Russian Federation: Nuclear Exports and Non Proliferation Challenges and Recommendations

Ivan Knezevica, Saima Aman Khan Sialb, Duc Giang Vuc

aBelgrade University, bNational Defense University, Department of Strategic Studies, cKAIST, Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering

Russian Federation, as one of the largest nuclear power producers in the world, with 33 reactors in operation, acts as the most important nuclear export country in the world. Expansion of nuclear power exports, with Build-Own-Operate model for nuclear facilities construction, is part of a strategy to garner global political influence through energy production. It is a challenge to accomplish this goal while complying with all the nonproliferation requirements without compromising on market competitiveness.

Critical analysis of the Russian export control system to understand its export control policies and outline its implications for the nonproliferation and present policy recommendations and specific measures for the Russian Federation to enhance its nonproliferation criteria for nuclear exports without compromising on its legitimate commercial interests.

Considering the market oriented nature of nuclear exports and the inherent risk of proliferation involved, how can Russia integrate stronger nonproliferation policies in its nuclear exports without compromising on market competitiveness?

Two types of licenses: • Single Export License

issued for implementation of exports under a single contract and lists the country of end user, the seller and the buyer

• Multiple Export (General) License issued only by a decision of the Government for multiple exports of a certain type of commodity to one or more destinations. Specific buyer does not need to be listed. Limitation on the quantity of commodities for export. Issued only under a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

National Legal Framework for Nuclear Exports

Introduction

Objective of the Study

Research Question

Requirements for the Importing Country - Transferred items : • shall only be used for peaceful purposes • shall be controlled by IAEA Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, Additional

Protocol; and shall be secured by sufficient measures recommended by the IAEA • can be re-exported or transferred to any other recipient country only on the

conditions outlined above No requirements on notifying Russia in case of re-export of items to another country.

ROSATOM – The State Nuclear Energy Corporation

250 companies and organizations. Rusatom Overseas for Build-Own-Operate international projects. Major power reactors abroad: Operating 6, Contracted 14, Under construction 5, Ordered 15, Under negotiations 8.

Case Study - Vietnam

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2002

2009

2010

2011

Inter-Governmental Agreement: peaceful uses of nuclear energy

EVN-ROSATOM MOU: cooperation in the first NPP in Vietnam territory

Inter-Governmental Agreement: 1st Vietnamese NPP

- Rosatom-MOET MOU: human resources training - VARANS-Rostechnadzor MOU: legal document development, licensing, and monitoring nuclear and radiation safety

- Rosatom-MOET MOU: Information Center for Nuclear Energy - Inter-Governmental Agreement: Center for Nuclear Science and Technology (CNST)

ISSUES: - Retransfer/ Reshipment - Intangible Knowledge Transfer - Spent Fuel and Waste

Legal Framework: Challenges & Recommendations

Internal Compliance System

Inter-Agency Process

Transparency

Border Controls

TRAINING & EDUCATION of the government as well as enterprise personnel in export control laws, regulations, and methods

UNIFORM CRITERIA for dealing with sensitive export decisions amongst the agencies involved

TRANSPARENCY IN REPORTING violations and prosecutions would greatly help in deterring future violations.

SINGLE DATABASE for all commodities related to Customs Union Market to perform adequate control

in terms of nonproliferation and enhance the uniform export control efficiency.

Nonproliferation: Challenges & Recommendations

Conditions for Exports

Re-Export/Re-Transfer Policy

State Level Safeguards

Nuclear Security and Physical Protection

Intangible Knowledge Transfers

COMPULSARY CONDITIONS for export controls for importing states:

- IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL - SIGNING NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT

NOTIFICATION & END-USER CERTIFICATION in the re-transfer to the third countries or entities

STATE-LEVEL SAFEGUARDS APPROACH as part of its conditions for nuclear export

to inculcate a nonproliferation culture and transparency in the importing states

CENTER OF EXCELLENCE for Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities

REGIONAL & INTER-REGIONAL TRAININGS with collaboration with the IAEA

SPECIAL CURRICULUM for training of importing states personnel on nuclear safety, security and safeguards

Transition from the Authoritarian to the Notification Based Model

NUCLEAR EXPORTS MARKET

NON PROLIFERATION

SAFETY

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

HUMAN RESOURCES

NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

SECURITY

ROLE OF ROSATOM ECONOMY

& FINANCE

SAFEGUARDS

Insufficient Safety

Culture

Requirements for re-transfer of items

By the importing country

Lack of trained personnel both in

Russia and the importing country

MC&A IAEA Safeguards

- Market sustainability - Cost increases - Transparency

- Infrastructure in new nuclear countries

- Customs Control - Illicit Trafficking

- Physical Protection

- High degree of autonomy

- Control & Monopole: Corruption?

- Role in State Administration

Increasing Pu stockpiles