As the Cold War progressed and states worldwide aligned themselves with the world’s two new superpowers, academics pondered whether a new kind of stability had arisen in the aftermath of the Second World War. While filled with tension, the Cold War seemed to put a damper on the outbreak of conflicts around the world. Influenced by the rise of systemic theorizing in the social sci-ences political scientists asked if the landscape of the international system, contoured by massively powerful states, could be the determinant of conflict. Heavenly bodies orbiting one another can be analyzed, and interactions pre-dicted, by mathematical equations and laws of physics. Could an understanding of international structural geography aid in the forecasting of state outcomes and the ability to predict war and atrocity?

It was a lofty and difficult question to answer that lead to a debate over the general stability of systems with numer-ous great powers versus systems with only two powers, reflective of the inter-national environment at the time. Politi-cal scientist Kenneth Waltz threw oil on the fire in the early 1960s by suggesting in the face of overwhelming tension be-tween the Soviet Union and the United States, that the world was headed for a "stability seldom known" to last throughout the 20th century. He argued that the propensity of war was deter-mined by the number of great powers, i.e. poles, in the system.1

The debate over the the stability of bipolar or multipolar systems flared dur-

ing the 1960s and 1970s, but was left unresolved. Empirical evidence was any-thing but conclusive. Though after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, polarity and stability became a major topic of inquiry once again. With only one superpower remaining how would other states in the international system react? Would balance-of-power politics require them to align themselves against the United States, or could the United States maintain it’s “Unipolar Moment”?

Beyond RealismIn his 1979 book Theory of Interna-

tional Politics Kenneth Waltz proposed that the interaction of states could be explained through a system-level theory. Waltz shifted focus from the behaviour of individual states and concentrated on their actions in relation to their position with other structural elements, or coun-tries of varying national power, within the international system. Waltz posited that the international structure constrains the actions of states, thus outcomes of state interaction can be predicted by an understanding of the make up of the sys-tem.

Structural realism, or neorealism, shares the main assumptions of classical realism: states are unitary, rational actors within an anarchic international system seeking security and acting in their own self-interest. Structural realists argue that since anarchical systems are devoid of an all-powerful actor that commands obedi-ence from other actors, states must look

out for their own security. Survival is dependent on preventing the rise of one state or coalition of states from being able to subordinate others. States there-fore must be sensitive to changing capa-bilities of other states as a matter of sur-vival, and must strive to counterbalance changes in relative power by either ex-panding their own capabilities or form-ing coalitions. Thus the international system has a predisposition to balance-of-power behaviour among its actors, characterized by the never-ending recur-rence of balancing equilibria. While clas-sical realists such as Machiavelli argued that balance-of-power politics was a strategy to pursue, neorealists differ only in perspective by saying that the balanc-ing of power is a natural mechanism of the international structure.

As time progresses and balance or near-balance of power between dominant states within a system is achieved, struc-tural realists argue that the actions of states will become more aligned. Waltz suggested that this phenomenon is evi-denced in the similar structural place-ment of the Soviet Union and the United States resulting in the convergence of their armament policies, military doc-trines and conduct of interventions. This principle could also be applied to foreign policy choices other than war such as free trade, which would not occur if the powerful states in the system chose pro-tectionism.

Structural realism is a wide-ranging research program from which a large variety of theories and explanations of foreign policy can be developed. In the case of the foreign policy choice of war Waltz argued that polarity alone could explain the level of instability in the world. His suggestion in 1964 that the world was bipolar and therefore stable was very controversial, and led to a number of attempts to attack or defend his position.

Size mattersThe identification of “Great Powers”,

or poles in the international system, was a matter of common sense during the Cold War. Kenneth Waltz noted that “since the Treaty of Westphalia, there have never been more than eight great powers.”2But in asking the question “How many poles is best?” political sci-entists had to decide on a definition of what makes a pole. Measuring state power with any intention of precision is

WS 502 Polarity & Warfare Chad KOHALYK

1 Kenneth Waltz. “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93, 3 (1964). p.901

2 Ibid. p.901

1

Polarity & Warfare

A weak attraction

a decidedly difficult task. Although for the purposes of determining poles within a system it is not necessary to rank states in an ordinal fashion, but only to identify the greatest powers. Waltz proposed that under the conditions of bipolarity, no third power would be able to challenge the top two. He also went on to argue that to qualify as a pole a state must be measured in terms of size of population, resource endowment, economic capabil-ity, military strength, political stability and competence. Ted Hopf pointed out that military strength “is the resultant of the other six elements, not an equivalent part of a bundle of power.”3 He simpli-fied criteria when examining the distri-bution of power in Europe during the 15th and 16th centuries, basing polar status on the just three characteristics: population, government revenue and military power (in terms of soldiers and ships). Hopf calculated the totals of each characteristic and attributed pole status to actors who held a disproportionate amount of power within the system. The top two states in the system, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire, counted for more than 50% of the sys-tem’s population, economics and military power.

Similar techniques have been used in other studies. It is important to note that great powers must score well on a num-ber of attributes, whereas would-be great powers will be characterized by an un-even distribution of attributes. North Korea may be able to field the largest military in the world, but that does not make it a superpower.

Two to tangoA bipolar system is characterized by

two relatively equal powers, each ma-neuvering to gain power over the other while simultaneously countering the op-ponent’s moves for power. Elimination of the other power may be an option, if the risks are calculated to be acceptable. Other actors may be present, but are ei-ther nonaligned and do not threaten the two dominant poles, or are too weak militarily to tip the balance of power in one way or another. Both great powers will compete for smaller powers to join their bloc or prevent them from joining the enemy bloc. In bipolar systems hos-tility between the two dominant powers is particularly pronounced, contributing to an extreme “them and us” attitude, and “each great power possesses a relatively clear set of beliefs about its limitations and the origins of its problems.”4

Advocates of bipolar systems con-tend that since the nature of bipolarity means there is an equivalent distribution of power, competitor powers must moni-tor closely any and all events that may change the power equilibrium, and strive to maintain stability. System poles be-come vested system managers in the tiniest of world affairs, intent on limiting conflicts within their sphere of influence so that they may not affect the balance of power vis-a-vis their competitor. Also, with such a small number of managers problems prove to be easier to adminis-ter. Bipolarity proponents argue that re-current crises will substitute outright warfare, therefore lowering the instances of war and instability across the globe whereas multipolar systems offer more potential for conflict.

Such a balance is illustrated histori-cally in the confrontations of Rome ver-sus Carthage and the United States against the Soviet Union.

The more the merrierProponents of multipolarity argue

that “peace by crisis in bipolarity struc-tures is, at best, a dubious and perhaps very dangerous manner of conducting policy.”5 Bipolar systems by their very nature are zero-sum, and thus more prone to conflict.

Due to the proliferation of power over a number of poles hostility between powers will be less intense. States must spread their attention across numerous competitor states, thereby lessening the chance for an arms race, a condition that bipolar systems are particularly suscepti-ble to. The most prominent challengers to Waltz’s bipolar argument, Karl Deutch and J. David Singer, contended that the number of possible interactions between poles increases disproportionately to the number of poles in the system, repre-sented by the equation N(N-1)/2, where N is the number of countries in the system.6 This indicates the existence of numerous coalition possibilities and a flexible balance-of-power system, which while may lead to sporadic conflict be-tween subsets of states, will not produce an extreme build-up of tension in the system as a whole.

WS 502 Polarity & Warfare Chad KOHALYK

3 Ted Hopf. “Polarity, Military Balance & War,” American Political Science Review 85, 2 (1991). p. 478

4 Patrick James. “Structural Realism and the Causes of War.” Mershon International Studies Review, 39, 2 (1995). p. 184.

5 Manus Midlarsky. “Hierarchical Equilibria and the Long-Run Instability of Multipolar Systems,” Handbook of War Studies (1990). p. 63

6 Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer. “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability.” World Politics, 16, 3 (1964). p. 394-5.

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Figure 1: Distribution of Power in Bipolar Europe, 1521-59

StatePopulationPopulation Soldiers (Ships)Soldiers (Ships) RevenueRevenue

Statemillions % ‘000 % M, ducats %

Habsburg Empire 30.4 40 62 (200+) 29 (32) 8.5 32

Ottoman Empire 21.0 28 74 (200+) 35 (32+) 9.5 36

France 17.0 22 32 (20) 15 (3) 5.0 19

England 6.0 8 31 (100) 15 (16) 2.1 8

Venice 1.6 2 12 (100) 6 (16) 1.5 6

TOTAL 76.0 100 211 (620+) 100 (100) 26.2 100

Average 15.2 20 42 (124) 20 (20) 5.3 20

Source: Ted Hopf, “Polarity, Military Balance & War,” American Political Science Review 85, 2 (1991). p. 480

Tripolar systems are ideal since the third power can play a balancing role preventing conflict. A third emerging superpower that chooses not to enter into alliance with either of the dominant powers is in the position to reap the benefits of good relations with both main powers in the form of concessions. Al-ternatively, if two of the three superpow-ers are considered “emerging” they may ally against the dominant power and the system would quickly degrade into a bipolar system. Stable tripolar systems are not readily evinced in history as they are tricky to maintain. Some suggest that nearing the end of the Cold War China played the role of balancing third power between the United States and the Soviet Union.7

Definitely maybeEmpirical evidence clearly support-

ing either bipolarity or multipolarity as more stable has remained elusive. His-torical research has produced only mixed results.

