PRANJE NOVCA U MEĐUNARODNOJ TRGOVINI

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* Docent na Fakultetu za menadžment u Zaječaru [email protected]** Saradnik u nastavi na Fakultetu za menadžment u Zaječaru [email protected]

PRANJE NOVCA U MEĐUNARODNOJ TRGOVINI

RezimeRazvoj tehnologĳe i globalizacĳa kontinuirano unapređuju postojeće načine i stvaraju

nove mogućnosti za konvertovanje “prljavog novca” u različite legalne oblike finansĳske aktive. Procenjuje se da pranje novca danas iznosi oko 2% do 5% ukupne svetske proizvodnje. S obzirom na tajnost i prirodu pranja novca, teško je proceniti njegov stvarni obim, ali mnogobrojne analize daju indikatore veličine problema na globalnom nivou. Međunarodni trgovinski i finansĳski sistem su centralne tačke borbe protiv pranja novca gde finansĳske institucĳe, posebno banke, predstavljaju kanal preko koga ovaj novac ulazi u legalne ekonomske tokove. U ovom radu dali smo pregled i analizu najčešćih metoda koje međunarodni “perači novca” koriste da bi legalizovali svoje nelegalno stečene fondove iz svojih međunarodnih trgovinskih operacĳa.

Ključne reči: pranje novca, banke, međunarodna trgovina, narkotici, indikatori

Dejan Cvetković**dr Bojan S. Đorđević*

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* Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Management in Zajecar [email protected]

** Assistant Tutor at the Faculty of Management in Zajecar [email protected]

MONEY LAUNDERING IN INTERNATIONAL

TRADESummary

The development of technology and globalization permanently enhances the existing methods and creates new possibilities for conversion of “dirty money” into various legal forms of financial assets. It is estimated that money laundering today accounts for about 2% to 5% of the world’s total production. Given the secrecy and nature of money laundering, it is hard to estimate its actual volume, but numerous analyses provide the indicators of the size of the problem on the global level. International trading and financial systems are the central points of the ba�le against money laundering, where the financial institutions, especially banks, are the channels through which this money enters the legal economic flows. This paper gives the review and analysis of the most familiar methods that are used by “money launderers” to legalize their illegally earned funds from their international trade operations.

Key words: money laundering, banks, international trade, drugs, indicators

Bojan S. Đorđević, PhD*

Dejan Cvetković**

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Pranje novca - pojam, modeli, faze

Pranje novca (money laundering) je proces kroz koji kriminalne grupe pokušavaju da prikrĳu stvarno poreklo i vlasništvo sredstava iz svojih kriminalnih aktivnosti uz krajnji cilj obezbeđenja legitimnog i legalnog pokrića za svoje izvore prihoda i finansĳe. To je sredstvo kroz koje velike kriminalne organizacĳe “žive” bez očiglednih veza sa kriminalnim svetom. Definicĳa pranja novca poziva za naglašavanjem kriminalnih aktivnosti koje proizilaze iz novca koji treba oprati. Različite zemlje su prihvatile različite metode adresiranja kriminalnih aktivnosti. Neke su zemlje generalizovale i uključile sve kriminalne aktivnosti, dok su druge napravile listu ozbiljnih kriminalnih poslova koji imaju tendencĳu da prikupe velike sume novca.

Međunarodno prepoznavanje borbe protiv pranja novca na globalnom nivou je identifikovalo potrebu za kolektivnim sprečavanjem kriminala, preko svih mogućih načina, od legitimizovanja procesa njihovih kriminalnih aktivnosti do prelaska fondova od prljavih ka čistim. Iako ima različitih metoda pranja novca koje mogu biti od kupovine luksuznih proizvoda do kompleksnih međunarodnih mreža prividno legitimnih poslova, zahtev za pranjem procesa kriminalnih aktivnosti je veoma često vitalan za uspeh takvih kriminalnih organizacĳa. Povećana integracĳa međunarodnih finansĳskih sistema, zajedno sa slobodnim kretanjem kapitala preko oslobođenja od barĳera, je povećala lakoću pranja gde kriminalni novac može biti opran prenosom istog iz jedne jurisdikcĳe u drugu, komplikujući proces traganja.

Bilo koji metod da se koristi za pranje novca, proces se najčešće vrši u tri faze. One se mogu javiti kao posebne i odvojene faze iako se mogu javiti simultano, poneki put se čak i preklapaju, u zavisnosti od kriminalne organizacĳe koja je uključena. Ove tri faze se obično sastoje od brojnih transakcĳa od strane perača u cilju prikrivanja procesa traganja. Takve transakcĳe mogu, ipak, upozoriti banku ili finansĳsku institucĳu na kriminalnu aktivnost preko bilo koje od ove tri faze (Bošković, 2005, str. 24.) :• Postavljanje, plasiranje - fizička predaja keš

sredstava dobĳenog od ilegalnih aktivnosti,

npr. ubačaj istog na bankarski račun;• Presvlačenje - kreiranje broja kompleksnih

presvlaka finansĳskih transakcĳa radi odvajanja istih od njihovog izvora zbog prikrivanja audit tragova obezbeđujući anonimnost - npr. transferi sa jednog na drugi račun, menjanje valute, menjanje jurisdikcĳe i

• Integracĳa - provizĳa očitog legitimnog objašnjenja za ilegalno dobĳenu imovinu koja se treba vratiti u ekonomski sektor - npr. likvidacĳa investiranja koja koristi procese za očite legitimne poslove.Uspešan proces presvlačenja uprošćava

šemu integracionog procesa postavljanja opranih sredstava nazad u ekonomĳu na takav način na koji oni ponovo ulaze u finansĳski sistem kao normalni biznis fondovi. Kada govorimo o bankama i ostalim finasĳskim institucĳama, određene ranjive tačke su identifikovane u prosecu pranja koje počinioci sa teškoćama izbegavaju i gde se njihove aktivnosti mogu lakše prepoznati:• Ulazak novca u finansĳski sistem;• Prekogranični protok fondova i• Transferi unutar i iz finansĳskog sistema.

Zbog ovog razloga je većina zemalja, u velikoj meri, koncentrisala svoje pokušaje u fazi postavljanja. Sprečavanje da finansĳski sistem bude korišćen za pranje novca pokazao se uspešnim čineći proces pranja novca težim. Ali to, ipak, ne sprečava činioce da istražuju i koriste druge metode pranja svojih ilegalno stečenih sredstava. Iako se većina regulativa o sprečavanju pranja novca fokusira na fazu postavljanja, naglašeno je da su banke i finansĳske institucĳe, kao provajderi širokog spektra usluga, i dalje ranjive kada se koriste za pranje i fazu integracĳe. Produžavanje kredita i rapidni prelaz fondova između računa sa različitim imenima i jurisdikcĳama može biti korišćen kao deo procesa kreiranja kompleksnih presvlaka transakcĳa. Banke i finansĳske institucĳe koje postanu uključene u šemu pranja novca rizikuju najverovatnĳe sudski progon, gubitak dobre trgovinske reputacĳe i mogući gubitak licence za rad.

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Money Laundering - Concept, Models, Stages

Money laundering is a process through which criminal groups try to disguise the true origin and ownership of funds from their criminal activities, with the ultimate aim of providing a legitimate and legal cover for their sources of income and finance. It is a means the large criminal organizations use to “live” without any evident relation to the criminal world. The definition of money laundering calls for the emphasis on the criminal activities that are incurred by the money that needs to be laundered. Different countries have accepted different methods of addressing criminal activities. Some countries made a generalization including all criminal activities, whereas some other countries composed a list of serious criminal operations that have a tendency of collecting large sums of money.

International recognition of anti-money laundering on a global level identified the need for collective prevention of criminal activities, by implementation of all possible methods, ranging from legitimization of these criminal activities to transition of funds from dirty to clean. Although there are various money laundering methods, ranging from luxurious products purchases to complex international networks of seemingly legitimate operations, the request for laundering in the process of criminal activities is o�en of crucial importance for the success of such criminal organizations. Improved integration of international financial systems, together with the free flow of capital over the removed barriers, made money laundering easier, since criminal money may be laundered by transfer from one jurisdiction to another, which further complicates the search.

