distinction between Islam andthe religion that secular Europe has hadmost experience with; Christianity.There is a tendency for Western writersto equate and impose upon the Muslimworld the political paradigms emanatingfrom their Christian history. The inade-quacy of the comparison can be illus-trated if we consider the religious textsthat define the dynamic between thetemporal and sacral for each. The first isthe Biblical verse to "...render untoCaesar what is Caesars and unto Godwhat is God's". The second is theQuranic injunction:

"Oh you who believe, obey Allah andobey the messenger and those inauthority amongst yourselves".

At first sight both could appear passiveand non-committal as regards politics.On closer inspection, while the formerhas come to be seen by a majority ofChristians today as ample justificationfor accepting the secular creed ofadhering to spiritual matters and leavingpolitics to the temporal authorities ofthe day, the latter is widely understoodby Muslims as demonstrating the subor-dination of the temporal authorities tothe divine authority of Allah and theProphet Muhammad.

For Muslims the temporal authority issubsumed and dependent upon obedi-ence to Allah. It works in two ways: firstthe Muslim is obliged to obey the divineauthority, second the Muslim is obligedto obey the temporal authority, third theorder of the obedience as well as theomission of the word 'obey' for thetemporal authority means it owes itslegitimacy to obedience to the divine

authority. The temporal authority is also'from amongst you' meaning amongstthose who believe and not any authority,such as that of the biblical Roman armyof occupation, and this authority has aspecific character in that it must imple-ment the Islamic systems of life. Islam isa whole body of thoughts, ideas, rulingsand more and its political element cannotbe separated from it just as its moralelement cannot be eliminated from iteither. Just as Muslims are told “he isnot of us who has no compassion forour little ones and does not honour ourold ones” Muslims are also told to “Ruleby what Allah revealed”. The moral andspiritual basis of Islam forms an integralwhole with its political viewpoint.

This understanding formed the basis ofMuslim political life since the establish-ment of the ruling system by theProphet Muhammad in the city-state ofMedina in the year 622CE until thedestruction of the state in 1924. Whilethe racial or tribal identity of its leaders,and the titles attributed to them(Khalifah, Sultan or Amir) changedmany times and was sometimes thesubject of passionate disagreement, thepolitical philosophy and the generalstructure of the state's apparatus was nota point of variance.

Spiritual Basis to Islamic Polity

Should the political nature of Islamarouse fear, and could Islam even be asource of hope? To answer such aquestion it is necessary to accept fromthe aspirations of Muslims, thirteencenturies of history and a wealth of reli-gious texts, that Islam is political innature. From this starting point Westernthinkers can make their own studies anddraw the conclusions that they believeto be valid.

Muslims, who do not share the samepast as their Western counterparts arepuzzled that it is the spiritual basis toIslamic polity, more than Islamic polityitself, which is the cause for secularconcern. Islam's political philosophyand its detailed systems of ruling andeconomy are a major theme of writingtoday, but what of Islam's spiritual andmoral bases? The following injunctionsof the Prophet Muhammad are worthyof consideration:

"You should be humble so that no-oneboasts over his neighbour nor anyoneoppresses his neighbour"

"Allah is not merciful to he who is notmerciful to people"

"Charity is due upon every limb of ahuman being on each day that the sunrises. To act justly between two people ischarity. To help a man with his ridingbeast, or to load his provisions on it orlift them up for him is charity. A goodword is charity. Every step going toprayer is charity. Removing from theroad what causes harm is charity."

The sentiments expressed in these reli-gious texts can be found in other reli-gions, but what distinguished Islamfrom them is the existence of a detailedsystem of governance that preservedthese values for the good of mixedcommunities comprising both Muslimsand non-Muslims from many differentraces. Islam was not, as Daniel Pipesonce declared, a mere “host” to “one ofthe world's great civilisations”; it was thebasis of a civilisation, that was rigidenough to maintain its character overthirteen centuries and flexible enough tomaintain its relevance, as G B Shaw said,to the “changing phase of existence” in“every age”. Its political appeal toMuslims today goes far deeper than itsantidote to the ills of Western neo-colo-nialism. It is a way of life that success-fully harmonised between the spiritualand temporal spheres of human socialactivity where the West historicallyfailed. Our pasts are indeed foreign toeach other. In order to avoid perpetualsuspicion and stereotyping it is essentialthat the people in the West betterunderstand the fears and hopes of theMuslim world, and their historical andideological basis.

