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OEA/Ser.G CP/doc. 4261/08 27 February 2008 Original: English FINAL REPORT OF THE ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSION IN JAMAICA GENERAL ELECTION 2007

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Page 1: OEA/Ser - Organization of American States 2007.doc · Web viewOEA/Ser.G. CP/doc. 4261/08. 27 February 2008. Original: English. FINAL REPORT OF THE ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSION IN

OEA/Ser.GCP/doc. 4261/0827 February 2008Original: English

FINAL REPORT OF THEELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSION IN JAMAICA

GENERAL ELECTION 2007

This document is being distributed to the permanent missions andwill be presented to the Permanent Council of the Organization.

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ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

FINAL REPORT OF THEELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSION IN JAMAICA

GENERAL ELECTION 2007

Secretariat for Political Affairs

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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................1

CHAPTER I. BACKGROUND...........................................................................................2A. History.................................................................................................2B. Electoral System..................................................................................4C. Political Party and Campaign Financing Framework.........................5

CHAPTER II. PARTICIPANTS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS..........................................6

CHAPTER III. VOTING PROCEDURE................................................................................9

CHAPTER IV. OBSERVATIONS OF THE OAS.................................................................10A. Pre-election.......................................................................................10B. Election Day......................................................................................12C. Post-Election Process..........................................................................14

CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................15

APPENDICES...............................................................................................................................19

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In an exchange of correspondence beginning in June 2007, Errol Miller, Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Jamaica (ECJ), invited the Organization of American States (OAS) to field an electoral observation mission in Jamaica. The Organization of American States (OAS) responded positively to this request and arranged, for the first time, to observe elections on the island. During a short preliminary mission, from August 15 to 16, OAS Assistant Secretary General Albert Ramdin met with the various administrative and political actors in the electoral process to discuss preparations for the election and signed an agreement with the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ) establishing the objectives and procedures for the observers’ activities. During this visit, the OAS also signed an agreement of privileges and immunities with the Government of Jamaica and another agreement of electoral guarantees with the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ).

Due to the damage inflicted by Hurricane Dean, the elections, originally scheduled for August 27, were postponed by a week until September 3. Among the effects of the hurricane was the almost total loss of electricity throughout the island. Hurricane Dean not only disrupted the preparations for the elections, but the mission as well. Flights had to be rerouted and expenses increased accordingly. Despite these adverse circumstances, the OAS fielded a mission comprising 38 international observers from 15 countries, who were deployed in 88 percent of the island’s constituencies. A core group of observers employed by the OAS joined a group of volunteers from resident diplomatic missions and from the University of the West Indies.

Since universal franchise in the 1940s, these elections proved to be the closest in the country’s history. Candidates from the two traditional parties of Jamaica, the People’s National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) competed in all 60 of the island’s constituencies. In 19 constituencies candidates ran independently or with a third political party. However, none of these succeeded in winning a seat. After 18 years of government by the People’s National Party (PNP), the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) returned to power with 33 seats, while the People’s National Party (PNP), with 27 seats, forms the new Opposition. By Jamaican standards, voter turnout was a relatively low 60%.

On Election Day, observers were deployed throughout the country, witnessing firsthand the electoral preparations, voting, and counting of ballots. They noted that, despite violent acts and loss of life in the campaign period, Election Day itself was peaceful. With few exceptions, polls throughout the country opened on time. The Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ) had effectively addressed the challenges posed by Hurricane Dean: polling stations provided the room, shelter, and equipment needed by voters. The appropriate election materials were present and, for the most part, well-trained election officials performed their duties efficiently and conscientiously. Everywhere, security was present and adequate. Auxiliary security workers manned the polling stations; the police and armed forces maintained order around the polling centers both during voting and during tallying. Party agents maintained a spirit of collegiality and worked together with election officials to ensure a smooth and orderly process.

Almost without exception, everyone whose name was on the voters’ list was able to vote. Even those citizens without identifying documentation were afforded their franchise through alternative verification processes. Observers remarked that officials were scrupulous in ensuring that no voter who could prove their entitlement to vote was disenfranchised. In 700 polling centers in the most contentious constituencies, also known as “Garrison Constituencies” in Jamaica, the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ) had implemented an Electronic Voter Identification and Ballot Issuing System, using fingerprints to verify voter identities. Reports from OAS observers and those of local electoral observation group Citizens’ Action for Free and

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Fair Elections (CAFFE) indicated that this technology worked well and was confidently accepted by both officials and voters.

Lines in the morning were long in many places. The wait was exacerbated by the fact that many voters did not have proper identification and their identities had to be verified through a series of questions. Lines eventually subsided and all who wanted to, voted. Polls closed promptly at 5:00 p.m. and, as at the opening, electoral officials followed procedures appropriately and expeditiously. Preliminary results were released the same day.

At the invitation of the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ), the Mission appointed a member of its team to participate in the deliberations of the Election Center, a mechanism that, in the run-up to the election, permitted the political parties to voice their concerns to appropriate authorities and seek immediate responses to these concerns. The observer of this process was impressed by the openness and effectiveness of the Election Center, which allowed participants from across the political spectrum to communicate grievances or anxieties in a neutral setting and to request and see quick action on security and election management.

The OAS Mission wishes to recognize and thank all those involved in the General Elections of 2007 in Jamaica. In particular, the Mission congratulates the Jamaican people on their peaceful and orderly participation in this vital democratic exercise. The Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ), headed by Danville Walker, did an excellent job under difficult circumstances. Election officials, the constabulary and security forces all performed their duties in an exemplary fashion, as did the national electoral observation group, CAFFE. There were some ways in which the Mission felt the electoral process in Jamaica could be improved and these are detailed in the conclusions and recommendations of this report. Overall, however, the conclusion of the OAS observation Mission in Jamaica is positive. These elections were extremely well organized, transparent, and every effort was made to promote the participation of all citizens.

The Mission would also like to thank the Governments of Canada, the People’s Republic of China and the United States for providing crucial financial support and observers and, likewise, the Governments of the United Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic, Haiti as well as the University of the West Indies, which also contributed volunteer observers.

CHAPTER I. BACKGROUND

A. HISTORY

Jamaica is an island in the Caribbean Sea, south of Cuba, with a land area of 10,831 square kilometers and a population of 2,780,132, of which approximately 91.2 percent are black, 6.2 percent are of mixed race, and 2.6 percent are of white or other ethnicity. The island’s modern economy is heavily dependent on services, which account for over 60 percent of the GDP. Tourism is a growth sector, but other important industries, such as bauxite mining, fruit production, sugar, and coffee have struggled in the face of international competition and events such as Hurricane Ivan in 2004, which caused extensive damage. Jamaica has steadily reduced its public debt in recent years and inflation has fallen, but the public debt to GDP ratio remains high, at over 130 percent, and unemployment, underemployment and violence fueled by gangs involved in the illegal drug trade remain significant challenges.