Ted Hopf’s examination of 15th and 16th century Europe found that the bipo-lar era of 1521-59 dominated by the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires was only marginally more stable than that multipolar era between 1495-1521, as influenced by Austria, England, France, Spain, the Ottoman Empire and Venice.In the multipolar era there were 26 dis-crete wars, averaging 27 months in dura-tion and totaling 58 war-years. The bipo-lar years had 26 wars, averaging 28 months for a total of 59 years. Hardly a significant variance.8

Michael Brecker compared four dis-tinct 20th century systems and found that 20 percent of conflicts that occurred were in the multipolar period (1918-1939), compared to 24 percent in the bipolar period (1945-1962). Manus Mid-larsky on the otherhand maintains that Thompson (1986) and Levy (1985) illus-

trate bipolarity “to be decisively more stable than multipolarity.”9

Patrick James points out a number of other studies with conflicting findings, and notes the interesting results of Char-les Ostrom and Joan Aldtrich (1978) who found that “the probability of war to be ‘moderately large’ with two poles, mini-mal with three, greater with four and five, and drastically lower with six.”10 This suggests that the relationship be-tween the number of poles and level of stability may be curvilinear, with war more likely at both very low and moder-ately high levels of polarization.

Meanwhile, Richard Rosecrance, searching for some middle ground, sug-gested that multipolarity was associated with a higher frequency of war and bipo-larity with greater severity. Waltz argued back that in nearly all cases of bipolarity relative peace prevailed, and that multi-polarity inherently contained instabilities that were likely to lead to very severe wars.11

All this confusion has lead some theorists to question the effect of system elements on conflict propensity in the first place. Jack Levy assembled a list of great power wars between 1495 and 1975 using data from the Correlates of War Project12 and analyzed three indica-tors: (1) frequency of war in a given pe-riod, (2) magnitude or total number of years of each war; and (3) severity of each war in terms of fatalities. He con-cluded that it was not the number of poles in the system, but the differences in power between great powers that ac-counted for instability.13 The finding that differences in distribution of power leads to a higher chance of conflict seems to have been generally accepted, but unfor-tunately did not end the debate: Manus Midlarsky countered with the argument that inequalities between poles are far more likely under a multipolar system and thus bipolarity is a more stable inter-national structure.

A time and a placeNo study as yet has resulted in unde-

niable evidence for one theory or the other. Studies into the effects of polarity are faced with difficult methodological problems and challenges. Firstly there is the problem of geography, not only in the sense that most of the historical data in the literature is Eurocentric, but also in that it has the potential to obscure re-gional patterns within the system. For example, in a multipolar system a few states might be partaking in a majority of wars, skewing the data for the entire sys-

WS 502 Polarity & Warfare Chad KOHALYK

7 John T. O’Rourke. International Politics on the World Stage (1999). p. 62

8 Hopf, p. 487.9 Midlarsky, p. 63.

10 James, p. 186.

11 Midlarsky, p. 63.

12 Correlates of War Project. Online, http://correlatesofwar.org.

13 Jack S. Levy. “Size and Stability in the Modern Great Power System.” International Interactions (1984). p. 349.

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Figure 2: Instability in EuropeFrequency and severity of wars during 15-16th C.

Polarity Type Freq. (%)Severity

(deaths per war-year)

Multipolar1495-1521 63 11,000

Bipolar1521-59 53 10,000

Source: Ted Hopf, “Polarity, Military Balance & War,” American Political Science Review 85, 2 (1991). p. 478-9,

Figure 3: CurveballPossible propensity of conflict in relation to number of poles in the international system

# Poles →

tem and hiding the fact that most of the powers experienced few wars.14

Secondly, finding comparable cases in different chronological periods is ex-ceedingly difficult not only due to change in technology, but also the lack of available sources. Comparing the bipo-larity of the Soviet Union and United States dominated system to the system of Rome and Carthage is tough when one must discount nuclear weapons and can-not make use of accurate sources on population, GDP, armed forces and se-verity of wars in terms of accurate battle-deaths. The alternative is to look at re-gional as opposed to global systems within a similar timeframe, but this raises questions regarding the hierarchi-cal interactions between regional and supra-regional polar systems. The actions of regional polar states are not only con-strained by their local competitors, but also by their supra-regional pole. This is an influence that does not affect global poles, rendering any comparison suspect.