Section 3 - The Caliphate, Islamic Governance & the Myth of Violence - 29

[Islam’s] political appeal... goes far deeper than

its antidote to the ills ofWestern neo-colonialism. It is a way of life thatsuccessfully harmonisedbetween the spiritual andtemporal spheres ofhuman social activity

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In the preceding sections, this reporthas sought to address the failure bynumerous commentators and politiciansto understand Islam, attitudes andchanges in the Muslim community andsupport for Islamic political ideals.These failures have underpinned talk ofa way forward and have subsequentlyresulted in measures that have onlywidened the growing chasm betweenthe Muslim world and the West. Thesemeasures have extended from anarchicand draconian security measures;changes to the way Islam is taught,promoting fringe groups who promoteideas that lack credibility and support,through to calls for a reformation ofIslam itself.

It is important that Western commenta-tors challenge how they continue tounderstand events in the Muslimcommunity and wider Muslim world ifthey are to understand why numerousWestern-sponsored measures havegained little traction or acted only toexacerbate the divide.

To conclude this report, we addresssome of these key campaigns andprovide insight into their continuedfailures. Simultaneously, we outline whyindigenous processes, institutions andvalues in the Muslim world are bestplaced to lift the Muslim world out of itsintellectual, technological and politicalmalaise. To this end, we argue in thissection that:

• Attempts at reforming Islam itself,have been discredited and gained little

traction amongst Muslims. IslamicOrthodoxy, not modernism, has wonthe opinion in the Muslim world

• Western Colonialism not Islam hasbeen at the heart of the political insta-bility and crises of the Muslim world.The onset of colonisation alsodisrupted indigenous efforts atmodernising the Muslim world

• Islam played a historic role inpreventing political excess, tyrannyand totalitarianism in the Muslimworld and its absence has allowedthese to go unchecked

• The Muslim world should be allowedto determine its own political future,not the West

PPaarrtt IIThe Failure of Calls for a 'Moderate',Reformed Islam

Refusing to Dialogue with OrthodoxIslam

If many media commentators andpoliticians are to be believed then we areengaged in a struggle to the death withIslamic fascists and nihilists who hateWestern societies for their freedoms andwho will not be satisfied until they havedestroyed Western civilisation. Othersclaim that Islamic radicals want to dragMuslim societies back to medieval timesby returning them to the imaginedpurity of a seventh century Islamic

society. We are told that there is nothingto discuss with these 'extremists'.

Traditional Muslim thinkers, scholarsand leaders have found the Westernpress and politicians eager to label themhomophobic, anti-Semitic, misogynistsand supporters of terrorists and suicidebombers. Whether or not this is a delib-erate policy is a debatable point, but thenet result is to intimidate and frightentraditional Muslims from speakingpublicly.

Some Western intellectuals argue thatthere is no place for Muslim orthodoxyand traditions in today's world, becauseit intellectually underpins the behaviourof Muslims fighting in Iraq, Palestineand Chechnya; it keeps Muslims fromaccepting their place in modernity.Commentators such as Melanie Phillipsand Michael Gove frequently assert thatnon-violent Islamists should be viewedas individuals who are engaged in meta-physical struggle with the West becausethey hate the values and culture ofWestern civilisation.