Whichever method is used to launder money, the process is usually completed in three stages. They can occur as special and separate stages though they can be simultaneous, too, and sometimes even overlap, depending on the criminal organization involved. These three stages consist of numerous transactions conducted by launderers with a view to hindering the search. Such transactions can, however, warn a bank or financial institution against a criminal activity through any of these

three stages (Bošković, 2005, pp. 24):• Positioning, placement - physical transfer of

cash funds received in illegal activities, e.g. depositing the funds on a bank account;

• Layering - creating a number of complex layers for financial transactions in order to separate them from their source and hide the tracks, thus providing anonymity - e.g. transfers from one into another account, currency conversions, changing jurisdictions;

• Integration - provision of an obvious legitimate explanation for illegally obtained assets that need to be returned to the economic sector - e.g. liquidation of investment which uses the processes for obvious legitimate operations.A successful process of layering simplifies

the scheme of integration processes for returning the laundered funds back into economy, so that they re-enter the financial system as normal business funds. Speaking of banks and other financial institutions, certain vulnerable points have been identified in the laundering process that are difficult for launderers to avoid, and where their activities are easier to recognize:• Money entering the financial system;• Cross-border flow of funds; and• Transfers within and from the financial

system.Due to this reason, most countries have,

to a great extent, focused their efforts on the placement stage. Preventing the financial system from being used for money laundering has proved to be successful, making the money laundering process more difficult. However, this still does not prevent the perpetrators from exploring and using other methods to launder their illegally obtained funds. Though most regulations on anti-money laundering are focused on the placement stage, it has been underlined that banks and financial institutions, as providers of a wide range of services, are still vulnerable when used for laundering and the integration stage. Credit extension and rapid transfer of funds between accounts opened to different names and under different jurisdictions may be used as a part of the process of creation of complex transaction layers. The banks and financial institutions that get involved in a money laundering

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Slika 1. Put ilegalno stečenog novca

Slika 2. Model etapa pranja novca(Izvor: G. Bošković, 2005.)

Međunarodni trgovinski sistem

Međunarodni trgovinski sistem je pod uticajem širokog spektra rizika i ranjivosti (izloženosti), koji pruža kriminalnim organizacĳama mogućnost da “operu” svoje kriminalne aktivnosti, kao i finansiranje terorističkih organizacĳa, uz minimalan rizik

da će biti opaženi. A t r a k t i v n o s t m e đ u n a r o d n o g trgovinskog sistema povezana je sa:• o g r o m n i m brojem trgovačkih operacĳa, koje omogućuju obimnu priliku za kriminalne organizacĳe da prebacuju sredstva preko granica,• s loženošću vezanom za m e đ u n a r o d n e transakcĳe i p r i b e g a v a n j u r a z n o l i k i m f i n a n s i j s k i m aranžmanima,• d o d a t n o m složenošću koja može nastati iz prakse mešanja nezakonitih sredstava sa tokovima gotovine iz legalnih poslova,• ograničenim p r i b e g a v a n j e m v e r i f i k a c i o n i m procedurama ili programima radi razmene carinskih podataka između zemalja i• ograničenim izvorima koje većina carinskih službi ima na raspolaganju kako

bi otkrila nelegalne trgovinske transakcĳe.U vezi sa poslednjim stavom, istraživanja

pokazuju da većina carinskih službi ispituje manje od 5 procenata svih teretnih isporuka koje ulaze ili napuštaju njihovu nadležnost. Uz to, većina carinskih službi je u mogućnosti da usmeri relativno ograničene analitičke izvore kako bi poboljšala određivanje i identifikovanje sumnjivih trgovinskih transakcĳa.

Poslednjih decenĳa, međunarodna trgovina je značajno porasla: globalna trgovina

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scheme probably risk to be prosecuted, lose their reputation, and possibly even have their license taken away.

Figure 1. The flow of illegally obtained money

Figure 2. Model of money laundering stages (Source: G. Bošković, 2005)

International Trade System

International trade system is under the influence of a wide range of risks and

vulnerabilities (exposures), and provides an opportunity for criminal organizations to ‘launder’ their criminal activities, and terrorist

o r g a n i z a t i o n s financing, with the minimum risk of being caught. The suitability of the international trade system is related to the following:• Huge number of trade operations, which provide vast opportunities for criminal organizations to transfer their funds abroad;• Complexity of international transactions and application of various financial arrangements;• A d d i t i o n a l complexity arising from the practice of mixing illegal funds with the cash flows from legal operations;• L i m i t e d application of v e r i f i c a t i o n procedures or programmes in order to exchange customs-related data between countries; and• L i m i t e d resources that most customs offices have

at their disposal for uncovering illegal trade transactions.Speaking of the last item, research shows

that most customs offices check less than 5% of all freight shipments entering or leaving their jurisdiction. In addition, most customs offices are in a position to direct relatively

ORDERING PARTY (“THE BOSS”)order

order order order

Organized criminal - drugs,

weapons, etc.

Giving the money to transfer

specialists

Transport to final

destination - usually offshore

centres

Money laundering - offshore

banks, fictitious companies, etc.

Documentation on money origin can no longer be

provided

Transfer of the laundered money

to the bank account

Investments in goods, real

estate, companies’ shares, etc.

RESULTor

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1. Placement Stage

Turning cash into paper documents through:

- Banks - Exchange offices - Casinos, etc.

2. Layering Stage

3. Integration Stage

Disguising the illegal origin of money by means of complex

financial transactions through:

- Offshore banks - Parallel banks - Fictitious companies, etc.

Introduction of the laundered money into

the legal economic flows through:

- Companies - Hotel chains - Restaurants - Real estate, etc.

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robom sada prevazilazi 9 triliona US dolara na godišnjem nivou, a globalna trgovina u uslužnom sektoru još dodatnih 2 triliona US dolara. Većina ovih poslova povezana je sa finansĳskim sistemima, pošto je veći deo dobara i usluga finansiran od strane banaka i drugih finansĳskih institucĳa. U industrĳskim zemljama porast trgovine je doveo do značajnog povećanja bruto domaćeg proizvoda, dok se u razvĳenim zemljama taj porast još brže povećavao. Uz to, praktično sve ekonomĳe su postale otvorenĳe za trgovinu. Ovo je dovelo do dodatnog pritiska na ograničene resurse koje većina zemalja, naročito onih u razvoju, ima na raspolaganju kako bi pomno ispitali ove aktivnosti.

Pranje novca zasnovano na trgovini

Za razliku od izbegavanja poreza i kretanja kapitala, koji obično uključuju transfer legalno zarađenih sredstava preko granica, kretanja kapitala povezana sa pranjem novca - ili pranje novca zasnovano na trgovini - uključuje kriminalne radnje, koje su mnogo teže za praćenje.

Pranju novca zasnovanom na trgovini posvećeno je mnogo manje pažnje u akademskim krugovima u odnosu na druge načine transfera sredstava. Literatura je prvenstveno usmerena na alternativne sisteme novčanih pošiljki i “pezos” menjačke poslove na crnim tržištima u regionu Severne i Južne Amerike. Međutim, određeni autori i institucĳe, u koje spadaju Baker (2005), de Boyrie, Pak i Zdanovich (2005), Odeljenja državne bezbednosti, migraciono odeljenje SAD i Carinski organi su u skorĳe vreme ispitivali opus drugačĳih metoda koje se koriste za pranje novca kroz međunarodni trgovinski sistem, baš kao i oblasti koje ove institucĳe treba da identifikuju i ograniče ove vrste aktivnosti.

Mnoge od ovih studĳa su takođe analizirale ustanovljene tehnike koje ocenjuju da li prĳavljene uvozne i izvozne cene utiču na vrednosti fer tržišta. Jedna od metoda koja se trenutno analizira uključuje upotrebu statističkih tehnika kako bi se detektovale nedoslednosti u informacĳama koje su date na brodskim dokumentima, a u želji da se efikasnĳe identifikuju sumnjive trgovačke aktivnosti.

Osnovne tehnike pranja novca zasnovanog na trgovini

Za namenu ovog rada, pranje novca zasnovano na trgovini definišemo kao proces prikrivanja kriminalnih aktivnosti i transfera vrednosti upotrebom trgovinskih transakcĳa u pokušaju da se legalizuje njihovo nezakonito poreklo. U praksi, ovo se može postići kroz lažan prikaz cene, kvaliteta ili kvantiteta uvoza ili izvoza.

U mnogim slučajevima, ovo takođe može da uključi zloupotrebu finansĳskog sistema kroz nepoštene (obmanjujuće) transakcĳe koje uključuju širok spektar instrumenata transmisĳe novca, kao što su transferi elektronskim putem. Osnovne tehnike pranja novca zasnovanog na trgovini uključuju:• više ili niže fakturisane račune proizvoda ili

usluga,• izdavanje većeg broja faktura od realnog

broja,• više ili niže fakturisane račune pošiljki robe

ili usluga brodom i• lažne opise proizvoda i usluga.

Neke od ovih tehnika pranja novca ne koriste se obavezno u svakoj zemlji i zavise od izbora kriminalne organizacĳe ili kompanĳe tzv. “perača”.

Lažno fakturisanje (uvećani ili umanjeni računi proizvoda i usluga)

Pranje novca kroz izdavanje faktura sa višim ili nižim vrednostima od realnih, koja je jedna od najstarĳih metoda nepoštenog transfera novca preko granica, ostala je i danas najčešće primenjivana tehnika. Ključni element ove tehnike je lažno prikazivanje cene proizvoda ili usluge kako bi se transferisala dodatna vrednost između uvoznika i izvoznika.

