Proactive Policing: Standing on the Shoulders of Community‐Based Policing

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  • This article was downloaded by: [FU Berlin]On: 22 October 2014, At: 03:26Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

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    Proactive Policing: Standing on theShoulders of CommunityBased PolicingCurtis ClarkePublished online: 15 Aug 2006.

    To cite this article: Curtis Clarke (2006) Proactive Policing: Standing on the Shoulders ofCommunityBased Policing, Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 7:1, 3-17, DOI:10.1080/15614260600579508

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  • Police Practice and Research,Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 317

    ISSN 15614263 print/ISSN 1477271X online 2006 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/15614260600579508

    Proactive Policing: Standing on the Shoulders of Community-Based PolicingCurtis Clarke

    Taylor and Francis LtdGPPR_A_157933.sgm10.1080/15614260600579508Police Practice & Research1561-4263 (print)/1477-271X (online)Original Article2006Taylor & Francis71000000March 2006Dr CurtisClarkecurtisc@athabascau.ca

    This paper examines how Edmonton Police Service has built on the foundation ofcommunity-based policing and problem solving in an effort to achieve greater levels ofefficiency and effectiveness. These proposed operational strategies are closely aligned withthe conceptual framework of proactive policing. Here, proactive policing, in its originalformulation, refers to the strategic deployment of resources in order to target criminallyactive individuals (Stockdale et al., 1999, p. 5). The paper also examines the implicationsproactive policing has for police management and how Edmonton has responded to anorganizational environment that requires management of demand.

    Keywords: Proactive Policing; Community Policing; Crime Management; Intelligence-Led Policing

    Introduction

    Recently, police policymakers and strategists have begun to build on the foundation ofcommunity-based policing and problem solving in an effort to achieve greater levels ofefficiency and effectiveness. These proposed operational strategies are closely alignedwith the conceptual framework of proactive policing. Here, proactive policing, in itsoriginal formulation, refers to the strategic deployment of resources in order to targetcriminally active individuals (Stockdale, Whitehead, & Gresham, 1999, p. 5). Interest-ingly, proactive policing has a number of implications for police management in that,it sets in place an environment that requires management of demand. These demandsare succinctly stated in the following passage:

    Curtis Clarke is an Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Criminal Justice Program at Athabasca University(Alberta, Canada). He has carried out empirical studies on the implementation of community-based policing,police organizational/managerial change, intelligence-led policing, and the shifting boundaries between privateand public policing. Correspondence to: Dr Curtis Clarke, 10-26312 Twp. Rd., 514 Spruce Grove, Alberta, CanadaT7Y 1C8. Email: curtisc@athabascau.ca

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    Increased proactivity requires a change in management ethos, as well as placing moredemands on managers. Higher levels of proactivity assume that managers are able to elicitsupport from all levels in the service, despite cultural resistance; to deal with a range ofethical and civil liberties issues; and, in many cases, to take greater accountability forresource deployment and outcome. (Stockdale et al., 1999, p. 5)

    Moreover, in this changing environment and adoption of proactive strategies, policemanagers must be prepared to stand away from traditional police philosophies andmethodologies; to believe that operations can and should be driven by intelligence; toact rather than to react (RCMP, 2002). From an operational perspective these initia-tives require a rapid adaptation from a service model which until relatively recently,still bore many of the structural characteristics of its organizational (and operational)origins in the nineteenth century (Savage & Charman, 1996, p. 39).

    Defining Proactive Policing (Crime Management/Intelligence-Led Policing)

    If there is indeed a trend toward the adoption of proactive policing the question of defi-nition becomes a critical point of clarification. As we can attest from previous paradigmshifts corresponding with community-based policing, clarity of definition is essentialto successful implementation. In the context of this paper and in light of previousoperational shifts in policing, the question to ask is whether or not a clear definition ofproactive policing exists. Certainly, a comprehensive definition is possible based onresearch regarding specific actions and goals associated with existing policing initia-tives and their implementation. Evaluations undertaken by numerous policingacademics and practitioners have resulted in a consensus of key elements and broadprinciples associated with Proactive and Intelligence-Led Policing. A synthesis of theseevaluations suggests the following typology of core components:

    1. A strategic future-oriented and targeted approach to crime control.2. A focus upon the identification, analysis, and management of persisting and devel-

    oping problems or risks.3. A strategy centred on the acquisition of intelligence in order to facilitate knowl-

    edge-based decision making, allowing the targeting of resources and the disruptionof prolific criminals.

