North-South Relations and the Outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, 1968-9: The Response of the "Irish Press"

North-South Relations and the Outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, 1968-9: TheResponse of the "Irish Press"Author(s): Frank FoleySource: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 14 (2003), pp. 9-31Published by: Royal Irish AcademyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30001961 .

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North-South Relations and the Outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, 1968-9: the Response of

the Irish Press*

Frank Foley

National University of Ireland, Cork

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the response of an influential Irish newspaper, the Irish Press, to the development of North-South relations and the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland in 1968-9. It outlines the newspaper's sceptical attitude towards North-South cooperation and argues that this constituted a break with the Press's traditionally supportive stance vis-a-vis the Fianna Fail party. The paper shows how editorial perceptions of both Ulster Unionists and the northern political minority were affected by events, but also how traditional anti-partitionism exercised a dominant influence. Although the Press reacted quickly in terms of news coverage to the outbreak of conflict in Northern Ireland in October 1968, its editorial opinions on civil rights and on violence in the North were confused and sometimes inconsistent. Within a few months, however, a consistently militant editorial line began to emerge, with the Press issuing aggressive warnings to Unionists and the British government and preparing its readership for southern intervention in Northern Ireland.

INTRODUCTION

The years 1968 and 1969 are often considered together and associated in Irish popular memory with the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. At the beginning of 1968, however, optimism seemed justified: a public process of North-South cooperation was improving relations between the governments of Northern Ireland and the Republic and producing practical results in areas from cross-border trade to electricity.' Although difficulties were expected to arise

1Michael Kennedy, Division and consensus: the politics of cross-border relations in Ireland, 1925-1969 (Dublin, 2000), 4-5, 294-5, 300-1.

*This paper is based on an MA thesis completed in 2001 at the National University of Ireland, Cork, under the supervision of Professor Dermot Keogh. The author is currently based in Brussels, where he writes for a website on EU affairs.

Author's e-mail: [email protected]

Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 14 (2003), 9-31.



10 Irish Studies in International Affairs

because of the increasing frustration of the minority in the North on the issue of civil rights, few anticipated the riots that would break out in Derry that October, nor did they foresee the violence that would follow.

This paper offers a perspective on how the trends of 1968 and 1969 were understood in the Republic of Ireland outside of government and the state administration.2 It is a study of the Irish Press newspaper's coverage of, and comment on, Northern Ireland from December 1967 to August 1969-a formative period for southern attitudes to the North over the next thirty years of the Troubles. Self-consciously 'national' in its focus, the Irish Press was the media ally of the largest political party in the Republic, Fianna Fdiil. Founded by then party leader Eamon de Valera in 1931, the Press acted as a key forum for argument and news that both reflected and influenced public opinion in the predominantly nationalist population of the Twenty-Six Counties.3 With a circulation of over 102,000, the Press was still highly influential in Irish society in the late 1 960s.4 In January 1968 a dynamic new editor, Tim Pat Coogan, was appointed;5 he began to write the editorials on northern issues 'almost immediately'.6 The development of the Press's editorial line on Northern Ireland under Coogan's stewardship will be the central topic of this paper. Although the analysis of the editorials presented here can be seen partly as a study of Coogan's political thinking before he came to greater prominence as a commentator on northern affairs, it can perhaps be better read as a study of the attitudes and rhetoric of the Irish Press itself-a newspaper with a historic role on the island as an influential organ of nationalist opinion, read by a significant section of the population. This, rather than an 'internal' study of the personalities and structures of the Press, will be the main focus of this study.

The paper begins by looking at the position of the Irish Press on North-South cooperation up to October 1968-the month when Northern Ireland began its descent into civil strife. It considers the level of northern news coverage in the Press both before and after this fateful month and examines the newspaper's attitude to those on both sides of the political divide in the North. The paper will also show how the Press's initial opinions on the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland were beset by inconsistency and confusion. However, this uncertainty was soon replaced by a strident editorial line that saw the Press issue uncompromising statements on partition and promote various forms of militant action as solutions to the northern problem.

QUESTIONING NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

On 11 December 1967 Taoiseach Jack Lynch travelled north to Stormont for his first meeting with the prime minister of Northern Ireland, Terence O'Neill. The two leaders were on first-name terms, and at the press conference that followed their meeting they were eager to project a positive image of the North-South

2For the reaction of the Irish government and the Department of External Affairs to events in Northern Ireland in 1968-9, see Ronan Fanning, 'Playing it cool: the response of the British and Irish governments to the crisis in Northern Ireland, 1968-9', Irish Studies in International Affairs 12 (2001), 57-85; Michael Kennedy, "'This tragic and most intractable problem": the reaction of the Department of External Affairs to the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland', Irish Studies in International Affairs 12 (2001), 87-95.

3Mark O'Brien, De Valera, Fianna Fdil and the Irish Press (Dublin, 2001); John Horgan, Irish media: a critical history since 1922 (London, 2001), 28-30.

40'Brien, De Valera, Fianna Fdil and the Irish Press, 45, 129; Irish Press, 14 February 1969. 5Horgan, Irish media, 94. 6Author's correspondence with Tim Pat Coogan, August 2001.



FOLEY-North-South Relations and the Outbreak of the Troubles 11

relationship.7 Whereas this cordial atmosphere was reflected in the Press's front- page coverage of the event, that day's editorial sought to shift its readers' focus. Questioning whether it was right to improve relations with Unionists, the editorial recalled that Sean Lemass's meeting with O'Neill three years earlier had been 'generally welcomed' but that it had not prevented sectarianism resurfacing in the meantime. Referring to a 'sickness in Northern society', created by 'bigotry and privilege', the Press warned of the perils of seeking accommodation with such a society: '...the recalcitrants remain, the fanatics...the privileged who batten on the fantasies of others...Until they are finally repudiated and rooted out, neither justice nor sound sense will flourish in this divided island.' The only favourable word about cross-border cooperation was a reference to its potential as a stepping-stone to Irish unity. Referring to the 'inevitability of re-union', the editorial asserted that by working together on practical problems, 'we can knit together again that old fabric of understanding and interest that once united us in a common patriotism'.8 Referring back to a mythological time when nationalists and Unionists shared a 'common patriotism' and looking forward to inevitable unity, the editorial preferred to focus on these fantasy worlds instead of facing the mundane reality of North-South cooperation on practical, non-constitutional matters.

Traditionally a forum for blatantly pro-Fianna FA-il news and opinion, the Press had altered its approach to a more subtle form of support for the party by the 1960s. Although the leading staff-no longer of the Fianna Fail persuasion-began to implement a more independent style of news coverage, the newspaper still supported the party line on the key issues of the day.9 However, Northern Ireland policy was a significant exception to this rule. The Fianna FAiil government had judged that the success of North-South cooperation required that Dublin scale down dramatically its public references to the partition issue.10 The Press's editorial priorities vis-h-vis the North from December 1967 to October 1968 flew in the face of this policy. In the months that followed Lynch's first meeting with O'Neill, the 'business meetings' and trade stories of North-South cooperation could inspire only minor and infrequent inside-page reports, with no editorial comment and no analysis." In contrast, such was the newspaper's enthusiasm for the goal of a united Ireland that it created its own storm on this very issue during Easter week, 1968. A notice on the Press's front page on 15 April, headed 'VITAL ISSUE', promised 'findings of historical significance on a matter of national importance' the very next day. The Press did not disappoint, publishing the results of an exclusive Gallup poll the following day under the heading 'POLL SHOWS SWING FOR UNITY: 54 p.c. in North say Border should go'. The findings of the poll were front-page news in the Press every day for an entire week. Readers were told that 'Economics and reason will end [the] border,' speculation was rife about how long it would take for the border to go, and editorials devoted to the subject spoke once again about the inevitability of 're-union'.12

7Kennedy, Division and consensus, 296-9, 302-3. 81rish Press, 12 December 1967. 90'Brien, De Valera, Fianna Fdil and the Irish Press, 124-5, 133-6. 10Kennedy, Division and consensus, 301-2. Leading civil servant T.K. Whitaker defined the Irish

government's stance as 'seeking unity in Ireland by agreement'. It was 'a long-term policy requiring patience, understanding...and absolute resistance to emotionalism...'.

I1The only exception was an opinion piece by the Press's Northern correspondent: see Irish Press, 3 January 1968. For news coverage of North-South cooperation, see Irish Press, 6 April 1968; 25 April 1968; 8 May 1968; 18 June 1968.

121rish Press, 16 April 1968; 17 April 1968; 18 April 1968; 19 April 1968.