Izdavanjem ovakvih faktura, sa cenama nižim od onih na fer tržištu, izvoznik je u mogućnosti da prebaci novac uvozniku, jer će isplata za dobra ili usluge biti niža od cene koju će uvoznik dobiti kada ih bude ponudio na otvorenom tržištu.

Kao alternativa, izdavanje fakture sa cenama višim od cena na fer tržištu, omogućava izvozniku da dobĳe određenu korist od uvoznika, pošto će isplata za dobra ili usluge biti viša od vrednosti koju će uvoznik dobiti njenom prodajom na otvorenom tržištu.

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limited analytical sources in order to improve detection and identification of suspicious trade transactions.

In the last decades, international trade boomed significantly: global trade in commodities now exceeds 9 trillion USD annually, whereas global trade in services accounts for additional 2 trillion USD. Majority of these operations is related to financial systems, since most commodities and services are financed by banks and other financial institutions. In the industrial countries the increase in trade led to the significant increase in GDP, whereas in the developed countries this increase was even quicker. Moreover, all economies basically became more open for trade. This, in turn, led to additional pressure on limited sources, which most countries, especially the emerging ones, have at their disposal, so that these activities could be closely examined.

Trade-based money laundering

As opposed to tax evasion and capital flows, which usually include the cross-border transfer of legally obtained funds, capital flows related to money laundering - or trade-based money laundering - include criminal operations, which are much more difficult to track.

Trade-based money laundering a�racts much less a�ention in the academic circles than the other ways of fund transfer. The existing literature primarily deals with alternative systems of cash shipments and “pesos” foreign exchange operations in the black markets of the North and South Americas. However, certain authors and institutions, including Baker (2005), de Boyrie, Pak and Zdanovich (2005), State Security Departments, the USA Immigration Department and Customs Duty Bodies, have recently started to examine a range of different methods used for money laundering through the international trade system, along with the areas these institutions need to identify and restrict this type of activities.

Many of these studies also analyzed the established techniques for assessing whether the reported import and export prices affect the fair market values. One of the methods currently being analyzed includes the use

of statistic techniques in order to detect discrepancies in the information provided in transport documents, all with a view to identifying suspicious trade activities more efficiently.

Basic Techniques of Trade-Based Money Laundering

For the purpose of this paper, trade-based money laundering is defined as a process of disguising criminal activities and transferring value through trade transactions in an a�empt to legalize their illegal origin. In practice, this can be achieved by means of falsely represented import/export price, quality or quantity.

In many cases, this also includes an abuse of the financial system through unfair (deceiving) transactions including a wide range of money transfer instruments, such as electronic transfers. The basic trade-based money laundering techniques are the following: • Over or under invoicing of products or

services;• Issuing more invoices than really needed;• Over or under invoicing of shipped products

or services; and• False descriptions of products and

services.Some of these money laundering techniques

are not necessarily used in all countries, and depend on the choice of the criminal organization or company, the so-called “launderer”.

False Invoicing (Over or Under Invoicing of Products and Services)

Money laundering through over or under invoicing, as one of the oldest methods of unfair cross-border money transfer, has remained the most frequently used technique even today. The key element of this technique is the false representation of product/service price in order to transfer an additional value between the importer and exporter.

By issuing such invoices, bearing the prices lower than the fair market ones, the exporter is in the position to transfer money to the importer, since the payment for goods or services will be lower than the price the importer will get once he/she offers them at the open market.

Alternatively, issuing invoices bearing the

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Primer 1Kompanĳa A (inostrani izvoznik) šalje

brodom milion jedinica robe koji vrede 2$ po komadu, ali Kompanĳi B (domaći uvoznik sa kojim je u dosluhu) šalje fakturu koja uključuje milion jedinica robe, ali po ceni od samo 1$ po komadu. Kompanĳa B plaća Kompanĳi A za proizvode slanjem novca elektronskim putem i to 1 miliona $. Kompanĳa B tada prodaje robu na otvorenom tržištu za 2 miliona $ i ulaže 1 milion $ extra sredstava (razlika između prikazane cene na fakturi i cene na “fer” tržištu) na bankovni račun kako bi se isplatila prema uputstvima Kompanĳe A.

Kao alternativa, Kompanĳa C (domaći izvoznik) šalje brodom milion jedinica robe po ceni od 2$ po komadu, ali Kompanĳi D (strani uvoznik sa kojim je u dosluhu), šalje uvećanu fakturu za milion gore pomenutih proizvoda, ali po ceni od 3$ po komadu. Kompanĳa D plaća Kompanĳi C za dobĳena dobra elektronskim transferom u vrednosti 3 miliona $. Kompanĳa C tada plaća 2 miliona $ svojim dobavljačima i ulaže preostalih 1 milion $ (razlika između fakturisane, više cene i cene na “fer” tržištu) na račun u banci kako bi ta sredstva bila isplaćena prema uputstvima Kompanĳe D.

Slika 3. Lažno fakturisanje robe(Izvor: preuređeno po B. Begović, M. Vasović i dr., 2003.)

U nekoliko slučajeva, međutim, ovakvi procesi gube na značaju. Prvo, nĳedna od navedenih transakcĳa ne bi se mogla sprovesti sem ako izvoznik i uvoznik nisu u dosluhu. Na primer, ukoliko bi Kompanĳa A poslala brodom robu vrednu 2$ po komadu, a zatim fakturisala njihovu vrednost od 1$ po komadu, izgubila bi 1$ milion po isporuci. Takav slučaj ne bi imao smisla sem ukoliko izvoznik i uvoznik nisu u

dosluhu u ovakvoj nepoštenoj transakcĳi.Drugo, ne postoji nĳedan razlog da

Kompanĳa A i Kompanĳa B ne budu kontrolisane od strane jedne organizacĳe. Obrnuto, ne postoji ništa što sprečava matičnu kompanĳu da osnuje inostranu filĳalu u oblasti sa manje rigoroznom kontrolom pranja novca i da prodaje robu svojoj kompanĳi kćerki po tržišnim cenama fer tržišta. U takvoj situacĳi, matična kompanĳa može da pošalje svojoj filĳali legitimnu komercĳalnu fakturu, a filĳala onda može da preproda ove proizvode po značajno nižoj ili višoj ceni krajnjem kupcu. Na ovaj način, kompanĳa može da prebaci lokacĳu izdavanja svojih lažnih faktura na inostrano područje, gde takve trgovačke nedoslednosti imaju mnogo manju mogućnost da budu primećene.

Treće, izdavanje lažnih izvoznih i uvoznih faktura može da ima značajne poreske posledice. Izvoznik koji uveća vrednost dobara koja je otposlao može biti u mogućnosti da značajno uveća vrednost izvoznih taksi ili vrednosnog rabata koji dobĳa. Slično, uvoznik koji dobĳa fakture sa vrednostima nižim od realnih za robu koju je dobio, moći će značajno da umanji vrednost svojih izvozničkih ili carinskih taksi

koje plaća. Oba ova slučaja pokazuju vezu između pranja novca baziranog na trgovini i zloupotrebe poreskog sistema.

I s t r a ž i v a n j a pokazuju da su umanjene fakture jedan od najčešćih metoda pranja novca

zasnovanog na trgovini koje se koriste kako bi se vršio transfer novca. Ovo ukazuje na činjenicu da je osnovni fokus većine carinskih službi smanjenje važnosti krĳumčarenja i sigurnost u smislu prikupljanja uvozničkih dažbina. Do sada, carinske službe, uopšteno gledajući, izvoz nadgledaju sa mnogo manje rigoroznosti nego uvoz.

Takođe je važno pomenuti da što je složenĳa roba kojom se trguje, veće su teškoće koje će carinske službe imati u identifikovanju lažnih faktura i ispravnom pristupu porezima i dažbinama. Delom, ovo je zbog toga što mnoge

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prices higher than the fair market ones enables the exporter to gain certain benefits from the importer, since the payment for goods or services will be higher than the one the importer will get once he/she offers them at the open market.

Example 1Company A (foreign exporter) ships a

million items of goods, worth 2$ per item, but sends an invoice for a million items of goods, at a price of only 1$ per item, to Company B (local importer with which it connives). Company B pays for the products to Company A by sending money electronically, in the amount of 1 million dollars. Company B then sells the goods at the open market for 2 million dollars, and deposits a million dollars of the extra funds (the difference between the represented invoice price and the fair market price) at a bank account, in order for these funds to be paid out according to the instructions of Company A.

Alternatively, Company C (local exporter) ships a million items of goods at a price of 2$ per item, but sends an over-invoice for the above-mentioned million products to Company D (foreign importer with which it connives), at a price of 3$ per item. Company D then electronically pays 3 million dollars for the received goods to Company C. Company C in turn pays 2 million dollars to its suppliers and deposits the remaining one million dollars (the difference between the represented, higher invoice price and the fair market price) at the bank account, in order for these funds to be paid out according to the instructions of Company D.

