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TAÑADA VS TUVERA G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 FACTS Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. ISSUE(S) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette. RULING The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. The clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

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Page 1: PFR Case Digests

TAÑADA VS TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

FACTS

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a

number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law.

The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it

was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become

effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the

necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish

in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and

effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general

applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that

publication must be made in the official gazette.

ISSUE(S)

Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

RULING

The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as

condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different

effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of

the content of the laws. The clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new Civil

Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the

publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

Page 2: PFR Case Digests

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC. VS MILITARY SHRINE

SERVICES

G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

FACTS

ISSUE(S)

HELD

Page 3: PFR Case Digests

DE ROY VS CA

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FACTS

The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed the

tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the death of

Bernal’s daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand but that she was

ignored.

In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of Appeals

affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roy’s counsel filed a

motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to the case of

Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing

a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.

De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because

said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE(S)

Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they

can be binding.

HELD

No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette

before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of

counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court

particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the

advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law

journals.

Page 4: PFR Case Digests

ATIENZA VS BRILLANTES

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

FACTS

This a complaint by Lupo Atienza for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety against

Judge Brillantes. Lupo Alleges that he has 2 children with Yolanda de Castro, who are living

together in a home purchased by him in 1987 in Manila. On 1991, Lupo saw Brillantes sleeping

on his bed. Upon inquiry, the houseboy told that Brillantes had been cohabiting with de Castro.

Lupo left the home without confronting Brillantes. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from

visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children from him. Lupo claims that

Brillantes is married to Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Brillantes on his part, alleged that

Lupo was not married to de Castro and that he is not married to Ongkiko although he admits

having 5 children with her. Brillantes claims that when he married de Castro in 1991 at

California, he believed in all good faith and with all legal intents and purposes, that he was

single because her first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license.

Brillantes argues that the provision of Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him

considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the

Philippines while the second marriage which took place in 1991 was governed by the Family

Code.

ISSUE(S)

Whether or not Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to Brillantes.

HELD

Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988

regardless of date of the first marriage. Besides, Art. 256 of the Family Code said Art. 15 is given

“retroactive effect” insofar as it does prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in

accordance with Civil Code or other laws. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not

violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Respondent is the

last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and

employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman.

Page 5: PFR Case Digests

NARZOLES VS NLRC

G.R. No. 141959 September 29, 2000

FACTS

ISSUE(S)

HELD

Page 6: PFR Case Digests

CONSUNJI VS CA

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001

FACTS

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji,

Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose

Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages

against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other

defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial,

the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE(S)

Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.

Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or

choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s

Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages

(actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the

employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,

HELD

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law

of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct

proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites:

(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)

the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the

person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any

voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the

application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable

Page 7: PFR Case Digests

presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other

evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of

res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.

The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed

only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under

other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmen’s

Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived their known right of the remedies

provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under

exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed

her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she

would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

Page 8: PFR Case Digests

GUY VS CA

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

FACTS

The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina

Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged

illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented by their

mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before

the RTC of Makati City.

Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the

dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled

without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss

alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and

not by counsel.

Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of

Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the

petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any

and all liabilities.

The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling

that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have

validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-

forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this

petition.

ISSUE(S)

Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards

HELD

No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must necessarily

obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to

Page 9: PFR Case Digests

protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release or

waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their

supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It

would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner,

the latter do not have.

As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs

The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants even

if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to

matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of

heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in

one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance. (Briz v. Briz)

Page 10: PFR Case Digests

FLORESCA VS PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

FACTS

Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation

who, while working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28,

1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Theircomplaint

alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and

deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men

working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s

Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also filed a separate

civil case against Philex for damages.

Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have already claimed

benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

ISSUE(S)

Whether or not Philex is correct.

HELD

Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the

WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.

Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming

benefits under the WCA.

HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to

ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a

remedy. But, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the

amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they

would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated.

Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law

insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but

its spirit giveth life.

Page 11: PFR Case Digests

DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Gutierrez dissenting:

No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are already

liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage

suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by the WCA can only be properly

removed by the legislature NOT the SC.

