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This article was downloaded by: [Queensland University of Technology] On: 13 October 2014, At: 06:26 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Democratization Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20 Political development theory and the dissemination of democracy Paul Cammack a a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government , University of Manchester Published online: 26 Sep 2007. To cite this article: Paul Cammack (1994) Political development theory and the dissemination of democracy, Democratization, 1:2, 353-374, DOI: 10.1080/13510349408403398 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510349408403398 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/ terms-and-conditions

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Page 1: Political development theory and the dissemination of democracy

This article was downloaded by: [Queensland University of Technology]On: 13 October 2014, At: 06:26Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

DemocratizationPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20

Political development theory and the dissemination ofdemocracyPaul Cammack aa Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government , University of ManchesterPublished online: 26 Sep 2007.

To cite this article: Paul Cammack (1994) Political development theory and the dissemination of democracy, Democratization,1:2, 353-374, DOI: 10.1080/13510349408403398

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510349408403398

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in thepublications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representationsor warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Anyopinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses,actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoevercaused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyoneis expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Political development theory and the dissemination of democracy

Political Development Theory and theDissemination of Democracy

PAUL CAMMACK

The relationship between political development theory and the dissemination ofdemocracy is a curious one. In the period when political development theory wasmost influential, efforts to disseminate democracy throughout the Third World inline with its core values were notably unsuccessful. It later went into eclipse as aconsequence of the failure of successive efforts at theory-building, fromfunctional, cultural and comparative historical perspectives respectively. Despitethis double failure, its core ideas have re-emerged as a dominant force in recentdemocratization literature. This article outlines the core ideas of the literature, inwhich conservative elitism rather than modernization theory provides theunifying thread. It then traces the failure of political development theory astheory in the 1960s and 1970s, and the emergence thereafter of a politics ofpragmatism in which the core values of conservative elitism survive intact.Finally, it suggests some of the reasons for its renewed ascendancy.

One of the aspirations which lay behind the attempt pursued from theearly 1960s onwards to produce a theory of political development was thehope that it might provide a basis for the dissemination of Westerndemocracy throughout the 'new states' of the developing world. By themid-1960s contributors to the theory-building effort such as Almond,Coleman, Powell, Pye, and Verba had arrived, after some false starts, atwhat they felt was an appropriate model of democratization for 'non-Western states' to pursue. However, they made little further progress.Successive attempts to place the theory itself on a sound footing did notprosper, while the examination of the developing societies themselvessuggested that there was a basic incompatibility between the cultural,historical and social requirements for democracy, and the condition of thedeveloping world. As a result, the internationalization of democracyremained a long-term goal, but theorists of political development did notadvocate the immediate dissemination of Western liberal democraticinstitutions. By the late 1970s three attempts to build a theory of politicaldevelopment - on functional, cultural and comparative historical basesrespectively - had ended in failure, and political development theory,

Paul Cammack is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government at the University ofManchester.

Democratization, Vol.1, No.3, Autumn 1994, pp.353-374PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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under heavy attack from competing approaches and from within, appearedto be moribund, with no practical or theoretical resources to offer.

It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that from the mid-1980s on,when a new project for the dissemination of democracy began to takeshape in political science and public policy communities primarily in theUnited States, it was based squarely upon the principles and precepts setout in the 1960s by the theorists of political development. The purpose ofthis essay is to explore the conjunction of theoretical failure and practicalsuccess reflected in this chain of events. After sketching the origins andtrajectory of political development theory, it identifies the set of ideaswhich underlay it, and describes the democratization model which tookshape in the mid-1960s. It then examines two obstacles which initiallyprevented theorists of political development in the period from devising asuccessful project for the dissemination of democracy - the finding thatconditions in the developing world were not appropriate for the model ofdemocratization devised, and the failure to arrive at a satisfactory theoryof political development itself. Finally, it examines the rebirth of thepolitical development democratization project as a blueprint for thedissemination of democracy in the 1990s.'

Origins and Trajectory

The concerted effort to build a theory of political development had its rootsin the founding in the United States in 1954 of the Social Science ResearchCouncil's Committee on Comparative Politics. Chaired first by GabrielAlmond and then by Lucian Pye, the committee promoted and sponsoreda variety of comparative work on both Western and 'non-Western' states.The ideas around which its work would centre were first addressed in anumber of position papers.2 These were followed by numerous individual,joint and collective works, the majority published either in the PrincetonUniversity Press series of Studies in Political Development or in the Little,Brown Series in Comparative Politics, which had Almond, Coleman andPye as series editors. Between 1963 and 1966 studies were published inthe Princeton series on the specific issue and policy areas of com-munications, bureaucracy, education, culture, and parties, along with acollection on political modernization in Japan and Turkey.'

During the same period Almond and Verba published The CivicCulture outside the Studies in Political Development series,4 and succes-sive efforts were made to develop a functional framework for analysis.5

Three comparative historical collections addressing the 'crisis' model ofdevelopment, drawing on work also begun in the early 1960s, appeared inthe 1970s, along with a volume edited by historical sociologist Charles

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND DEMOCRACY 355

Tilly, published in the Studies in Political Development series, but of adifferent character to the main political development effort." At the sametime Huntington, outside the political development 'school' but central toits trajectory, made three significant critical interventions on the themesof political decay, order and change.7

By the mid-1970s political development theory appeared to have runout of steam, and to be giving way to competing approaches. In the late1980s, however, its architects regained their prominence. Between 1988and 1994 Huntington, Pye and Verba each became President of theAmerican Political Science Association, and a spate of publicationsdeclared the enduring vitality of the political development approach andits relevance to contemporary processes of democratization." Politicaldevelopment theory was back, and it took the form of a political projectfor the dissemination of democracy as first elaborated in the 1960s.