Figure 3. False invoicing of goods(Source: adapted from B. Begovic, M. Vasovic, et al, 2003)

In several cases, however, such processes lose their importance. First, none of the mentioned transactions could be conducted unless the exporter and importer are in connivance. For instance, if the Company A shipped goods worth 2$ per item, and then invoiced its value at 1$ per item, it would lose one million dollars per shipment. Such a case would not have any sense unless the exporter and importer were in connivance in such a fraudulent transaction.

Secondly, there are no reasons for Company A and Company B not to be controlled by an organization. On the other hand, nothing prevents a parent company to establish a foreign subsidiary in a region with a less rigorous money laundering supervision, and then sell the goods to its daughter company at the fair market prices. In such a situation, the parent company can send a legitimate commercial invoice to its subsidiary, and the subsidiary can, in turn, re-sell these products at a significantly lower or higher price to the end user. Thus, the company can relocate the site of issuing its false invoices onto the foreign territory, where such trading discrepancies stand a much lower chance of being detected.

Thirdly, issuing false export and import invoices can bear significant tax consequences. Exporter who increases the value of goods he/she has shipped may be in the position to significantly increase the value of export taxes or rebate value he/she is entitled to. Similarly, importer who receives invoices bearing the significantly lower amounts than the actual price of the goods is may considerably reduce the value of the import taxes or custom duties

he/she has to pay. Both these cases prove the connection between trade-based money laundering and tax system abuse.

Research shows that under-invoicing is one of the most frequent, trade-based

money laundering methods, used in order to conduct money transfers. This indicates the fact that most custom offices focus on reducing the

Company B Importer

Country B

Company A Exporter

Country A

Transfer of 1 million USD to the importer

Ship transport of a million product units at 2$ per unit

Payment for a million product units at 1$ per unit

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carinske službe nemaju pristup podacima i izvorima kako bi ustanovile tržišnu, realnu cenu mnogih proizvoda. Osim toga, većina carinskih uprava ne razmenjuje podatke sa drugim zemljama i na taj način može da uoči samo jedan deo transakcĳe. Kao takva, njihova mogućnost da otkrĳu proizvode sa inkorektnim cenama, je često ograničena na one proizvode kojima se često trguje (i čĳe su cene često navođene) na međunarodnim tržištima.

Izdavanje višestrukih fakturaJoš jedna tehnika koja se koristi za

pranje novca uključuje izdavanje više od jedne fakture za jednu istu međunarodnu trgovinsku transakcĳu. Fakturisanjem jednog istog proizvoda ili usluge više od jednom, onaj koji pere novac ili je finansĳer terorističke organizacĳe, može da opravda višestruke isplate za jednu istu isporuku proizvoda ili učinjenu uslugu. Upošljavanje većeg broja različitih finansĳskih institucĳa kako bi se ostvarila ova dodatna plaćanja može samo da uveća nivo složenosti koji okružuje ovakve transakcĳe.

Osim toga, čak iako je slučaj izdavanja višestrukih faktura za istu isporuku proizvoda ili učinjenih usluga otkriven, postoje mnogobrojna zakonska objašnjenja za ovakve situacĳe, uključujući tu dopunu uslova isplate, ispravke prethodnih instrukcĳa za plaćanje ili plaćanje zakasnelih isplata. Za razliku od umanjenih ili uvećanih faktura, treba napomenuti da ne postoji potreba za uvoznika ili izvoznika da pogrešno prezentuje cenu proizvoda ili usluga na trgovinskoj fakturi.

Umanjene ili uvećane isporuke proizvoda ili usluga

Kao mogućnost manipulisanja izvoznim ili uvoznim cenama, perač novca može da umanji ili uveća količinu robe koja se isporučuje ili usluga koje se vrše. Kao krajnji slučaj, izvoznik može uopšte da ne isporuči robu, već da se jednostavno u dosluhu sa uvoznikom osigura

kako bi sva carinska i transportna dokumenta koja su u vezi sa ovo tzv. “fantomskom isporukom” bila rutinski procesuirana. Banke i druge finansĳske institucĳe mogu bez svog znanja biti uključene u obezbeđivanje finansiranja ovakvih fantomskih isporuka.

Primer 2Kompanĳa E (domaći izvoznik) prodaje

milion jedinica proizvoda Kompanĳi F (strani uvoznik, saučesnik) po ceni od 2$ po komadu, ali u stvari isporuči 1.5 miliona jedinica. Kompanĳa F plaća Kompanĳi E za proizvode 2 miliona $ elektronskim transferom novca. Kompanĳa F tada prodaje proizvode na otvorenom tržištu za 3 miliona $ i ulaže 1 extra milion $ (razlika između “doterane” količine i one stvarne) na bankovni račun kako bi ta sredstva bila isplaćena po instrukcĳama Kompanĳe E.

Nasuprot tome, Kompanĳa G (inostrani izvoznik) prodaje milion jedinica proizvoda Kompanĳi H (domaći uvoznik, sa kojim je u dosluhu) po ceni od 2$ komad, ali isporuči samo 500.000 jedinica. Kompanĳa H plaća Kompanĳi G za proizvode i to elektronskim transferom 2 miliona $. Kompanĳa G tada plaća 1 milion $ svojim dobavljačima i ulaže preostalih 1 milion $ (razlika između “doterane” i stvarne količine) kako bi ta sredstva bila isplaćena po instrukcĳama Kompanĳe H.

Slika 4. Umanjivanje / uvećavanje isporuke robe

(Izvor: preuređeno po B. Begović, M. Vasović i dr., 2003.)

Ukoliko želi da manipuliše izvoznim i uvoznim cenama, perač novca može lažno da prezentuje kvalitet ili vrstu proizvoda ili usluge. Na primer, izvoznik može da isporuči

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importance of smuggling and increasing safety in terms of collection of import taxes. So far, generally speaking, custom offices have been much less rigorous when supervising export than import.

It is also important to mention that the more complex the goods traded, the bigger the problems that the custom offices will have when identifying false invoices and correct approaches to taxes. This is partly due to the fact that many custom offices do not have access to relevant data and sources when determining the real market price of many products. In addition, most customs offices do not exchange data with other countries, which is why they can only monitor one part of the transaction. As such, their ability to detect incorrect priced products is o�en limited to those products that are traded frequently (and whose prices are o�en quoted) at the international markets.

Issuing Multiple InvoicesAnother technique used in money

laundering includes issuing of more than one invoice for the same international trade transaction. By invoicing one and the same product or service more than once, the party laundering money or financing a terrorist organization may justify multiple payments for one and the same shipment of products or delivery of services. Employing a large number of various financial institutions in order to conduct there additional payments may only increase the level of complexity surrounding such transactions.

Apart from this, even if the case of a multiple invoicing for the same shipment of products or delivery of services gets detected, there are numerous legal explanations for such situations, including revisions of payment conditions, modifications of previous payment instructions, or payment of overdue payments. As opposed to the over- or under-invoicing technique, it should be underlined that there is no need for importers or exporters to falsely represent the product/service

price in the commercial invoice.

Over- or Under-Shipment of Goods or ServicesAnother possibility of manipulation with

export or import prices is for the money launderer to reduce or increase the quantity of goods delivered or services provided. As an extreme case, exporter can chose not to deliver the goods at all, but to simply connive with the importer, ensuring that all customs and transport documents related to this, so-called “phantom delivery” are routinely processed. Banks and other financial institutions can get unknowingly involved in providing finance for such phantom deliveries.

Example 2Company E (local exporter) sells a million

units of a product to Company F (foreign importer, accomplice) at a price of 2$ per unit, but, in fact, delivers 1.5 million units. Company F pays to Company E for the received products an amount of 2 million dollars by means of electronic transfer. Company F then sells the products at the open market for 3 million dollars and deposits one extra million dollars (the difference between the “fixed” and actual amount) at a bank account in order for these funds to be paid out according to the instructions of Company E.

Conversely, Company G (foreign exporter) sells a million units of a product to Company H (local importer, with which it connives) at a price of 2$ per unit, but actually delivers only 500,000 units. Company H pays 2 million dollars to Company G by electronic transfer. Company G then pays 1 million dollars to its suppliers and deposits the remaining one million dollars (the difference between the “fixed” and actual amount) in order for these funds to be paid out according to the instructions of Company H.

Figure 4. Over-/Under-Shipment of Goods(Source: Adapted from B. Begovic, M. Vasovic, et al, 2003)

Ship transport of 1.5 million product units at 2$ per unit

Company E Exporter

Company F Importer

Payment for a million product units at 2$ per unit

Transfer of 1 million USD to the importer

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relativno je�ine proizvode, a zatim lažno da ih predstavi na fakturi kao znatno skuplje ili čak potpuno različite proizvode. Ovo stvara neslaganje između onog što se nalazi na carinskim i transportnim dokumentima i onog što je realno isporučeno. Upotreba lažnih opisa može se takođe koristiti u prometu usluga, kao što su finansĳsko savetovanje, savetodavne (consulting) usluge i istraživanje tržišta. U praksi, realne cene ovih usluga mogu da dovedu do dodatnih teškoća u procenama.

