Instructional Science 24: 343-356, 1996. 343 © 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Positivist and constructivist persuasions in instructional development

AHN-SOOK HWANG Seoul, South Korea

Abstract. Constructivism has been an influential theoretical persuasion in recent years in the field of instructional design and development. Yet the theoretical tenets and applications of constructivism in instructional development (ID) have been often discussed outside the context of the long-standing paradigmatic pursuits from which constructivism stems. Efforts to continue an intellectual journey, exploring how different theoretical bases lead to different implications for ID, must be based on a clear understanding of different paradigms. Hence, constructivism is discussed here in the context of the underlying paradigm debate involving the old positivist paradigm and the new constructivist paradigm. This article explores how these different paradigms have shaped different theories and practices in ID. Specifically, three versions of constructivism and how they have influenced ID are critically examined. Finally, it is recommended that the two paradigms, positivism and constructivism, can be applied in a complementary way in ID.

Introduction

Constructivism, at its essence, implies that human knowledge is constructed. Constructivism has attracted the attention of scholars in different areas of education such as science education, curriculum, inquiry methodology, and instructional design and development (e.g., Bednar, Cunningham, Duffy & Perry, 1991; Duffy & Jonassen, 1992; Duffy, Lowyck & Jonassen, 1993; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; von Glasersfeld, 1991). The theoretical tenets of constructivism and how they are related to educational practices have been argued in the context of each field. One thing that these arguments have in common is that in each field, discussions of constructivism have been presented as alternatives to conventional frameworks.

In recent years, the constructivist view has been one of the major influ- ences in the field of instructional design and development. Yet, the term constructivism has been used differently by various scholars in instructional development (ID), and its meaning appears to derive from different construc- tivist positions. Moreover, the theoretical basis of constmctivism has been often discussed outside the context of the long-standing paradigmatic pursuits from which constructivism stems.

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Clearly, different instructional design positions in the field of instructional design and development are embedded in different theoretical bases (Bednar et al., 1991; Jonassen, 1991). Constructivism should be understood in the context of the argument underlying the ongoing paradigm debate. Hence, this article begins by providing the theoretical foundations of this debate and how the various paradigms have shaped our understanding and practices in ID.

It is important to note that different versions of constructivism have been developed in the literature and may have varying implications for ID. It is therefore necessary to look into the key ~distinctions among these versions and how various constructivist positions relate to the practices of ID. It is also necessary to look critically at assertions by those who claim the constructivist label in the field of instructional design and development so as to improve our understanding and practices of ID.

Finally, this article presents the possibility of reconciliation between the two frameworks in the ID process. Scholars in the field of instructional design and development who believe in different theoretical bases advocate different ID approaches and have attacked each other's positions (see special issue of Educational Technology (1991) for specific discussion). It has been argued that adoption of constructivism replaces current ways of doing instructional design, rather than complementing or adding to our current practices (Bednar et al., 1991 ). This is because of the profound differences in assumptions about leaming and instruction that constructivism entails. Yet, the ID process can benefit from both the positivist and constructivist frameworks, if we look at them as two complementary ways of understanding learning and instruction. First, we begin with the discussion of different paradigms in an attempt to understand the theoretical tenets of two frameworks.

Discussion of paradigms

Paradigms can be "defined as the creative ideologies of intellectuals in partic- ular eras in the history of human thought" (Bhola, 1992, p. 104). Numerous paradigms have emerged, and some have faded away. But others have lived on and still influence our thinking. Different paradigms have guided directions in scholarship and research in education and the social sciences.

In pursuing knowledge production in education and the social sciences, one encounters two questions: What is the nature of being and reality?; and what is the nature of knowledge? The first line of questioning involves metaphysical (or ontological) issues, and the second relates to epistemological issues (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Broadly speaking, there are two opposing positions in each domain of metaphysics and epistemology (Doyal & Harris, 1986).

