Plato's Theaetetusby David Bostock

Philosophical Review

Plato's Theaetetus by David BostockReview by: Gail FineThe Philosophical Review, Vol. 100, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), pp. 687-692Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185192 .

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BOOK REVIEWS

historical relationship to a magnificent natural environment" (p. 28). But Sagoff is surely assuming a much more homogeneous public than exists. Is it so clear that Americans are environmentalists in their public roles as citizens? More importantly, we are faced, as a society and as a world, with increasingly difficult decisions concerning the environment. Our survival may depend on making choices that require drastic adjustments in our lifestyles. As the costs of such changes bear down on individuals, will people continue to be motivated, even if they are now, to accept the costs out of concern for nature per se, for this aspect of our supposed national character? And is it rational that they should be? A more sophisticated analysis of power and interest in capitalist society is needed here.

It is true that we need to face the environmental crisis with a greater sense of community, global as well as national. But there are difficult questions about what this community should look like, what values will be focal, and even about whether such a community is possible. Sagoff is wary of liberalism, as he should be, and seemingly sympathetic to the commu- nitarian critique while aware of some of its dangers. He needs, however, to develop his analysis further in this direction to make it convincing.

Despite this criticism, The Economy of the Earth contains much that anyone concerned with the environment and policy will find extremely valuable. Insofar as policy continues to be discussed in terms of an economic ap- proach, we will, as this book clearly shows, be the poorer.

LAWRENCE H. SIMON

Bowdoin College

The Philosophical Review, Vol. C, No. 4 (October 1991)

PLATO'S THEAETETUS. By DAVID BOSTOCK. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1988. Pp. vi, 285.

David Bostock's Plato's Theaetetus is a full-length treatment of the dialogue as a whole. The book displays Bostock's characteristic virtues: it is admirably clear; it is highly intelligent; and it is often insightful and thought-provoking. Unfortunately, however, it is also quite uncharitable in its interpretation of the text. Time and again, Bostock concludes that an argument is "merely captious" (p. 86), or rests on "what is obviously a mistake" (p. 106). (On the other hand, when he sketches an "attractive picture" (p. 205) of Plato, he often says that it is "rather a long way from the text" (p. 205) or that it is "over-charitable" (p. 169).) Although Bostock hopes that second- and third-year undergraduates will benefit from the book (p. v), I doubt that any but the best such students will find it generally

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accessible; but it is certainly accessible to more advanced undergraduates and to graduate students.

In this brief review, I shall focus on just three topics: (i) Bostock's account of the overall structure and point of the Tht.; (ii) the dialectical nature of the first part of the dialogue; and (iii) Bostock's view of the relation between the Tht. and Tm.

(i) Bostock believes that the Tht. exhibits the following overall structure. In its first part (through 186),' Plato assumes that knowledge is always of truths, and so is propositional; and he uses that view to argue that knowledge is not perception. For if knowledge is always of truths, then it is always of complex objects (propositions); but perception is always of simple objects. If knowledge and perception are directed at different objects, then they themselves differ (pp. 166, 194).

But, Bostock argues, in the second part of the dialogue Plato challenges the conclusions of the first part. For, Bostock thinks Plato believes, to understand a proposition, one must somehow grasp its terms, by being acquainted with the referents of those terms (p. 119; p. 275, where n. 6 is important). In the case of terms for imperceptible entities, this grasping must consist in knowledge. To know a thing, one must provide an account or analysis of it. But, Bostock thinks Plato believes, on pain of circularity such accounts must stop somewhere. Hence, there must be simples that are known without an account, and here knowledge cannot be truth-entailing or propositional. Hence, contrary to the first part of the Tht., not all knowledge is truth-entailing and so propositional. Further, if there is knowledge of simples, as Bostock thinks the second part of the dialogue argues, then Plato cannot distinguish between knowledge and perception, as he alleg- edly does in the first part, by claiming that knowledge (like belief) is always of complexes, perception of simple. Hence too, Bostock believes, the aporetic conclusion of the dialogue: Plato would like to avoid the conclusion of its second part, but he does not see how to do so.

I find much to disagree with in all of this. First, despite the popularity of a Russellian interpretation of Plato,2 it is quite controversial (and, I think, false) to claim that Plato believes that in order to make a judgment one must be acquainted with its constituents. Yet Bostock introduces the claim quite casually and almost entirely without defense-perhaps because he thinks it is so obvious that Plato accepts it.3 One would have thought that,

'Bostock divides the dialogue into just two parts, from the beginning through 186, and the rest of the dialogue. Some commentators favor a different division, but I shall follow Bostock here in speaking of just two parts.

2Bostock pursues the parallel with Russell especially at pp. 275-79. 30n p. 125, he claims that Plato took this assumption to be "completely obvious."

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when this controversial claim underlies much of Bostock's account of the overall structure and moral of the Tht., it would be directly defended in some detail; but it is not.

Second, I do not see why Bostock believes that Plato suggests or is committed to the view that the objects of perception are in any interesting sense simple. Even if, as Bostock controversially believes (p. 117), one can perceive only one's experiences, they are not the sorts of simples that can only be perceived and not also described; they are not the sorts of simples that the dream theory, for example, adverts to (though Bostock may disagree with this verdict: cf. p. 204). Experiences have plenty of proper- ties; they have a complex causal origin; and so on.4

Third, I do not think Plato responds to the circularity objection by claiming that there must be simple entities that are known without an account. An alternative I prefer is that he responds by endorsing a coher- entist conception ofjustification according to which accounts circle back on themselves.5 In any sense in which there are simples, they are knowable in the same way in which anything else is, by having some sort of account.6

Finally, part of Bostock's motivation for his account of the overall structure of the dialogue is disputable. He believes that without it, the Tht. would be "a muddle," "incoherent" (p. 270). For, again, he claims that the first part of the Tht. takes all knowledge to be propositional, whereas the

4Bostock himself claims that there are judgments about the objects of perception, so I am not sure why he also claims that perception grasps only simple. Perhaps he means that perception grasps simples insofar as its objects are not themselves propositions; but that is an unusual use of 'simple'. Moreover, if that is all he means, then Plato would reject the view that knowledge and belief are only of complexes, never of simples; for he reasonably enough believes that one can have beliefs about, and know, some objects.

5I defend this account in "Knowledge and Logos in the Theaetetus," The Philo- sophical Review 88 (1979), pp. 366-97. Bostock criticizes my account on pp. 243-250.

61 was also unpersuaded by some of Bostock's argument for the claim that the alleged simples are known without any account. For example, on p. 273 he seems to move from saying (i) that the sorts of accounts Plato specifies must run out, and so are not available for some things, which must then be simple and knowable without such an account, to saying (ii) that we know such things by being able to recognize them and distinguish them from other things, to saying (iii) that knowledge here does not "reach truth." But (i) and (ii) do not imply (iii). Bostock may think they do, because he at various places argues that one can think of a thing without relying "on a description, but in some more direct fashion" (p. 229). But his discussion here seems to slide between (i) not needing any description of a thing in order to think of it, (ii) not needing a uniquely identifying description of a thing in order to think of it (p. 230), and (iii) needing to think of a thing under some aspect, but not under a description (p. 231). (I'm not sure what aspects are, if they are not conveyed by descriptions.)

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second part of the dialogue talks about knowing things.7 Or again, he suggests that the first part claims that knowledge is always knowledge of truths. Yet Plato goes on to talk about knowing Socrates. "And Socrates is not a truth. Is not this very odd?" (p. 164). Further, Bostock thinks, knowledge of things does not always attain to truth (it does not do so in the case of simples). If we see the second part of the dialogue as challenging the conclusion of the first part by arguing that there must, after all, be some nonpropositional knowledge, then there is no difficulty in fitting the two parts of the dialogue together; if we do not endorse something like Bos- tock's account, he thinks, we shall have to conclude that there is an inex- plicable "change of subject" (p. 268), from knowledge of propositions to knowledge of things. But we can extricate Plato from confusion without needing to see the second part of the Tht. as challenging the first part. Even if Plato believes that all knowledge is truth-entailing, it is not very odd for him to speak of knowing things; for he reasonably enough believes that one knows things by knowing truths about them. For Plato, knowledge of things is an instance of knowledge of truths. Hence, in speaking of knowledge of things, he does not betray his insight that all knowledge is truth-entailing.

Fortunately, Bostock's account of the structure and overall moral of the Tht. does not affect most of his discussion in other parts of the book. Although he hints at that account throughout, he does not describe it in any detail, or even explicitly mention it, until the last chapter. Most of the book can be read, and much of it agreed with, even if, like me, one almost entirely rejects its main theme.

(ii) The first part of the Tht. is dialectical. Theaetetus having proposed that knowledge is perception, Plato proceeds to investigate both the Pro- tagorean measure doctrine that as things appear to one so they are to one, and also a Heracleitean doctrine according to which all things change. His thought seems to be that if one accepts Theaetetus' proposal, one needs to adopt a Protagorean epistemology and a Heracleitean ontology-"needs" in the sense that one is thereby committed to them, and also in the sense that it is by appeal to them that one has the best chance of supporting Theaetetus' definition.

Bostock is often quite clear about the dialectical nature of this part of the text (e.g., pp. 83b, 155); but he does not always appreciate it sufficiently. Consider, for example, his account of Tht. 181-83 (pp. 99-109), where Plato aims to refute extreme Heracleiteanism, the thesis that at every mo- ment everything constantly changes in every way. Bostock rightly points

7Here Bostock sets aside both the "short and unimportant passage" (!) (p. 272) in which Plato refutes the claim that knowledge is true belief, and also the "strange terminology" (ibid.) used in the discussion of false belief.

