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Leslie Ader Ader 1 IP501 Professor Cox Conflict Assessment paper Introduction: The Camp David Accords was a group agreement between President Al- Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Prime Minster Menachem of Israel, and it was overseen by President Jimmy Carter of the United States of America. This agreement was an attempt to restore peace in the Middle East and arrest or slow deep rooted Palestinian-Israeli violence that had erupted again during the Cold War. The objective of this paper is to analyze and discuss the content of the Accords by looking at the historical context, actors, positions, interests, and how each of these factors played a role in the formation of the agreement itself. Short Background/Political Context: Prior to the Accords, the Middle East had been in an uproar since the establishment of Israel in 1948. This event upset the balance of power and demographics of British controlled Palestine that helped ignite a prior diplomatic squabble over

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Page 1: Peace Agreement. Camp David Accords

Leslie Ader Ader 1IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper

Introduction:

The Camp David Accords was a group agreement between President Al- Anwar Sadat

of Egypt, Prime Minster Menachem of Israel, and it was overseen by President Jimmy Carter of

the United States of America. This agreement was an attempt to restore peace in the Middle

East and arrest or slow deep rooted Palestinian-Israeli violence that had erupted again during

the Cold War. The objective of this paper is to analyze and discuss the content of the Accords

by looking at the historical context, actors, positions, interests, and how each of these factors

played a role in the formation of the agreement itself.

Short Background/Political Context:

Prior to the Accords, the Middle East had been in an uproar since the establishment of

Israel in 1948. This event upset the balance of power and demographics of British controlled

Palestine that helped ignite a prior diplomatic squabble over territorial claims established by

two contradictory agreements: Sykes Picot (1916) and the Balfour (1917) declaration

(Appendix II). The Sykes Picot agreement granted the land of Palestine to the Arabs for an

Arab state; however, the British reversed this policy in favor of Israel and granted the same

area of land to Jewish settlers. Both documents had been engrained in both Arab and Jewish

memory and identity, which lead to a series of conflicts and ad hoc agreements that helped

spark some of the current conflicts. The Camp David Accords themselves emerged out of a

series of agreements that formed the context of the Middle East during the Cold War. During

this time, most Arab states like Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq allied themselves with the

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former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to check the power of the West, particularly the

United States and Israel (Andersen 2008; Barnett 1996; Gerson 1983). The most notable

leading Arab state for the movement that help solidified the Soviet-Arab collation was Egypt

(United Arab Republic) under General Gamal Nasser. He transformed Arab identity into a Pan-

Arab identity that was amiable to the Communist ideology and this resulted in a defense of

power against Israel. Most of the Arab-Soviet bloc consisted of the nations most threatened by

the establishment of Israel: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the newly formed PLO

(Palestinian branch of government). In turn, this erupted into a series of wars between the

1950’s and 1970’s: 1956 War/Suez War, 1967/Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War 1973.

The Suez War is crucial to understanding the Accords because it was the first war

related to the issues that would later be discussed in the Accords. This conflict was over the

issue of the Sinai and Suez Canal, in which both Egypt and Israel claimed it as their own

trading choke point. Nasser, however, nationalized the canal and created trade deals with the

United Kingdom and France. This sparked conflict with Israel and Israel cemented the United

States’ support for Israel’s cause (Dinstien 1980; Falk 1978). The conflict ended in a United

Nations agreement and ceasefire, in which Egypt kept the canal under their control and Israel,

occupied the Sinai Peninsula as a security measure. However, the ceasefire agreement stated

nothing about Israeli withdraw of the Sinai or the issue of the Palestinians (Finklestein 2001;

Stork 1979). In the next decade, the Six Day War picked-up where the 1956 war ended. This

war was a huge victory for Israel and its allies, but for the Arabs, (particularly the United Arab

Republic) it was a huge military defeat. The entire UAR air force and weaponry (provided by

the former USSR) were nearly destroyed and the Sinai was “securely: occupied by Israeli