Core Ideas

The core idea of political development theory was that the pressure formass participation in the 'new states' was both irresistible, and likely tooutrun the capacity of governments to channel and control it. Theorists ofpolitical development feared that the new states would prove unable tocope with pressure for change, and sought to devise appropriate policiesto contain and control the upsurge of participation which they thoughtwas inevitable. They saw modernization as unavoidable, and in the longrun desirable, but driven forward in the new states more by externalforces than by internal evolution. The new states, as traditional or transi-tional societies, lacked the attributes of modernity yet were exposed to itsdestabilizing influence as the global effects of modernization impactedupon political structures and attitudes which were unprepared for them.In these circumstances, enormous practical and theoretical efforts wereneeded if dangerous instability was to be avoided. They were eager todiscover, in Pye's words, 'how democratic values and modern politicalinstitutions can be most readily transferred to new environments', but thiswas not seen as an easy enterprise.1' Furthermore, the task was madeurgent by the pressure of demands for greater participation across theThird World, and by the powerful challenge from Marxist-Leninism. Itwas to be achieved, if at all, by limiting the political consequences of socialand economic modernization.

The context in which the theory of political development emerged,then, was one in which the identification of widespread aspirations forparticipation, global competition for political loyalty, and a resulting needto promote the adoption of Western institutions, coexisted with an awareness

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of the difficulty of establishing such institutions in states which had notexperienced the institutional and social developments which hadpreceded them in the West. The root problem, as perceived in the 1950s,lay in unresolved cultural conflicts arising out of the uneven impact ofWestern influence on traditional societies which were facing abruptprocesses of change."' As Pye later put it, with his customary brutalfrankness:

people in the new countries aspire to have things which are in noway consistent with their fundamental cultural patterns; . . .politically, they want their societies quickly to possess all theattributes of the modern nation-state. The time has clearly arrivedfor those who value free institutions to face up to the very realproblems of the appropriate strategies and doctrines which mightfacilitate the process of nation building in the new countries."

In responding to this challenge Pye and others aspired not only tounderstand but also to influence the politics of those states by directacademic intervention on behalf of foreign elites and US interests abroad.Pye urged students of international communication 'to shift their emphasisfrom . . . the problems of communicating the policies and the image ofthe United States to the emerging countries to the problems of domesticcommunications within these countries',i: while Almond and Verbaoffered the balanced blend of participation and deference to elite andgovernmental authority which made up the 'civic culture' as a solution to'the central question of public policy in the next decades'."

At the same time, the theorists of political development were as con-cerned to contribute to new theory as they were to address the issue ofinternational public policy. In this area the most significant influence wasnot modernization theory, but the 'behavioural revolution', which beganat the University of Chicago, where Almond had been a graduate studentfor a decade before the Second World War. When the theorists of politicaldevelopment offered policy advice on mass participation they drewdirectly on the findings of behavioural analyses of politics in the UnitedStates, which revealed that the average citizen had little interest inpolitics, little knowledge of the issues raised at election time, a weakcommitment to voting, and virtually no record of political participation ofany other kind. These findings led the behaviourists to question therelevance of the idea of the citizen in a liberal democracy as a 'rationalactivist', and to expect and endorse as appropriate a lower level ofinvolvement.14

The theorists of political development quickly embraced this newempirical and normative orthodoxy as they turned their attention to the

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new states, and when they endorsed the idea of the adoption in the newstates of the institutions of Western democracy, they advocated notunbridled activism, but rather the limited and elite-led pattern of partici-pation understood to be the norm in the United States. Influences fromother principal sources - the theory of modernization as drawn fromWeber by Parsons and Shils, anthropological approaches to politicalculture, and the concept of the 'political system' developed by Easton -were combined in various manners within the framework provided by theempirical findings and elitist bias of behaviourism.

The constant element was an insistence that the transfer of democraticinstitutions to the Third World was inherently problematic, and it wastherefore essential to identify and build in mechanisms which wouldenhance governmental and elite authority from the start. It was this thatconferred unity upon the basic set of ideas which underlay politicaldevelopment theory: that the global and domestic forces of modernizationwere too strong to be resisted; that established national political cultureswere deeply embedded, and resistant to rapid change; that politicalsystems had their own internal coherence and logic; that elites and masses(leaders and citizens) had different characteristics and roles; and that inthe ideal citizen activism was tempered by the influence of traditional,non-political ties and the acceptance of governmental and elite authority.

Within the analytical framework provided by behaviourism and coldwar conservatism, political development theory drew upon moderniza-tion theory, but at the same time it engaged in a critical dialogue with it.Almond, Pye and Huntington all drew upon the idea of modernization asa long-term process of rationalization, secularization and structural dif-ferentiation, and compared 'Western' and 'non-Western' political systemsin ways which contrasted 'modern' and 'traditional' patterns of behaviour.However, they emphatically rejected the polarization of the characteris-tics of tradition and modernity, and the suggestion that political develop-ment either implied or required the modernization of all aspects ofpolitics.

Almond's first full account of the functional approach, published in1960, was founded on an extended critique of modernization theory. Itargued that all political systems were mixed, and that 'certain kinds ofpolitical structure which we have usually considered to be peculiar to theprimitive are also to be found in modern political systems, and not asmarginal institutions, but having a high functional performance'." Pyesimilarly argued that in dealing with central problems of the politicalprocess it was not possible to rely upon 'the distinctions between"modern" and "traditional", urban and rural, Gemeinschaft and Gesell-schaft, which the social theorists have found useful in categorizing social

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and economic systems', as 'the processes by which interests and values areexpressed and then combined to give form and substance to political liferepresent in all cases a fusion of those traits of behavior customarilyidentified as both "modern" and "traditional"'."1 For all the differenceshe claimed between himself and the political development theorists,Huntington took a similar view, arguing that 'modernization and socialmobilization . . . tend to produce political decay unless steps are taken tomoderate or restrict its impact on political consciousness and politicalinvolvement'."

