The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History ofthe near EastAuthor(s): Omer Lutfi Barkan and Justin McCarthySource: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan., 1975), pp. 3-28Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162732Accessed: 04/11/2008 03:38

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 6 (I975), 3-28 Printed in Great Britain 3

Omer Lutfi Barkan

THE PRICE REVOLUTION OF THE

SIXTEENTH CENTURY: A TURNING POINT

IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE

NEAR EAST

Translated by Justin McCarthy

The sixteenth century came to an end with the countries of the Ottoman Middle East falling into a grave economic and social crisis which presaged a decisive

turning point in their history. The most symptomatic sign of what was, in fact, a structural crisis was a series of popular revolts which appeared most prominently among the Muslim Turkish population of Anatolia. Known as the Celali revolts, these uprisings developed into open civil war against the forces of the Ottoman state, and in their first phase lasted approximately fifteen years, from 1595 to i6io.

The Ottoman chronicles describe these uprisings as mere bandit actions, organized and led by evil bandit chiefs. More recent studies in Ottoman archival materials, however, indicate that these events were far more complicated and

significant, both in their origins and in their manifestations. The first indication of this new view came shortly after the Kemalist revolution in the work of

Hiiseyin Husameddin, Amasya Tarihi,I which indicated that the Celali agitation was in fact an open revolt of the Turkish population of Anatolia against the

corrupt administration of the Ottoman government, which had fallen totally into the hands of the devqirme slaves converted for the service of the Sultan. Accord-

ing to him, the nomadic and Turkoman elements of Anatolia had never been comfortable under the financial administration of the Empire. Added to this were new nationalist feelings among the Turkomans, nourished by glorious historic memories of the Turkish past in Central Asia, as well as by the religious propaganda spread by the Safavis, which transformed the general discomfort into a tremendous hatred of the central Ottoman rule. The Husameddin ex-

planation was interesting and attractive, but it ignored the fact that in the major revolt of the period, led by Kara Yazicl, most of those participating were not recruited from the Turkoman elements of Anatolia.

The next scholar to examine the problem was the Russian Turkologist A. S. Tveritinova,2 who found in the Celali uprisings a collaboration between the

I Istanbul, I927, III, 348-75. 2 'Vosstanie Kara Yazlci-Deli Hasan v Turtsii', Izd. Ak. SSSR, pp. 85-93.

1-2

4 Omer Lutfi Barkan

peasantry and the smaller feudal holders revolting against the larger feudal leaders of the time. Tveritinova, however, presented no documentary evidence to support her theory, aside from the information found in the Ottoman chronicles regarding the specific uprisings, and her article accomplished no more than present the known facts in accordance with Marxist schemas. The general theme regarding the crisis of the Ottoman feudal elements impoverished by a crisis of capitalism and the misery of the exploited peasants did provide subsequent scholars with a useful hypothesis which they could examine by research into the documentary evidence.

The most prominent and successful of the Turkish historians who have examined the social and economic background of the Celali revolts is Professor Mustafa Akdag, of the University of Ankara, who has presented his findings in a series of studies based on detailed examination of the archival documents.I

According to Akdag the idea of a Turkish nationalist reaction against foreign slave rule cannot be substantiated, since the prestige of the Ottoman dynasty remained quite high throughout Anatolia during this period. The insurgents, for the most part, were not peasants acting in behalf of a definite revolutionary program, but rather cultivators left without land or employment as a result of a tremendous inflation combined with the dissolution of the great military fiefs established previously to support the Ottoman army.

My own archival studies into the movements of prices and demography of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries attempt to shed new understanding on these events. Many causes can be examined, but here I propose to investigate the role of economic factors, as well as that of monetary problems originating outside the

Empire.

I. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE OF THE OTTOMAN

EMPIRE

The economic system in effect in the first centuries of the Ottoman Empire was in many ways original and to a certain extent was in harmony with the conditions of its time. While it has been subjected to heavy criticism, one must remember that, during the first centuries of the Ottoman Empire, it permitted the rise of considerable economic prosperity in an area that before the Ottoman

conquest had for centuries fallen into decay and impoverishment. The Ottoman system was basically one of imperial self-sufficiency. In order

systematically to exploit the vast sources of wealth within the empire and to

preserve its political and economic integrity and unity, the Ottomans sought to establish a tightly closed economic order. They saw the need of bringing to an end the economic penetration and exploitation by European powers such as Venice and Genoa. At the same time they attempted to develop means by which the different economic zones of the Empire would complement one another,

Celali Isyanlar (Ankara, 943).

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 5

instead of developing the dangerous ruptures and disequilibrium that had

brought economic crises and depressions in the past. To a great extent, the Ottomans were successful in these endeavors. The robust constitution and

political power of the Empire in its first two centuries enabled it to pursue an economic policy that was highly favorable to it, and as a result to avoid entirely the kind of economic crises that had weakened its predecessors.

It was only when Europe began to develop its own political and economic

power that the system was breached. The decline of the established Ottoman social and economic order began as the result of developments entirely outside the area dominated by the Porte, and in particular as a consequence of the establishment in Western Europe of an 'Atlantic economy' of tremendous vitality and force. The economic system of the Empire decayed neither through a flaw inherent in its constitution, nor through an organic law, but because of immense historical changes that destroyed its equilibrium, arrested its natural economic evolution, and condemned its institutions to irreparable damage.

In the second half of the fifteenth century the major European nations began the intellectual and commercial development that was to eventually bring them to world domination. At that time, the expansion outside of Europe by the countries bordering the Atlantic began to reach a peak, extending first into

Africa, and culminating in the discovery of entire new continents. The European nations were attracted to Africa primarily by the highly lucrative commerce in

gold and slaves. It was not long before they had drained a substantial portion of the African gold supply. This gold had been the principal source of economic nourishment for the entire Mediterranean world, and by taking it the Europeans laid the foundation for the development of a highly profitable colonial system in the centuries to come. The African experience gave the colonial powers the

experience and means to develop new techniques and a powerful economic and financial base which made it inevitable that they would proceed to the discovery of America (I492) and of the Cape of Good Hope (1498). These discoveries led them inevitably to conquest and exploitation in the heart of Asia.

The effects of these important geographic discoveries on the economic and social structures of Europe have only begun to be explored; their influence on

non-European lands is even less known. The shift of the old international trade in silks and spices to the new all-water route was surely a severe blow to the economies and finances of the lands that controlled those routes. Here I examine less the overt facts of the trade shift and more the consequent 'price revolution' that engulfed Europe as well as the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth

century.

Imperialist organization and colonial commerce produced incredible riches for certain European countries. After the initial phase of conquest and pillage, European powers quickly converted their colonial holdings into agrarian plantations and, perhaps more important, mines. Their rapidly developed

6 Omer Lutfi Barkan

efficient means of exploitation enabled them to bring into Europe tremendous

quantities of gold and silver; the amount rose to as much as three, five, or seven times that originally imported in I495. The injection of this tremendous new

supply of capital produced new activity in European commerce and industry and

put at the Europeans' disposal new products whose profits could only be fully realized if new markets as well as new sources of investment could be found. At the same time, an inevitable result of this situation was an immense inflation

throughout Europe, with vast repercussions in its social and political order. While the European economy developed rapidly, with capital accretion, invest-

ment, and inflation feeding one another, the Ottoman closed economy, by its

very nature, strongly resisted the temptation to follow a similar path. As a result, the economies of Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire moved farther and farther apart. The consequent increase in the prices paid for basic commodities in

Europe gradually began a process by which those commodities were sucked out of Ottoman markets. Wheat, copper, wool, and the like, which had been the bases of the Ottoman economic strategy, now came into such short supply in the

major centers of the Empire that here also was developed a rapid inflation of

prices which soon endangered the equilibrium and security of the closed economic system. While the established system forbade the export of such basic commodities outside its boundaries, the lure of the profits to be found in the

highly inflated European markets led Ottoman and foreign merchants alike to

adopt all possible measures to smuggle these goods outside Ottoman territory. This situation made it increasingly difficult for the Porte to fulfill its major

function of arranging for sufficient supplies for the major cities of the Empire; at the same time the lack of raw materials produced a mounting crisis in Ottoman

industry, which in turn led to ever greater discontent among the artisans, whose direct and indirect complaints found voice in the Ottoman administrative docu- ments of the time. Of course, for them the situation was the result of the entry of the 'accursed spirit of speculation and excessive gain' into the empire, the abandonment of the older trade regulations and the corporate traditions among artisans and the indifference and corruption of the administrative authorities.