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forces (Andersen 2008; Neff 1994). As for the UAR’s key ally (Jordan and Syria) it lead to a

devastating loss of the Golan Heights (key water source) the West Bank and Gaza to Israel

(Appendix III). By the end of the war, the UAR was in chaos, Nasser the Arab champion had

died, and he was succeed by Anwar Sadat who was intent on following Nasser’s dream of

making the UAR a regional power (Karawan 1994; Lapping 2004; Mueler 2002). In retaliation

for the 1967 war, Egypt and its allies launched another attack in 1973 that also lead to a huge

defeat of the Arab alliance (Lapping 2004; Mueler 2002; Summits and Peace Agreements). A

ceasefire was then called by UN Resolution 338 and 339, but again there was no mention of

Israel ceding any “occupied territories” it gained in the war. As shown earlier, the issue of

Palestinian autonomy remained unanswered.

Furthermore, Sadat faced an additional concern during this time. The former USSR

differed with the ideas Sadat had in mind for his foreign policy. Since the death of Nasser,

Sadat had found that he was under more pressure by Moscow, but Sadat was fighting to keep

Egypt to less reliant on both Soviet-made militarily and ideology (Lapping 2004; Mueler 2002).

In turn, this lead to a growing rift between the former partners, especially after the defeat in

1973. At this point, Sadat sought to find another partner that agreed with him policy-wise and

personally, for nothing was being gained in the current situation. Sadat initiated his new policy

when he traveled to Jerusalem and addressed the Knesset of his intentions for peace between

Israel and Egypt; naturally Israel rebuffed Sadat and his claims (Dinstien1980; Falk 1978). In

order to gain creditability, Sadat had to seek a world stage by obtaining backing from the

United States of America. A partnership was born (Beinin 1981; Lapping 2004). However,

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there were many roadblocks along the way in creating a lasting partnership between the two

states.

Peace Agreement:

Despite the fact that there were great moments of contention between Menachem,

Sadat, and Carter, the peace agreement was forged even though it would not answer all the

questions from decades before. Eventually after thirteen days on debate the parties came to an

agreement as to what framework to the agreement should be. The main goals of the agreement

were to “Achieve peace between them; Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a

goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty”

(Appendix 1).

The framework of the treaty consisted of a number of strategies to obtain peace that

included ceding land back to Egypt under special conditions, the lifting any impediments

imposed by Egypt related to the use of the Suez Canal, and Israel had to withdraw their forces

in a specific time frame and recognize internationally established sovereign borders. Each of

the details was clearly spelled out in the treaty. For example, the treaty stated that it would be

activated within three years from the signing of the agreement. Secondly, the areas of

contention (including air fields and ground troops) are to be withdrawn and be replaced with

United Nations peacekeeping forces near both Israeli and Egyptian military bases (and

surrounding areas of the Sinai). Thirdly, the region of the Mediterranean Sea that is adjacent to

the international border, including the Sharm el-Sheikh area free passage in the Strait of Tiran,

would provide safe conduct and free passage for civilians and air travel between Jordan and

Egypt. Lastly, the terms established that the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international

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waterways and are to be governed as such (The Camp David Accords 2001). These were the

key elements within the Accords; however, it was not overall pleasing to all the actors involved

in the conflict.

Actors:

The primary actors within the conflict included the government of the State of Israel, who

was represented by Prime Minster Menachem, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, President

Jimmy Carter, of the United States of America (who was also acting as the mediator).

However, the mediator like the main actors had their own ‘agenda’ or positions and interests

that they wanted represented. While Carter served as the mediator advocating for peace

between Israel and Egypt on the “surface”, below that he had other positions and interests of

his own. During the Peace Summit, Carter made it clear to Sadat on his position of how the

treaty should be framed, which would not address the overall conflict between Palestine and

Israel. But, what would be addressed were the threats facing Egypt as far as national security in

terms of borders and alliances (Beinin 1981; Lapping 2004).