Primer 3Kompanĳa I (domaći izvoznik) isporučuje 1

milion zlatnih jedinica robe od 3$ po komadu Kompanĳi J (inostrani uvoznik, saradnik), ali fakturiše Kompanĳi J milion srebrnih jedinica po ceni od 2$ / kom. Kompanĳa J plaća Kompanĳi I putem elektronskog transfera 2 miliona $. Kompanĳa J zatim prodaje zlatne jedinice robe na tržištu za 3 miliona $ i ulaže preostalih 1 milion $ (razlika između fakturisane i stvarne vrednosti) na račun u banci kako bi ta sredstva bila isplaćena po instrukcĳama Kompanĳe I.

Kao alternativa, Kompanĳa K (inostrani izvoznik) isporučuje milion bronzanih jedinica robe po ceni 1$ / kom. Kompanĳi L (domaći uvoznik sa kojim je u dosluhu), ali šalje fakturu Kompanĳi L za milion srebrnih jedinica po ceni 2$ / kom. Kompanĳa L plaća Kompanĳi K 2 miliona $ putem elektronskog transfera novca. Kompanĳa K tada plaća 1 milion $ svojim dobavljačima i ulaže preostalih 1 milion $ (razlika između fakturisane i stvarne vrednosti) na bankovni račun kako bi ta sredstva bila isplaćena po instrukcĳama Kompanĳe L.

Slika 5. Realizacĳa SREBRNO-ZLATNIH transakcĳa

Složene tehnike pranja novca zasnovanog na trgovini

U praksi, strategĳe za pranje novca obično kombinuju nekoliko različitih tehnika. One često uključuju istovremenu zloupotrebu i finansĳskog i međunarodnog trgovinskog sistema. Aranžmani razmene pezosa na crnom tržištu predstavljaju korisnu ilustracĳu kako veći broj različitih tehnika pranja novca može biti kombinovan u jednoj, pojedinačnoj kriminalnoj operacĳi.

Aranžmani razmene pezosa na crnom tržištu Severne i Južne Amerike (“Black Market Peso Exchange”)

Mehanizmi ovakvih operacĳa postali su predmet značajne studĳe 1980-ih kada je Kolumbĳa postala vodeći i dominantan izvoznik kokaina u SAD. Ove ilegalne prodaje droge donele su oko 10 milĳardi US dolara godišnje kolumbĳskim narko kartelima, od kojih je nekih 4 milĳarde US dolara oprano putem aranžmana razmene pezosa na crnom tržištu. Mehanizmi jednostavnog crnog tržišta pezosa mogu biti izloženi kroz sledeće korake (Đorđević, 2008):• Prvo, kolumbĳski narko kartel ilegalno

krĳumčari drogu u SAD i prodaje je za keš;• Drugo, narko kartel ugovara prodaju US

dolara ispod cene sa pezos brokerom za kolumbĳske pezose;

• Treće, pezos broker plaća narko kartelu pezosima sa svog bankovnog računa u Kolumbĳi (čime eliminiše narko kartel iz bilo kakve dalje umešanosti u aranžman);

• Četvrto, pezos broker strukturiše ili “prošvercuje” SAD monetu u njihov

bankarski sistem kako bi izbegao potrebne izveštaje i ulaže taj novac na svoj račun u američkoj banci;• Peto, pezos broker pronalazi kolumbĳskog uvoznika kome su potrebni dolari kako bi kupio dobra od američkog izvoznika

(broker obično nudi kurs koji je značajno povoljnĳi nego onaj koji je dostupan u kolumbĳskoj banci);

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If they want to manipulate export and import prices, money launderers can falsely present the quality or type of products/services. For instance, an exporter can deliver relatively cheap products, and then falsely present them in the invoice as significantly more expensive or even as completely different products. This creates a discrepancy between what is wri�en in the customs and transport documents, and what is actually delivered. False descriptions can also be used in the services market, e.g. in financial advising, consulting services and market research. In practice, the actual prices of these services can cause additional problems in assessments.

Example 3Company I (local exporter) delivers one

million of golden units of goods at a price of 3$ per unit to Company J (foreign importer, accomplice), but sends an invoice to Company J for one million silver units at a price of 2$ per unit. Company J pays 2 million dollars to Company I by means of electronic transfer. Company J then sells the golden units of goods at the open market for 3 million dollars and deposits the remaining one million dollars (the difference between the invoiced and actual value) at a bank account, in order for these funds to be paid out according to the instructions of Company I.

Alternatively, Company K (foreign exporter) delivers one million of bronze units of goods at a price of 1$ per unit to Company L (local importer with which it connives), but sends an invoice to Company L for one million silver units at a price of 2$ per unit. Company L pays 2 million dollars to Company K by means of electronic transfer. Company K then pays one million dollars to its suppliers and deposits the remaining one million (the difference between the invoiced and actual value) at a bank account, in order for these funds to be paid out according to the instructions of Company L.

Figure 5. Execution of SILVER-GOLD transactions

Compound Trade-Based Money Laundering Techniques

In practice, money laundering strategies o�en combine several different techniques. They o�en include simultaneous abuse of both financial and international trade systems. The arrangements of pesos exchange at the black market represent a useful illustration of how a large number of different money laundering techniques can be combined in a one single criminal operation.

Arrangements of Pesos Exchange at the North and South Americas Black Market (“Black Market Pesos Exchange”)

The mechanisms of such operations were the subject of a significant study in 1980s when Columbia became the leading and predominant exporter of cocaine into the USA. These illegal drug sales yielded about 10 billion USD per year to the Columbian drug cartels, about 4 billion USD out of which were laundered through the pesos black market exchange arrangements. The simple, pesos black market mechanisms can be broken down into the following steps (Djordjević, 2008):• First, a Columbian drug cartel illegally

smuggles drugs into the USA and sells it for cash;

• Second, the drug cartel makes an arrangement with a peso broker to sell US dollars below the price for Columbian pesos;

• Third, the peso broker conducts a payment to the drug cartel in pesos from his/her account in Columbia (thus eliminating any further connection of the drug cartel and the arrangement);

Company I Local exporter

Transfer of 1 mill. USD to the importer

Company J Foreign importer

Ship transport of a million GOLDEN units at 3$ per unit

Payment for a million SILVER units at 2$ per unit

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• Šesto, broker uređuje plaćanje a m e r i č k o m izvozniku sa svog računa u nekoj američkoj banci;

• Sedmo, izvoznik i s p o r u č u j e proizvode u Kolumbĳu i

• K o n a č n o , k o l u m b i j s k i uvoznik prodaje robu (veoma često je to skupa roba kao što su PC računari, aparati za domaćinstva, elektronika) za pezose i vraća novac brokeru. Na ovaj način se ponovo popunjavaju brokerove zalihe pezosima.Ove transakcĳe kombinuju različite ilegalne

aktivnosti, kao što su krĳumčarenje droge, pranje novca kroz finansĳski sistem i pranje novca zasnovano na trgovini. Kao dodatak, ne postoji ni jedan razlog zbog koga narko kartel ne bi mogao da se ponaša kao svoj sopstveni broker ili uvoznik. U stvari, mnogi karteli kao da su objedinili ove funkcĳe.

Za razliku od osnovnih tehnika pranja novca o kojima je ranĳe govoreno, ovde takođe ne postoji potreba za dosluh uvoznika i izvoznika u obmanjujućoj transakcĳi kako bi aranžmani razmene pezosa na crnom tržištu mogli da funkcionišu. Umesto toga, cene i količina robe mogu biti predstavljeni u realnoj vrednosti carinskim službama, pa se ipak može vršiti transfer sredstava preko granica. Iako se termin “razmena pezosa na crnom tržištu” odnosi na tehniku pranja novca koja je prvobitno povezivana sa kolumbĳskim prometom narkotika, ovi aranžmani su u širokoj upotrebi u mnogim zemljama kako bi ujedinili različite tipove kriminala.

Slika 6. Mehanizam razmene na "Crnom tržištu pezosa"

Studĳe slučajaStudĳa slučaja 1

• Brazilska kompanĳa potpisuje ugovor o izvozu sojinog zrna nemačkoj kompanĳi

• Nemačka kompanĳa unapred plaća brazilskoj kompanĳi za isporuku

• Brazilska kompanĳa istog momenta vrši transfer sredstava trećoj strani koja nĳe u vezi sa transakcĳom

• Sojina zrna koja su bila kupljena od strane nemačke kompanĳe nikada nisu isporučena.

Slika 7. Shema pranja novca putem kupovine robe koja neće biti isporučena

kupcu

KomentarU ovom slučaju, nemačka kompanĳa izvršila

je transfer sredstava brazilskoj kompanĳi kao plaćanje unapred za isporuku sojinog zrna.