They could not see that the situation was in fact created by economic develop- ments outside the empire, against which the traditional Ottoman administrative

system found itself powerless to act. Traditional methods were naturally em-

ployed in an effort to counter the threat; controls on the export of 'strategic' grains were augmented, violators were threatened with severe punishment, and

goods seized in transit were expropriated by the state, but the profits to be gained from illicit smuggling of grains into the European market were so enormous that this traffic continued to attract participants who were able to find accomplices even among the most highly placed representatives of the state. This contraband commerce became for many persons in the Empire a normal trade and for some social classes a source of far more riches than they had ever been able to amass before. Ottoman agriculture, organized in great tax farms in the areas that were

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 7

most conveniently located for participation in this clandestine trade, also began to feel the pressure of the inflated European prices on its own organic structure, and it began to orient itself toward an agrarian regime better adapted to massive commercialization of its products.

Archival materials from the time demonstrate that it was impossible to stem the flow resulting from the price differences between the hitherto integrated Ottoman zone and the 'Atlantic economy'. The penetration of the high pressure 'dominant economy' into the Ottoman low tension economy was the inevitable result of the price difference between the two. It was accomplished in spite of all the resistance the Ottoman system could provide. Economic penetration pro- duced a grave inflationary current in the Ottoman Empire which together with other, more internal factors, produced social and political changes that disturbed the social and economic security of the Empire, and in the end proved to be irreversible.

The crisis in Ottoman industry As the Empire's price system gradually fell under the influence of the 'domin-

ant economy', Ottoman industry was also undergoing disastrous changes which cannot be explained simply as the effects of European absorption of the reserve stocks of primary materials necessary for industry. In addition to the weapons of the

price mechanism and the absorption of goods, the economy of the Atlantic zone threatened as well the traditional production and trade structures of the Empire.

In Europe, prodigious commercial expansion had given birth to a new capi- talist industry, particularly in textiles and metallurgy, an industry working always for massive exportation. This new industry was concentrated in the hands of capitalist entrepreneurs and merchants - men free of all corporate restraint who worked with a new spirit, inventing new techniques, starting new fashions, and creating new needs. They inaugurated intensive methods of production and

opened new markets in order to make their merchandise accessible to an in-

creasingly far-flung clientele. In doing so, they completely changed international

trade, giving it a new character - unlimited expansion. The Ottoman craft industry was thus faced in the second half of the sixteenth

century with a European industry rapidly evolving toward the conquest of the world's markets. The times had produced a vast change in traditional international commerce. For example, European commerce, represented by a small number of merchants, had previously exported a few luxury and speciality items to the Ottoman Empire. These imports represented no threat to local industry. On the

contrary, they produced customs revenues and added to the pleasures of life for those classes privileged enough to afford them. Then again, the Europeans were

good clients of the Ottoman luxury industries who bought as much, if not more, than they sold; their trade was actively sought and encouraged. European com- merce was an indispensable part of Ottoman prosperity.

During the second half of the sixteenth century that picture changed. Euro-

8 Omer Lutfi Barkan

pean commerce, sustained by strong commercial organization and encouraged by powerful nation-states, began to be a threat to local industry, a prime factor in economic decline. The new European national commerce intended to sell the

greatest possible quantity of goods abroad, while restricting imports of any finished products. Thus it provided no market for local Ottoman export industry. The commerce of the Levant changed to a 'colonial commerce', turning Turkey into a client for the European industry which was itself to furnish only primary materials, no longer to export finished goods.

An example of this pattern is the silk industry of Bursa: Until the latter half of the sixteenth century, this city produced huge quantities of high quality silk cloth, most of it intended for the export market. Once the European silk industry was perfected, however, European merchants no longer bought anything from Bursa but silk thread, eagerly awaiting the day when they would only have to buy the cocoons.' The same industrial evolution characterized the mohair (sof) in-

dustry of Ankara. Ankara had been renowned for its export-quality woven mo- hair cloth, but by the end of the sixteenth century it had fallen to the level of a thread center, a simple market for the hair of Ankara goats. Like Bursa, it had become a supplier of primary material from which others now drew riches.z

One can clearly see that the advent of the new European commerce began the

stagnation of the Ottoman craft industry. Certainly the craft industry continued in many places to exist, but it never advanced or evolved. Faced with the con-

tinuously evolving European industry, Ottoman industry could not find the

dynamism necessary to adapt to the new conditions of the world economy. As an ever wider gap between it and European industry opened, the Ottoman

system was condemned to degeneration. The new European commerce must be included as one of the main causes of

the sixteenth-century Ottoman economic stagnation. The shock produced by this commerce on local industry is one of the principal reasons for the progressive decline in the balance of trade. This in turn not only caused the loss of gold and

silver, but made it impossible to redress the loss. It is thus that, well before the use of steam as a source of energy in industry and

transport and long before the Industrial Revolution, other, smaller economic revo- lutions in world commerce and industrial production had already given European commerce a crushing superiority in its drive for the conquest of world markets.

II. WAS THERE A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN PRICE INCREASE

PARALLEL TO THAT OF EUROPE?

During the last quarter of the sixteenth century, prices in Europe for goods and services rose to three or four times those at the start of the century. This

I Fahri Dalsar, Bursada Ipekfilik (Istanbul, 1960). 2 Mustafa Akdag, ' Osmanli Imparatorlugunun Kurulu? ve inki?af devrinde Tiirkiyenin

lktisadi vaziyeti', Belleten (Istanbul, I949, x950), 51, 55.

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 9

tremendous increase began in Western Europe, then spread to Italy and Central

Europe. Braudel states that, even though the Ottoman Empire had always been viewed as an entirely separate economic, as well as political and social, system, this movement reached Turkey soon afterward.'

One of the purposes of my research has been to examine this hypothesis by systematic study of the Ottoman sources, and I have published the results in articles on the official Ottoman price lists (narh),2 on the estates of deceased Ottoman soldiers in Edirne,3 and on the prices paid for labor and materials

during the construction of the Siileymaniye mosque and adjacent buildings,4 as well as on the operations of several Imarets, hospices maintained for the free

lodging and feeding of travelers and students.5 Table I demonstrates the type of information which can be gained from these

sources, for example, the increases of food prices toward the end of the sixteenth

century. Part i of the table shows the actual prices, amounts purchased, and total costs of the major food items and other supplies purchased for the Siiley- maniye hospice in 1585/6. For comparative purposes, since similar accounts for the same foundation are lacking for earlier and later times, accounts of similar foundations have been used, that of the Fatih Imaret for I489-90 in part 2, and that of the Bayezid II Imaret for 1603-4 in part 3. In parts z and 3, the actual unit prices as shown in their accounts are presented, together with what would have been paid at those prices had the same quantities been purchased as at the

Siileymaniye Imaret in 1585-6. These figures demonstrate the changes in total

purchase cost for the same items over approximately one century. Items that cost 615,I94 akfes in the late fifteenth century, cost I,I22,635

akfes in the late sixteenth century, and 2,908,618 akfes in the early seventeenth

century. Where several prices were given for individual items in an account book, the average price paid for the bulk of purchases of that item was used. Since all three imarets purchased the goods at the same markets in Istanbul, valid com-

parisons can be made to demonstrate the tremendous price increase that occurred. If the 1489-90 price is assigned the price index of Ioo, it means that the prices of

1585-6 reached 182z49 and those of 1604-5 reached 472-79. An even more detailed demonstration of the price increase is presented in

I F. Braudel, La Mediterrande et le Monde Mediterraneen a I'Epoque de Philippe II (Paris, 1966), vol. I, part 2, 'Mtaux precieux: Monnaies et prix', pp. 448, 488.

2 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'XV. asrln sonunda bazi biiyik ?ehirlerde e?ya ve yiyecek fiyatlari', Tarih Vesikalari, nos. 5, 7, 9 (I942).

3 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'Edirne Askeri Kassamina ait Tereke Defterleri', Belgeler, III (1966), I-479.

4 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'L'organisation du travail, dans le chantier d'une grande mosquee a Istanbul au XVIe siecle', Annales (Economie, Societes, Civilisation), no. 6 (1962), 1093- 06; idem, 'Edirne ve givarlndaki bazi Imaret Tesislerinin Yillhk Muhasebe Bilan;olari', Belgeler, I (i963), 235-377.

