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Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza www.influenzacentre.org The Melbourne WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza is supported by the Australian Government Department of Health

Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

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Page 1: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza

Ian BarrDeputy Director

WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza

www.influenzacentre.org

The Melbourne WHO Collaborating Centrefor Reference and Research on Influenza issupported by the Australian GovernmentDepartment of Health

Page 3: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Influenza EcologyType A Type B

?

? ? ?

?

?

? ? ?

?

?

Type C Type D

18 subtypesWide host rangeWild water birds natural host

2 lineages“Human” virus

No subtypesLimited hostsMild disease

No subtypesLimited hosts?infect man

Page 4: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

The influenza virus

Electron micrograph

100nm

Schematic

Note: Influenza viruses-Have a segmented genome (8 seg., 13Kb)Coding for approx. 12 proteinsNo proof-reading during replication – 1 error each new virion made

2 major surface glycoproteinsHaemagglutnin (HA), Neuraminidase (NA)

HA

NA

Page 5: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Influenza A is a zoonotic disease with many possible hosts

Central host are Water fowl eg. ducks, 16 Influenza A HA subtypes; most infections occur in GI tract and do not affect birds health, 2 subtypes in bats

H17/H18 in bats!

?

(Tong S. 2012, 2013)

Page 6: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Poultry Densities(20 billion chickens)

Swine Densities (1 billion)

Page 7: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Birds travel on the wing and on bike!

Page 9: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

H5Nx HPAI

H7N9 LPAI

Avian influenza outbreaks in birds reported to FAO 2014-2016

http://empres-i.fao.org/eipws3g/#h=0 Generated by: Ahmed Al-Naqshbandi, Animal Production and Health Division-Animal Health Service, FAO

Page 10: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

There has been no shortage of unusual influenza viruses infecting humans in recent years!

April 1 2013

H7N9

Page 11: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

There has been no shortage of unusual influenza viruses infecting humans in recent years!

June 22 2013

H6N1

Page 12: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

There has been no shortage of unusual influenza viruses infecting humans in recent years!

June 27 2013

H3N2v

Page 13: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

There has been no shortage of unusual influenza viruses infecting humans in recent years!

Dec 18 2013

H10N8

Page 14: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

There has been no shortage of unusual influenza viruses infecting humans in recent years!

Dec 30 2013

H9N2

Page 15: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

There has been no shortage of unusual influenza viruses infecting humans in recent years!

Jan 8 2014

H5N1

Page 16: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

There has been no shortage of unusual influenza viruses infecting humans in recent years!

May 9 2014

H5N6

Page 17: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

There has been no shortage of unusual influenza viruses infecting humans in recent years!

May 2016

HPAI H7N9

Page 18: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

There has been no shortage of unusual influenza viruses infecting humans in recent years!

Dec 2017

H7N4

Page 19: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Outcomes from these zoonotic infections

• Outcomes from H5N1 human cases

– Since 2003; 860 cases detected, 454 deaths; HFR 53%

– But in 2017; 4 cases with 2 deaths; 2018 (up to March) 0 cases

• Outcomes from H7N9 (Chinese) human cases

– Since 2013 a total of 1565 cases with 620 deaths (HFR 39%)

– 5th wave 2016-7 766 cases (incl. HPAI); 6th wave 2017-8 only 3 cases reported, ?deaths

• Outcomes from other isolated human avian influenza infections– H6N1, single case, hospitalized, recovered, no evidence of person-person transmission

– H10N8, 3 cases, 2 deaths, no evidence of transmission

– H9N2, several cases, few hospitalized, recovered, no evidence of person-person transmission

– H5N6, 17 cases (1 in 2017) – all in China, 11 deaths, no evidence of person-person transmission

• Outcomes from other isolated human swine (variant) influenza infections– In US 468 cases since 2005, small number of hospitalizations and 1 death

– Other isolated human cases in several countries eg. Switzerland 2017; mild disease

Page 20: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Clinical syndromes in human infections of novel subtypes of influenza A viruses

Uyeki T et al. Lancet 2017

Avian source Swine source

Page 21: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

U.S. Human nfections withVariant swine influenza Viruses by State (since December 2005)