As stated previously, Egypt had been defeated several times and this resulted in the loss

of the Sinai, which is crucial in the process of solidifying international borders and asserting

power in the region (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). Secondly, it was pressed that Egypt should

focus on disarmament and the withdrawal of troops on both sides of the border so that it would

create a more stable peace with Israel. This meant that Egypt would have less authority in the

conflict over Palestine (Gerson 1983). Carter noted to Sadat that this would be the only

criterion Prime Minster Menachem could possibly accept because of his position (Mearshiemer

and Walt 2006; Pricen 1991). Such statements and positions established by Carter at the

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summit clearly illustrate what were his interests and how they came to frame the agreement and

what was to be in them.

President Carter, who was coming up on a reelection bid, saw it in his best interests to

create a standing peace and to assist Israel, which was fulfilled in the political and economic

goals of the Accords. Politically, by retaining Cold War relations with Israel (which played

well for some key American electorates), as well as obtaining a Western ally in Egypt, it would

allow the United States to “check” the former USSR’s presence and influence in the Middle

East (Andersen 2008). In terms of the economic gains created from the Camp David Accords, it

formed a negative peace with Israel for trade reasons. This peace meant a securing of access of

oil in the Suez Canal, the Straights Tiran, and Gulf of Aqaba.

Sadat’s positions were initially true and genuine for peace in the Middle East because

Sadat wanted an end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

Unfortunately, he had to abandon his position as an advocate for Palestinian sovereignty during

the conference, for several reasons that Carter suggested (Lapping 2004; Mearshiemer and

Walt 2006; Pricen 1991). However, Sadat’s call for peace was retained but they now became

more nationally oriented in favor of Egyptian security rather than peace in the Palestinian

Israeli conflict (which mirrored and suited his nation’s interests). Sadat needed to secure his

power in Egypt, especially after he abandoned the Soviet alliance in 1971. During this alliance

vacuum, he grew unpopular and was continually overshadowed by Nasser’s legacy among the

people. By signing the Accords that would return the Sinai, it became the rallying cry to gain

him the prestige he desired (Lapping 2004; Mearshiemer and Walt 2006; Pricen 1991; Strok,

1979).

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Furthermore, his aims of diplomatic prestige helped to achieve his goal as a peacemaker

that bolstered his ability to regain territory for Egypt from Israel (Finklestein 2001;

Mearshiemer and Walt 2006; Mueler 2002). Then there was the issue of replacing old alliances,

in which Sadat opted for a US alliance compared to the previous alliances with Arab states and

the former USSR. Sadat did this because if Egypt came under the US umbrella it would allow

Egypt to enjoy the benefits of military protection from the USSR and their allies, gain superior

weapons, and obtain diplomatic protection/international credibility/political legitimacy as an

ally to the West in the Middle East. One other possible factor could be that the United States of

America was less demanding of an ally since the only time the USA would possibly interfere in

Egyptian affairs would be if Egypt challenged Israel (Finklestein 2001; Mearshiemer and Walt

2006). However, all of these points would leave a heavy political price to pay at home, in order

to secure the long-term benefits that Sadat needed from the USA in the Accords. Despite this

potential set back, Sadat agreed to focus on peace with Israel and at the same time he placed a

“price tag” on the alliance that meant that Sinai truly be handed back over (Mearsheimer and

Walt 2006).

