This article was downloaded by: [McGill University Library]On: 08 October 2014, At: 07:34Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

West European PoliticsPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20

Portugal's administrativeelite: Social origins andpolitical attitudesWalter C. Opello Jr. aa Assistant Professor in the Department ofPolitical Science , University of Mississippi ,Published online: 03 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Walter C. Opello Jr. (1983) Portugal's administrative elite:Social origins and political attitudes, West European Politics, 6:1, 63-74, DOI:10.1080/01402388308424402

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402388308424402

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

Portugal's Administrative Elite: Social Originsand Political Attitudes

Walter C. Opello, Jr.

The primary purpose of the research reported in this paper was todetermine if the purge of high-level civil servants associated with theSalazar-Caetano dictatorship carried out after the PortugueseRevolution of 25 April 1974 was actually effective in changing thesocial origins and political attitudes of individuals composing thiselite group. Using an abbreviated version of a questionnairedeveloped at the University of Michigan to study administrativeelites in Western Europe, data on careers and political attitudeswere gathered. Statistical analyses of these data revealed, inter alia,that there has been some, but not overwhelming, change in recruitmentpatterns ofhigh-level civil servants and some change toward greatertolerance for democratic politics and less elitism.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRATIC REFORM

It is widely recognised that the power to make public policy in Western Europeanpolitical systems has relatively recently shifted away from legislative bodiestoward administrative agencies.1 The vast majority of policy proposals areconceived within such agencies by permanent civil servants in consultationwith outside organised interests. Although this practice is followed in Portugal,the central role of the administration in the Portuguese policy process is not arelatively recent development and does not represent a loss of power byrepresentative institutions to more technically sophisticated and specialisedadministrative agencies. Throughout Portugal's history, the bureaucracy hasbeen central to its governance and, from time to time, its continuity as a nationstate due to a long tradition of overseas empire, absolutism, and unitary stateorganisation; a history of social and political upheaval; and a recent protracteddictatorship.2 Not unlike France, these traditions have created an 'overinstitu-tionalised'3 administrative system and retarded the emergence of a strong,effective, specialised political infrastructure composed of political parties andparliament. Consequently, in Portugal the route to power and control oversociety traditionally has been through the administrative apparatus and notparliament, as was the case in those Western European political systems withstrong democratic traditions.

Beginning in the last century, administration has become especiallyimportant in Portugal's governance as various modernising elites haveattempted to consolidate their control and authority over the national territory,not by building a viable political infrastructure but by hegemonising thebureaucracy.4 Such control reached a zenith during the New State (EstadoNovo), the dictatorship established by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in 1932.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

64 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

Despite the corporatist ideology of Salazar and the elite which came to powertwo years after the military overthrew Portugal's First Republic (1910-1926),5

the New State gradually evolved into a bureaucratic polity which did notdepend upon popular support for its survival. During the dictatorship, Portugalwas ruled almost single-handedly by Salazar, who, as prime minister,gradually usurped the power and authority of the President of the country, thechief executive under the 1933 constitution.6 Gradually, Salazar's informalcontrol became institutionalised and the locus of policy making shifted to thePresidency of the Council of Ministers, which became a superministrycomposed of loyal civil servants and military officers personally accountableto Salazar and individually charged with the responsibility of controlling andreporting on various aspects of Portuguese society and economy.7 Thus, thestructures which mediated between government and people during thedictatorship were administrative and technocratic, not political. Salazarsought to demobilise and depoliticise the citizenry and to increase theefficiency and rationality of the administrative apparatus which made andimplemented public policy in almost total isolation from the population.

On 25 April 1974, Portugal experienced agolpe de estado led by a group ofarmy officers called the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das ForqasArmadas: MFA). In the wake of this coup, a new elite came to power whicheffected a political revolution by sweeping away the New State's instrumentalitiesof repression and establishing the political infrastructure of pluralist democracy,political parties and elective assemblies at all levels of government.8 Facedwith the highly centralised administrative apparatus and well-entrenchedtradition of bureaucratic policy making, Portugal's new political elite alsofound it necessary to carry out an administrative revolution as well. This wasattempted, first, by revitalising a bureaucratic reform movement which hadbeen initiated during the waning years of the dictatorship9 and, second, bypurging from the bureaucracy those high-level personnel most closelyidentified with the New State. In their stead, Portugal's new political eliteattempted to install individuals thought to be more tolerant of and responsiveto democratic institutions, political activity, and popular involvement in thepolicy process.10

