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1 Procedures for Off-Nominal Cases: Three Closely Spaced Parallel Runway Operations Savita Verma, Sandra Lozito, NASA Ames Research Center Deborah Ballinger Thomas Kozon, Perot Systems / NASA Ames Herbert Resnick, Raytheon Corporation Gordon Hardy, Ramesh Panda, SAIC/ NASA Ames Darrell Wooten & Diane Carpenter, ATM 2009 Conference June 29- July 2 2009

Procedures for Off-Nominal Cases: Three Closely … Procedures for Off-Nominal Cases: Three Closely Spaced Parallel Runway Operations Savita Verma, Sandra Lozito, NASA Ames Research

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1

Procedures for Off-Nominal Cases: Three Closely Spaced Parallel Runway Operations

Savita Verma, Sandra Lozito, NASA Ames Research CenterDeborah Ballinger

Thomas Kozon, Perot Systems / NASA Ames

Herbert Resnick, Raytheon Corporation

Gordon Hardy, Ramesh Panda, SAIC/ NASA AmesDarrell Wooten & Diane Carpenter,

ATM 2009 Conference June 29- July 2 2009

2

Agenda

• Background• Approach• Focus of the study• Results• Conclusions• Future Research

3

Motivation

• Potential capacity gains from third runway 750 ft apart especially because it could be added within the existing foot print of the airport

• No previous research on procedures for three parallel runways 750 ft and their impact on workload and situation awareness

Background

4

Previous ResearchConcept No. of

runwaysRunway

SeparationResearcher / Research area

Triple at Hartsfield, Atlanta

3 1000ft/4000ft

Variations on simultaneous approachesGladstone (2000) Mitre

3

SOIA/ MPAP 2/3 >=750 ft Non-Transgression Zone (for breakout maneuvers)

Multiple Parallel Approach Program-(MPAP)

4000 ft and 5300 ft

Breakout maneuvers on three runwaysMagyarits & Ozmore, 2002FAA

Background

5

Focus of Study

• Investigate procedures, roles and responsibilities for off-nominal situations that require a breakout maneuver for simultaneous approaches to three parallel runways 750 ft apart.

– Feasibility of the procedures– Impact of procedures on workload and/or situation

awareness levels

Focus

6

Independent Variables• Nominal vs. breakout

• Cause of breakout: – Aircraft deviation (blunder)– Crosswind blowing wake towards the trailing aircraft

• Location of breakout:– Above 500 ft– Between 200 ft and 500 ft

• Relative position of the simulator– Center– Trailing

Approach

7

Experimental Procedure• Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator:

digital, audio, and video data collection– Six degree motion – Performance similar to Boeing 757– Side stick control

• 8 days of data collection - 8 participants • Total runs = 24 per participant.• Each run was 10-15 min long followed with

questionnaires and debriefs.• All runs had visibility of 2 nm at 400 ft.

Approach

8

Our ApproachRunways 750 ft

apart Dynamic S-trajectories

adaptive and displayed in real

time

DGPS*, ADS-B**, winds on a/c

assumed

*Differential Global Positioning System**Automatic Dependent Surveillance System

S trajectory parallels 1.5 nmi for center a/c and at 3 nmi for the

trailing aircraft

Approach

9

Procedure / ScenarioApproach

Coupling Point

Ownship

Navigational Display

10

Displays for Breakout Procedure

Primary Flight Display Navigation Display

Approach

Normal conditions

wakewake

LSILSI

Predictor Dots

Breakout trajectory

11

Breakout Procedures and DisplaysApproach

Wake drifting towards follower

Leader’s wake drifted by one wing span

Follower’s center of gravity in leader’s wake

12

Breakout Procedures & DisplaysApproachApproach

Leader deviates 120 ft towards follower

Leader deviates 60 ft towards follower

Aircraft Blunder

13

Breakout Maneuvers

Altitude Bank Angle

> 500 ft 30 deg

200- 500 ft 10 deg

Relative Position

Heading change

Center 20 deg

Trailing 40 deg

Approach

14

Dependent Variables

• Aircraft separation during breakout• Accuracy of breakout maneuver• Subjective data:

