On the Status of Equality

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On the Status of EqualityAuthor(s): Amartya SenSource: Political Theory, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), pp. 394-400Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191919 .

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ON THE STATUS OF EQUALITY

AMARTYAEN

HarvardUniversity

1. INTRODUCTION

The belief thatthere s a close connectionbetweenequalityand ustice is

quite common. Since justice is a quintessentiallyethical idea, thatlinkage

clearly must have some ethical status.But what is the basis of this status9

On this subject, presumptionsdiverge-explicitly or by implication-even

amongthosewhofirmlyassociateequalitywith ustice.Some see thelinkageto be mainly political;others take it to be more than that-perhaps even

logically necessary.Thisdistinction s notunimportantince politicalperspi-cuitywouldhave to becontingentonthe ideasandcommitmentsof thepeople

involved, whereaslogical necessity must be independentof that. I want todiscuss the difference between the two approaches-the political and the

logical-and toexaminebrefly therespectivedomainsof analytical elations

andpolitical contingencies n connectingequalitywithjustice.The immediateoccasionfor thisexanunations an interestingandimpor-

tantpaperbyJohnKane, nwhichhedisputes heviewthat here sanylogicalconnectionbetweenjustice andequality.'Kane is not alone to have ques-tionedthepresumed ogical link,and this makesit all themoreimportanto

addressKane'scogent reasoning. argue hatKane s partlynght,buthedoes

notgive theanalyticalrelations hedueacknowledgement hateven his ownline of reasoningwouldrequire.

However,before I proceedfurther, must commenton an ambiguity-

perhaps even an error-in Kane's interpretationof my own position in

InequalityReexamined,on this subject.2This is important o do notjust to

set the recordstraight,butalso becausethe substantivepositionI shallargue

AUTHOR'SNOTE:For helpfuldiscussionon the issues in thisarticle, I am gratefulto Sudhir

Anand,JohnRawls,and ThomasScanlon.Thanks re also due to the MacArthurFoundationfor

researchsupport.

POLITICALHEORY,ol.24No.3,August 996394-400? 1996SagePublicatons,nc.

394



Sen/ ON THE STATUSOF EQUALITY 395

for is a developmentof whatI hadproposed n thatmonograph. n thissense,

the next section hasbotha correctiveanda constructivepurpose.Inthe latersections,I proceedto distinguishbetweentherespectivedomainsof analyti-cal relations and political contingencies,and also to comment on Kane's

substantivearguments.

2. POLITICAL LAUSIBILITYNDBASALEQUALITY

Kanenotes that thepresumption

f somenecessary

connection between

the ideas of justice andequalityis endemic as Sen andI bothbelieve.

Buthe also contends-suggesting strongly hatthere s adivergencebetween

our views here-that sucha presumptions in fact mistaken. 3 hadnot, in

fact, claimed that one mustpresume that there is a necessary connection

between usticeandequality.Rather, hadnotedthat everynormative heoryof social arrangementhathas at all stood the test of time seems to demand

equalityof something-something thatis regardedas particularlymportantin thattheory p. 12). I did tryto clarifywhatexactly I was claiming:

We may be persuadedthat the basic disputationsare likely to be about equalityof

what? ,butit mightstill be asked whether hereneedbe a demandforequality n some

importantspace or other. Even if it turnsout thatevery substantivetheoryof social

arrangementsn vogue is, in fact, egalitaran in some space-a spaceseen as central n

thattheory-there is still the needto explainanddefendthatgeneralcharactenzationn

each case. The issue to addressis not so muchwhether there mustbefor strctly

formal reason(such as thedisciplineof the anguageof morals ),equalconsideration

for all, at some level, in all ethical theories of social arrangement. I am more

concernedwith the question whetherethical theories must have this basic featureof

equalityto have substantiveplausibility n theworldInwhich we live.4

In theformalstructure hadtried odevelop,equalityof sometype-whatwas called basalequality -is sought neach suchsubstantive thicaltheoryby arguing or(orbysimply assuming) hepnmacyof somespace-incomes,utilities, libertariannghts, and so forth, in the respectiveactual ideas of

justice. The endorsementof the importanceof equalityin thatcentralspace(i.e., basalequality)thenyields the need to acceptinequality n otherspaces,since thesedifferentequalitiescouldnotbesimultaneouslyguaranteed.The

extensive diversities of humanbeings-a majortheme of my book-makesthe congruenceof equalitiesin thedifferentspaces extremelyunlikely.)For

example, those who seek equalityof incomes cannotalso demandequalityof libertarianrghts of ownership,transactions,and bequeathal-and vice