While there is not much doubt now that the political revolution has met withconsiderable success, what of the administrative revolution, especially thedegree of responsiveness to and toleration of democracy and democraticpolicy making by Portugal's administrative elite? After all, it is relatively easyto create political institutions where none existed before. The bureaucracy, onthe other hand, as Max Weber pointed out, is 'among those social structureswhich are hardest to destroy...and makes "revolution" in the sense of theforceful creation of entirely new formulations of authority, technically moreand more impossible.'" Has Portugal's bureaucratic elite been able to resistthe impact of the political revolution? How extensive was the purge of oldguard administrators identified with the dictatorship? Has the politicalrevolution brought about any significant change in the social origins ofPortugal's high-level administrative personnel? Are the political attitudes ofPortugal's administrative elite now more compatible with democracy anddemocratic policy making?12

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

PORTUGAL'S ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 65

The purpose of this article is to provide some answers to these questions byascertaining the social origins of Portugal's administrative elite and byassessing the relative importance of background characteristics on politicalattitudes for individuals appointed to their posts before and after 25 April1974. The major presumption of the article is that an administrator's politicalattitudes are important determinants of behaviour and must be compatiblewith democracy if the Portuguese people are ever to have a significant role inthe policy process. It can reasonably be assumed that the administrativeapparatus will not be responsive to democratic policy making if Portugal'sadministrative elite is composed of traditional bureaucrats; that is, individualswho display a monistic conception of the public interest, believe that politicalissues can best be solved by applying objective technical, legal and administra-tive standards, reject and distrust political parties and parliament, and preferthe depoliticised environment of dictatorship. Indeed, such an administrativeelite may threaten the very existence of democracy in Portugal by sabotagingand blocking the action of democratically elected governments. If, on the otherhand, Portugal's administrative elite is composed of 'political' bureaucrats;that is, individuals who demonstrate a pluralistic conception of the publicinterest, recognise the necessity for bargaining compromise, and preferpolitical programmes to administrative procedures, then it can reasonably beassumed that the administrative apparatus will be responsive to democraticpolicy making.13 The presence of such an administrative elite in Portugalwould greatly enhance the chances that the Portuguese citizenry will have asignificant role in the policy process, and it would augur well for the futurestability of one of Western Europe's newest democracies.

DATA AND INDICES

The concept 'administrative elite' was defined as all the individuals in the topgrade of the national civil service, the directors-general (directores-gerais:DGs), of whom there are 120 within the administrative system. Although theyare officially non-partisan, these career officials are selected by the Presidencyof the Council of Ministers which makes them, in effect, political appointees.Consequently, an investigation of their political attitudes will be a goodbarometer of the impact of the political revolution on such attitudes. Thereshould be differences between those DGs appointed before 25 April 1974, andthose appointed since that date if the political revolution has had anyappreciable effect. Data on social origins and political attitudes were gatheredusing a survey instrument based on a closed questionnaire developed at theUniversity of Michigan to study political attitudes of administrative andpolitical elites in Western Europe and the United States.14 A somewhatabbreviated version of this instrument, translated into Portuguese, was sent in1980 to all 120 DGs in eleven of Portugal's thirteen ministries.15 Sixty-eightDGs completed and returned the questionnaire to give a return rate of 56 percent.16

As in the Michigan study, certain responses were combined into thefollowing political attitude indices: first, questions that tapped various aspectsof tolerance or hostility toward politics were combined into a tolerance for

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

66 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

politics index.17 DGs who scored high on this index were more tolerant of theinstitutions and political activity of liberal democracy while those who scoredlow were less tolerant of such institutions and politics. Second, questions thattapped the extent to which programme objectives and political ideals wereconsidered important to a DG in the policy process were combined into anindex of programmatic commitment.18 DGs who scored high on this indexbelieved that a government's programme is more important for policy makingthan the government's strength, while DGs who scored low believed that thestrength and power of a government is more important than its specific policyobjectives or ideology. Third, questions that tapped the degree to whichPortuguese DGs supported political equality and popular participation ingovernment were combined into an elitism index." Those DGs who scoredhigh on this index were not positively oriented to political equality and popularinvolvement while those who scored low were more supportive of suchdemocratic behaviour. Fourth, questions that tapped the extent to which DGsaccepted group conflict were combined into a tolerance for political conflictindex.20 DGs who scored high on this index were those who saw conflict asuselessly exacerbating problems while those who scored low were those whoviewed conflict as useful for problem solving. Scores on all four indices couldrange from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 90.

