Post-Communist Russia: A Historic Opportunity Missed by Lilia Shevtsova

7/29/2019 Post-Communist Russia: A Historic Opportunity Missed by Lilia Shevtsova

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Post-communist Russia:

a historic opportunity missed

International Afairs83: 5 (2007) 891912 2007 The Author(s). Journal Compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute o International Afairs

LILIA SHEVTSOVA

Russia is approaching the end o a cyclea cycle defined not just by the termo Vladimir Putins presidency, but by the act that the country has reached the

logical endpoint o the path set or it by its two post-communist leaders, BorisYeltsin and Vladimir Putin. The goal o this article is to shed light on the nature othe current Russian system built by the two leaders, assessing its efectiveness, itssustainability and its uture trajectory.

Consolidation of the system

Vladimir Putin will definitely enter Russian history not as the creator but as theconsolidator o the process begun during Boris Yeltsins tenure. The first post-Soviet Russian Pesident had dismantled the old state and laid out the blueprint o

the new one. Appointed by him, his successor finished the job, working withinthe ramework provided, and the result o their joint eforts turned out to bevery amiliar. The Russian system we see today reflects a contradiction: Russiahas moved ar away rom its past, yet in many respects it paradoxically remainsdeeply entrenched in it.1 To understand Russia today one needs to be aware o acomplicated interplay o continuity and change, in which continuity oten imitateschange discrediting the very ideas o innovation and modernization.

Under Yeltsins and Putins leadership, the Russian political class was orcedto abandon several principles upon which the power o the state had been basedor centuries. For the first time in Russian history, the regime sought legitimacythrough elections rather than by ideology, totalitarianism or hereditary succession.The days o rallying the Russian people by both openly conronting the West asan alien and even hostile system and ofering a civilizational alternative to it werelet behind. A ree market was introduced, which weakened the states control osociety and individual alike. Finally, the Russian political elite began to learn howto live in a competitive environment. Admittedly, some backtracking on many othese developments has become evident during Putins presidency.

What remains today o the traditional Russian way o exercising power?The elite has preserved two key elements: personalized powerand the principle o

1 On the evolution o the Russian system under Putin, see Lilia Shevtsova, Russia lost in transition: the Yeltsin andPutin legacies (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment or International Peace, orthcoming).


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892International Afairs 83: 5, 2007 2007 The Author(s). Journal Compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute o International Afairs

indivisibility. Power remains monolithic and ocused at the top o the executivebranch o government. The Russian president is elected, but not accountable to theelectorate. Power in Russia is urther consolidated by the mingling o business andpolitics, and the economy continues to experience heavy political pressure. Stateinterests retain primacy over the interests o the individual and society. The eliteand the overwhelming majority o the population continue to see Russias globalrole and regional spheres o influence as undamental. This sentimentsharedeven by Russian liberalsis encapsulated in the term derzhavnichestvo: Russia is agreat power or it is nothing.

Among the actors that have afected Russias recent evolution are its historicallegacy, institutional obstacles to change, and the subjective actor, that is, the roleo the leader and the ruling elite.2 In the postwar period Russias predecessor theSoviet Union was not shaken by revolutions or political and social turmoils likethose that acilitated the opening up o communist Poland, Hungary and Czecho-

slovakia. At the crucial moment when Gorbachev threw open Russias windowsto the world in the late 1980s, Russia had neither an opposition that presented acredible alternative to the system nor pragmatists inside the ruling team capableo unctioning in a politically competitive atmosphere. No less influential is theact that Russia missed out on the period in European history when the spirit oconstitutionalism flourished. In the nineteenth century, beore European societydemocratized, the Rechtsstaat evolved, expressing the principle that the state itselshould be subject to the law. Russia missed what Ral Dahrendor has called thehour o the lawyer, thus ailing to acquire the basis o liberal constitutionalism.Without that basis Russian society could not successully move to the next stages o

transormation, the hour o the economist and the hour o the citizen.3 Instead,Russia moved towards the system Fareed Zakaria called illiberal democracy.4

It would be unair to overlook the serious di culties Russia aced in its trans-ormation in the 1990s. No imperial superpower with messianic pretensions hadever successully democratized. And the Russian elite needed simultaneously todemocratize a regime and orm a new statetasks that are not easy to recon-cile.5 As i that were not enough, Yeltsin and his team were orced to attemptourrevolutions at once: create a ree market, democratize the state, abolish an empireand create a non-imperial Russia, and seek a new geopolitical role or a ormernuclear superpower that had been or decades an adversary o the West. The devel-

oped world had passed through the phases o nation-building, capitalist growth,political liberalization and democratization in sequence: Russia tried to take allthose steps in one great leap. Moreover, all successul post-communist transitions

2 On the efects o the historical legacy on the evolution o the current Russian state, see Robert Legvold, ed.,Russian oreign policy in the twenty-first century and the shadow o the past (New York: Columbia University Press,2007); Stean Hedlund, Vladimir the Great, grand prince o Muscovy: resurrecting the Russian service state,EuropeAsia Studies 58: 5, July 2006.

3 Ral Dahrendor, Reflections on the revolution in Europe (London: Chatto & Windus, 1990), p. 79.4 Fareed Zakaria, The rise o illiberal democracy, Foreign Afairs 76: 6, NovemberDecember 1996.5 Juan Linz and Alred Stepan rightly warned that a precondition o successul democratization is a stable state:

No stateno democracy. Juan J. Linz and Alred Stepan, Problems o democractic transition: southern Europe,South America, post-communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 145.


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Post-communist Russia


in Central and Eastern Europe began with the establishment o a new politicalsystem, whereas in Russia, everything started with the privatization o propertybeore the introduction o any independent political institutions and rule o law.

Theoretically, a reorm-minded leadership and a socially responsible elitein Russia might have compensated or the lack o some o the prerequisites ordemocratic transormation. This is what occurred in Central and Eastern Europe,proving that Giuseppe di Palma and Juan Linz were right to predict that efectiveleadership and political engineering can compensate or the absence o some othe conditions or a successul transition.6 This did not occur in Russia, however.Communism collapsed at a time when the Russian elite had no vision o a newsystem. Even liberals and democrats in the 1990s were not up to the challenge ocreating a liberal political system, preerring instead to rely on Yeltsin.

Alas, Yeltsin was neither a Russian Surez nor a Russian Havel. The firstPresident o Russia may go down in history as the leader who missed a chance to

transorm his countryand apparently did not even understand what a chance hehad missed. During his tenure, Russians began to enjoy unprecedented reedoms(although these reedoms were more the work o Gorbachev); but beore long,while Yeltsin was still in o ce, Russia began slipping backwards, having ailedto cope with its newound reedom. It was Yeltsin who handed over power tohis avourites and enabled cliques to help themselves to state property. It wasYeltsin who adopted (and even edited) the authoritarian constitution that createda ramework or the electoral monarchy. It was Yeltsin who, by ailing to copewith the deepening crisis and paralysis o power, provoked among Russians thelonging or order and an iron hand. It is paradoxical that the degeneration o

Yeltsins leadership strengthened demands, not or independent institutions thatcould prevent urther abuses o power, but or a new and more powerul authori-tarian leadership. Putin has merely ollowed the path laid out by his predecessor.Ironically, in the eyes o society he became Yeltsins antidote and antithesis, whilein reality he guaranteed the continuity o the system his predecessor had begunto establish.

The second and third waves o democratization in Europe showed thatintegrating transitional societies into the European community was an importantactor in ensuring the success o their democratic reorms. Such integration provedimpossible in Russias case. Europe was having di culty digesting East Germany

and was unwilling to engage in urther sel-sacrifice. Post-communist Russia, orits part, having begun to build a new state, could not aford to surrender sover-eignty to supranational institutions.

