PSCI 2002B/Q – Canadian Political EnvironmentFinal Essay - 2016/03/24

Ludovica Chiappini #101028674

THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION OF INTEREST GROUPS TO CANADIAN POLITICS: HOW REGULATION DEFEATS THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF

NARROW INTERESTS

Introduction

In every functioning democracy interest groups are ubiquitous and the range of interests

represented covers virtually every aspect of human experience. The myriad organizations

concerning issues as antithetical as abortion and nuclear power link the individuals to public

institutions and seek to influence public policies1. Nonetheless, interest groups engagement with

policy is a debatable phenomenon in pluralistic societies and there are enduring scholarly

discussions whether these groups are positive or negative for the political process of a country.

This paper centers on the role of interest groups in the Canadian democracy and their

correlation with its political system. It lies on the table the ensuing research questions: do they

contribute positively to Canadian policy-making? How important is the regulation of interest

group agents in influencing their role in Canadian politics? Despite the limitless confusion

surrounding the argument, the essay’s response is distinct: interest groups play a positive role in

Canadian politics due to the presence of a specific lobbying regulation that enhances the

potential benefits of their actions, ensuring transparency, accountability and legitimacy in the

political process.

The first section of the paper examines the main queries made by academics about the inherent

nature of interest groups and their positive or negative contribution to the policy-making process.

As a result of the literature review, the paper assumes that interest groups have a neutral

connotation and they are potentially harmful or useful depending on the specific political

environment. Based on such premises, the second section focusses on the Canadian political

framework presenting the major arguments that demonstrate how the Canadian context is

particularly suited to observing interest groups playing a useful role. Primarily, the inherent

1 Lehman Schlozman, Kay. "Interest Groups." International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA. 2015 Elsevier Ltd., 368-70.

tendency to compromise entrenched in the Canadian multiculturalism is brought up. Secondly,

the paper presents the Lobbying Act adopted by the Canadian government as the crucial vector

that enables the beneficial interest group involvement in the policy formulation. To strengthen

this argument, the essay highlights the key elements of the Act and it discusses the approval of

the Product Containing Mercury Regulations to illustrate how the transparent and regulated

interaction among several interest groups allow them to contribute positively to the Canadian

politics. Successively, the third part provides a further evidence to support the paper statement

carrying out a counterfactual analysis with the unregulated Italian political ecosystem. The recent

Expo 2015 scandal and the negative interference of the Italian gambling industry in the policy

formulation are examined as case studies to point out the harmful impact of interest groups on a

non-transparent political framework. Finally, the conclusions will be drawn in the last section.

The inherent neutral character of interest groups

The idea of interest groups is highly controversial and scholars have not yet found a persuasive

thinking whether these groups are inherently positive or negative for the political process. To cut

through the fog surrounding the nature of interest groups, it is useful to frame the analysis

unearthing the two main interpretations: Stanbury’s sceptic view of self-interested groups2 and

Montpetit’s assumption of outward-looking organizations3.

Concisely, Stanbury’s proposition is that politician, public servants and citizens should be

sceptical of the interest groups always advocating policies that award collective benefits.

Actually, the evidence is that greatest utility usually accrues to the members of the group and not

2 Stanbury, W. T. "A Sceptic's Guide to the Claims of So-called Public Interest Groups." Canadian Public Administration/Administration Publique Du Canada Canadian Public Admin 36, no. 4 (1993): 580-605. 3Montpetit E. “Are Interest Groups Useful or Harmful? Take Two”. In J. Bickerton and A. G. Gagnon (eds.), Canadian Politics.   Sixth Edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014.

to the overall community. In fact, interest groups “dress themselves in the clothes of altruism”4

while seeking to influence the government to benefit their members at the expense of the others.

Their real nature is being intolerant of other expressed desires aiming to overcome different

interests rather than to achieve compromises. In essence, Stansbury assumes that interest groups

are inherently negative for the policy-making process. Indeed, they divide the society and

obstruct the realization of an appropriate balance of interests in the final policy. Oppositely,

Montpetit defines interest groups as “organizations created to facilitate the collective action of

members who share interests and ideas with the objective of making a contribution to policy

making”5. He claims that these actors are not strictly motivated by narrow material interests,

rather they are driven by the desire to contribute ideas and expertise in the political process.

Hence, according to Montpetit’s view, interest groups have a positive outward-looking nature.

They play a useful role putting their expertise and knowledge at the service of the policy

formulation.