    4. An enabling of variability and flexibility of operational initiatives.5. A requirement for management of demand, in order to increase the resources for

    proactivity, as well as, the resources made available.6. A presupposition of a higher status afforded to the intelligence function.7. And use of feedback to adjust, expand, abandon, and maintain initiatives (Amey,

    Hale, & Uglow, 1996; Barker-McCardle, 2001; Maguire, 2001; Read & Tilley, 2000;Stockdale et al., 1999).

    Simply put, in practice proactive policing means

    making use of data to establish the existence and extent of a problem, to analyse its natureand source, to plan intervention measures to reduce it, and to monitor and evaluate theeffectiveness of the selected responses. (Read & Tilley, 2000, p. 3)

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    Previous evaluations of proactive policing have articulated clear criteria for success-ful implementation based upon a police services ability to achieve key crime manage-ment concepts (Amey et al., 1996; Read & Tilley, 2000; Stockdale et al., 1999; Tilley &Laycock, 2002). These concepts are outlined in Table 1.

    While it is essential to define what is meant by Proactive or Intelligence-LedPolicing it is also important to evaluate both the effectiveness and the degree towhich these concepts are in fact operationalized. With this objective in mind theremainder of this paper analyses Edmonton Police Services (EPSs) efforts to imple-ment a model of proactive policing. The following sections offer first a brief over-view of the socio-political drivers guiding the EPSs operational shift towardproactive policing and secondly an examination of the current implementationprocess, best practices, and efforts EPS has undertaken to ensure proactive policingstrategies are effective.

    The Socio-political Context: Responding to an Era of Fiscal Restraint

    Edmontons evolution toward a model of proactive policing has been driven, in part,by a decade of Provincial and Municipal fiscal restraint. The trend of fiscal conserva-tism had begun with the 1993 election of Premier Ralph Kleins Conservative Party.Under the stewardship of the Klein government, policing, like other municipalservices, was swept into the vortex of budget restraint and restructuring. The Kleinrevolution (a phrase frequently utilized when referring to the Klein policy platforms)would deliver two direct policy hits to municipal policing. The first came from theMinistry of Justice in its attempt to set in place its required three-year business plan.In Alberta Justices 199495 annual report Deputy Minister of Justice Neil McCrankset out 11 business functions all of which had a number of goals attached, some of[which] are related to budget, while others are related to increased efficiency orimprovement of service (Alberta Justice, Annual Report, 199495, p. ii). Topping thelist of business functions was that of reducing crime through policing and preventionprograms and the first goal related to this function was to provide high quality cost

    Table 1 Crime Management Concepts.

    Concept 1 Proactivity is given a higher priority over reactivity.

    Concept 2 Divisional management teams direct all operational work and manage resources according to force and divisional priorities.

    Concept 3 Intelligence unit is central to the working of the Division and produces targeted intelligence files and quality information to support policing functions. Intelligence is used to target criminals and to inform crime prevention activities.

    Concept 4 Reactive response is decreased by use of an appropriate call dispatch distribution strategy.

    Concept 5 The primary output of each team/individual initiative should be identified and made the subject of team performance indicators for both quantity and quality. This will ensure accountability, as well as create a pool of best practices.

    Source: Amey et al. (1996).

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    effective programs to prevent and control crime (ibid., p. 2). In order to achieve thisgoal municipal policing grants were reduced by 50% ($16 million) over the threeyears of the business plan (ibid.). The achievement of this restraint was well underway within the first year of the business plan and by April 1, 1994, Alberta Justice nolonger awarded municipal policing grants, relinquishing this responsibility to theMinistry of Municipal Affairs. It was at this point that municipal policing was to takeits second hit.

