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Lecciones del terremoto de Chile 2010 y suimpacto en el suministro eléctrico

Hugh Rudnick



Preocupación en la sociedad moderna

Suministro seguro de servicios básicos

Alta dependencia de suministro eléctrico Impactos diversos en suministro eléctrico por

Problemas de abastecimiento de combustibles

Guerras, conflictos políticos, terrorismo

Desastres naturales (huracanes, terremotos,maremotos, erupciones volcánicas, etc.)

Necesidad estar preparados para enfrentarlos

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Seguridad de abastecimiento eléctrico



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Araneda, Juan Carlos(Transelec), Rudnick,Hugh (PUC), Mocarquer,Sebastian (Systep), Miquel,Pedro (Systep), "Lessons

from the 2010 Chileanearthquake and its impacton electricity supply", 2010International Conferenceon Power System

Technology (Powercon2010), Hangzhou, China,October 24-28, 2010



1575 Valdivia 8.5 1730 Valparaiso 8.7 1751 Concepción 8.5 1835 Concepción 8.5 1868 Arica 9.0 1906 Valparaíso 8.2 1922 Vallenar 8.5

1943 Coquimbo 8.2 1960 Valdivia 9.5 1985 Santiago 8.0 1995 Antofagasta 8.0

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Large earthquakes in Chile



•

03:34 hrs. February 27 2010• 8.8 Richter shakes 6 regions of Chile

along 500 km (80 % of population)

• Tsunami hits the cost minutes after

• Death toll: 521; Missing: 56

• Injured: 12,000; Displaced: 800,000• Infrastructure affected:

• 370,000 houses

• 4,013 schools

• 79 hospitals

• 4,200 boats damaged

• Economic loss: 30 billion US dollars

• Acceleration of 0.65 g in Concepcion

• 10 meter average plaques displacement

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The 2010 earthquake



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Large acceleration for long time

Peak acceleration of 0.65 g for one of the horizontalrecords. Duration of strong shaking for 70 seconds



Its effects– structural collapses



Its effects– building collapses



Effects of the tsunami



High standard of seismic requirements for its civil works. Buildingcodes in Chile are substantially the same as US codes (ACI 318, aleading concrete design reference for building codes worldwideissued by the American Concrete Institute).

High voltage electrical facilities, the national technical standardestablishes that facilities must obligatorily fulfill the ETG 1.015Chilean standard or the IEEE 693 standard in the condition of HighPerformance Level. It specifies a maximum 0.50 g acceleration and amaximum horizontal displacement of 25 cm. to be considered in the

design as the seismic intensity at the facility location. Specific electrical requirements for installation construction and

maintenance through Technical Norm of Security and Quality ofService, which defines technical and economic evaluations todetermine the reliability level on the planning and operation of the

power system.10

Norms and standards in Chile



SIC

Immediate blackout for4,522 load (peak demandof 6,145 MW and installedcapacity of 11,023 MW)

Longitudinal transmissionsystem over 2,200 km long

Grid lines mainly at 220kV and 500 kV

Five, then two, islandscheme for grid supplyrecovery

Distribution networks

severely damaged



Evolution of electricity supply



Black out with loss of 3,000 MW

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Evolution of electricity demand



Impact on operation

Severe impacts on country communicationsystems. Basic systems (mobile networks,emergency alert schemes, public order control),electricity dependant, did not operate as desired

and caused additional harm.Difficulties also arose in the communications

and telecontrol schemes of most electricityinstallations, transmission substations andgenerating plants, complicating plant andsystem recovery and operation. No alternative

backup radio systems.



Impact on operation

System operator (CDEC-SIC) had additionaldifficulties throughout the emergency as theSCADA system in use (for over ten years), wasnot able to provide information required for

system recovery (alarms could not be trusted asthey were often incorrect).

Traditional phone calls had to be used to learnon local conditions and supervise actions forequipment and system restoration.



4,522 MW dispatched

Immediate blackout

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Dispatched generation at event



Damage in generation plants

Bocamina plant



3,000 MW became unavailable immediately 693 MW (13 plants) went to major repairs

950 MW being built also

damaged

Cooling systems,

transformers,communications,lines, etc.