Israeli Prime Minster Menachem, like President Carter, had his interests represented in

the agreement, except for the issue over the Sinai. Menachem made his position very clear that

Israel, under any pretenses would only cede any land to an Arab state as long as they alone

recognized Israeli’s sovereignty and not that of the Palestinians (Andersen 2008; Finklestein

2001; 2006). Both these positions are crucial in understanding Menachem’s interests. Israel

argued that they could not allow Palestinians a self-autonomous government because they had

no claim to the land. Moreover, sovereignty over the land was promised to the Jewish people

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by the Balfour Declaration and by international standards which recognized Israel’s legitimate

sovereignty over the Palestinian Territories since 1948 (Mearshiemer and Walt 2006; Muler

2002; Pricen 1991; Quandt 1979). Any compromise of any of these positions or interests would

pose a security dilemma for Israel. Additionally, Israel at first refused give up any of the newly

acquired territory gained by the Six Day, because Israel needed the land and water sources for

its growing population (Muler 2002; Pricen 1991; Quandt 1979). It must also be taken into

account that Israel had powerful allies backing their positions as this would protect their

security interests. Lastly, the psychological reason for retaining any of the territories and

refusing to recognize Arab control over Palestine was that of Israel’s political memory of the

successful tale of survival against all odds and extinction (Holocaust) (Muler 2002; Pricen

1991).

While two of the main parties had most of their positions and interests retained there

were others involved in the conflict that were neglected; however, their interests must be

mentioned or considered in the making of the Accords. The first key, secondary actor to be

considered that was neglected was the King of Jordan, Hussein bil-Talal. At this time, he has

positions that were similar to Egypt: a Palestinian State to check the power of Israel and

prevent any further land expansion (Andersen 2008; Gerson 1991; Lapping 2004). While the

Jordanian interests were also along the same lines, they were more domestically driven because

Jordan claimed that the West Bank was taken “illegally” by Israel (which dates back to the

Anglo-French mandate of Sykes Picot that declared the area to be under Jordan’s jurisdiction)

(Avalon Project 2008; Gerson 1983). By obtaining the area around the Jordan River, it would

provide Jordan with additional water and trade routes. Furthermore, and in a view that was

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much more varied than Egypt’s, the fear of creating a Palestinian state may also decimate the

Jordanian economy (unless Jordan had direct control over the situation) (Andersen 2008;

Gerson 1991). Jordan saw the agreement as a way for the nation to open a window to recover

(Gerson 1991). Then there is the benefit of international prestige if Jordan were to conduct

peace talks themselves without US involvement, in which they would gain support from other

Soviet-Arab aligned nations, such as Syria (Beinin 1981; Falk 1978).

Syria is the second neglected secondary actor in the agreement (Beinin 1981; Falk

1978). Syria’s main position was to support the Palestinian people, without dealing with the

Israeli government. Syria’s main interest was to support the Palestinian people in order to gain

another ally that could ‘check’ and prevent any further Israeli territorial expansion in the

Middle East. As it was, Syria saw this as possible because Israel had already taken the Golan

Heights away from Syria as a strategic position and as a source of water (Beinin 1981; Falk

1978; Lapping 2004; Meuler 2002). However, despite the need for a border security and the

return of a large water source, Syria refused to enter in negations with the United States and

Israel because it would have upset their relations with the former USSR (Andersen 2008).

Interestingly, the USSR had no stated policy or position. But, at the same time it had a great

interest in the continuation of the conflict for the Arabs states were weak and needed weapons

just as much as the USSR needed allies to counter the threat of US power in the Middle East.

The last of the secondary actors were that of the Palestinian people themselves. The

people of the territories had no legitimate political recognition as a self-governing nation-state.

Instead, the Palestinian people only had representation through their popular leaders like Yasser

Arafat, who was the former leader of the PLO. His main position and interest was the

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establishment of a Palestinian state and to destroy Israel. This rhetoric preached by Arafat was

taken seriously by the international community (in particular the United States) who at the time

viewed the PLO as a terrorist group and refused to negotiate with them in any shape or form

(Falk 2001; Pricen 1991). Just as much as the PLO had no intention of involving Israel or any

Western government in the matter, this was purely a conflict of grievance that had long been

ignored. The PLO needs were that of any other mass group of refugees, which is the need of

self-determination in order to have a livelihood for its people (Finklestein 2001). The best way

to obtain this goal was unfortunately through fear. By acting out this way, it gained the

attention of the world, which would help place pressure on other Arab states to act as they had

in the past. This is exactly what happened after the signing of the Accords.