Reporting State

H3N2v H1N1v H1N2vTotal

Detected

Arkansas 2

Colorado 1

Delaware 1

Hawaii 1

Illinois 5 1

Indiana 154

Iowa 7 5 1

Kansas 1

Maine 2

Maryland 51

Michigan 23 1

Minnesota 9 4 6

Missouri 2

Nebraska 1

New Jersey 1

North Dakota 1

Ohio 131 3 3

Pennsylvania 17

South Dakota 1

Texas 1 1

Utah 1

West Virginia 5

Wisconsin 22 2 1

Total 434**(93%) 21 (5%) 13 (2%) 468

US Swine density 2016

OhioIndiana

Iowa

**The majority of H3N2v human cases occurred in 2012 with 309 lab confirmed cases (71% H3N2v cases); with 16 hospitalizations and 1 death

Page 22: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Age dependent serum antibody levels to A/Minnesota/11/2010 H3N2v of Australians by MN titre (sera sampled end 2011)

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

0-5yo 6-10yo 11-15yo 18-24yo 25-34yo 35-44yo 45-54yo 55-64yo >65yo

Age group

pro

po

rtio

n o

f to

tal

>40

>80

>160

>320

>640

>1280

Data generated by Karen Laurie @ WHO CC Melbourne

HI titre

Page 23: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Swine influenza in Australia

Virus subtype

SourceGene Segment

PB2 PB1 PA HA NP NA MP NS

H1N2* WA pigs

H3N2* WA pigs

H1N2* Qld pigs

H1N2 Qld pigs

H1N1pdm Qld pigs

H1N1pdm (post 2009 Human H1N1 (~1983-96) Human H3N2 (~1970-2003)

Apart from incidental H1N1pdm infections, Australian swine thought to be influenza free2 outbreaks detected in July/August 2012 in pigs in Western Australia and Queensland

Virus isolation and sequencing work performed with CSIRO, AAHL, Geelong

Page 24: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Ferret contact transmission model

❖ Infect donors intranasally

❖ 24 hr’s post infection, naïve ferret is placed in the same cage

❖ Transmission from donor to recipient ferret measured (RT-PCR + TCID50)

❖ Actually a combination between contact/aerosol transmission

Work performed by Chantal Baas

•Hurt et al, 2010 J Virol 84(18): 9427-9438

• Laurie et al, 2010 J Infect Dis 202(7):1011-1020

24 hr

+

D

R DR

Page 25: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Australian swine H1 & H3 viruses readily transmit & replicate in ferret contact model (C. Baas)

A(H1) viruses A(H3) viruses

Conclusion: Both the Australian H1N2v and the H3N2v were capable of close contact transmission in ferrets and probably ?humans

Page 26: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Can we learn from past influenza pandemics?

A(H1N1)

1918: “Spanish Flu”

40 to 50 million deaths

CFR 2-3%

Original source: ?

A(H2N2)

1957: “Asian Flu”

1 to 4 million deaths

CFR <0.2%

Original source: ?

A(H3N2)

1968: “Hong Kong Flu”

1 to 4 million deaths

CFR <0.2%

Original source: ?

A(H1N1)swl

2009: “Swine Flu”

<0.1 million deaths

CFR <0.005%

Original source: swine?

1977Re-emergence

of A(H1N1)

Page 27: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

How did the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 arise?No swine H1N1pdm09 virus; phylogenetic reconstruction only!

H3N2USA Triple Reassortant

USA H1N2

?Eurasian H3N2 / H1N1

H1

M, N1

PB1,2,PA,NP,NS

H1N1pdmAdapted from Smith et al. 2009

H3,N2,PB1

M,NP,NS

PB2, PA

Page 28: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

IRAT (CDC) and TIPRA (WHO)

• IRAT (Influenza Risk Assessment Tool) for pandemic preparedness– Developed by US CDC (began 18-19 October 2011)

– CANNOT predict a future pandemic

– Intended to prioritize and maximize investments in pandemic preparedness by helping to determine which novel (new) influenza viruses to develop vaccines

– Identify key gaps in information and knowledge which can be the basis to prompt additional studies

– Document in a transparent manner the data and scientific process used to inform management decisions associated with pandemic preparedness

– Provide a flexible means to easily and regularly update the risk assessment of novel influenza viruses as new information becomes available

– Be an effective communications tool for policy makers/influenza community

– Be a measure (by using 10 scientific criteria) of the ability of an influenza virus to “emerge” as a pandemic capable virus (i.e., become capable of efficient human-to-human spread) or “impact” the human population if it did emerge

Page 29: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

The 10 evaluation criteria of IRATProperties of the Virus

1. Genomic variation is a measure of the extent of genetic diversity or presence of known molecular signatures important for human infections and disease.