The group of people deemed acceptableto engage with has become smaller andsmaller excluding even those organisa-tions previously promoted by thegovernment. Media criticism has beenheaped on Foreign Office officials whoattempted to engage in political dialoguewith Islamists. Martin Bright's PolicyExchange pamphlet, 'When ProgressivesTreat with Reactionaries', is as Brightacknowledged "dedicated to a ForeignOffice whistleblower whose courageous

Section 4Mapping a Way Forward

30 - Section 4 - Mapping a Way Forward

actions have allowed me to exposeWhitehall's love affair with Islamism".The British Government is now openlytelling Muslim organisations in the UKthat if they don't become 'progressiveand spiritual', address the 'false griev-ances' of the Muslim community andtake a 'pro-active' role in the fightagainst extremism they will no longerreceive government funding. This hasleft only a handful of marginal groupsthat commentators and politicians havebeen willing to engage with, but whocarry little credibility or support in theMuslim community and reflect opinionslargely rejected by the Muslim commu-nity.

Calls for a Reformation of Islam havenot Convinced Muslims

Such premises and assumptions leadmany Western thinkers to conclude thata reformation of Islam itself is required,so that Muslims will eventually leavetheir outdated traditions and values. Onthe eve of the US invasion of Iraq in2003, it was reported that the then USDeputy Defence Secretary PaulWolfowitz said that "We need an Islamicreformation", and later in the samestatement he mentioned that he thought"there is real hope for one". Daniel Pipesof the Philadelphia based Middle EastForum who President Bush appointedhim to the board of directors of the USInstitute of Peace in June 2003, stated inJuly 2004 that the "ultimate goal" of theWar on Terrorism had to be Islam'smodernisation, or as he put it, "religion-building".

There have been changes amongst someMuslims in their interpretation of Islamover the last fourteen centuries. Forexample, when Muslims came intocontact with people with differing tradi-tions and philosophies such as theGreeks, Persians or Indians, someMuslims tried to integrate the best ofthe local philosophies and traditionsinto their understanding of Islam. Butthroughout the centuries, the majorityof Muslims have maintained an attach-ment to a common set of referencepoints - the Qur'an and the traditions of

the Prophet Muhammad - and were inclose agreement on most doctrinal andlegal issues. The five most influentialschools of Islamic thought (madhahib) -Hanafi, Shafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Jafari- named after their founding scholars,were established on this approach anddefined much of the body of Islamicinterpretations and opinion over manycenturies, and still do so today.Although some have termed this attach-ment 'traditionalism', ultimately it hasbeen this approach that has won theargument in the sphere of Muslimpublic opinion.

Drawing False Battle Lines

What those who call for the reformationof Islam for the whole Muslim world areattempting is without precedent. One ofthe most influential contemporaryadvocates of the radical idea to reformIslam has been the Middle East expertBernard Lewis. His fifty years of studyand scholarship led him to the conclu-sion that the West-which used to beknown as Christendom-is now in thelast stages of a centuries-old struggle fordominance and prestige with Islamiccivilisation. It was Bernard Lewis whocoined the phrase the 'Clash ofCivilisations' in a September 1990Atlantic Monthly article on 'The Rootsof Muslim Rage' in which he paintedIslam as engaged in a fourteen centurylong war against Christianity. This wasthree years before Samuel Huntingtonpublished his famous article on the‘Clash of Civilizations’ in ForeignAffairs. Ian Buruma summarised Lewis'argument in an article in the NewYorker as the following:

"…The clash between Christendomand Islam has been going on since theMuslims conquered Syria, NorthAfrica, and Spain. Muslims, at theheight of their glory, in tenth-centuryCairo, thirteenth-century Tehran, orsixteenth-century Istanbul, thought ofthemselves as far superior to theChristians and Jews among them, whowere tolerated as second-class citizens.Since then, however, as Lewis puts it,'the Muslim has suffered successive

stages of defeat'. Turks reached Viennain 1683 but got no farther. When therampant West expanded its empires,European ideas penetrated, dominated,and dislocated the Muslim world. Itwas deeply humiliating for Muslims tobe humbled by inferior Christians andJews ("Crusaders" and "Zionists" inmodern parlance). Traditional ways,which had produced so much glory inthe past, were eroded and oftendestroyed by ill-considered experi-ments with Marxism, fascism, andnational socialism. Out of political andcultural failure came this Muslim rage,directed against the West, the historicalsource of humiliation, and out of thisrage came the violent attempts to estab-lish a new caliphate through religiousrevolution."