    Municipal Affairs disbursement and administration of municipal policing grantswould prove problematic in that they were included in the lump sum grants allocatedto the municipalities. The situation became even more precarious when the 199495budget set out a $59 million cut in municipal grants. Further to this the 1995/96budget would see this grant reduced by 10 percent to $169 million and outlined plansto cut this grant in half again by 199697 (Lisac, 1995, p. 196). Limited municipalgrants nurtured a competitive relationship between municipal agencies and servicesas they vied for shrinking pieces of the budgetary pie. As with other municipalities,Edmontonians would take on increased responsibility for order maintenance as afunction of the Services fiscal constraints and adoption of community-basedpolicing.

    One early solution to Edmontons increased fiscal restraint and demands forefficient service took shape in the guise of the Edmonton Police Plan. The police planwas conceived as a guide by which Edmonton would set out clear Service goals, bound-aries of accountability, and methods of evaluation. As noted in the Police Plansstrategic vision:

    The creation of the Edmonton Police Plan is the first step in establishing a mutual andcollective vision which guides the Service in the delivery of quality policing in this city forthe next three years. The Edmonton Police Plan will evolve to include the principal compo-nents ordinarily associated with separate plans devoted to strategic issues, technology,communications, facilities, finances, and operations. It will not be shelf material. (Edmon-ton Police Service, 1996, p. 1)

    The underlying premise of this process was the objective of implementing a decentral-ized service structure, whereby the responsibility for service could be downloaded tothe Division and thus to the community.

    The operational premise of the Police Plan corresponded to Osborne and Gaeblers(1993) concept of steering and rowing in which the executive sets the objective or goalfor the organization (steering) and empowers those who are most capable of deliver-ing the service (rowing). Similarly Edmontons Police Plan outlined a process ofservice delivery that required a bottom-up process wherein frontline officers, supervi-sors, and managers synthesized service-wide plans into actions and standards. TheseDivisional actions and standards would be negotiated with the Chiefs Committee forthe purpose of planning, performance evaluation and accountability (Memorandumfrom Chief Lindsay, April 8, 1997, cited in Edmonton Police Service, 1997e). Thecriteria by which these would be measured were based on whether or not theysupported the goals of the EPS. By way of comparison one can readily note the simi-larity between the Police Plans underlying managerial thrust and a key concept of

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    proactive policing which states: Divisional management teams direct all operationalwork and manage resources according to force and divisional priorities. And yet, thePolice Plan would serve only as a skeletal framework for future strategic and tacticalsteps in Edmontons effort to implement a solid proactive policing model.

    Developing a Tactical Management Tool for Edmonton: Building on a Foundation of Proactive Policing

    In response to an ongoing environment of increased demand and decreased resources,the EPS further sought to develop a refined model of policing; one that would build onits strengths and enable the service to identify crime patterns and thus effectively imple-ment strategies to reduce crime (Clarke, Weissling, & Montgomerie, 2002). The newmodel was to also facilitate a process wherein the EPS could add structure andaccountability to the current business practices of the service (Thue & Alston, 2002, p.1). Furthermore, Edmontons model was to incorporate the concepts of proactivepolicing with the operational elements of Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP). In thiscontext, ILP was to become an operational tool for tactical management. And while thedevelopment and institutionalization of a strategic model of intelligence-led policingcontinues to unfold, EPS has benefited from a strong foundation of both community-based policing and proactive policing. In its early stages EPS undertook an assessmentof best practices and existing gaps in an effort to identify operational elements thatwould either support or undermine the implementation of ILP. Throughout the earlystages of assessment there were numerous concerns regarding both tactical and strate-gic structures. And yet, there was a clear sense throughout the assessment process thatthe Service had a strong institutional understanding of community policing, as well as,operationalizing numerous concepts of proactive policing.

    Perhaps one of the most difficult concepts for any police service to articulate oraccurately assess is that of proactivity. This was a particular concern for EPS, particu-larly when data suggested that the EPS patrol workload status exceeded the Serviceobjective of maintaining 10% of each shift for police officers to organize crime preven-tion initiatives (Edmonton Police Service, 1998). And yet, if we return to the definitionof proactive policing we can see that a measure of proactivity is much more than merelya measure of patrol workload status. Proactivity refers to the strategic deployment ofresources in order to target criminally active individuals and community disorder(Stockdale et al., 1999, p. 5). Working from this definition EPS could readily locate anumber of initiatives and practices that matched this concept.