– Workload– Situation awareness– Acceptability of procedures

Approach

15

Aircraft Separation During Breakout• Three-way repeated measures analysis of variance

• Dependent variables: - Slant range between

1. leader / center aircraft2. center / trailing aircraft

• Independent variables:- Cause of breakout- Location of breakout (low / high altitude)- Relative position of the simulator (center / trailing)

Results

16

Aircraft Separation During Breakout

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

Breakout Breakout+15s Breakout+30s

Results

leader/center

Slant range separation (ft)

• No single instance of slant range separation less than 2400 ft• Breakout aircraft separation always well above the threshold

value specified in an FAA study (Magyaritis & Ozmore, 2002)

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

Breakout Breakout+15s Breakout+30s

center/trailing

17

Aircraft Separation During Breakout• Leader / Center Separation 15s past breakout

• Pilot participants indicated that the uncertainty of wake characteristics prompted faster responses

• Higher altitude breakout reflect different post breakout geometries between aircraft

Results

2500260027002800290030003100320033003400

Aircraftblunder

Wake Higheraltitude

Loweraltitude

Mean aircraft separation (ft)

Breakout locationF=20.45 df=1,7 p<0.01

Breakout causeF=89.87 df=1,7 p<0.0001

18

Aircraft Separation During Breakout• Center / Trailing Separation 15s past breakout

Pilots indicated that the center aircraft needs to maintainseparation with two other aircraft

Results

2500260027002800290030003100320033003400

Higheraltitude

Loweraltitude

Center Trailing

Mean aircraft separation (ft)

Breakout LocationF=44.73 df=1,7 p<0.001

Simulator PositionF=40.39 df=1,7 p<0.001

19

Pilot Workload: NASA Task Load Index

• Higher overall workload in breakout runs

• Off-nominal conditions require the safe maneuvering of the aircraft following breakout, rather than implementing normal approach procedures

Results

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

men

tal

phys

ical

* te

mpo

ral

* pe

rfor

man

ce

* ef

fort

* fr

ustr

atio

n*

com

posi

te

Workload 1=low7=high

nominal breakout

* p<=0.05

20

Pilot Situation Awareness

• Dependent variables from Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART)- Ten subscales combined Into 3 broader categories

Demands of the situation- instability, variability, complexity

Personal resources- alertness, spare mental capacity,concentration,division of attention

Situation provision- information quantity, information quality, familiarity

Results

21

Pilot Situation Awareness (SART)

• Higher overall situation demands in breakout runs (F=25.46, df=2,6, p<=0.01)

• Situation instability, variability, complexity: consistent with workload results

• Non-significant results for situation provision indicate that information and procedures provided was adequate for both nominal and off-nominal cases

Results

1

6

11

16

21

26

* situation demands(range= 3 to21)

personal resources(range = 4 to 28)

situation provision(range = 3 to 21)

level of situation

awareness

nominal breakout

22

Pilot Discussion / FeedbackFeedback on Procedures

• Some maneuvers were aggressive• Trust in automation could be an issue• Automate breakout maneuvers

User Interface Feedback• Pilots wanted the system to automatically set the

field of view of the navigation displays so that all three aircraft were always visible

• Information provided via the displays was considered simple, clear and unambiguous

Results

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Conclusions

Feasibility of breakout procedures was tested using three very closely spaced parallel runways

• Aircraft separation was maintained well above 2400 ft during breakout across all conditions

• Similar levels of situation awareness between nominal and breakout runs indicate adequacy of information and procedures

• While workload was higher in breakout flights, it still remained manageable across all conditions

Summary

24

Future Work• Auto pilot versus manual breakout procedures

• Evaluation of the role of air traffic control

• Evaluation of post-breakout maneuvers back into the arrival flow

• Evaluation of the integration of our concept with terminal and surface operations

Summary

25

[email protected]

[email protected] courtesy of the FAA