In relation to the attacks of September11th 2001 on the US, Lewis said: "I haveno doubt that September 11th was theopening salvo of the final battle…" It isclear that Lewis has been influential inshaping how George W Bush's adminis-tration views the Muslim world. He isclose to Vice President Dick Cheney;has been invited to speak at the WhiteHouse; his best-selling book entitled'What Went Wrong?', which examinesthe decline of Muslim civilisation, hasbeen regarded in that circle as a kind ofhandbook in the war against Islamicterrorism.

Turkey - A False Model

The example of a moderate Muslimcountry for Lewis and his neo-confollowers is Turkey. In the 1920sMustafa Kemal demolished theOttoman Caliphate and replaced it withhis vision of a modern secular Westernsociety. Religious schools were closed,the wearing of the Hijab was forbiddenin government offices and universities,many religious scholars were impris-oned or killed and the Arabic languagewas replaced with Turkish. MustafaKemal was not a believer in "govern-ment of the people, by the people, forthe people…" but was more influencedby fascism of the 1920s and followed astyle of ruling characterised in his own

Section 4 - Mapping a Way Forward - 31

What those who call for the reformation of Islam for the whole Muslim world areattempting is without precedent.“ ”

words as "government for the people -despite the people". From his position ofauthority, he dictated his views on thesociety since he was convinced he knewwhat was best for it.

More than eighty years on it is still ques-tionable whether Kemal has beensuccessful in his forcible secularisationof a Muslim society. Undoubtedly, inTurkey there are groups of people whoare European in their behaviour, atti-tudes and values and do not see them-selves as Muslim other than in theirnames; but they represent a smallminority of that society. In the samecities where there are very secularMuslims, there are also many moretraditional and conservative Islamiccommunities, and in much of ruralTurkey, the values and attitudes ofpeople have not changed much in thelast two hundred years. Today, the politi-cal party that enjoys the clear support ofthe majority of the Turkish population isthe Islamic Justice and DevelopmentParty (AK). Its leader, Prime MinisterRecep Tayyip Erdogan was once bannedfrom public service after reciting a poemthat said "the mosques are our barracks,the domes our helmets, the minarets ourbayonets, and the faithful our soldiers".

As we see today it is the institution ofthe Turkish army that prevents thegovernment from bringing Islam backinto public life. When the AK partyproposed Foreign Minister AbdullahGul to be the new President the armyresponded with concern about theelection and stated: "It should not beforgotten that the Turkish armed forcesare a side in this debate and are astaunch defender of secularism."

It follows that Turkey is not really amoderate Muslim society in the way thatLewis, Bush and Wolfowitz understandthe term 'moderate'. Rather it representsthe failure to replace by force a culturethat was home grown and present forseveral centuries with a foreign one. As amilitary supported ruler, Mustafa Kemalfaced no restrictions when he wentabout removing from Turkey its Islamicheritage. Many Islamic scholars werekilled or imprisoned, religious schoolswere closed down and people wereforced to behave in accordance withWestern values. Yet even after eightyyears of Kemalism, Islamic traditional-

ism is increasing in strength and gaininginfluence in Turkish society. The forcethat prevents Islam from coming topower is the secular army that feels dutybound to defend Kemalism.