During the first half of 1968 the Press was a forum for a considerable amount of correspondence highly critical of the Irish government's North-South cooperation policy. These passionate letters to the editor spoke of Dublin politicians consorting with Stormont ministers while remaining silent and inactive on the vital issues of partition and discrimination against Catholics in the North. Leon MacEanna from Glasnevin in Dublin wrote, 'The young career politicians of the Fianna Fail party may be able to overrule the sincere Irishmen in their midst and betray the ideals for which their predecessors fought a civil war, but the time will come when their names will be anathema.'13 In June the attendance of General Sean MacEoin at celebrations in Belfast marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Royal Air Force (RAF) prompted a week-long series of outraged letters expressing contempt at the government's 'selling out' of the North.14 News reporting of such criticism was less frequent, but the sentiments were the same, as in one story with the headline 'Too quiet on partition, Government criticised'.15 Throughout all of this comment from letter- writers and others over that six-month period, the Press editorial column did not address the issue or defend Fianna Fail's North-South cooperation policy once.

Although Irish Press criticism of a Fianna Fail government was usually unthinkable, the politicians' neglect of partition was judged serious enough to justify something of a break with this tradition. On 24 June 1968 the annual conference of the northern Nationalist Party revealed growing nationalist anger at discrimination in Northern Ireland. An Irish Press editorial acknowledged this frustration, although it conflated the issue with partition:

The Government's attitude is that the problem of partition is raised at every suitable opportunity... [and] to raise it [partition] at every international conference, as was suggested at yesterday's convention, would serve no useful purpose. But it is some time now since mention was made of it anywhere at official level.16

Thus hinting strongly at its frustration with the government's silence on partition, the Press editorial sided with the critics against its traditional Fianna Fiil ally. Nor was the criticism confined to the editorial-the juxtaposition of three news stories in that same edition of the Press also implied a negative judgement of what the government's northern policy involved. A report on another condemnation-this time by Sinn F6in-of General MacEoin's attendance at the RAF celebrations in Belfast was placed beside a story about the Orange Order expelling moderates from its ranks. Beside this story was a report on a ceremony at Bodenstown in tribute to Wolfe Tone.'7 Each story was a straightforward one, but their placement beside each other may have caused some readers to wonder, 'Is this why we are silent on partition? Is this what we are compromising Tone's legacy for: tea with the British forces and gestures to a bigoted Orange state?' The Press editorial column was unenthusiastic and sceptical about North-South cooperation well before the obvious trouble spot of October 1968. Such was the lack of sympathy with the Dublin government's policy that partition still inspired more interest and news coverage than

131rish Press, 10 February 1968. See also the 'Letters to the Editor' page in the Irish Press on 14 December 1967, 28 February 1968, 29 April 1968, 2 May 1968, 15 May 1968 and 18 June 1968.

141rish Press, 26 June 1968. See also the 'Letters to the Editor' page in the Irish Press on 25 June 1968, 28 June 1968, 29 June 1968 and 1 July 1968.

'5lrish Press, 17 June 1968; also 25 April 1968. 161rish Press, 24 June 1968 (emphasis added). '7lrish Press, 24 June 1968.




cross-border cooperation. If the nascent reconciliation of the two governments was going to make any impression on southern nationalist public opinion, it was not going to happen through the efforts of the Irish Press.

LEVELS OF NORTHERN COVERAGE

Although the sceptical attitude towards North-South cooperation was significant, the single most striking aspect of the Irish Press's northern coverage and comment up to October 1968 was its paucity. From December 1967 to June 1968, the Press carried only one or two substantial news stories relating to Northern Ireland per week. In addition, one Belfast column and a number of isolated and very brief one- paragraph or one-column news reports could also be found. There was no regular parliamentary reporting from Stormont, and the newspaper's new editor regarded its northern coverage as 'haphazard'.18 The North would occasionally be the focus of sustained attention, but only if the story had a strong national dimension, as with the all-Ireland poll on partition in April, or if it was traditionally of significant interest to readers in the Republic, as with the onset of summer tension and the Unionist marching season in July. Editorials on the North averaged only two per month in the entire period from December 1967 to late September 1968. On the evidence of its news coverage and editorial comment, it seems reasonable to conclude that very little sustained thinking about Northern Ireland took place in the corridors of the Irish Press during the peaceful period up to October 1968. The newspaper was unprepared for the new situation in this sense, and, as will be shown below, its editorials struggled to understand the political forces that emerged when the civil rights marchers took to the streets. In terms of news coverage, however, the Press sprang into action very quickly.

On Saturday 5 October 1968, civil rights marchers in Derry were blocked by the RUC and attacked with batons, without 'justification or excuse'.19 This unrestrained police batoning led to two days of rioting and provoked a widespread sense of outrage in the Republic. Acting the part of a popular newspaper well, the Press changed the entire shape of its front page to communicate the magnitude of what was happening in Derry. The front-page headline was in extra-large print (double its usual size), with the words 'DERRY EXPLODES AGAIN'.20 The Press reverted to its usual front-page layout the following day, 8 October, but its overall level of northern coverage would now be transformed from a position of neglect to a level approaching saturation point. From a pre-October average of a few short columns per day, the Press's average now increased to between one and two full pages per day, with the North providing the front-page lead story on two days out of three. The newspaper was starved of capital in comparison with some of its rivals and had only one resident reporter in Northern Ireland, Paddy Reynolds. He supplied not only the daily newspaper with northern material but also the Evening Press and the Sunday Press.21 To compensate for this, editor Tim Pat Coogan commissioned freelance articles, and at tumultuous times he would usually be able to send between two and

"'Author's correspondence with Tim Pat Coogan, August 2001. '9This was the judgement of the Cameron Commission, which investigated the disturbances in Derry

and published a report in September 1969. See Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, Northern Ireland: a chronology of the Troubles, 1968-1993 (Dublin, 1993), 4, 22.

20lrish Press, 7 October 1968. The word 'again' is a reference to the fact that Sunday was the second night of rioting.

21Author's correspondence with Tim Pat Coogan, August 2001.




four staff members from the Republic to Northern Ireland to report on events on the ground.22 Meanwhile, editorials on the North jumped from around two per month to an average of fifteen per month. Coogan also revamped the Press's leader page in late October, increasing the size of its editorial space from single column to double column.23 These developments led to a dramatic increase in the number of news stories and the level of editorial comment on Northern Ireland available to Press readers. The new and impressive size of the editorial column confirmed it as the authoritative voice of the Irish Press on northern issues. What did it have to say about its nationalist brethren and the increasingly frustrated minority in the North?

NEW POLITICS, NEW MILITANCY: THE POLITICAL MINORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Already, in the quiet months of February and March 1968, the Press's editorial column had shown its commitment to constitutional means when reacting to the northern Nationalist Party's decision not to field a candidate in an upcoming by- election for the traditionally safe Unionist seat of Lisnaskea (Co. Fermanagh). Acknowledging the problems of discrimination and gerrymandering in Northern Ireland, one editorial affirmed that the 'only way' to end them was to do 'something constructive to fight these evils like fighting and perhaps winning by-elections'.24 The Press was disappointed when, in October 1968, the Nationalist Party withdrew from its position as official opposition at Stormont. Even though the northern Parliament represented a 'half-baked system of democracy', it would have been 'more encouraging to see the Nationalists opposing in Stormont [rather] than retreating to a ghetto', stated an editorial. Instead of relying on extra-parliamentary means, nationalist grievances 'might have found just as effective an outlet through more vigorous activity within the existing parliamentary system', it was thought.25 In sentiments such as these, one finds a perspective based on the largely positive parliamentary experience of the Fianna Faiil party.

Convinced that northern nationalists had to use the existing parliamentary system to advance their agenda, editorials nevertheless cloaked this constitutional commitment in the language of militant action: 'Even if the odds are heavily loaded it would have been better to have fought and lost than never to have fought at all.'26 Echoes of the 1916 blood sacrifice can be heard here, without the blood perhaps, but with the virtues of Republican self-sacrifice clearly implied (and found to be lacking in northern nationalists). This was more than just a throwaway gesture to militancy, however. When honouring the country's revolutionary history and interpreting the lessons that this history held for modern Ireland, the Press showed itself to be an enthusiastic exponent of the traditional rhetoric of Irish nationalism. The fiftieth anniversary of the first Daiil fell on 21 January 1969, and in the course of two editorials, the Press paid tribute to the 'fine frenzy' of the 1916 Easter Rising, 'the

22This was the case in October and November 1968, as well as January, April, July and August 1969. The editor was able to send six reporters to Northern Ireland for the February 1969 election. See Irish Press, 15 February 1969; Horgan, Irish media, 94; Author's correspondence with Tim Pat Coogan, August 2001.