2. Receptor binding refers to the host preference (e.g., animal or human) of an influenza virus as well as the types of tissues and cells the virus is best suited to infecting (e.g., nose tissue and cells vs. deep lung tissue and cells

3. Transmission in lab animals is a measure of the ability of an influenza virus to transmit efficiently in animals in laboratory studies (transmit through the air via small infectious droplets /direct contact with an infected host)

4. Antiviral treatment susceptibility/resistance is a measure of how well an influenza virus responds to treatment with influenza antiviral drugs, such as oseltamivir, zanamivir and M2 blockers.

Attributes of the Population

5. Existing population immunity does the human population has any existing immune protection against the novel influenza virus being evaluated. Susceptibility/severity may depend on age, geographic area, or genetic factors

6. Disease severity and pathogenesis measures the severity of illness caused by a particular influenza virus in people and/or animals.

7. Antigenic relationship to vaccine candidates is a measure of how similar a novel influenza virus is when compared to a current or previously manufactured influenza vaccine strain.

Ecology and Epidemiology

8. Global distribution (animals) measures of how widespread an influenza virus is in animals. For example, is the virus found in animals in a limited area or is it found in animals from many different areas?

9. Infection in animal species refers to what kinds of animals are impacted by the influenza virus and the likelihood of human contact with these animals. For example, are influenza infections occurring in wild birds or domestic birds?

10. Human Infections are human infections with a novel influenza virus are occurring. If so, how? Eg Has human-to-human transmission or clusters of disease occurred? or how frequently/easily does transmission occur after direct/prolonged contact between humans/ infected animals?

Page 30: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Information on H7N4 case provided by CNIC on 15.2.2018(original H7N4 diagnosis by Jiangsu Provincial CDC)

58y female farmer from Jiangsu province, developed cough on 25/12/2017, local clinic 27/12/2017, County level hospital 30/12/2017, ICU city hospital 1/1/2018 (severe pneumonia), Discharged 22/1/2018

Page 31: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Next……

Influenza subject matter experts evaluate novel influenza viruses based on each of these 10 criteria “low risk” scored 1-10; 1-3; “moderate risk” scored 4-7; “high risk” scored 8-10 then elements multiplied by set weightings for BOTH “Emergence” and “Impact” then graphed.

Page 32: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

And the output

https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/monitoring/irat-virus-summaries.htm

Page 33: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

WHO CC’s/ERL makes seed viruses against the most prevalent/concerning/different viruses currently circulating

http://www.who.int/influenza/vaccines/virus/201802_zoonotic_vaccinevirusupdate.pdf?ua=1

H7N9H5Nx

H9

H7Nx

Page 34: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Global interconnectivity in 21st Century – airline routes

BMJ. 2010 May 21;340:c2424. doi: 10.1136/bmj.c2424.Transmission of pandemic A/H1N1 2009 influenza on passenger aircraft: retrospective cohort study.Baker MG, Thornley CN, Mills C, Roberts S, Perera S, Peters J, Kelso A, Barr I, Wilson N.

Swine H1N1 human pandemic in 2009

Page 35: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Summary

• The source and subtype of the next pandemic influenza virus is unknown

• At this point in time:– H5Nx viruses are still prevalent in wild birds, less so in poultry, even less so in humans

– H7N9 viruses in man and poultry in China are vastly reduced in 2017-8 vs 2016-7

– Swine viruses (eg H1N1v, H1N2v, H3N2v) cases persist in USA (+ elsewhere) but reduced

• But……– Avian influenza viruses are still quite prevalent

– Avian surveillance (especially poultry) is heavily focused on HPAI viruses

– Influenza surveillance in swine is very limited (USA/Europe)

– Extensive reassorting of viruses occurs at all interfaces b/w av/av, sw/sw, av/sw, sw/human

– A small number of amino acid changes (HA/NA/PB2) can change transmission efficiency

• Evaluation tools, animal models and NGS give us insights into novel viruses– CDC IRAT and WHO TIPRA “rank” potential pandemic viruses by “emergence” & “severity”

– WHO has a bank of seed viruses prepared that can be rapidly used for vaccine production

– WHO has developed a series of processes for use in a pandemic eg PISA, PIRM etc.

• Need to remain flexible– May get another 2009 pandemic (mild) or a more severe pandemic (1968, moderate)

– Source wont matter once the pandemic occurs but can try to reduce current potential sources

Page 36: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference

Updated and new WHO pandemic documents

May 2017

Jan 2018

Mar 2018

Mar 2017 May 2017

Page 37: Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal …...Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza Ian Barr Deputy Director WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference