Andrew NelsonPSCI 4122

4/25/2014Term Paper

Paraguay: An Analysis of a Fraudulent State

Introduction

Paraguay’s status as small landlocked country with a relatively feeble economy and

weak political institutions has enabled its elite class to establish a strong system of social

control, characterized by fraudulent elections, turbulent transfers of power, non-representative

political institutions, and the continuous political involvement of the military1. Although the

military was directly responsible for facilitating Paraguay’s transition to democracy in 1989, the

continuous threat of military intervention in politics, along with the inability of the country’s

opposition parties to counteract the powerful elite-run Colorado Party, suggests that the future

of democracy in Paraguay is far from promised. Thus, in order to fully understand the current

pattern of civil-military relations in Paraguay, one must analyze the history of military

involvement in Paraguayan society. This paper will analyze the civil-military relations that

existed in Paraguay during the final years Alfredo Stroessner’s dictatorship and will evaluate the

evolution of Paraguayan civil-military relations in the post transition period. Although at specific

points in the post transition period civil-military relations in Paraguay exhibited signs of

conforming to democratic standards, the enduring legacy of the Stroessner dictatorship has had

a profound effect on the current pattern of civil-military relations, in which the military,

together with the Colorado party, have become the vehicles of power for president Horacio

1 Sondrol, P. C. "The Paraguayan Military in Transition and the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations." Armed Forces & Society 19.1 (1992): 105-22. Print.

Cartes. This paper will also examine the similarities and differences between the 2009 coup in

Honduras, and the situation the lead to the impeachment of Paraguay’s former president,

Fernando Lugo, in order to illustrate the unique status of Paraguay’s political culture.

Stronato

General Alfredo Stroessner’s rise to power in 1954 came about in the same manner that

eventually led to his demise, with a violent coup. Stroessner’s military takeover and subsequent

34 year rule was directly connected to his ability to use both the military, and the powerful

Colorado party as vehicles for opposition repression and mechanisms to legitimize his rule.

Stroessner’s rule is known as a personalist dictatorship that was brought to power by the

military, however, the collective military did not rule Paraguay2. Instead, the military and the

Colorado party became the mainstays of Stroessner’s rule, collectively supporting the Stronato

(Stroessner Regime) in exchange for political subsistence and financial rewards. According to

Donald Richards, Paraguayan society under Stroessner’s rule exemplified what he calls a

predatory state, or a state in which the leadership is exercised not in the best interests of

society, but rather, in the interests of the ruling group. In this predatory state the identification

or creation of opportunities to harvest rents, such as natural resources, manipulating market

imperfections, and illegal trades, was used to purchase loyalty from various individuals or to

finance repressive apparatuses that operated to control potential opposition groups (as cited in

Wintrobe 1998)3. Under Stroessner’s rule the military became thoroughly involved in politics,

exemplified by the fact that until 1992 officers and officer cadets were required to be members

2 Sondrol, P. C. "The Paraguayan Military in Transition and the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations." Armed Forces & Society 19.1 (1992): 105-22. Print.3 Richards, Donald G. "Transition and Reform in a Predatory State: The Case of Paraguay." Journal of Economic Policy Reform 11.2 (2008): 101-14. Print.

of the Colorado Party, in which Stroessner retained overall control of promotions4. The

politicization of the Paraguayan military also occurred at a time when external security threats

were practically non-existent. Thus, an important control mechanism that was used to

incentivize the military’s loyalty to Stroessner was simply to employ them. This meant

reorienting the military’s missions away from traditional external defense and more towards

internal security and regime support, specifically stressing their role as anti-subversion agents5.

Although a key military mission under Stroessner was internal security, the Paraguayan military

forces were notorious for being relatively small and underequipped. For example, the

Paraguayan air force could only put into the skies eight Brazilian-built, propeller driven

counterinsurgency aircraft, constituting a force significantly smaller than what Brazil or

Argentina could bring about individually (as cited in Dept. of Defense 1988)6. The technical

inferiority of the Paraguayan military reflects the notion that the military’s internal security

mission during this time may have taken a back seat to supporting the regime and reinforcing

the legitimacy of the Colorado Party. Towards the end of Stroessner’s rule the highly politicized

Paraguayan military acted as a preventative mechanism for repression of autonomous groups

before they could gain sufficient support to directly challenge the government. The Stroessner

regime moved swiftly against opposition groups, arresting and exiling mass numbers of people,

and using torture and disappearances as a means of deterring dissension7. In 1986 the United