The post-Soviet system bequeathed to Russia by Yeltsin and Putin includesthe ollowing components: bureaucratic capitalism, with the state assuming anexpanded role; a bureaucraticauthoritarian political regime; a social inrastructurethat depends or its survival on the state, rather than on individuals or society as a

6 G. di Palma, To crat democracies: an essay on democratic transitions (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley University Press, 1990),p. 210; Juan Linz, Some thoughts on the victory and uture o democracy, in Axel Hadenius, ed., Democracysvictory and crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 408.


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whole; and a oreign policy that balances partnership and disagreements with theWest. Other processes have conerred on this system additional characteristics:

the usion o power and property; the emergence o a state bureaucracy, with the energy- siloviki (representa-tives o the law enorcement agencies and security orces) lobby playing adominant role;the hybridization o economic, political, social and oreign policy, reflectedin adherence to mutually exclusive principles such as market and bureau-cratic control, authoritarianism and democracy, paternalism and socialDarwinism, and anti-western and pro-western trends;the replacement o any coherent ideology by pragmatism;the adoption o a policy o imitation that allows the system to adapt to newrealities without rejecting traditionalism.

How efective is this system? We could judge it according to the ollowing criteria:whether it creates the conditions or a successul diversified economy; whetherit succeeds in building viable human capital; whether it guarantees politicalreedoms and the rights o the individual; and finally, how well it secures riendlyinternational environment or Russia. In the light o these criteria, how should weview the post-communist Russian system, joint legacy o Yeltsin and Putin?

A system for growth or stagnation?

A first glance at Russias economic perormance during Putins term might yieldan impression that the system is rather efective. Indeed, the Russian economyhas perormed astoundingly well.7 Under Putin, gross domestic product has risenrom $200 billion in 1999 to $920 billion in 2006. Gold and currency reserves haverisen rom $12.7 billion in 1999 to $303.86 billion in February 2007. The reserveso the Stabilization Fund have reached $70 billion. In 2006 the trade surplus wasmore than $120 billion, and the budget surplus is currently 7.5 per cent o grossdomestic product. The Russian economy is now the twelth largest in the world.Although economic growth has been slowing down (rom 10 per cent in 2000 to6.8 per cent in 2006), it is still growing at a brisk pace. (In the first hal o 2007economic growth was 78 per cent.) The economy is booming not only in theextractive sectors, but also in construction, trade, and the service and bankingsectors. Russian business has shown that it is able to organize large-scale produc-tion and compete successully against international corporations. Russia repaid itsdebt to the Paris Club ahead o schedule. The number o major businessmen inRussia is increasing more than twice as quickly as in the United States: in 2005 thenumber o dollar millionaires in Russia grew by 17.4 per cent compared with 6 percent in the United States.

7 The economic data are taken rom Kommersant, Vedomosti, www.liberal.ru.


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However, like everything else in Russia, the economy has a alse bottom. Themain cause o the economys success is high oil prices, along with protectionrom oreign competition in key areas o industry and trade. A collapse o the oilprice could plunge the Russian economy into recession.8 Many predict an inevi-table devaluation o the rouble, which may trigger a financial crisis. Wages andincomes in Russia have been growing more quickly than productivity, and as aresult consumption as a share o GDP has increased at the expense o investment.(Gross investment amounts to no more than 20 per cent o GDP.) The govern-ment cannot get inflation below 10 per cent. The banking system is not ulfillingits role as a mediator: financial flows in the raw materials sector are not beingtransmitted to other sectors. The government has no idea what to do about thenegative impact o the flood o petrodollarsnamely, the strengthening o therouble, which stimulates imports and damages Russian industry. The corporatedebt o Russian companies has risen rom $30 billion in 1998 to $216 billion in 2005.

Russias oreign trade accounts or 45 per cent o GDP (in China this indicator iscloser to 70 per cent), which sounds a warning that Russian goods are uncompeti-tive. Russian investors preer to invest abroad, a trend which is now called exporto capital.9 All these are signs that bureaucratic capitalism has serious problems.

The key problem with the Russian economy is the role o the state. The stateis the economic regulator, but does not respect the supremacy o law and operateson the basis o slippery, uno cial rules that it does not even observe consistentlyitsel. The expansion o a state that rejects the rule o law makes corruption inevi-table and drives business into grey areas. Moreover, the bureaucratic corporationhas privatized the state, leaving no room or the observance o property rights or

economic laws.10 No amount o economic reorm can stimulate business activitywhile the state is the servant o the bureaucratic corporation and reuses to operatein a competitive environment.

The bureaucratic component o Russian capitalism is not the whole story.Russias economic model is slowing evolving into that o a petro-state. In 2006the Russian oil and gas sectors share o the ederal budget was 44.5 per cent andcommodities accounted or 63.3 per cent o exports. Aside rom these signs, Russiais increasingly characterized by the typical eatures o a petro-state: an alliancebetween the bureaucracy and business; the appearance o a rentier class which liveson dividends rom the sale o natural resources; systemic corruption; the domina-

tion o large monopolies controlled by the bureaucracy; an economy susceptibleto external shocks; the risk o Dutch disease, whereby a large increase in revenuesrom natural resources de-industrializes a nations economy; state intervention in

8 The sixold decrease in the oil price in 1986 led to the collapse o the USSR, and the twoold all in 1998 causeda financial crisis that almost finished of the barely breathing Russian economy.

9 In 2006 oreign investment in the Russian economy amounted to $150 billion and Russian export o capitalreached $140 billion. Capital inflow in the first hal o 2007 amounted to US$67 billion (capital inflow or thefirst hal o 2006 was US$42 billion). Most o this was made up o loans and speculative operations.

10 On the role o the Russian state in the economy, see William Thompson, Putin and the oligarchs: a two-sided commitment problem, in Alex Pravda, ed., Leading Russia: Putin in perspective (Oxord: Oxord Univer-sity Press, 2005).


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the economy; and a gul between rich and poor.11 The petro-state has an interestnot in modernization but in preserving the natural-resource economy.

As the state is busily re-establishing itsel in the economy, nobody thinksabout reorm. A regime characterized by personalized power that cracks downon political pluralism is incapable o creating a dynamic post-industrial economy,which needs economic competitiveness; its primary concern is to saeguard itsown interests, and anything threatening those interests must be restrictedcom-petition, property rights, open courts, transparency in decision-making, businessethics, reedom o the press. High oil prices lull everyone into complacency.Bureaucratic capitalism in Russia can produce economic growth stimulated byhigh oil prices and consumption, but this growth, by its very nature, is not sustain-able and benefits the rentier class above all.

The economic success story in Russia has ailed to repair the social structure.True, under Putin, most Russians have better lives. The government now pays

salaries and pensions regularly. Per capita income is on the rise, with the nationalaverage reaching $350 per month in 2006, compared with $80 in 2000. The numbero people living below the poverty line ell rom 37 per cent in 1999 to 25 per centin 2006. Unemployment ell to 19 per centrom 7 million to 5.7 million people.These marginal improvements in the social landscape do not change the dismaloverall picture, however.

Russias population continues to decline in numbers and grow older. Thequality o its workorce is also declining. In short, Russias human resources arein poor shape, and there is a danger o urther degradation. A ew acts shouldserve to demonstrate the scale o the social problems Russia aces. The popula-

tion has allen rom 149 million in 1991 to 142.8 million in 2006. Lie expectancyin Russia is extremely low, lagging behind the developed countries by 1519 yearsor men and 712 years or women. The mortality o people o working age isexceptionally high. Throughout the world, the main cause o death is cardiovas-cular disease, ollowed by cancer, with other causes o death (murders, accidents,poisoning, tra c accidents and the like) ranked between fith and ninth. In Russia,however, these last causes are number two on the list. I present trends continueand immigration does not compensate, the population o Russia in 2025 will be123 million (pessimists put the figure as low as 77 million). This raises doubts aboutRussias ability even to control, let alone administer, its territory east o the Urals

in 50 years time.Russias poor human resources situation is tied to the alarming state o its

health services. Only one Russian in three considers himsel to be in good health,while 40 per cent are requently ill, and 30 per cent sufer rom chronic illness.According to o cial figures, 60 per cent o Russian children are sufering rom achronic illness, presaging an even less healthy population in the uture. Diseasesthat had been eradicated in the USSR are spreading once again, among themtuberculosis and bubonic plague. Russia is on the brink o an AIDS pandemic: in1999 only several thousand were HIV-positive, but in 2006 the figure had grown

11 OECD Economic Surveys, Russian Federation (Paris: OECD, July 2004).


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to somewhere between 800,000 and 1.1 million. These unortunate statistics andother actors have led the World Health Organization to rate Russia 127th amongits 192 member states in terms o the general health o its population.

A particular cause or concern is the growing income gap between rich andpoor: the richest 10 per cent now earn twenty-five times more than the poorest10 per cent. The diferential between the most prosperous and the least avouredregions has increased to 281:1 (in 2000 it was 64:1). On the other hand, according toForbess lists, 20 new members joined the billionaire club in Russia in 2006 alone,bringing the total number o Russian billionaires to 53, with a joint net worth oapproximately $172 billion.

The structure o Russian society is hardly a recipe or stability. Between 1 and 2per cent o the population constitute really rich people; 1520 per cent are middleclass, able to save and to contribute money to their childrens education; 6065 percent dwell in the twilight zone between the middle class and the poor; 1520 per

cent are fighting or survival; and 57 per cent have allen to the social bottom.Such a pyramid social structure is inherently prone to turmoil.12

Only a wholesale reorientation o the political system towards the commongood can revitalize this desiccated social inrastructure and prevent urther degra-dation o Russias human capital. I the current system continues to serve onlythe interests o a parasitic rentier class, while simultaneously nurturing a cultureo dependency among the populace, the degradation o society may becomeirreversible.

Political regime as the driving forceIn order to see whether the Russian system could create a positive political environ-ment, let us look at the nature o the countrys bureaucraticauthoritarian regime.Such a regime is reminiscent o Latin American governments in the 1960s and1970s: power is concentrated in the hands o a leader who relies on the bureau-cracy, security orces and big business or support.13 The reorming potential osuch a regime is airly limited, but it could be boosted by the inclusion o liberaltechnocrats. The system works i the leader manages to keep the constituentactions o his regime under control. Workable authoritarianism relies on theleaders charisma, security orces loyal to him and an efective state apparatus. In

the absence o any o these, the leader can soon find his power usurped by thebureaucracy or security orces. Putins regime has demonstrated that it relies ona delicate balance between personalized power and the bureaucracy, which has

12 In early 2007 only 27% o those surveyed considered that things would turn out well, while 50% anticipatedno improvement. Only 34% o respondents elt confident about the uture; 63% did not (3% had no opinion).Russians in the spring o 2007, despite continuing economic growth, were still not sure about their uturesand elt rustrated with government policy. According to Levada Center polls, 49% o Russians thought thatthe government could not control rising prices, 47% said that the authorities had neglected social issues, and22% complained about corruption. See www.levada-center.ru, Politika and Obschchestvo (Politics and Society),2007.

13 Guillermo ODonnell, Tensions in the bureaucraticauthoritarian state, in D. Collier, ed., The new authori-tarianism in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 292.


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always been powerul in Russia. Yeltsins and Putins regimes have one commoneature: too much power, the excess o which they have had to share with theirentourage, proo that both regimes have evolved in a neo-patrimonialist direction.The key goal o Russian bureaucratic authoritarianism is not modernization butthe perpetuation o the status quo.

Russias post-communist evolution serves as a textbook case o a ailed transi-tion. The Russian experience has confirmed that Francis Fukuyama was rightwhen he said that there are ew alternative institutional arrangements that elicitany enthusiasm other than liberal democracy.14 Democracy is the only broadlylegitimate regime orm. As Larry Diamond has put it, post-totalitarian regimeshave elt unprecedented pressure to adopt or at least mimic the democratic orm.15This is precisely why the Russian elite proclaims its democratic credentials, evenas it skilully adapts democracy to its own purposes. Imitation democracythat is,retention o the ormal institutions o democracy in order to conceal authori-

tarian, oligarchic or bureaucratic tendencies, and most oten all three at the sametimeis not to be ound only in Russia; it has become the most popular orm opolitical regime across the post-Soviet territories.

Pseudo-democracy discredits democratic principles, but ironically, unless theregime resorts to violence, it also undermines aith in the authorities omnipotence.The game o lets pretend played so assiduously by the Kremlins occupants willhave unintended consequences. Imitating a multi-party system, reedom o thepress, democratic elections, parliamentarianism and a ree market may well lead toan imitation o presidential power that conceals governance by Kremlin insiders.An imitation government and imitation nationhood cannot be sustainable.

The constitutionally mandated end to a leaders term marks the moment otruth or a regime. The Russian political class still cannot bring itsel to accept theuncertainty entailed by political competition and ree elections. It has ailed to learnto think in terms o alternatives, instead desperately trying to transer power to aloyal person and maintain its status as the power behind the throne. Meanwhile,the country is let to its own devices. All problems are put of to another day.The state becomes paralysed. All that really matters is to ensure the continuity opower. So it was under Yeltsin, so it is under Putin, and so it will be under the newleaderor as long as a system o personalized governance continues in Russia.Accordingly, no matter who is president, his second term will be lost time. For

several years beore elections, Russia leaves of everything except trying to guessthe name o the next ruler or persuading the incumbent to stay. 16

14 Francis Fukuyama, The primacy o culture,Journal o Democracy 6: 1, Jan. 1995, p. 9.15 Larry Diamond, Thinking about hybrid regimes,Journal o Democracy 13: 2, April 2002, p. 24.16 By mid-2007 two o cial presidential candidates appointed by Vladimir Putin had entered the presidential

marathon: Dmitri Medvedev and Sergei Ivanov, both deputy premiers, the latter being the ront runner. Yeton the bench o the presidential hopeuls a number o other Putin loyalists have been waiting or a chance torepeat the ascent to power made by the incumbent, among them the speakers o both houses o the parlia-ment (state Duma and Federal Council): Boris Gryzlov and Sergei Mironov; the head o the Russian railways,Vladimir Yakunin; and the St Petersburg governor, Valentina Matviyenko. At any moment Putin may pulla joker rom his pack and appoint him a new candidate. Preserving suspense and uncertainty is one way ocontrolling the situation at the end o the political cycle.


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More important than the identity o Putins successor in the Kremlin is whatkind o leadership the country will look or. Yeltsin entered the Kremlin as an anti-communist leader prepared to make a sharp break with the past. Putin became the

stabilizerater the chaos o the 1990s. Today, the regime is ofering society a choicebetween two modifications o the status quo: a populist stabilizer who promotesconsumerist aspirations, and a strong, statist leadership (which does not necessarilyexclude the populist agenda). The Kremlins oreign policy assertivenesscharac-terized by Moscows open anti-Americanism and the tough rhetoric o Putins 2007Munich speech, macho posturing towards Europe and readiness or a diplomaticstandof with Great Britain, and attacks directed against Georgia and Estoniaindicates that the Russian elite is ready to choose the second option, the strong,statist model. Playing the nationalist and great power card serves to compensateor the lack o any other uniying idea. The Kremlin doesnt want a conrontationwith the West; it apparently understands (or at least, some members o the ruling

team understand) the risks o rhetoric and actions designed to mobilize a populaceon the basis o identiying an enemy and the possible implications o its oreignpolicy technique o intimidation in the revisionist game. However, Putin himseland his team cannot stop playing the game, earing to begin looking weak or losingcontrol over the situation; in their view, being strong and confident means playingtough. There are no guarantees that the state, having started a campaign o anti-western and anti-American mobilization, will be able to stop it down the road.The Kremlin hopes that it can control the genie it has let out o the bottle, but itis unclear i the Kremlins insiders can succeed.

Putin and his closest associates are hoping that he can remain on the scene as

a kind o Russian Deng Xiaoping. It seems that Putins successor is expected togive up his seat at any moment i (or when) the Russian Deng decides to return topower. However, those who take power usually are not in a hurry to leave it. Anadditional problem is that the Russian public is unlikely to adjust well to the ideao two centres o personalized powerone in the orm o the de jure presidentand the other in the orm o a de actopuppet-master. Both the population andthe elite would rapidly transer allegiance to the elected head o state, who mightwell decide to cut the puppet strings.

Indeed, one cannot exclude the possibility o Putin attempting to stage aconstitutionally legitimate return to the Kremlin. Thus ar, polling supports the

continuation o Putins rule: in March 2007, 66 per cent o Russians were ready tosupport a constitutional change allowing Putin to be elected or a third term, withonly 21 per cent against (12 per cent had no opinion).17 The explanation or this issimple: people view the continuation o Putins rule as the lesser evil, comparedwith the unpredictability attached to a change at the top. Besides, the people eelincreasingly powerless to afect the political process, not to mention cynical aboutthe importance o the elections. I the new president continues down Putins path,why all this hassle about changing the leader at all?

17 www.levada-center.ru, 2007, Politika and Obschchestvo (Politics and Society), 2007.


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Vladimir Putin apparently understands the consequences o staying in o cebeyond his constitutional term. Repudiating an electorally legitimized authoritywould make his hold on power less secure. He would become more dependent onhis entourage and more vulnerable. Hence, Putin seems likely to leave the Kremlinin 2008. This will create a positive precedent: a leader riding high on a tide opopularity obeys the constitution and steps down rom power, making it moredi cult or his successors to act any diferently. Notwithstanding such a positiveprecedent, however, the regimes ocus on sel-perpetuation makes the Russiansystem both highly inefective and vulnerable.

Russia as both partner and opponent of the West

During Putins second term, the impact o international events on Russias internalsituation decreased. But while events outside Russia have less efect inside it, events

inside Russia have begun to drive its oreign policy. The Russian elite has takento using oreign policy as a tool to strengthen the state, to consolidate itsel andmobilize the population on the basis o suspicion towards the outside world. Thisis not an exclusively Russian eature; oreign policy is used as an important servanto domestic agendas in the developed democracies as well. But in the Russian caseoreign policy has become one o the crucial systemic actors that helps to preservethe system in the situation when domestic sources o bureaucratic authoritarianismare no longer reliable. So what is the Kremlins oreign policy, and what drives it?

Russia has shocked the world, and especially the West, with its hardball gamein the international arena. Some o the motives behind Russias assertiveness are

readily apparent: a willingness to exploit high oil prices and the worlds addictionto hydrocarbons; the stabilization o Russias internal situation; the Wests uncer-tainty about how to build a new world order; the US setbacks in Iraq; growingglobal hostility to American hegemonism; and the crisis o the colour revolutionsthat alarmed the Russian elite in 20042005. All these actors raised the Russianelites opinion o its own worth. In some cases, the West has given the Kremlinthe motivation or pretext or its policy.18 However, the key actors behind newRussias sel-assurance are structural, and they are twoold: first, the attemptsto justiy centralization o power by returning to anti-western derzhavnichestvo;and second, the desire to preserve it in its new orm by endorsing Russias role

as an energy superpower. The Russian political class views the resumption ogreat power aspirations as an essential prerequisite o the revival o the Russianstate. The Russian political class has decided to overcome the humiliation o thecollapse and ragmentation o the Soviet Union, not by choosing the path takenby Germany and Japan ater their deeat in the Second World War, that is, joiningthe liberal democracies, but by returning to authoritarianism. Values are crucial inunderstanding Russias rupture with the West in 20062007, especially the rupture

18 The US decision to deploy elements o the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in Poland and the Czech Repub-lic, especially in the context o the orthcoming change o power in Moscow, could be viewed as a pretext thathas been skilully used by the Kremlin to justiy its mobilization agenda.


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between the United States and Russia, but they do not explain everything. Ironi-cally, the relationship between the West and Communist China looks much moreconstructive than the relationship between the West and Russiaa member o theG8 and the Council o Europe. The reason is that whereas Russia has chosen tostrengthen itsel by opposing the West, China is trying to guarantee its ascendancyby embracing the West.

Putin has reversed the policy o Russias aperturathe opening up towardswestern civilization pursued by Gorbachev and Yeltsin. He has done so both interms o viewing the West as an enemy and in terms o using oreign policy as atool o domestic restoration. A leader ailing to play a tough hand on the interna-tional stage would oreit the confidence o the Russian elite and have no chance ocontrolling events within the country, especially at the moment o a power transer.The regimes domestic needs lurk behind all Russias actions on the world stage,whether they take the orm o grumbling about American hegemonism, selling

arms to Syria, Venezuela or Iran, pandering to Iran, or bullying Ukraine, Georgia orthe Baltic states. Thus, Moscows opposition to US hegemonism derives less romthe vector o its oreign policy (which should be pushing Russia to work with theUnited States against common challenges like international terrorism or Chineseascendancy) and more rom the need to have a mighty opponent whose existence

justifies the continued existence and uture maintenance o a centralized state.The West, by ailing to find a response to the emerging Russian challenge, bears

at least partial responsibility or this state o afairs. As Robert Legvold wrote, Theproblem is that neither the US leadership nor or that matter European leadershave ever seriously wrestled with the underlying conceptual challenge: that is,

how to integrate Russia with the West when it cannot be integrated into theWest, that is, into the institutions that are at the core o Europe (the EU) and theEuro-Atlantic alliance (NATO).19 Only while the window was open or Russiaspolitical reorm in the autumn o 1991 was there a chance o including Russia inwestern institutions, even i only as an associate member o NATO and the EU.Neither side saw this opportunity. Both Russian and western elites were caughtout by the collapse o the USSR and ailed to see the historic choice they couldhave made. The first round o NATO enlargement was a sign that the West hadmade its goal the integration o Eastern and Central Europe, even at the expenseo its relationship with Russia. This may mean that western political elites had

reconciled themselves with the idea that Russia couldnt be embraced. It is possibleto get the impression that the ailure o Russias reorms did not alarm the Westparticularly; many had already written Russia of as either a potential adversaryor a spoiler. The resurgence o a sel-possessed Russia seeking to restore its greatpower status and to revisit the rules o the game drawn up in the 1990s took theWest by surprise.

Vladimir Putin began his first term by experimenting with a multi-vectorpolicyin efect, a policy o opportunistic vacillation in response to day-to-day

19 Robert Legvold, USRussia relations: an American perspective, in USRussiaEurope: cooperative eforts,33rd conerence o the Aspen Institute, 2318 Aug. 2006, Congressional Program, pp. 1011.