5 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'Tiirkiye ?ehirlerinin tesekkiil ve inkiSaf tarihi bakimlndan, Imaret Sitelerinin Kuruluy ve tIleyis tarzma ait Arastirmalar', Iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuasz xxiII (1963), 239-398.

TABLE I Yearly totals of kitchen expenses, taking as a base the ratio of goods and amounts found in the balance sheets

of the Siileymaniye Imaret for i585/6 and applying them to the prices listedfor the other Imarets

I. Sileymaniye Imaret (Istanbul, 1585/6)

Lamb Wheat Flour Rice Clarified butter Honey Almonds Black plums Starchd Red grapes Saffron Chickpeas Black pepper Onions Cumin Firewood Salt

Unit Okkaa Kileb Kile Kile Kantarc Kantar Kantar Kantar Kantar Kantar Dirheme Kile Okka Okka Okka Cekif Kile

Price (akfes)

3-00 23'38 25'54 33'00

525'41 40I.10

462-20 II73

173'70 87-99

i 66 30-00

119'61 0-92 8-9I

12'12

I I00

Total Amount of expenditure goods used (akfes)

77,61500oo 4,482-50

11,521 00

4,338oo00 208-40 292'52

22-34 17'70 71I50 50-20

7,423-00 192-00

66-30 3,762-00

124-50 4,683'00

390-50

232,845 104,784 294,246 143,154 109,495 117,330

I0,326 1,978

12,420

4,417 12,322

5,760 7,934 3,46I I,IIO

56,758 4,295

II. Fatih Imaret (Istanbul, 1489/90)

Total Price expenditure

(akfes) (akfes) I 43

13'50 18-22

16'93 264-00 18o-40 I67-20

79'20 128-28

33'00 0-24

16-25 25'17

0-41 4-00 5-00

12'00

Totals I,122,635 Index I82-49

110,989 50,513

209,912 73,442 55,017 52,770

3,735 1,401

9,029

I,656 1,781 3,120 1,678 I,541

498 23,415 4,696

615,194 I00

III. Bayezit II Imaret (Istanbul, 1604/5) r To ta

Total Price expenditure

(akfes) (akfes) 10'00

7I'71 75-00 6o-oo

792-00 800-00

I,144'00 26400oo 264-00 264'00

4'oo 90-00

3.00

33'11 30-00

776,150 321,440 864,075 260,280 I65,o52 234,o16

25,556 4,672

18,876 13,252

29,692 9,792 5,967

11,286 1,743

155,054 11,715

2,908,618 472'73

a 1285 grams (figures taken from Viqueinel's Voyage dans la Turqulie d'Europe (Paris, b The Istanbul wheat kile: 20 okkas or 25-7 kilograms (35 liters); rice kile: 0o okkas. c 44 okkas or 56-5 kilograms. d Edible starch, made from wheat, etc. e 3-212 grams. f A ceki of firewood: 18o okkas or 231 kilograms.

I868), p. 258).

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 1 I

TAB L E 2 Table, by dates, of the foodstuff and kitchen expenses, taking as a base the ratio of goods and amounts found in the balance sheet of the Siileymaniye Imaret

for I585/6 and applying these to the prices listed for other dates

(I) In akfes (II) In grams-silver

Year's Year's Defter total total

No. Date number expenditure Index expenditure Index I 1489/90 o'9I 615,194 Ioo'oo 472,469 Ioo0oo 2 1555/6 7098 875,184 I42-26 639,759 I35'41 3 1573 6278 I,I07,173 I79-97 755,092 I59-82 4 1585/6 I954 I,I22,965 I82'48 765,862 I62-I0

5 1586/7 I954 1,649,975 268-20 633,590 I34-10 6 1587/8 5833 1,959,381 318-50 752,402 159'25 7 1588/9 5832 2,248,665 365-52 863,487 I82-76 8 1595/6 5039 2,716,593 441-58 1,043,I72 220-80 9 1596/7 5039 3,273,274 532'07 1,256,937 266-20

10 1599/I600 5039 2,572,694 4I8-20 987,914 209-10 1I I6oo/I 5039 2,83I,I30 460-20 914,455 193'55 I2 I6o0 5039 2,966,493 482-20 958,I77 202-80

13 I602/3 5039 2,908,618 472'79 939,483 I98-85 14 I605 5039 3,788,575 6I5'83 I,223,709 259-00 I5 I6o5/6 5039 3,879,814 630-66 1,253,I79 265-24 I6 I623/5 5039 3,650,75I 593'43 1,I79,132 249'57 17 I628/9 6019 2,635,718 428-44 806,529 I70-70 I8 I629 5813 2,603,42I 423'-9 796,646 i68-6i I9 I632/3 632 3,103,609 504-50 949,704 20I00oo 20 I634/5 682 2,957,876 480-80 905,I10 I9157 21 i635/6 682 I,986,904 486-52 913,992 193'45 22 I636/7 682 2,96I,130 48I-30 906,106 191-78 23 I648/9 580 2,892,179 470-I2 885,007 I87-3I 24 I655/6 989 2,84I,328 46i-86 869,446 I84-02

((I) The totals, in akfes, which one would have paid in those years and an index based on 1489/90. (II) Totals and index, calculated by the amount of gram-silver in the akfe at the time.)

Table 2, which is based on various annual accounts of different imperial imarets located in Istanbul. Number i represents the same Fatih Imaret account; num- bers 4-7 come from the Suileymaniye Imaret; numbers 8-I6 and I8-23 represent the Bayezid II Imaret; number I7 that of Selim I; and number 24 that of Sultan Ahmet.' The price indexes continue to be computed using the total of 6I5,194

I The figures in these registers are from the annual account registers of the Imperial imarets (Sultanin Imaretlerinin Yzllzk Muhasebe Bilanfolarz), with the exceptions of nos. 2 and 3, which come from the kitchen accounts of the imperial palaces. Some of the registers cover the solar year and some the lunar year, so some discrepancies are inevitable due to seasonal differences. In addition, the accounts in nos. 9, i2, 15, and 19 covered only six months or even less in the years mentioned, while that of I6 covered an eight-month period. In all cases, where several prices appeared for individual items, average prices paid for them have been used.

I2 Omer Lutfi Barkan

akfes for 1489-90 as the base index figure of 0oo. Because of the change in value of the akfe coin during this time, owing not only to price changes but also to the debasement of the coin by the state and by counterfeiters, I have reduced the total values of food purchases given in each budget to a constant silver-gram value to find the real cost of the items and thus arrive at an accurate comparison. For this purpose, it was necessary to determine the actual weight and purity of the silver coins (akfes) in use at the time of each account, and to determine its value in relation to gold.' During the first half of the sixteenth century, from I491 to

1566, Ioo dirhems of silver were cut into 420 akfes, giving each akfe a weight of

0-73 I grams of silver. Fifty-two of these akfes equaled the value of one Ottoman Gold Coin (altun) between i49I and I516, 55 equaled one altun from I517 to

I549, and 60 equaled an altun from I550 to I566. According to this count, I gram of gold equaled io064 grams of silver in I49I, and 1142 grams of silver in I560.2 The akfe's stability, however, fell rapidly during the next half century.

Following the accession of Selim II in 1566, 450 akfes were cut from Ioo dirhems of silver instead of 420, and the amount of silver in each akfe fell from

0-73I grams to 0-682. Despite this, the government continued to try to compel the exchange of 60 akfes for one altun gold piece. The value of silver coinage fell

rapidly as counterfeiters and money cutters reduced the amount of silver

remaining in akfes in circulation. As a result, the actual market price of silver fell to between 80 and Ioo akfes per gold piece, and inflation followed, causing multiple economic and financial problems. The government tried at various times to restore the value of the akfe, but without success.

In an order issued sometime between 1584 and 1586, the Ottoman government established a new akfe with 800 cut from ioo dirhems of silver, each akfe weighing only 0-384 grams. One hundred and twenty of the new akfes were supposed to equal the Ottoman gold piece of 3-517 grams of gold. Thus, in place of the old silver coin, where 60 akfes weighing 40-92 grams of silver equaled one gold piece, a coin was created worth I20 akfes weighing 46-08 grams purchased the same gold piece. The actual price of gold thus rose from I I-52 grams of silver to I3- I0.