23Author's correspondence with Tim Pat Coogan, August 2001; Irish Press, 21 October 1968.

24Irish Press, 6 March 1968. An earlier Press editorial criticising the Nationalist Party's decision had

provoked hostile letters to the editor from two northern nationalists. This second editorial was a response to those letters. See Irish Press, 27 February 1968; 5 March 1968.

25Irish Press, 16 October 1968. 26Irish Press, 27 February 1968.




first flare of armed patriotism' in that era. The 'panache that attended the bloody birth of the Irish state' was recalled, and the values of blood sacrifice re-affirmed by honouring 'the memories of great men...who went out knowing they were going to die-Pearse, Connolly and their comrades in arms'.27 However, the values of constitutional politics were also affirmed, as the editorial considered that a pragmatic patriotism was needed for the world of 1969, in which the Irish people should emulate the determined spirit of the revolutionaries but apply it to spheres such as social welfare and education: 'The task confronting us today has to do with evolution-not revolution.'28 Although constitutionalism was in the ascendancy, the Irish Press was still committed to the historic values of militant nationalism. However, the conflict between the two remained unresolved, and in 1968-9 the editorial column struggled to balance constitutional and militant values, providing an analysis of political change in Northern Ireland that veered between ambiguity and confusion. The reaction of Press editorials to the January 1969 campaign of a left-wing, Queens University-based civil rights group, People's Democracy, was a good example of this unresolved conflict.

In the quiet weeks after Terence O'Neill's conciliatory 'Crossroads' speech of mid-December 1968, it was widely believed that Northern Ireland had a chance to leave behind the civil strife of October and November. A Press editorial advised the civil rights movement to suspend their street campaign: 'Decent people of all shades of opinion must play it cool but courageously.'29 However, People's Democracy ignored the Irish Press and others who believed that a cooling-off period of at least a month was now necessary.30 It organised a four-day march from Belfast to Derry for early January 1969 along a route that involved parading through traditionally Protestant territory.31 The Press's reaction to this was to abandon its previous editorial line for the sake of anti-Unionist unity. When the march came under heavy attack from loyalist mobs and was followed by vicious street fighting in Derry, a Press editorial concentrated its fire on the Unionist government, which had failed to provide enough police to protect the civil rights marchers adequately. As for People's Democracy,

...it is evident that the civil rights movement can be absolved of blame...It is true to say that at the beginning of the march, public sentiment was against it as being unwise in its timing. This point of view is still valid, but it must be conceded that the discipline and restraint of the marchers have forced a change in that attitude.32

This was dubious reasoning. The Press acknowledged the destructive timing of the march, but because the marchers showed restraint, they were 'absolved' of all responsibility for raising tension in Derry.33 In the polarised atmosphere of January

271rish Press, 22 January 1969. 281rish Press, 21 January 1969. 291rish Press, 12 December 1968. 30The Derry Citizens' Action Committee, led by John Hume and Ivan Cooper, called for a period of

calm, announcing a month's moratorium on demonstrations, while the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) also called a 'truce'. See Irish Press, 17 December 1968; J.J. Lee, Ireland, 1912-1985: politics and society (Cambridge, 1989), 422.

31Thomas Hennessey, A history of Northern Ireland, 1920-1996 (Dublin, 1997), 151; Lee, Ireland, 1912-1985, 422.

321rish Press, 4 January 1969. 33Fearing the establishment of a conservative peace, People's Democracy planned to raise tension

at this crucial time. See Hennessey, A history of Northern Ireland, 150-2; Lee, Ireland, 1912-1985, 422-3.




1969, however, logical thinking took second place to political rhetoric as events in Northern Ireland shifted rapidly from the struggle for civil rights to the reinvigoration of old hatreds and the waging of open street warfare along sectarian lines.34 The Irish Press, like much of the population, was retreating to the tribal trenches.

In this fractious atmosphere the editorial column barely concealed its relish for militant action against the old enemy: 'The people agitating for reform have since the bloody October 5 in Derry established an image of successful militancy. As most of us are aware, it is generally the activists who succeed in achieving anything worth struggling for.'35 Referring to 'us' (the Irish Press and its southern nationalist readership), the editorial seemed to be alluding to the achievements of the revolutionary tradition upon which the 26-county state was founded. Indeed, the kind of 'successful militancy' referred to consisted of more than just marching. As the situation in Derry deteriorated, the Press's front page carried a photograph of an armed vigilante group with the caption 'Defending the Bogside: Members of the Bogside area display some weapons at their all-night vigil'.36

Inconsistency continued to reign as both militant and non-violent impulses influenced the Press's editorial line. On 6 January the editorial column called for an end to long protest marches, but it struck a markedly different tone the very next day (reacting to the call-up of the B-Specials), arguing that 'agitation must and should continue'.37 By the end of the week, however, the Press seemed to have grown wary of People's Democracy, even expressing a hope that the RUC would ban the group's planned march through Protestant areas in Newry so that 'no harm [would] come to anyone'. In contrast to the Press's romantic memory of the violence of 1916, these and other words showed an awareness of the painful reality of the violence that followed some civil rights demonstrations.38 Two days later, after crowds of young people ran riot in Newry, the Press counselled that the 'best course' for the civil rights movement 'over the next few months, would appear to be a period of taking it easy'. The primacy of parliamentary activity, as an alternative strategy to militant action, was hinted at when the editorial advised the civil rights movement to step up its campaign of pressure on the political parties at Westminster.39 Having been a somewhat inconsistent mouthpiece for both militant and constitutional values, the Irish Press seemed to have settled on the latter by mid-January 1969.

Attention began to move from the streets to the hustings as Northern Ireland faced into a general election. Various correspondents of the Press had been warning for some time about the decline of the northern Nationalist Party and the possibility that it could be eclipsed by the civil rights movement.40 When Terence O'Neill called an election in early February 1969, a number of civil rights leaders declared that they would stand as independent candidates. They included John Hume of the Derry Citizens' Action Committee, who decided to stand for the Foyle seat then held by the leader of the Nationalist Party, Eddie McAteer. In Irish Press news coverage and editorial comment, however, the Unionist side of the election overshadowed the battle

34Bew and Gillespie, Chronology, 11-12. 351rish Press, 4 January 1969. 361rish Press, 7 January 1969. 37lrish Press, 6 January 1969; 7 January 1969. 381rish Press, 11 January 1969. See other editorial expressions of thanks and surprise that no lives

had yet been lost, for example: Irish Press, 18 November 1968; 6 January 1969; 13 January 1969. 39Irish Press, 13 January 1969. 40'Whither the nationalists', 'Belfast letter' column, Irish Press, 22 June 1968; Joe Carroll, 'The

nationalist dilemma', Irish Press, 22 November 1968.




between the Nationalist Party and the Independents (civil rights candidates). The Press's editorial column became obsessed with arguing against O'Neill's attempts to woo Catholic voters, as well as with the battle between pro- and anti-O'Neillites for the soul of Unionism.41 Early in the campaign, however, one leading article did hint at a preference for McAteer's 'doctrine of moderation' over what it called 'the Civil Rights Movement and other militant bodies'. From this perspective, it betrayed some despair at McAteer's sudden announcement of his resignation and his reversal of that decision 24 hours later: 'The Nationalist Party and Catholics generally have suffered a grievous blow. Now, above all, is no time for a display of weakness...'42 The Press was clearly in the comer of traditional Catholic nationalism.