Failure or Success:

The content of the Accords caused a mixed result because the “surface positions” of

each actor were met by name only. Egypt was granted the Sinai back under their control and

arms deals as well as diplomatic protection of the US from the USSR. Israel obtained peace

with Egypt and access to the Suez Canal, as well as all other of trade routes in the area. As for

the United States, it gained another ally in the Middle East that was brought through economic

means, weaponry, and faster access to trade routes (Finklestein 2001; Gazit 1997; Quandt

1979). The United States also “secured” the deal by introducing the United Nations as a police

force on the borders of Sinai to ensure that all the conditions of peace between Israel and Egypt

were met. This meant a successful military withdrawal from both sides and insurance of free

passage and use of the trade routes for all nations (Finklestein 2001; Gazit 1997; Quandt 1979).

Each of these criterions of the Accords was met, thus resulting in the signing of the Israeli-

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Egyptian Peace treaty a year later (Gazit 1997; Lapping 2004; Mueler 2002). However, these

parts of the Accord had disastrous consequences that caused the agreement to fail in other

accounts.

While there are several elements that lead to the failure of the Camp David Peace

Accords, all can be tied to the fact that the negotiators forgot the overall context of the conflict

ranging from: the absence of secondary actors, neglecting the key issues that ignited the

conflict in the first place, and the issue of Arab perceptions of the agreements (Barnett 1996;

Karawan 1994). As shown earlier, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a complex, deep rooted

conflict, which involves many primary and secondary actors. However, in the Camp David

Accords three of these secondary actors (in regards to the peace agreement) were absent from

the peace discussion forum: PLO (representatives for the Palestinians), Jordan and Syria

(Barnett 1996; Karawan 1994). The Camp David Accords, like every other peace treaty that

came before it, failed because it intentionally omitted the root of the conflict that stemmed from

the socio-political factors within the Holy Land. The Accords forgot that the West Bank,

Palestine, and Gaza were also in existence besides the State of Israel.

The Camp David Accords clearly represent what interests Israel, Egypt and the United

States had in mind (Andersen 2008; Karawan1994). This was especially a win for the United

States, because as it was stated before, the United States obtained an Arab ally in the Middle

East who was agreeable to the desires to support Israel, was willing to remain anti-Soviet, and

agreed to open the Suez Canal as well as (See below for more details on this point). But, most

of all the agreement on border security was agreed by both sides as well as secured by the

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United Nations who had the job of acting as a police force on the borders. According to the

following statements the United Nations forces will be stationed:

“In part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and

adjacent to the international border, the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage

through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is

approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five

permanent members.”

All of the basic goals of the primary actors were met, but mostly at the expense of

Sadat’s personal goals and two of the secondary parties, Jordan and the PLO. While Syria was

a secondary actor, its only terms it really wished for (like that of Egypt) was the re-taking of the

Golan Heights. The PLO desired political recognition as well as the establishment of a

Palestinian State as dictated in the Sykes Picot agreement. However, as shown previously,

President Carter ensured that the PLO as well as their interests was omitted from the agreement

because of his own interests and the outcome of the Summit (Finklestein 2001).

Carter knew that omitting the “Palestinian Question” from the agreement would make it

easier for Israel and Egypt to come to an agreement, for Israel would never agree to have the

PLO in attendance either side’s interests and needs. If Israel would have allowed the PLO to

attend, it would have run in clear contrast of both Israel and the US’ agenda (Gerson 1991;

Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). As for Jordan and Syria they both refused to be present at the

summit, and Syria openly refused to negotiate with Israel on principle simply because they did

not recognize Israel’s right to exist. It was also well noted that Israel would never agree to

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return the Golan Heights (Gerson 1991; Karawan 1994) .On the other hand, Jordan evaded the

question and sent no reply, despite their assertion that the West Bank belonged to Jordan based

on the Sykes Picot agreement which mandated that the West Bank was a part of British

mandated Trans-Jordan (up until 1946) (See Appendix I). Regardless of these crucial actors and

claims not being presented, President Carter insisted on continuing peace talks with both Israel

and Egypt, he knew that the most success would come out of any Accords signed (Mueler

2002; Lapping 2004).