In their diagnosis of the 'problem' of political development, Almond,Huntington and Pye shared a common perspective. They availed them-selves of modernization theory in order to characterize the challengefacing new states; they saw the forces of modernization as posingproblems at the level of the political system; and they wished to retainand strengthen elements of 'traditional' political culture, or introduceother means of control, in order to provide stability. The adoption of amodernization perspective did not lead to support for the wholesaledissemination of 'modern' values throughout the political system. Rather,the political system was required to absorb the pressures generated bythe mismatch between modernization pressing in from outside, andpre-modern internal social and psychological attributes. By and large,this was to be achieved by retaining elements of 'traditional' politicalculture where possible, and by adopting policies or devising institutionswhich were capable of substituting new constraints for old ones wherenecessary.

In sum, none of the protagonists of political development theoryadopted a unilinear theory of modernization. They saw the process asproblematic from the start; they were all primarily concerned with thedislocations it produced, and directly concerned with public policy in thedeveloping world as a result, precisely because the dissemination ofWestern democratic institutions was always viewed with apprehension. Itis quite wrong, therefore, to talk at this point of 'faith that the politicalinstitutions of liberal democracy could and should be imparted to theThird World',1" or of 'the early prevailing assumption . . . of a relativelyunproblematic chain of causation from cultural modernisation to economicdevelopment to democracy'.'1"

Every theorist of political development subscribed to a form ofmodernization theory, but none expected the process of modernizationto produce modernized political systems characterized by harmoniousrelations between rational authority, differentiated structures, and massparticipation, or Western political institutions which would foster demo-cracy and guarantee stability. Rather, each saw modernization as a global

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social and economic phenomenon creating problems with which theoriesand policies of political development would have to deal. And in formu-lating their theories and policies, they were strongly influenced by ashared set of conservative values drawn from a variety of sources amongwhich the behavioural approach was dominant. These centred on a singleimperative: the need to contain and control the demands for massparticipation to which modernization gave rise.

These views led to the promotion of a model of democratization and ofdemocracy founded upon elite leadership, conscious efforts to limit theexpectations and demands of the masses, and the fostering of politicalcultures in which 'modern' and 'traditional' elements were judiciouslyblended. The first requirement was that the public political sphere shouldbe insulated from direct social pressure. For Almond, a core idea of thefunctional approach was that the necessary degree of institutionalautonomy required good boundary maintenance between the polity andsociety, and between the particular structures within the political systemitself.. Otherwise societies would be plagued by 'frequent eruptionsof unprocessed claims without controlled direction into the politicalsystem'.3I This was to be avoided not simply by the presence of interestgroups, political parties, and mass media of some kind, but by specifictypes of these institutions: associational interest groups, secular, prag-matic, bargaining parties, and free and neutral mass media such as typifiedthe homogeneous political cultures of the United Kingdom, the oldCommonwealth and the United States.21 Huntington was equally insistentupon the need for such institutional autonomy:

political institutionalization, in the sense of autonomy, means thedevelopment of political organizations and procedures that are notsimply expressions of the interests of particular social groups. Apolitical organization that is the instrument of a social group -family, clan, class-lacks autonomy and institutionalization.22

In a developed political system, Huntington argued, 'the autonomy of thesystem is protected by mechanisms that restrict and moderate the impactof new groups', and 'the political system assimilates new social forceswithout sacrificing its institutional integrity'.23 He envisaged a three-stageprocess of political modernization in which power was first concentratedin the hands of a modernizing elite, then expanded to admit new groups,and finally dispersed (at some indeterminate point in the future) to allowa degree of pluralism similar to that endorsed by Almond.

The second requirement for democratization was that elites shouldenjoy authority over non-elites. This was the central theme of The Civic

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Culture, in which the 'civic culture' itself, with its fusion of modern andtraditional elements, was endorsed as being 'appropriate for maintaininga stable and effective democratic process'.24 In a smoothly functioningcivic culture, elites could be both authoritative, and responsive to citizendemands:

On the one hand, a democratic government must govern; it musthave power and leadership and make decisions. On the other hand,it must be responsible to its citizens. For if democracy meansanything it means that in some way governmental elites mustrespond to the desires and demands of citizens.25

The model democracy, then, as described by political developmenttheorists in the 1960s, was one in which authoritative elites inhabited aninsulated and autonomous public political sphere, and were sufficientlyresponsive to the limited demands of appropriately socialized masses toenjoy their support and hence maintain stability. However, such situa-tions proved to be sufficiently rare in the developing world to raise doubtsas to the practical significance of the model democracy which theydescribed.

The Lack of Readiness of the Developing World

When the theorists of political development turned their attention to thepolitics of the 'new states' in the 1950s, the situation they discerned wasthe polar opposite to the ideal of an autonomous public political sphere,elite authority, and a citizenry inspired by civic consciousness. Kahin,Pauker and Pye listed seven 'distinctive characteristics of the politicalprocess in non-Western countries' which rendered politics both unstableand unpredictable: a high rate of recruitment of new elements intopolitical activity; a lack of consensus about the legitimate forms andpurposes of political activities; a prevalence of charismatic leaders; a lowdegree of integration in the action of participants, particularly betweenvillage and national level; a high degree of substitutability of roles; adearth of formally and explicitly organized interests; and a tendency forunorganized and generally inarticulate segments of society, such aspeasants and urban masses, to involve themselves in politics in a discon-tinuous, sudden, erratic and often violent way.2"

In 1958 Pye expanded the list he first proposed with Kahin and Paukerto 17 key features, in an effort to build a generalized model of the politicalprocess common to non-Western societies. Its central assertion was that'in non-Western societies the political sphere is not sharply differentiated

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from the spheres of social and personal relations', and that as a result 'theaffective or expressive aspect of politics tends to override the problem-solving or public-policy aspect of politics'.27

These broad characteristics were reflected in a number of ways inpolitical institutions, activity and leadership. Organized interest groupswere lacking; parties represented total ways of life rather than specificprinciples or policy objectives; oppositions tended to be seen as seekingto overthrow the system rather than proposing limited alternatives; therewere few 'brokers' between elites and masses; leaders generally represen-ted communities rather than ideas; they tended to be charismatic; theyenjoyed a high degree of freedom in determining strategy and tactics; andin the absence of differentiated publics they normally confined themselvesto broad generalized statements on domestic issues, adopting clearlydefined positions only on international issues.