Coverage over the next three weeks was allocated fairly evenly between the two groups. There were, for example, interviews with Eddie McAteer and Austin Currie of the Nationalist Party, on the one hand, and with Independents John Hume and Ivan Cooper, on the other.43 When the Press returned to Foyle in the crucial final week of campaigning, however, a statement by McAteer was the top story on its front page, whereas a report on Hume's progress was placed in a much less prominent position on page 4.44 On the day of the election itself, Hume was nowhere to be seen in the Irish Press, although eve-of-poll messages by McAteer and Terence O'Neill were published side by side.45 John Hume, who hoped to upset what he believed was a traditional sectarian mode of politics, probably would have seen this presentation as a conservative vote by the Irish Press for the orthodox Unionist-nationalist status quo. In the event, three Independents, Hume, Cooper and Paddy O'Hanlon, succeeded in winning three seats from the Nationalist Party, defying the prediction of the Press (and other commentators) that the latter would hold on to all nine of their seats.46

A Press editorial struggled to come to terms with the new political forces on the anti-Unionist side, following what it called 'one of the most baffling elections of all time'. It lamented the defeat of Nationalist Party leader Eddie McAteer but also acknowledged the victor, John Hume, though it did not mention his name and merely referred to him as 'the decent young Civil Rights man who won the seat'. It struck a discouraging note vis-h-vis Nationalist MP Austin Currie's intention to form a new left-wing political movement with John Hume and the other Independent (civil rights) MPs: 'The reaction of the Nationalists to a move of this kind is likely to be at best cautious. Their first concern will be to examine the causes of their poor showing and put their house in order...'47 The baffled Press was in defensive mode as it saw threats to orthodox nationalism in the North approaching from all sides. A month later, however, another editorial took a more reflective view: 'The fact that the militant Civil Rights stood for election and took their seats in Stormont was in itself a victory for the democratic process...' Such a development should be welcomed by 'anyone who values parliamentary democracy', stated the Press, in a signal of adherence to constitutional values.48 An editorial three days later welcomed 'two positive decisions' by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA): the

41See, for example, the editorial on election day, Irish Press, 24 February 1969. 421rish Press, 6 February 1969. 431rish Press, 12 February 1969; 18 February 1969; 10 February 1969; 15 February 1969. 441rish Press, 21 February 1969. 451rish Press, 24 February 1969. 461rish Press, 24 February 1969. 471rish Press, 26 February 1969. 48lrish Press, 21 March 1969.




decisions to support properly marshalled and disciplined marches only and to begin a non-violent programme of civil disobedience.49 It would not be long, however, before Press editorials adopted more militant positions once again.

UNIONISM AND THE STATESMAN WHO WENT TOO FAR

Much comment and news coverage in the Press from late 1967 to September 1968 reflected the Dublin government's friendliness towards northern Unionists, and particularly their leadership during that period. Terence O'Neill was seen in Press editorials as a different kind of Unionist leader, one whose encouragement of reconciliation within the North marked a new departure from 'the attitudes of Carson and Brookeborough'.o50 When O'Neill hosted the Irish government delegation at Stormont in December 1967, a Press front-page photograph showed a smiling Lynch and a laughing O'Neill (with a positively beaming T.K. Whitaker between them!). On an inside page was a picture of O'Neill's nineteen-year-old daughter, Ann, who (readers were told) 'cooked the lunch at Stormont House, Belfast, yesterday, for her father and Mr. Lynch'.51 This foregrounding of O'Neill's personable nature and of his family amounted to a humanising of the Unionist leader for a southern audience. The 'Belfast letter'/'Northern correspondent' column, published once every one to two weeks at this time, also provided a broadly sympathetic view of Unionist government reforms in areas such as local government and housing.52 The column offered constructive and rhetoric-free criticism of ongoing discriminatory practices in a measured tone that some Press editorials also adopted on questions of northern reform.53

Editorials might have offered some constructive criticism of discrimination in the Unionist state, but they had nothing but contempt for Unionists' upholding of partition. A history and folklore column in the Press sometimes focused on the historic Ulster of the early-modem Gaels and of the fine Presbyterians who rebelled in 1798.54 The editorial column displayed a similar historical understanding, convinced that the ancestors of modern Unionists and nationalists were 'once united...in a common patriotism'.55 However, this united country was broken into two pieces by the imposition of partition, and as one editorial noted regretfully, 'The experience of a northern visit can be shattering to people of fixed ideas who may not have realised how far the two parts of Ireland have fallen apart over the years.'56 Given this background, Unionism was not even regarded as a political ideology as such. Instead, it was viewed as a corrupt non-philosophy: 'The only known reason why he [O'Neill] and his followers still ignore the unchallengeable rights of the Irish people is simply the pot of gold that Britain offered for continued allegiance and which now in its diminishing days proffers less and less.'57 Apart from showing a

491rish Press, 24 March 1969. 50olrish Press, 20 February 1968. 51lrish Press, 12 December 1967. 521rish Press, 20 February 1968; 5 March 1968; 1 June 1968. 53For the 'Belfast letter' column, see Irish Press, 9 January 1968; 11 May 1968; for editorials, see

Irish Press, 11 January 1968; 15 June 1968. 541rish Press, 18 December 1967; 14 November 1968. 551rish Press, 12 December 1967. 56Irish Press, 22 March 1968. 571rish Press, 20 February 1968. This was the editorial column's considered view of the basis of

Unionist loyalty to Britain. See also Irish Press, 14 April 1969, in which Unionist allegiance to the Crown is again said to spring 'solely from self-seeking economic reasoning'.




serious misunderstanding of the basis of Unionist allegiance to Britain, the view that Unionism was motivated purely by financial gain gave an insight into the historical narrative and resultant sense of grievance that fuelled the Press's obsession with partition. As far as Irish Press editorials were concerned, Unionists had divided a once happy and united land and maintained this division of the country merely for a 'pot of gold'. Should the Irish government really improve relations with people who had committed such a grave injustice against the nation, without addressing that fundamental injustice? In this context, any friendly gestures made were rooted in a very 'green' vision of North-South cooperation. One editorial proposed, 'Perhaps S6amus O'Riain would say "Be my guest" to Captain O'Neill on next All-Ireland day, especially if the gallant sons of Antrim are in the fray.'58 For the Irish Press, the new future promised by North-South cooperation would arrive when Unionists entered Croke Park, the cauldron of a revitalised Gaelic Ireland! No neutral space was envisaged. The other side did not deserve it.

Despite the evident resentment of partition in Press editorials, the paper's view of Unionists should not be seen as monolithic but rather as a product of the interplay between three distinct elements-the leader, O'Neill; the Protestant population; and the Unionist establishment. When violence broke out in Northern Ireland in October 1968, a Press editorial criticised the heavy-handed approach of the northern government and questioned the sincerity of the 'sweet reasonable' prime minister. However, O'Neill was still seen as a different kind of Unionist leader, under whom community relations in Northern Ireland were likely to get better, not worse.59 Following O'Neill's 'Crossroads' speech of 9 December, in which he rejected a Northern Ireland based on the interests of only one section of society, a Press editorial praised his 'resolution and statesmanship'. Warm words indeed for a southern nationalist newspaper. The Press also published the Unionist leader's address in full and took the unusual step of placing a (sympathetic) analysis of his speech, by political correspondent Michael Mills, on its front page.60 Press editorials also showed a commitment to the idea that the Protestants of Northern Ireland were a decent and moderate people.61 However, it was believed that these hopeful conditions were ruined because the Unionist political establishment did not reflect the views of the people who voted for the party:

Unionism is, of course, founded on privilege... [The Unionist Party] has extremists in its ranks-people to whom Catholicism is anathema...But the great majority of those who vote for it are reasonable, level-headed Protestants who could have no more truck with Paisleyism than with the I.R.A.-if only orange agitators would leave them alone.62

If only, indeed. Northern Ireland was presented in tragic terms in the editorial column of the Irish Press: a society in which decent and reasonable people were controlled by bigots in key positions of power.

Contempt for the Unionist and Orange establishment was fuelled by the attempts of the northern authorities to suppress civil rights marches. The Unionist Party was dubbed a haven for 'the most bigoted extremists of all time', whereas the Orange Order was compared to the Ku Klux Klan, and politicians associated with the Order

58Irish Press, 20 February 1968. 591rish Press, 7 October 1968; 16 October 1968. 60Irish Press, 12 December 1968; 10 December 1968. 61lrish Press, 16 April 1968; 25 January 1969. 621rish Press, 14 December 1968 (emphasis added).




were dubbed 'the dour, narrow, bitter bigots of Belfast'.63 Press editorials went beyond mere vitriol, however, in their depictions of the Unionist elite: they emphasised the secretive role of the Orange Order in northern politics and constructed a powerful picture of the Unionist establishment through the repeated use of cloak-and-dagger imagery. References were made to the Orange Order's 'sinister link' with the Unionist Party, to its manipulation of northern politics from 'behind the scenes' and to its meetings, which took place 'behind the closed doors of every loyal lodge'." Prime Minister O'Neill, still viewed as a moderate, was said to be 'locked in the jaws of the all-powerful Unionist hierarchy', having 'found out that the Orange Order must be obeyed in the fundamentals of northern politics'.65 This focus on the all-powerful Orange-Unionist elite in Northern Ireland led the Press, somewhat unusually, to exonerate the RUC of responsibility for brutal acts against citizens. Responding to unrestrained police batoning of civil rights marchers on 5 October 1968, editorials spoke of 'the unfortunate police who were driven into action' and focused their anger not on the minister responsible, William Craig (who had 'no alternative', it was thought), but on the Orange lodges. The 'dark hand of the Orange Order' was said to be behind both the government's banning of the civil rights march and the violent intervention of the RUC.66