    The linking of strategic resource deployment and criminal activity had becomecommon practice for some EPS Divisions prior to the shift to ILP. In fact, prior to theservice-wide assessment, Divisional tactical meetings were consistent practice withinthree of the four Divisions (North, South, and West). While each of these Divisions hasspecific procedures they all have a common characteristic in that they implement aformalized process for the purposes of intelligence sharing, resource allocation, andproblem solving. Both North and South Division utilize tactical meetings on a dailybasis while West Division tactical meetings occur once per week. In the context of the

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    North Divisions daily tactical meetings, management staff (Patrol, CIS, Traffic,Superintendent, and Divisional Intelligence Officer) formalize both daily and long-term strategies based on identified Divisional problems and broad service objectives.The tactical meeting begins with the Divisional Intelligence Officer (DIO) outliningparticular hot spots and intelligence data. Guided by this information, managers artic-ulate particular strategies and coordinate resource allocation based on availablemanpower. The tactical objectives are placed on a white board in the ops/report roomoutlining the specific problems and operational directions. Overall, the tactical processis layered in a manner that facilitates both daily strategies and broad Divisioninitiatives, but more importantly, allows management to focus resources at the imme-diate needs of the Division. It is a process that reflects a well-defined understanding ofdecentralized operations and autonomous tactical management.

    West Division approaches the process of tactical management from the understand-ing that the Division cannot be all things to all people. Priorities must be set based onresources guided by a range of information used to identify particular problems. Here,the tactical management team sets out a do and do not matrix to problem solvingbased on two-week projections of available resources. While this process does not differdramatically from the other Divisions it does enable the management team to setobjectives for problem resolution, targeting, etc. based on weekly resources. Moreover,it articulates the necessity of long-range resource allocation and deployment during aperiod of limited resources.

    There is little doubt that increased proactivity places new demands upon theDivisional management structure. Greater proactivity requires managers to elicit thesupport from a range of service members, as well as, be accountable for resourcedeployment. Subsequently, the management focus becomes one of freeing resourcesthat were being used in a predominantly reactive and unproductive way and use themto bring proactive strategies centre stage (Amey et al., 1996, p. vi). This does notsuggest that proactivity and reactivity are separate approaches to operational work butshould be considered in terms of overlapping, interdependent methods to achievedivisional priorities. In turn, this requires an operational model that allows flexibledeployment of resources, problem solving, and accountability/performance assess-ment, while enabling management teams to guide operational priorities.

    An exemplar of how this might be achieved is illustrated by Downtown Divisionsoperational model. Downtown Division had instituted a community response modelthat enabled the Division to maintain the flexibility for problem solving while address-ing the need to respond to calls. The Community Response Model combines theconcept of empowerment with defined functions and duties for designated officers(Response, District, Community, and Beats). Shifting to this model has also required amore equitable distribution of workload through the S/Sgt and Sgts facilitated, in part,by the following management team structure: Superintendent, Inspector, Admin S/Sgt, S/Sgts for (beats, community stations, front desk, and CIS), and platoon Sgts.1

    From a tactical/operational stance, the Division utilizes the Community ResponseModel in setting a clear hierarchy of ownership of calls for service. Embedded in thisoperational model is the requirement of problem solving and in an effort to facilitate

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    this requirement the Divisional management team has formalized the use of StrategicOperational Projects (SOPs). In the fall of 2001 the SOPs became entrenched in theDivisional business due to the loss of the special project teams. With the demise of thespecial project teams, SOPs have become a useful tool in the development of problem-solving projects. Officers identify particular issues and put forward an SOP thatoutlines (using a SARA model) the issue, response, etc. Once it has been approved bythe command, a team is formed and divisional resources shifted to address the SOP.The basic managerial concept behind this process is that of empowerment. If amember identifies a problem, the member will stay involved as the driver of the initia-tive or at least be a team member.