As a result the prices of food and other materials soared, black marketeers prospered, and those on fixed incomes suffered. In Istanbul, a general popular uprising occurred against the administration responsible for the new coin, and the Beylerbey Mehmed Papa and the Treasurer (Defterdar), the officials most

The figures presented here are based on the unpublished doctoral thesis of Docent Dr Halil Sahillioglu, ' Kurulu?undan XVIIe asrin sonlarina kadar Osmanli Para tarihi hakkinda bir deneme' (Istanbul, 1958).

2 These figures are based on Sahillioglu's study, which is based on the Tebrizi dirhem (drachma), weighing 3-072 grams, which he states was used in the Ottoman Empire toward the end of the seventeenth century. The dirhemn used after that time, called Rumi, weighed 3-207 grams. Sahillioglu states that the Ottoman gold goin called sultani con- tained 3-572 grams of pure gold in 1552, compared with a Venetian ducat of that time of 3'559 grams. The sultani gold piece weighed 3-544 grams between I552 and I56o, and 3-517 grams in I563. It fell to 3-490 in I64I and afterward to 3-464 grams. Between 1560 and I641, the Venetian ducat fell to 3-426 grams.

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 13

immediately responsible for ordering the new coin, were beheaded.' It was not until 1589-90 that the government was able to issue new coins to replace the old and thus restore financial stability. Despite this, the akfe continued to lose value and prices continued to rise owing to international movements in precious metals, changes in trade patterns, the tremendous expenditures of the Ottoman

government for various wars undertaken at the time,2 and a great population increase which took place in most of Europe, as well as in the remainder of the Mediterranean world, during the sixteenth century.3

It was just as difficult to maintain the akfe during this period as it would be later. Turkey, in spite of every precaution, vacillating and floundering, found itself firmly within the cycle of a sweeping international inflation.

According to the preface to a price schedule (Narh Defteri) dated 15 November i6oo,4 some time after the devaluation and price regulation of 1584-6, the fine- ness and value of coins again began to drop and the prices of goods and food

began haphazardly to rise. Attempting to restore order in the Empire's economic

life, the state seized the depreciated coinage and brought out new akfes, standard- ized and fixed in their rate of exchange. It declared that it was about to apply in the bazaars and markets a new price list, the stipulations of which would cause a return to the old, normal prices, recently driven out of their traditional bounds.5

In addition to the work of Sahillioglu cited above, see Istanbul Belediye Kitapligi, Muallem Cevdet MS no. B/9, as cited in Barkan, 'Tereke Defterleri', p. 447.

2 Braudel, op. cit. p. 490, shows that a similar devaluation occurred in Iran at the same time, and that (p. 480) the money of account in most European countries also underwent devaluation during the same period.

3 Ibid. pp. 361-83. My own research in two Ottoman censuses taken in 1520-35 and 1570-80 confirms Braudel's hypothesis regarding the Ottoman Empire in this regard. The provinces of Anatolia increased by 56 per cent, those of Rumelia by 71 per cent, and the 12 largest cities of the empire, excluding Istanbul, Aleppo, and Damascus, increased by 90o per cent during the sixteenth century (0. L. Barkan, ' Essai sur les donnees statistiques des registres de recensements dans l'empire Ottoman aux XVe et XVIe siecles', Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, I (1957); idem, 'Defter-i Khakani', EI.2 At this time, it is not possible to prove a direct connection between the population increase and that of prices. It seems to me that the former was not a cause of the latter, but that it did make the resulting crisis more severe and dangerous.

4 Istanbul Belediye Kitapliki, Muallem Cevdet MS no. B/9 and Barkan, 'Tereke Defterleri', p. 447.

5 As is seen in the records of the Narh Defters, the value of the akfe had fallen so much that, while it was theoretically 120 to the altun, the official price, it really became necessary to pay i8o akfes for one altun gold piece. In comparison, prices of goods increased as much or even more. Now, with the coinage regulation, the akfe was returned to 120 to one, a one-third drop, and prices of goods were caused to drop in a similar manner. Some goods went to two-thirds of the old price. Official price lists fixed the new amounts to be paid: bread which had been sold at I I5 dirhems to the akfe was now to be sold at possibly 200 for one akfe; one akfe now brought 120 dirhems of fine bread, not 8o. A kile of flour, which had been i20 akfes, was now 8o; less acceptable flour went from 75 to 50 a kile, rice from 56 to 39 a kile, honey from 20 to I3 an okka, an okka of butter from 26 akfes to 19. An even greater comparison is to be seen in the fall in price of imported luxury goods. For example, a cubit of fine French velvet could fall from i ,200 to 550, a cubit of Genevese velvet from 88o to 400, a cubit of ' newly produced' (nev-peyda) broadcloth from 300 to I20. In the records of the Bayezid II Imaret in Istanbul (number I2 in the table), prepared

14 Omer Lutfi Barkan

The newly minted akFes would be the legal tender, accepted at 120 to the gold altun.

This time, however, the state did not settle the problem by replacing the seized akfes at the old rate, making good the loss from the Treasury. Instead it decided to further devalue the akfe and took advantage of the situation to lessen its financial straits. The old akfe of 0-384 grams, already dropped to that weight in

1586 by cutting 950 akfes instead of the traditional 800 from Ioo dirhems of silver, now fell further to 0o323 grams. Thus one gold altun, which had previously equaled 46-08 grams of silver (that is, i20 akfes at 0o384 grams each), would now be expected to equal only 38-76 grams (12o akfes at 0-323 grams). Or, in another

interpretation, previously one gram of gold yielded I 3I0 grams of silver, now it was I I-o grams, thus increasing the official value of silver.

We know that after this reform, between the years 161i and 61 8, the price of

gold fluctuated between I20 and 130 akfes at the free rate of exchange,' but toward the end of i618 the gold price began to rise. It rose because the govern- ment had once again changed the silver value of the akfe. It now cut ,000o akfes, not 950, from Ioo dirhems of silver, while still keeping the official rate of 120 to the altun. Though the akfe had been debased to 0o306 grams of silver the official rate was the same as it had been when the akfe's silver content was 0-384 grams.

Ignoring for a while the causes, we have seen that the Ottoman Empire, caught up in the current of a great international inflation, tried ineffectually to counter its difficulties with devaluation. Devaluation, however, led to even

greater dislocation of prices, and the empire was dragged from one financial crisis to another, unable to move against the strong current that held it. Rather than develop a well-thought-out economic plan, one that would consider the financial contingencies and possibilities and have a chance of success, the govern- ment allowed the devaluation operation to drag on. State policies were ineffectual and hopeless in the face of crises that every day became more severe. Recognizing that the devaluation policies were one of the important causes of the increases that had brought them to poverty, the people rioted and killed the officials who had initiated them.

An adjustment in the coinage was made in the beginning of I6I9. From 1620 on, however, the price of gold once again began to rise - to 200 and 240 akfes in the first months of 1623, later to 275 and 3Io akfes, finally, in the first months of I624, approaching 400. Once again it was necessary for the state to intervene.

The workings of the coinage regulation are demonstrated in a Narh Defteri from Bursa.2 According to this defter, an order which came from Istanbul on

a year after the officially fixed price went into effect, we find the following: the average price of a kile of wheat, 73'14 akfes; a kile of rice, 88 akfes; an okka of butter, 26; an okka of honey i6; and an okka of lamb io akfes.

Halil Sahillioglu, 'XVII'nci asrin ilk yarlsmda Istanbul'da Tedaviildeki Sikkelerin Rayici', Belgeler Dergisi, vol. 2 (I964), pp. 223-8.

2 Ahmed Refik, Osmanli imparatorlugunda Meskukat, Turk Tarih Enciimeni Mecmuasi, nos. 6, 7, 8, and Io (Istanbul, 1330-40).

The price revolution of the sixteenth century I5

GRAPH I

Price Indexes of foodstuffs from imaret records, I490-I655; solid lines in akCes, broken lines in grams-silver

700 . t

650 -

600- 631 - 550 - 93

500 - 532 504 4504-

r. '- 473 | 400- 442

350 - / 418 424 300- 250- 267 265 Jloo3 267 . l49 200- . 2 01

150 - J _180 182 ..- \20:18 142 '

':....."'22 50 136 169

0 ./ A B C DE F

? >o? , as v< ? <o ? X- ? 800- ?-' O C r"? m "'!t ?t?n 0'I ..... t: ' / i

i I "r

t.. ..

' I I i- 'I 'I 1

/

ct ̂ ? vr m l 4 mn l ml rmrmr vlr In o \ ?o o o o o oso ?