Cutting through the detail, two key ideas ran through these formula-tions: first, the 'non-Western political process' was characterized by theabsence of a separate and relatively autonomous public political sphere,and as a result policy-making was erratic, irrational, and pervaded byprivate interests; and second, elites in the developing world were failing tocontrol mass political activity and channel it into appropriate areas.Despite Huntington's later boast to have 'quietly dropped' the term'political development',2" the substance of the diagnosis set out in PoliticalOrder in Changing Societies was essentially the same. He did not so muchdrop it as redefine it in institutional terms. He regarded the extent towhich the political sphere was differentiated from other spheres asmaking the fundamental difference between the 'civic polities' of GreatBritain, the United States and the Soviet Union and the 'corrupt' or'praetorian' polities of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Civic polities were consensual political communities with effectivepolitical institutions enjoying high levels of legitimacy and 'recognizableand stable patterns of institutional authority appropriate for their level ofparticipation', while corrupt or 'praetorian' polities were distinguished by'the fragility and fleetingness of all forms of authority V uncontrolledrecruitment to political positions, the pursuit of personal and socialpurposes within 'public' institutions, the lack of both intermediary struc-tures between leaders and masses and civil associations, and the absenceof consensus. In other words, Huntington's 'corrupt polity' was noneother than Pye's 'non-Western political process'. For all the theorists ofpolitical development, the developing areas lacked the essential social,structural and institutional prerequisites for stable democracy, and it waswith this finding before them that they set about the attempt to build atheory of political development.

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The Failure of Political Development Theory

In the 1960s and 1970s, three separate attempts were made to produce atheory of political development, from functional, cultural and compara-tive historical principles respectively. Each attempt ended in failure andabandonment. And throughout the period covered by these endeavoursthe initial object of enquiry - the political process in the developing worldand the prospects for the internationalization of democracy - steadilyreceded from view as attention turned increasingly to the developedcountries themselves. At the end of this period, therefore, the prospectsfor a viable theory of political development addressed to the developingstates of the Third World seemed remote.

FunctionalismThe basic idea behind the functional approach, stated in the openingpages of The Politics of Developing Areas, was a simple one: all politicalsystems perform the same core set of functions, although these functionsmay be performed by different structures from one society to the next."'This first sketch of the approach was followed by a more elaborate versionsix years later. Judging the framework of analysis presented in ThePolitics of Developing Areas (the identification of the seven corefunctions of political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation,interest aggregation, and political communication, rule-making, ruleapplication and rule adjudication) to be excessively static. Almond andPowell attempted to produce a more dynamic model in ComparativePolitics: A Developmental Approach. Here they introduced the idea ofthe capabilities of political systems and their development over time,defined the functions of political socialization and recruitment asdevelopmental processes, and redefined the remaining six functions asconversion processes internal to the political system. They argued thatwithin this framework political development could be explained andpredicted by relating system challenges to system responses, and wouldbe expressed in the dimensions of structural differentiation and culturalsecularization.

Despite the energy devoted to theory development, the results weremeagre. The case studies of regions of the developing world in ThePolitics of Developing Areas made no effort to apply the full functionalframework, while Coleman's conclusion, as he admitted, consistedlargely of an attempt to classify independent Third World states inaccordance with a typology of political systems." In Comparative Politics:A Developmental Approach the focus shifted dramatically away from thenew states, towards contrasts between primitive and modern systems,

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and between one modern system and another. In their conclusion,Almond and Powell dealt at length with comparisons between Britain,France and the United States, and between Western states and the SovietUnion. When they turned their attention to the 'premobilized modernsystems' which characterized the new states, they argued that any classi-fication was provisional, thereby admitting the failure of the theory tocope with such cases:

When one calls a political system at this stage of development'democratic' or 'authoritarian' one refers not to a functioningpolitical system, but rather to what might be thought of as a 'stance'at the beginning of a developmental process, and one that maychange quickly and without much prior warning.'2

The effort to produce a functional theory of political development ended,therefore, with a concentration on the politics of the developed countries,and a recognition that the framework devised could not cope with thepolitics of the developing countries themselves.

Political Culture

Efforts to produce a theory of political development from the perspectiveof political culture proved no more successful. They began with Almondand Verba's The Civic Culture, which set out to use modern quantitativesurvey methods and analysis to identify the attitudinal underpinnings ofsuccessful democracies, and devise ways of diffusing them through othercultures:

If we are to come closer to understanding the problems of thediffusion of democratic culture, we have to be able to specify thecontent of what has to be diffused, to develop appropriate measuresfor it, to discover its quantitative incidence and demographic distri-bution in countries with a wide range of experience with democracy.With such knowledge we can speculate intelligently about 'howmuch of what' must be present in a country before democraticinstitutions take root in congruent attitudes and expectations.11

The elaborate analytical framework identified parochial, subject andparticipant orientations and allegiant, apathetic and alienated politicalcultures, and prefaced a detailed examination of the cases of Britain,Germany, Italy, Mexico (a last-minute replacement for Sweden) and theUnited States. At its conclusion, however, Almond and Verba foundthemselves in an impasse. They were obliged to acknowledge that theproblem of how to create a civic culture in new nations took them 'well

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beyond the scope' of their data, as 'a slow political development mayfoster a civic culture, but what the new nations of the world lack is thetime for this gradual development'.u The theory of the 'civic culture' hadnot produced a theory of political development; on the contrary, itsuggested that such a theory was impossible.