Initially populated by Amerindian Tainos, Jamaica was colonized by the Spanish in the sixteenth century, causing extermination of the native population. The colonists increasingly brought slaves from West Africa to supply labor; some escaped into the island’s interior,

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becoming known as cimmarones (“untamed”), a word later corrupted by the British into ‘Maroons’. In the mid seventeenth century, a British force led by Robert Venables and William Penn captured Jamaica from the Spanish and large tracts of the island were divided into estates for the naval officers involved in the conquest. Buccaneers, who pursued Spanish ships in Caribbean waters, were initially encouraged by the British, who benefited from the defense and booty they afforded, but were then outlawed, as the Jamaican economy turned from intercepting South American cargo to exporting sugar, of which in the eighteenth century it became the world’s biggest producer.

Sugar and coffee plantations manned by large numbers of slaves, kept in squalid conditions, generated enormous wealth for a small number of colonists. Grotesque inequality and abuse produced continual conflict between slaves and slave owners. Slave rebellions, with escaping slaves sometimes joining the renegade inland Maroons, followed by violent reprisals in which thousands of slaves were executed, were a feature of British occupation, from 1690 through to 1838 when slaves were finally emancipated. Jamaica remained tense after abolition, with freed slaves struggling to afford high rents to farm land still held by planters, and a further revolt against the colonists in 1865, followed by summary executions by the British Governor, led Britain in 1866 to make the island a Crown Colony, with direct rule from Britain replacing an elected assembly that had been dominated by plantation owners. This change had the benefit of introducing modern reforms and investment in education, transport, law courts, and policing; however, paternalistic and unrepresentative rule from overseas frustrated the development of democracy on the island for nearly eighty years.

The early twentieth century brought increasing economic prosperity to Jamaica, with the fruit industry, especially bananas, and tourism, initially from travelers carried on the banana boats, developing in tandem. However, gross inequality remained a feature of the island’s socio-economic make-up and a series of natural disasters including earthquakes and hurricanes took their toll. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, a dramatic fall in sugar exports, a banana crop decimated by disease, and tightened US immigration laws all put pressure on swelling numbers of unemployed workers. Riots, protests and strikes erupted. As a result of a fatal clash in 1938 between police and workers at the West Indies Sugar Factory in Frome, Alexander Bustamante founded Jamaica’s first trade union and, in the crucible of trade union activism, a political party took shape: the People’s National Party (PNP), founded by lawyer Norman Manley. In 1943 Bustamante split from Manley’s PNP to found the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). These two parties have continued as the major forces contesting Jamaican politics to the present day.

Jamaica was an important Allied base during World War II, the island provided Britain with vital food supplies, and many Jamaicans fought on the Allied side. These roles created a more international outlook, financial investment and pressure for greater autonomy. A new constitution in 1944 introduced universal adult suffrage and the first elections were held for a locally-based government to work in conjunction with the British-appointed governor. The JLP, which came to adopt a liberal capitalist philosophy, won these elections on a ‘Bread and Butter’ platform and returned to government in 1949. Norman Manley’s PNP, which leant toward democratic socialism, at first failed to persuade voters with its vision, which favored independence. However, in 1955, the PNP was successful at the polls and a break with Britain followed. In 1958, Jamaica joined the new West Indian Federation, intended to form an economic and political bloc that would replace colonial with inter-Caribbean ties; the federation, however, disintegrated in 1961. Jamaica gained full independence in 1962, while remaining a member of the British Commonwealth.

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On winning the 1962 election, Alexander Bustamante became Jamaica’s first post-independence Prime Minister and the JLP continued in power until the election of 1972, won by the PNP, led by Michael Manley (Norman Manley’s son). There followed eight years of PNP rule. During the 1970s, Jamaican politics became highly polarized. Rejecting ties with the United States, Michael Manley’s government turned to the nonaligned movement and created close ties with Fidel Castro’s Cuba. Higher taxation and American economic sanctions encouraged some wealthy white Jamaicans and foreign investors to leave. Edward Seaga, leader of the JLP, accused the administration of ‘communism’. There was an upsurge in political violence, particularly in urban ghetto or ‘garrison’ constituencies, where party supporters increasingly carried guns. Rival gangs affiliated with the major political parties evolved into organized crime networks involved in drug smuggling and money laundering. Difficult economic times, in which the government was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), exacerbated rising political tensions and the 1980 election campaign was exceptionally violent, with several hundred deaths in shoot-outs and gang warfare.

Edward Seaga of the JLP won the 1980 elections and immediately realigned Jamaica toward the United States, embracing the newly-elected Reagan administration. In 1983, Jamaican troops assisted the US invasion of Grenada to depose Marxist leaders who had overthrown and executed the Prime Minister. Shortly afterward, the JLP called a snap election, which the PNP boycotted, leaving the JLP under Seaga in sole control of Jamaica’s parliament until 1989, when Michael Manley and the PNP returned to office. Although the new PNP administration restored links with Cuba, they emphasized continuity of policy, maintaining diplomatic relations with the USA and a generally liberal economic policy. In 1992, Manley resigned the premiership on grounds of ill health and was succeeded by P.J. Patterson. Patterson went on to defeat Seaga and the JLP in the 1993 general elections and was re-elected in 1997 and 2002, bringing to an end an era in which the PNP and JLP had typically alternated after two terms. In 2006, he resigned as Prime Minister, handing over to Portia Simpson-Miller, who became Jamaica’s first female Prime Minister.

At the time of the 2007 OAS Electoral Observation Mission (EOM), Portia Simpson-Miller led the PNP, which had been in power for 18 years. Meanwhile, Bruce Golding led the JLP, which was seeking a return to government after a long absence. Election preparations were affected by Hurricane Dean, a category four hurricane, which arrived on August 19. Although Jamaica was spared a direct hit, its south coast was battered with torrential rain, high winds and storm surges, causing significant damage to property, toppling trees across roads and pylons, outing electricity supply to much of the island, and forcing airport closures. The Prime Minister declared a month-long state of emergency and the general elections were postponed from their original date of August 27 until September 3.

B. ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Jamaica is a parliamentary democracy on the Westminster model. Its bicameral Parliament consists of an appointed Senate and an elected House of Representatives. The House of Representatives has 60 seats, corresponding to Jamaica's 60 constituencies, which are grouped into 14 administrative parishes. Single members are elected by popular vote in a “first-past-the-post” general election, to serve parliamentary terms of up to five years, until the next election. The Senate has twenty-one seats, thirteen appointed on the advice of the prime minister, and eight on the advice of the leader of the opposition; significant constitutional change requires a two thirds majority in both houses: thus, for example, at least one opposition appointee would have to vote with those of the government in the Senate. General elections must be held within five years of the forming of a new government.

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The Governor General, an honorary appointment made on the advice of the Prime Minister, represents British monarch Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State, and performs ceremonial functions, though formally possessing a reserve power to dismiss the Prime Minister or Parliament. Following general elections, the Governor General will usually nominate the leader of the majority party as Prime Minister, and the Cabinet on the Prime Minister’s advice. No fewer than two and no more than four members of the Cabinet must be selected from the Senate.

All Jamaican citizens who have reached the age of eighteen are entitled to register to vote, provided they are residents in Jamaica on the date of registration. Citizenship is bestowed by birth, parentage (either parent) or marriage. Commonwealth citizens may also vote if they have been residents in Jamaica for at least twelve months prior to registration. Dual citizenship is recognized by Jamaica for the purpose of voting, but dual nationals are not qualified to be appointed to the Senate or elected to the House of Representatives. Election workers and members of the police and armed forces cast their ballots a few days before the general election, to allow them to work on Election Day to manage and secure polling sites.

C. POLITICAL PARTY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING FRAMEWORK

Like most of its counterparts in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Jamaica does not have a tradition of public funding for political candidates or political parties. Jamaica’s Representation of the People Act requires candidates, rather than political parties, to disclose the amounts they receive or spend. Each candidate is required to account for election-related income and expenditure within six weeks of Election Day. There is a J$ 3 million (approximately US$42,700) limit on expenditure. There is, however, no system in place for inspecting or auditing candidates’ returns. Expenditure limits are thus largely unenforced and disregarded. Moreover, parties do not insist that candidates obey the law. Some candidates even declare that they spent nothing, and that the party met all their expenses. Lacking juridical definition, political parties are not required to indicate funding sources or amounts spent. There are no significant requirements for distribution of resources, nor prohibitions and limits on financing. This situation contributes to a degree of inequity and unfairness of competition among parties and candidates running for office. Those with access to resources enjoy a distinct, though not necessarily decisive, electoral advantage. The financing regime facilitates undue influence by the private sector, licit and illicit, undermines the integrity of the public procurement system, and brings the wider political system into disrepute.

A lack of disclosure in Jamaica makes it difficult to estimate campaign expenditures with any real precision. As elsewhere in the Caribbean, though, there is considerable evidence of a significant increase in spending on electoral activities in recent years, due partly to a marked decline in volunteer political activism, but chiefly due to a substantial increase in media campaign costs.

There is a concentration of major donors. Recipients of significant donations are confined to the candidates and leadership of the two major political parties. While no one has been convicted or even charged with receiving illegal campaign contributions, many Jamaicans interviewed in a 2005 OAS study into Caribbean political financing believed that proceeds from illegal drug money found their way into election campaigns, probably through individual candidates.

There have been some recent signs that both major parties are concerned by the lack of transparency and accountability in current campaign finance requirements and that the regulation of political financing in Jamaica is on the legislative agenda. A professor at the University of the West Indies has argued that legislative reform to ensure "greater transparency and accountability

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in political parties and in the public sector" is an urgent requirement for strengthening national integrity systems in the Caribbean.1

CHAPTER II. PARTICIPANTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

A. ELECTION AUTHORITY AND ELECTION OFFICIALS

1. The Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ)

The Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ), headed by the Director of Elections, is responsible for operating the electoral system and conducting the island’s elections; it employs and deploys election officials. On Election Day a Presiding Officer and a Poll Clerk staff each polling station; they report to the Returning Officer for that constituency. Returning Officers report preliminary results electronically, immediately following the count, to the Election Centre, where the Director of Elections controls operations.

2. The Jamaican Electoral Commission (JEC)

The Jamaican Electoral Commission (JEC) replaced in December 2006 the Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC). Currently headed by Professor Errol Miller, it has nine members: four nominated (two PNP and two JLP), four selected members (from civil society), and the Director of Elections, who is a non-acting member. This structure replaces that of the former Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC), effective since 1979, which had eight members: two persons nominated by the Prime Minister, two nominated by the Leader of the Opposition, three independent voting members and the Director of Elections. The new JEC structure gives equal weight of voting numbers to party political and civil society members. The JEC also carries greater authority than the previous EAC and can enforce compliance with its recommendations.

3. The Political Ombudsman

The Office of the Political Ombudsman was established in 2002 and has the responsibility of investigating complaints and problems in the political arena. The Ombudsman, currently Bishop Herro Blair, is required by law to investigate complaints to his office – for example complaints about intimidation and harassment, or other improper or illegal activity by politicians and their supporters. He has authority to appoint a tribunal comprising political party representatives to assist him in the investigation process. Complaints to the office may be made by any person or a body of persons whether incorporated or not, who claim to be affected by any such action by members of a political party. As the Political Ombudsman described the process: “We go through the complaints, we discuss them and I try the matter before the leaders, come up with a decision and then they go away with the decision. So far so good, the decisions have been accepted by the persons concerned.”2 From nomination day to Election Day the Political Ombudsman makes all his rulings public, stating why he has come to a decision and what action he has determined that the political actors should take.

1 Organization of American States, “Caribbean Meeting of Inter-American Forum on Political Parties Final Report,” Montego Bay, Jamaica. April 27 to 29, 2005, page 19.2 “Political Ombudsman urges Citizens to Maintain Peace during Election Period ,” in General Election 2007, Jamaica Information Service, August 3, 2007.

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4. The Election Centre

The Election Centre was established in 2002 to enhance the management, transparency and interaction of all stakeholders in the period between nomination day and Election Day. The centre includes representatives of the main political parties – the People’s National Party (PNP), the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), and the National Democratic Movement (NDM). It also includes the Political Ombudsman, a representative of the civil society group Citizens’ Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE), a representative of the Jamaica Constabulary Force and the Director of Elections. Regular, scheduled meetings are held to discuss any issue affecting either political or electoral matters; political matters are handled by the Political Ombudsman and electoral matters by the Director of Elections. The Centre provides a safe and functional forum for conflict resolution and a clearing-house for information, in which the competing parties and other stakeholders can raise complaints, address problems such as outbreaks of election-related violence, and see immediate action taken on these issues. The Centre is equipped with telephones, computers and databases that allow it to track incidents, follow-up actions, and outcomes. It issues daily press briefings, combating the spread of rumor and misinformation that have in the past fueled violence during the election period. A member of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) was permitted to sit in on the deliberations of the Election Centre and observe its workings.

B. POLITICAL PARTIES

Two political parties have traditionally dominated elections in Jamaica: the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People's National Party (PNP). Third party or independent candidates contested 19 constituencies in the 2007 election but none won a seat and, taken together, they polled only 0.1% of the vote.

1. The Jamaica Labour Party (JLP)Party colour: Green Party symbol: The liberty bell

The Jamaica Labour Party, founded in 1943 by Alexander Bustamante, as the political wing of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, won the first elections held in Jamaica under universal suffrage in 1944. Although born, like the PNP, out of the trades union movement, with an emphasis on improving relations between workers and employers and pursuing greater racial and social equality, the JLP gradually came to occupy a liberal capitalist position further to the political right than the PNP, stressing the importance of attracting inward investment and economic growth. Ideological difference from the PNP was at its most pronounced in the 1970s and early 1980s, when the JLP objected strongly to the PNP’s socialist fiscal and foreign policy. Bustamante led the party from its founding until 1964, when he retired from active participation in politics. The JLP held a parliamentary majority from independence in 1962 to 1972 under Bustamante, de facto succeeded by Donald Sangster and Hugh Shearer as acting leaders during Bustamante's long illness. In 1980, the JLP, then led by Edward Seaga, regained its majority in the second of two elections marked by violence between supporters of the two parties. In 1983 a controversial snap election called by Seaga was boycotted by the PNP and thus effectively uncontested. The JLP remained in power until 1989 and then lost five consecutive elections. The current leader of the JLP, Bruce Golding, took the helm of the party in 2005.