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requirements. Recognizing that the usual hard power instruments were no longerefective, the Kremlin began concentrating on the commercialization o oreignpolicy. Bobo Lo was right when he remarked, Economization, ar rom beingincompatible with geopolitics, gives it teeth.20A new phase in Putins oreignpolicy began in 20052006, when the Russian elite first demonstrated its readi-ness to dictate its agenda in the ormer Soviet space and then proved to have moreambitious goals. In 2006, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov began to speak o a roleor Russia as mediator in world crises. Russia cannot take anybodys side in acivilizational conflict on a global scale, he said. Russia is prepared to be a bridge.21For the first time in 15 years the Kremlin expressed unwillingness to integrate withwestern civilization. In late 2006 Sergei Lavrov put orward two new ideas. The firstwas a geopolitical triangle o Russia, the EU and the United States which wouldmanage world developments. The second was a proposed transition to networkdiplomacy.22 The Kremlins very terminologymediator, bridge, network

diplomacy, geopolitical triangle and finally energy superpowercharacterizesthe new mindset o the Russian elite. It wants to guarantee or the regime a role asa superpower and the reedom to move in a variety o diferent directions. On theone hand, Russia wishes to find a way to interact with the West and the rest o theworld on its own terms. On the other, Moscow would like to enjoy a privilegedplace in a USEuropeanRussian triumvirate, even as it remains ootloose.

Relations between Russia and the West have begun to assume the charactero both partnership and opposition, with collaboration in some areas and mutualcontainment (or an attempt at it) in others. This hybrid conveys a sense o theKremlins eforts to project the incompatibility o the principles underlying

domestic policy into the realm o oreign policy. Autocracy plus elections presentsan arithmetical logic as dubious as that o trying to marching in step with the Westwhile ollowing a path all its own. Given such a contradictory model o behav-iour, the question over which so many analysts have wracked their brainsWhichchoice should Russia make?proves to be without substance. There is no choice or astate that has firmly decided not to choose sides. In the atermath o 11 September2001, the Kremlin unambiguously sided with the United States, suggesting that inexistential crises Russia is likely to make common cause with the West. In times opeace, however, the country will vacillate or as long as the current system persistsin Russia. The real questions are: How long can Russia continue with this combi-

nation o realism, economic pragmatism, aspiration to join the club o westerndemocracies, and desire to regain great power status and to oppose the West? And

20 Bobo Lo, Evolution or regression? Russian oreign policy in Putins second term, in Helge Blakkisrud, ed.,Towards a post-Putin Russia (Oslo: Norwegian Institute o International Afairs, 2006), p. 64.

21 The pro-Kremlin analyst Vladimir Frolov says: A consensus has ormed in Russia to the efect that Russiacant be integrated into Western structures. And there is no opening or us to be integrated into the East. Thismeans that Russia is destined to remain an independent center o power, whether it wants it or not. It willhave to rely on its own code o civilization, doing its best to establish equally distant or equally close relationswith other centers o power: Vladimir Frolov, Cho dlya nas zapad poslie Mjunchena? (What is the West tous ater Munich?), Izvestia, 28 Feb. 2007.

22 Sergei Lavrov emphasized that what the times called or were not cumbersome unions with fixed obligations,but temporary, variable-geometry alliances based on present interests and in pursuit o specific goals, and thatnetwork diplomacy was to provide or flexible bilateral relations between states: Izvestia, 31 Dec. 2006.


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how it will eventually resolve the conflict between such diverse impulses? TheWest will have a hard time ormulating a consistent policy towards such a country.Indeed, sometimes it will be obliged to ollow Russias zigzags.

The Kremlins urge to be both riend and oe to the West leads to absurdity.On the one hand, Russia cooperates with Europe in the Council o Europe andits parliamentary assembly, and with NATO in the NATORussia Council; itdevelops road maps or rapprochement with Europe. On the other hand, Moscowregards Ukraines inclination towards Europe and Georgias attempt to join NATOas hostile acts. On the one hand, Russia had the presidency o the G8 in 2006. Onthe other, it continues to accuse the West o undermining its territorial integrity.On the one hand, Moscow views the United States as a partner in the anti-terroristcoalition. On the other, it demands that the Americans leave Central Asia, whichis rapidly becoming a centre or the spread o terrorism. On the one hand, Putinseeks to attract western investment in Russia. On the other, he unleashes a barrage

o anti-western propaganda and attempts to orce western investors to sell theirassets to the Russian state.23

Putins speech in Munich on 10 February 2007 was perceived as the start o anew Cold War between Russia and the United States. Since then, he has not misseda chance to blast America. In his Victory Day speech on 9 May Putin said, Thenumber o threats is not decreasing. They are only transorming and changing theirguise. As during the Third Reich era, these new threats show the same extent ocontempt or human lie and the same claims to world exclusiveness and diktat.24Few observers had any doubts which state Putin had in mind. By all appearances,the USRussia relationship had returned to the pre-Gorbachev period.

Does this mean that the Russian elite is prepared to conront the West? Theoverwhelming majority o the Russian elite has no desire to return to isolation,let alone to troubled relations with the West. How does membership o the G8,and all the energy Putin devoted to the success o the St Petersburg G8 summitin July 2006 and the economic summit in the same city a year later, square withRussias distancing itsel rom the West? The hardliners who control Rosnet, oneo the state mega oil companies, went to great lengths to organize the IPO (initialpublic ofering) and attract western managers. That is all very well, the sceptics say,but how do you explain why Moscow throws a stick in the Wests wheel-spokeswhenever it gets a chance? Russia obstructs the West in the post-Soviet territo-

ries; sells arms to pariah regimes; hinders the implementation o sanctions againstIran and sells it weapons; receives Hamas and Chvez in Moscow; and plays up toChina.

Certainly, Russias behaviour does not fit into any tidy scheme. The ruling eliteis indeed eager to become integrated into the West at a personal level. At the same

23 In October 2006 Moscow obliged Shell, together with its partners, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, to sell it a control-ling share in the Sakhalin-2 project. Gazprom increased the pressure on Total and Hydro, which have licencesto develop the Kharyaga oilfield. In June 2007 Moscow orced TNKBP, which controlled development othe Kovykta oilfield, to sell its stake to Gazprom. Exxon-Mobil ran into serious problems in operating theSakhalin-3 project.

24 Vladimir Putin, Interax, 9 May 2007.


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time it publicly rejects the West and makes it an enemy in order to rally Russiansociety. This schizophrenic mindset is nothing new. Back in the late 1940s, Sir IsaiahBerlin commented on the dual-track policy o the Russian ruling class: Russia isready to take part in international relations, but she preers other countries toabstain rom taking an interest in her afairs; that is to say, to insulate hersel romthe rest o the world without remaining isolated rom it.25

Russia retreats every time a conflict occurs between its interests and those o theWest, beginning with Bosnia and ending with Ukraine. It retreats because it lacksan ideology that might justiy conrontation with the West; because o the risk-averse, hybrid nature o the regime; and because it lacks the resources to support aconflict with the West. True, there are some among the elite who see conflict withthe western powers as a actor they can use in the struggle or power. At present,these hard-liners would probably not go so ar as to see Russia isolated rom theoutside world like an enormous Cubaalthough how they might behave in the

uture, especially in a crisis, is anyones guess.At any rate, the hopes or partnership between Russia and the West on the basis

o common interests have not produced the expected rapprochement so ar. Indeed,both sides increasingly understand that they have diferent perceptions o theircommon interests. This suggests that, or the time being, Russia and the West canhardly behave as consistent partners, a act both sides apparently acknowledge.Their relationship will inevitably include elements o partnership, cooperationand disagreement. This mix will be di cult to manage, and it will give groundsor disappointments and even or tensions.