Year

21 November I624 ordered the circulation of a new akfe. It was to be circulated at the rate of 8o to i Spanish real, 120 to i altun, and to be 'pure, accurate, and true akfes, ten to a dirhem'. A price regulation was to be prepared according to the correct market price. Similar regulations were taken in Istanbul, and the new coin values were announced on 24 November i624.1

The exchange rate, maintained with difficulty for one or two years, once again began to rise. It was at 130 at first, then I8o in A.H. 1036-9 (I626-9), 200 in I040-I, 220 in 1042-4, 240 in 1045-6, and finally 250 between 1048 and Io50 (I636-40). Once again, a new coinage adjustment was necessary.

For the coinage reform that was announced on i January I64I (I7 Ramazan

I050), it was decided that I,000 akfes would once again be cut from Ioo dirhems of silver. One hundred and twenty 0-307 gram akfes would be given in exchange for one Osmanh altun (at that time, either 3-490 or 3-464 grams in weight).2

I Bursa Arkeoloji Miizesi Ar?ivi, B/44, Kadi Sicilli, yp 90-91. In this official price list for food in Bursa, a kile of good wheat is 55 akfe, other wheat 40; barley is 20, Egyptian rice 50, native rice 40, an okka of butter 20, of olive oil I6, of honey 12, of lamb 8 akfes. One akfe would buy 2-5 dirhems of black pepper.

2 Concerning the coinage regulation, there exists a Narh Defteri which organizes, in the new market price of money, the prices of every sort of foodstuff and goods in Istanbul at this date. The prices in this defter are slightly higher than those in the defter of I6oo, though they are figured at the same rate of exchange: an akfe will buy 200 dirhems of bread in the I6oo defter, 150 in this one; an okka of lamb is 8 akfes in one, 9 in the other, an okka of butter 9 and 24 akCes, an okka of honey i and 13 akces. This demonstrates that, when needed, the official rate was flexible. (The Istanbul defter is in the Topkapi Sarayi Museum, Revan Kitaplilg No. 1934. For the I6oo defter, see the source cited in footnote I, p. 12.)

16 Omer Lutfi Barkan

The graph shows price changes in the Empire. Whether computed in akfes, the official currency of the Empire, or in reals, so as to obviate the difficulties caused by fluctuations in the akfe's silver content, the composite index of food- stuff prices in Turkey, rising quickly from 1585, reached its highest level in I606. Although it fell a little immediately after that, the increase remained until the middle of the seventeenth century.

If an index value of ioo is given to I490 prices, the price of food, figured in 'nominal' akfes, rose to 182 by 1585, a period of nearly Ioo years. The index in reals - that is, the index considering the change in silver content of the akfe - rose to I62. Between 1585 and I6o6 the akfe index rose to 631, the real index to

265. These increases demonstrate the extent of Turkey's involvement in inter- national inflation.

In spite of the effects of state intervention, which took the form of fixed official prices and the devaluation of the akfe, we are able fairly accurately to

analyze the price increase by considering prices in terms of the 'essence' of

payment, the pure silver content of the coins. Thus, even though price figures were recorded in 'nominal' akfes, that is, the often debased akfes used at the

time, by using the real 'silver-gram weight' we can judge the degree of financial

difficulty visited on the masses of the people, on financial life, and on the state, which made its transactions from the official rate when paying salaries and

collecting tax debts. It should be added here that studies made in the Estate Registers (Tereke

Defterleri) and imaret records in cities such as Edirne and Bursa corroborate accounts of price rises drawn from the yearly accounting records (yzllzk Muhasebe

Bilanfolarz) of the Istanbul imarets. In a previous study of the Bayezid II Imaret in Edirne for the years I489-I6I6I I published exact copies of two accounting records. According to these, a composite foodstuffs index of Ioo for I489 would have risen to 434'4 by 16i6. Careful study reveals that the rise occurred in the Istanbul imarets as well. We find this same tendency in studies drawn from Tereke Defters.2 In the tereke defter of the Edirne kadzzhk (judicial district) the

price of a bushel (kile) of wheat fluctuated between 6 and 10 akfes between I540 and 1555, from 1566 it began to move from 9 to 20 akfes. We find a mean price per bushel of 40-65 akfes from I597 to I607. (See the table on page 447 of the work cited in footnote 2, p. I4.)

Wheat prices registered in the yearly records of the Sultan Orhan imaret in Bursa also show a large increase. The price of wheat between I539 and I565 moved from 4-5 akfes to 7 akfes, and finally to around 8 akfes per kile. By I6I7 it had risen to 52*5. A kile of rice changed from 8 to II akfes from 1539 to 1565, then went to 37-5 in I617. One okka (400 dirhems, or 2-8 pounds) of cooking fat rose from 6-8 akfes to 26.8; an okka of honey from 5-6 to I6.7 akfes.

It is clear that it will be necessary to find similar accounts that will extend the

I See the source quoted in footnote 2, p. 9. 2 Ibid.

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 17

study of prices to include items other than foodstuffs and others of the many and varied types of charitable institutions. Our future work will hopefully bring out whether or not these other possibilities for study exist in the Turkish Archives.

Economic conditions of the Empire in the latter part of the sixteenth century Toward the end of the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire underwent

a great international inflationary price and trade movement which shook the foundations of its social and economic life. In order to understand the effects of this movement on national finance, it is useful to investigate Ottoman 'budgets', essential reflections of state finances and financial difficulties. It should be under- stood, however, that these national budgets, both in nature and form, have a different meaning than modern national budgets. The budgets under discussion here are summaries (icmal), end-of-the-year balance sheets of the General

Accounting Office, which it was customary to submit to the Sultan for con- firmation. Few of them have been preserved and many of those that have sur- vived were compiled according to different methods. Because of this, it is difficult to compare and study the budgets in series or to give them complete scholarly investigation.'

From the four budgets we will consider here, the yearly income and expendi- tures of the state Central Administration Office (Merkezi Devlet Idaresi) can be summarized as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

Budget A, Budget B, Budget C, Budget D, I527/8 1567/8 158I/2 I669/70

Income Akfes 221,582,402 229,034,916 279,649,967 592,528,960 Altuns2 (4,028,771) (3,817,248) (4,660,832) (4,937,74i) Expenditures 150,228,282 221,532,423 277,578,755 637,206,348

(akfes) Difference (akfes) 71,354,114 7,502,493 2,071,967 44,677,388

I Three of the four budgets on which these figures are based have been published in the Istanbul University Iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuasz as ' Osmanli tmparatorlugu biiutelerine ait notlar' ('Notes relating to the budgets of the Ottoman Empire'). The other will be forthcoming in the same journal. Listed below are the dates and numbers of the volumes in which they were published, along with the financial years of the budgets: (A) 1527/8, in volume xv (I955); (B) 1567/8, in volume xix (I960); (C) 1581/2, to be published; (D) 1669/70, in volume xvII (I96I).

2 In order to find the real measure of value, the yearly income figures, which were expressed in akfes in the budgets, were converted separately to gold. According to the exchange lists (resmi kur') of the times, one gold coin would convert to 55 akfes in budget A, 60 in budgets B and C, and 120 in budget D. As was shown in footnote 5, p. I3, and footnote 2, p. 15 above, in times of inflation the value of the akfe decreased and, compared to the official exchange lists (resmi kur'), a different free exchange rate for gold

2 MES 6 I

I8 Omer Lutfi Barkan

It must be kept in mind when examining these budgets that numbers registered in the 'yearly revenues' (senelik gelir) section are not all of the Empire's existing tax records for those dates. For example, according to the budget for fiscal year 1527/8, the total tax revenue for the year was 537,929,006 akfes. Of this, only 5 percent (276,977,724) is listed as belonging to the Central Administrative Office, under the name of the 'Sultan's Privy Purse' (Padi?ah Haslan). Thirty-seven percent is listed by name under the accounts of 37,5I2 timar landlords, large and small. The remaining I2 percent is found listed in the same manner, under the names of administrators or emlak and evkaf properties.