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• Fourth, the peso broker structures or “smuggles” the US currency into their banking system in order to avoid necessary reports, and deposits that money at his/her account with a US bank;

• Fi�h, the peso broker finds a Columbian importer who needs dollars to purchase goods from a US exporter (the broker usually offers the FX rate significantly more favourable than the one available in Columbian banks);

• Sixth, the broker arranges payment to the US exporter from his/her account with a US bank;

• Seventh, the exporter delivers the products in Columbia; and

• Finally, the Columbian importer sells the goods (it is very o�en expensive goods, such as PCs, household appliances, electronics) for pesos and returns the money to the broker. In this way the broker’s stock of pesos is refilled. These transactions combine different illegal

activities, such as drug smuggling, money laundering through the financial system, and trade-based money laundering. In addition, there are no reasons why a drug cartel would not be able to behave as its own broker or importer. In fact, many cartels seem to have combined these functions.

As opposed to the basic money laundering techniques mentioned before, there is no need here either for the importer and exporter to be conniving in the deceiving transaction in order to make the pesos black market exchange arrangements work. Instead, the price and quantity of goods can be presented in their real value to the customs offices, and the cross-border fund transfer can still be conducted. Although the term “pesos

black market exchange” refers to the money laundering technique originally associated with the Columbian drug trafficking, these arrangements are widely used in many countries in order for different types of criminal activities to be combined.

Figure 6. Exchange mechanism at the “Pesos Black Market”

Case StudiesCase Study 1

• A Brazilian company signs a contract on exporting soya beans to a German company;

• The German company pays to the Brazilian company in advance;

• The Brazilian company immediately transfers the funds to a third party which has no relation to the transaction;

• Soya beans bought by the German company have never been delivered.

Figure 7. Scheme of money laundering through purchase of the goods that will not be

delivered to the buyer

Drug Cartel BANK Columbian Importer

USD

Pesos Pesos

Peso broker

Dru

gs

Goods

1. German company pays in advance for the delivery

2. Brazilian company transfers the funds to a third company unrelated to the delivery

3. Brazilian company does not conduct delivery

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Sumnje su podgrejane kada je ustanovljeno da izvoz sojinog zrna nĳe u vezi sa regularnim poslovnim aktivnostima brazilske kompanĳe, kao i to da je prĳavljena količina bila u disproporcĳi sa skalom svakodnevnih operacĳa te kompanĳe.

Studĳa slučaja 2• Kolumbĳski kartel ilegalno krĳumčari drogu

u SAD i prodaje je za keš• Kartel koristi keš kako bi kupio staro zlato u

SAD, koje se topi i preliva u zlatne poluge• Istovremeno, kartel prevozi brodom

olovne poluge iz Urugvaja u SAD, koje su fakturisane kao zlatne poluge.

• Kada pošiljka stigne, olovne poluge se uništavaju i zamenjuju se prelivenim zlatnim polugama

• Sa pravom dokumentacĳom, zlatne poluge se prodaju na otvorenom tržištu. Ovaj novac se zatim elektronskim putem šalje nazad u Urugvaj i eventualno u Panamu.

Slika 8. Shema OLOVNO-ZLATNIH transakcĳa

KomentarZa razliku od aranžmana razmene pezosa

na crnom tržištu, radĳe nego da krĳumčari američku monetu na račune SAD bankarskog sistema, kartel bira da minimizira rizik od otkrivanja kroz upotrebu lažnih opisa isporučene robe. Transportna dokumenta povezana sa ovim lažnim južnoameričkim zlatnim polugama korišćena su kako bi se ozakonila prodaja zlatnih poluga iz SAD-a. Prihod od prodaje ovih američkih poluga je zatim transferisan u bankarski sistem SAD-a.

Studĳa slučaja 3• Kompanĳa koja se bavi trgovinom

prehrambenim proizvodima je osnovana kao ofšor finansĳski centar i u poslovnom je kontaktu sa nekoliko afričkih prehrambenih kompanĳa.

• Novac koji kompanĳa dobĳa za prodaju svojih proizvoda je istog momenta prebačen sa kompanĳinog ofšor računa na lični račun

svog menadžera u Belgĳi. Naizmenično, sredstva se zatim brzo prebacuju na račune nekoliko stranih kompanĳa.• K o m p a n i j a takođe prima sredstva od strane kompanĳe koja nĳe umešana u ove radnje, a koja je u poslu sa dĳamantima. Novac iz kompanĳe koja trguje dĳamantima tada se izmeša sa kompanĳskim prihodima iz drugih poslova i prebaci kroz

Belgĳu istim inostranim kompanĳama.

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CommentIn this case, the German company transferred

the funds to the Brazilian company as a form of advanced payment for the delivery of soya beans. The doubts were confirmed when it was established that the export of soya beans has no relation to the regular business activities of the Brazilian company, and that the agreed quantity was disproportionate to the scale of everyday operations of the company concerned.

Case Study 2• A Columbian cartel smuggles drugs into the

USA and sells it for cash;• The cartel uses the cash to buy old gold in

the USA, which is then melted and turned into gold bars;

• At the same time, the cartel ships lead bars invoiced as gold bars from Uruguay into the USA;

• Once the shipment arrives, lead bars are destroyed and swapped with melted gold bars;

• With the proper documentation, gold bars are sold at the open market. This money is then sent back electronically into Uruguay and, possibly, Panama.

Figure 8. Scheme of LEAD-GOLD transactions

CommentAs opposed to the arrangements of pesos

exchange at the black market, instead of smuggling American currency into the USA banking system accounts, the cartel chooses to minimize the risk of being exposed by using false descriptions of the delivered goods. The transport documents related to these false South American gold bars are used in order to legalize the selling of gold bars in the USA. The profit from sales of these American bars was then transferred into the USA banking system.

Case Study 3• A company trading in food products has

been established as an offshore financial centre and has had business contacts with several African food-processing companies;

• The money the company receives a�er selling its products is immediately transferred from the company’s offshore account to the personal account of its manager in Belgium. Alternately, the funds are then quickly transferred to the accounts of several foreign companies;

• The company also receives funds from a foreign company not involved in these operations, trading in diamonds. The money from the company trading in diamonds is then mixed with the company’s profit from other operations and transferred through Belgium to the same foreign companies as before.

1. Columbian cartel smuggles the drugs into the USA

3. The cartel imports lead bars from Uruguay into the USA

2. The cartel uses the money from the drug sales to buy old gold

4. Lead bars are swapped with gold ones and sold

5. Payment for the gold bars to a company in Uruguay

6. Payment via a third country to Columbia

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Slika 9. Mešanje legalnog i ilegalno stečenog novca

KomentarOvaj slučaj ilustruje

nivo dodatne složenosti koja može biti pridodata novčanim prevarama mešanjem nezakonito stečenih sredstava sa novčanim tokovima legalnog biznisa. U ovom slučaju, kompanĳa koja trguje dĳamantima je kasnĳe bila predmet istrage u trgovini nelegalnim, takozvanim “krvavim dĳamantima” (Blood Diamonds).

Studĳa slučaja 4• Kriminalna grupa uvozi falsifikovane

proizvode iz Azĳe u Belgĳu koristeći

kreditna pisma i prodaje ih za keš novac.• Ova grupa zatim ulaže novac na račun u nekoj belgĳskoj banci i uređuje sledeće kreditno pismo.• Grupa prodaje dodatne falsifikovane proizvode iz Azĳe koristeći novo kreditno pismo.• Ovi dodatni falsifikovani proizvodi su prodati i prihodi su

uloženi u banku, a zatim iskorišćeni kako bi se ugovorila nova kreditna pisma.

Slika 10. Korišćenje kreditnih pisama

KomentarU ovom slučaju, kriminalna grupa je bila

u mogućnosti da upotrebi keš novac koji je

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Figure 9. Mixing of legally and illegally obtained money

CommentThis case illustrates

the level of additional complexity that may be added to the money frauds by mixing illegally obtained funds with the cash flows of a legal business. In this case, the company trading in diamonds was later a subject of investigation of the trade in the so-called illegal “blood diamonds”.

Case Study 4• A criminal group imports counterfeit

products from Asia into Belgium using le�ers of credit, and sells them for cash;

• This group then deposits the money at the account in a Belgium bank, and arranges another le�er of credit;• The group sells additional counterfeit products from Asia using a new le�er of credit;• T h e s e additional counterfeit products are sold and the profit deposited at a bank account,

which is later used to arrange new le�ers of credit.