396 POLITICALTHEORY August1996

versa. Equalityn what s seenasthe 'base' s invoked orareasoneddefence

of theresulting nequalities n thefar-flung periphenes.'5

I had notclaimedthat twould belogicallyimpossibletoconstructamoral

theory that would not demandequality in any space whatsoever,nor in

particularattachany importance o equalityin some space that is seen as

central o thatmoraltheory.But in confiningmy attention o theclass of

theoriesthat do value equalityin some space,I did emphasizethe politicalforceof having equalconcernfor all at some level -a level that s seen as

quite centralin thattheory(e.g., incomes for Income-egalitanans, iberties

for libertarians, nd so on).6Political diversities of ourbeliefs permitsome

variation n the choice of space in whichequalityis to be basally valued,buttheydo noteasily accommodate ejecting he need for equality n every

possible space. I did try to readsome significancein the fact that everynormative heoryof social arrangementhat has at all stood the test of time

seems to demand equality of something-something that is regardedas

particularlymportantn thattheory, butthereadingwas primarilypolitical

(withoutanyclaimbeingmadethatthingscould nothave beenotherwise,or

that merelogic wouldmake this testof time analytically nescapable).To seize the structureof this

argument,t is useful to note thatI was not

only acknowledgingthe practical orce of the demandsof equalityin some

chosen space that is seen as central,but also-the other side of the same

coin-the corresponding eed toaccept(and, n termsof consistency,contin-

gently require) nequality n otherspacesthatareseen as less central.There

is no necessity in all this of disputingKane's claim that justicerequiresdifferentthingsin differentcircumstances,and no a pnon judgmentsas to

equalityor inequalityof treatmentarejustifiable (p. 389). Indeed,even as

far as basalequality s concerned, heargumentmustsurelygo wellbeyond

the a priori,andwell beyondthe acceptanceof the need to seek equalityinsomespace.Substantivearguments aveto bepresentedas towhyaparticular

space rather hananothershouldbe seen as central n thatethicalcontext.7

3. ARISTOTELIANROPORTIONALITY

While the need to have substantiveargumentsgoing beyondtheform of

equalityis not a bone of contentionbetweenus, Kanedoes, in fact, offera

differently ormalizedview ofjustice, related o theAristoteliandoctrne of

proportionality.He contrasts his formalprnciple withthe ruleof equality

in some space, in outliningwhathe believes the basic conceptionof justice

to be:



Sen / ON THESTATUSOF EQUALITY 397

The pnnclple uponwhich such rghts, penalties,or dutiesaretraditionally alculated s

the Anstotelianpnnciple of proportionality:he more one has of a certainpropertyX,

the more one deserves of whatever reatmentY is relevant o it. (p. 378)

I had, in fact,brieflydiscussedthisprnciple, in termsof particularuses, in

InequalityReexamined pp. 90-2), treating t as a type of equalityof treat-

ment. Since Kane sees equality and proportionalityas two contradictoryformalprinciples, it is worthdiscussing in what sense they are or are not

reallycontrary.In fact, a kind of formalequality,with well-defined analyticalrequire-

ments,is

implied by anyrule

ofthe

typeofthe

proportlonality rinciple: nthis case, thatdifferentpersons(no matterwho) that share thesame value of

the centralpropertyX must be seen as deservingthe same value of Y.The

basic pointhere is that the Y that is due to use Kane'sterminology)to a

personis supervenlenton his or herX, and not on who the personis (or on

anyother charactersticof thisperson).Thegeneralnatureof treatingpeople

equally in this sense was extensively discussed in InequalityReexamined,andItapplies inter alia to the proportionality rnciple as well.