Nor was all of the 51 percent that was under the Central Administrative Office included in the national budget. For example, in the same I527/8 budget, 35,395,322 akfes from the 'privy purse' were never sent from the

provinces of Egypt, Aleppo, Damascus, and Diyarbekir, by order of their

beylerbeyis. The money was spent locally on pay for fortress guards and for the

provinces' soldiery. In the same way, when it became evident that a war would be prolonged, the military commander at the front might order that the entire incomes of the eyalets near the embattled border be spent where they were collected. These sums were not usually included in the national budgets. If we consider the budget of I669/70, even though the figures here are not as firm as those above, we find that only one-fourth of the national revenue is listed in the

budget. Of an estimated 2-4 billion akfe revenue, only 592,528,960 appears. The above reasons prove as unfounded one other notion - that as long as the

country grew through conquests the sources of money that could be used by the Central Administrative Office would increase and new financial sources pass into state hands. In reality, in spite of spectacular conquests and the acquisition of vast territories, the extended wars of the last half of the sixteenth century exhausted more and more the financial reserves of the Ottoman Empire. The

army was no longer prepared for the great tasks thrust upon it by historical events. It seemed to show signs of fatigue and sensed the difficulty of following the advances in armament and tactics which rapid economic evolution had given to the West. And, what is worse, Ottoman conquests had passed the 'optimum' territorial limit. They ceased to be of benefit to the finances of the state, while the defense of the conquered lands created enormous expense.

This was the case, for example, in the conquered Austrian and Hungarian territories, as well as those annexed from Iran at the end of the sixteenth century. These provinces, after exhausting their own revenues, demanded from the central government an annual and substantial subsidy, always composed of gold or silver 'of good fineness'.

The example of the conquered provinces of Iran in this regard is very signi- ficant. The central government was obliged to spend, in excess of the revenues of

would be in effect. Until an adjustment was made, the superintendents of wages and incomes (dar-gelirli maaf sahipleri) and the Financial Bureau (devlet maliye idaresi) experienced a great many difficulties.

The price revolution of the sixteenth century I9

these territories, a large part of the income of adjacent provinces such as Aleppo, Diyarbekir, and Erzerum. Ordinarily, these provinces furnished a large part of the 'budget' of the central government. Forced to do without this income, the

imperial treasury became exhausted. The state was put in the dangerous position of having to neglect important and pressing matters, such as the pay of the soldiers quartered in the capital.

In the expenditure sections of our budgets, the most important parts are those

dealing with military expenditure. It will be seen that, during this period, the salaries of the sultan's private troops, the Kapu Kulu Ocaks, gradually increased their share of revenues, becoming an ever greater burden on the treasury. This can best be understood by comparing the two most important sections of the

military, the Janissaries and the Sipahis. Table 4 lists five sets of measures: (I) the numbers of each group; (2) each group's total yearly pay; (3) the percentage each claimed of that year's total expenditure; (4) the average pay of the individual

Janissary or Sipahi, in akfes; (5) the individual's pay, converted into gold.x During the period 1528-1670, the Janissary numbers increased seven times, the

Sipahi numbers three times. The increases demonstrate their relative importance in the sultan's Hassa Ordu.

It is evident that the sums paid to the members of the two groups, figured in

gold so as to eliminate the effects of the great losses in the value of the akfe, became smaller. This was especially true after the great devaluation of 1584-6, when the difference between the value of the akfe and gold began to increase. For example, the yearly pay of the Janissaries in budget D registers a 25 percent increase in akfe over budget C. When compared with the official rate of exchange, however, the average Janissary payment of 34-38 altun in budget C has fallen to 20o73 in D. Using the estimated 'free market' rate of 225 (or even 250) akfes to the altun, it appears that the average yearly salary fell even lower, to I I o5 altun. The average yearly salary of the Sipahis, which fell from 99-2I to 4I'I4 altun in

the table, would have gone to 2I'93 or lower, according to the free market rate. As is made clear by the above, in view of the poor economic condition of the most respected troops of the Empire, the income of the military class had to be

increased, if their livelihood was to be insured. Because of this the soldiers were allowed to enter fields of commerce. Thus began the destruction of military discipline.

Continuing the investigation of the structures and facets of the budgets, it is evident that a large portion of budget expenditures went to costs other than

kapu kulu salaries. Pay of soldiers in fortresses, the expenses of the fleet, weapons I Also included in these budgets are the acemi oglans, the topfus, and the cephanecis,

who together amounted to I-98-3-07 percent of the national expenditure. The acemi oglans, youths who were organized into labor battalions to work in construction, transport, and gardening before they became Janissaries, numbered 8,ooo-Io,ooo. The topfus (artillerymen) and the cephanecis (munitions workers) numbered I,377, 1,689, 1,645, and 2,445 in the four budgets.

2-2

20 Omer Lutfi Barkan

TABLE 4

Budget A, Budget B,I Budget C, Budget D, 1527/8 1567/8 1582/3 1669/70

Number Janissaries 7,866 12,798 18,905 53,499 Sipahis 5,o88 8,739 8,366 14,070

Group's total pay Janissaries 15,423,426 34,264,772 39,008,0I9 I33,968,556 Sipahis 30,957,300 29,460,I82 49,799,767 69,456,552

Budget percentage Janissaries 10-26 I5'42 I55IS 21'02 Sipahis 20-60 26-84 i8-o6 10-90

Individual's pay (akfe) Janissaries 1,955 2,677 2,063 2,487 Sipahis 6,084 6,804 5,952 4,936

Individual's pay (altun)2 Janissaries 35'50 44,62 34'38 20-73 Sipahis II0-62 113'40 99-2I 41I14

and ammunition, material for clothes, and meat and bread rations were important expenses.

In the D budget, of the 637,206,348 akfe total expense, 62.5 percent (398,393,602 akfes) were spent as follows:

Item Akfes

Kapu Kulu salaries 226,106,740 Bread, meat, and cloth expenses 45,223,498 Marine arsenal and dockyard (tersdne) workers 41,291,808

and some fleet commanders Prices of dockyard and arsenal (tophane) materials, 23,766,976

gunpowder, and hard biscuit Salaries of guards of certain fortresses 62,003,602

Total 398,392,624 The increase in the mean yearly income of the individuals in budget B can be

explained by the addition of 315 akfes a day made to the soldiers' pay on account of the accession of a new sultan, which occurred during the year. 'Total Salaries' increase is due to the increase in the number of recipients. These additions were men enrolled in the ocaks who, together with about 5,000 of the household guards, took part in the Anatolian wars of accession on the part of the new sultan. Later dissatisfaction among the Istanbul Kapu Kulus caused a great number of them to be erased from the rolls. They nevertheless still contribute to the swelling of this budget's figures.

2 These figures, based on the official rates of exchange, estimate the amount of gold which would equal the mean yearly salary. In these periods the difference between the free and official rates of exchange was great. It is clear that this must have resulted in great problems over methods of payment. On one hand the state would not have wanted to give out, at the official exchange rate, the foreign silver coins or gold it had taken with great difficulty from the people at those same official rates. On the other hand, those affected would not have wanted to accept payment in akfes, because their value in the market place had drastically fallen. For this reason, those on the imperial payroll tried as much as possible to be paid in gold. They could then take the pay they received at the rate of 120 akfes to the altun and change their gold back into akfes at 225 or even 250 to one.

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 21

TABLE 5

Item Akfes Percentage

Military expenses 398,392,602 62-5 Palace expenses 189,208,403 29-5 Expenses of bureaus 5,032,512 0-7

of the Divan Other expenses 44,572,831 7'5

Total 637,206,348 Io00o

The general form of the D budget is explained in Table 5. The largest expendi- ture, more than 62 percent of the income controlled by the Central Admini- strative Office, went to military expenditures. Of these, the central army took the

greatest share. In the next largest group, palace expenses, it is the monies expended on the

padi?ahzn sahst (sultan's private purse) which should draw our attention. The income of the 'Egypt Exchequer' (Misir Hazinesi), which amounted to

more than half a million altuns, paid the following directly to the padi4ahzn fahsz: from the A budget, 4'47 million akfes; from the B budget, 4-58 million; from the C budget, 6-67 million; and from the D budget, 4-5 million. Robes of honor

(hil'at), wedding and circumcision feasts, and travel expenses were also separately provided through the national budgets, with funds dispersed under the titles

'gifts' (bahsii) or 'alms' (sadaka). In this section, expenses of the palace kitchens are also of the greatest im-

portance. They were 2'5, 5'5, I3'43, and 52'5 million akfes, respectively, a twenty-fold increase from the A to the D budget. This same period of time saw the number of cooks and helpers in the palace kitchens rise to 277, 844, and 1372.

The expenses of the Royal Stables also formed an important part of these

expenditures. The cost of buying fodder, barley, harness implements, and carts was, in the four budgets, 5-5, 6-73, 5-5I, and 2I million akfes, respectively. The number of stable workers was registered at 2,830, 4,34I, 4,241, and 3,633, and their pay at approximately 5, 6, 7, and 8 million akfes a year.