No further sustained attempt was made to develop a formal theory ofpolitical development out of a theory of political culture. In 1965 Pye andVerba's edited collection on Political Culture and Political Developmentin the Princeton series dropped the idea of using a systematic quantitativeapproach. Pye suggested that 'it seemed best to emphasize more theexisting richness of area studies than the potential advantages of systema-tic schemata for defining and classifying political cultures'.15 The 'civicculture' as a model or a goal was also abandoned, with Verba arguing that'the types of political attitudes that developed within the older democra-cies may be neither feasible nor the most useful to late-comers to thedemocratic scene . . . What led to stable democracy in an earlier age maybe less relevant today'."" The attempt to identify universal attitudinalcorrelates of stable democracy now gave way to a focus on elite-massrelations and conscious manipulation and control. Verba argued that incountries as different as Germany, Egypt and India, 'with a great deal ofsophistication and with a great deal of self-consciousness, elites . . . havetaken upon themselves the task of remaking the basic belief systems intheir nations as part of their overall task of nation building'."

The German model of post-war reconstruction of the polity wasadopted in place of the supposedly consensual but now historicallyobsolete British model, and the whole of the analysis flowed directly fromthe assumption that the objective of political elites was to manipulate thepolitical beliefs of the masses in order to win their commitment to eliterule. The attempt to find a basis for a universal theory of politicaldevelopment had collapsed again, this time into a restatement of elitetheory.

Comparative HistoryThe failure of attempts to produce functional and cultural theories ofpolitical development led by different routes to the comparative historicalapproach, sketched out in the early 1960s, but emerging as the dominantline of enquiry only in the 1970s. This approach focused on common crisesarising from a shared 'development syndrome', and contrasting patternsof development arising from the varying sequences in which these criseswere encountered and resolved. It began to take shape in workshops heldin 1962 and 1963, and figured as a minor theme in the work of Almond,Powell, Verba and Huntington thereafter, but did not emerge fully as a

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distinctive approach for nearly a decade, when Binder, Coleman,LaPalombara, Pye, Verba and Weiner jointly published Crises andSequences in Political Development in 1971.

This collection, seen as an exercise in 'collective theory building inthe social sciences', was complemented in 1978 by Crises of PoliticalDevelopment in Europe and the United States, a set of detailed historicalcase studies edited by Grew. In its final form, the 'crises' approach centredon the five crises of identity, legitimation, penetration, participationand distribution, and attention centred on the question of whether thedifferent crises were encountered and resolved in a sequence over time,or whether they recurred, or coincided in time. In the 1971 collectionColeman attempted to relate the 'crises' of development to the 'develop-ment syndrome', described in terms of capacity, differentiation, andequality,1" while Verba spoke of a continuing but as yet unmet need todevelop 'a coherent and interdependent set of propositions' and 'testablehypotheses'.w

The approach subsequently gave rise to a number of historical investi-gations, particularly in the 1978 collection, but failed, once again, toprovide a sound basis for a theory of political development. Summing upthe efforts in the first volume, Verba commented that 'the relationshipbetween the notions of equality, capacity and differentiation on the onehand and the five crises of development on the other is not completelyclear'.4" Opting for the term 'problem area' rather than crisis, he confessedthat while the five problem areas identified seemed to be important, hecould 'find no clear logical structure among them nor any warrant forconsidering the list exhaustive'.41 •

The crises model fared no better at the hands of the historians whoapplied it to country case studies in the 1978 volume. By this time thefocus had shifted entirely, as it did in the effort to construct a functionalmodel, to Europe and the United States. Reflecting on the enterprisefrom the perspective of the group of historians who had undertaken theproject, Grew reported that his collaborators 'recognized that they werenot dealing with anything so grand as an integrated social scientifictheory, tightly woven with prescribed regularities and predicted causes',opined that the crises 'are really five categories of crucial social andpolitical relationships that invite discussion of who shares in what way itiwhat aspects of politics at any given time', and concluded that 'for themost part we have written as if the Committee's aim had merely been toprovide a framework for comparative analysis of European politicalhistory'.42

He reported scepticism with the Committee's idea that political changehad a direction towards greater equality, capacity and differentiation,

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declaring that he and his collaborators made little use of the categories,'have not found the empirical measures of them we once imagined',43 andcame to the conclusion that the specified crises threw little light on theconnections between politics on the one hand, and geography, economicand military competition, the effect of foreign influences, the role ofideas, social structure, economic organization and culture on the other.In addition, he noted, the concept of political crisis itself had provedimpossible to relate to developmental change. In a wry comment on theproject he concluded that 'the quantitative indicators we do not have informs that facilitate comparison will provide analytical power only whencombined with theories not yet elaborated'.** Overall, he reported that'the concept of "crises" being "resolved" has faded; one is merely lookingat problems that at a given time are (or seem) more pressing'.4' Whateverelse it may have achieved, then, the five crises model did not lead to aworkable theory of political development.

In summary, three different efforts to find a basis for a robust theory ofpolitical development were pursued in the 1960s and 1970s, and each ofthe three ended with the major protagonists admitting that their effortsleft them without one. Given this record, the interim assessment offeredby Almond and Mundt in 1973, after close on 20 years of vain pursuit,may stand as an epitaph for the entire exercise:

The reader in search of hard theory, of hypotheses deduced fromaxioms and subjected to rigorous tests of proof, will find littlecomfort in this analytical framework and our collection of casestudies. If anything, our study demonstrates the high costs ofmoving prematurely and without the benefit of theoretical imagina-tion and historical knowledge into an imitation of hard science.46

As we shall see, however, the failure of efforts to produce theory to liveup to expectations had the perverse effect of reinforcing the core ideas atthe heart of the political development project, and prompting theircondensation into policy advice.

