On the contrary. We know political terror. There is also a terror of the matheme. The fact that one impinges on living bodies while the other concerns established thoughts only allows us to infer the greater harm of the first if we hold that life, suffering and finitude are the only absolute marks of existence. That would imply that there exists no eternal truth into the construction of which the living being can incorporate itself—sometimes, it is true, at the cost of his or her life. A consistent conclusion of democratic materialism. Without any particular joy, the materialist dialectic will work under the assumption that no political subject has yet attained the eternity of the truth which it unfolds without moments of terror. For, as Saint-Just asked: ‘What do those who want neither Virtue nor Terror want?’ His answer is well known: they want corruption—another name for the failure of the subject. The materialist dialectic will also propose some remarks drawn from the history of sciences. From the 1930s, acknowledging the lag in French mathematics after the bloodbath of World War I, young geniuses like Weil, Cartan and Dieudonné undertook something like a total refoundation of the mathematical setup, integrating all the crucial creations of their time: set theory, structural algebra, topology, differential geometry, Lie algebras, etc. For at least twenty years, this gargantuan collective project, which took the name ‘Bourbaki’, justifiably exercised an effect of terror on the ‘old’ mathematics. This terror was necessary in order to incorporate two or three new generations of mathematicians into the subjective process that had been opened up on a grand scale at the end of the nineteenth century (even if anticipated by Riemann, Galois or even Gauss). None of that which overcomes finitude in the human animal, subordinating it to the eternity of the True through its incorporation into a subject in becoming, can ever happen without anxiety, courage and justice. But, as a general rule, neither can it take place without terror. 13. When the incorporation of a human animal is at stake, the ethics of the subject, whose other name is ‘ethics of truths’, comes down to this: to find point by point an order of affects which authorises the continuation of the process. Here we cannot but cite Beckett, from the end of The Unnamable. In this text, the ‘character’ prophesies, between dereliction and justice (Beckett will later write, in How It Is: ‘In any case we have our being in justice I have never heard anything to the contrary’). Tears of anxiety stream down his face. He wreaks unspeakable terror on himself (the bonds between 88 LOGICS OF WORLDS
On the contrary. We know political terror. There is also a
terror of thematheme. The fact that one impinges on living bodies
while the otherconcerns established thoughts only allows us to
infer the greater harm ofthe first if we hold that life, suffering
and finitude are the only absolutemarks of existence. That would
imply that there exists no eternal truth intothe construction of
which the living being can incorporate itselfsometimes,it is true,
at the cost of his or her life. A consistent conclusion
ofdemocratic materialism.Without any particular joy, the
materialist dialectic will work under theassumption that no
political subject has yet attained the eternity of thetruth which
it unfolds without moments of terror. For, as Saint-Just asked:What
do those who want neither Virtue nor Terror want? His answer iswell
known: they want corruptionanother name for the failure of
thesubject.The materialist dialectic will also propose some remarks
drawn fromthe history of sciences. From the 1930s, acknowledging
the lag in Frenchmathematics after the bloodbath of World War I,
young geniuses like Weil,Cartan and Dieudonn undertook something
like a total refoundation ofthe mathematical setup, integrating all
the crucial creations of their time:set theory, structural algebra,
topology, differential geometry, Lie algebras,etc. For at least
twenty years, this gargantuan collective project, whichtook the
name Bourbaki, justifiably exercised an effect of terror on theold
mathematics. This terror was necessary in order to incorporate two
orthree new generations of mathematicians into the subjective
process thathad been opened up on a grand scale at the end of the
nineteenth century(even if anticipated by Riemann, Galois or even
Gauss).None of that which overcomes finitude in the human animal,
subordinatingit to the eternity of the True through its
incorporation into asubject in becoming, can ever happen without
anxiety, courage and justice.But, as a general rule, neither can it
take place without terror.13. When the incorporation of a human
animal is at stake, the ethics of thesubject, whose other name is
ethics of truths, comes down to this: to find point bypoint an
order of affects which authorises the continuation of the
process.Here we cannot but cite Beckett, from the end of The
Unnamable. In thistext, the character prophesies, between
dereliction and justice (Beckettwill later write, in How It Is: In
any case we have our being in justice Ihave never heard anything to
the contrary). Tears of anxiety stream downhis face. He wreaks
unspeakable terror on himself (the bonds between88LOGICS OF
WORLDS