The Failure of Calls for ReformingIslam

Despite fifty years of scholarship Lewisfailed to predict how Muslims wouldrespond to an American occupation ofMuslim land. In 2001 he said that publicopinion in Iraq and Iran was so pro-American that both peoples wouldrejoice if the US army liberated them. Ayear later, he repeated the message that"if we succeed in overthrowing theregimes of what President Bush hasrightly called the 'Axis of Evil' thescenes of rejoicing in their cities wouldeven exceed those that followed theliberation of Kabul." Perhaps there was asense of relief felt by many Iraqis whenthe Saddam Hussein government wasremoved but a sense of occupation hasdriven many ordinary Iraqis to take uparms against the US army. Although thereality of the Iraq war has largelydiscredited the ideas of Bernard Lewisand his neo-conservative followers,Western intellectuals persist in arguingfor ways to moderate or reform Islam. Arecently published RAND report,'Building Moderate Muslim Networks',makes the case for the West to supportnetworks of 'moderate' Muslims inorder to counter, what they argue are,the radical and dogmatic interpretationsof Islam that are gaining ground in theMuslim world.

PPaarrtt IIIIUnderstanding the Causes of thePolitical Crises in the Muslim World

Today, many if not most of the Muslimcountries are dysfunctional. Politicallythe governments in many Muslim statesare dictatorships based on monarchs,military rulers or life-long Presidents.The 2002 Arab Human DevelopmentReport (AHDR), written by a group ofArab scholars from the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP),described the region as not developingas fast or as fully as other comparableregions. The most striking weaknessidentified in the report and one which

32 - Section 4 - Mapping a Way Forward

It follows that Turkey isnot really a moderate

Muslim society in the way thatLewis, Bush and Wolfowitz

understand the term 'moderate'.Rather it represents the failure

to replace by force a culturethat was home grown and

present for several centurieswith a foreign one

This state of affairs cannot beput at the door of Islamic

orthodoxy, since Islamicinstitutions and traditions havebeen marginalised for most ofthe last century in the Muslimworld. Rather the last century

has been one in which mostMuslim countries have first

been colonised and theninherited political, economic

and social institutions that thecolonialists left them

“

”

the authors suggest lies behind all otherproblems is a lack of democracy, whichleads to poor governance. Theydescribed that the attitude of Arabgovernments towards civil societiesranged from opposition to manipula-tion to "freedom under surveillance".The 2003 AHDR discussed the chal-lenges of developing a Knowledge BasedSociety in the Arab world andconcluded that the major obstacles werepolitical. The writers of the 2004 AHDRexamined the constraints on freedomthat prevent good governance in theArab world, and the last publishedAHDR report in 2005 examined thechallenges of empowering Arab womenin societies where the institutions ofcivil society don't really exist.

Colonisation, not Islam, is at the Rootof the Muslim World's PoliticalProblems

This state of affairs cannot be put at thedoor of Islamic orthodoxy, since Islamicinstitutions and traditions have beenmarginalised for most of the last centuryin the Muslim world. Rather the lastcentury has been one in which mostMuslim countries have first beencolonised and then inherited political,economic and social institutions that thecolonialists left them. Even the conceptof many independent countries in theMuslim world was new. During the earlypart of the twentieth century the Frenchand the British governments agreedbetween themselves as to who would getwhich part of the dominions of theOttoman state. The task of negotiationswas delegated to Georges Picot ofFrance and Sir Mark Sykes of Britainand the resulting Sykes-Picot agreementled to the division of the Ottoman statesuch that France's mandate corre-sponded to the future states of Syria andLebanon and Britain's mandate corre-sponded to Iraq and Transjordan.France ended up with direct control ofMediterranean coastal regions whilstBritain ended up controlling theprovinces of Basra and Baghdad andmaintained an exclusive relationshipwith the Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms.

Where independence brought multi-party democracies, they were soon todisappear. Most Muslim countries werecharacterised by one coup after anotheras different political or military factions

often supported by outside powersassumed power. For example, there wasthe 1947 coup led by Colonel Husni Al-Za'im in Syria, the 1952 coup led byGeneral Neguib in Egypt, the 1953 CIAsponsored coup that ended the rule ofPrime Minister Mossadeq, the 1958coup led by General Ayub Khan inPakistan, and the 1960 coup led byGeneral Cemal Gürsel in Turkey.