As in the Michigan survey, information on the following social backgroundcharacteristics was obtained: (1) age; (2) year of entrance into the civil service;(3) tenure in present post; (4) class; (5) place of birth; (6) parent or relative inthe civil service; (7) educational attainment; and (8) sex. Values on thesecharacteristics were combined into categories as follows: five categories wereused for the age, tenure in present post, educational attainment, and year ofentrance into the civil service characteristics. For age, the categories were:(1) 25-34; (2) 35-44; (3)45-54; (4) 55-65; (5) 65 and over. The categories foryear of entrance into the civil service were: (1)1930-39; (2) 1940-49; (3) 1950-59;(4) 1960-69; (5) 1970-79. The categories for time in present postwere: (1)0-2yrs; (2) 3-5 yrs; (3) 6-10 yrs; (4) 11-20 yrs; (5) 21-30 yrs. The five categories foreducational attainment were: (1) primary school; (2) 2nd lyceum year orequivalent; (3) 5th lyceum year or equivalent; (4) 7th lyceum year orequivalent; and (5) university. Three categories were used for the class, placeof birth, and parents or relatives in the civil service characteristics. For classorigin, the categories were: (1) upper-higher managerial and professionaloccupations; (2) middle-all other non-manual occupations, and (3) lower-allmanual occupations. For place of birth, the categories were: (1) Lisbon; (2)Porto; and (3) provinces - anywhere outside of Lisbon and Porto. Thecategories for the parents or relatives in the civil service were: (1) yes, regularcivil service; (2) yes, but only in the post office and schools; and (3) no. Thecategories for sex were, of course, (1) male and (2) female.

SOCIAL ORIGINS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Before presenting the result of the analysis of political attitudes, it is firstnecessary to present the background data for the sample. These data will givean indication of the extent of the purge carried out by Portugal's new political

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

PORTUGAL'S ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 67

elite, and the degree to which the political revolution has affected patterns ofadministrative elite re.cruitment and selection for the rank of director-general.

TABLE I

BACKGROUNDS AND CAREERS OF A SAMPLE OFPORTUGUESE DIRECTORS-GENERAL (N=68)

Characteristics and Categories N* %

Age25-3435-4445-5455-6465+

Years Entered Civil Service1930-391940-4 91950-591960^691970-79

Tenure in Present Post0-2 yrs.3-5 yrs.6-10 yrs.11-20 yrs.21-30 yrs.

ClassUpperMiddleLower

BirthplaceLisbonPortoProvinces

Relatives in Civil ServicesYes, regular civil serviceYes, post office, schools onlyNo

Education (highest level)University 68 100

SexMale 63 93Female 5 7

* N's in the categories for some characteristics do not addup to 68 because of missing data.

152217122

210112519

71671614

173015

20342

28732

233225183

315173728

1226122723

284824

30565

421048

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

68 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

The frequency distribution for each background characteristic is displayed inTable I. The table shows Portugal's administrative elite to be mainly young(55 per cent between 25 and 44); relatively recently appointed (65 per centsince 1960); universally college educated; primarily from middle- and upper-class families (76 per cent); principally of provincial origin (65 per cent);overwhelmingly male (93 per cent); and from regular civil service familiesabout one-half of the time (52 per cent). When compared to the data on seniorcivil servants in Western Europe provided by the Michigan group, PortugueseDGs are found to be similar in terms of sex, educational attainment, class, andfamily connections to the civil service. However, they differ significantly interms of age and time in the civil service. Portuguese DGs are decidedlyyounger and more recently recruited than their Western European colleagues.21

As can be observed in Table I, 38 per cent of Portugal's DGs wereappointed to their posts since the 1974 revolution (categories 1 and 2) and 62per cent were appointed before that event. While it is debatable whether a 38per cent change in personnel represents a 'revolution', there is little doubt thatit is significant. Its significance can be seen when compared with Italy, forexample, where there was considerably more carry-overs in high-levelpersonnel subsequent to the collapse of the fascist regime after a comparableperiod of time.22 Thus, the purge in Portugal in the aftermath of the 1974revolution does seem to have made a substantial impact on personnel althoughthe numbers of high-level civil servants appointed during the dictatorshipremain high.