Figure 10. Using le�ers of credit

CommentIn this case, the criminal group was in the

position to use the cash deposited at the bank

3. Food-processing company receives funds from other companies, including the company dealing in diamonds

2. Cooperation and transfer with other countries

1. Mixed funds are transferred to a personal manager’s account

1. Criminal group imports counterfeit goods from Asia into Belgium

2. Selling of goods

3. Cash in a Belgium bank

5. Counterfeit goods manufacturer in Asia

4. Criminal group arranges new counterfeit goods import operations by means of le�ers of credit

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uložila na račun u banci kako bi ugovorila nova kreditna pisma. Zatim, ova pisma su se mogla iskoristiti kako bi se mogle finansirati serĳe novih isporuka falsifikovane robe. Kriminalna grupa je mislila da će upotreba kreditnih pisama povezanih sa trgovinskim transakcĳama, pre nego elektronski transfer novca, povećati legitimnost ovih transakcĳa i smanjiti mogućnost otkrivanja.

Studĳa slučaja 5• Kriminalna organizacĳa ilegalno prodaje

drogu u Japanu. Organizacĳa zatim krĳumčari keš novac iz zemlje i to u Francusku.

• Novac se koristi kako bi se kupili luksuzni proizvodi u objektima renomiranih dizajnera, koji se zatim izvoze u Japan i prodaju od strane kompanĳe školjke.

• Prihodi od prodaje ovih luksuznih roba se zatim ulažu na račune u bankarskom sistemu Japana.

Slika 11. “Pranje” putem trgovine luksuznom robom

KomentarRadĳe nego da “ugura” japansku monetu

u japanski bankarski sistem, kriminalna organizacĳa bira minimiziranje rizika od otkrivanja krĳumčarenjem keš novca iz zemlje, a zatim koristi međunarodni trgovinski sistem za uvoz luksuznih dobara nazad u Japan. Prihodi od prodaje ovih dobara su zatim uloženi na račun u nekoj japanskoj banci.

Sumnje su bile podgrejane kada je otkriveno da su falsifikovana dokumenta bila korišćena za izvoz ovih proizvoda i da se organizacĳa nikada nĳe prĳavila za povraćaj poreza na dodatu vrednost.

Finansĳske obaveštajne jedinice (FIU)

Polovina finansĳskih obaveštajnih jedinica dobĳa izveštaje o sumnjivim aktivnostima koji su aktivirani zabrinutostima o procesima povezanim sa trgovinom. Ipak, u mnogim zemljama, broj ovih izveštaja je relativno nizak (često manje od 25 godišnje). Pored toga, ovi izveštaji dolaze od carinskih i organa gonjenja, a u manjoj meri, od strane poreskih vlasti i bankarskih supervizora. Negde jedna trećina finansĳskih obaveštajnih jedinica koristi trgovačke informacĳe kao deo svojih tekućih analiza pranja novca i finansiranja terorističkih aktivnosti, a ove informacĳe često doprinose

istragama i gonjenjima suskim putem.

F i n a n s i j s k e obaveštajne jedinice istakle su da bi mogle da počnu sa intenzivnĳim korišćenjem tzv. “crvenih zastavica” indikatora. Kao dodatak, većina veruje da postoji prilična namera za poboljšanjem upotrebe ovih indikatora i drugih analitičkih tehnika, kako bi se promovisao pristup

koji je više zasnovan na riziku, a koji služi detektovanju aktivnosti pranja novca. U ovom slučaju, interesantno je da je samo jedna četvrtina finansĳskih obaveštajnih jedinica istakla da ima koristi od trgovinskih baza podataka kao dela svojih analiza.

Neiznenađujuće, finansĳske obaveštajne jedinice su u mogućnosti da dele informacĳe sa organima gonjenja, carinskim službama, poreskim vlastima i bankarskim supervizorima. Međutim, napominje se da striktna komercĳalna poverljivost koja se

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account in order to arrange new le�ers of credit. These le�ers of credit were, in turn, used to finance the new deliveries of counterfeit goods. The criminal group believed that the use of le�ers of credit related to the trade transactions would, more than electronic money transfer, increase the legitimacy of these transactions and reduce the probability of being exposed.

Case Study 5• A criminal organization illegally sells drugs

in Japan. The organization then smuggles cash from Japan to France;

• The money is used to buy luxurious products in the renowned designer stores, which are then exported to Japan and sold by the shell companies;

• The profit from the sale of these luxurious products is then deposited at the bank accounts in the Japanese banking system.

Figure 11. Laundering by means of trade in luxurious goods

CommentRather than “pushing” the Japanese currency

into the Japanese banking system, the criminal organization chose to minimize the risk from being exposed by smuggling the cash out of the country, and then using the international trade system for importing luxurious goods back to Japan. The profit from the sale of these goods is then deposited at the account with a Japanese bank. The doubts were confirmed when it was discovered that the documents used for

the export of these products were counterfeit, and that the organization never applied for the value added tax refund.

Financial Intelligence Units (FIU)

Half of the financial intelligence units receive reports on suspicious activities, triggered by concerns about trade-related processes. Still, in many countries the number of these reports is relatively low (o�en less than 25 a year). In addition, these reports are sent by customs and prosecution bodies, and, to a smaller extent, by tax authorities and banking supervisors. About a third of financial intelligence units use trading information as a part of their current analyses in respect of money laundering and terrorist activities financing, and these pieces of information o�en facilitate investigations and court proceedings.

F i n a n c i a l intelligence units pointed out that they could start using the so-called “red flag” indicators to a greater extent. In addition, most of them believe that there is a firm intention to improve the use of these indicators, along with other analytical techniques, in order to promote a more risk-based approach, which would be used

to detect money laundering activities. In this case, it is interesting that only a quarter of financial intelligence units claimed that the trade databases are useful as a part of their analyses.

It does not come as a surprise that the financial intelligence units are in the position to share information with prosecution bodies, customs offices, tax authorities and banking supervisors. However, it has been underlined that the strict commercial confidentiality of these pieces of information limits their use for intelligence purposes. Also, it has been emphasized that the exchange of information

2. Luxurious clothes are exported to Japan and sold through a shell company

3. Sales profits are deposited at a Japanese bank account

1. Smuggling money from the drug sales into France and purchasing luxurious products (e.g. luxurious clothes)

Shell company

A renowned fashion designer in FranceCriminal

organizationJapanese bank

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daje ovim informacĳama ograničava njihovu upotrebu u obaveštajne svrhe. Takođe, ističe se da je razmena informacĳa često ograničena na slučajeve kriminalnih istraga koje su u toku. Domaće finansĳske obaveštajne agencĳe su u mogućnosti da razmenjuju informacĳe sa inostranim jedinicama, ali ovo obično zahteva memorandum razumevanja ili međunarodnog reciprociteta (protivusluge).

Po analizama FATF, otprilike polovina službi u okviru svog personala ima specĳaliste za trgovinu, ali samo četvrtina njih omogućava treninge svojim analitičarima kako bi poboljšala njihovo razumevanje tehnika pranja novca baziranog na trgovini. Činjenica je da bi finansĳske obaveštajne jedinice imale koristi od efikasnĳeg treninga i svesnosti različitih tehnika aktivnosti pranja novca. U načelu, veruje se da su države ozbiljno ranjive na polju zloupotrebe trgovinskog sistema u kriminalne svrhe.

Indikatori “crvene zastave” (“Red flag” indicators)

Po analizi, ispitanici koji su uzeli ušešća u popunjavanju upitnika FATF-ovog projektnog tima istakli su veliki broj indikatora crvenih zastava koji se rutinski koriste za otkrivanje aktivnosti pranja novca. Ovo uključuje situacĳe u kojima:• se javljaju značajna odstupanja između opisa

robe na tovarnom listu i same fakture;• se javljaju značajna odstupanja između opisa

robe na tovarnom listu ili samoj fakturi i stvarno isporučene robe;

• se javljaju značajna odstupanja između vrednosti robe prĳavljene na fakturi i njene vrednosti na realnom tržištu;

• obim isporuke deluje protivrečno sa skalom regularnih poslovnih aktivnosti uvoznika ili izvoznika

• je vrsta robe koja se isporučuje označena kao “visokorizična” za aktivnosti pranja novca

• je vrsta robe koja se isporučuje protivrečna sa regularnim poslovnim akrivnostima uvoznika ili izvoznika

• isporuka nema ekonomsku opravdanost (upotreba kontejnera od 40 stopa za transport male količine relativno lake robe)

• se isporuka vrši u ili iz oblasti koje su

označene kao visokorizične sa poslove pranja novca

• se isporuka vrši kroz jednu ili više oblasti bez neke očigledne ekonomske opravdanosti

• se način plaćanja ne podudara sa karakterističnim rizicima transakcĳe (plaćanje unapred za isporuku od novog dobavljača iz visokorizične zemlje)

• transakcĳa uključuje uplatu u kešu ili druga plaćanja od strane trećeg lica ili kompanĳe koja nĳe očigledno povezana sa transakcĳom

• transakcĳa uključuje upotrebu često izmenjenih ili frekventno proširenih kreditnih pisama

• transakcĳa uključuje upotrebu fasadnih ili kompanĳa školjki.Carinske službe koriste više preciznih

informacĳa koje se odnose na specifične uvozne, izvozne ili transportne kompanĳe. Kao dodatak, “crvene zastave” koje se koriste za otkrivanje drugih metoda pranja novca mogu biti korisne u otkrivanju potencĳalnih slučajeva pranja novca koje je zasnovano na trgovini.