Nations cited Paraguay as the country in Latin America with the largest amount of un-4 Zagorski, P. W. "Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela: The Shape of Things to Come for Latin America?" Armed Forces & Society 30.1 (2003): 87-116. Print.5 Sondrol, P. C. "The Paraguayan Military in Transition and the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations." Armed Forces & Society 19.1 (1992): 105-22. Print.6 Zagorski, P. W. "Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela: The Shape of Things to Come for Latin America?" Armed Forces & Society 30.1 (2003): 87-116. Print.7 Sondrol, P. C. "The Paraguayan Military in Transition and the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations." Armed Forces & Society 19.1 (1992): 105-22. Print.

sentenced political prisoners8. Although the Paraguayan military was involved to some degree

in these anti-subversion tactics, Stroessner was able to shield the military from controversy by

emphasizing the role of Paraguay’s secret police in being the practitioners of arrests and

torture, which fell under the authority of the ministry of the interior, not defense9. The fact that

Stroessner was so willing to shield the Paraguayan military from controversy suggests that the

legitimacy of the military, combined with their perpetual loyalty to Stroessner, was central to

the survival of his dictatorship. The Paraguayan state, controlled by Stroessner, in unison with

the Colorado Party, and the Paraguayan Armed forces, collectively enabled Stroessner’s

personalist dictatorship to survive for over 34 years. However, as the once prominent dictator’s

health began to erode with age, questions of succession threatened the unification of both the

Colorado Party and the Military, eventually leading to a military coup that deposed Stroessner

and created an opening for democracy in Paraguay.

Transition to Democracy

On February 3rd 1989, General Andres Rodriguez deposed Stroessner, stating that the

reason why the Paraguayan armed forces left its barracks in contention of Stroessner’s rule

was, “to defend the dignity and honor of the Armed Forces, for the total and complete

unification of the Colorado Party in government, for the initiation of the democratization of

Paraguay, for respect for human rights, and for respect for our Christian, apostolic, Roman

8 Sondrol, P. C. "The Paraguayan Military in Transition and the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations." Armed Forces & Society 19.1 (1992): 105-22. Print.9 Sondrol, Paul C. "The Emerging New Politics of Liberalizing Paraguay: Sustained Civil-Military Control without Democracy." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 34.2 (1992): 127-63. JSTOR. Web. 20 Apr. 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/166031

Catholic religion” (as cited in FBIS 1989)10. While Rodriguez indicated his support for the

initiation of democracy in Paraguay, the people had little role in ending Stroessner’s rule,

suggesting that the coup was nothing more than a power play by Rodriguez to reestablish and

legitimize his influence11. The coup of 1989 significantly increased the political role of the

Paraguayan military, in which they assumed a moderator role, characterized by the oversight of

the systemic liberalization of Paraguayan society12.

The increased politicization of the Paraguayan military in the post-transition period,

which directly threated the consolidation of democracy, is most amply exemplified in the civil-

military crises that characterized the Wasmosy, Cubas, and Macchi presidencies. Leading up to

the 1993 Paraguayan presidential elections, the Colorado Party continued to diverge,

separating into different factions. One faction of the Colorado Party, led by Luis Argana, was

able to successfully construct a constitutional ban on the re-election of General Rodriguez,

which was met by the interference of the Paraguayan military, led by General Lino Oviedo, in

the vote counting process of the Colorado Party’s nomination convention13. In turn, the military

backed candidate, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, won the Colorado Party’s nomination, and eventually

went on to win the 1993 presidential election. The result of Wasmosy’s presidential victory

ensured a continual threat of military interference and intervention, and also exacerbated the

10 Sondrol, P. C. "The Paraguayan Military in Transition and the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations." Armed Forces & Society 19.1 (1992): 105-22. Print.

11 Zagorski, P. W. "Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela: The Shape of Things to Come for Latin America?" Armed Forces & Society 30.1 (2003): 87-116. Print.

12 Sondrol, P. C. "The Paraguayan Military in Transition and the Evolution of Civil-Military Relations." Armed Forces & Society 19.1 (1992): 105-22. Print.