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Realism and idealism are contrasting metaphysical views (e.g., Farrel, 1994). According to the realist, the world exists and is organized indepen- dently of us, our language, and our methods of inquiry. Our investigations of the world merely reveal a structure that is already there and not supplied by our minds. On the other hand, according to the idealist, the world and its organization are dependent upon our intellectual activities and, perhaps, our language. Our methods of investigation do not reveal structure that is given, waiting for us to discover, but we construct that structure.

Rationalism and empiricism are opposing epistemological views (e.g., Aune, 1970; Doyal & Harris, 1986). According to the rationalist, knowl- edge is reliable only when it is based on "pure" reasoning, that is, reasoning from fundamental principles known independently of everyday observation. On the other hand, according to the empiricist, knowledge is most reliable when it is based on everyday experience or direct observation.

Bearing in mind these distinctions, I now turn to the issue of the so-called paradigm debate currently going on in education and the social sciences (e.g., B auman, 1978; Bemstein, 1983). Roughly speaking, the two theoretical streams involved in this debate can be summarized as the old paradigm of positivism and the new paradigm of constructivism. These two opposing paradigms are sketched here in barest outline to help clarify some of the critical arguments surrounding them, which are pertinent to the points to be argued throughout this article. The terms positivism and constructivism have been loosely defined at times and used as names for epistemology, pedagogy, or the methodology of research inquiry. In discussing these two paradigms, the complexities in placing different philosophical positions under the two categories of positivism and constructivism must be recognized. There are several different positions that exist under the broad paradigmatic umbrella of the old and new paradigms. For example, Phillips (1983) discusses how the term "positivism" has been associated with the various branches of philosophy of science, namely, Comtean-type positivism, logical positivism, behaviorism, and empiricism. And it also must be noted that there are several different positions subsumed under the new paradigm, such as critical theory and interpretivism.

Some positivists who take a realist stand assume that there is a fixed external world, and it is by comparison with this world that scientific claims are tested. In the positivist view, knowledge is built by the rational activity of scientists who use scientific methods to justify their claims. This positivistic position has guided much social science research using quantification of data and its statistical manipulation.

The logical positivist's adherence to "the verifiability principle of meaning" (Phillips, 1983, p. 5) has often been understood to be associated with a realist

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view of science. For example, in discussing the different modes of evaluation, Guba and Lincoln (1989) argue that the conventional paradigm (i.e., the positivist or scientific paradigm) resides in a realist ontology. They put in this way:

In the past, the methodology employed in evaluations has been almost exclusively scientific, grounded ontologically in the positivist assumption that there exists an objective reality driven by immutable natural laws, and epistemologically in the counterpart assumption of a duality between observer and observed that makes it possible for the observer to stand out- side the arena of the observed, neither influencing it nor being influenced by it. (p. 12)

However, as Phillips (1983) points out, all positivists do not necessarily adopt the realist position:

. . . On the whole, the logical positivists were not realists with respect to the status of theoretical entities . . . . Thus, scientific theories could not be true or false, but as tools they could be economical, useful, or instrumen- tally helpful; theories were hypotheses designed to predict facts (facts being sense experiences, or rather reports of sense experience in terms of propositions). (p. 6)

Clearly, various doctrines of positivism have been advocated and applied in education and the socialsciences, and the positivist paradigm has been a dominant ideology (Giroux, 1981). In this sense, I refer to certain distinct positions of positivism pertinent to the discussion of this article as a positivist ideology.

The constructivist, following the idealist stand, accepts multiple realities in place of one single reality. Constructivists posit that an external world does not exist for everyone to see, but is in the eye of the observer; that is, reality is an individual construction. In the constructivist view, knowledge is a structure that is subjectively constructed by individual minds. The aspirations o f adherents of this paradigm are not to make law-like statements, but rather to address sense-making in this world, in social and historical contexts. "Core concepts about knowledge production in the new paradigm are holism and contexuality" (Bhola, 1992, p. 106). Constructivists talk of emergent design and participative methodologies, and interpretation of data goes through a process of negotiation with stakeholders (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).