The JLP's 2007 manifesto, "A Better Way... for a Better Jamaica", starts by criticizing the eighteen years of PNP administration, asserting that Jamaica has fallen steadily behind comparable nations. It goes on to focus on key areas: economic growth, reduction in the national debt, unemployment, crime, education and skills, corruption, health services, road maintenance, water, human rights, the justice system and "values, standards and respect" in society as a whole.

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The party slogan "Justice, Liberty & Prosperity", plays on the initials JLP, and emphasizes its message that these three areas suffered under the PNP. While conspicuously absent from the manifesto, other campaigning material accused the PNP of large-scale corruption.

2. The People's National Party (PNP)Party colour: Orange Party symbol: A head

The People's National Party (PNP), founded by Norman Manley in 1938 and supported by the National Workers' Union (NWU), is regarded as the more left wing of the two main Jamaican political parties. It came to office in 1955, which it held until just before independence in 1962, when it was defeated by the JLP. Ten years later, under the leadership of its founder's son, Michael Manley, it returned to office committed to democratic socialism and an anti-imperialist foreign policy that brought it into conflict with vested interests on the island and with the United States. The PNP won the following election but was defeated at the polls in 1980, both campaigns being marked by violence between the supporters of the two parties. In 1983, Manley led the party in a boycott of the snap election, and the PNP was absent from parliament for more than five years.

Still under Manley, the PNP returned to power in 1989, having largely abandoned its previous fiscal and foreign policy stance while continuing to stress investment in the public sector. Manley retired in 1992, and the party went on to win the next five consecutive elections under Percival Patterson. In February 2006, Portia Simpson-Miller was elected as Patterson's successor, becoming the first female president of the PNP and Prime Minister of Jamaica, on a huge wave of popular support.

The PNP's 2007 manifesto, "Shaping the future together... on course to the quality society", emphasized tackling poverty through economic development, with a declared mission "Toward developed country status". It claimed credit for economic stability, infrastructural development, transformation of social services and attraction of foreign investment. Specific policy areas highlighted included: constitutional reform; governance and justice; public order and security; wealth and job creation; environment, land and development planning; energy security; education and training; governance and community development; and a number of specific social programs.

3. The National Democratic Movement (NDM)Party color: Yellow and green Party symbol: The lighthouse

A third political party, with conservative leanings, the National Democratic Movement (NDM), was formed in October 1995 by Bruce Golding, former chairman of the JLP. The NDM claims that Jamaica has suffered due to a stagnant economy and rapidly growing population and that constitutional and civic reform and investment are desperately needed to save the country from poverty and corruption: two-party politics has served Jamaica ill and it needs a third way. Mr. Golding returned to the JLP in 2002, assuming its leadership when Edward Seaga retired, and several other leading figures in the NDM have since withdrawn or significantly reduced their activities in the party. Under its leader, Earl DeLisser, the NDM polled only 540 votes in the 2007 election.

4. Imperial Ethiopian World Federation Incorporation Party (IEWFIPP)  

The first Rastafarian political party was launched in October 2001 by Ras Astor Black. His campaign platform was to rid Jamaica of ‘economic and political terrorists’ and to abolish the current constitution and monarchy. This paved the way for the creation of IEWFIPP in 2002 by members of the church of Haile Selassie. Many Rastafarians are opposed to any involvement in

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mainstream politics, including voting, but IEWFIPP seeks to unite Rastafarians, to seek better political representation for their views, and closer ties between Africa and Jamaica. In 2007 the party was represented in nine constituencies but did not win a slice of the vote.

C. CIVIL SOCIETY

Citizens’ Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE) was founded in 1997 and is staffed solely by volunteers. It aims to monitor elections, including parish council elections and by-elections as well as general elections in its remit, and to encourage a peaceful and orderly campaign period. Before a general election CAFFE holds meetings around the island and seeks around 2000 volunteers, who are trained to observe the polls and are deployed throughout Jamaica’s fourteen constituencies.

The Jamaica Women's Political Caucus (JWPC), a non-partisan, voluntary organization devoted to increasing the participation of women in representational politics at the highest level, encourages and supports female candidature in elections. As it has done since 1993, during the campaign the JWPC hosted a media breakfast in a Kingston hotel specifically for women candidates, inviting them to present their campaign highlights and their personal profile.

D. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

In addition to the OAS Election Observation Mission, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) mounted an observer mission, with which the OAS Mission liaised closely, and which presented similar findings. The CARICOM Mission numbered nine, and was headed by Mr. Gerald Watt, Chairman of the Election Commission of Antigua and Barbuda.

CHAPTER III. VOTING PROCEDURE

Each polling station is manned by a Presiding Officer and a Poll Clerk. These election officials report to a Returning Officer, responsible for the electoral district. Members of the police, auxiliary police and/or armed forces are present to secure each polling site, and one party agent or representative for each candidate contesting the election is permitted to be present to witness the conduct of the poll, as are accredited national and/or international observers. No candidate and his or her agent should both be in the same polling station for more than five minutes and no more than four election observers are permitted to remain in any polling location at any one time. No cell phones, cameras, or other video recording devices are permitted in the polling station.

Polls open at 7 a.m. and close at 5 p.m. All polling officials should report for duty no later than 6 a.m. The Presiding Officer must post the Directions to Electors in a visible place outside the polling station before the poll opens. S/he must count the ballot papers in the presence of the agents and give them copies of a certificate signed by the Returning Officer setting out the serial number of ballot papers for use at that station. At 7 a.m., s/he must display the empty ballot box to all present, then lock it and keep the key, placing the box on the table in full view where it must remain until the poll closes.

On entering the polling station each elector declares his or her name, which the poll clerk checks against the official list of electors for that station, and produces his or her identity card. The Presiding Officer checks the ID card and inspects the elector’s finger with the integrity lamp to ascertain if there is any stain of electoral ink.

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Electors without ID cards can also be identified by other means. If the polling station is equipped with an Electronic Voter Identification and Ballot Issuing System (EVIBIS), the voter’s fingerprint(s) can be electronically scanned, bringing his or her name up on a computer screen if s/he is eligible to vote. Electors who lack ID cards can also be identified by means of the Black Book, a compilation of voter data: the voter is asked questions, such as ‘in what parish was your father born; what is your mother’s maiden name; what is your spouse’s occupation’, which s/he must answer correctly.

