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Leslie Ader Ader 1IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
Introduction:
The Camp David Accords was a group agreement between President Al- Anwar Sadat
of Egypt, Prime Minster Menachem of Israel, and it was overseen by President Jimmy Carter of
the United States of America. This agreement was an attempt to restore peace in the Middle
East and arrest or slow deep rooted Palestinian-Israeli violence that had erupted again during
the Cold War. The objective of this paper is to analyze and discuss the content of the Accords
by looking at the historical context, actors, positions, interests, and how each of these factors
played a role in the formation of the agreement itself.
Short Background/Political Context:
Prior to the Accords, the Middle East had been in an uproar since the establishment of
Israel in 1948. This event upset the balance of power and demographics of British controlled
Palestine that helped ignite a prior diplomatic squabble over territorial claims established by
two contradictory agreements: Sykes Picot (1916) and the Balfour (1917) declaration
(Appendix II). The Sykes Picot agreement granted the land of Palestine to the Arabs for an
Arab state; however, the British reversed this policy in favor of Israel and granted the same
area of land to Jewish settlers. Both documents had been engrained in both Arab and Jewish
memory and identity, which lead to a series of conflicts and ad hoc agreements that helped
spark some of the current conflicts. The Camp David Accords themselves emerged out of a
series of agreements that formed the context of the Middle East during the Cold War. During
this time, most Arab states like Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq allied themselves with the
Leslie Ader Ader 2IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to check the power of the West, particularly the
United States and Israel (Andersen 2008; Barnett 1996; Gerson 1983). The most notable
leading Arab state for the movement that help solidified the Soviet-Arab collation was Egypt
(United Arab Republic) under General Gamal Nasser. He transformed Arab identity into a Pan-
Arab identity that was amiable to the Communist ideology and this resulted in a defense of
power against Israel. Most of the Arab-Soviet bloc consisted of the nations most threatened by
the establishment of Israel: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the newly formed PLO
(Palestinian branch of government). In turn, this erupted into a series of wars between the
1950’s and 1970’s: 1956 War/Suez War, 1967/Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War 1973.
The Suez War is crucial to understanding the Accords because it was the first war
related to the issues that would later be discussed in the Accords. This conflict was over the
issue of the Sinai and Suez Canal, in which both Egypt and Israel claimed it as their own
trading choke point. Nasser, however, nationalized the canal and created trade deals with the
United Kingdom and France. This sparked conflict with Israel and Israel cemented the United
States’ support for Israel’s cause (Dinstien 1980; Falk 1978). The conflict ended in a United
Nations agreement and ceasefire, in which Egypt kept the canal under their control and Israel,
occupied the Sinai Peninsula as a security measure. However, the ceasefire agreement stated
nothing about Israeli withdraw of the Sinai or the issue of the Palestinians (Finklestein 2001;
Stork 1979). In the next decade, the Six Day War picked-up where the 1956 war ended. This
war was a huge victory for Israel and its allies, but for the Arabs, (particularly the United Arab
Republic) it was a huge military defeat. The entire UAR air force and weaponry (provided by
the former USSR) were nearly destroyed and the Sinai was “securely: occupied by Israeli
Leslie Ader Ader 3IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
forces (Andersen 2008; Neff 1994). As for the UAR’s key ally (Jordan and Syria) it lead to a
devastating loss of the Golan Heights (key water source) the West Bank and Gaza to Israel
(Appendix III). By the end of the war, the UAR was in chaos, Nasser the Arab champion had
died, and he was succeed by Anwar Sadat who was intent on following Nasser’s dream of
making the UAR a regional power (Karawan 1994; Lapping 2004; Mueler 2002). In retaliation
for the 1967 war, Egypt and its allies launched another attack in 1973 that also lead to a huge
defeat of the Arab alliance (Lapping 2004; Mueler 2002; Summits and Peace Agreements). A
ceasefire was then called by UN Resolution 338 and 339, but again there was no mention of
Israel ceding any “occupied territories” it gained in the war. As shown earlier, the issue of
Palestinian autonomy remained unanswered.