Page 12: PFR Case Digests

VAN DORN VS ROMILLO

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

FACTS

In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina, and Richard Upton, an American, married in Hong Kong.

However, in 1982, Upton obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, USA. Later, Reyes married

Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against Reyes in Pasay City. Upton was

petitioning that he be granted management rights over a property in Manila (The Galleon). It

was his contention that the divorce decree they obtained abroad do not apply to properties in

the Philippines, hence, despite the divorce, Reyes’s property in the Philippines remained

conjugal with Upton. Judge Manuel Romillo, Jr. agreed with Upton. The judge ruled that the

divorce decree issued by the Nevada court, a foreign court, cannot prevail over the declared

national policy of the Philippines which prohibits divorce.

ISSUE(S)

Whether or not Judge Romillo, Jr. is correct.

HELD

No. Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy

against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy

and morality (nationality principle). Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be

recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this

case, the divorce in Nevada Upton from the marriage from the standards of American Law,

under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no

longer the husband of Reyes. He would have no standing to sue as Reyes’s husband as he is not

entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision of his own

country’s court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not

repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right

over the alleged conjugal property.

Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes van Dorn should not be discriminated against in her own

country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Page 13: PFR Case Digests

PILAPIL VS SOMERA

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

FACTS

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard

Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at

Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20,

1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private

respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the

Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation,

support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of

marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of

Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early

as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE(S)

Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though

they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who

can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this

case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid

divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects

may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same

consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has

no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the

offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Page 14: PFR Case Digests

RECIO VS RECIO

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

FACTS

The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987.

They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued

a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired

Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in

Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single”

and “Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their

conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former

marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his

prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first

marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was

legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage

was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the

Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE(S)

1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

HELD

The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In

mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the

former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the

alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may

be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore,

before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce

as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

Page 15: PFR Case Digests

In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic,

issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance

with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree

was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the

fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its

admissibility.

Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence,

adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are

two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely

suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent

procured.

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still

restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who marries

again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy”. This shows that

the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to

produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other

evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to

the alleged foreign law.

Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can

not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondent’s

legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare

nullity of the parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

Page 16: PFR Case Digests

QUITA VS CA

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FACTS

Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines

on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954. Both of them remarried

another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondent herewith. They were

blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to

declared as to who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case

held that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private

respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in

Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes

provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herself answered that

she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a

Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen.

The Trial court disregarded the respondent’s statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered

in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children

moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring

the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one- half of the estate to the

exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not

declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during the

existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court

of Appeals thatthe case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE(S)

(1) Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo void ab initio.

(2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of

Arturo.

Page 17: PFR Case Digests

HELD

No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita at the time

of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was already an alien

at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their country’s national law. Thus, Fe D.

Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will

be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.

Page 18: PFR Case Digests

PEREZ VS CA

G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006

FACTS

Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The

marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems

that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984,

Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil

Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce

action under its laws.

On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United

States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one

offspring.

During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the

Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not

recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under

Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his

marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.

ISSUE(S)

Whether or not Perez has a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be

intervenor in Tristan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife?

HELD

No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan

was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the

Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws

relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are

binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a

citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to

his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if

Page 19: PFR Case Digests

a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition

abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting

an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.

Petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad

lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion

for intervention is based.

Page 20: PFR Case Digests

SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

FACTS

During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luis’s dad) contracted three marriages. His

first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On

August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a

son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint

for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree

Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20,

1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with

Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on

December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their Felicisimo’s

conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993,

Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati

City. Rodolfo claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was

only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to

Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the

First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already

been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue

of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.

Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive

effect to validate Felicidad’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair

vested rights in derogation of Article 256.

ISSUE(S)

Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of administration over Felicisimo’s estate.

Page 21: PFR Case Digests

HELD

The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to

remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as

Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to

prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad and

Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific

guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that

presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and

due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document

may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official

publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If

the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate

issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in

the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she

submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act

of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said

law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they

must be alleged and proved.

The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce

decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.