If the elector is satisfactorily identified, the Presiding Officer then issues a ballot, instructing the elector impartially on how to mark and fold the ballot and directing him or her to the voting booth. Having made his or her mark in the voting booth against the name of a candidate, the elector presents the ballot to the Presiding Officer, folded in such a way that his or her mark is not seen but the initials of the Presiding Officer are visible. The Presiding Officer examines the top of the ballot and checks the serial number to make sure it is the ballot issued to that elector. The serial number of the ballot returned must be recorded in the Poll Book. The Presiding Officer then tears off the serial number and destroys it in the presence of the elector. S/he requires the elector to immerse the right index finger in the electoral ink and deposits the ballot in the ballot box. The Poll Clerk then records in the Poll Book that the elector has voted.

Those physically incapacitated may direct the presiding officer, in the presence of the poll clerk and party agents, to cast their vote according to their instructions. Blind voters may, alternatively, be assisted by a chosen friend, but no person can act in this capacity for more than one blind voter.

If at 5 p.m. there are persons still waiting to vote, the Presiding Officer can either invite them into the polling station and close the door (depending on number) or ask the policeman to note the last person in the line and not to allow any other person to join the line. All eligible voters in line at 5 p.m. must be allowed to exercise their franchise.

At the close of the poll, the Presiding Officer seals the slot on top of the ballot box and writes and signs a statement in the Poll Book below the last entry, declaring the number of persons who voted at that station. S/he checks the number of spoiled and unused ballots, distributes tally sheets, then opens the ballot box and counts the ballots therein. S/he encases ballots in appropriate envelopes, as marked for individual candidates, and ensures the packages are signed and sealed. S/he completes a preliminary certificate and affixes a copy of the preliminary results on a form which is pasted on the side of the ballot box. The Presiding Officer then prepares a Statement of Poll and the Polling Station Accounts.

When all the necessary election materials have been properly packaged and signed by the election officials and party agents, the Presiding Officer delivers or dispatches the ballot box to the Returning Officer as directed.

CHAPTER IV. OBSERVATIONS OF THE OAS

A. PRE-ELECTION

During a short preliminary mission, from August 15 to 16, 2007, the Chief of Mission met with the various administrative and political actors in the electoral process to discuss preparations for the election, and signed an agreement with the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ) establishing the objectives and procedures for the EOM and an agreement of privileges and immunities with the Government of Jamaica. During that visit, and in the days before the election, he also met

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with the Governor General, the Political Ombudsman, representatives of civil society organizations, including youth and religious organizations, the international diplomatic community, and the local observer group CAFFE. The OAS Electoral Observer Mission remained in close contact with the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ) during the period of disruption due to the hurricane on August 19, which caused the election to be postponed by a week. Observers arrived a few days before the new election date of September 3.

From the beginning, the 2007 election appeared closely contested. While Portia Simpson-Miller took office in 2006 on a wave of popular support and some early polls suggested a narrow PNP lead, the JLP gathered increasing support as the campaign wore on and polls began to suggest the possibility of a narrow JLP victory. Media criticism of Simpson-Miller’s leadership, particularly her handling of relief efforts in the wake of Hurricane Dean, appeared to contribute to this shift. Personalities loomed large in campaign rhetoric, with an unfortunate degree of “ad personam” rhetoric and negative campaigning on both sides that sought to emphasize opponents’ failures rather than proposing positive policy directions. Indeed, several commentators remarked that there was now little to differentiate the policies of the two major parties.

Party political broadcasting on television and radio was ubiquitous throughout the campaign period, including the final 48 hours before Election Day, when several of the incidents of politically-related violence occurred. The unusually lengthy campaign period of eight weeks (including the week-long postponement) meant that this was clearly a very costly campaign and traditional rivalries between supporters of the two major parties had an opportunity to manifest and deepen.

On a positive note, candidates in all 60 constituencies signed a Code of Conduct, agreed to in Parliament between the two main political parties. This Code extended to all members of political parties operating in Jamaica and enshrined principles including non-violence and non-intimidation, safety of public and private property, avoidance of confrontation, avoidance of inflammatory utterances, freedom of access, eschewing political tribalism, and commitment to a code of ethics.

According to Errol Miller, the chairman of Jamaica’s Electoral Commission (JEC), there was a small rise in 2007 in the number of incidents of politically-related violence compared with the 2002 elections, in which there were four politically-related deaths. Gunmen shot seven people on September 1, in what police said was political violence. Many of the ten other killings reported to police over the weekend of September 1 and 2 were thought to have been politically linked. Miller attributed the rise in violence to the tension of a tight political race in an election that had ‘a sharper edge than 2002’, but emphasized that these incidents, though lamentable, were small in number compared to the hundreds of fatal incidents of political violence Jamaica endured in the past. The general trend toward a peaceful electoral process remains positive and many emphasized the process of ‘painstaking change’ that Jamaica has undergone toward reform.

Improvements in the electoral system introduced in 2002, such as the introduction of the Election Centre and the reinstatement of the role of Political Ombudsman, continued to prove their worth in the 2007 elections. The Election Centre and the power of the Political Ombudsman helped address complaints and resolve conflict quickly and openly, to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. Rallies were cancelled on the spot in constituencies where violence had flared up. A helicopter tour of constituencies by one candidate was deemed to fall into the forbidden category of campaigning in the final 24 hours before the poll and the candidate was promptly grounded. The member of the OAS EOM who was permitted to visit the Election Centre reported on the effectiveness of this mechanism and the civility of its interactions.

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The Mission conducted a training session on September 1, where observers were taken through the parameters and methodology for observing and were assigned partners and areas to cover. At this session, the Mission met with the Director of Elections and was likewise impressed by the steps undertaken by the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ), some tested in 2002 and refined and reinforced in 2007, to create a more robust and reliable electoral process. For example, swift electronic transmission of results directly to the Election Centre meant that ballot boxes, which in previous elections had sometimes been stolen en route to Returning Offices, were no longer targets. The fact that, since 2002, election workers vote at an early date, along with the police and armed forces, allowed for greater flexibility in deployment. Election Day workers could thus be deployed to any polling site on the island and were frequently brought from elsewhere in the country to staff stations in Garrison Constituencies, where the integrity and impartiality of officials were formerly difficult to ensure.

A voters’ list is produced every six months and every month a meeting in every constituency looks at reported duplicates and anomalies. A recent house-to-house re-verification exercise removed 235,000 people from the voters’ list of 1.3 million. The Director of Elections explained that, although the list likely remained inflated by the names of some who had died or emigrated, the EOJ’s chief concern was that it should not accidentally disenfranchise any legitimate voter, but should robustly prevent double or fraudulent voting. To that end, identification checks had been made more stringent in 2007, with an Electronic Voter Identification and Ballot Issuing System (EVIBIS) using fingerprints to verify voter identities in 700 of the most contentious constituencies. Voters without ID were asked a series of questions (such as their spouse’s occupation, their date of birth, and mother’s parish). The answers were supplied to election officials as a “Black Book” of voter data. Voters verified by the Black Book system were required to leave a manual record of their index fingerprint for inclusion in future records.