Being the direct reflection o the Russian domestic hybrid system, the Russian

partneropponent model o relations with the West cannot radically changeunless the domestic system is reormed. For Moscow, this model could be ratherefective in reaching short-term goals and adapting to the changing environment,but it lacks substance and rejects strategic commitments. This is a oreign policymodel or a country that is not ready to choose its final path. In the longer runthe partneropponent ormula could become a serious barrier to real partnershipbetween Russia and the Westa partnership without which Russias domestictransormation is impossible.

Stability versus instabilityOn the basis o the preceding discussion it is possible to conclude that the old/newRussian system cannot guarantee the country sustainable and efective develop-ment and dey riendly relationship with the West. But could this system helpat least to maintain stability? At the end o Putins presidency Russia seems to bequite stable, and there are drivers that support this stability. The oil price is crucial,helping to raise the living standards o society. Economic revival continues, whichcontributes to a positive outlook among the population. People have not yet ully

25 Isaiah Berlin, The Soviet mind: Russian culture under communism, in Henry Hardy, ed. (Washington DC:Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p. 90.


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recovered rom their weariness ater the upheavals o the Yeltsin era, and have nodesire either to take to the streetseven when they are dissatisfiedor to demandany policy change. They are disillusioned with the opposition, both o the let ando the right, and are in no hurry to support it, waiting or new aces to appear.Meanwhile, remnants o the old opposition ormed in Yeltsins time have losttheir combativeness but continue to occupy the niches o protest, hindering theemergence o opponents more dynamic and more dangerous to the Kremlin. Forits part, the Kremlin is adept at stealing the oppositions more appealing slogans.

Particularly noteworthy is the loss o the intelligentsias old spirit o dissent anddissatisaction, so strong in Soviet times. The regime is in act not too repressive,allowing its opponents to survive, i only ater driving them into a ghetto andrestricting their access to the public. Opposition figures socialize with eachother through clubs, the coteries o the ew remaining small opposition parties,and finally the internet, and the act that there are such saety valves creates the

impression o a degree o reedom. The Kremlin and its spin doctors have cloggedthe political arena with clones: parties o loyal bureaucrats, mushrooming youthmovements, a public chamber, a state council. These ronts create the illusion oan active political lie and reduce opportunities or the ormation o genuinelyvibrant social and political movements. The only opposition party that is allowedis the Communist Party, whose role is to make the authorities look preerable.

O course, the institution o leadership is immensely important. When every-thing is uncertain, when there is no sense o progress, society sees the leader asthe guarantor o order and certainty. People see the corruption o the regime,but place the leader above o cialdom and exempt him rom criticism. Initially

Vladimir Putin was supported because people hoped he would revive Russia; nowhe is a president o hopelessness, supported because the populace can find no alter-native and looks or the lesser evil. To summarize, Russias stability is based onthe longing or a durable status quo on the part o both the elite and most o thepopulation, though their respective motivations or that desire are diferent. Theelite that has succeeded in consolidating its position during Putins years wants topreserve that position and its control over property. The wider society, remem-bering Yeltsins chaos, ears any changewhich has made Yeltsin and the memoryo his years the most successul stabilizing actor under Putin.

This appearance o apathy and indiference in Russia may, however, be decep-

tive. Slowly but surely, systemic actors are emerging that may gradually underminethis docility. I see three such long-term actors, engendered not by adventitiouscircumstance but by the way society is organized. The first is the undamentallyillogical nature o democratically legitimized personalized power. The regimesdetermination to retain power obliges it to control elections, which weakens itslegitimacy, and a regime that is losing legitimacy becomes ragile. The secondactor is the regimes determination to maintain the status quo while simultane-ously redistributing resources. This pits one elite against another and destabilizesthe political situation. The third actor is the inevitable emergence o discontentwhere power is excessively centralized in a society that has become accustomed to


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some degree o reedom. I popular discontent cannot be expressed in parliamentand the mass media, then sooner or later it will spill out onto the streets. In additionto these actors, other conflicts may appear: between the centralization o powerand the greater independence the provinces need or their survival; between theregimes attempts to manage business and the needs o the market; between thestates expansion and its attempts to control society and the populations aspirationsto run its own afairs; between the growing Russias integration into the globalizedworld and the Kremlins attempts to close of society rom external influences.

There is danger also rom situational actors which today work in avour ostability but which tomorrow may have the opposite efect. The Russian authori-ties have virtually no contingency plans or the possibility o a all in the price ooil. Another tool used by the regime to shore up stability is popular movementscreated by the Kremlin. Who is to say that such youth movements as Nashi (OurSide), Miestnyje (Locals) or Molodaya Gvardija (Young Guard) will not go the

same way as the nationalistic Rodina (Motherland) Party, which also was set upby the Kremlin but then became a loose cannon?

It is an unrewarding task to speculate how stable a closed social system that worksin its own interests can be. Let us imagine an unexpected combination o untowardevents: a reorm o housing, now outdated and still subsidized; an increase in uelbills; transport snarl-ups in major cities; a rise in the rate o inflation; unrest amongstudents due to be drated into the army; a technical ailure, like the 2005 powercuts in Moscow; a succession o ethnic riots; resumed terrorist attacks. This mightstir up the most stoical and inert o societies. At the same time, social tension,in the absence o powerul liberal democratic orces, can play into the hands o

populist nationalism. I a lurch in this direction were to occur, we would have toagree with those occupants o the Kremlin who mutter darkly that todays regimeis the acme o civilization by comparison with what might replace it. The wholeproblem, o course, is that the Kremlin authorities have provided the basis or atide o populist nationalism by addressing and strengthening public phobias andcomplexes; and the longer the present system continues, the stronger this tidecould become.

An uncertain trajectory

Russia has ailed to liberalize and westernize, but it does not want to return to theclassic matrix either: that is, personalized power along with the drive to become acivilizational pillar which is an alternative to the West, and pretensions o unique-ness. Power in Russia remains personalized, but it is no longer rooted in the publicmind as something inevitable, sacred and God-given. The Soviet model o a stategoverned by imitation law has been revived, only now without the communistideology or the ormer repressive bureaucratic apparatus. Russian society hasemerged rom a patriarchal culture, but the varied ragments o culture flittingabout in its consciousness have not yet coalesced into a new orm. In trying toimitate the rule o law, pluralism and reedom while simultaneously clinging to


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authoritarianism, Russia has marooned itsel in the doldrums o history, becalmedbetween civilizations. Mimicry requently replaces reality, so it is di cult to distin-guish between the two when examining developments in Russia. At home, thereis a desire to dress up the emphasis on authoritarianism as democracy. Abroad,Russia lays claim to partnership with the West while simultaneously opposing it.On the one hand, Russia rightly regards itsel and its culture as part o Europe andEuropean culture. On the other hand, Russias politics and power structures remainalien to Europe and the West generally. The attempt to combine the incompatibleis disguised behind the mask o pragmatism. This points to the inability o boththe ruling class and Russian society finally to leave the past behind, although theyalso have no wish to remain in it or ever.