The presence of nuclear weapons themselves is a challenge when examin-ing the historical stability of bipolar sys-tems. In 1964 Kenneth Waltz asserted that nuclear weapons consolidated bipo-larity in the Cold War by making the two strongest states still more powerful, but since bipolarity preceded the two-power nuclear competition, the weapons them-selves could not be credited solely with the stability of the international system. He argued that the build-up of conven-tional forces would have simply replaced nuclear detente.15 There is no doubt that a conventional arms race was both possi-ble and probable, but the bipolar stability that lasted out the Cold War was affected deeply by policies based specifically on nuclear stockpiles and "mutually assured destruction." Even current policy is be-ing determined by the proliferation and construction of nuclear weapons. Noth-ing like this existed in the past. Thus comparing the nuclear age with ages gone by necessitates a stretch of the imagination.

Lastly, the rise of intergovernmental organizations since the mid-19th century proves a troublesome asymmetry when comparing different historical periods.

IGOs are more than just alliances be-tween states for security purposes or otherwise, yet lack all the distinct power characteristics of states. By their very nature they possess only a one-sided attribute of power, whether military, po-litical or economic.Intergovernmental organizations cannot be considered as great powers in the strict sense of pos-sessing superior "population, resource endowment, economic capability, mili-tary strength, political stability and com-petence." Even so, they do have an effect on the interactions between great powers. The United Nations proved an invaluable forum for communication between the US and the USSR, helping them to achieve the equilibrium necessary for the "peace by crisis" maintained throughout the Cold War. Institutions such as these did not exist in previous bipolar periods; yet another hurdle for historical compari-son.

Thus, in the face of such methodo-logical obstacles, the polarity debate seemed to trail off in the late 1970s. Then came a new development, and the polarity of the system changed com-pletely.

One is the loneliest numberThe post-Cold War era brought hope

that the threat of war would be dramati-

cally diminished as power was dis-persed to a number of other centers in-cluding Europe, Japan and China. It seemed the first multipolar system was upon us in a half century. Syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer argued differently asserting that the world was not becoming multipolar, but unipolar:16

There is today no lack of second-rank powers. Germany and Japan are eco-nomic dynamos. Britain and France can deploy diplomatic and to some extent military assets. The Soviet Un-ion possesses several elements of power – military, diplomatic and po-litical – but all are in rapid decline. There is but one first-rate power and no prospect in the immediate future of any power to rival it.

With nearly one third of the world's GDP, the third largest population and a military force that far outstrips any pos-sible competitor it is evident that the United States is the world's sole super-power. Waltz's condition of bipolarity, that no third power would be able to challenge the top two, could be applied appropriately to the current international structure, except in this instance there is only one power.

Of course there still remain a number of other great powers in the post-Cold War system. Regional systems may con-tain a number of poles. But if conflict were to get out of hand, spreading and threatening the global interests of the United States, disagreements will be settled by intervention on behalf of the superpower. Ultimately the system is unipolar.

Unipolar systems are rare in history: only the ancient Roman, Mongolian and Chinese empires controlled all or most of the established societies in the known world. Unipolar systems are considered transitional stages in international struc-ture: the rise of new powers is only a matter of time. Waltz and others pre-dicted that a multipolar system would materialize early in the 21st century, within 10-20 years after the end of the Cold War.17

Unipolar systems obviously lack great power war, but are characterized by

WS 502 Polarity & Warfare Chad KOHALYK

14 James, p. 189.

15 Waltz, p. 885-6, 907.

16 Charles Krauthammer. “The Unipolar Moment.” Foreign Affairs 70, 1 (1990/91).

17 Michael Mastanduno. “Preserving the Unipolar Moment.” International Security 21 (Spring 97). p. 53.

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Figure 4: The Player’s ClubNuclear stockpiles

US 10,640

Russia 16,000

UK 200

France 350

China 400 (?)

Israel 200

India 110-150

Pakistan 200

North Korea 13-15 (?)