    Integral to the success of this model is the Services commitment to the concept ofownership. Ownership is understood in the following manner:

    Ownership applies to the structure of the organization. Ownership is built into all areasand levels of the organization. Ownership and empowerment has de-emphasized the chainof command and encouraged decision making at the lowest possible level. Managementhas given members increased latitude, autonomy and trust. (Edmonton Police Service,1997a, p. 35)

    From an operational standpoint, the implementation of ownership is the responsibilityof each Division and is customized to fit the Divisional Objectives. This requires Divi-sional Superintendents to tailor the concept of ownership based on manpower, divi-sional demographics, and current problems. An example of the use of ownership canbe noted in North Divisions service delivery model. The Division is divided into zonesthat have designated ownership/turf officers that are tasked with problem resolution inthe zone. The shift structure is split into primary and secondary response teams withownership/turf officers being within the secondary category. While they must continueto respond to high priority calls in their zones, they are released from minor callresponse in order to address identified problem-solving tasks. This division of labour,coupled with the reallocation of resources occurring at the daily tactical meetingscreates a multi-layered approach to problem solving and proactivity.2

    The premise supporting this concept is that the responsibility for providing localpolicing is devolved to the level of the Divisional Command. The DivisionalCommand must manage all resources (patrol, CIS, etc.) proactively in accordancewith intelligence-led objectives rather than allowing them simply to react (Gill, 2000,p. 82). As the above examples indicate, Edmontons decentralized model enablesDivisions to respond to the need for proactive and reactive strategies in a manner thatbest suits the needs of their Divisional boundaries and resources.

    And while it is important to facilitate a decentralized approach it is also necessary toensure that the Services reactive response is decreased by use of an appropriate calldispatch distribution strategy. A large number of calls for service are minor and do notrequire the attendance of a police officer and as such should be dealt with in a moreeffective manner than the traditional practice of dispatching officers to all calls forservice. Therefore, if a shift to proactivity is to be successful, there must be a mechanismthat facilitates a freeing of resources; one that can reduce the reactive demands placedon existing resources.

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    During the mid-1990s, Service-wide brainstorming resulted in the position that ifEPS was to implement a more efficient service model, it would need to be responsiveto community needs, increase public access, decrease the number of police responsesto calls, and improve the effectiveness of overall call management. To facilitate theseoutcomes the EPS formulated a model consisting of four service components, eachinclusive of a set of guiding principles and a strategy for implementation. These fourservice components were:

    Receiving: How the public accesses police service. Responding: How the police make themselves available and attend to public needs. Recording: How the police capture information. Resolving: How the police work to identify problems and develop solutions.

    Each of these components is connected with a common objective of improved servicedelivery. And while there is an assumed interplay between each component, receivingis considered the stage at which service delivery is first negotiated.

    The operational component of receiving necessitates effective management of callsfor service. This first requires the diversion of calls to appropriate levels of service.Edmontons initial response was the development of a call path chart with theunderlying rationale of reducing calls for service. If the number of calls could bediminished, officers would have less committed time, enabling them to executeproblem-solving initiatives. While the call path chart was an important initiative,diverting calls was only part of the solution. Call management would also beachieved through the application of response criteria and effective application of thecall path chart.

    The synthesis of these components resulted in the Services development of a two-tier response strategy: primary and ownership. Primary response officers respond to allemergency and service level calls. Ownership officers respond to emergency calls,priority response calls close to their ownership turf, and all service or deferred level callsin their community. Calls not fitting these criteria are diverted to community stationsor other non-emergency services (this process has been highlighted in the previousexample of ownership).

    While ensuring operational characteristics and processes are appropriately reengi-neered, it is also incumbent upon police managers to ensure the central function ofintelligence. As Peter Gill suggests,

    intelligence is intended to be used in two main ways, first, to target specific criminallyactive people with a view to developing the evidence necessary for a conviction and,second, to inform crime prevention strategies via the analysis of problems. (2000, p. 83)

    In this context, the intelligence unit is central to any proactive model and that it isresponsible not only for generating intelligence itself but also for developing strategiesand tactics for other teams within the Division (Amey et al., 1996, p. 4). Others havesuggested that the intelligence units are the linchpin in ensuring that resources areeffectively allocated and that problem-solving initiatives are directed in the mostefficient manner.