What is the crucial obstacle that stands between Russia and liberal democracy?Is it the tradition o the primacy o the state? This is certainly not an insurmount-able barrier. All societies were initially built on this principle, and indeed some

abandoned it only at the end o the twentieth century. In the Russian case, theprimacy o the state has always been linked not only with its superpower status butalso with the existence o real or imagined threats, both internal and external. Thisentailed the constant search or enemies and the cultivation o a siege mentality,which required in turn the militarization o everyday lie and consciousnessthatis, the subordination o the very oundations o society to militarist goals. In short,Russia developed a unique model or the survival and continuation o power. Apermanent war ooting was maintained even in peacetime (always a temporarycondition in Russia). As the Russian political scientist Igor Klyamkin explained,Russia has always developed by annihilating the boundary between war and peace,

and its system simply could not and still cant exist in a peaceul environment.26This militarist model was intended to legitimize the super-centralized state inthe eyes o the people. It is this militarism and these suspicions o the outsideworld that distinguish Russia rom the other similar countries that emphasized theprimacy o the state; and this explains why Russian transormation is so di cult.

Putins presidency is crucial in determining the uture course o Russias devel-opment. It has demonstrated, perhaps unwittingly, both the possibilities and thelimits o using militarist thinking to preserve elements o the traditional state.On Putins watch, the Kremlin has resorted to the old tactic o going in searcho enemies at home and abroad in order to justiy authoritarianism and state

expansion. Among the enemies nominated by the Kremlin are the West, Ukraine,Georgia, the Baltic states and even authoritarian Belarus, non-governmentalorganizations, liberals and oligarchs. The Kremlin uses militarist symbols andactions to keep the mobilizational paradigm alive: it tests a new intercontinentalballistic missile (ICBM) with multiple warheads that could penetrate any US anti-missile shield; threatens to abrogate the intermediate nuclear orces (INF) treatyand withdraw rom the conventional orces in Europe (CFE) treaty; threatens toretarget its missiles on Europe; and carries out joint military exercises with China.To date, this enemy search and deterrence tactic has worked quite well, but at some

26 Igor Klyamkin, Protiv techenija (Against the tide), Kontinent, no. 131, 2007, p. 165.


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point, the return to militarist thinking and the witch hunt could undermine thestability and security o Russia and its elite, leading to a battle between clans. Thismodel also hampers dialogue between the Russian elite and the West, as well as theelites ability to use the West to ensure its own survival. The Kremlin recognizesthe limits o the militarist paradigm, as is apparent in its attempts to reduce it tosymbolic actions and rhetoric. It is trying not to cross the line beyond which thepath would lead not only to internecine battles within the political class, but alsoto Russias marginalization on the global arena. Yet even this militarist syndromedemonstrates both the extent to which Russia has extricated itsel rom the pastand how deep it is still rooted in the past.

The ailure o the liberal democratic project is grist or the mill o those who seeRussian development as cyclical in naturethat is, rom liberalization to restora-tion and back againas well as those who view it in the context o continuitytheory as the constant replication o a traditional paradigm. Both these theories

reflect a atalistic view o Russia as doomed to choose between autocracy or ailure.The ailure o the last liberal project is superficial evidence o that view, but mattersare always more complicated. Russian history is neither a mechanistic cyclingbetween reorm and counter-reorm, nor is it merely repetitive, even though itoten appears to be. In reality, each successive reorm moves the country a littleurther orward, driving society towards greater openness. The successive restora-tions never take Russia all the way back to its starting point; they always leave alittle more reedom than existed to begin with. Just so with the Putin restoration,which resurrects neither the Soviet Union nor the traditional Russian servicestate: it is a backsliding that nevertheless leaves society some breathing space. The

regime appears to be telling the population, Do as you please; just dont try toseize power. Leaving society alone, giving it the right to seek its own survival(but not the right to interere in politics or claim ultimate control over property),represents an advance in terms o social autonomy, compared with the communistperiod, when the regimes control over society was absolute.

Russia is gradually coming out o its shell and opening up to the world in anirreversible way, proving that it is not doomed to a single destiny. Today, evenRussian traditionalists dont like to live in a hermetically sealed country like NorthKorea. True, ater each Russian thaw, there is a reversion to personalized powerand state lawlessness; but with each repetition o the pattern, the regime loses

some o its earlier power and is orced to limit its repressive instincts.The time is approaching when the authoritarian regime will no longer be able to

provide what society requires o it: stability and a standard o living approachingnot Soviet but western levels. We may find that the present period is one o thelast gasps in the lie o personalized power, enabled to return mainly because ohigh oil prices and the pain o Yeltsins reorms. Indeed, these two actors may haveartificially prolonged the lie o some elements o the Russian system on the wayto its extinction. I the regime takes a sharper turn towards authoritarianism, itmay even paradoxically accelerate the process o its demise; stagnation and ambiv-alence always postpone the exit solution.


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I liberal trends were cut short in the early twentieth century because societywas not yet ready or reedom, the deeat o Russias liberal project in the earlytwenty-first century can be explained first o all by the elites unreadiness orreedom and political competition. True, we should not overstate the maturity oordinary Russians or their ability to live in a state governed by law. The Russianpeople are still politically inactive and seem incapable o petitioning the regimeto address their interests. The Russian public has no experience in orming civilassociations, and no experience o lie in a country in which state power is dividedbetween executive, legislative and judicial branches. A significant part o Russiais, however, increasingly ready to move towards European cultural and legalstandards, and those people already consider themselves European. The worldhas become globalized, and Russia is now a reasonably developed country witha population reasonably well educated and inormed about the rest o the world.Thereore it does not have to repeat all the stages that the western nations accom-

plished on the path to liberal democracy. Having said that, I have to admit thatPutins nearly eight years in power have had an impact on the mood o the Russianpopulation. Yeltsin had let many Russians rustrated and disenchanted with theliberal reorms, nostalgic or the Soviet Union, or the certainty and stability othe communist past. Putin is leaving a legacy o mass cynicism and popular belie(even conviction) that in order to survive and succeed in the post-Soviet realityone needs to know how to circumvent rules by pretending to ollow them, andto learn to pay lip service to the regime while understanding its corrupt nature.Putins legacy may become a serious obstacle to real democratization when Russiaagain finds itsel at the ork in the road.

What the future has in store for Russia

For the first time in its history, Russia is enjoying an extraordinarily avourabledomestic and international atmosphere or transormation. It aces no seriousinternational threats or enemies; it has domestic stability; its leader enjoys popularsupport; the West is ready to assist it in a new round o reorms; its oil money couldcushion the shock o the new reorms or societys most vulnerable members; andfinally, Russian society does not reject liberal democratic values and part o it mightactively support the new transormation, i it is persuaded that it will benefit and i

a new political orce comes to the ore that could represent liberal principles.The Russian elite, on the other hand, is not interested in any reorm; it is

returning to its traditional ways, and is spending the oil windall on imports, justas the Soviet Union did during the Brezhnev stagnation. The ruling class orcesRussian society to drit downstream with no thought o the troubled waters ahead.The mutually incompatible trends within the system and within society itsel,combined with historical weariness ater the ailed revolutions, make it di cult togenerate the energy to change things. The elite has not orgotten the Gorbachevperiod, which it holds up as proo that weakening control would lead to chaos andpossible collapse. Besides, so ar there are no active subjects o transormation


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those leaders and groups that can not only ormulate liberal principles but linkthem with the economic aspirations o the people.

Moreover, one can hardly expect a liberal democratic upsurge in an atmosphereo stagnation. Change can be provoked only by a crisis, or the imminent threat oone. It may seem to some liberals that a crisis would be preerable to hopeless rotand decay. There is no guarantee, however, that a crisis in Russia will usher in agolden age o reedom and pluralism. A crisis may be dealt with by a mere changeo rhetoric, or new policies, or new personalities in the Kremlin, while the oldsystem continues unchangedas happened in 1991, 1993, 1998 and 2000. It maybe that, beore Russia can have another opportunity to turn to liberal democracy,it will have to ree itsel rom the temptation to try to resolve its problems with anationalistic totalitarian regime. A lot depends on when the next crisis occurs, andwhat conditions prevail in Russia at the time.