The Director of Elections reported that only eight polling stations had been relocated because of hurricane and 155 had been damaged but repaired in time for the election. These centers represented just a small fraction of Jamaica’s 6,230 polling stations, most of which were unaffected. Electricity loss had been restored in most places. The EOJ could thus express confidence that the aftermath of the hurricane would not materially affect Election Day.

B. ELECTION DAY

Observers, working in pairs, were assigned to cover the polling stations in a designated area. Those observing in rural areas were typically able to cover between one and three constituencies, while those in densely populated urban areas were able to cover between three and five constituencies. On Election Day, September 3, 2007, each pair of observers arrived at a selected polling station at approximately 6 a.m. to observe preparations and opening procedures. Throughout the day, they circulated to different polling stations in their constituencies, collecting information about the opening and closing of the polls and the conduct of the voting and recording it on special forms (see Appendix VI). They obtained this information through firsthand observation and through interviews with the election officials, policemen and voters at the polling stations. In all, the OAS EOM’s 38 observers covered 88 percent of the island’s constituencies

Observers remained at a particular polling station after 5 p.m. to witness the close of the poll and counting of ballots. They delivered their completed forms to the Mission rapporteur and made an oral report at a meeting held by the Chief of Mission on the evening of September 3. A small CARICOM mission also observed the 2007 Jamaica general election and both observer missions shared their impressions, which proved broadly similar.

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A consistent picture emerged from the observer testimony about the election, despite the very varied areas of Jamaica in which teams were deployed. On Election Day, polling was peaceful and ran smoothly. A small percentage of polling stations experienced minor delays in opening, in a couple of cases because the Black Book had not yet arrived. However, the vast majority opened on time at 7 a.m. In general, the necessary election materials were present and correct.

The secrecy of the ballot and integrity of the ballot box were rigorously maintained. Almost without exception, everyone whose name was on the voters’ list was able to vote. Even those citizens without identifying documentation were afforded their franchise through alternative verification processes; observers remarked that officials were scrupulous in ensuring that no voter who could prove their entitlement to vote was disenfranchised. For example, in one case in rural St. Andrew, a woman who had been impersonated by another individual and who had thus been wrongly recorded as having voted was, after proving her identity, permitted to vote. This case of impersonation was the only case the observers came across of serious irregularity on the part of an elector. Election officials addressed this problem following standard procedure.

Observers noted long lines at polling stations, especially in the morning. In a couple of cases, an attempt to prevent long and unruly lines within the polling site resulted in a frustrated crowd developing outside its gates. These lines dwindled during the day and all those entitled to vote could do so. However, lines were rendered long in some cases due to uneven distribution of voters between polling stations, often at the same polling site. Some polling stations had as many as 400 voters while, according to one observer in West Rural St. Andrew, one polling station had only seven registered voters. Within urban polling sites, it was common to find that one polling station had double or triple the number of voters registered at others, so that one team of electoral officers was stretched to capacity while others remained idle.

Many voters did not have their voter identification card with them and therefore had to go through a process of questioning, confirmation and fingerprinting, which on average doubled the time for the casting of the ballot. In 700 polling centers in the “Garrison Constituencies”, the Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ) implemented the Electronic Voter Identification and Ballot Issuing System (EVIBIS), using fingerprints to verify voter identities. This technology required the use of a fingerprint reader, a portable computer and a printer. The voter merely placed his or her finger on the reader and all of the relevant information appeared on the computer screen. Despite the high-level technology, voters appeared to trust this system. Likewise, the technicians and poll workers were comfortable in its use.3 Reports from OAS observers indicated that this technology worked well and expedited the voting process.

Security on Election Day was everywhere present and robust. A large number of auxiliary police officers supplemented the presence of regular police and members of the armed forces at polling sites. Minor incidents were speedily and effectively controlled. Observers noted a couple of instances in which one voter attempted to verbally intimidate or harass another; in both cases the offending elector was immediately removed by election officials. Gunshots were fired outside one polling site in St. Andrew South Eastern and voting was suspended for 30 minutes while security forces dealt with the incident. Nobody was hurt, however, and voting resumed shortly afterward.

A few voters suggested that fears about insecurity, fuelled by a few widely publicized incidents of violence in the run-up to Election Day, may have contributed to a low turn-out. Such speculations are impossible to verify but highlight the importance of visible and dependable

3. It is important to note, however, that this is not electronic voting. Citizens still mark a paper ballot creating a paper trail that is later verified.

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security in the campaign period, particularly the final 48 hours, to mitigate voter anxieties that may be out of proportion to the real threat of unrest.

Access to polling stations for the physically challenged was difficult in some cases due to stairs, crowds, and other obstructions. Some polling stations were also unduly cramped. This problem was particularly reported by the team observing in Portland and Clarendon. One team of observers in Manchester Central and Southern reported that a few citizens complained that they had wanted to vote but lacked transport to reach the poll.

A subtler access issue is presented by the visible demonstration of party affiliations on Election Day. Voters often wear bright party colors and carry party membership cards. Those in the queue may therefore be difficult to distinguish from party agents inside the polling station. Voters also typically check their name on the voter list with either one of the party groups encamped outside the polling site. This is a matter of custom in Jamaica and the Mission observed primarily good-natured banter between rival party groups on Election Day, with only one group reporting dissatisfaction that counterparts were too close to the polling site itself. The Mission considers that the overtness of supporters from the two main parties may intimidate some voters.

Observers noted that a disproportionate number of electors were in the over-35 age group, suggesting that in Jamaica, as in many other countries, a significant proportion of young people are not sufficiently motivated to vote. Gender imbalance was also apparent in the election, with a majority of election workers and agents being female, while males dominated the lists of candidates. Some observers noted that the EOJ’s slogan “one man, one vote”, widely printed on t-shirts worn by election officials, while it could be interpreted as including both sexes, was not gender neutral.

Election officials were, on the whole, well trained and performed their duties impartially, efficiently and with pride in and commitment to their roles. Not all election officials were aware of what the OAS was, why it was observing elections, and how long observers might be allowed to stay in a polling station to observe it. However, teams were treated with cordiality and helpfulness even in those places where their role was not fully understood.

Observers in the field noted a handful of cases in which electoral officials were inexperienced and their need to consult instructions delayed voting. The handbook provided by the EOJ is, however, commendably thorough and the correct procedures were eventually identified and followed. Likewise there were occasional variations in practice – the most common being Presiding Officers forgetting to tear off the serial number from ballots before depositing them in the ballot box. None of these anomalies, however, was deemed deliberate or detrimental to the integrity and accuracy of the result.

The closing of the polls, the counting of ballots and the transmission of preliminary results were completed safely and conscientiously. A small number of recounts delayed confirmation of the final election result, but this reflected the very close nature of the contest rather than any inadequacy in the counting system. The overwhelming sentiment expressed by observers at the end of Election Day was that Jamaica had risen to the challenge of mounting peaceful and rigorous elections in the wake of Hurricane Dean.