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    Management of intelligence is central to facilitating the effective dissemination anduse of the knowledge resident in different units of EPS. As a concept, intelligencemanagement is complex and goes beyond the mere management of information.Intelligence consists of two basic components: data and information. Data are identi-fiable, objective facts about events, while knowledge is created by adding context,providing analysis, ensuring accuracy, and summarizing data into concise and under-standable forms. There is no shortage of data and information at EPScrime statistics,response times, hot spots, crime mapping, etc. However, it is only when they are inter-preted, analysed, and used as a tool to proactively guide tactical manoeuvres leading tocrime prevention and other goals of EPS, that data and information become intelli-gence. The task, then, becomes one of empowering officers at all levels of EPS toidentify what data and information are most useful and effective to develop into intel-ligence. Certainly Edmonton had recognized these very issues and as the followingexamples suggest the Service had indeed acknowledged the proactive value of intelli-gence in its efforts to implement a model of proactive policing.

    Divisional Intelligence Officers (DIOs)

    Each Division has one intelligence officer (an exception to this is Downtown Divisionwhich has two). Divisional Intelligence Officers (DIOs) serve a range of functions butmore importantly they peel away the various layers of information entering theDivisions intelligence hopper, such as CAD data, reports from community stations,Street Information Reports (SIRs), Central Crime Analyst reports, etc. The end resultis a snapshot of Divisional trends, hot spots, and high-risk individuals from whichtactical strategies can be mounted and appropriate resources allocated. The DIO playsan integral role in the daily tactical meetings, platoon/squad parades, CIS intelligencepackaging, and inter-divisional intelligence sharing. An example of the latter is thenumerous collaborative relations DIOs are associated with: weekly DIO conferencecall, monthly multi-agency property meetings, shared data with Alberta Justice (re:release dates for YOA and adult offenders), etc. At a micro level DIOs collect andcorrelate data as they pertain to specific SOPs, investigations, etc. Here, the DIO devel-ops an intelligence package that relates to a specific project or member request. In thisfunction the DIO supplies a consistent layer of information and management of infor-mation related to a range of Divisional projects.

    Community Program Coordinators, D Division

    This position has traditionally been located in the crime prevention unit but hasrecently moved to the Divisions. On a day-to-day basis the Community ProgramCoordinator (CPCO) works with the DIOs comparing and deconstructing weeklystatistics in an effort to identify trends specific to the Divisional districts. This hasenabled the Division management to both direct and identify particular projects at themicro level of the district. Moreover, the CPCO is able to develop intelligence packagesthat support problem-solving initiatives. Under this tactical format, problems and

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    resolution strategies are generated in two ways. (1) An officer will approach the CPCOand identify a problem at which point a file is opened. (2) The CPCO may note partic-ular trends from their daily analysis of statistics. At this point, the CPCO will notify thedistrict officers of the trend/problem who will then direct the problem resolution.There is a two-month diary date that is set for each internal file at which time theofficer/team should have submitted a follow-up report.

    An essential concern for implementing this level of proactive policing is the flow ofintelligence both in terms of internal and external inputs. The success of proactivepolicing is directly reliant upon pertinent and complete data (often referred to asrobust data). Good data on crime and intelligence on criminals are prerequisites toeffective crime control (Tilley & Laycock, 2002). This suggests the need for a service-wide tactical structure that ensures a coordinated synthesis of both operationalapproaches and intelligence. Unfortunately, the current tactical structure of EPS isdefined by autonomous (Divisional) operational approaches loosely linked byfragmented networks of intelligence and tactical coordination, as illustrated in Figure1. One of the challenges that currently confronts EPS is how it will address theseidentified gaps and fragmented networks so that the service can achieve an effectivecoordination of resources.Figure 1 Tactical Structure and Identifying Gaps.