13 Richards, Donald G. "Transition and Reform in a Predatory State: The Case of Paraguay." Journal of Economic Policy Reform 11.2 (2008): 101-14. Print.

divisions within the Colorado Party to the point that governing the country was nearly

impossible14.

Another crises that reflects the increased politicization of the Paraguayan military in the

post-transition period is the attempted coup by General Lino Oviedo in 1996. This coup attempt

came as a result to President Wasmosy’s efforts to reduce the influence of General Oviedo, who

had become increasingly powerful ever since Paraguay’s dubious transition to democracy.

When presented with the demand for his resignation, Oviedo denied this order and retreated

to a local garrison where he consolidated a force that applied pressure on the president15. In

the end, General Oviedo was captured and sentenced to ten years in prison, while his loyal

followers in the officer corps of the military were removed. The ability of the Wasmosy

government to successfully deter the power play of General Oviedo suggests an increased

capacity of the civilian authorities to check and control the power of the Paraguayan Armed

forces. However, the intensely corrupt political culture of Paraguay made prosecuting Oviedo

extremely difficult. In 1998, Raul Cubas won the presidential elections despite his close

relationship with Oviedo. Upon being elected president, Cubas issued a decree that negated

General Oviedo’s sentence, and purged the armed forces of officers who had supported

Wasmosy against Oviedo in the 1996 coup16. The situation that ensued could be described as a

cycle of power plays between the anti-Oviedo opposition and the Cubas regime, in which the

opposition, along with the Supreme Court, attempted on numerous occasions to annul the

14 Richards, Donald G. "Transition and Reform in a Predatory State: The Case of Paraguay." Journal of Economic Policy Reform 11.2 (2008): 101-14. Print.15 Zagorski, P. W. "Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela: The Shape of Things to Come for Latin America?" Armed Forces & Society 30.1 (2003): 87-116. Print.16 Zagorski, P. W. "Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela: The Shape of Things to Come for Latin America?" Armed Forces & Society 30.1 (2003): 87-116. Print.

president’s decree. However, each attempt was met by Cubas sending the trial to a military

court, in which the cases were subsequently dismissed. In March of 1999, Vice President Argana

was assassinated by unidentified assailants believed to be associated with Cubas and Oviedo17.

The assassination, combined with the declining economy, provoked public outcry and set the

stage for Cubas’s impeachment. Although Cubas was never officially impeached, his voluntary

resignation marked a significant victory for Paraguay’s delicate democracy.

In March of 1999, Luis Macchi, a Colorado Party member, succeeded to the office of

President following Cubas’s resignation. With Cubas out of the picture Macchi began picking up

the pieces of Paraguay’s damaged government. Macchi’s restoration efforts were

overshadowed in May of 2000, as former General Lino Oviedo, who had recently emerged from

hiding, attempted to overthrow president Macchi. According to witness accounts, Oviedo’s

coup attempt was a disaster in that many of his supporters abandoned his campaign at the last

minute, and those who remained accomplished little more than firing a couple tank shots at the

legislative palace before being scared off by the Paraguayan Air Force18. During the short-lived

battle, members of Macchi’s military were uncertain as to which tanks were theirs and which

belonged to Oviedo’s supporters19. This confusion reflects the notion that the

institutionalization of civilian control of the armed forces had not yet occurred in Paraguay20.

However, according to Samuel Fitch, one of the keys to establishing civil-military relations that

17 Zagorski, P. W. "Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela: The Shape of Things to Come for Latin America?" Armed Forces & Society 30.1 (2003): 87-116. Print.18 Carter, Miguel. "Paraguay: A Caudillo's Long Goodbye." NACLA Report On The Americas 34.1 (2000): 57. Academic Search Premier. Web. 20 Apr. 2014.19 Carter, Miguel. "Paraguay: A Caudillo's Long Goodbye." NACLA Report On The Americas 34.1 (2000): 57. Academic Search Premier. Web. 20 Apr. 2014.20 Zagorski, P. W. "Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela: The Shape of Things to Come for Latin America?" Armed Forces & Society 30.1 (2003): 87-116. Print.

conform to a democratic standard is that military personnel must be subject to the rule of law21.

Thus, the ability of the Paraguayan public to oust Oviedo and Cubas in 1999, and defend the

country against Oviedo’s coup attempt in 2000, reflects the increased adaptation of civil-

military relations in Paraguay towards a democratic standard.