Second,it so happens hat f Y andX arestrictlyproportionalasthename

of the rulesuggestsandsome versionsof the Arstotelianclaimendorse), hennotonlydoeseveryonewith the same X getanequalY,butalsoeveryone-nomatterwhatX he or she has-gets an equal amount of Y per unit of X. In

fact, however,despite the name, it is common to considermonotonlc func-

tions f(X) otherthanproportlonalitynapplying he so-calledproportlonality

princlple.This involves an additionalproblemof rescaling to characterze

the sense in which the due values of Y for respective values of X are

supposedto be determinedby theprincipleof proportionality. he ideaof

equal reatment would relateto the dueness unctionconnected withthat

scaling. I shall not pause here to elaborateon this (the relationcan be dealt

with, mathematically,n similarways to the problemof interpersonal om-

parability).8The crucial issue is the equal treatmentof people in identical

circumstances (taking, in this case, the relevant circumstance to be thevalue of X).

Thefact thattheproportlonality ule falls well withinthegeneralcategoryof egalitarian ules need notcome as agreatsurprise, ince theformalaspectsof equalitycanbe veryversatile.Thisis nottodenythat here s aninteresting

substantivequestionas to theform in whichequalitymay be mostplausiblysought.Indeed, nInequalityReexamined 91-3), theproportlonality iew of

havingone's Y in line withone's X ( equal reatment nrelatingY toX) was

contrasted, n this respect,with the rule of workingfor the same Y for all

( equaltreatment n giving everyone equalY). A substantiveexamination




of equalityof what has to address his questionalong with the choice of

space. Butwhat is

at Issue is not whether or not to have any general re-quirementof equalityof treatment,butthe formthatequaltreatment hould

take. Any principle of the kind that Kane himself discusses thus incor-

poratesarequirement f equality, nd theonlyremaining ssue is themore

general one(towhichInequalityReexaminedwasaddressed),namely,equal-

ity'ofwhat?

4. REACHANDLIMITSOFNECESSITY

So whatdo we conclude? As a substantiveproposition,the requirementof equalityof any particular ind(of incomes,of utilities,of freedoms,etc.)

cannot,of course,bea logically necessarypartofjusticeundereverypossible

conception.Even therequirement f demandingequalityof something hat

is regardedas particularly mportant n the respective theory of justicecannotbe fully analytical.If it is indeed the case (as I have triedto claim it

is) that everynormativetheoryof social arrangementhat has at all stood

the test of time does, in fact,satisfy sucha requirement,hatcommonalitycertainlydenves largely romthepoliticalregulantles hathaveemergedover

time in the beliefs andconvictionsof people.Forthisreason,I see noreason odisagreewith Kane's mainclaim(except

withhis implicitsuggestionthatI hadargued orthecontraryview; thisI had

notdone).But there s a furtherssue,to wit, theformalrequirementshatare

imposed by any general rule of justice. Any delineationof principles-ofneeds, of deserts,of entitlements,or whatever-makes the rightoutcomes

supervenienton some specific charactenstics hata personmay possess or

acquireorreceive,andthiscames withit the entailment hatanyonewho hasthe samecharactenstics-no matterwhoheorshe is-must receive the same

consideration.That equalityof treatment s nonspecific,butit does incor-

poratea substantivedemand orequality, n a parametrcform.

This applies to all the classes of justificatoryarguments hatrequire he

use of such rules andregularntes.Kane does not say this, and indeed in his

citationof Anstotelian proportionality ules,he seems to be denyinganyconnectionof such prnciples withequaltreatmentat all. But this is largely

a matterof presentation.Consider,for

example,Kane's

argument:If a

teacherpunishesawhole class forthe misbehaviour f onepupil,or anofficer

shoots an entirevillage for an actof sabotage by one of its members,surelythe onus is on the perpetratorsf the equal treatment o say why they have

madenodistinctionsbetweentheguiltyand theinnocent p.389).Thesame



Sen / ON THE STATUSOFEQUALITY 399

substantivequerycan be raisedby asking the offendingteacher(or police

officer)whytheprinclple hould notbe thatall misbehavers orall saboteurs)be treatedequally,rather han thatpeople with dissimilarresponsibilitiesbe

given the samepunishment.What Kanecalls theequaltreatment s notthe

only formthatequaltreatment an take.