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Positivism and ID

The two paradigms of positivism and constructivism have shaped different theories and practices in ID, although this has not been explicitly discussed in the ID literature. Behaviorism, which is consistent with positivism (Phillips, 1983), has influenced the practices of ID for many years (e.g., Dick, 1992; Bednar et al., 1991; Jonassen, 1991; Knuth & Cunningham, 1993). Examples of the influence of behaviorism on the practices of ID include programmed instruction and computer managed drill and practice (Knuth & Cunningham, 1993). Programmed instruction was "essentially an application of operant conditioning wherein the learner's behavior was shaped by reinforcement of desired learning behaviors" (Jonassen, 1991, p. 6).

In the last decade, the field of instructional technology has adopted cognitive science (Jonassen, 1991) which focuses on mental operations (Bell-Gredler, 1986). That is, cognitive science looks into the role of the mind in gaining knowledge. Cognitive science also operates within the positivist framework, or, from the perspective that knowledge is objectively obtained through observation and sensation. Bednar et al. (1991) thus argue that "the goal of instruction, from both the behavioral and cognitive information processing perspectives, is to communicate or transfer knowledge to learners in the most efficient, effective manner possible" (p. 9!).

Bhola (1988) claims that the traditional design theme of instructional technology stems from the ideology of positivism. It is "to 'program' the teaching-learning process" (p. 35). Learning and instruction have been conceived as phenomena amenable to scientific analysis (Cunningham, 1992a). Gagn6's (1985) conditions of learning and the prescriptive instruc- tional theory advocated by Reigeluth (1983) are cases in point. These two theories operate under the assumption that instructional methods can be manipulated so as to accomplish instructional outcomes under certain condi- tions. The idea that one can prescriptively design instruction through prede- termined plans is based on the belief that it is possible to predict a learner's behavior (Knuth & Cunningham, 1993).

The influence of positivistic assumptions on the majority of current ID models is overwhelming. Dick and Carey's (1990) instructional systems design model, for example, involves a series of developmental steps starting with the definition of objectives and culminating in evaluation. The primary concern in this approach is efficiency (Davies, 1982). Such prevailing ID models have been criticized as being linear and algorithmic (Winn, 1986).

Cunningham (1992a) echoes a similar view in discussing the activities of instructional design under the positivist framework:

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Someone decides what it is the student should know, constructs a task anal- ysis of that knowledge, analyzes the learner's existing capabilities, designs a strategy to communicate the required information to the leamer, then tests to see if the communication process has been successful. Commonly this is carried out within the artificial setting of the classroom or learning laboratory since distractions to the learning process are minimized. All of these are seen as somewhat independent stages in an ongoing process. (p. 38)

Such an ID approach, which denies the generative nature of learning, has been challenged by the new paradigm of constructivism. There is a growing body of literature on the strategies of ID embedded in construc- tivism. Academics and practitioners in the field of instructional design and development have proposed an ID approach grounded in the constructivist paradigm, as a replacement for the conventional approach based on the posi- tivist framework (e.g., Bednar et al., 1991; Jonassen, 1991).

Different versions of constructivism and ID

The term constructivism represents different viewpoints in the field of instruc- tional design and development (Knuth & Cunningham, 1993; Winn, 1993) and its particular meaning seems to have been shaped by the intent of its users. Hence, it is necessary to come to grip with different versions of constructivism in the literature, which have relevance in the field of instructional design and development. Three different versions of constructivism are discussed.

The first view will be called social constructivism, as labeled by Gergen (1985). This view argues that our knowledge of the world arises through our constructions of social reality (Berger & Luckman, 1967). That is, meanings are socially constructed. This view emphasizes the importance of the social environment in which leaming takes place, but it does not pay attention to the internal cognitive leaming process. The focus in social constructivism is on the generation of meaning as shaped by social processes.