But, does this level of change mean that the political revolution ha also hadan appreciable effect on other background characteristics? Do DGs; ^pointedafter 1974 come from different social classes? Do they come from Pt rtugal'stwo major cities, Lisbon and Porto, or the provinces? Are they more or lesslikely to have family ties to the civil service? Are there more women among thepost-1974 appointees? In order to answer these questions, the sample wasbroken down into two groups: those appointed before 1974 and thoseappointed after. The frequencies for each category of the various backgroundcharacteristics were calculated and compared for these two groups, except foreducation which was the same for all respondents.

The frequencies for age, which can be seen in Table II, show clearly thatDGs appointed since 1974 are decidedly younger, 68 per cent being between25 and 44, and those appointed before are considerably older, 43.5 per centbeing 45 years of age or older. Thus, the relative youthfulness of Portugal'sDGs stems from the fact that a fairly large proportion of appointees since 1974have been younger individuals. The data on class background show noappreciable difference between DGs appointed before 1974 and thoseappointed after; that is, about the same proportion of both groups come fromthe upper, middle and lower classes. It is interesting to note that the largestpercentage of both groups comes from middle-class backgrounds. Thefrequencies for place of birth show a clear tendency for DGs appointed before1974 to originate in the provinces while those appointed after are about aslikely to come from Lisbon or the provinces, with a slight edge to the latter.This suggests a certain tendency away from the provincial domination of thehighest reaches of the bureaucracy so evident among the pre-1974 appointees.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

PORTUGAL'S ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 69

TABLE II

FREQUENCIES FOR BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND THEIRCATEGORIES BY WHEN APPOINTED TO POST OF DIRECTOR-GENERAL

Characteristics and CategoriesWhen Appointed

Before-7 4N %

After-74N %

Age25-3435-4445-5455-6465+

ClassUpperMiddleLower

BirthplaceLisbonPortoProvinces

Relatives in Civil ServiceYes, regular civil serviceYes, post office, schools onlyNo

SexMaleFemale

6141382

11

209

102

30-

184

21

38'5

14.032.630.218.64.7

25.646.520.9

23.34.769.8

41.99.3

48.8

88.411.6

98840

6107

101

12

10311

250

36.032.016.016.000.0

24.040.028.0

40.04.048.0

40.012.044.0

100.000.0

X Total Ns for each characteristic vary because of missingdata

Frequencies for relatives in the civil service show no significant differencesbetween the two groups. Surprisingly, the frequencies for sex show that all fiveof the women in the sample were appointed before the revolution.23

It can be concluded from these findings that the purge of the high-level civilservice carried out by Portugal's new political elite had its most significantimpact on the age of DGs and their place of origin. These data suggest thatthere has been not only a fairly important purge of individuals associated withthe old regime but also some change in recruitment patterns and appointment

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

70 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

preferences. The most important of these changes is the discernible shift from aclear preference for individuals from the provinces because of the light it shedson the social origins of the dictatorship and the fundamental social cleavagewhich brought it to power in the late 1920s. Political life during the FirstRepublic (1910-1926) was marked by clashes between the interests and styleof Lisbon and those of the provinces, especially the traditional, Catholic, smalllandowners of the north. The dictatorship was a result of the mobilisation ofthis periphery against the centre, especially Lisbon.24 The victory of theperiphery can be seen in the predominance of DGs from the provinces amongthose appointed before 1974. The relatively substantial purge of many DGsassociated with the dictatorship as well as the greater tendency for DGsappointed since 1974 to come from Lisbon might be suggestive of thereassertion of the centre over the periphery.

