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Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

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Page 1: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures

Bronius CikotasJohn Kappenman

Page 2: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

An Overview of Space Weather & EMP Risks and the US Electric Power Infrastructure

Comparing Space Weather Threat to Other Power System Threats

High Winds & Ice Loading – Design Code

Lightning – Shield Wires & Lightning Arresters

Seismic – Design Code

Continuously monitor and base operational decisions on Terrestrial weather conditions

Severe Threats are geographically confined

Storm DevelopmentElectromagnetic Processes nearly Instantaneous

Conventional Terrestrial Threats Geomagnetic Storm Threats

Geographic ExtentPlanetary Scale - Impact at each station – with Large Cumulative Impact

Industry Design ApproachDesign Evolutions have unknowingly Escalated GIC Risks and Potential Impacts

Un-Recognized Systemic Risk – No Design Code Yet to minimize this Threat

Terrestrial Weather – Air mass related that can take many days to evolve - Hurricanes

Page 3: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

• Hardening the Power Grid for Naturally Occurring Geomagnetic Storms also Hardens against slow pulse or E3 portion of EMP

• Hardening the Power Grid for Fast Pulse or E1 portion of EMP Threat also diminishes Threat from RF Weapon Attacks (IEMI)

• Proximity Control – important for Physical Attacks also diminishes Threat from IEMI

• Layered Mitigation Approach for both Geomagnetic Storms and EMP– Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and is

readily available(Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels instead of ambiguous K Indices)

– Hardening - Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing Storm-Related Catastrophic Failure - Remedial Design measures for the Grid (transformer neutral devices) are readily feasible and cost effective

Common Solution Approaches - Overview

Page 4: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

•Given Sufficient Time the Reoccurrence of Large Storm Event is a Certainty – with Significant Consequences for Society

•Power Grid has not been designed for Terror or War Fighting Mission, but it does provide an attractive and asymmetric target.

• Proliferation of Nuclear Materials & Designs is a reality• Non-Nuclear Device Options are readily available & growing

in unchecked capability

•Methods for Hardening Infrastructures are known and readily available – not a Technology Push

•International Standards & Guidelines exist for Hardening against EMP and IEMI Threats

Common Solution Approaches - Overview

Page 5: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

GIC Blocking

Capacitor

Hi-Speed ByPass

Electron Tube is Critical High Speed / High Current Technology

• Blocking Devices will Protect Transformers and Grid from Damage

• Devices were originally developed in early 1990’s • At Present Only Limited Numbers of Devices are installed• Wide-Spread Installation Needed to Reduce GIC Flows• Appropriate & Robust Design will work to Block GIC from

Storms and EMP• Can be easily applied Remedially to Today’s Power Grids

Common Solution Approaches – GIC Blocking

Page 6: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

Improved Situational AwarenessView of Storm Environment - May 4, 1998

Synoptic Condition Map provides Ability for End-Users to Quickly make Situational Assessments

Provides Details on Impacted Region to

End-Users

Page 7: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

1 9 9 8 / 0 5 / 0 4 0 4 : 1 6 : 0 0 . 0 0 0

Transformer GICRed & Green Indicate

Polarity of GIC – Red Into Transformer, Green Out of

Transformer

Geo-Electric Field Orientation and Size of Vector

Indicate Relative Direction and Intensity of Field

Improved Situational AwarenessStorm and GIC Flows in New England

Power Grid State Estimation at 4:16 UT May 4, 1998

Page 8: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

Improved Situational AwarenessOther Critical Infrastructures

• Improved Situational Awareness – End Users of Electric Power with Critical Functions

• Examples are various IT, Telecommunications, SCADA centers

• Critical Systems which have UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) and Back-Up Generation Capability

• “Island or Disconnect from the Grid” for extra protection

• UPS’s general vulnerabilities to Harmonic Distortion due to Geomagnetic Storms (from Defense Dept work)

Page 9: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

• Shielding Structures• Filtering• Zoning or Nesting of Multiple Barriers

Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening

Page 10: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

Concept of Layered Mitigation

Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening

Page 11: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

Cable Management•Power cables•Data communications (e.g. IT networks)•Auxiliary circuits (e.g. door openers, fire alarm)•Sensitive circuits

Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening

Widespread migration to Fiber Optic-based Data and Signal Cabling is an important improvement in Robust

Hardening for E1 & IEMI Threats

Page 12: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

4138 Bi-tron™Series Configuration

Example of Bulkhead Device for EMP Protection for Power Supply to Secure Facility

13.8kV Power In

13.8kV Power

Out

Flange Provides secure grounding of power feed penetrations at Facility

Wall Perimeter

Page 13: Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

New Advanced Fusion Systems technology

significantly improves Protection margin compared to MOV

MOV – much slower

Time Scale of EMP Protection