Northern Ireland as a whole could still be portrayed as a rather dark place, with allusions to what one article called 'the Sunday gloom that pervades the Six Counties' because public houses and cinemas were closed on that day. The article looked for 'Brighter Sundays in the "Black" North', while one editorial derided the 'Belfast bigots' who tried to slow down such changes. 'Even Belfast must grow up,' it concluded.67 Irish Press editor Tim Pat Coogan told a University College Dublin debating society that people in the Republic had a 'duty' to help 'our co-religionists and those who differ from us [in the North] out of the dark ghettos of bigotry and prejudice into the sun of social justice...'.68 With its images of light and darkness, Coogan's rhetoric provided an interesting insight into why the North was often referred to as a dark or black place. Apart from the fact that there was indeed bigotry and an element of gloom in Northern Ireland, the use of such imagery confirmed the North as the one place that the Republic could confidently look down on--despite its own tendencies towards an inferiority complex vis-h-vis the rest of the world.69

The Press editorial column's perception of both the 'positive' and 'negative' elements of Unionism was strongly influenced by its commitment to a united Ireland. Drawing a sharp distinction between the Protestant people and their political representatives allowed editorials to argue that regardless of Unionist leaders' strident affirmations of support for the link with Britain, most of the reasonable people who voted for them would, in certain circumstances, come voluntarily into a united Ireland:

63Irish Press, 14 October 1968; 15 November 1968. 64Irish Press, 4 October 1968; 10 December 1968 (emphasis added). 65Irish Press, 26 August 1968; 7 October 1968. 661rish Press, 7 October 1968; 14 October 1968 (emphasis added). For more editorials critical of the

RUC but also understanding of their 'invidious role', see the Irish Press, 18 November 1968; 6 January 1969.

67lrish Press, 21 October 1968; 3 July 1969 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the background to the commonly used phrase 'the black North', see C. O'Halloran, Partition and the limits of Irish nationalism (Dublin, 1987), 4.

68Reported in the Irish Press, 10 December 1968 (emphasis added). 69See the Irish Press, 21 August 1969, in which the largely tolerant South is contrasted with the

more bigoted North. See also Irish Press, 14 October 1968; 20 January 1969, for a discussion of the superiority of the Garda SiochAina (the Republic's police force) to the RUC.




When the Twenty-six counties can demonstrate to the men and women in the streets of Belfast and Derry that they will not suffer in any way-socially, religiously or economically-by joining with their fellow men and women in Dublin or Cork, then harmony and unity will be a realistic possibility.70

Viewing Terence O'Neill as a reasonable leader also allowed for the possibility that he or a successor could be won over by this benign vision of national unification: 'Surely the Captain could come in from the cold by changing his sights from the London which he admits does not know him to the Dublin where he rightly belongs.'7' As for the idea that Unionist loyalty to Britain was based on the lure of a 'pot of gold', this view lent itself to optimism that Unionists would agree to a united Ireland when the contents of the 'diminishing' coffers of the British treasury were refused to them. Calling on northern Unionists and nationalists to join with the rest of the Irish people, one editorial asked, 'If the British subsidies are withdrawn and the North must stand on its own two feet...what other real benefit is to be gained from the British connection?'72 Stressing that the Unionist establishment was unrepresentative and 'sinister' encouraged the idea that a horrified Great Britain would eventually force an increasingly bigoted Northern Ireland state into the hands of the Republic: 'The British people are watching with a fascinated horror the strange creatures that political turmoil has brought to the surface.' This desperate vision of the North's entry to an all-Ireland state prompted the question of why the South would want to join up with such a diseased political entity. Nevertheless, given that Westminster 'would be quite glad to sever the golden chain that binds her to Northern Ireland', the Press concluded that an 'imaginative gesture' from Dublin 'might produce long term results' on the border issue.73

Other contributors to the Irish Press, such as Michael Mills and Joe Carroll, believed that anti-partitionist speculation was irrelevant and unhelpful in the context of the struggle for civil rights and the (by now declining) efforts to improve North-South relations.74 The Press was an open forum for nationalist opinion, and their contributions, as well as the columns of W.A. Newman, occasionally took positions that differed either in content or tone from the editorial line.75 However, these writers' articles did not command the same space, authority or regularity that the paper's leading articles did. The editorials continued their regular speculation about how the current situation could lead to a united Ireland, often seeing the civil rights movement as a key contributor to the ongoing national struggle: 'They are demonstrating, by demonstrating against its consequences, that any border in this country is an evil thing.'76

The depiction of Terence O'Neill in editorials was still as sympathetic as ever when he called a general election in early February 1969, but one uncomfortable fact remained:

70lrish Press, 14 November 1968. 71lrish Press, 19 September 1968. 721rish Press, 10 December 1968. 731rish Press, 26 February 1969 (emphasis added). 741rish Press, 23 November 1968; 28 January 1969. Austin Currie and other civil rights campaigners

also warned against anti-partitionist speculation in the context of the struggle for civil rights. They argued that such speculation was unrealistic and that it allowed the Unionist authorities to dismiss their campaign as another Republican conspiracy. See Irish Press, 16 January 1969.

751rish Press, 14 December 1968; 31 December 1968. 76lrish Press, 31 October 1968; also 19 April 1969; 24 April 1969.




For us it is ironical to reflect that this very spirit of fair play which has won admiration for Capt. O'Neill on both sides of the Border is more likely to maintain the Border...the British will be less disposed to pull the financial rug out from underneath his administration...77

Although the Press called for civil rights in Northern Ireland and the defeat of extreme Unionists, these goals were inconsistent with its overriding commitment to a united Ireland. It was clear that if O'Neill defeated his internal opponents, secured an incontestable mandate and implemented a real civil rights programme, his success could serve only to bail the Unionist state out of its present crisis and increase the viability of Northern Ireland as a political entity. Then O'Neill, the statesman, went too far. He called on Catholics to vote for his policy of 'equal citizenship for all the people of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom'.78 The Irish Press was horrified: '...if O'Neill got a landslide victory which would indicate substantial Catholic support, this would make useful propaganda for the continuation of partition. Nobody who is truly Irish at heart could append their support in these circumstances.'79

From a nationalist perspective, the Press had every right to advise Catholics against voting Unionist. The problem with this stance, however, was that the newspaper then had to retreat from its hitherto consistent commitment to equality for the northern minority. Catholics in the North were told not to give O'Neill a mandate for reform and to wait for their civil rights: 'World opinion will force reform-even if it takes longer-no matter who takes power.'80 Editorials also quickly abandoned their sympathetic line on O'Neill-one that had survived the state-enforced brutality of October 1968 and January 1969-and embarked on a vigorous anti-O'Neill campaign. One editorial, for example, was dominated by two paragraph-long quotes from Lord Brookeborough, speaking in 1933 and 1934 on why Protestants should not employ 'disloyal' Catholics. These grotesquely sectarian sentiments were crudely juxtaposed with a quote from O'Neill stating that his aim was the same as Carson's and Brookeborough's (to preserve the Union), as the editorial warned voters to be aware of O'Neill's 'admiration for the men of the past'.81 Somewhat disingenuously, O'Neill was now being lumped together with previous prime ministers for rhetorical purposes, even though the Press had previously acknowledged that he was a different kind of Unionist leader. Indeed, this editorial line was about more than just preventing O'Neill from consolidating partition. Civil rights agitation had brought the northern state to its knees for the first time, and the Press was beginning to see the value of Unionist inertia and leadership crises. It believed that this instability, together with the trouble on the streets, opened up a host of new possibilities. In the midst of one of those leadership crises in late January, for example, an editorial commented with some relish:

The truth is that the Unionist ship of state is being swamped. Its captain may lash himself to the helm, but with half the crew in a state of mutiny the 50-year-old, ill-found vessel is unlikely to weather the storm...the constitutional position of Northern Ireland is now at stake.82

77Irish Press, 13 December 1968. 78Hennessey, A history of Northern Ireland, 158. 791rish Press, 24 February 1969. 80lrish Press, 24 February 1969. 81lrish Press, 19 February 1969. 82lrish Press, 31 January 1969.




RIOTING FOR IRELAND: THE LEAD-UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE TROUBLES

Recognising the importance of visual representation to a readership now accustomed to television, the Irish Press began, from January 1969, to publish full pages of photographs from Northern Ireland during particularly violent periods. In these presentations, six or more images of rioting, fighting or rubble-laden streets would be printed together across a whole page in a prominent part of the newspaper.83 The Press also developed a keen interest in international opinion of the trouble in Northern Ireland, republishing editorials critical of Stormont from the British media or comments from newspapers in France, Germany, the Soviet Union and elsewhere.84 Some editorials highlighted the power of 'world opinion' and claimed that the Council of Europe's Human Rights Commission was keeping a close eye on the North and putting pressure on the British government.85 If emphasising the moral power of international opinion is the tactic of the powerless, the Irish Press's focus reflected the Irish government's lack of geopolitical power and its inability to exercise a significant influence over events on its doorstep.86 Nationalist Ireland could only hope that some kind of universal moral outrage would eventually force the change it desired in Northern Ireland. On the other hand, it could return to more traditional methods.

Although they had called in January 1969 for a period of calm, Press editorials began to display a growing frustration when just such a peace took hold for the next three months: 'Has all the stirring, all the tumescence of the past winter come to nothing? Do the masters of Stormont really believe that plus ca change, plus ca la meme chose [sic]... ?'87 Serious rioting broke out in Derry in late April, however, and Press editorials called on the Unionist authorities to stop delaying reform, a view that was consistent with the calls of civil rights leaders in Northern Ireland such as John Hume and Ivan Cooper.88 Such leaders also spoke out against any further escalation of events on the ground by people on their own side. Their calls for calm and for people to keep off the streets were echoed by NICRA, which also made clear that its organisation 'deplore[d] the recent hooliganism' by groups of young people on the anti-Unionist side.89 In contrast, the Irish Press did not issue one call for calm or restraint in any of its four editorials on the North during this potentially explosive week, nor did it signal any disapproval of the young rioters' activity. In January 1969, the Press had used its influence to call for a period of calm in Northern Ireland. From April on, however, the editorial column began to hint that instability and violence on the streets served the interests of nationalists all over the island.

Even in quiet March, editorials wondered about the potential for a return to violence in Northern Ireland and how this could precipitate intervention by the British government or even the UN, with all sorts of constitutional implications.90

831rish Press, 6 January 1969; 13 January 1969; 21 April 1969; 22 April 1969; 14 July 1969; 13 August 1969; 14 August 1969.

84Irish Press, 7 October 1968; 12 October 1968; 7 January 1969; 14 January 1969. 851rish Press, 6 January 1969; 7 January 1969; 24 February 1969. 86The British government refused to take Dublin's concerns seriously and still referred to Northern

Ireland as an 'internal matter'. See Kennedy, Division and consensus, 332-4; Fanning, 'Playing it cool', 58, 84. The Irish government's legitimate interest and role in Northern Ireland was not acknowledged in 1968-9, although it would be later.

871rish Press, 5 April 1969 (italics in original). 881rish Press, 21 April 1969. For the views of Ivan Cooper, see Irish Press, 23 April 1969. 89For the comments of Hume and Cooper see Irish Press, 21 April 1969. For NICRA's view see

Irish Press, 24 April 1969. 90lrish Press, 1 March 1969; 5 March 1969.




During the chaos and uncertainty of late April and early May, editorials speculated about British intervention over the heads of Unionists and the implications of the instability that was rocking the North. Referring to Derry, one editorial gleefully pointed out that 'Stormont's writ no longer runs in the second city of the Six Counties'.91 The escalation of violence had finally led the authorities to introduce 'one man, one vote' in local government elections, provoking yet another crisis in the Unionist leadership. Terence O'Neill, who had failed to secure a mandate from Catholics in February, emerged weakened from the election before resigning in late April. When Major James Chichester-Clark succeeded him, the Press thought that Unionists had thrown up a lightweight politician as leader.92 'Major Domo', as one editorial nicknamed him, had criticised his predecessor's approach but was now quietly conceding that O'Neill's reform policies would have to be continued.93 Unionism looked weaker and more amenable to the threat of violence than ever before, and the Press sought to maintain the pressure:

The point of no return has been reached so far as Unionist rule in the North is concerned. There must be immediate and acceptable guarantees to the minority...or there will be a return to the bloody battles on the streets, a state of anarchy that will be indistinguishable from civil war, and intervention, possibly of the most drastic kind, from Westminster.94

The editorial also noted that there was now a question mark over the very existence of Stormont itself. The Press was relishing what it believed to be the results of violence and instability in Northern Ireland-an increasing potential for constitutional change. Lest there be any doubt, one editorial reminded Unionists of what the ultimate conclusion to the unrest would be: 'The root cause [of the minority rebellion] is the unjust partition of this country. There can be no real peace or progress in the North until it is ended.'95 In these and other uncompromising words, the Press was taking a strongly militant position in advance of the increased civil strife that was expected.

Further rioting in July served to heighten awareness of 12 August, the day of a traditional Apprentice Boys parade in Derry, which was already widely regarded as a serious potential flashpoint.96 As tensions rose, rioting broke out in Belfast on 3 August, with groups of rival youths roaming the streets, throwing petrol bombs.97 The situation was deteriorating rapidly, and the Press was intrigued. An editorial on 7 August referred to reports suggesting that if British troops were required to quell riots in the North, the British government would demand the surrender of Stormont's political authority to Westminster before sending the troops in. The editorial spelled out what it saw as the 'staggering' implications of this, which 'have probably been overlooked by most people, North and South': 'The entry of the troops will be the signal for [Stormont's] humiliating dissolution and replacement by direct rule from Westminster...'. After months of speculation about British intervention and the potential fall from grace of the hated Orange-Unionist establishment, the Press

91lrish Press, 21 April 1969. 921rish Press, 2 May 1969. 93Hennessey, A history of Northern Ireland, 162. 94lrish Press, 2 May 1969. 951rish Press, 22 April 1969. 96Kennedy, Division and consensus, 332. See also Irish Press, 28 June 1969; 29 July 1969, for

statements by the Derry Citizens' Action Committee. 97lrish Press, 4 August 1969; Hennessey, A history of Northern Ireland, 164.



FOLEY--North-South Relations and the Outbreak of the Troubles 25

wondered if the hour was finally at hand: the headline on the leading article read, 'The Orange card played out?' Was this about to happen? What would be necessary for it to happen? The same editorial gave a clear answer to the latter question: '...a further outbreak of civil disturbances across the North, involving say, Belfast, Derry, Newry simultaneously, could not be quelled by the RUC alone...'. This would lead to the employment of 'an "ultimate contingency plan" for the use of troops' and thereby bring about the end of Unionist rule in the North. The editorial column of a national newspaper could hardly encourage rioting and street fighting in explicit fashion. It was, however, speculating in a way that could only have encouraged northern nationalists to make their contribution-along with militant loyalists-to an intensification of violence that was, they were now assured, bound to bring Stormont crashing to the ground.

Indeed, the Press believed that the momentum of constitutional change might not end with the fall of the Northern Ireland administration. The editorial of 7 August continued, 'Whether a future withdrawal of political authority from Stormont will bring the end of Partition nearer or not is an intriguing question which must now interest quite a number of people, both north and south of the Border.' Yes, there was the Attlee government's pledge that there would be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the agreement of the Stormont Parliament: 'But supposing the Parliament has had to be suspended...?'98 What would happen then, wondered the Irish Press? These 'intriguing' questions provided a further incentive for northern nationalists to contribute to the civil strife that could, they were told, ultimately lead to a united Ireland. In this context, the Press was no longer merely silent or ambivalent about the nationalist rioters of the North-it glorified them and linked their agitation to the national struggle. One editorial derided those who appealed to the rioters with economic arguments. Restating that 'the root cause of the persistent trouble lies in Partition', it added, 'Telling the people of Derry and Belfast that they will have no employment if the present unrest continues will be no sop to those who are fundamentally imbued with a spirit of liberty and equality...'99 The nationalists of Derry and Belfast were, in a sense, rioting for freedom and for Ireland. The only other time that such a romanticised view of violence was expressed in the editorial column was when it spoke of the 1916 leaders who sacrificed themselves for the cause of freedom. The Press was now hinting that another kind of blood sacrifice at this time could advance the cause for which those men died- a free and united Ireland.