Institutions in the Muslim World areImported, not Home-Grown

In comparison the Western countrieshave largely not suffered from this typeof political instability during the lasthundred years. What differentiatesWestern political institutions from thosein the Muslim world is that they devel-oped organically over a number ofcenturies, adapted themselves to differ-ent realities over time and represent aneffective social consensus on how thesesocieties go about solving theirproblems. For example, the operation ofand the relationship between the BritishHouses of Parliament, the Judiciary, theMonarchy, the Army and the CivilService has been defined over a numberof years, as the British state found itselfin different situations and with differentproblems. Even today, it is still adaptingto new realities. For example the role ofthe House of Lords is being redefined inlight of the fact that aristocracy is nolonger as powerful as big business inter-ests and it is difficult to justify whyhereditary peers should participate inthe legislative process. There is a socialconsensus over the role of these institu-tions. It is not possible that a smallclique of people - generals or otherwise- could undertake a coup in Britain andstart making the laws themselves; therest of society would just not accept it.

However in the Muslim world, the insti-tutions that exist are not home grown ororganically developed, they do notreflect the historical experience ofpeople and do not connect with theirtraditions or values. What this means isthat there is very little social consensuson these systems, meaning they havevery limited legitimacy and there is littleor no reaction from people when ageneral undertakes a coup. In addition,Muslim countries tend to have veryinfluential Westernised elites, who haveusually studied abroad and are often

Section 4 - Mapping a Way Forward - 33

... in the Muslim world,the institutions that

exist are not home grown ororganically developed, they donot reflect the historicalexperience of people and donot connect with their traditionsor values

Looking back...it is very likelythat if Muslims had been left totheir own devices, a socialconsensus would have beendeveloped in the Muslim worldas to what form this changeshould have taken ... Howeveroccupation by foreign powersand colonisation led to aninterruption of this naturalprocess

“The collectivity of religiousscholars acted at leasttheoretically as a countervailingforce against tyranny. You hadthe implicit notion that if Islamis pushed out of the publicsphere, tyranny will increase,and if that happens, people willlook to Islam to redress thetyranny” (Richard Bulliet, Professor of

Middle Eastern Studies, Columbia

University)

“

”

wealthy. They are usually ignorant oftheir own history and traditions andtheir wealth allows them to live verydetached lives from the rest of society.Because of their situation and attitudesthey are unable to comprehend why therest of society behaves in the way it doesand they come to look down upon themasses.

Colonial Interference StalledIndigenous Attempts at Modernisingthe Muslim World

Prior to the colonisation of the Muslimworld, many Muslim politicians andthinkers had seen modernisation andindustrialisation take place in Westernnations and had come to the conclusionthat the Muslim world was backwardand needed to be reformed. This was anatural situation as there was muchinteraction and trade between theMuslim and non-Muslim world. Thedebate had started and there were avariety of opinions as to how Muslimsshould 'modernise' themselves. Iranianintellectuals Mulkum Khan (1833-1908)and Agha Khan Kermani (1853-96)urged Iranians to acquire a Westerneducation and replace the Shariah (thereligious legal code) with a modernsecular legal code. Some of the Ottomansultans pursued new models of industri-alisation and modernisation of theirown accord. For example, SultanMahmud II inaugurated the Tanzimat(Regulation) in 1826 which abolishedthe Janissaries (the highly dedicated elitecorps of troops organised in the four-teenth century), modernised the armyand introduced new technology. In 1839Sultan Abdul Hamid issued the Gulhanedecree which made his rule dependentupon a contractual relationship with hissubjects and looked forward to majorreform of the Caliphate's institutions.Some Muslim scholars took an approachof re-interpreting Islam so that it wasmore conformant to Western models;they wanted to maintain some Islamicvalues and principles whilst justifying

the adoption of some Western conceptswhich they thought would bringMuslim progress. There were many suchmodernising scholars, but two of themost famous ones were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97) and MuhammadAbduh (1849-1905). At this time theneed for change was evident to manythinkers, but the nature of this changeand the path to achieving it was poorlydefined.