From Theoretical Bankruptcy to the Politics of Pragmatism

As we have seen, the attempts to produce functional and cultural theoriesof political development in the 1960s succeeded only in persuading theirauthors that the developing countries were as resistant to theoreticalencapsulation as they were to democracy. In these circumstances, Almond,Verba, and their collaborators were reduced to restating the character ofthe dilemma at the heart of the challenge of political development, and

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seeking to devise responses that would meet the interests of local elitesand their Western allies. What emerged was a politics of pragmatism thatleft no space for democracy. As a result, the commitment of the theoristsof political development to the internationalization of democracy soonwithered. As early as 1963, Almond and Verba concluded in The CivicCulture, after rehearsing the many obstacles to the emergence of 'civiccultures' in new states, that

we cannot properly sit in judgement of those leaders who concentratetheir resources on the development of social overhead capital,industrialization, and agricultural improvement, and who suppressdisruptive movements or fail to cultivate democratic tendencies.47

The outcome, in both Political Culture and Political Development andComparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, was that the discus-sion of the developing countries was disconnected from the question ofdemocracy, while 'prudential rules' for survival were offered for the guid-ance of elites. Introducing Political Culture and Political Development,Pye calmly announced the adoption of different analytical perspectivesfor 'more advanced' and 'less developed' countries respectively, arguingthat while in the former 'the principal issue becomes one of whetherdemocracy will survive', in the latter 'there is a fundamental crisis ofleadership . . . and attention is directed more to the elite cultures'.4*Emphasis was placed upon the establishment of elite authority over non-elites, rather than the introduction of democratic institutions, andpositive or negative lessons in the art of establishing elite authority weredrawn from individual country case studies.

Ward held out Japan as an example of successful elite-led moderniza-tion in which a unified and progressive elite had overseen a gradualprocess of change, deliberately cultivating national symbols, and usingthe school system as 'an active agency of political indoctrination'.49

Overall, Ward argued, 'the general policy of early governments was togive as little as possible as slowly as possible in terms of institutions whichwould make effective even limited popular participation in the politicaldecision-making process',5" while the Liberal-Democratic party continuedto exploit 'traditional control devices' centred on personal clientelism tosecure the loyalty and electoral support of the rural population. Judgedagainst such criteria, the Egyptian, Mexican and Turkish elites were heldto have done well, while those of India and Ethiopia had been respectivelytoo 'modern' and too 'traditional' to strike the right balance.

Verba's conclusion took up the same general theme, but moved fromthe need for elites to devote themselves to 'the task of remaking the basicbelief systems in their nations' to identify the core of the problem facing

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such elites.51 Given the absolute requirement for elite control, 'if non-elites do not in some way identify with and have confidence in politicalelites, the elites will have to exact obedience by more forceful andperhaps more destabilizing means'.52 But elite attempts to mobilize thepopulation and to build legitimacy were likely to aggravate demandsupon the government. The result was a problem of overload, as 'expecta-tions of social improvement involve expectations that this will beaccomplished through the activities of the government'.53

In the conclusion to Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach,Almond and Powell similarly abandoned the pursuit of democratictheory, and advanced a step further in the creation of a set of prudentialrules for aspiring elites. There, the attempt to sketch out the possibilitiesfor a theory of political change was abandoned before the case of 'pre-mobilized modern systems' was addressed, and Almond and Powellturned instead to the advocacy of strategies of leadership, or 'politicalinvestment strategies'.

Returning to the dilemma facing the leaders of new states in thecontext of the explosion of participation and 'the image of the modernand democratic state which, given the social and cultural conditions oftheir societies, is unattainable in the immediate future',54 and noting theappeal of the Marxist-Leninist alternative, they now offered specificpragmatic advice to rulers in new states. They should stress state andnation-building in the first stages over participation and welfare; preservea limited degree of pluralism in order to keep options open; makecompensatory investments to cope with the disruptive consequencesof the modernization process; and pursue complementary investmentstrategies in education, industrialization, family structure and organiza-tion, and urban and community planning. Long before the effort to createa convincing theory of political development entered its final death throesin the 1970s, its exponents had stepped aside from any commitment eitherto democracy itself or to the development of theory, and fallen back ontheir core belief in the need for elite leadership and the containment ofpopular demands.

The Democratization Model Reborn

At the beginning of the quest for a theory of political development thedesire to offer relevant policy advice went hand in hand with the desire tocontribute to the theoretical development of political science. By the mid-1960s, however, the theorists of political development had detached thequestion of pragmatic policy guidance for elites in new states from theeffort at theory-building. Elites in the developing countries in the same

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period regularly found themselves unable to secure their intereststhrough democracy, and opted, to borrow a form of words from Verba, toexact obedience by more forceful means. They did so with the enthusiasticbacking of Western governments and the tacit and sometimes overtsupport of the theorists of political development.

The literature on democratization that has proliferated over the lastdecade takes up where the literature of the 1960s left off. Devoid oftheoretical ambition, and overwhelmingly concerned with pragmaticpolicy advice to aspiring political leaders, it faithfully reproduces, in itsgeneral orientation and in matters of detail, the conservative elitismwhich typified the approach of the political development theorists of the1960s. The journals are now thick with the advocacy of 'political crafting'or 'political engineering', statements of ideological commitment todemocracy have replaced searches for theoretical understanding, and oldcampaigners and new recruits have mustered in equal numbers to theflag.