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But most remain available

MW (thermal plants) unavailable



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Damages in lines

Transelec has 8,239 km.of lines, 50 substations,10,486 MWtransformation capacity

Hualpen-Bocamina line (3 towers)



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Damages in substations



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Damages in substations



Capacitor bank

without damage

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Circuit breakerswith sufficientdamping

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Transmission assesment

Damages concentrated in one transmission line3 towers 154 kV line (1.6 km)

Substation damage (12 out of 46 substations,

26%). Mainly focused at:500 kV bushings (high failure rate, particularly in

transmission bushings)

500 kV pantograph disconnector switches

220 kV circuit breakers (live tank type)

154 kV circuit breakers (air compressed type)



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Transmission interconnection recovery

Recovery process of the interconnected system



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Worse extended damage in distribution



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28




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But most remains standing



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Distribution damage

4.5 million people were initially affected by theextended blackout that took place because of theearthquake and it took days, and even weeks insome areas, to recover full electricity supply.

Most affected areas supplied by CGE, Emelectricand Emelat. Chilectra also affected in Santiago.

80% of clients were without supply the day after

the earthquake and this reduced to 0.4% twoweeks after (related mainly to Concepcion andTalcahuano, next to the earthquake epicenter).



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Distribution damage

Some distribution networks were destroyed bythe effects of the earthquake, as houses fell overstreet lines or simply were washed away by thetsunamis (for example 40,000 houses were

destroyed out of 1.5 million supplied by CGE).Besides those distribution installations directly

damaged, there was little damage elsewhere.Distribution poles in Chile are mainlycompressed pre-stressed concrete poles, whichare well founded, and support importantmechanical stresses. Exceptions in overloaded

city poles.



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Heavily loaded poles in main cities




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Small percentage damage

760,000 poles in CGEand 300,000 in

Chilectra

50,000 transformers inCGE and 20,000 in

Chilectra.



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Challenges in supply recovery



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Damage in distribution

Distribution aerial transformers are often placed between two poles and a steel support, thus they alsowithstand well an earthquake.

Main difficulties in restoring supply to houses took placeat the connection point between the low voltage linesand the buildings.

Companies have equipment and human resources torepair normal failures within one or two days. But whenseveral hundred thousand of those connections fail, as in

an earthquake, the problem is quite different.Communication problems, difficult physical access tolocations, no resources to manage the huge number ofneeded repairs. Companies involved human resources

brought from other regions.



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Damage in distribution

Mobile generating sets brought to support recovery ofsupply, particularly in more isolated areas.

Challenges for distribution companies lasted monthsafter the earthquake (many latent faults, caused by thequake, that could not be detected when repairs were

been made days after the event, or if detected, weresecondary to the objective of supplying consumers asfast as possible).

Arrival of winter, with rain and wind, started ignitingthese faults in a a massive way, demanding thecompanies to comply.



37

Araneda, Juan Carlos(Transelec), Rudnick,Hugh (PUC), Mocarquer,Sebastian (Systep), Miquel,Pedro (Systep), "Lessons

from the 2010 Chileanearthquake and its impacton electricity supply", 2010International Conferenceon Power SystemTechnology (Powercon2010), Hangzhou, China,October 24-28, 2010



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Balance y conclusiones

Experiencia internacional indica mayores dañosen transmisión y distribución

Altos estándares y códigos constructivos civilesy en equipos eléctricos de generación

Imposible evitar impactos de desastre natural deesa magnitud en instalaciones eléctricas

Necesidad aprovechar experiencia y producirnecesarios cambios en métodos de prevención yde recuperación



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Balance negativo de capacidad de respuesta delpaís y su institucionalidad de emergencia.

Inaceptables niveles de fallas de infraestructurade comunicación

Balance positivo del nivel sísmico de lainfraestructura eléctrica (particularmente en

generación/transmisión)Claras oportunidades de mejoras,

particularmente a nivel de CDEC y de redes dedistribución



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Cuidado con reacciones excesivas a evento de baja frecuencia de ocurrencia

Necesidad evaluar económicamente accionespreventivas versus correctivas.



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Agradecimientos

Transelec

CGE Distribución

CGE Transmisión

CDEC-SIC

Chilectra

American Society of Civil Engineers’ Post-

Disaster Assessment Teams (Dr. Anshel Schiff,Stanford University)



Lecciones del terremoto de Chile 2010 y su

impacto en el suministro eléctrico

Hugh Rudnick

Documents

PUC Rudnick