These two antithetical assumptions are the mirror of an endless debate that attempts to

categorize interest groups into saviors or destroyers of the democratic policy-making process

without considering the countless shades. In contrast, the paper embraces a less binding

interpretation. Interest groups serve as intermediaries between individuals and policy makers and

they all perform certain ordinary functions such as providing information and assisting public

officers in designing policy, seeking to persuade policy makers to a preferred course of action.

Despite the widely shared functions, their capacity to penetrate the political system, the

techniques used to influence and the consequences of their action on the policy-making process

vary substantially depending on the set of regulations established to manage the interaction

4 P.J. O’Rourke, Parliament of Whores (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991): 186,187, 193-94.5 Montpetit, “Are Interest Groups Useful or Harmful? Take Two”: 331.

between interest groups and governments in a specific political system6.

Hence, these fluctuations of interest groups behaviors lead reasonably to assume that they are

not positive or negative under any circumstance. Instead, they have an inherent neutral

connotation and the political environment of a country has a pivotal role in shaping their impact.

Indeed, Interest groups play a negative role in the policy-making process when they seek to

increase their utility at the expenses of other expressed desires being intolerant and trying to

overcome them. Thus, the public policies are the outcome of narrow interests. On the contrary,

interest groups contribute positively to the policy process when they put their ideas, expertise

and knowledge at the service of problem-solving, aiming to public policies based on an

appropriate balance of interests. To conclude, their configuration depends on the political

environment in a country and its capacity to define their performance through regulations.

The Canadian political environment: the useful contribution of interest groups to the policy process

Considering the above-mentioned conclusions, it is essential to inspect the specific political

environment of a country in order to evaluate the harmful or useful role of interest groups in its

politics. Therefore, the paper reflects on the Canadian political framework and on the traits that

prove the pertinence of the Canadian context to observe the useful role of the interest groups. In

particular, it draws the attention on two features of the Canadian political landscape: a cultural-

oriented pattern, the multiculturalism, and a more normative-oriented one, the Canadian lobbying

regulation.

1.Canadian Multiculturalism: the inherent tendency to compromise

Canada stands out to be a “multicultural society”. Ideologically, multiculturalism consists of a

“relatively coherent set of ideas and ideals pertaining the celebration of Canada’s cultural

6 Lehman Schlozman, Kay. "Interest Groups.": 368.

diversity”7. The pluralism is the essence of the Canadian identity. Hence, the ethos of a

multinational state with linguistic-cultural divides has relevant implications for the way Canada

and its people use to deal with the diversity. For instance, English Canadians have to share their

federation with Québécois who are less attached to a pan-Canadian prospective. For their part,

French Canadians had to accept the compromise of a less developed version of nationalism. In

essence, Canadian multiculturalism leads to an inherent tendency to compromise entrenched in

its political culture8.

This attitude partially shaped the inclination of interest groups in participating in the policy-

making process. They have a bias towards differences tolerating them and aiming to achieve an

appropriate balance of interests that should be taken into account in the final policy. Indeed,

Canadian public policies are potentially the outcome of multiple special interests and groups do

not divide the society having traditionally an inclination to think that neither side can fully

achieve its objectives. Although multiculturalism is a relevant nudge to encourage the

constructive participation of interests in the political process, a mere cultural attitude is not

enough to be a justification. In fact, it is the strict lobbying regulation adopted by the Canadian

government that encourages the beneficial impact of interest groups on the Canadian political

environment.

2.The pivotal role of lobbying regulation in giving a positive name to interest groups in

Canada

The absence of interest groups public visibility threatens the democratic policy process allowing

the most influential representatives of interests to have the liberty to take advantage of their

7 Dewing, M. “Canadian Multiculturalism” (Background Paper). Library of Parliament, Publication No. 2009-20-E. 15 September 2009. Revised 14 May 2013.8 Resnick, P. "Canada: A Different North American Society?" Inroads no. 14 (Winter, 2004): 98-106.

power to persuade the government. Before 1989, the secrecy surrounding anonymous interest

agents and their closed-door negotiations with the public office holders were contributing to the

erosion of Canada encouraging bribery, deceits and falsification of information. The unregulated

agency of interest groups was a reason of the consistent number of political scandals and

“private-gain” policies9. Hence, the Canadian government decided to adopt The Lobbyists

Registration Act that came into force on September 30, 1989. It set basic requirements for the

registration of lobbyists, including their commitment providing information about themselves

and the subject of their lobbying activity10.