In the post-transition period, Paraguay exhibited an increased effort to consolidate and

legitimize its delicate democracy. While elected civilian officials were in charge of running

Paraguay’s government, its military retained significant political influence, exemplified by

Oviedo’s coup attempts in 1996 and 2000, and the dual political interference by Cubas and

Oviedo in 1999. At specific points in Paraguay’s post transition period, such as the public

ousting of Cubas and Oviedo in 1999, civil-military relations exhibited signs of conforming to

democratic standards, however, during this time the Paraguayan military did not internalize a

traditional role belief, such as a constitutional role belief, or an arbiter role. Instead, the

Paraguayan military was more devoted to the pursuit of power and wealth via contraband

smuggling, stakes in private enterprises, and narcotics trafficking, which was all made possible

by its endless support for Paraguay’s hegemonic Colorado Party22. Thus, with the victory of

Fernando Lugo, a member of the Patriotic Alliance for Change party (APC), in the Paraguayan

presidential elections of 2008, the question becomes: “How have civil-military relations in

Paraguay changed as a result of the Colorado Party losing its grip on power?”

Post-Colorado Period

21 Fitch, John Samuel. "Contemporary Patterns of Civil-Military Relations." The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1998. 36-60. Print.22 Pion-Berlin, David. "Will Soldiers Follow? Economic Integration And Regional Security In The Southern Cone." Journal Of Interamerican Studies & World Affairs 42.1 (2000): 43. Academic Search Premier. Web. 20 Apr. 2014.

Fernando Lugo’s presidential victory marked the end of six decades of Colorado Party

rule in Paraguay, in which the government has alternated between authoritarian, transitional,

and democratic regimes, yet, the Colorado Party has always remained on top23. Lugo’s victory

can be accredited to his ability to accumulate massive support from Paraguay’s marginalized

groups through his commitment to progressive social, economic, and agrarian reforms, with the

latter being particularly important considering Paraguay’s highly unequal distribution of land24.

Initially, Lugo’s presidency was characterized by a feverous public sense of hope for the future,

however, as Lugo attempted to enact his promised reforms he was met with strong opposition

from legislators in the Colorado party, who controlled congress25. It is clear that during this time

the Colorado Party was in a vulnerable state because the proposed reforms by Fernando Lugo

directly threatened the established social system in which Paraguay’s elite class reaped the

benefits of social control, largely at the expense of the country’s impoverished majority. In

2009, president Lugo responded to allegations that high-ranking military officials and Colorado

Party members were plotting a coup against him by removing the leaders of the army, navy and

air force26. This situation bared a striking resemblance to the forced resignation of General Lino

Oviedo by President Wasmosy in 1996. However, in the latter case, Oviedo responded to this

call for his resignation by rounding up his supporters and attempting to overthrow the

president. Conversely, in the former case, the forced removal of the leaders of the Paraguayan

23 Abente-Brun, Diego. "PARAGUAY: THE UNRAVELING OF ONE-PARTY RULE." Journal of Democracy 20.1 (2009): 143-56.ProQuest. Web. 21 Apr. 201424 Lambert, Peter. "A New Era For Paraguay." NACLA Report On The Americas 41.4 (2008): 5-8. Academic Search Premier. Web. 20 Apr. 2014.

25 Barrionuevo, Alexei. "Paraguayan President Replaces Military Leadership." The New York Times. The New York Times, 05 Nov. 2009. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.

26 Barrionuevo, Alexei. "Paraguayan President Replaces Military Leadership." The New York Times. The New York Times, 05 Nov. 2009. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.

armed forces by president Lugo, while disputed, was accepted by these leaders who did not try

to gather support in their various branches and attempt to overthrown the president. According

to Samuel Fitch, one of the keys to establishing civil-military relations that conform to a

democratic standard is that the military must be politically subordinate to the democratic

regime27. Thus, the differences between these two situations suggests that in the post-Colorado

Party period, democratic consolidation of the Paraguayan armed forces was extended, and civil-

military relations in Paraguay changed substantially, further advancing toward a democratic

standard.

During Lugo’s presidency the Paraguayan military assumed a greater role with regards

to internal security measures, exemplified by the mobilization of military forces against the

Paraguayan People’s Army, a leftist insurgent group believed to be responsible for numerous

acts of violence. In both 2010 and 2011 president Lugo issued a state of exception, which

granted him increased power to deploy Paraguay’s military forces to dismantle the guerilla

insurgency28. Lugo’s increased control over Paraguay’s Armed Forces reflects the enormous

political pressure that he faced from opposition forces who were disillusioned by the lack of

social order in Paraguay during this time. This disillusionment culminated with Lugo’s

impeachment in June of 2012, in which both the Colorado Party and the Liberal Party turned

against the president, citing Article 225 of the 1992 Constitution, which allows impeachment in

cases of poor performance of duties29. Critics of Lugo’s impeachment described the situation as

27 Fitch, John Samuel. "Contemporary Patterns of Civil-Military Relations." The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1998. 36-60. Print.28 Stone, Hannah. "Paraguay Has Nothing to Show for State of Emergency, Again.” Organized Crime in the Americas. Organized Crime in the Americas, 9 Nov. 2011. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.

29 Marsteintredet, Leiv, Mariana Llanos, and Detlef Nolte. "Paraguay and the Politics of Impeachment." Journal of Democracy 24.4 (2013): 110-23. Print.

a “parliamentary coup”, in which Lugo, who controlled no party of his own, became a victim of

the machine politics that has characterized Paraguay’s political culture since the times of

personalist dictator, Alfredo Stroessner30. Although Lugo’s impeachment was technically legal,

the motivations behind his removal from office were political in nature and not grounded on

any real instances of Lugo poorly performing his duties as President. Following Lugo’s

impeachment several South American countries condemned the Paraguayan Congress,

equating the impeachment to an institutional coup, and temporarily suspended Paraguay from

the MERCOSUR trade agreement for having violated their democracy clause31. The lack of

military participation in this institutional coup suggests that the Paraguayan military was less

involved in politics during this time, signifying an increased institutionalization of civilian control

over the Armed Forces. However, the feverous sense of optimism that once encapsulated the

Paraguayan public had been deflated, marking a reversal of previous advances made towards

consolidating Paraguay’s delicate democracy.

Horacio Cartes

In April of 2013, tobacco mogul Horacio Cartes, won the Paraguayan presidential

elections in a decided victory that returned the presidency to the hegemonic Colorado Party. A

week after being sworn in as president, the Paraguayan Senate passed reforms to the National

Defense Law that grant enormous control of the military to the president’s office, allowing

Cartes to deploy soldiers anywhere in the country with relative ease, and without the approval

30 HETHERINGTON, KREGG. "Paraguay's Ongoing Struggle Over Land And Democracy." NACLA Report On The Americas 45.3 (2012): 8-10. Academic Search Premier. Web. 20 Apr. 2014.31 Marsteintredet, Leiv, Mariana Llanos, and Detlef Nolte. "Paraguay and the Politics of Impeachment." Journal of Democracy 24.4 (2013): 110-23. Print.

of the legislative body32. These reforms to the Paraguayan National Defense Law came as a

result of increased violence on the part of the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP). Although the

leftist EPP insurgency had been increasingly active during this time, the group constituted a

meager threat to social order, and was rumored to have less than 100 fighters33. During this

time the most crucial threat to Paraguay’s delicate democracy was drug trafficking, institutional

corruption, contraband smuggling, and organized crime groups, all of which could be traced

back to the “Triple Frontier” area along the converging borders of Argentina, Brazil, and

Paraguay34. According to Jeffrey Robinson the epicenter of the Tri-Border Area is the

Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este, described as, “The anus of the earth is cut into the jungle on

the Paraguay side of the Parana River—a home-away-from-home for the South American drug

cartels, Chinese Triads, Japanese Yakuza, Italian gangsters, Russian gangsters, Nigerian

gangsters and Hezbollah terrorists—and is called Ciudad del Este. . . . A city of 200,000 hustlers,

whores, hoodlums, revolutionaries, thugs, drug traffickers, drug addicts, murderers, racketeers,

pirates, mobsters, extortionists, smugglers, hitmen, pimps and wannabes” (as cited in Robinson

1999)35. To a large degree, this lawless region existed, and continues to exist, because of the

corrupt political and military officials who are financially invested in the survival of this system.

