Ontology of the multiple The opening gesture of Being and Event literally turns the history of ontology - which, from Parmenides on, holds that what is is one and what is there (or is presented) is multiple - on its head. Considering the famous theses on the one and the multiple in the Parmenides, Badiou, in a philosophical tour de force, argues that the true Platonic assertion is not "if the one is not, nothing is", but rather "if the one is not, (the) nothing is" (BE 36).3 At base this means that, if there is no ultimate consistency or unity to being ("if the one is not") - this being for Badiou the necessary precondition for any truly non-theological ontology4 - then being must be that which "in-consists" ("the nothing is"). In fact, this is the very kernel of Badiou's "subtractive" ontology: that which is one (or is "consistent") is not, strictly speaking, what is. Rather, what is per se is multiple (devoid of any instance of the one, radically withdrawn from all possible unification). Which is finally to say that being, thought in its very being (the "being-ness" of being, or being qua being), is nothing other than inconsistent multiplicity. This is why Badiou holds that ontology is the science of the pure multiple.5 While the one is not, there is nevertheless an "effect" of one-ness, which is necessarily posterior to the pure multiple. The fundamentally of this point cannot be overlooked: pure multiplicity is for Badiou anterior to the one; inconsistency precedes consistency.6 Now, in so far as that which is consistent is clearly one and the same as that which is presented of being, we must conclude that the retroactive "oneification" of pure multiplicity (or the rendering consistent of inconsistency) is nothing other than the presentation of multiplicity as such. Indeed, this fact would appear self-evident given that in everyday life what is presented or brought to experience is in one way or another unified: simply, our experiences are of the one, and in no way of the 49
Ontology of the multipleThe opening gesture of Being and Event
literally turns the history ofontology - which, from Parmenides on,
holds that what is is one andwhat is there (or is presented) is
multiple - on its head. Consideringthe famous theses on the one and
the multiple in the Parmenides,Badiou, in a philosophical tour de
force, argues that the true Platonicassertion is not "if the one is
not, nothing is", but rather "if the one isnot, (the) nothing is"
(BE 36).3 At base this means that, if there is noultimate
consistency or unity to being ("if the one is not") - this beingfor
Badiou the necessary precondition for any truly
non-theologicalontology4 - then being must be that which
"in-consists" ("the nothingis"). In fact, this is the very kernel
of Badiou's "subtractive" ontology:that which is one (or is
"consistent") is not, strictly speaking, what is.Rather, what is
per se is multiple (devoid of any instance of the one,radically
withdrawn from all possible unification). Which is finally tosay
that being, thought in its very being (the "being-ness" of being,
orbeing qua being), is nothing other than inconsistent
multiplicity. Thisis why Badiou holds that ontology is the science
of the pure multiple.5While the one is not, there is nevertheless
an "effect" of one-ness,which is necessarily posterior to the pure
multiple. The fundamentallyof this point cannot be overlooked: pure
multiplicity is for Badiouanterior to the one; inconsistency
precedes consistency.6 Now, in sofar as that which is consistent is
clearly one and the same as that whichis presented of being, we
must conclude that the retroactive "oneification"of pure
multiplicity (or the rendering consistent of inconsistency)is
nothing other than the presentation of multiplicity as such.Indeed,
this fact would appear self-evident given that in everyday lifewhat
is presented or brought to experience is in one way or
anotherunified: simply, our experiences are of the one, and in no
way of the49