Over the years, several improvements have been achieved in line with the purpose to ensure

the ethically correct behavior of interest groups enhancing the integrity, objectivity and

impartiality of government decision-making. Finally, The Lobbying Act was approved on

July 2, 2008 improving the accountability of the interest agents and the legitimacy of the

Government. It enforces equal opportunities to access public offices stimulating the participation

of different voices to the public decisions. The Act provides for the presence of a public register

of interest groups, entrusted to a super partes authority (Commissioner of Lobbying); the public

disclosure of legislative process; the commitment of both MPs and interest groups to publish the

details of meetings. Indeed, lobbyists are required to disclose certain information regarding their

communications with public office holders (DPOHs). DPOHs, for their part, are required to

confirm to the Commissioner the reliability of the information submitted by lobbyists. Moreover,

The Lobbying Act includes the guarantee of access to any documents and products of public

administration and regulates the phenomenon of revolving doors through the introduction of

9Gatner, J. "In Pursuit of Public Opinion: Politics of Pressure Groups." Canada: Canadian Regional Review 3, no. 3 (September 1980): 32-36. 10 "The Lobbying Act." Government of Canada, Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying. Accessed March 15, 2016. https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/eic/site/012.nsf/eng/h_00008.html

cooling-off period meaning a post-employment prohibition on lobbying for five years that is

imposed on all former DPOHs. Finally, monetary penalties and imprisonment for a term not

exciding two years are established for lobbyists who are found guilty of violating the

requirements of the Lobbying Act11.

Since the introduction of such strict lobbying regulation, interest groups have been

limited to act harmfully in the Canadian democracy. According to the official statistics, the

control of corruption in Canada - one of the worldwide governance indicators that “reflects the

perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain as well as capture of

the state by elites and private interests” - is at 97%12. Higher values correspond to better

governance outcomes. This means that Canada is ranked as one of the best countries in terms of

corruption control and good governance. Indeed, starting from 1989, the Canadian political

environment practically creates the conditions to stimulate the potential benefits of interest

groups promoting transparency, accountability and legitimacy in the policy making process and

increasing the possibility that all interests could be taken into consideration without any

preferences. The statistics confirm that interest groups play a positive role in Canadian politics

and that the lobbying regulation is the pivotal trait in giving them a positive name.

A concrete example of how the transparent and regulated interaction among several

interest groups play a positive role in the Canadian policy-making process is the approval of

the Products Containing Mercury Regulations. Coming into force on November 8, 2015, it

prohibits the manufacture and import of products containing mercury or any of its compounds.

Some exemptions occur for products which have no technically or economically feasible

11 Lobbying Act, § R.S., 1985, c. 44 (4th Supp.), s. 1; 2006, c. 9, s. 66. (July 2, 2008).12 "Corruption by Country / Territory." Transparency International. Accessed March 15, 2016. http://www.transparency.org/country/#CAN_DataResearch.

alternatives. For instance, in the case of lamps, rather that prohibit, the regulations limit the

amount of mercury contained in fluorescent and other types of lamps13.

Without going into issues concerning the legislation, the attention of the paper is

concentrated on the positive role interest groups played in achieving the policy and how the

transparent structure of the relations between them and the Government helped. In fact, the

political outcome, as inferable from the content of the regulation, is a perfect compromise

between the interests of the environmentalists and health associations and the ones of the

business stakeholders. The balance is in the prohibition of the manufacture and import of

products containing mercury due to their detrimental impact on individuals’ health and the

environment while excluding some products which do not have other economically viable

alternatives than being made of mercury. In this manner, the economic downturn of the

industries involved is avoided.

Thus, the achievement of the representation of all interests in a political decision through

the compromise is feasible in Canada. The reason lies in the institutional practices that envisage

public consultations with all the stakeholders14 allowing interest groups to publicly put their

expertise and knowledge at the service of the policy makers. The presence of rules that

circumscribe the activity of interest group agents and guarantee the transparency of the policy-

making process is the key point to avoid political corruption and the dominance of the wealthiest

groups of interest. The validity of this argument is further demonstrated through the

counterfactual scenario of an unregulated ecosystem such the Italian one. As presented in the

following paragraph, the impact of interest groups on this environment is detrimental and

antithetical to the Canadian reality.

13 Products Containing Mercury Regulations, § SOR/2014-254 (November 7, 2014). http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2014/2014-11-19/html/sor-dors254-eng.php14 Ibid.