Huntington has encapsulated current wisdom into no fewer than 27'guidelines for democratizes' that effectively codify the installation ofcompetitive elitism, prominent among them the injunctions to 'keepexpectations low as to how far change can go,' 'encourage development ofa responsible, moderate opposition party', 'cultivate generals', 'mobilizesupporters in the United States', and 'resist the demands of leaders andgroups on your side that either delay the negotiating process or threatenthe core interest of your negotiating partner'." Pye has cheerfullyadmitted, a propos of the once heady dreams of the behaviouralrevolution, that 'our findings have appallingly short half-lives', and foundsolace in the discipline's 'sensitivity to problems and developments in thereal world of public affairs'.*

Diamond, Linz and Lipset similarly concede that there is no sign of 'asingle, all-encompassing theory, and that it will be some time (if ever)before the field produces one', and console themselves with the observa-tion that the dearth of acceptable theory about democracy is counter-balanced by a gratifyingly large amount of empirical evidence of it.57

Against this backdrop the model of democracy they endorse - thesharp separation of politics and economics, the gradual extension of massparticipation under elite control, and the central importance of appropri-ate leadership, institutionalized parties, and organized associationalgroups - could have been taken (and often is taken) point by point fromthe literature reviewed above. There are two significant differences, evenso, between the literatures of the 1960s and the present. Where oncetheory and public policy were meant to be mutually supportive, thecelebration of policy relevance and success now makes up for confessed

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theoretical failure. And where the theorists of the 1960s found themselvesin an impasse in which they could formulate a model of democracy but feltinhibited from recommending its implementation, those of today are avidexponents of the dissemination of democracy.

Conclusion

It remains, then, to address this teasing conundrum. How is it that whilethe effort to build a theory of political development pursued under theauspices of the New York SSRC Committee on Comparative Politicsexperienced successive failures and ended in apparently comprehensivedefeat in the 1970s, its central ideas live on in current approaches todemocracy and political development? Four reasons suggest themselves.

First, political development theory had a central concern with theproblematic character of mass participation in the developing world thatwas always independent from attempts to produce a suitable theoreticalframework through which to sanctify it. The same central concernremains paramount today.

Second, it addressed this concern from a consistent analytical perspec-tive which has survived intact. Central to this analytical perspective was aconstant emphasis upon the need for an autonomous political sphereinsulated from popular pressure, and for elite leadership and control.

Third, the major obstacles to conservative democratization in thedeveloping world which were identified in the 1950s and 1960s have beenreduced or eliminated, making it possible for the policy goals of thepolitical development theorists to be promoted with some success.

Finally, the question of the failure of political development theory maybe by no means as simple as it appears at first sight. It is possible to discernthe half-emergence of a coherent theory informing the changing discourseon political development, but it is a theory of contained representativedemocracy in a capitalist society which can maintain a set of efficaciousnormative fictions only if it does not speak its name.

From the start, political development theory addressed the issue ofpolitical participation in the developing world from the perspective of theinterests of the leading capitalist states of the West. It did so, too, in thelight of the emphasis emerging within the behavioural approach upon theneed for and the normative acceptability of elite control and relativelylimited popular participation. Its consistent message was that popularparticipation could and should be strictly controlled and the demands ofthe majority deflected and contained by institutional constraints and elitecontrol if stable democracy was to be achieved. Hence its constantprogramme: institutional autonomy and elite dominance.

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The democratic institutions of the West were not valued so much fortheir own sake as for the stability they might potentially deliver.However, in the 1950s and 1960s the circle could never be squared, asevery line of research that was pursued suggested that there were realobstacles to the achievement of the objective of pro-Western politicalstability through the export of Western political models. Politicaldevelopment theorists were perfectly aware of these obstacles, whichwere identified over and over again as the main elements of the inter-national political economy of the post-war world: the global confrontationbetween capitalism and socialism, the expectation throughout the worldthat the state should play an interventionist role in remedying socialdeprivation and inequality, and the enormous pressure for a swiftresponse to social needs of populations throughout the developing world.Despite being aware of them, however, they were capable of doing littlemore than recognizing them as apparently insoluble problems.

The relevance and the apparent realism of the agenda of politicaldevelopment theory today arises from the simple fact- again interminablycelebrated in the literature - that these key elements of internationalpolitical economy have been reversed. The socialist alternative appearsto have been removed from the agenda; the tendency towards increasingstate intervention has been reversed; and the expectations of the majoritypopulations of the world have been effectively lowered, both by internalfailure and by international pressure. From the perspective of the globalsituation, it is now possible to conceive of conservative democratizationof the kind envisaged by the theorists of political development withoutit appearing immediately as an impossible dream. From the perspectiveof Western elites and interests, the political project at the heart ofpolitical development theory is today more consistent, more coherent,and more realizable than it ever was in the days when such efforts wereexpended to develop a theory of political development. In these circum-stances of immediate practical opportunity, the apparently comprehensivefailure of efforts to theorize political development is genuinely of littlemoment.

It should be noted, though, that the mainspring driving political devel-opment theory throughout has been an implicit if barely understoodtheory of political stability in capitalist society. Functional theory rightlycentred upon the need for an autonomous political sphere, but lost its wayas a result of its effort to theorize this need, which is specific to capitalistsociety, as part of a project for a universal theory of politics. The politicalculture approach centred its attention on the question of elite supremacyover non-elites, but interpreted the question of legitimacy as an effect ofindividual psychic orientations to political objects, rather than as a

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necessary part of bourgeois hegemony, and therefore social rather thancultural-psychological in its character and dynamics.

Finally, the comparative historical approach brought together in itsfocus on identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation and distributionall the elements required for an examination of the themes of nation-building and state-building, and a theory of the state and politics incapitalist society, but, having abandoned the systemic approach that wasthe only redeeming feature of functionalism, was unable to arrive at anintegrated understanding. A benevolent observer would take the viewthat these meanderings were the product of genuine confusion. But thefailure to relate the character of contemporary political systems to thestructural characteristics of capitalism and its current state of evolution asa global system also serves its purpose.