In view of the increases in both the number of palace helpers and in the pay- ment for goods and supplies, it is hard not to gain the impression that the palace was more and more given to luxury and ceremony. The increase in palace porters (kapzczs), recorded in the four budgets as 319, 467, 716, and i856, respectively, is but another sign of this.

The number of craftsmen who worked in the various workshops of the palace was placed in the records as 886, I,oI6, 1,505, and 949.

The D budget lists I8 treasurers (hazineddrs) and 67 helpers (sakird) working in the national treasury (di4 hazine). The sultan's privy treasury (if hazine) employed three scribes and I6 helpers. Divan scribes numbered 37, of whom 15 were doctors.

22 Omer Lutfi Barkan

The remaining expenditures are summed up under 'Other expenses'. They include payments made to the people of the sultan's retinue, ambassadors, yearly payments to the Circassian emirs and Tatar khans, sums sent to the Holy Cities for the ceremonies of the hac, and gifts made to some royal mosques which did not have vakzf endowments.

III. THE DISORGANIZATION OF STATE FINANCES AND ITS SOCIAL

AND POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS

The introduction into Europe of a considerable quantity of precious metals, first from Africa, later from America, caused repercussions in both the political and military spheres. In the persons of their kings, the European states, caught up in the feverish rush for gold and silver that characterized the times, gave their

greatest concern to commercial affairs and to enrichment of their lands in

precious metals. This desire for enrichment seemed to be especially justified by the rise in the cost of living and the multiplication of needs which came with the onset of modern times. Drawn forward by the powerful force of their new needs, these states felt required to earn as much as possible, to find extraordinary resources, and to reorganize their finances.

As their financial strength grew, however, rivalries between states increased and European states became more and more monarchical and 'national'. The

contemporary passion for riches and the desire for ever increasing military force dictated the assembling of a modernized national army, the improvement of recruitment methods, and the perfection of armaments. This race to armaments and centralized monarchical power, owing in great part to the precipitous increase of the financial and economic potential of these states, produced both

political tension and the natural desire to use the new weapon of state, the modern

army, to gamble on conquest or ruin. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire clashed with

these newly enriched states in Central and Eastern Europe and on the Medi- terranean Sea and Indian Ocean. Since these countries drew new economic

strength from African gold, American silver, and capitalist commerce, it became

increasingly difficult for the Ottomans to win victories against them and advance into new lands. The Ottomans could not overlook the political power of their new

enemy in Iran, nor that the new world powers were laboring to harm the Empire. Because of their pressure, the Ottomans felt the need to make war on the enemies who were ever increasing on their borders and crush them before the

danger increased. To be able to win these wars, they were constrained to find new sources of income.

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 23

Liquidation of the territorial 'feudal' troops and its consequences

Following the increased perfection of its opponents' armies, the Ottoman

Empire felt obliged to progressively transform the structure and armament of its

army, the greater part of which was composed of a territorial and feudal cavalry that had proved increasingly incapable of adapting to the exigencies of modern warfare. This military reformation, encompassing the destruction of the terri- torial feudal cavalry, was a great debt and direct expense to the state. It demanded the gradual suppression of the ancient military fiefs known as timars of sipahis, originally intended to support a large territorial army composed of the feudal

cavalry of the provinces. Interestingly, this organic transformation of the Turkish army was accom-

plished without much resistance or revolt on the part of those affected by it. The evolution of the monetary economy and the long inflation had already produced a financial crisis in these military 'fiefs'. The revenues of the timariots, com-

posed of medieval rights and privileges, were not able to respond to the necessary costs of modern armament and the increased cost of living. Thus one of the first victims of the extended inflation of the second half of the sixteenth century was the semi-feudal military class of the territorial cavalry. Financial ruin became the cause of their financial and military degradation.

The timariot class had been the foundation of the agrarian organization and administration of the Ottoman Empire. Their inability to remain as a landed

aristocracy and their elimination as a class is an important phenomenon of the

history of the Empire. When this military class disappeared its place was left to other, less organic social classes which enjoyed, because of their origin and method of recruitment, less social and political prestige. This new class was, in

consequence, less apt to give the Ottoman society a framework that would allow its social and economic organization to conform to the requirements of the new times.

In addition, the concentration of an immense army in the environs of the

capital, without the counterbalance of a territorial cavalry, constituted a perman- ent danger to the security of the state and its maintenance created enormous financial difficulties. Troops of mercenaries, foolishly recruited in later times, under the pressure of events and during interminable wars, destroyed the high quality of discipline and professional conduct that had characterized the im-

perial army. This army, previously so exemplary, was now a center of troubles and revolts. Often encouraged by political rivalries, led by usurping leaders, it

exploited the least political or financial difficulty to advance its own demands. Submitting to the pressure of its transformed army and reactionary political force, the Ottoman government was not free in its decisions. It was always obliged to take into account the attitudes of this retrograde and anarchic force.

The imperial army, conscious of its power, became more and more exacting in its demands for increased salaries and privileges. It increasingly became an

24 Omer Lutfi Barkan

immense corporation whose purpose was the exploitation of the country through the administrative and fiscal organization of the state. Army men obtained

patents as 'farmers-general' and, transgressing all ordinances and customary laws, became active in commerce,' gaining lucratively from clandestine com- merce. They opened shops and abusively exercised control over trades and com- merce. This was all the more easy because of the judicial immunity of the military and their being unaffected by corporate and state regulations.

The penetration and integration of this immense mass of unscrupulous soldiers and usurpers, with their grotesque habits and deportment, into the

disciplined work life of the populace constituted a great burden on the social and economic life of the country. As an agent of disorganization and impoverishment, the army was, moreover, a cause of degradation of the morality of the people of the time.

Thus it was that a group of usurpers on yearly military 'annuities', con- centrated in the capital or dispersed into all corners of the Empire, profited from the privileges of their class and pretended to constitute a kind of commercial middle class. Their commerce, however, was always based on encroachment on other businesses and their underhanded use of military privileges and allowances to exploit the revenue sources of the state and the economy of the land. That which produced the hoarding of the profits of the long inflation had created in

Turkey a financial capitalism, but an economically unequal and unevolved

capitalism which fell into the hands of usurping soldiers and their accomplices in the Central Administration. Such a capitalism was in fact a hideous instrument of waste and corruption for the state, an organization for the systematic spoliation of the people.

Changes in the Ottoman financial system Alterations in the structure of the Turkish army, by concentrating effective

troop strength in the hands of the central government, had greatly augmented expenditures in the state budget. The thrice-yearly payment of troop salaries, upkeep of an army and navy capable of waging modern war, extraordinary ex-

penses caused by long and continuous wars, the cost of the more and more luxurious life style of both royalty and high functionaries, and, finally, the

general pressure of rising prices, put the state in a dangerous financial position. The ordinary resources of the state were no longer sufficient to fill the financial

chasm created by the expense of a giant army. It became necessary to find new sources of revenue, to free capital, coin new money, and in fact exploit thoroughly all fiscal possibilities:

Farmers-general were found to be a convenient and suitable tool for the collection of the revenues of the imperial domain (which, as stated above, was

being enlarged, to the detriment of the military fiefs), and their use spread.2 In

I Barkan, 'Tereke Defterleri', pp. 59-74. 2 This spread achieved such intensity that even the 'fiefs' of the smaller timariots and

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 25

fact, many factors combined in favor of the system of selling these revenues to the highest bidder. First, considering the presumed waste of a bureaucratic administration increasingly suspect of embezzlement and negligence, the new

system could not bring in less than the old state administration (emanet). The new system was efficient in that, pushed by competition, the farmers bid against each other and raised the prices of farms. They, of course, had to recoup their losses from their renters. In fact, once in possession of their farms, they arranged the extortion of every possible profit. They had found, so to speak, the secret of unlimited exploitation, and they did not hesitate to resort to practices both

illegal and ingenious to keep it. On the other hand, the farmers-general, by paying in advance a large part of

their debts to the state, acted as a kind of 'credit agency' in a country where the lack of a public credit institution was severely felt. The system of giving to bidders the revenues of the state, however, gave them the opportunity to

represent the state in the distant regions of the country, without effective control and with all the prerogatives awarded to an agent of the Imperial.Treasury. This both added to the oppression of the people and was a source of disorder and financial inadequacy in the imperial administration.