Furthermore, Sadat faced an additional concern during this time. The former USSR
differed with the ideas Sadat had in mind for his foreign policy. Since the death of Nasser,
Sadat had found that he was under more pressure by Moscow, but Sadat was fighting to keep
Egypt to less reliant on both Soviet-made militarily and ideology (Lapping 2004; Mueler 2002).
In turn, this lead to a growing rift between the former partners, especially after the defeat in
1973. At this point, Sadat sought to find another partner that agreed with him policy-wise and
personally, for nothing was being gained in the current situation. Sadat initiated his new policy
when he traveled to Jerusalem and addressed the Knesset of his intentions for peace between
Israel and Egypt; naturally Israel rebuffed Sadat and his claims (Dinstien1980; Falk 1978). In
order to gain creditability, Sadat had to seek a world stage by obtaining backing from the
United States of America. A partnership was born (Beinin 1981; Lapping 2004). However,
Leslie Ader Ader 4IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
there were many roadblocks along the way in creating a lasting partnership between the two
states.
Peace Agreement:
Despite the fact that there were great moments of contention between Menachem,
Sadat, and Carter, the peace agreement was forged even though it would not answer all the
questions from decades before. Eventually after thirteen days on debate the parties came to an
agreement as to what framework to the agreement should be. The main goals of the agreement
were to “Achieve peace between them; Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a
goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty”
(Appendix 1).
The framework of the treaty consisted of a number of strategies to obtain peace that
included ceding land back to Egypt under special conditions, the lifting any impediments
imposed by Egypt related to the use of the Suez Canal, and Israel had to withdraw their forces
in a specific time frame and recognize internationally established sovereign borders. Each of
the details was clearly spelled out in the treaty. For example, the treaty stated that it would be
activated within three years from the signing of the agreement. Secondly, the areas of
contention (including air fields and ground troops) are to be withdrawn and be replaced with
United Nations peacekeeping forces near both Israeli and Egyptian military bases (and
surrounding areas of the Sinai). Thirdly, the region of the Mediterranean Sea that is adjacent to
the international border, including the Sharm el-Sheikh area free passage in the Strait of Tiran,
would provide safe conduct and free passage for civilians and air travel between Jordan and
Egypt. Lastly, the terms established that the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international
Leslie Ader Ader 5IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
waterways and are to be governed as such (The Camp David Accords 2001). These were the
key elements within the Accords; however, it was not overall pleasing to all the actors involved
in the conflict.
Actors:
The primary actors within the conflict included the government of the State of Israel, who
was represented by Prime Minster Menachem, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, President
Jimmy Carter, of the United States of America (who was also acting as the mediator).
However, the mediator like the main actors had their own ‘agenda’ or positions and interests
that they wanted represented. While Carter served as the mediator advocating for peace
between Israel and Egypt on the “surface”, below that he had other positions and interests of
his own. During the Peace Summit, Carter made it clear to Sadat on his position of how the
treaty should be framed, which would not address the overall conflict between Palestine and
Israel. But, what would be addressed were the threats facing Egypt as far as national security in
terms of borders and alliances (Beinin 1981; Lapping 2004).
As stated previously, Egypt had been defeated several times and this resulted in the loss
of the Sinai, which is crucial in the process of solidifying international borders and asserting
power in the region (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). Secondly, it was pressed that Egypt should
focus on disarmament and the withdrawal of troops on both sides of the border so that it would
create a more stable peace with Israel. This meant that Egypt would have less authority in the
conflict over Palestine (Gerson 1983). Carter noted to Sadat that this would be the only
criterion Prime Minster Menachem could possibly accept because of his position (Mearshiemer
and Walt 2006; Pricen 1991). Such statements and positions established by Carter at the
Leslie Ader Ader 6IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
summit clearly illustrate what were his interests and how they came to frame the agreement and
what was to be in them.