We canstill questionwhether here s any necessityto have thesegeneralclasses ofjustificatoryargumentshat akeus toequalityof treatmentnsome

generic sense (e.g., a personshouldget this because of some characterstic

he or she has).Indeed,one can arguethatthenecessityof equality n classes

of substantivemoral theores was not in itself a necessity.I do not see much

merit in spendingeffort to resist this claim. I have no great difficulty inconceiving of a putativetheoryof justice thatremainscompletely arbitraryin its allocation,withoutany use of a principlethat involves supervenienceon some generalcharactensticsof persons(rather hansimply who is who).I will, of course,resist such a theoryof justice, but not on the groundthat

there is something of a logical mistake here. Its arbltrannesshas to be

comparedwith thereasons-plausible to us-that can be given in favour of

equal treatmentof one kind or another,and this fits into the discipline of

examininga substantive

heoryof

justicein

political philosophy.The really engaging questions about the status of equality concern

(a) the choice of the space and the form in which equalityis to be sought

( equalityof what? ),and(b) addressingconflictsbetween theclaims of any

particular ypeof equalityand otherconsiderations,ncludingothertypesof

equality( whatrelativesignificance to attach? ).The statusof equalityis asubstantiverather hana formal ssue.

NOTES

1. John Kane, Justice,Impartiality, nd Equality: Why the Conceptof Justice Does NotPresumeEquality, Political Theory24, no. 3 (1996, this issue):375-93.

2. AmartyaSen, InequalityReexamlned Oxford:ClarendonPress;New York:RussellSageFoundation;Cambrdge, MA. HarvardUniversityPress, 1992).

3. Kane, Justice, mpartiality,ndEquality, 76. He does notexplicitlyattributehis viewto me (as far as I can see) butproceedsas if I believed in a logically necessaryconnection. He

comes closest to attribution n thefollowing passage:

Sen suspects thatthe reason why so many altogetherdifferentsubstantivetheones ofsocialjusticehave thecommonfeatureof demanding qualityof something s tobe foundin a foundationalprnciple of ethicalreasornng,namely, hepnncipleof equalconcern

for all at some level. The absenceof such concern,he says, makes a theoryarbitrarilydiscnnmnating.pp. 375-6)




But the questionto ask here surely is: whatlknd of arbitrarnesswould this be-political or

logical or both?

4. Sen, InequalityReexanuned,16-7. I had, m fact, gone on to argue: A theory may

accept-indeed demand-inequality intermsof manyvariables,but ndefending hose nequali-ties it would be hard o ducktheneed to relatethem,ultimately, oequalconsideration or all in

some adequately ubstantialway (p. 17).5. Sen, InequalityReexanuned,19.

?6.Thatargumentativeorce relatesclosely to the ideathathas been illummatingly xplored

by Thomas Scanlon of the need to have reasons hatothers could not readilyreject. Idem,

Utilitanamnsmnd Contractualism, n Utilitaranism and Beyond, ed. AmartyaSen and

BernardWilliams(Cambridge,UK. Cambrdge Umnversityress, 1982).7. Kanesimplyasserts that the castesystemm India s formally ust, and in this context

cites MichaelWalzer o the effect that ina societywhereshared ocial meaningsareintegratedandhlerarchical,justicewill come to the aidof inequality' (p. 390). Butpoliticalmovements

challenging this view have been, in fact, dominantin contemporaryIndia, and even the

constitutionof the Indian Umon (adopted on the basis of a consensus immediately after

independence)bans variouspracticesof caste-based nequalityand requires affirmativedis-

crimnations m favor of lower castesin civil serviceandeducation provisions hathave been

furtherexpanded n the last decade). The disciplineof politicalplausibility s not without its

substantivebite.

8. On this,see my CollectiveChoice and Social Welfare SanFrancisco:Holden-Day,1970;

republished,Amsterdam:North-Holland,1979),chaps.7 and 7*

ProfessorAmartyaSen is LamontUniversityProfessorandprofessorof economics and

philosophyat HarvardUniversity.

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On the Status of Equality