Source: GlobalSecurity.org, Jan 2005

"small wars" such as interventions as well as background conflicts of a mostly domestic nationalistic or ethnic nature. Krauthammer argues that the only chal-lenge to the solitary pole, and thus threat to the stability of the international sys-tem, is the "weapon state." Weapon states are those that do not possess power across a spectrum "in terms of size of population, resource endowment, eco-nomic capability, military strength, po-litical stability and competence," but in fact lack most of these characteristics. They pursue nuclear weapons as a way to "leapfrog history" in order to be able to challenge a so-called Western-imposed order.18 These states could in no way survive a nuclear stand-off, and consider nuclear capability as a way to deter an intervening conventional force, so preva-lent in the post-Cold War world. Of course there is an added fear that weap-ons states may pass technology or knowledge onto non-state actors to carry out attacks, and hopefully elude retribu-tion.

Intergovernmental organizations play an interesting role in this new unipolar world. Kenneth Waltz's assertion that "the skillful foreign policy ... is designed to gain an advantage over one state with-out antagonizing others and frightening them into united action"19 could be ap-plied to the United States vis-a-vis its international legitimacy as threatened by the organizing principle of IGOs in try-ing to balance the weaker many against the stronger one. Michael Mastunduno encourages the US to play a delicate game of "balance-of-threat" politics and not "succumb to the arrogance of power" in order to maintain its unipolar status. "It is ironic that in a unipolar setting the

dominant state, less constrained by other great powers, must constrain itself."20

Thus far the 10 to 20 year lifespan of the "unipolar moment" has held firm. China, America's most feared potential near-peer competitor still has substantial development to undergo before it may challenge the US. India, currently a close ally of America, is much further behind China in terms of economic and military power, and although the remilitarization of pacifist Japan seems imminent, it is unlikely that Tokyo would balance against America in the foreseeable fu-ture. The leaves Russia, who scores high on population, number of troops and stockpiled nuclear weapons, but whose floundering economy is still trying to comes to terms with the free market, and shake off the incapacitating effects of communism. The only threat Russia

poses is "soft balancing" through the United Nations Security Council. De-spite recent blows to its international legitimacy, it is likely that the dominant position of the United States will remain beyond the original forecast of Waltz and others.

Moderately attractive resultsThe relationship between the number

of poles and level of conflict in a system remains obscure. There may be subtle effects on the equality of power distrib-uted across poles, thereby affecting sta-bility indirectly. After decades of theoriz-ing, researching and arguing a conclu-sion has not been attained. Was it all for naught? Not at all.

Although structural realism has had a harrowing time trying to explain interna-tional conflict in system level terms, it has influenced other areas of interna-tional relations theory, having a profound impact on the development of its main rivals: liberalism and constructivism. Besides the ongoing discussion about the stability of unipolarity, the polarity de-bate has also lived on in another lively form as power transition theory. The future of stability in the international system may be unforeseeable but as No-bel laureate Sir William Bragg once noted, "The important thing in science is not so much to obtain new facts as to discover new ways of thinking about them."

WS 502 Polarity & Warfare Chad KOHALYK

18 Krauthammer, p. 31.

19 Waltz, p. 884.

20 Mastunduno, p. 85.

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Figure 5: Poles du jourAbridged list of world powers

State Populationmillions

Armed Forces (Reserves)‘000

GDP$bn

USA 288.5 1414 (1259) 10383.1

China 1294.4 2270 (550) 1266.1

India 1041.1 1298 (535) 510.2

Russia 143.8 988 (2400) 346.5

Japan 127.5 240 (47) 3993.4

Source: The Economist

Cited Works

Karl Deutsch & J. David Singer. “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability.” World Politics, 16, 3 (1964).

The Economist, Pocket World in Figures (2005).

Ted Hopf, “Polarity, Military Balance & War,” American Political Science Review, 85, 2 (1991).

Patrick James. “Structural Realism and the Causes of War.” Mershon International Studies Review, 39, 2 (1995).

Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment.” Foreign Affairs 70, 1 (1990/91).

Jack S. Levy, “Size and Stability in the Modern Great Power System.” International Interactions (1984).

Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment.” International Security 21 (Spring 97).

John J. Mearsheimer, The Trajedy of Great Power Politics (2001).

Manus Midlarsky, “Hierarchical Equilibria and the Long-Run Instability of Multipolar Systems,” Handbook of War Studies (1990).

John T. O’Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage (1999).

Kenneth Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93, 3 (1964).

Correlates of War Project. Online, http://correlatesofwar.org.

GlobalSecurity.org. Online, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/summary.htm