NOTES

1. For an application of these ideas to Latin America, to which this article may be seen asprefatory, see Paul Cammack, 'Democratization and Citizenship in Latin America',in Geraint Parry and Michael Moran (eds.), Democracy and Democratization (London:Macmillan, 1994).

2. See for example Gabriel A. Almond, Taylor Cole and Roy C. Macridis. 'A SuggestedResearch Strategy in Western European Government and Politics', American PoliticalScience Review, Vol.49, No.4 (1955), pp. 1042-49; George McT. Kahin, Guy Paukerand Lucian W. Pye, 'Comparative Politics in Non-Western Countries', American Poli-tical Science Review, Voi.49, No.4 (1955), pp. 1022-41; Gabriel A. Almond, 'Compara-tive Political Systems', Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, No.3 (1956), pp.391-409; and LucianW. Pye, 'The Non-Western Political Process', Journal of Politics, Vol.20, No.3 (1958),pp.468-86.

3. Lucian W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1963); Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Politi-cal Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Robert E. Wardand Dankwart A. Rustow, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1964); James S. Coleman (ed.), Education and PoliticalDevelopment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965); Lucian W. Pye andSidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1965); Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.),Parties and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).

4. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes andDemocracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

5. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, I960); Gabriel A. Almond and G. BinghamPowell, Jr.. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston, MA: Little,Brown, 1966).

6. Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, SidneyVerba and Myron Weiner, Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton.NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, andRobert J. Mundt (eds.), Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of PoliticalDevelopment (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1973); Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formationof National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975);Raymond Grew (ed.), Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States

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(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).7. Samuel P. Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Decay', World Politics,

Vol.17, No.3 (1965), pp.386-430; Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven,CT: Yale University Press, 1968); and 'The Change to Change: Modernization,Development and Politics', Comparative Politics, Vol.3, No.3 (1971), pp.283-322.

8. See, for example, Myron Weiner, 'Empirical Democratic Theory and the Transitionfrom Authoritarianism to Democracy', PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol.20, No.4(1987), pp.861-66; Gabriel A. Almond, 'Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Politi-cal Science', PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol.21, No.4 (1988), pp.828-42; SamuelP. Huntington, 'One Soul at a Time: Political Science and Political Reform', AmericanPolitical Science Review, Vol.82, No.1 (1988), pp.3-10; Lucian W. Pye, 'PoliticalScience and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', American Political Science Review, Vol.84,No.l (1990), pp.3-19; Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan and Robert J. Mundt,'Crisis, Choice, and Change in Retrospect', Government and Opposition, Vol.27, No.3(1992), pp.345-67.

9. Lucian W. Pye, 'Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development', in Pye andVerba,pp.3-26,p.5.

10. Kahin, Pauker and Pye, p.1023.11. Pye, Communications, pp. 12-13.12. Ibid., p.14.13. Almond and Verba, p.3.14. Ibid., pp.31-2.15. Gabriel A. Almond, 'Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics',

in Almond and Coleman, pp.3-64, p.20 (emphasis added).16. Pye, Communications, p.18.17. Huntington, Political Order, p.86.18. Richard Higgott, Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate (London

and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), p.9.19. Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Criti-

cal Introduction to Third World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 13.20. Almond, 'A Functional Approach', p.35.21. Ibid., p.46.22. Huntington, Political Order, p.20.23. lbid., pp.21-2.24. Almond and Verba, p.493.25. Ibid., p.476.26. Kahin, Pauker and Pye, pp.1024-327.27. Pye, 'Non-Western Political Process', pp.469, 483.28. Huntington, 'Change to Change', fn.42, p.304.29. Huntington, Political Order, p.82.30. Almond, 'Functional Approach', p.11.31. James S. Coleman, 'Conclusion: The Political Systems of the Developing Areas', in

Almond and Coleman, pp.532-76, esp. p.576.32. Almond and Powell, pp.313-14.33. Almond and Verba, pp.9-10.34. Ibid., pp.500-501.35. Pye and Verba, p.13.36. Sidney Verba, 'Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture', in Pye and Verba,

Political Culture, pp.130-70, p.134.37. Sidney Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', in Pye and Verba, Political Culture,

pp.512-60, pp.520-21.38. James S. Coleman, 'The Development Syndrome: Differentiation-Equality-Capacity',

in Binder et al., Crises and Sequences, pp.73-100.39. Sidney Verba, 'Sequences and Development', in Binder et al., Crises and Sequences,

pp.283-316, pp.282, 316.40. Ibid., p.291, fn.7.

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41. Ibid., p.299.42. Raymond Grew, 'The Crises and their Sequences', in Grew, Crises of Political Develop-

ment pp.3-40, pp.8-9.43. Ibid., p.9.44. Ibid.45. Ibid., p.l4.46. Gabriel A. Almond and Robert J. Mundt, 'Crisis, Choice, and Change: Some Tentative

Conclusions', in Almond, Flanagan and Mundt, Crisis, Choice, and Change, pp.619-49, p.619.

47. Almond and Verba, p.504.48. Pye, 'Political Culture and Political Development', p. 15.49. Robert E. Ward, 'Japan: The Continuity of Modernization', in Pye and Verba, Political

Culture, pp.27-82, p.45.50. Ibid., p.76.51. Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', p.521.52. Ibid., p.536.53. Ibid., p.539.54. Almond and Powell, p.327.55. Samuel P. Huntington, 'How Countries Democratize', Political Science Quarterly,

Vol. 106, No.4 (1991-2), pp.579-616; pp.601-2, 607-8, 616.56. Pye, 'Political Science', pp.4-5.57. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Democracy in

Developing Countries, Vol.4: Latin America (London: Adamantine Press, 1989), p.xiv.

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