The unregulated Italian political ecosystem

The Italian political environment suits to observe interest groups playing a negative role. Italy

has always identified political parties the only entities responsible for representing the interests

of the society. This feature undermined the role of interest groups in the policy-making process

and recognized them as external entities. Indeed, they used to act behind the public scenes. Yet,

the cultural attitude is not sufficient to justify their negative role. It is the lack of a specific

lobbying regulation the essential reason.

Even though almost 50 draft laws15 have been presented to the parliament since the

beginning of the Republic in 1946, no regulation has been passed. Hence, the political

framework in Italy does not embrace any compulsory register of lobbying, any reporting

requirement or public disclosure from the lobbyists. Also, public sector representatives, for their

part, are not required to disclose information on their contacts with stakeholders. In particular,

everything remains opaque when the law is in a draft version. Likewise, when the law passes

through the Parliamentary Commissions, there is no track record of the procedures. Finally,

equal participation in decision-making is not properly enforced. Indeed, the consultations are

used discretionally and there is no guarantee that all interest groups potentially affected by the

legislative proposal would be heard16.

In this unregulated landscape, it is not reasonable to assume that the political decisions

are achieved after copious discussions where all groups bring their expertise and contribute to the

policy-making process. In absence of a specific lobbying regulation, interest groups meet the

15 Del Monte, D., C. Putaturo, G. Fraschini, and S. Ferro. "Lobbying and Democracy: Representing Interests in Italy, Transparency International Report, November 2014." Transparency International Report, November 2014.16 Petrillo, P. L. Democrazie Sotto Pressione: Parlamenti E Lobby Nel Diritto Pubblico Comparato. Milano: Giuffrè, 2011.

policy makers informally and engage in closed-door negotiations, encouraging the practice of a

lobbying based on personal relations rather than official procedures and public communications.

An example of this practice relates to vicissitude of the Universal Exposition (Expo) held

in Milan in 2015. The scandal involves a group of interest made up of former politicians who

relied on networks built in the past to create informal connections between companies and public

officers working in the Expo 2015 area17. This interest group prevailed above the others in the

governmental negotiations due to the lack of a revolving door normative.

The negative interference of the Italian gambling industry in the policy formulation is

another practical example of the harmful impact of interest groups on a non-transparent political

framework. The sector is linked to politics through funds and revolving doors practices. Several

politicians are involved in the gambling sector and a case regarding slot machines appeared in

the news in December 2013. It concerned a decree law aimed at introducing financial measures

to reduce the debt of local administrations. Nonetheless, an amendment was silently introduced

to the decree. The aim of this favoritism action was to reduce funds to those regions and

municipalities that restrict gambling. A public track record of the meetings held with lobbyists

would have discouraged the negative involvement of the gambling industry in the legislative

process. Furthermore, for both the gambling case and the Expo one, improved regulations on

revolving doors could have better avoid situations of undue influence. In essence, these cases

demonstrate how the lack of regulation on interest groups encourage the dominance of privileged

narrow interest and their harmful impact on the policy-making process. It is not surprising that

the control of corruption in Italy, according to the same statistics mentioned for Canada, is at

57%18.

17 Ibidem, 4.18"Corruption by Country / Territory." Transparency International. Accessed March 16, 2016. http://www.transparency.org/country/#ITA

Conclusions

In reaction to the investigations that aim to categorize the nature of interest groups as inherently

positive or negative independently of the circumstances, the paper carried out a different

approach assuming that the character of interest groups is neutral and their connotation is

influenced by the political and institutional context in which they operate. In line with this

assumption, the paper has observed the specific Canadian political environment. Furthermore, it

has presented a counterfactual analysis with the unregulated Italian ecosystem highlighting the

different role interest groups have in this context. Finally, the paper proved that interest groups

play a positive role in Canadian politics. They make their interests, expertise and knowledge

available to policy makers allowing them to formulate balanced policies. Differently, the Italian

ecosystem is appropriate to illustrate the detrimental contribution of these entities.

The essay observed that the presence of interest groups regulatory measures is the

distinguishing factor in framing their role. To conclude, interest groups play a positive role in

Canadian politics due to the presence of a specific lobbying regulation that enhances the

potential benefits of their actions, ensuring transparency, accountability and legitimacy in the

political process.

Bibliography

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"Corruption by Country / Territory." Transparency International. Accessed March 16, 2016. http://www.transparency.org/country/#ITA

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Stanbury, W. T. "A Sceptic's Guide to the Claims of So-called Public Interest Groups." Canadian Public Administration/Administration Publique Du Canada Canadian Public Admin 36, no. 4 (1993): 580-605.