The second version of constructivism will be labeled radical constructivism, as defined by yon Glasersfeld (1991). This view has been labeled as an extreme position in that, contrary to the emphasis in social constructivism, radical constructivism focuses solely on the internal knowledge construction process, and ignores the influence of social environments in the process of knowledge construction, von Glasersfeld (1991) contends that to know is "not to possess 'true representations' of reality, but rather to possess ways and means of acting and thinking that allow one to attain the goals one happens to have chosen" (p. 16). The focus here is on the meaning-making activity of the individual mind.

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Finally, the third view, which has been advocated by academics and prac- titioners in the field of instructional design and development, appears to take an eclectic position by embracing both social constructivism and radical constructivism. The third view regards learning as "a constructive process in which the learner is building an internal representation of knowledge," as well as a personal and social interpretation of such experiences (Bednar et al., 1991, p. 91). Knowledge is constructed as individual experiences and inter- acts in the physical and social worlds. This view sees the learning process as being fundamentally context-bound (Bednar et al., 1991; Brown et al., 1989; Streibel, 1991).

Since this eclectic view has been an influential conceptual persuasion in the field of instructional design and development, its constructivist assertions may require considerable scrutiny. As stated above, many who advocate the constructivist approach in ID endorse two different versions of construc- tivism, that is, social constructivism and radical constructivism. Yet, these different versions of constructivism are rooted in different theoretical assump- tions, and thereby may lead to different implications for ID.

Consistent with social constructivism, Cunningham (1991) emphasizes "the social construction of meaning" (p. 27). In other words, he argues that "knowl- edge emerges in contexts to which it is relevant" (Cunningham, 1992a, p. 37). As discussed earlier, it is widely viewed that our understanding of the world is constructed in social and historical contexts through social negotiations. Hence, learning is regarded a s a social process (Resnick, 1987).

Many who claim the constructivist label in the field of instructional design and development take this orientation one step further. These construc- tivists emphasize the role of the mind hunting for meaning through personal and social experiences. They hold that learning should be situated in real world contexts so that learners' cognitive learning processes can be nurtured in relation to their personal and social experiences (Bednar et al., 1991; Cunningham, 1992a). Although this concept of situated cognition (Brown et al., 1989) may hardly be new, it is still one of the most important contributions that constructivist discussion has brought into ID.

Radical constructivism in ID appears to be predicated on the assumption that "all knowledge is constructed" (Knuth & Cunningham, 1993, p. 168), which seems to be a rather extremist view. These constructivists appear to be deeply committed to the view that "learners do not transfer knowledge from the external world into their memories; rather, they create interpretations of the world based upon their past experiences and their interactions in the world" (Cunningham, 1992a, p. 36). Knuth and Cunningham (1993) go on to claim that "one goal of instructional design derived from this principle might be to allow or encourage the experience of the 'constructedness' of

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our knowledge of the world, a feature that is usually invisible to us in our ordinary daily interactions" (P. 168). Thus, they emphasize that meanings are entirely constructed, not discovered by the mind, and that learning is an active process (Bednar et al., 1991).

In examining this extreme aspect of the constructivist claim, consider the following remark by Schwandt (1994):

In a fairly unremarkable sense, we are all constructivists if we believe that the mind is active in the construction of knowledge. Most of us would agree that knowing is not passive - a simple imprinting of sense data on the mind - but active, mind does something with these impressions, at the very least [it] forms abstractions or concepts. (p. 125)

In other words, many constructivists in ID are making a "psychological" claim, to borrow language from Schwandt.

What seems to be problematic in the typical eclectic constructivist argument is that it moves from a psychological claim to an epistemological claim (Matthews, 1992; Strike, 1987). For example, when Knuth and Cunningham (1993) argue that "all knowledge is constructed" (p. 168), they are making an epistemological claim that meaning is constructed only through an indi- vidual's constructing process, and they ignore knowledge being discovered in the real world that exists outside the mind of the learner.