It was such notions that lead to the second factor that lead to the failure of the

agreement. It was through the avoidance of discussing the roots of the overall conflict that lead

to Israel and Egypt opposing each other. Nowhere in the Accords is there a mention of a

possible Palestinian State or a self-autonomous government for the Palestinians or a possible

solution to resolve all the different land conflict. The only land dispute that was solved was that

of Sadat’s desire to regain the Sinai, which this simple claim of compromise cost him his initial

goal of supporting the Palestinians. But, it did allow him to re-open the Suez Canal for

international trade purposes (Appendix I). Israel on the other hand, gained an Arab ally at the

cost of relinquishing the Sinai; which ended up being worth the compromise on positions, for in

the end Israel still had access to the ‘previously owned” waterways because of the following

clause:

“The Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of

1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international

waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded.”

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The last benefit that both Israel and Egypt received was a free trade zone at the expense

of Jordan: “The construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with

guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan.” This was a clear offense to Jordan

for both Israel and Egypt took advantage of Jordan’s absence in the peace talks for their own

gain. Jordan had neither informed nor consented to this clause in the agreement. This clause

only escalated the pre-existing tensions between Sadat and his old ally, in which this only made

matters worse in terms of the Accord’s possible success for peace in the Middle East.

Sadat may have gained the Sinai back from Egypt; however, this was not enough for the

Egyptian people or the Arab world (Lapper 2004; Mueler 2002). Even prior to the agreement

Sadat walked a “political tight-rope” for he had heavy expectations placed upon him by his

own people, many who were still left-overs from Nasser’s regime. To up the stress, the whole

Arab world was watching him too. With his recent “collaboration” with the United States and

Israel it did little to help him gain credibility or establish Egyptian regional hegemony (Lapper

2004; Gazit 1997; Mueler 2002). If anything it made Sadat look weak and showed him to be he

a “sell-out” to the Palestinian people and the “Pan-Arab code of conduct” by disregarding his

Arab brothers/allies just to regain the Sinai (Barnett 1996; Mueler 2002). This perception was

not only present in Egypt but all across the Middle East: Jordan rebuffed Sadat and did little to

help him when he called for aid in the early 1980 when he faced massive riots. Furthermore,

Syria followed Jordan’s example and sent PLO agitators (that fled from Jordan) into Egypt to

lead and ignite protests and riots against the treaty. As for Egypt’s new allies, Israel did little to

help Sadat, except keep their end of the bargain by giving back the Sinai without resistance

after three years. By continuing friendly relations with Sadat it would have given Israel more

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trouble than they were worth taking on (Falk 2001). Like Israel, the United States was of very

little help, especially because President Carter lost his re-election bid to Ronald Reagan.

President Reagan was an anti-communist that supported the Accords and continued to

aid Sadat by continuing the “covert” weapons deals to Egypt (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006).

This managed to keep Sadat in power for a year before his assassination in 1981 at a military

parade. Sadat was later replaced by Hosni Mubarak, who ironically continued Sadat’s policy of

retaining “good relations with the US”. But, Mubarak would prove to only avoid any further

issues relating to the Accords and Israel (Gerson 1983). Other Arab nations followed

Mubarak’s example when it came to the “Palestinian Question”, for it seemed impossible to

solve it without endangering their position or national interests (Meuler 2002; Quandt 1979).

This lead to more violence in the Middle East that doubled out of response by the PLO who

grew desperate for attention to voice their needs for a Palestinian state.