TABLE III

GRAND MEAN SCORES FOR THE TOLERANCE FOR POLITICS, PROGRAMMATICCOMMITMENT, ELITISM, AND TOLERANCE FOR CONFLICT INDICES BY

WHEN APPOINTED TO POST OF DIRECTOR-GENERAL

Index Pre-1974 Post-1974

Tolerance for PoliticsProgrammatic CommitmentElitismTolerance for Conflict

Now that age and place of birth have been determined to be importantvariables in the recent recruitment of Portugal's administrative elite, what oftheir political attitudes? Do the political attitudes of DGs appointed after theRevolution of 1974 differ significantly from those appointed before? Table IIIshows the mean scores for the four political attitude indices for the two groupsof DGs. It is apparent from the table that DGs appointed after 1974 showmore tolerance for politics, programmatic commitment, and less elitism thantheir colleagues appointed during the dictatorship. Surprisingly, however, themean scores for tolerance for conflict show the post-1974 DGs to be lesstolerant of conflict in general than those appointed before. Except for toleranceof conflict, then, the mean scores show a clear change in attitudes betweenDGs appointed before 1974 and those appointed afterwards towards a greatertolerance for and responsiveness to democratic policy making. The greatertolerance for conflict among post-1974 DGs may be a reaction to the higherlevels of conflict that have characterised Portuguese political life since 1974.

How do Portugal's DGs compare with high-level administrators fromWestern European countries in terms of political attitudes? Making some

32.634 .334.044 .6

38.240 .030 .649.8

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

PORTUGAL'S ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 71

comparisons with scores from other countries for which comparable data areavailable will help answer the general question raised in the Introduction aboutthe overall level of support for democracy by Portugal's administrative elite.25

TABLE IT

GRAND MEAN SCORES ON TOLERANCE FOR POLITICSAND ELITISM INDICES FOR PORTUGAL, BRITAIN,

ITALY, GERMANY AND SWEDEN

Index

Tolerancefor

Politics

Elitism

Pre-1974

32.6

34.0

Post-1974

38.2

30.6

Britain

62

40

Germany

59

39

Italy

26

50

Sweden

58

*

* Elitism score not available for Sweden

It can be seen in Table IV that Portugal's DGs, irrespective of whether theywere appointed before or after 1974, score well below senior civil servants inBritain, Germany, and Sweden in terms of tolerance for politics. On average,only their Italian counterparts are less tolerant. Interestingly, however,Portugal's DGs, irrespective of when they were appointed, are the least elitistamong high-level civil servants for the three countries for which comparativedata are available.

Although no comparative data are available for the programmatic commit-ment and tolerance for conflict indices, some idea of the relative position ofPortugal's senior civil servants can be achieved by comparing their scores withthe mid-point of each of these scales. As both range from 10 to 90, the mid-point is 50. The mean score on the programmatic commitment index for DGsappointed before 1974 is 34.3 and 40.0 for those appointed since that date.Thus, irrespective of when appointed, the scores for Portuguese DGs are wellbelow the mid-point. The mean score on the tolerance for conflict index for thepre-1974 group is 44.6 and 49.8 for the post-1974 appointees. On this indexthe scores for Portuguese DGs are only slightly below the mid-point of 50.

Unfortunately, these comparisons with other Western European countriesand index mid-points do not give an unequivocal answer to the degree ofsupport for democratic policy making manifested by Portugal's senior civilservants as a whole. While there has been change in the political attitudes frompre-to-post-1974 appointees, Portuguese DGs appear to be comparativelyintolerant of politics (but not the most intolerant) and demonstrate low levels ofprogrammatic commitment as would be expected given the long tradition of

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

72 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

administrative policy making in Portugal. However, Portuguese DGs do seemto be comparatively the least elitist and relatively tolerant of conflict, whichwould not be expected given this tradition.

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing discussion of the social origins and political attitudes ofPortugal's administrative elite has noted, first, that Portuguese DGs, whencompared to high-level civil servants from other West European democracies,differ significantly in terms of age and length of time in the civil service, beingon average younger and more recently appointed to their posts than their WestEuropean counterparts. This youthfulness is a result of the purge carried outafter the revolution of 1974 which saw the replacement of well over one-thirdof Portugal's DGs.

Second, in addition to the lowering of the average age of Portugal's DGs, theanalysis has noted that the post-1974 purge resulted in a discernible tendencyin the recruitment of proportionately fewer individuals of provincial origins,indicating, perhaps, the reassertion of Portugal's centre, that is Lisbon, over itsperiphery.

Third, the analysis showed some change in attitudes from less to moretolerance and programmatic commitment and from more to less elitism forDGs appointed after 1974. The analysis also showed, however, that the post-1974 appointees were somewhat less tolerant of conflict than the pre-1974group. Thus, it can be concluded that the purge has not only affected the ageand origins of Portugal's DGs as a whole but on three of the four indices hasbrought about some changes in political attitudes. These changes, except forthe general intolerance of conflict, are favourable to democratic policy making.