NATIONAL CRISIS, NATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: PREPARING FOR SOUTHERN INTERVENTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The events of October 1968 had already led the Irish government to change its policy of playing down the partition issue in public. Jack Lynch began to bang the anti- partitionist drum while repeatedly defining North-South cooperation as a means to a united Ireland.100 This 'green' version of the policy, unacceptable to Lynch's erstwhile partners, the Unionists, was precisely the version of North-South cooperation that the Irish Press could accept. Editorials now abandoned their pre-October scepticism and

981rish Press, 7 August 1969. 99Irish Press, 4 August 1969 (emphasis added). '00Fanning, 'Playing it cool', 60; Kennedy, Division and consensus, 315-16.




began to praise the government's northern policy, writing off the damage to cross- border cooperation as 'a peripheral matter'.101

By April 1969, Press editorials were making it clear that the civil strife in Northern Ireland was a national issue. Following a series of terrorist attacks on vital installations, British troops had been sent to the North to guard public buildings and utilities-a situation 'completely unacceptable to Irishmen north and south of the Border', the Press warned.102 Another editorial was more explicit:

The wind of demand for change in the North has strengthened to a tempest that can sweep away the Stormont Government; it could set Irishman against Irishman in fratricidal conflict, and all that Britain proposes to do is what is certainly the worst, most provocative action in her power-the reinforcement and the more open deployment of her army of occupation in the North.

Britain had learned nothing 'from the blunders of 700 years', it was thought. 03 Indeed, its actions could only 'gravely extend the possibility of armed conflict':

It is not so many years since British soldiers were waging war against the national independence movement here. No doubt the Irish Government will make it plain to Britain that it has the strongest objection to this misuse of any portion of the 32 Counties that constitute the national territory of Ireland.'04

By invoking articles 2 and 3 of de Valera's constitution, the editorial was setting out the legal basis upon which the South could intervene in the North, if the government so wished. By bitterly recalling ancient and modern examples of war between Britain and Ireland and by speaking of 'provocative' British acts and potential 'armed conflict', the Press sought to confer historical legitimacy on its increasingly militant stance.

With one week to go before the widely expected 12 August conflagration, the Press editorial column made it clear once again that this would be a national crisis:

How many people realise that our country is face to face with crisis? There is, by all appearances, a real danger that British troops will be brought into the North to cope with the grave situation there. Nobody can be sure what the reaction will be either there or here.105

As in April, it was believed that the unacceptable presence of openly deployed British troops on Irish soil could trigger a conflict on the island as a whole. For the authorities in the South, 'So terrifying a decision will demand not merely a searching of the national conscience, but a coolness of judgement such as has not been needed for many years.'106 The 'national conscience' was pricked on 11 August by the Press's front-page coverage of northern nationalist leader Eddie McAteer's call for assistance from the south, including troops, if the feared loyalist attack on the Catholic minority materialised. 'I pray to God that our watching brethren will not stand aside any longer,' he was reported as saying. That day's editorial called for

'01'rish Press, 31 October 1968; 12 November 1968. Lynch's change of tone vis-a-vis North-South cooperation also inspired enthusiastic front-page coverage: see Irish Press, 30 October 1968, 31 October 1968, 1 November 1968, 8 November 1968 and 12 November 1968.

102lrish Press, 21 April 1969; Bew and Gillespie, Chronology, 14. 103lrish Press, 22 April 1969. "04Irish Press, 21 April 1969. 05slrish Press, 6 August 1969 (emphasis added). 106lrish Press, 6 August 1969 (emphasis added).




'political help' to be given to northern Catholics but warned that 'unorganised interference from the South' would be counterproductive.'07 But what about organised state action? On 12 August, the day that Northern Ireland was expected to explode, the front page of the Press featured a photograph of Irish army soldiers taking aim with sub-machine guns at a target in the distance. 08 This image was placed beside the lead story of the day, which detailed how the men of the Bogside were going to try to defend themselves and their area. The photograph seemed to be a reminder that Irish people in the North need not be totally defenceless-that there was an Irish army that could defend them.

As expected, the Apprentice Boys' parade through Derry later that day and the Catholic reaction to it was the catalyst for the most vicious violence that Northern Ireland had seen thus far in 1968-9, with the RUC employing armoured vehicles and tear gas against rioters in Derry's Bogside. Violence, amounting to open sectarian warfare in some areas, spread across Northern Ireland.109 The Irish Press editorial of 13 August spoke of innocent people in the North facing a potential 'holocaust' and concluded with a dramatic call for immediate action on the whole northern issue: 'It's a problem which Belfast, Dublin and London have a vested interest in solving and history will accord the palm to the centre or leader who makes the first move. The time is now. Tomorrow may be too late and too bloody."'0 Eddie McAteer had appealed for troops from the Republic just two days previously, and the Press editorial column had recently warned of a 'terrifying' decision that would soon face the South. Within the Irish government, Neil Blaney was arguing that the Irish army should go into Derry or Newry.1"' This was the kind of idea that was being debated on 13 August 1969. In this context, the Irish Press's dramatic call for action must have been regarded by most readers as a call on the Lynch government to make a military gesture in defence of northern Catholics, and to make it as a 'first move' towards the ending of partition and the solution of the northern 'problem'.

That night, in a television address, the taoiseach told the nation: 'The Irish government can no longer stand by...'. Field hospitals, manned by Irish army personnel, were to be set up along the border to cater for the injured and others, including many Catholics who were being evacuated as their homes burned at the hands of loyalists."12 The Press editorial of 14 August compared the sight of Catholics under siege in the North to 'the G.P.O. stand'. However, this allusion to 1916 was the only reference to the suffering of the northern minority in a commentary that was obsessed with partition. As far as the Press was concerned, the plight of northern Catholics was a worry, but it was primarily of interest in so far as it provided an opportunity for southern action on the big issue: 'The movement of Army field hospitals to the Border taken in conjunction with the proposals to the UN and Westminster together add up to one of the most far reaching steps ever taken on

'071rish Press, 11 August 1969. o18Irish Press, 12 August 1969. The soldiers were pictured with the minister for defence, James

Gibbons, during army exercises at Gormanston camp. 109Hennessey, A history of Northern Ireland, 164; Kennedy, Division and consensus, 335; Bew and

Gillespie, Chronology, 17. io1Irish Press, 13 August 1969 (italics in original). "'According to Dick Walsh, Blaney, the minister for agriculture and fisheries, argued that 'the army

should go into Derry or Newry or both and at the very least, create an international incident which would lead to intervention by the United Nations'. See Dick Walsh, The party: inside Fianna Fdil (Dublin, 1986), 96.

"12Kennedy, Division and consensus, 336-7; Bew and Gillespie, Chronology, 17-18.




the partition issue by a Southern Government.' 113 Indeed, the Irish army's presence on the border was relished as an opportunity to bring the partition issue to a head:

Nobody on this side of the border wants an eye-ball to eye-ball confrontation across the border with our Protestant fellow Irishmen, but the time has come when they must realise that they are Irish, that they cannot for ever hold onto their hegemony on a part of this Island under another Flag.114

After years of frustration on partition, in a country whose government was allowed no influence over events on its doorstep,115 the Press regarded the crisis as a chance to confront Northern Unionists, supported by the threat of violence:

Equal citizenship now; settlement of the partition issue subsequently. These are the proposals. Meanwhile, let no one misunderstand the implications of the fact that it is army field hospitals which are being set up and not units operated by the Irish Red Cross. This is a time for control, wisdom and diplomacy and it would not do to labour this point."16

One wonders what would have been said had the Press not restrained itself! The editorial was glorying in the 'implications' of the military aspect of the Irish government's action. It also betrayed an increasingly flippant attitude to violence: 'One day, the blow-up had to come and after it a peace. The pictures from the Bogside show us that the blow-up has come...'.117 In tune with the militant sounds of its editorial, the Press's front-page report from Derry struck a triumphalist note, with this rose-coloured vision of cheering crowds on a flag-adorned battlefield:

Virtual civil war hit Derry in the wake of the Taoiseach's speech when 5,000 cheering men, women and children, hurling petrol bombs and stones, waving the Tricolour and shouting 'Up the Republic' charged RUC and B Specials and drove them out of the Bogside."118

The Fianna F il government was busy trying to defuse a situation in which much of the public in the South was ready to invade Northern Ireland.19 The Irish Press was busy contributing to that public feeling with its militant editorial line during a period when the aggressive mood in the Republic threatened to boil over.'20

If, as noted above, coverage of Northern Ireland in the Irish Press increased dramatically from October 1968, one can only say that this coverage exploded in August 1969. From a previous average of one to two pages per day, northern coverage took up between four and five full pages every day for two weeks from

113Irish Press, 14 August 1969. Lynch also announced that his government had requested that Britain apply to the UN for the urgent dispatch of a peacekeeping force.

ll41rish Press, 14 August 1969. 115It seems reasonable to suggest that the British refusal to allow the Irish government any influence

over events in Northern Ireland was one of the factors that fuelled frustration in the Twenty-Six Counties.

l"l6rish Press, 14 August 1969. "7lrish Press, 14 August 1969. 118Irish Press, 14 August 1969. "19Fanning, 'Playing it cool', 74, 77-8. The minister for external affairs in 1969, Patrick Hillary,

recalls: 'The Fianna Faiil party in the country; they'd come to me, including all the TDs, thinking this is the opportunity to invade the North...'.