C. POST-ELECTION PROCESS

The close result, in which the preliminary count indicated that the JLP had won 32 seats to the PNP’s 28 seats, made for a tense post-election atmosphere. Portia Simpson-Miller, the Prime

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Minister and leader of the PNP, refused initially to concede defeat, claiming irregularities on the part of JLP candidates and supporters. The re-counting process in a few seats was acrimonious, with recourse in the Hanover Eastern constituency to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal over whether and how a recount should be conducted. This dispute lasted over three weeks after the election. A minor irregularity was revealed by the EOJ, in which two ballot boxes in the South East St. Mary constituency containing early votes by Election Day workers, had accidentally remained uncounted. This was remedied, however, and the result was unchanged. Ms. Simpson-Miller accepted the JLP victory in the days immediately following the election, after recounts fixed their tally of seats at 33 to the PNP’s 27.

The PNP later filed court papers to have the election of two JLP candidates declared null and void, on the grounds that they were dual US-Jamaican citizens and thus ineligible to hold public office. Mr. Bruce Golding of the Jamaica Labour Party was sworn in as Prime Minister on September 11, 2007. However, given that legal verdicts have not yet been filed on the dual-nationality issue, questions regarding the final balance of PNP and JLP MPs in the House of Representatives continued in the national press at the time of writing this report.

CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

The OAS Electoral Observation Mission wishes to congratulate the people of Jamaica on the peaceful, orderly, and courteous conduct of the general election of September 3, 2007. The OAS Mission commends all those involved in the preparations for elections: the EOJ; the political parties; the police, for securing polling stations throughout the country; and civil society organizations involved in voter education and election observation. This, the first OAS Electoral Observation Mission in Jamaica, received a very warm welcome from all concerned in the electoral process, which both facilitated and enhanced the experience. There were relatively few areas in which the Mission felt that the electoral process in Jamaica could be improved. However, in the spirit of constructive engagement with the electoral authorities and political leaders of Jamaica, and as is customary in reports of this nature, the Mission would like to present the following observations and recommendations.

1. The Campaign i. Traditionally, campaigns in Jamaica last about two weeks. This campaign, however,

officially lasted a total of eight weeks, taking into account the postponement of elections, and unofficial campaigning began nearly a year before Election Day. Many, including party representatives themselves, complained that the campaign was too long, too expensive and too acrimonious.

ii. Currently, the electoral law prohibits parties from organizing campaign rallies in the final 24 hours of the campaign, but this prohibition does not include print and media campaigning which can intensify in the run-up to the poll, potentially contributing to escalating tensions between rival party supporters.

2. Campaign Financei. The increasing cost of political campaigning in Jamaica, as elsewhere in the Caribbean, is

a matter for considerable concern. There is no system in place for inspecting or auditing candidates’ returns and expenditure limits are largely not enforced or disregarded. Political parties are not required to indicate funding sources or amounts spent.

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3. Election Preparationsi. The Electoral Office of Jamaica’s preparations for the 2007 elections were rigorous,

timely and effective. The work of the Election Center and the Political Ombudsman, which allowed participants from across the political spectrum to communicate grievances or anxieties in a neutral setting and to request and see quick action on security and election management, was of great value in securing a peaceful and constructive pre-election period.

4. Election Dayi. Election Day was peaceful and, with very few exceptions, those eligible to vote were

afforded their right to exercise their franchise. Voter identification was scrupulous, if often time-consuming.

ii. Lines at polling stations were rendered longer than may have been necessary due to uneven distribution of voters between polling stations, often at the same polling site. The Electronic Voter Identification and Ballot Issuing System (EVIBIS) worked well and inspired confidence in officials and voters alike. Where EVIBIS was not present, the Black Book method of verifying the many voters who did not bring ID cards proved crucial in guaranteeing voter franchise. This method, however, proved to be time consuming and contributed to delays and long lines.

iii. Access to polling stations for the physically challenged was difficult in many places. Some polling stations were also too cramped. In a few, predominantly rural polling stations, voters had difficulty in getting transport to the polls. On the whole, however, those who wished to vote could do so.

iv. Women are extremely active and visible in running elections in Jamaica. The Mission noted that a high percentage of election officials and party agents were female. However, relatively few women run for office. Twenty-one female candidates were nominated to compete for seats in the 2007 general election and eight won their constituencies. This marks a very small increase in the number of female MPs, previously seven in number. According to figures produced by Amnesty International, in 2005 women made up only 7 percent of mayors, only 17.6 percent of cabinet ministers, and only 11.7 percent of members of parliament.4 It is evident that Jamaica still has a long way to go in ensuring that women are equally represented in political roles and that political talent is fostered regardless of gender.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Campaign i. Electoral law prohibits parties from organizing campaign rallies in the final 24 hours of

the campaign. The Mission believes all forms of campaigns, including print and electronic media, should be included in this prohibition.

ii. Political and electoral authorities might consider the constitution of a Media Monitoring Unit to follow and analyze campaign coverage as well as party-political advertising to increase awareness of appropriate norms and boundaries in campaign literature, broadcasting, and related journalism, to foster balance and promote civility in political debate.

4. Amnesty International, Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Jamaica: Just a Little Sex, June 22 2006, page 7.

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2. Campaign Financei. In Jamaica, there are few legislative requirements to disclose campaign contributions and

expenditures. Where legislation does exist, it pertains to the candidate and not to the party, making it easy to obviate restrictions and disclosure requirements. This situation is unsatisfactory in the context of safeguarding the democratic process from undue influence by corporate and transnational interests and the maintenance of a political system in which all can compete equally and fairly. Both major parties have recently affirmed their intention to address this glaring issue: the PNP in 2006 by proposing a Joint Select Committee of Parliament to discuss party funding and the JLP by proposing as part of its 2007 manifesto pledge to ‘enact, in consultation with the Electoral Commission, legislation to regulate the financial operation of political parties’. A 2002 resolution had called for the establishment of a national commission to examine and make recommendations for registering political parties and providing them with public funding to counter the threat of corruption. Political parties should review the conclusions of the EAC-organized conference of July 2006 and subsequent Senate submission and work to implement a meaningful and enforceable reform of Jamaica’s political party and campaign finance regime before the next general elections. The participation of Bruce Golding (JLP) and Trevor Monroe (PNP) in the OAS’s 2005 study into party and campaign finance reform in the Caribbean shows that bipartisan support and agreement on this issue is achievable. The OAS restated its willingness earlier in 2007 to assist in this process and remains ready to lend its good offices.

3. Election Preparationsi. The Mission was particularly impressed with the structure and functioning of the Election

Center. Representatives of the political parties were provided with a permanent, private forum to express their concerns and request immediate action of the electoral and security authorities. Where it was deemed appropriate, immediate and effective action was indeed taken (for example, to cancel a rally in a volatile area) and this both served to reduce actual and potential tensions and to increase the confidence of all stakeholders in the electoral process. The Electoral Center included among its members the national observation mission as well as the OAS Electoral Observation Mission. This Center could represent a model for other countries in the Caribbean and Latin America.