Fourth, the comparisons made with their counterparts in those WesternEuropean countries for which data are available showed Portuguese DGs tobe on the whole less tolerant of politics, less programmatically committed, andsomewhat less tolerant of conflict, but less elitist.

These findings, while not uniformly favourable, allow the conclusion thatchanges in background characteristics and orientations toward democraticpolicy making have been achieved by the post-1974 purge which, if continued,will enhance the survival chances of Portugal's new democratic regime.Although they are not at present so disposed, Portuguese DGs could come tobe as positively oriented toward democratic policy making as their colleaguesin the established democracies of West Europe.

NOTES

This article is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Second Meeting of the Council forEuropean Studies, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C., 23-25 October 1980. Support for fieldwork in Portugal from May to July, 1980 was provided by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation,Lisbon and the Committee on Faculty Research, University of Mississippi. I wish to thank mycolleagues William Claggett and Daniel Geller for their advice on a previous draft.

1. On the decline of parliament as initiators of policy see Alfred Grosser, 'The Evolution ofEuropean Parliaments', and Karl Dietrich Bracher, 'Problems of Parliamentary Democracy

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

PORTUGAL" S ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 7 3

in Europe' in Stephen R. Graubard (ed.), A New Europe (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967);Gerhard Lowenberg (ed.), Modern Parliaments: Change or Decline? (Chicago and NewYork: Aldine/Atherton, 1971); and Otto Kirchheimer, 'The Waning of Opposition inParliamentary Regimes', Social Research, Vol. 24, Summer 1957, p.127-56.

2. Lawrence S. Graham, Portugal: The Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order(Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1975).

3. On this concept see Mark Kesselman, 'Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint:The Case of France', Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, October 1970, p.21-44.

4. A history of these struggles can be found in H.V. Livermore, A New History of Portugal(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), esp. Chaps. 10 and 11. See also StanleyG. Payne, 'Spain and Portugal', in Raymond Grew (ed.), Crises of Political Development inEuropeand the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 197-218.

5. On the collapse of the First Republic see Douglas L. Wheeler, Republican Portugal: APolitical History, 1910-1926 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

6. Jorge Campinos, O Presidencialismo do Estado Novo (Lisbon: Perspectives & Realidades,1978).

7. Lawrence S. Graham, 'Problems of Portuguese Bureaucracy and Prospects for AdministrativeReform', paper delivered at the 1979 meeting of the International Conference Group onModern Portugal, Durham, New Hampshire, 21-24 June.

8. For an excellent summary of these events, see Thomas C. Bruneau, 'Portugal in the 1970's:From Regime to Regime', paper delivered at the 1980 meeting of the American PoliticalScience Association, Washington Hilton Hotel, 28-31 August 1980.

9. In 1968 a Secretariat for Administrative Reform was established whose function was to'readjust' the administrative machinery of the state. See Secretariat for AdministrativeReform, Principles and Directives of the Administrative Reform in Portugal, Lisbon, 1968.

10. Graham, 'Problems of Portuguese Bureaucracy...'. See above.11. 'Essay on. Bureaucracy' in Francis E. Rourke (ed.), Bureaucratic Power in National

Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp.8-10.12. For analyses of the social origins of other Portuguese elites see Paul H. Lewis, 'Salazar's

Ministerial Elite, 1932-1968', Journal of Politics, Vol. 40, August 1978, pp.622-47; andHarry M. Makler, 'The Portuguese Industrial Elite and Its Corporative Relations: A Studyof Compartmentalization in an Authoritarian Regime', in Lawrence S. Graham and HarryMakler (eds.), Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and Its Antecedents (Austin andLondon: University of Texas Press, 1979), pp.123-65.

13. This dichotomous typology of bureaucrats is from Robert D. Putnam, 'The PoliticalAttitudes of Senior Civil Servants in Britain, Germany, and Italy', in Mattei Dogan (ed.),The Mandarins of Western Europe (New York, London: Halstead Press, 1975), pp.89-91.

14. See the articles in The Mandarins of Western Europe reporting the results of this research.15. The questionnaire was sent (May- June, 1980) to the Ministries of Internal Administration,

Justice, Finance and Planning, Education and Culture, Labour, Social Affairs, Agricultureand Fishing, Communications and Transportation, Commerce and Tourism, Industry andEconomy, and Housing and Public Works. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defencewere not sent questionnaires because the personnel in these services are not strictly part ofthe regular civil service.