Such tactics resorted to terrorism to gain international attention. As for Israel,

established military check points and sent troops to occupy and secure the Gaza Strip (Lapper

2004; Mueler 2002). Such tactics form both Israel and the Palestinian Territories have resulted

in a long series of conflicts called infatadas, which wax and wane until this present day. All of

this violence is a result of a history of failed peace agreements that go as far back as the Sykes

Picot agreement, Camp David Accords, Oslo, and Camp David II. The entire conflict, which

first began over Palestinian statehood, grew that pit nation versus nation. With everyone’s

interests proving to be of more importance, it has successfully buried Palestinian assistance and

negotiations on how to actually address the grievances.

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Appendix I:

The Camp David Accords

Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treatybetween Egypt and Israel

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them:

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;

2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb,

and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;

4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;

5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

6. the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

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Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).

In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed:1. in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the

Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and2. in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the

Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of theArab Republic of Egypt:

Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

For the Governmentof Israel:

Menachem Begin

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America

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Appendix II:

Appendix III:

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Refrences:

I. Online Sites:

American Experience. Peace talks at camp David, September 1978. Retrieved from

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/carter-peace/

Anwar Sadat: Summits and peace agreements. (1999). Retrieved from

http://sadat.umd.edu/archives/summits.htm

Avalon Project. (2008). Camp David Accords; September 17, 1978. Retrieved from

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/campdav.asp

Israeli Knesset. (1999). The Camp David Accords: the Framework for Peace in the

Middle East. Retrieved from

http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/camp_david_eng.htm

PBS News Hour. (17, September 1978). Camp David Accord. Retrieved from

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/conflict/peaceefforts1.html

The Camp David Accords: The framework for peace in the middle east. (2001, July 21).

Retrieved from http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml

II. Documentaries

Lapping, B. (Producer), & Boston, W. (Producer) (2004).The 50 years war: Israel and

the Arabs [DVD]. Available from PBS.org

Mueler, D. (Producer) (2002). Tragedy in the Holy Land: The Second Uprising [DVD].

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III. Articles:

Barnett, M. N. (1996). Identity and Alliances in the Middle East. Columbia University

Press, 400-447

Beinin, J.(1981). Jerusalem: The Camp David Connection. Journal of Palestine

Studies, 10(2), 122-125.

Dinstien, Y. (1980). Sadat viewed from Israel. Journal of Palestine Studies, 9(4), 158-

164.

Falk, R. (2001). Camp David ii: Looking Back, Looking Forward. Journal of Palestine

Studies, 36(3), 78-88.

Falk, D.(1978). Sadat's Desperate Mission. MERIP Reports, 64, 3-16.

Finklesstien,N. (2001). The Palestinian-Israeli Camp David Negotiations and

Beyond. Journal of Palestine Studies, 31(1), 62-75.

Gazit, M. (1997). Egypt and Israel: Was there a peace opportunity missed in

1971?. Journal of Contemporary History, 32(1), 97-115.

Gerson, A. (1983). Models of autonomy: Camp David. American Journal of

International Law, 7(8), 1-9.

Karawan, I. (1994). Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli. International Journal of Middle East

studies, 26(2), 249-266.

Mearsheimer, J. Walt, S. (2006). The Israel Lobby. London Review, 28 (6),3-12

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Neff, D. (1994). The clinton administration. Journal of Palestine Studies, 23(2), 20-30.

Pricen, T. (1991). Camp David: Problem Solving or Power Politics as Usual?. Journal of

Peace Research, 28(1), 57-69.

Quandt, W.(1979). Who won at Camp David?. Journal of Palestine Studies, 8(2), 168-

173.

Strok, J.(1979). Camp David seen from Israel. Journal of Palestine Studies, 8(2), 144-

155.

IV. Books:

Andersen, R. (2008). Politics and change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and

Accommodation. (9th ed., pp. 1-300). New York City, New York: Prentice Hall, Inc.