President Carter, who was coming up on a reelection bid, saw it in his best interests to
create a standing peace and to assist Israel, which was fulfilled in the political and economic
goals of the Accords. Politically, by retaining Cold War relations with Israel (which played
well for some key American electorates), as well as obtaining a Western ally in Egypt, it would
allow the United States to “check” the former USSR’s presence and influence in the Middle
East (Andersen 2008). In terms of the economic gains created from the Camp David Accords, it
formed a negative peace with Israel for trade reasons. This peace meant a securing of access of
oil in the Suez Canal, the Straights Tiran, and Gulf of Aqaba.
Sadat’s positions were initially true and genuine for peace in the Middle East because
Sadat wanted an end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Territories.
Unfortunately, he had to abandon his position as an advocate for Palestinian sovereignty during
the conference, for several reasons that Carter suggested (Lapping 2004; Mearshiemer and
Walt 2006; Pricen 1991). However, Sadat’s call for peace was retained but they now became
more nationally oriented in favor of Egyptian security rather than peace in the Palestinian
Israeli conflict (which mirrored and suited his nation’s interests). Sadat needed to secure his
power in Egypt, especially after he abandoned the Soviet alliance in 1971. During this alliance
vacuum, he grew unpopular and was continually overshadowed by Nasser’s legacy among the
people. By signing the Accords that would return the Sinai, it became the rallying cry to gain
him the prestige he desired (Lapping 2004; Mearshiemer and Walt 2006; Pricen 1991; Strok,
1979).
Leslie Ader Ader 7IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
Furthermore, his aims of diplomatic prestige helped to achieve his goal as a peacemaker
that bolstered his ability to regain territory for Egypt from Israel (Finklestein 2001;
Mearshiemer and Walt 2006; Mueler 2002). Then there was the issue of replacing old alliances,
in which Sadat opted for a US alliance compared to the previous alliances with Arab states and
the former USSR. Sadat did this because if Egypt came under the US umbrella it would allow
Egypt to enjoy the benefits of military protection from the USSR and their allies, gain superior
weapons, and obtain diplomatic protection/international credibility/political legitimacy as an
ally to the West in the Middle East. One other possible factor could be that the United States of
America was less demanding of an ally since the only time the USA would possibly interfere in
Egyptian affairs would be if Egypt challenged Israel (Finklestein 2001; Mearshiemer and Walt
2006). However, all of these points would leave a heavy political price to pay at home, in order
to secure the long-term benefits that Sadat needed from the USA in the Accords. Despite this
potential set back, Sadat agreed to focus on peace with Israel and at the same time he placed a
“price tag” on the alliance that meant that Sinai truly be handed back over (Mearsheimer and
Walt 2006).
Israeli Prime Minster Menachem, like President Carter, had his interests represented in
the agreement, except for the issue over the Sinai. Menachem made his position very clear that
Israel, under any pretenses would only cede any land to an Arab state as long as they alone
recognized Israeli’s sovereignty and not that of the Palestinians (Andersen 2008; Finklestein
2001; 2006). Both these positions are crucial in understanding Menachem’s interests. Israel
argued that they could not allow Palestinians a self-autonomous government because they had
no claim to the land. Moreover, sovereignty over the land was promised to the Jewish people
Leslie Ader Ader 8IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
by the Balfour Declaration and by international standards which recognized Israel’s legitimate
sovereignty over the Palestinian Territories since 1948 (Mearshiemer and Walt 2006; Muler
2002; Pricen 1991; Quandt 1979). Any compromise of any of these positions or interests would
pose a security dilemma for Israel. Additionally, Israel at first refused give up any of the newly
acquired territory gained by the Six Day, because Israel needed the land and water sources for
its growing population (Muler 2002; Pricen 1991; Quandt 1979). It must also be taken into
account that Israel had powerful allies backing their positions as this would protect their
security interests. Lastly, the psychological reason for retaining any of the territories and
refusing to recognize Arab control over Palestine was that of Israel’s political memory of the
successful tale of survival against all odds and extinction (Holocaust) (Muler 2002; Pricen
1991).