    Finally, if a Service is to successfully achieve proactive policing outcomes there mustbe a mechanism whereby the primary output of each team/individual initiative can beidentified and made the subject of team performance indicators for both quantity andquality. Unfortunately, as Read and Tilley (2000) suggest, dependable outcome evalu-ations of problem-solving initiatives have been less than consistent throughout policeorganizations. And yet, evaluations are in fact valuable methods of encouraging a crit-ical assessment of successful, as well as, unsuccessful practices. Moreover, consistentevaluation of initiatives assists in the process of replicating best practices. Tilley andLaycock (2002, p. 18) note, it is through replication that successful interventions aredisseminated more widely. The payoff from hard-won evidence that a given response

    Reactive

    Resolution PredictingProactive

    FragmentedNetwork

    FragmentedNetwork

    FragmentedNetwork

    FragmentedNetwork

    Prevention

    Figure 1 Tactical Structure and Identifying Gaps.

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    has been effective is its successful application elsewhere. While there is a sense thatintelligence-led policing is solely concerned with crime-related data, it is important tonote that the evaluation of project outcomes is a form of intelligence that informsfuture allocation of resources and operational practices. For Edmonton the importanceof evaluation was recognized in its earlier shift to community-based and problem-oriented policing. As the following Problem Files Management process suggests withinEPS there is indeed an institutionalized expectation of how problem files (problem-solving initiatives) are identified, tracked, and managed.

    EPS Problem Files Management

    Problem Identification is determined by one of two ways

    1. Information received from frontline officers. They communicate this information tothe Community Programs Coordinator.

    2. Through the Community Programs Coordinator/DIOs analysis of repeat calls forservice or other external sources.

    Once the existence of a problem has been confirmed it is assigned to a particular member,in most cases, members who have ownership in district, community, or beat where theproblem exists.

    Problem Tracking

    1. Once the problem has been assigned the problem is added to the Master List.2. An electronic folder is created for the particular address and linked to the appropriate

    district, community, beat.3. A tracking sheet is created containing basic information, platoon commander,

    assigned service member and a diary date for response. The diary date is forwarded tothe Platoon commander as well. (It is the responsibility of the assigned member torespond back through the chain of command on or before the diary date. This doesnot mean that the problem must be resolved by this date but rather it is an update ofwhat the member has accomplished to date.)

    Concluded or Ongoing Files

    If problems are ongoing then new diary dates are assigned and future updates required. Ifthe problem is concluded, a Problem Solving (PS-1) form is completed by the member, theproblem is removed from the master list and placed in to the completed problems folderand a hard copy of the information is printed for the District binder. It is important to notethat the master list and district folders are used not only by other ownership members(Beats, Community and District) but also the Divisional Intelligence officers (DIO), themanagement team and others in the Service. The data in these files provide a snapshot ofwhat is going on in the Division and what is being done about it. This information is usedon a regular basis to update members of the community and Service. (EPS Memorandum,April 3, 2002)

    While this analysis suggests the existence of a strong foundation for ILP there are anumber of opportunities and practices the Service must evaluate as it moves forward.Edmonton must ensure that its model of ILP continues to refine the concepts of proac-tive policing. Moreover, it must ensure that intelligence supports both proactive andreactive policing activities.

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  • 14 C. Clarke

    Points of Concern

    The model of ILP proposed by EPS certainly offers an opportunity to propel the serviceinto a proactive stance wherein resources can be utilized in a strategic and effectivemanner. And yet, it is not as simple as it may appear on the surface. It does require astrategic orientation whereby activities are guided and evaluated in terms of broadservice objectives. Moreover, it is a process that implies a multi-layered linkage ofinformation, tactical initiatives, resource allocation, etc. As one can note from Figure2, there are numerous points in which the process can break down.Figure 2 The Key Elements of the EPS Intelligence-Led Policing Model. Source: Veitch, Warden, Alston, & Thue (2004).

    Therefore, the evaluation process must remain dynamic in order to addressdysfunctional elements within the model. In the case of Edmonton, early analysissuggested that both tactical and strategic elements of the service required attention.For example:

    Tactical:

    Develop IT capacity that will enable DIOs to quickly cross-reference divisional intel-ligence, share analysis and trends.

    Utilize Community Stations in a more effective manner (Community Stationpersonnel should be more active in coordinating problem-solving initiatives,funnelling information from the community, serve as a clearing house of informa-tion for patrol, beat, and community officers, etc.