As has been discussed, claims by many constructivists in ID seem to combine both radical constructivism and social constructivism. Yet, linking the radical and social constructivist claims appears, on the surface, to be contradictory. If we follow the logic of radical constructivism, knowledge constructions "are resident in the minds offindividuals" (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 143), and thus it is not possible that knowledge or information can be shared or transmitted among individuals such that the individual construc- tion of knowledge is modified or changed (Schwandt, 1994). When a leamer develops knowledge in interactions with the physical and social worlds, which represents the social construction of knowledge, certain knowledge is discovered or transmitted from outside the individual mind in the process of knowledge construction. Hence, it can be argued that some knowledge is discovered or given by virtue of being in the world, and not all knowledge is constructed.

In this sense, it is not surprising that instructional designers have found the radical version of constructivism inapplicable in conducting actual instruc- tional design. For instance, Schwen, Goodrum and Dorsey (1993), in attempt- ing to apply an extreme view of constructivism in their design of a corporate learning environment, explain: "We find the extreme view of all knowledge being relevant to personal experience and therefore idiosyncratic, too imprac- tical, and anarchic to be useful" (p. 6).

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Linking positivism and constructivism in ID

Now that the two general paradigms of positivism and constructivism have been described, and how each has led to different positions in ID has been discussed, the question arises as to whether the two theoretical positions may possibly be complementary. I hold that the two theoretical frameworks can be complementarily applied in ID practice.

Constructivism in a sense encompasses some positivistic notions about the world. Cronbach (1982) argues that one can come across two different contexts in the educational and social world: the context of control and the context of accommodation. Bhola (1992), who shares a similar view, explains:

Constructionists do indeed talk of the world being both "found" and "made." That gives us the reality of two worlds in one. The world we "find," that is, the world already constructed, is quite amenable to positivist assumptions. The world we "make" through our individual transactions with social reality is best studied by the constructionist paradigm. (p. 108)

Learning can occur by giving certain kinds of knowledge to an indi- vidual and/or by nurturing the knowledge construction process by virtue of individual capacity through provision Of individual and social experi- ences. The former is consistent with positivism, and the latter is amenable to constructivism. These processes of knowledge acquisition through transfer and construction can be enriched by embedding learning in relevant contexts or in individual and social experiences. Furthermore, on-going processes of reflective leaming (Cunningham, 1992b) must be encouraged in dealing with changing environments. Since reflective individual learning often occurs within the context of social practice, in cooperation with peers, collaborative learning needs to be promoted. In this way, learning becomes a socio-cultural process.

Therefore, the process of ID must accommodate the making of instructional decisions that reflect these different kinds of learning processes by employing disciplined speculation. For example, an instruction to teach factual knowl- edge that requires abstract context can be designed through a rationalistically based plan. That is, instructional strategies can be prescribed.1

But in many cases, the instructional strategies proposed must be general, flexible, and reflective of the particular situation since most learning episodes are ad hoc, involving both the transfer of knowledge and/or the knowledge construction process. Accordingly, Streibel (1991) argues:

Lately I have begun to believe that the discrepancy between instructional design theories and instructional design practice will never be resolved

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because instructional design practice will always be a form of situated activity (i.e., depend[dent] on the specific, concrete, and unique circum- stances of the project I am working on). Furthermore, I now believe instructional design theories will never specify my design practice at other than the most general level. (p. 122)

The process of ID must be situation-specific and context-embedded. In order to achieve this, ID should go through a continuous process of re-inven- tion so as to fulfill instructional needs in a given context. Goals, needs, and objectives are in a continuous process of emergence in the real world of ID practice. Hence, the instructional development process must be practiced as iterative learning activity, in collaboration with all possible actors (e.g., teachers, students, and subject matter experts), with regard to choices to be made, and the actions to be pursued throughout the process. Re-inventing the ID process in collaboration with learners in a given context would not only validate instructional decision choices but would also increase ownership of instructional episodes by learners. The participative and collaborative aspect of ID is one of the most critical aspects derived from constructivism in ID practice. Concepts such as rapid prototyping (Tripp & Bichelmeyer, 1990), which emphasize the iterative development process, and participatory design (e.g., Greenbaum & Kying, 1991; Campbell-Bonar & Olson, 1992) are in line with the constructivist framework. Tennyson's 4th generation ID which regards the ID process as interrelated and cyclic can be also considered as being in constructivist mode.