4. Election Dayi. Lines at polling stations could be reduced in a number of ways, minimizing waiting time

for voters and maximizing the efficiency of election workers. Firstly, efforts should be made to achieve a more even spread of registered voters among the polling stations, making at the same time, every attempt not to disrupt citizens’ original voting sites. A better spread of registered voters amongst polling stations, especially within larger polling sites, would reduce instances in which one polling station had long lines while another stood idle. Secondly, since some delays are attributable to voters arriving without ID cards and undergoing a series of verbal checks. The Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ) may wish to consider the use of other documents for identification such as a passport or driver license. Though the Mission recognizes that the technology is expensive, electoral authorities should consider implementing the EVIBIS system in a greater number of polling stations.

ii. The Mission recommends improving polling sites and polling arrangements for physically challenged voters to enable ready access for all voters. Likewise, the accessibility of polling sites to rural voters should be considered and adequate transport assured that is independent of party agency.

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iii. Political parties should actively consider and pursue mechanisms to recruit, train and finance women to be candidates for public office. Disaggregating electoral data to establish the numbers of women and youth voters and electoral officials would be a useful step in quantifying relative participation rates and considering which groups are under-represented at different stages of the electoral process and why. The technology of the voter registry has already captured this information and it should be easy to obtain, analyze and publicize it.

iv. The OAS EOM welcomes the commitment of political party leaders to the Code of Conduct enshrining the principles of nonviolence and non-intimidation, avoidance of inflammatory utterances, avoidance of political tribalism, and commitment to a code of ethics in political life. Jamaica has made painstaking progress in tackling the problems that have historically beset its electoral process. However, more can be done to reduce negative and hostile political tactics before, during, and after elections and the Mission calls upon all stakeholders to promote a more inclusive and constructive cross-party politics in Jamaica and to foster unity and amity in the post-election period.

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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX I. LETTER OF INVITATION

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APPENDIX II. LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE

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APPENDIX III. AGREEMENT ON THE PRIVILEDGES AND IMMUNITIES

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APPENDIX IV. AGREEMENT ON THE OBSERVATION PROCESS

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APPENDIX V. LIST OF OBSERVERS AND DEPLOYMENT ASSIGNMENTSOAS ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSION

2007 General Elections - JamaicaDeployment Schedule

TEAM NATIONALITY CONSTITUENCIESTEAM 1    Kingsley Layne St. Vincent 3.7 WESTMORELAND WESTERNGaston Ain Argentina 3.8 WESTMORELAND CENTRAL    3.9 WESTMORELAND EASTERNTEAM 2    Mark Kirton Guyana 3.4 ST. JAMES SOUTHERN    3.5 HANOVER EASTERN    3.6 HANOVER WESTERN    2.5 TRELAWNY NORTHTEAM 3    Jean Ricot Dormeus Haiti 3.1 ST. JAMES EAST CENTRALAnne Marie Blackman Barbados 3.2 ST. JAMES NORTH WESTERN    3.3 ST. JAMES WEST CENTRALTEAM 4    Cristina Gutierrez Bolivia 2.3 ST ANN NORTH WESTERNCynthia Barrow-Giles St. Lucia 2.4 ST ANN SOUTH WESTERN    2.5 TRELAWNY NORTHERN    2.6 TRELAWNY SOUTHERNTEAM 5    Jose Labarca Chile 1.6 ST. MARY CENTRALPaul Wander Canada 1.7 ST. MARY WESTERN    2.2 ST. ANN NORTH EASTERN    2.3 ST ANN NORTH WESTERN    2.1 ST. ANN SOUTH EASTERNTEAM 6    Denise Antonie Grenada 1.3 PORTLAND EASTERNSharan Singh Trinidad 1.4 PORTLAND WESTERN    1.5 ST. MARY SOUTH EASTERN TEAM 7    Roget Bryan Trinidad 4.2 ST. ELIZABETH NORTH EASTERNJean Joseph Estime Canada 4.3 ST. ELIZABETH SOUTH WESTERN    4.4 ST. ELIZABETH SOUTH EASTERNTEAM 8    Shannan Johnston Canada 4.7 MANCHESTER NORTH CENTRALJeff Johnston Canada 4.8 MANCHESTER NORTH EASTERN    5.1 CLARENDON NORTH WESTERN    5.2 CLARENDON NORTHERNTEAM 9    Lorraine Belisle Canada 4.5 MANCHESTER SOUTHERNPierre David Canada 4.6 MANCHESTER CENTRAL    5.5 CLARENDON SOUTH WESTERN

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OAS ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSION2007 General Elections - Jamaica

Deployment Schedule

TEAM NATIONALITY CONSTITUENCIESTEAM 10    Sheena Zuniga Colombia 5.3 CLARENDON NORTH CENTRALMartha Nunez Colombia 5.4 CLARENDON CENTRAL    5.6 CLARENDON SOUTH EASTERN    6.1 ST. CATHERINE NORTH WESTERN    6.7 ST. CATHERINE WEST CENTRAL    6.2 ST. CATHERINE SOUTH WESTERNTEAM 11    Jessica Byron St. Kitts and Nevis 6.8 ST. CATHERINE NORTH EASTERNLucy Eugene Trinidad 6.6 ST. CATHERINE EAST CENTRAL    6.4 ST. CATHERINE CENTRAL**TEAM 12    Filomena Navarro Dominican Republic 6.9 ST. CATHERINE SOUTH CENTRALLaury Lamothe Dominican Republic 6.3 ST. CATHERINE SOUTHERNLina Maria Gomez Dominican Republic 6.4 ST. CATHERINE CENTRAL **TEAM 13    Gillian Apfel United States 7.9 ST. ANDREW EAST RURALHester Dredge United States  TEAM 14    Christiana Foreman United States 7.1 ST. ANDREW WEST RURALSusan Wilson United States  TEAM 15    Chris Healy Suriname 7.2 ST. ANDREW WEST CENTRALJavier Montes Bolivia 7.3 ST. ANDREW EAST CENTRAL    8.3 KINGSTON EAST PORT ROYAL    8.4 ST. ANDREW WESTERN     8.5 ST. ANDREW SOUTH WESTERN     8.6 ST. ANDREW SOUTHTEAM 16    Steven Griner United States 7.4 ST. ANDREW SOUTH EASTERNSara Lodge United Kingdom 7.6 ST. ANDREW NORTH EASTERN    7.8 ST. ANDREW NORTH WESTERN    7.7 ST. ANDREW NORTH CENTRALTEAM 17    Chief of Mission Suriname 8.1 KINGSTON WESTERNGarvin Pettier Trinidad 8.2 KINGSTON CENTRAL    8.3 KINGSTON EAST & PORT ROYALTEAM 18    Jo Seaman United Kingdom 1.1 ST. THOMAS WESTERNEmily Hardy United Kingdom 1.2 ST. THOMAS EASTERNTEAM 19    Brian Peterson United States 7.5 ST. ANDREW EASTERNLesley Hayden United States 8.2 KINGSTON CENTRAL

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APPENDIX VI. FORMS COMPLETED BY OBSERVERS

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APPENDIX VII. PRESS RELEASES

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