While two of the main parties had most of their positions and interests retained there
were others involved in the conflict that were neglected; however, their interests must be
mentioned or considered in the making of the Accords. The first key, secondary actor to be
considered that was neglected was the King of Jordan, Hussein bil-Talal. At this time, he has
positions that were similar to Egypt: a Palestinian State to check the power of Israel and
prevent any further land expansion (Andersen 2008; Gerson 1991; Lapping 2004). While the
Jordanian interests were also along the same lines, they were more domestically driven because
Jordan claimed that the West Bank was taken “illegally” by Israel (which dates back to the
Anglo-French mandate of Sykes Picot that declared the area to be under Jordan’s jurisdiction)
(Avalon Project 2008; Gerson 1983). By obtaining the area around the Jordan River, it would
provide Jordan with additional water and trade routes. Furthermore, and in a view that was
Leslie Ader Ader 9IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
much more varied than Egypt’s, the fear of creating a Palestinian state may also decimate the
Jordanian economy (unless Jordan had direct control over the situation) (Andersen 2008;
Gerson 1991). Jordan saw the agreement as a way for the nation to open a window to recover
(Gerson 1991). Then there is the benefit of international prestige if Jordan were to conduct
peace talks themselves without US involvement, in which they would gain support from other
Soviet-Arab aligned nations, such as Syria (Beinin 1981; Falk 1978).
Syria is the second neglected secondary actor in the agreement (Beinin 1981; Falk
1978). Syria’s main position was to support the Palestinian people, without dealing with the
Israeli government. Syria’s main interest was to support the Palestinian people in order to gain
another ally that could ‘check’ and prevent any further Israeli territorial expansion in the
Middle East. As it was, Syria saw this as possible because Israel had already taken the Golan
Heights away from Syria as a strategic position and as a source of water (Beinin 1981; Falk
1978; Lapping 2004; Meuler 2002). However, despite the need for a border security and the
return of a large water source, Syria refused to enter in negations with the United States and
Israel because it would have upset their relations with the former USSR (Andersen 2008).
Interestingly, the USSR had no stated policy or position. But, at the same time it had a great
interest in the continuation of the conflict for the Arabs states were weak and needed weapons
just as much as the USSR needed allies to counter the threat of US power in the Middle East.
The last of the secondary actors were that of the Palestinian people themselves. The
people of the territories had no legitimate political recognition as a self-governing nation-state.
Instead, the Palestinian people only had representation through their popular leaders like Yasser
Arafat, who was the former leader of the PLO. His main position and interest was the
Leslie Ader Ader 10IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
establishment of a Palestinian state and to destroy Israel. This rhetoric preached by Arafat was
taken seriously by the international community (in particular the United States) who at the time
viewed the PLO as a terrorist group and refused to negotiate with them in any shape or form
(Falk 2001; Pricen 1991). Just as much as the PLO had no intention of involving Israel or any
Western government in the matter, this was purely a conflict of grievance that had long been
ignored. The PLO needs were that of any other mass group of refugees, which is the need of
self-determination in order to have a livelihood for its people (Finklestein 2001). The best way
to obtain this goal was unfortunately through fear. By acting out this way, it gained the
attention of the world, which would help place pressure on other Arab states to act as they had
in the past. This is exactly what happened after the signing of the Accords.
Failure or Success:
The content of the Accords caused a mixed result because the “surface positions” of
each actor were met by name only. Egypt was granted the Sinai back under their control and
arms deals as well as diplomatic protection of the US from the USSR. Israel obtained peace
with Egypt and access to the Suez Canal, as well as all other of trade routes in the area. As for
the United States, it gained another ally in the Middle East that was brought through economic
means, weaponry, and faster access to trade routes (Finklestein 2001; Gazit 1997; Quandt
1979). The United States also “secured” the deal by introducing the United Nations as a police
force on the borders of Sinai to ensure that all the conditions of peace between Israel and Egypt
were met. This meant a successful military withdrawal from both sides and insurance of free
passage and use of the trade routes for all nations (Finklestein 2001; Gazit 1997; Quandt 1979).