Towards the end of the nineteenthcentury the desire for change was verystrong in the Muslim world. It was selfevident to most of the political elites,intellectuals, Muslim scholars andeducated people that something neededto be done; the status quo was unaccept-able. They had concluded that in manyrespects Muslims were far behind theWest and needed to catch up. Lookingback to this time it is very likely that ifMuslims had been left to their owndevices, a social consensus would havebeen developed in the Muslim world asto what form this change should havetaken. The social consensus may havetaken several decades to occur but itwould have been home grown, wouldhave happened organically and wouldhave adapted the Muslim world to newrealities. However occupation by foreignpowers and colonisation led to an inter-ruption of this natural process. Whenthe foreign powers finally departed whatthey left behind was a medley of coun-tries; many of which may have lookedgood on a map when the French andBritish planners created them, but inreality they were completely artificialand did not represent peoples that hadbeen bound together by a common andshared history and set of values. Inaddition, the institutions that Muslimsinherited were based on French orBritish models. By the time the colonialpowers left there was no public role forIslam to play in society, Islamic law andeducation had been devalued andIslamic scholars had been marginalised.With the old well established moral

compass no longer available and withsocial and political institutions that wereFrench or British in origin and lacking insocial consensus, it is not surprising thatthe Muslim world is blighted by instabil-ity, coups, tyranny and totalitarianism.

A Lack of Islam in the Politics of theMuslim World has CreatedTotalitarianism and Tyranny

The institutional role that Islamicculture has historically played inMuslim societies has been recognised bysome Western experts. Richard Bulliet,the Columbia Professor of MiddleEastern Studies, argued in his book -'The Case for Islamo-ChristianCivilization' - that comparative stabilityprevailed in the Islamic world notbecause of the Ottomans' success butbecause Islam was playing its traditionalrole of constraining tyranny.

"The collectivity of religious scholarsacted at least theoretically as a counter-vailing force against tyranny. You hadthe implicit notion that if Islam ispushed out of the public sphere, tyrannywill increase, and if that happens, peoplewill look to Islam to redress thetyranny."

This began to play out during theperiod. Instead of modernisation, whatensued was what Muslim clerics hadlong feared: tyranny. What the Arabworld should have seen was "not anincrease in modernisation so much asan increase in tyranny. By the 1960s,that prophecy was fulfilled. You haddictatorships in most of the Islamicworld." Egypt's Gamel Nasser, Syria'sHafez Assad and others came in theguise of Arab nationalists, but they werenothing more than tyrants.

Some Muslims put the blame for thetyranny and the totalitarianism prac-ticed in the Muslim world and the lackof a role for Islam in Muslim societieson Western interference. There is littledoubt that historically Western nationshave a share in the responsibility forbringing the Muslim world to where itis; they occupied it, created artificialentities and left the conditions fortyranny to arise. However, arguably theMuslim rulers who practice tyrannyupon the Muslim masses and theMuslim elites who support them also

34 - Section 4 - Mapping a Way Forward

With the old well established moral compass no longeravailable and with social and political institutions that were

French or British in origin and lacking in social consensus, it is notsurprising that the Muslim world is blighted by instability, coups,tyranny and totalitarianism

“”

have a share of the blame. However,only a few from amongst this viewpointplace all the blame on the West for thecurrent situation of the Muslims andthen seek to attack the West so thatWesterners also taste the pain of whatMuslims have been forced to suffer.Their aim, we are told, is to push for acivilisational war between the Westernand Muslim worlds, one in which allMuslims will be forced to join in fromthe sidelines. The irony is that theLewis-Bush doctrine in Iraq has donefar more to realise such an aim than anypreachers from within the fold of Islamcould have achieved.