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out that no one is likely to accept extreme Heracleiteanism, and that earlier

in the Tht. (in the 150s) Plato had adverted to a weaker version of Hera-

cleiteanism. Why, then, Bostock wonders, does Plato aim to refute only

extreme Heracleiteanism? Would not a refutation of it leave the weaker

Heracleitean thesis untouched? But Plato's point is that if we are to support Theaetetus' definition of

knowledge as perception, we cannot stop with weak Heracleiteanism but

are, in the end, committed to extreme Heracleiteanism. Hence, if he re-

futes extreme Heracleiteanism, he refutes the sort of Heracleiteanism on

which Theaetetus must ultimately rely. If no one is likely to believe that

thesis, then Theaetetus must reconsider his account of knowledge as per-

ception since, Plato believes, it commits him to that thesis. Or again, Bos-

tock sees that even in the earlier passage (in the 150s), Plato at least men-

tions extreme Heracleiteanism; but, he notes, Plato was surely aware that

the argument on its behalf depends on a "grossly implausible" (p. 107)

premise. Well, yes; but the premise is used because Plato believes that

Theaetetus-Protagoras-Heracleitus cannot avoid it.8

(iii) The dating of the Timaeus is disputed. In discussing this topic, Bos-

tock curiously neglects to mention the most recent, detailed, and reliable

account, by Brandwood,9 although he devotes some attention to Ryle's

often rather fanciful speculations. Bostock, like Owen and unlike Brand-

wood, believes that the Tm. precedes the Parm. and Tht. One of his reasons

is that he believes that the Tht. and Tm. are at odds with one another on

some crucial matters; since on these matters the Tht. is clear where the Tm.

is confused, the Tm. "must" (p. 150) precede the Tht. Even if Bostock is

right about the relative merits of each dialogue, "must" is obviously too

strong. But I doubt that the two dialogues differ in the ways Bostock

suggests. For example, the Tm., on his view, disallows knowledge of sensibles,

whereas the Tht. allows it. I agree about the Tht., but disagree about the

Tm.'0 Or again, he thinks that the Tm. denies that sensibles are, whereas

the Tht. allows that they are. I agree that the Tm. denies that sensibles are,

and that the Tht. claims that they are; but since the sorts of being at issue

8Pp. 108f, on the other hand, are more interesting and charitable. But Bostock concludes his discussion here by remarking that perhaps it "attributes to Plato more clarity" than is warranted.

9L. Brandwood, The Dating of Plato's Works by the Stylistic Method: A Historical and

Critical Survey (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1958). A brief summary of Brand- wood's results may be found in his A Word Index to Plato (Leeds, England: W. S. Maney & Sons, 1976).

loSee my "Plato on Knowledge and Belief in Republic V," Archivfiir Geschichte der

Philosophie 60 (1978), pp. 121-39. Although I do not discuss the Tm. in detail there, I believe that its conclusions match those I take to be present in Rep. V.

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are different, their claims do not conflict. The Tm. denies that sensibles are, on the ground that they are both F and not F; the Tht. affirms that sensibles are, on the ground that they are something or other. These two claims are perfectly compatible." Bostock also thinks that Tht. 184-86's distinction between perception and belief criticizes the Tm. and middle dialogues, which, he believes, generally confuse them (p. 149; also intro- ductory chapter). But when the middle dialogues and Tm. discuss perception, they have in mind, not the pure perception in view in Tht. 184-86, but perceptual beliefs, beliefs based on perception. Once again, the Tht. does not refute anything said in the Tm; it simply uses 'perception' in a different way.'2

If I am right, then we should not date the Tht. after the Tm. on the ground that it corrects views to be found in the Tm.; for the two dialogues, rather than contradicting one another, are simply directed at different issues.

I have spent more time presenting alternative positions than is perhaps usual in a relatively brief review. My excuse is that Bostock's own argu- ments are generally so lucid that one can object to them only by arguing against his starting assumptions.

GAIL FINE

Cornell University

"'See my "Plato on Perception," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, supp. vol. (1988), pp. 15-28.

12See "Plato on Perception."

The Philosophical Review, Vol. C, No. 4 (October 1991)

BOETHIUS'S IN CICERONIS TOPICA. Translated, with notes and an in- troduction by ELEONORE STUMP. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. xi, 277.

Aristotle's Topics is a rich storehouse of logical lore which developed an art of argumentation independently of the formal logic of the syllogism. This makes it a much broader treatise than Aristotle's Prior Analytics, but also much less systematic. Topic follows on topic often without any appar- ent reason for the ordering. Consequently, in ancient times as much as today, there was the question of what to make of the treatise as a whole.

One tradition, the one Boethius inherits, was made up of what we might call "practical" logicians since their interests focused on using logic to develop dialectical, rhetorical and forensic skills. To them Aristotle's trea-

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Plato's Theaetetusby David Bostock