It should be recognized that the traditional ID themes based on positivism and the emerging themes grounded in constructivism are all relevant to ID practices. The ID process should cover both the logical and the systemic (Hwang, 1995). Today ID is practiced in several settings and, therefore, ID involves complex human action. In order to deal with the complexity of the real world, ID practitioners need to use both approaches. Instructional development may start with "the logic of the process" of ID, as suggested by Bhola (1991) and as embedded in Dick and Carey (1990). Most ID models, which are composed of five phases: analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate or control (Nervig, 1990), and are thereby models of the logic of the process, can serve as the crutch with which to begin (Hwang, 1995). Yet, ID must grow out of a linear, systematic mode into a holistic and systemic mode in order to accommodate the whole range of problems in the ID process (Bhola, 1991).

As Schwen, Goodrum, and Dorsey (1993) point out, ID is a socio-technical process. ID takes place in a social context and is not limited to technical interventions (Schwen, Leitzman, Misanchuk, Foshay, & Heitland, 1984). Thus, the ID process should go beyond the technical to the socio-technical

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realm. This means that the ID practitioner needs to take into account social, cultural, and organizational processes as well as the technical process of developing an instructional intervention in educational and business contexts.

Finally, I would like to close this article by suggesting the issues to be considered in order to use both positivist and constructivist views appropri- ately and effectively in ID practice. I emphasize a socio-cultural process of learning. I argue that learning requires both knowledge transfer and construc- tion processes and these processes can be enriched by embedding learning in relevant contexts or experiences. However, institutional and cultural constraints can hinder the appropriate employment of both views. In order to adopt this approach, institutional constraints, such as time and resources required to develop an appropriate curriculum and instructional strategies and the current more positivistic educational measurement system, need to be resolved. Further, cultural aspects, such as willingness to adopt collaborative and reflective learning approaches and resistance from teachers and adminis- trators who are not willing to change the current educational programs with their emphasis on technical rationality, need to be taken into account (Kubota, 1991).

Second, the proper training of ID practitioners may be a concern. As discussed, ID should be an on-going, emergent and socio-technical process, and making instructional decisions requires disciplined speculation. ID prac- titioners need to reflect on different kinds of learning processes and the complex systems surrounding an instructional enterprise, in order to make instructional decisions appropriately. Hence, the challenge lies in training ID practitioners to meet the need to deal with the complex ID process.

Concluding remarks

In order to accommodate our efforts to develop further the intellectual discus- sion surrounding constructivism in the field of ID, it is essential to understand the different theoretical frameworks, that is, positivism and constructivism, underlying ID practices, and how each framework has led to different theories and practices in ID. In exploring the implications of constructivism for ID, it also is important to keep in mind that different versions of constructivism can lead to different applications in the field of ID.

As is obvious from the discussion above, positivism and constructivism have different implications for ID, and can be complementarily applied in the ID process. Dialog surrounding the theoretical basis that instructional design embodies, as well as its implications, must be encouraged and continued. The intent of this article will have been partially accomplished if the reader is engaged in further inquiry of the issues raised here.

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Author notes

This article was written while the author was a doctoral student at Indiana University-Bloomington.

Note

1. I do not imply here that educational objectives can be classified from simple to complex, as suggested in Bloom's taxonomy terms. My point again is that not all knowledge is constructed, and some knowledge can be transferred by prescribed instruction. An example would be that instructional strategies to teach service mechanics how to tear a car engine apart and put it together can be prescribed.

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