PPaarrtt IIIIIIAllowing the Muslim World to Shape itsOwn Political Future

The Implications of Silencing theVoice of Islam

It is well known within Islamic scholar-ship that the deliberate targeting ofcivilians is prohibited irrespective of thevictims religion of nationality. Howeverin the tyrannies of the Muslim world, itis extremely difficult to start a debateupon the correct response to Westernimperialism using Islamic texts andprinciples. Islamic scholars in theMuslim world are unable to debate thisor other social issues openly because thecurrent regimes in the Muslim world donot tolerate such debate and discussion.For this reason the public scholars,appointed by the governments to preacha message of the governments choosing,lack credibility in their pronounce-ments. These governments view anygenuine Islamic debate as a threat andthey fear that once started it will bedirected towards them, exposing theirown lack of legitimacy and theirongoing tyranny. Whilst some Muslimscholars are co-opted by the regime,given government funded positionswhere they are only able to state theofficial government position, manyothers remain locked up in prisonsbecause in the past they have dared tocriticise the actions and policies ofMuslim governments. Other Islamicscholars practice self censorship of thesubjects they will discuss because theyare afraid of the consequences of beingseen to be critical of the government.

Even though orthodox Islam has notplayed a public role in most Muslimsocieties for the last century and Islamicscholars and teachings were margin-alised, in many Muslim societies arevival in Islamic practice and teachingsis taking place. For more and moreMuslims, Islam is becoming a majorfactor in shaping their attitudes, behav-iour and perspective. Many ideas suchas Arab nationalism, secularism andsocialism have been discredited in theMuslim world by regimes that claimedto be socialist, secular, or pan-Arabistbut brought totalitarianism and tyrannyand little material progress. Todayhowever, the only public choices that arebeing presented to Muslims are chosenby governments that are discredited andthere is a distinct lack of independentvoices - Islamic or otherwise - forpeople to listen to. Those that existoperate under persecution. Given thislack of open political debate and thesensation of Western armies occupyingMuslim lands, with the blessing of manyMuslim governments, it is unsurprisingthat many Muslims feel deeply alienatedfrom their own governments.

Muslims Should be Allowed toDetermine Their Own Political Destiny

There is a way of tackling chronic insta-bility in the Muslim world causedmainly by oppressive pro-Western dicta-tors. Outside attempts to dictate asecular Islam will fail and occupation ofMuslim lands by foreign armies is coun-terproductive and will simply generatemore recruits for countering, by anymeans, the Western onslaught.Therefore, it is required that Westernpoliticians and intellectuals to acceptthat Islam should be allowed to play itsnatural role in Muslim societies. Theyshould do this even if they disagree withsome of orthodox Islam's positions.There are too many Muslims in theworld for their beliefs and religion to besidelined against their wishes.Globalisation means that we will beaffected by what happens in other partsof the world. Muslims need to beallowed to complete the transformationof their societies without Western inter-ference - a process that started in thenineteenth century - so that they toocan find their place in the world of thetwenty-first century with a system thatfairly represent their own beliefs and

values. If liberal and secular thinkersfind they have strong disagreementswith Muslims then they should try toengage in thought provoking debatewith Muslims on the rights and wrongsof their beliefs and system. Theapproach of the neo-conservatives andintellectuals like Bernard Lewis or theRAND Corporation who want to dictatethe reformation of Islam, importAmerican defined democracy upon theMuslim world and occupy large parts ofit, will bring about a conflict that willlast for many generations. To avoid this,Western politicians and thinkers mustfind a constructive way of dealing withMuslims and Islam based around thenotion that Muslims must be left todefine their own political destiny inde-pendently.

Section 4 - Mapping a Way Forward - 35

Western politicians andthinkers must find a

constructive way of dealingwith Muslims and Islam basedaround the notion that Muslimsmust be left to define their ownpolitical destiny independently

Muslims need to be allowed tocomplete the transformation oftheir societies without Westerninterference ... so that they toocan find their place in the worldof the twenty-first century witha system that fairly representtheir own beliefs andvalues

“

”

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Notes

Explaining the aims in the 'War on Terror'

Challenging misconceptions about Radicalisation,Extremism and Political Violence

Explaining Islam's Political Tenets

Mapping a Way Forward