Each of these criterions of the Accords was met, thus resulting in the signing of the Israeli-
Leslie Ader Ader 11IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
Egyptian Peace treaty a year later (Gazit 1997; Lapping 2004; Mueler 2002). However, these
parts of the Accord had disastrous consequences that caused the agreement to fail in other
accounts.
While there are several elements that lead to the failure of the Camp David Peace
Accords, all can be tied to the fact that the negotiators forgot the overall context of the conflict
ranging from: the absence of secondary actors, neglecting the key issues that ignited the
conflict in the first place, and the issue of Arab perceptions of the agreements (Barnett 1996;
Karawan 1994). As shown earlier, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a complex, deep rooted
conflict, which involves many primary and secondary actors. However, in the Camp David
Accords three of these secondary actors (in regards to the peace agreement) were absent from
the peace discussion forum: PLO (representatives for the Palestinians), Jordan and Syria
(Barnett 1996; Karawan 1994). The Camp David Accords, like every other peace treaty that
came before it, failed because it intentionally omitted the root of the conflict that stemmed from
the socio-political factors within the Holy Land. The Accords forgot that the West Bank,
Palestine, and Gaza were also in existence besides the State of Israel.
The Camp David Accords clearly represent what interests Israel, Egypt and the United
States had in mind (Andersen 2008; Karawan1994). This was especially a win for the United
States, because as it was stated before, the United States obtained an Arab ally in the Middle
East who was agreeable to the desires to support Israel, was willing to remain anti-Soviet, and
agreed to open the Suez Canal as well as (See below for more details on this point). But, most
of all the agreement on border security was agreed by both sides as well as secured by the
Leslie Ader Ader 12IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
United Nations who had the job of acting as a police force on the borders. According to the
following statements the United Nations forces will be stationed:
“In part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and
adjacent to the international border, the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage
through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is
approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five
permanent members.”
All of the basic goals of the primary actors were met, but mostly at the expense of
Sadat’s personal goals and two of the secondary parties, Jordan and the PLO. While Syria was
a secondary actor, its only terms it really wished for (like that of Egypt) was the re-taking of the
Golan Heights. The PLO desired political recognition as well as the establishment of a
Palestinian State as dictated in the Sykes Picot agreement. However, as shown previously,
President Carter ensured that the PLO as well as their interests was omitted from the agreement
because of his own interests and the outcome of the Summit (Finklestein 2001).
Carter knew that omitting the “Palestinian Question” from the agreement would make it
easier for Israel and Egypt to come to an agreement, for Israel would never agree to have the
PLO in attendance either side’s interests and needs. If Israel would have allowed the PLO to
attend, it would have run in clear contrast of both Israel and the US’ agenda (Gerson 1991;
Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). As for Jordan and Syria they both refused to be present at the
summit, and Syria openly refused to negotiate with Israel on principle simply because they did
not recognize Israel’s right to exist. It was also well noted that Israel would never agree to
Leslie Ader Ader 13IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
return the Golan Heights (Gerson 1991; Karawan 1994) .On the other hand, Jordan evaded the
question and sent no reply, despite their assertion that the West Bank belonged to Jordan based
on the Sykes Picot agreement which mandated that the West Bank was a part of British
mandated Trans-Jordan (up until 1946) (See Appendix I). Regardless of these crucial actors and
claims not being presented, President Carter insisted on continuing peace talks with both Israel
and Egypt, he knew that the most success would come out of any Accords signed (Mueler
2002; Lapping 2004).