Thus, pressed by the effects of a long inflation and the increase in the necessary expenses of wars increasingly costly, the imperial government felt the need of

finding means to augment its financial resources, of gaining higher returns on its land, and of more easily gaining funds. These needs led it toward a system of

farmers-general. This change in the financial administrative system was not only insufficient but in the long run deficit-causing and destructive. It became neces-

sary to find other means of erasing the budget deficits that had originated in the

mounting increase in state expenses. In such conditions, the government was obliged to have recourse to well-known

taxation procedures which, as they were used more frequently, began to change in nature. Like the kings of Western monarchies, the Ottoman sultans had a kind of droit regalien which in exceptional cases allowed them to require aid from all the subjects in the imperial domain, as well as from the 'fiefs' of their vassals. There was, however, a great difference between the right of the sultan and the droit regalien of European kings. Whereas the latter were restricted in their use of absolute power to a certain number of exceptional cases, the sultan's powers were to be used totally at his discretion. A decision of the Grand Imperial Council (Divan), declared by aferman in the name of the sultan, was able to raise the 'Extraordinary Taxes of the Divan' (Avdrzz-z Divaniyye) or the 'Common Law Taxes' (Tekalif-i Orfiye) each time there was a need.' the revenues of charitable institutions (wakfs) were being sold to contractors who specialized in such business. This further demonstrates the tremendous need for revenues and money, a need that gave birth to a class of financial speculators who were interposed, to the great injury of the public interest, between the administrative cadres of the state and the people.

I See the section "Avarlz' in the Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 2, Istanbul.

26 Omer Lutfi Barkan

Because of the ease with which it was levied, this method of taxation, truly an

exception at the beginning of the sixteenth century, had become customary by the century's end; it can be considered the beginning of modern taxation in

Turkey. In actual fact, such a taxing power was a very dangerous instrument in the hands of a government menaced by bankruptcy. Its use was very tempting to a central, despotic government, because it was a system of distributive taxation, very easy to apply.

Inflation and the change in the mentality of the bureaucracy The long period of inflation in the second half of the sixteenth century grew into

a period of severe financial crisis and social agitation for the Ottoman Empire. While the inflation had created a class of nouveaux riches, it had no less reduced to

misery and desolation many who had formerly been comfortable. By releas-

ing a great passion for luxury, disturbing the public morality, and producing a sentiment of discontent and dislocation among many, the inflation constituted a source of great difficulties for the state.

Inflation, the product of contact with the 'Atlantic Economy', significantly changed the mentality of Ottoman bureaucrats. Inflation, the century's economic

illness, contaminated all with the sickness of unlimited spending, not least the bureaucrats, both high and low, who were able to make illicit gains by exploiting their public charge. The habits of petty bribery (bahsfi), intrigue, and the selling of public office were widespread and they became the causes of the downfall of the prestige and integrity of the imperial administration. This degeneration of

governmental morality caused an enormous squandering of government funds, bringing the state to a financial and political crisis.

The formation of the agricultural estate (ciftlik)

Owing to historical conditions at the time of its founding, a large part of the

agriculture of the Ottoman Empire had been divided into small peasant holdings. This was changed through the conquest and colonization by the Ottomans of vast territories and the destruction of aristocratic classes, among other reasons. Well-defined historical conditions presented the Ottoman Empire with the

necessity and possibility of administering a great part of the conquered lands as state property. The judicial and administrative machinery of state property, however, was not sufficient to save the agrarian structure from the economic and social crises. The continuous increase in the prices of agricultural commodities, pushed upward by Western prices, made possible great profits in foodstuffs. In search of these profits, the farmers-general extracted as much as possible by means of fraudulent administration and excessive exploitation of the peasants. Their success gave birth to a class of nouveaux riches, of obscure origin and

aspirations, oriented toward the countryside, who became a factor in the destruc- tion of the agrarian structure which had characterized the first centuries of the

Empire. Those who had profited from the country's economic disorders and

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 27

from inflation became more and more interested in the countryside as a place for safe and profitable investment.' Using classic methods of usury and hoarding, they increased their agricultural exploitation, playing dual roles as usurers and

country gentlemen.

IV. TOWARD A GRAVE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL UPHEAVAL

The effects of the long inflation, the influx into the villages of capital-city usurpers, the founding of vast agricultural estates, and the exploitation of the

peasants by the state in time of financial crisis and by the farmers-general continually and without scruple drove the peasants from the land and became the cause of general impoverishment and rural depopulation. Inflation had also robbed the traditional 'feudal' cavalry of its prestige and prosperity. To all these was added another factor of desolation and misery - rapid population growth.

At the precise moment of threat to its economic structure the Ottoman Empire was undergoing population growth too heavy for its means of subsistence. This

exceptional demographic increase, even more than inflation and the agrarian crisis, increased the army of unemployed, heightening the scope and destruction of the malcontents.2

How could employment be found for these classless, uprooted people, left without work and deprived of their means of existence?

i. The military offered extensive opportunities for employment: The inter- minable and exhausting wars against Persia and Austria necessitated great levies of men to fill the gaps in the ranks of the army. It was also possible to find a place in the personal following of a powerful man. The multitude of unemployed (levend) constituted a reserve army of mercenaries who did not hesitate to form their own 'companies', with their own customs and codes of honor. The docu- ments of the time often allude to such groups, called sekbdn or sarica, as being in the service of a governor.3 When their leader died or was removed, however, these 'companies', who had been his personal following, were obliged to disperse into small units and find a new master. Until they found new employment they were forced to live off the land. Under such conditions they were easily, perhaps necessarily, transformed into bandits.

2. A great number of the peasants driven from the land sought refuge and any possible employment in large cities. Toward the end of the sixteenth century the

principal cities of the empire were congested with those who had come to 'end their exploitation as peasants' (fift-bozan). The government expressed its unrest at the cities becoming the home of crime and misery, fostered by the gathering

I Barkan, 'Tereke Defterleri', pp. 30-58; Celali Isyanlarz, pp. 36-43. 2 See footnote 3, p. 13 above. 3 Akdag, Celali Isyanlari, p. 44; Mustafa Cezar, Osmanlz Tarihinde Levendler (Istanbul,

I965), Giuzel Sanatlar Akademisi Yayinlarn, no. 28.

28 Omer Lutfi Barkan

there of people of no set occupation, living in mean and unhealthy hovels and inns.

3. In addition to the army, the religious, cultural, and administrative sectors should have furnished a place for the surplus population. At a time when inflation and social dislocation cast people from their villages and their traditional classes, however, the various cultural and administrative services were already filled with workers of low quality. The charitable hospices open to students preparing to enter these fields were literally inundated by students who far outstripped their

capacities. These schools became a center for idlers and malefactors of every sort, centers of social and political agitation. In the guise of students, the un-

employed, evicted from the cities, organized themselves into armed bands and forced the peasants to maintain them.

Sometimes the peasants, already crushed by the exploitations of the imperial treasury, fought back. Peasants and 'students' fought armed battles and the intervention of the peace-keeping forces of the governor or, in some cases, the

imperial army, was necessary. We see, in the archive documents of 1560-85, an endless stream of sensational reports reaching the central government of engage- ments between the forces of order and detachments of revolting students, and of the atrocities committed by the students.'

From all sorts of revolts already fomenting under various names in Anatolia, a chief of a band of obscure origin, under the name Kara Yazicl, gathered together malcontents and mutineers and made a great army of them. The forces com- manded by Kara Yazici were repeatedly able to defeat the forces sent by Istanbul and, in turn, to have the power to occupy great cities like Kayseri, Tokat, and Urfa. After his death, Kara Yazlci's command passed to his brother, Deli

Hiiseyin, who, with an army of 20,000, marched on the richest cities of Western Anatolia and held them for ransom. The central government judged it wise to

compromise with him and offered important posts to Deli Hiiseyin and 400 of his

advisers, which they accepted. In the end, arrangements such as these, using the prestige of imperial govern-

ment offices to make the chiefs more easily capitulate, were not sufficient to

extinguish the conflagrations. It was increasingly necessary to send punitive expeditions which, as much as the revolts themselves, destroyed the prosperity of the countryside. Despoiled by both the rebellious bandits and the troops sent to put down the revolts, the Anatolian peasant fled, abandoning his fields and

villages, forced into either nomadism or the great farms.

I Mustafa Akdag, 'Tiurkiye Tarihinde I9timai Buhranlar serisinden: Medreseli Isyanlarl', Iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuasz, vol. xI (1950).