    Figure 2 The Key Elements of the EPS Intelligence-Led Policing Model. Source: Veitch,Warden, Alston, & Thue (2004).

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  • Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 15

    Insure that middle management play an active role in informing frontline officersabout why it is important to both input and access intelligence data.

    Encourage community members to take a more active role in the dissemination ofintelligence.

    Strategic:

    Adopt a fully integrated business planning process for the purpose of improving:operational performance, strategic decision making, and resource allocation andaccountability for the achievement of stated outcomes.

    Implement a quarterly Crime Management Conference in which Divisions shareinformation on operational objectives, best practices, performance measurement,etc.

    Develop a process for community involvement in identifying priority areas andoutcomes (Clarke et al., 2002).

    Recognition of these shortcomings is only a first step. The operational and organiza-tional response to these would require both the coordination and support of internaland external stakeholders. As with the earlier examples of Community-Based Policingone of the key challenges will be to ensure there is a continued inclusion of key stake-holders. All stakeholders must understand both the concepts of proactive policing andtheir role in the successful implementation of proactive initiatives.

    Conclusion

    As this case study indicates, prior organizational practices of community-based policinghave underlined current strategic and operational efforts to implement an effectivemodel of proactive policing. More importantly, these examples suggest that communitypolicing continues to be a central vehicle for the development of future operational andstrategic policing initiatives. This is not to say that future trends will be confined by theconcept of community policing but that community policing offers a foundation bywhich innovation can evolve. Edmontons operational shift to proactive policing repre-sents a logical transition from the earlier operationalization of community policing andproblem-oriented policing. More succinctly, proactive policing is a maturing or refine-ment of these. Furthermore, returning to the basic definition of proactive policing,making use of data to establish the existence and extent of a problem, to analyse itsnature and source, to plan intervention measures to reduce it, and to monitor and eval-uate the effectiveness of the selected responses one can easily see how this conceptparallels the central theme of problem-solving models such as SARA, CAPRA, andPARE (Read & Tilley, 2000, p. 3). Perhaps the central difference is that proactive polic-ing is a broad strategic application which guides service-wide operations.

    Notes1[1] This management structure characterizes Divisional governance throughout the Service.2

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  • 16 C. Clarke

    [2] It should be noted that while the above examples focus on North and Downtown Divisions,there are new operational models being implemented in the remaining two divisions. As ofMay 1, 2002, South Division had implemented a team-policing model that would supportgreater sharing of resources, linkage of events, and continuity. Recently, West Division hasundergone a structural reorganization implementing a change from nine squads to 12. Theobjective of this model is to allow greater overlap of manpower, enabling the Division toimplement a priorities-based management model. Moreover, this model will support anoperational shift currently focused on crime-related issues to one that is inclusive of alldisorder issues.

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    Edmonton Police Service. (1996). The Edmonton Police Plan 1996/1998.Edmonton Police Service. (1997a). Community based policing in Edmonton.Edmonton Police Service. (1997b). Community policing in Edmonton: The vision continues.Edmonton Police Service. (1997c). Policy and procedures manual.Edmonton Police Service. (1997d, December). Statistical report.Edmonton Police Service. (1997e). The Police Plan: Policing for results.Edmonton Police Service. (1998). Benefits of the patrol staffing forecast.Edmonton Police Service. (2002) Service Memorandum, April 3.Fahlman, R. (2002). Intelligence led policing and the key role of criminal intelligence analysis:

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    Heaton, R. (2000). The prospects for Intelligence-Led Policing: Some historical and quantitativeconsiderations. Policing and Society, 9(4), 337.

    Lisac, M. (1995). The Klein revolution (Edmonton: New West Press).Maguire, M. (2000). Policing by risks and targets: Some dimensions and implications of intelligence

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    Thue, L., & Alston, J. (2002). Project Archimedes: Developing an intelligence led policing model forEdmonton Police Service. Edmonton Police Service.

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    Walsh, W. (2001). Compstat: An analysis of an emerging police managerial paradigm. Policing: AnInternational Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 24(3), 347.

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