It was such notions that lead to the second factor that lead to the failure of the
agreement. It was through the avoidance of discussing the roots of the overall conflict that lead
to Israel and Egypt opposing each other. Nowhere in the Accords is there a mention of a
possible Palestinian State or a self-autonomous government for the Palestinians or a possible
solution to resolve all the different land conflict. The only land dispute that was solved was that
of Sadat’s desire to regain the Sinai, which this simple claim of compromise cost him his initial
goal of supporting the Palestinians. But, it did allow him to re-open the Suez Canal for
international trade purposes (Appendix I). Israel on the other hand, gained an Arab ally at the
cost of relinquishing the Sinai; which ended up being worth the compromise on positions, for in
the end Israel still had access to the ‘previously owned” waterways because of the following
clause:
“The Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of
1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international
waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded.”
Leslie Ader Ader 14IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
The last benefit that both Israel and Egypt received was a free trade zone at the expense
of Jordan: “The construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with
guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan.” This was a clear offense to Jordan
for both Israel and Egypt took advantage of Jordan’s absence in the peace talks for their own
gain. Jordan had neither informed nor consented to this clause in the agreement. This clause
only escalated the pre-existing tensions between Sadat and his old ally, in which this only made
matters worse in terms of the Accord’s possible success for peace in the Middle East.
Sadat may have gained the Sinai back from Egypt; however, this was not enough for the
Egyptian people or the Arab world (Lapper 2004; Mueler 2002). Even prior to the agreement
Sadat walked a “political tight-rope” for he had heavy expectations placed upon him by his
own people, many who were still left-overs from Nasser’s regime. To up the stress, the whole
Arab world was watching him too. With his recent “collaboration” with the United States and
Israel it did little to help him gain credibility or establish Egyptian regional hegemony (Lapper
2004; Gazit 1997; Mueler 2002). If anything it made Sadat look weak and showed him to be he
a “sell-out” to the Palestinian people and the “Pan-Arab code of conduct” by disregarding his
Arab brothers/allies just to regain the Sinai (Barnett 1996; Mueler 2002). This perception was
not only present in Egypt but all across the Middle East: Jordan rebuffed Sadat and did little to
help him when he called for aid in the early 1980 when he faced massive riots. Furthermore,
Syria followed Jordan’s example and sent PLO agitators (that fled from Jordan) into Egypt to
lead and ignite protests and riots against the treaty. As for Egypt’s new allies, Israel did little to
help Sadat, except keep their end of the bargain by giving back the Sinai without resistance
after three years. By continuing friendly relations with Sadat it would have given Israel more
Leslie Ader Ader 15IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
trouble than they were worth taking on (Falk 2001). Like Israel, the United States was of very
little help, especially because President Carter lost his re-election bid to Ronald Reagan.
President Reagan was an anti-communist that supported the Accords and continued to
aid Sadat by continuing the “covert” weapons deals to Egypt (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006).
This managed to keep Sadat in power for a year before his assassination in 1981 at a military
parade. Sadat was later replaced by Hosni Mubarak, who ironically continued Sadat’s policy of
retaining “good relations with the US”. But, Mubarak would prove to only avoid any further
issues relating to the Accords and Israel (Gerson 1983). Other Arab nations followed
Mubarak’s example when it came to the “Palestinian Question”, for it seemed impossible to
solve it without endangering their position or national interests (Meuler 2002; Quandt 1979).
This lead to more violence in the Middle East that doubled out of response by the PLO who
grew desperate for attention to voice their needs for a Palestinian state.
Such tactics resorted to terrorism to gain international attention. As for Israel,
established military check points and sent troops to occupy and secure the Gaza Strip (Lapper
2004; Mueler 2002). Such tactics form both Israel and the Palestinian Territories have resulted
in a long series of conflicts called infatadas, which wax and wane until this present day. All of
this violence is a result of a history of failed peace agreements that go as far back as the Sykes
Picot agreement, Camp David Accords, Oslo, and Camp David II. The entire conflict, which
first began over Palestinian statehood, grew that pit nation versus nation. With everyone’s
interests proving to be of more importance, it has successfully buried Palestinian assistance and
negotiations on how to actually address the grievances.