Thus, the fact that president Cartes chose to use his increased control over the Paraguayan

military to target and dismantle a small leftist guerilla group over using this force to clean up

32 Bargent, James. "Paraguay Grants President Sweeping Military Powers.” Organized Crime in the Americas. Organized Crime in the Americas, 23 Aug. 2013. Web. 24 Apr. 2014.33 Bargent, James. "Paraguay Grants President Sweeping Military Powers.” Organized Crime in the Americas. Organized Crime in the Americas, 23 Aug. 2013. Web. 24 Apr. 2014.34 Sverdlick, Ana R. "Terrorists and Organized Crime Entrepreneurs in the “triple Frontier” among Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay." Trends in Organized Crime 9.2 (2005): 84-93. Print.

35 Sverdlick, Ana R. "Terrorists and Organized Crime Entrepreneurs in the “triple Frontier” among Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay." Trends in Organized Crime 9.2 (2005): 84-93. Print.

the lawless Tri-Border Area, suggests that president Cartes is either completely oblivious to the

internal problems facing Paraguay, or the president is simply using this area as a means to buy

the patronage of political and military officials in order to solidify his control over Paraguayan

society. The consolidation of the Colorado Party, the Paraguayan Military, and the State under

president Cartes undoubtedly resembles the structure of Alfredo Stroessner’s dictatorship, just

in a slightly more democratic context. In an elite-dominated country such as Paraguay, the

military, much as it always has, constitutes a tool used by politically powerful individuals to

reinforce and legitimize their control over society, in which the elite benefit at the expense of

the poor majority. Therefore, the current pattern of civil-military relations in Paraguay is

characterized by this inability of the Paraguayan military to internalize a role belief that seeks to

bring about any positive changes to Paraguay’s feeble political culture, choosing instead to stay

in the background, silently supporting and participating in the same corrupt social system that

granted them this elite status.

Comparative Analysis

In June of 2009, Honduran president Manuel Zelaya and his government were deposed

in a military coup that was directly connected to the disillusionment of Honduras’s powerful

elite class with Zelaya’s populist tendencies36. Throughout his presidency Zelaya embarked on a

continuous shift towards more left-leaning, populist policies, such as an increased minimum

wage, lower interest rates on home loans, and increased public participation in government

activities, with the latter being seen as the primary pretext for the coup37. These populist

36 Joyce, Rosemary A. "Legitimizing The Illegitimate: The Honduran Show Elections And The Challenge Ahead. (Cover Story)." NACLA Report On The Americas 43.2 (2010): 10-17. Academic Search Premier. Web. 25 Apr. 2014.37 Joyce, Rosemary A. "Legitimizing The Illegitimate: The Honduran Show Elections And The Challenge Ahead. (Cover Story)." NACLA Report On The Americas 43.2 (2010): 10-17. Academic Search Premier. Web. 25 Apr. 2014.

tendencies were perceived by Honduras’s elite class as a direct threat to their powerful status,

and in partnership with the military, decided that in order to preserve their elite status they

must overthrow the president. Following the coup, the de facto government ushered in a

period of public repression in Honduras, characterized by the suspension of constitutional

rights, government control over the media, police and military brutality, and repression of

groups that opposed the coup38. The 2009 Honduran coup is similar to the impeachment of

president Lugo in that both cases reflect a concerted effort by the elite class in each country to

protect their powerful social and political status. Both Honduras and Paraguay have historically

retained a small unified elite class of individuals that use their connections to the military and

powerful political parties, such as the Colorado Party in Paraguay, and the Liberal Party in

Honduras, to influence the political culture in their respective countries, allowing for the

fortification of their elite status. While the similarities between these two situations are

obvious, the primary difference between them relates to the participation of the military in

each case. With regards to Lugo’s impeachment in 2012, the Paraguayan military sat in the

background as Paraguay’s elite driven politicians effectively used the political process to

overthrow Lugo. Conversely, in the Honduran cases, the military was the primary vehicle for the

elite class to overthrow Zelaya. Thus, in Honduras, the presence and relative strength of

opposition groups would have made it incredibly difficult for the elite class to depose president

Zelaya without the participation of the military. However, in Paraguay, the presumed legality of

Lugo’s impeachment, along with the non-participation of Paraguay’s military, suggests that the

38 Joyce, Rosemary A. "Legitimizing The Illegitimate: The Honduran Show Elections And The Challenge Ahead. (Cover Story)." NACLA Report On The Americas 43.2 (2010): 10-17. Academic Search Premier. Web. 25 Apr. 2014.

political culture in Paraguay is structured in such a way that regardless of the strength of

opposition groups, the elite class is universally in control.