Zaključna razmatranja

Na osnovu mnogobrojnih analiza i istraživanja relevantnih međunarodnih institucĳa, došli smo do ključnih saznanja u pogledu pranja novca u međunarodnoj trgovini:• Ova vrsta pranja novca je važan kanal

kriminalnih aktivnosti i, uz rast u obimu svetske trgovine, prikazuje sve više važnu ranjivost sistema od uticaja procesa pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma (najčešće od trgovine narkoticima, oružja, ljudi, cigareta itd.)

• Ova vrsta pranja novca razlikuje se od slučaja do slučaja u smislu svoje kompleksnosti. Najosnovnĳe šeme jesu prevare vezane za praksu u trgovini (umanjene ili uvećane fakture). Ipak, složenĳe šeme integrišu ovu vrstu prakse u mrežu kompleksnĳih transakcĳa, koja takođe uključuje prenos vrednosti kroz finansĳski sistem (elektronski transferi ili bankovne uputnice, čekovi) i/ili fizički prenos novčanica (keš kuriri). Upotreba ovih složenih transakcĳa dalje otežava ulazak u trag opranom novcu i

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is o�en restricted to the criminal investigation cases that are in progress. Local financial intelligence agencies are in the position to exchange information with foreign units, but this o�en requires a memorandum on understanding or on international reciprocity (counter-service).

According to the FATF analyses, about half of the agencies have trade specialists within their personnel, but only a quarter of them provide trainings for their analysts in order to improve their understanding of trade-based money laundering techniques. The fact is that the financial intelligence units would benefit from more efficient training and awareness of the various money laundering techniques. Generally speaking, it is believed that countries are considerably vulnerable in the field of trade system abuse for criminal purposes.

“Red Flag” Indicators

According to the analysis, the participants who took part in completing the FATF project team questionnaire, pointed to the large number of red flag indicators routinely used in detection of money laundering activities. This includes the situations in which:• There are significant discrepancies between

the description of goods in the bill of lading and the invoice itself;

• There are significant discrepancies between the description of goods in the bill of lading or the invoice itself and the actually delivered goods;

• There are significant discrepancies between the value of goods stated in the invoice and its real market value;

• The scale of delivery seems to be in contradiction with the scale of regular activities of the importer or exporter;

• The type of goods delivered is considered to be ‘highly risky’ in terms of money laundering activities;

• The type of goods delivered is in contradiction with the regular business activities of the importer or exporter;

• The delivery is not economically justified (the use of 40-feet containers for the transport of a small quantity of relatively light goods);

• The delivery is conducted to/from a region considered to be ‘highly risky’ in terms of money laundering operations;

• The delivery is conducted through one or more regions without any evident economic justifiability;

• The method of payment is not adjusted to the characteristic risks of the transaction (advanced payment for the delivery from a new supplier from a highly risky country);

• The transaction includes a cash payment or other payments from a third party or a company not evidently related to the transaction;

• The transaction includes the use of the frequently altered or frequently extended le�ers of credit;

• The transaction includes the use of ‘shell’ companies.Customs offices use various precise

information related to the specific import, export or transport companies. In addition, the “red flags” used for detection of other money laundering methods may also be useful in detection of potential trade-based money laundering cases.

Concluding Remarks

Based on the numerous analyses and studies conducted by the relevant international institutions, we have come to some key findings in respect of the money laundering in international trade:• This type of money laundering is a major

channel for criminal activities and, with the increase in world trade volume, it increasingly demonstrates the significant vulnerability of the system to the impact of money laundering process and financing of terrorism (most o�en through trading in drugs, weapons, cigare�es, human trafficking, etc.);

• This type of money laundering differs from case to case in terms of its complexity. The most basic schemes are frauds related to trade practice (over- or under-invoicing). However, the more complex schemes integrate this type of practice into a network of more complex transactions, which also includes the transfer of value through the

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komplikuje otkrivanje.• Analiza trgovinskih podataka i njihova

međunarodna razmena su korisni alati za otkrivanje anomalĳa u trgovini, koje mogu odvesti do same istrage i sudskog gonjenja za slučajeve pranja novca.

• I dok carinske službe, organi gonjenja, finansĳske obaveštajne agencĳe, poreske vlasti i bankarski supervizori mogu razmenjivati informacĳe o trgovini, ovo je često zabranjeno u određenim okolnostima ili se preduzima na dobrovoljnim više nego na obaveznim osnovama. Kao dodatak, većina finansĳskih obaveštajnih agencĳa ne dobĳa konstantno izveštaje o sumnjivim aktivnostima koje su povezane sa trgovinskim transakcĳama.

• Većina organa gonjenja, carinskih službi, poreskih vlasti, finansĳskih obaveštajnih jedinica i bankarskih supervizora se čini nedovoljno sposobnim u identifikovanju i borbi sa pranjem novca zasnovanom na trgovini nego što je to slučaj sa drugim

oblicima pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma. Delom, ovo izgleda da odražava njihovo ograničeno razumevanje tehnika koje su vezanu za ovu vrstu pranja novca.

• Većina organa gonjenja, carinskih službi, poreskih vlasti, finansĳskih obaveštajnih jedinica i bankarskih supervizora je identifikovala neodložnu potrebu za jačim treningom kako bi bile sigurne da će njihovo osoblje posedovati dovoljno znanja da prepozna proces pranja novca baziranog na trgovini.

• Većina organa gonjenja, carinskih službi, poreskih vlasti, finansĳskih obaveštajnih jedinica i bankarskih supervizora istakla je ozbiljnu zabrinutost zbog ranjivosti njihovih država na ovu vrstu pranja novca. Osim toga, većina njih veruje da njihove zemlje poseduju ograničene mere kojima se mogu umanjiti aktivnosti pranja novca koje je zasnovano na poslovima u međunarodnoj trgovini.

Literatura / References

1. Begović, B., Vasović, M. i dr. (2003), Korupcĳa na carini, CLDS, Beograd

2. Bošković, G. (2005), Pranje novca, Beosing, Beograd

3. Financial Action Task Force (2004), “Alternative Remi�ance Systems”, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Typologies 2004-2005, June 2005.

4. Financial Action Task Force (2004), “Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Trends and Indicators: Initial Perspectives”, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Typologies 2004-2005, June 2005.

5. Financial Action Task Force (2006), Background Documents - Summaries of Trade-Based Money Laundering Case Studies and Domestic Regimes, FATF Secure Website.

6. Financial Action Task Force (2006), Background Documents - Summary of Responses to Trade-Based Money Laundering Questionnaire, FATF Secure Website.

7. Klasens, R. (2007), Sprečavanje pranja novca, Udruženje banaka Srbĳe, Beograd

8. Kovačević, M. (2002), Međunarodna trgovina, Ekonomski fakultet, Beograd

9. Lilley, P. (2006) Dirty Dealing - The Untold Thruth about Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism, 3rd edition, Kogan Page Ltd.

10. Đorđević, B. (2008), “Underground Banking: Legitimate Network or Money Laundering System?”, International Scientific Conference “Challenges of economic sciences in the 21st century”, Book of papers, Institute of Economic Sciences, Belgrade, pp. 552 - 559.

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financial system (electronic transfers or bank orders, cheques), and/or physical transfer of banknotes (cash couriers). The use of these complex transactions makes it even more difficult to track the laundered money and hinders detection.

• Analysis of trade-related data and their international exchange are useful tools for detecting trade anomalies, which may lead to investigation and court prosecution for the money laundering cases.

• And although customs offices, prosecution bodies, financial intelligence agencies, tax authorities and banking supervisors may exchange trade-related information, this is o�en forbidden in certain circumstances or is undertaken more on a voluntary than on a mandatory basis. In addition, most financial intelligence agencies do not regularly receive reports on suspicious activities related to trade transactions.

• Most prosecution bodies, customs offices, tax authorities, financial intelligence units and banking supervisors seem to be

insufficiently capable to identify and fight trade-based money laundering, more than any other form of money laundering and financing of terrorism. In part, this seems to reflect their limited understanding of the techniques related to this form of money laundering.

• Most prosecution bodies, customs offices, tax authorities, financial intelligence units and banking supervisors identified an urgent need for be�er training in order to ensure that their personnel owns the knowledge sufficient to recognize the trade-based money laundering process.

• Most prosecution bodies, customs offices, tax authorities, financial intelligence units and banking supervisors pointed out their serious concern about the vulnerability of their countries to this form of money laundering. Apart from this, most of them believe that their countries possess limited measures that can reduce money laundering activities based on international trade operations.