120For accounts of the aggressive mood of the population of the Twenty-Six Counties and the potential for instability on the island as a whole, see Fanning, 'Playing it cool', 73-4; Dermot Keogh, Twentieth-century Ireland: nation and state (Dublin, 1994), 301-7; Kennedy, Division and consensus, 342: Kennedy. "'This tragic and most intractable nroblem"'. 90.




13 August. It then dropped to an average of three pages per day, but huge northern- related headlines dominated the front page of every edition throughout the second half of August and into September.121 Partition and the doubtful future of Stormont dominated the editorial column for a few more days until 18 August, when the plight of northern Catholics finally reached the top of its agenda.122 On 28 August Jack Lynch issued a statement in which he ruled out the use of force in relation to the North: 'The Government agree that the Border cannot be changed by force; it is and has been their policy to seek the re-unification of the country by peaceful means.' While this was reported in the Press the next day, the paper's coverage focused overwhelmingly on partition and Lynch's proposal for talks on constitutional issues.123 The pledge on peaceful means was a significant one, and it set a precedent for the taoiseach's policy statements over the next year. Yet the editorial column of the Irish Press was uninterested. It made no comment on Lynch's rejection of the use of force, preferring instead to advance a fairly typical anti-partitionist argument, including a reminder that the taoiseach would be 'failing in his duty' if he did not 'take every opportunity' to raise the partition issue.124 Was this a warning to the Irish government not to return to its pre-October 1968 policy of playing down the border grievance? Regardless of the answer to this question, August 1969 had shown that whereas the Irish Press would exalt military gestures by the Irish government, an affirmation of peaceful means by that government would not even warrant a mention in the Press's editorial column.

CONCLUSION

A number of trends can be identified in the response of the Irish Press in 1968-9 to the changing political landscape in Northern Ireland and the shifting course of North-South relations. Attitudes to Ulster Unionists expressed in the editorial column ranged from absolute contempt for their upholding of partition to a sympathetic perspective on certain individuals, such as Terence O'Neill. Most of the Press's opinions on Unionists-whether it praised the decent nature of ordinary Protestants or declared that Unionist loyalty to Britain was due merely to a 'pot of gold'-were strongly influenced by the paper's commitment to a united Ireland. The Press's attitude to the newly assertive political minority in Northern Ireland was a mixture of pride that they were exposing and weakening the Unionist state and concern that they were challenging the traditional role of the Nationalist Party. Editorials struggled to understand the political significance of the civil rights movement and insisted on linking civil rights to the task of achieving a united Ireland, despite the conviction of activists and some of the Press's own contributors that the civil rights movement was an attempt to move away from the traditional and sterile debate on the partition of Ireland. Nevertheless, the partition issue was a higher editorial priority for the Press than civil rights or the plight of northern

121Editor Tim Pat Coogan believed that Press news coverage of Northern Ireland had improved from its previously 'haphazard' state and that by August 1969, it was arguably 'the best in the country'. See Tim Pat Coogan, 'Foreword', in Mark O'Brien, De Valera, Fianna Fdil and the Irish Press (Dublin, 2001), ix-xx: xv.

1221rish Press, 15 August 1969; 16 August 1969; 18 August 1969. 1231rish Press, 29 August 1969. The front-page headline read 'Lynch again urges talks: Border the

basic issue'. 1241rish Press, 29 August 1969. For an account of Lynch's statements on Northern Ireland from

August 1969, see Keogh, Twentieth-century Ireland, 303, 305-6.




Catholics. For example, the editorial column changed its sympathetic attitude to Terence O'Neill not when the RUC launched Stormont-sanctioned assaults on Catholics in October 1968 and January 1969 but when O'Neill threatened to consolidate the border by wooing Catholic voters. During the conflagration of mid- August 1969 it was also evident that Press editorials were more exercised by the potential for movement on the border issue than they were about the precarious position of Catholics in Northern Ireland. In its response to such events, and in its general views on Unionists and the minority community, the Irish Press revealed the overwhelming influence of partition on its perceptions of the North.

In terms of North-South relations, the Press associated cross-border cooperation with governmental amnesia on the vital question of partition. From December 1967 to October 1968 the newspaper signalled its dissatisfaction with Irish government policy through its northern news priorities, critical editorial comment and the expression of rigidly orthodox views on partition that were contrary to the spirit of that policy. Frustrated with the Fianna Flil leadership's drift away from anti- partitionism, the Press eschewed its traditional role as the party's media ally, opting instead to act as the conscience of Irish nationalism on the border issue.125 Indeed, the fact that this influential newspaper was unenthusiastic and sceptical about North-South cooperation raises a question about how public opinion in the Twenty- Six Counties regarded the policy. Notwithstanding the general support for North-South cooperation in government circles, were the people of the Republic persuaded by the Fianna Flil administrations of Lemass and Lynch that it was a project worth supporting?

Although Irish Press news coverage and editorial comment on Northern Ireland were very infrequent before October 1968, the newspaper dramatically increased its northern coverage after the violence broke out in Derry on 5 October. The Press responded quickly and innovatively to the new situation in terms of the paper's layout, use of photographs and high level of news coverage. However, very little sustained thinking about Northern Ireland had taken place in most quarters of the newspaper from December 1967 to October 1968. The effects of this were seen in confused and inconsistent editorial comment on northern events in the months after October 1968. On the one hand, the Press wanted civil rights for the minority in Northern Ireland, but on the other, it did not want that state to become a more viable entity. These two opinions clashed at the beginning of the February 1969 general election, and the latter one prevailed, though not without bringing the editorial column into contradiction with some of its previous statements about O'Neill and the importance of civil rights. Similarly, Press editorials initially responded to the violence in the North with a hotchpotch of traditional nationalist rhetoric and relatively newer opinions based on the positive constitutional experience of Fianna FAil. Constitutional values led the Press to warn against marches that could lead to violence, whereas nationalist militancy led it to abandon this position when such marches actually took place. This muddled thinking was no intellectual match for the new forces that were beginning to shape politics in Northern Ireland.

The editorial uncertainty diminished from April 1969, however, as the Press settled on a strongly militant line, increasingly aware that the growing instability in

125As has been seen above, Jack Lynch reverted to a more traditional anti-partitionist stance from October 1968, so the Press began to support his northern policy. Although it supported Lynch during the Arms Crisis of 1970, the Press sided with those who wanted a 'greener' policy during the upheaval of 1979 that ended Lynch's career. See O'Brien, De Valera, Fianna Fdil and the Irish Press, 137-40, 165.




Northern Ireland had the potential to effect significant constitutional change. This awareness reached its logical conclusion with editorial speculation that implicitly encouraged young nationalists to riot for liberty and for Ireland until Stormont was brought to its knees. Having warned the British army that its presence could provoke 'armed conflict' on the island, the Press was hinting by August 1969 that the Irish government should bring the partition issue to a head through military action. Relishing the Irish army presence on the border, it glowered across at Unionists and gloried in militant innuendo. The Press believed that a violent showdown was inevitable and that the goal of a united Ireland could well have been advanced when the country emerged from this 'blow-up'. Readers of the Press were urged to rejoice in the military assertion of Irish might: at last-no longer in a position of shameful silence on partition, no longer powerless over events on its doorstep-the Irish government was acting on the national issue. All over the country, readers were offered a perspective on events that glorified military gestures, warned of 'no real peace' until the border was abolished and downplayed statements ruling out force. The Irish Press was in the vanguard of nationalist opinion in the Republic, making its influential contribution to an aggressive public mood that threatened the stability of Ireland, North and South.



Documents

North-South Relations and the Outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, 1968-9: The Response of the "Irish Press"