It remains unclear what efect the hybrid nature o the regime will have on

Russias uture development. Democratization o similar regimes in Serbia, Georgiaand Ukraine has shown that hybrids, because they aford a degree o reedom, canraise aspirations to genuine democracy in part o the population. So ar, however,Russias authoritarian evolution, under the disguise o managed democracy, orsovereign democracy as it is dubbed now, brings only rustration or genuinedemocracy and the desire not or change but or order.

Even so, I believe that the desire to see Russia reborn as a liberal state is still aliveamong some sectors o the Russian population. There are ar more people whowant to live in reedom than one might suppose. It is true that, when Russians areasked about their priorities, they put at the top security, stability and standard o

living: 75 per cent regard these as their priority, while only 13 per cent mentiondemocracy. At the same time, 60 per cent o respondents believe that the oppositionhas the right to express its views. Asked what will guarantee well-being in Russia,only 29 per cent mentioned presidential verticalitythat is, top-down gover-nance. And 43 per cent answered that strengthening o civil rights will guaranteewell-being.27 This is a sea-change in the thinking o a people that or centurieshave been brought up to revere the state and its leader. As yet, the people whoeel this way are not consolidated; they have ound their own ways o individualsurvival and are not ready to risk dangerous dissent.

So ar the Law o Failure has been governing Russia. According to this law,

when a liberal opposition group is not ready to take power, society may have topursue a dead-end path to its conclusion beore it can look or another way out oits predicament. The leader has to ail spectacularly in order to demonstrate thatthe path was wrong. Gorbachevs ailure to reorm the Soviet Union showed that itcould not be reormed. Yeltsins ailure to create unctioning oligarchic capitalismproved that big business in power cannot think about a national agenda. Putinsdestiny may be to confirm that Russia cannot be modernized rom the top down.In that case, his success as an authoritarian modernizer would have only delayed

27 www.levada-center.ru, AprilMay 2007, Politika and Obschchestvo (Politics and Society), 2007; NezavisimayaGazeta, 20 Feb. 2007.


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Russias discovery o a road to genuine modernization, while his ailure might haveacilitated liberal transormation. Thus ar, in the peoples eyes and in the eyes othe West, Vladimir Putin is not a ailure, which means that true modernizationmay be a long way of.

Russians have yet to conceptualize the problems that will arise as their countryclimbs out o the past and embarks on its journey towards the kind o open societyKarl Popper dreamed about. The Russian public has yet to decide how muchreedom and pluralism it can handle, given the nationalistic neuroses o somegroups. How can a lawless state be restructured without plunging Russia back intochaos? This is the eternal quandary and stumbling-block o Russian reormers.

In the uture, there seem to beat least theoreticallythree ways or Russia togo: continued stagnation; a systemic crisis; or a breakthrough to liberal democracy.For the time being, Russias stagnation continues, despite its economic growth.This stagnation maniests itsel in the Kremlins ailure to diversiy the economy,

to move beyond the wish to sustain the status quo aspirations, to orm a new andambitious vision or Russia and its return to tradition. Some optimists, however,believe that this scenario in the end will push Russia towards liberal reorms. I donot see how it is to happen: how reorm would begin without impetus, agenda,social support and driving orce. And why should the elite support something thatmight undermine its position?

It is more likely that, i stagnation continues, it will end either with crisis and amore authoritarian response or with gradual decay. Both carry the threat o stateor national collapse. I post-communist Russia begins to all apart, the world willrue the consequences o its disintegration. What matters most or Russian society

and the elite is that they find the means o bringing about the liberal transorma-tion o Russia beore its relapse into the old ways and its degradation becomeirreversible. Each year that Russia remains stagnant reduces the probability o aliberal democratic breakthrough. The opportunity, I believe, is still there, but orhow much longer will the window remain open (or is it already hal shut?)ten,seven, five years?

I Russia were to try once more to realize its liberal project, it would acenew challenges. Russia is unlikely to be able to transorm its enormous territorywithout the cooperation and assistance o the liberal democraciesespecially indeveloping Siberia and the ar east, as well as modernizing the North Caucasus.28

Russia will need to abandon its stubborn desire or sel-su ciency and its patho-logical sensitivity over sovereignty, especially as it becomes increasingly depen-dent on consumers o Russian natural resources. Inviting oreigners to resolvemanagerial and economic tasks is nothing new or Russia, but or the developeddemocracies to be willing to take part in the new Russian project, they will have tobe persuaded that the goal is a law-governed state. Moreover, western cooperationis unlikely to be unconditionally acceptable to Russia. The West will also need to

28 Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote o a transnational efort to develop and colonize Siberia that could stimulategenuine EuropeanRussian bonding: see Zbigniew Brzezinski, The choice: global domination or global leadership(New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 103.


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bear in mind just how di cult it may prove to complete joint initiatives on theterritory o Eurasia, and how painul it will be or Russia (more specifically, orits elite) to find a way to maintain national identity while integrating itsel intothe western world. I western politicians indulge in displays o petty egoism, orcontinue to allow themselves to be coopted by the Russian state,29 or ail to recog-nize the magnitude o the challenge, they may give Russia an additional push inthe direction o restoration. There is no need or Russia to become a ull membero such organizations as NATO or the EU to become a liberal democracy. Indeed,tailor-made orms o association and partnership may prove better able to easeRussias integration into European civilization.

The West should not expect the liberal Russia to prove an easy, agreeable partneror to maniest much gratitude. Shared values do not necessarily lead to sharednational interests or unanimity on how the world should be ordered and governed.This has been amply demonstrated by the ructions between Europe and the United

States during the two terms o the Bush administration (and by Frances perpetu-ally idiosyncratic take on the world). It is not impossibleindeed, it is probablethat there will be tensions between liberal Russia and its western partners. Butthere is no doubt that Russia will stand with the West in trying times, i onlybecause Russian society aces many o the same threats as the Westprimarily,Islamic extremism and nuclear prolieration.

Liberal Russia is an inconceivable alternative, the sceptic would shrug,dismissing my speculations on Russias positive uture. I would argue that we havealready seen the inconceivablethe peaceul collapse o the Soviet Union. Russianexperience over the past 16 years has demonstrated not only Russias backtracking

but also the act that there are powerul orces that have been preventing thissocietyso arrom lapsing into harsh authoritarianism. Thus, nothing ispreordained, and determinism is not the most efective way o analysis, obscuringas it does the complexity o the landscape, its hidden tensions and its drama.

For the time being, Russia continues to drit, missing its window o oppor-tunity. The next moment o truth is likely to come in 201011, when the newgovernment and the new leader will have to decide what to do with all the reormslet on the back-burner. By then, the limits o the petro-economy and the potentialo the bureaucratic system will be clearer, and Russia might reach the last availablemoment to restart reorm beore the new election cycle begins. There are no signs

that the Russian political class ormed in Yeltsins and Putins times will find thecourage to change the rules by which it plays; it might allow the rot to continue, orseek its salvation in a more aggressive iron hand. At the moment, however, no oneknows or sure what is happening under the surace in Russian society, how long itwill be satisfied with the status quo and with its rentier class. One cannot excludethe possibility that in the next ten years Russia will once more begin to deliberateon its new trajectory. It may happen even sooner than we expect.

29 Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeders taking a job as a Gazprom bureaucrat is a typical example osuch cooption.

Documents

Post-Communist Russia: A Historic Opportunity Missed by Lilia Shevtsova