Leslie Ader Ader 16IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
Appendix I:
The Camp David Accords
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treatybetween Egypt and Israel
In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them:
It is agreed that:
The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.
All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.
Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.
The following matters are agreed between the parties:
1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb,
and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;
4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
6. the stationing of military forces listed below.
Stationing of Forces
No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.
Leslie Ader Ader 17IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).
In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.
Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.
The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.
Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.
United Nations forces will be stationed:1. in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the
Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and2. in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the
Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.
After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.
Interim Withdrawal
Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.
For the Government of theArab Republic of Egypt:
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat
For the Governmentof Israel:
Menachem Begin
Witnessed by:
Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America
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Appendix II:
Appendix III:
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Refrences:
I. Online Sites:
American Experience. Peace talks at camp David, September 1978. Retrieved from
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/carter-peace/
Anwar Sadat: Summits and peace agreements. (1999). Retrieved from
http://sadat.umd.edu/archives/summits.htm
Avalon Project. (2008). Camp David Accords; September 17, 1978. Retrieved from
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/campdav.asp
Israeli Knesset. (1999). The Camp David Accords: the Framework for Peace in the
Middle East. Retrieved from
http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/camp_david_eng.htm
PBS News Hour. (17, September 1978). Camp David Accord. Retrieved from
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/conflict/peaceefforts1.html
The Camp David Accords: The framework for peace in the middle east. (2001, July 21).
Retrieved from http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml
II. Documentaries
Lapping, B. (Producer), & Boston, W. (Producer) (2004).The 50 years war: Israel and
the Arabs [DVD]. Available from PBS.org
Mueler, D. (Producer) (2002). Tragedy in the Holy Land: The Second Uprising [DVD].
Leslie Ader Ader 21IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
III. Articles:
Barnett, M. N. (1996). Identity and Alliances in the Middle East. Columbia University
Press, 400-447
Beinin, J.(1981). Jerusalem: The Camp David Connection. Journal of Palestine
Studies, 10(2), 122-125.
Dinstien, Y. (1980). Sadat viewed from Israel. Journal of Palestine Studies, 9(4), 158-
164.
Falk, R. (2001). Camp David ii: Looking Back, Looking Forward. Journal of Palestine
Studies, 36(3), 78-88.
Falk, D.(1978). Sadat's Desperate Mission. MERIP Reports, 64, 3-16.
Finklesstien,N. (2001). The Palestinian-Israeli Camp David Negotiations and
Beyond. Journal of Palestine Studies, 31(1), 62-75.
Gazit, M. (1997). Egypt and Israel: Was there a peace opportunity missed in
1971?. Journal of Contemporary History, 32(1), 97-115.
Gerson, A. (1983). Models of autonomy: Camp David. American Journal of
International Law, 7(8), 1-9.
Karawan, I. (1994). Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli. International Journal of Middle East
studies, 26(2), 249-266.
Mearsheimer, J. Walt, S. (2006). The Israel Lobby. London Review, 28 (6),3-12
Leslie Ader Ader 22IP501Professor CoxConflict Assessment paper
Neff, D. (1994). The clinton administration. Journal of Palestine Studies, 23(2), 20-30.
Pricen, T. (1991). Camp David: Problem Solving or Power Politics as Usual?. Journal of
Peace Research, 28(1), 57-69.
Quandt, W.(1979). Who won at Camp David?. Journal of Palestine Studies, 8(2), 168-
173.
Strok, J.(1979). Camp David seen from Israel. Journal of Palestine Studies, 8(2), 144-
155.
IV. Books:
Andersen, R. (2008). Politics and change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and
Accommodation. (9th ed., pp. 1-300). New York City, New York: Prentice Hall, Inc.