16. It should be noted that the degree of bias in the sample is unknown because proportions of allDGs in the various independent variable categories are unavailable.

17. The following six questions from Putnam, op.cit., p.101, were combined to create thetolerance for politics index: (1) Fundamentally, it is not the political parties and theAssembly of the Republic but, on the contrary, public administration which guaranteessatisfactory public policy in this country; (2) Often, those who enter politics think more oftheir own well-being or the well-being of their party than of the well-being of the citizens;(3) The interference of politicians in the affairs which are appropriately the function of publicadministration is a disturbing characteristic of contemporary political life; (4) In contemporarysocial and economic affairs it is essential that technical considerations have more weightthan political factors; (5) The general well-being of the country is put in grave danger by thecontinual clash of groups with private interests; and (6) Although political parties play animportant role in a democracy, frequently, they uselessly exacerbate political conflicts. Tocompute the tolerance for politics index, each DG was given one point for an 'agree'response to a question, three points for an 'agree with reservations', seven points for a

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

74 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS

'disagree with reservations' and nine points for a 'disagree'. The tolerance for politics indexfor each DG is the average score on the six questions multiplied by 10.

18. The following three questions from Putnam, op.cit., p.105, were combined to form theprogrammatic commitment index: (1) The force and efficiency of a government are moreimportant that its specific programme; (2) Generally, in political controversies, extremepositions should be avoided because the true answer lies somewhere in the middle, and (3)Politics is 'the art of the possible' and, therefore, the leaders of the country ought to worrymore about that which can be done in the short run than about ambitious long-range plans. Aswith the tolerance for politics index, the programmatic commitment index was computed bygiving one for an 'agree' response to a question, three points for an 'agree with reservations',seven points for a 'disagree with reservations' and nine points for a 'disagree'. Theprogrammatic commitment index for each DG is the average score on the three questionsmultiplied by 10.

19. The following six questions from Putnam op.cit., p.108, were combined to construct theelitism index: (1) Some people are more qualified to lead this country because of theirtraditions and family background; (2) It does not make sense to speak of control of the acts ofgovernment by ordinary citizens; (3) It will always be necessary to have a small group ofstrong and competent individuals who know how to take charge of the situation; (4) Thepeople should be allowed to vote even if they do not know what they want; (5) Few peopleknow what their true interests are in the long term; and (6) All citizens should have the sameopportunity to influence government policy. The elitism index was computed by giving ninepoints for an 'agree' response, seven points for an 'agree with reservations', three points for a'disagree with reservations' and one point for a 'disagree' for questions 1, 2, 3 and 5. Scoringwas reversed for questions 4 and 6 which are phrased so that to agree is to be anti-elitist. Theindex is each respondent's average score on the six questions multiplied by 10.

20. The tolerance for political conflict index was composed of the following four questions fromSamuel Eldersveld, et.al, 'Elite Perceptions of the Political Process in the Netherlands,Looked at in Comparative Perspective' in Dogan, op.cit., p.147: (1) Abstract principles ofjustice rarely resolve social problems; (2) When a group or individual gains a victory, itgenerally indicates that another group or individual loses; (3) Only by social conflict canprogress be achieved in modern society; and (4) To compromise with political adversaries isdangerous because it normally leads to the betrayal of one's own group. The tolerance forconflict index was computed by giving nine points for an 'agree' response, seven points for an'agree with reservations', three points for a 'disagree with reservations' and one point for a'disagree' for questions 1 and 4. Scoring was reversed for questions 2 and 3 which werephrased so that to agree is to be intolerant. The index is each respondent's average score onthe four questions multiplied by 10.

21. Comparative data are from Putnam, op.cit., pp.95-9.22. Putnam, 'The Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants in Western Europe: A Preliminary

Report', British Journal of Politics, 3, 1973, pp.278-81.23. It should be noted that none of these differences were found to be statistically significant.

This is probably due to the small size of the sample.24. Philippe C. Schmitter 'The "Regime d'Exception' that Became the Rule: Forty-Eight Years

. of Authoritarian Domination in Portugal', in Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler(eds.), op.cit., p.12.

25. Comparative data are from Putnam, 'The Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants inBritain, Germany, and Italy', in Dogan, op.cit.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McG

ill U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

07:

34 0

8 O

ctob

er 2

014