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9 Nonmoral guilt HERBERT MORRI S Most of us share the belief that we sometimes are a nd sometimes are not gu il ty. To deny it wo uld seem to flout common sense. But , of co urse, philoso phers h;l\·e done prec isely Th ey ha,·e offered ar- guments w demo nstrate th e radical view that none of us is. or indeed ever could be, guilt y- art,'l. tments. for exampl e. that cast doubt upon our ever possessing free choice or our h;l\·ing an idenl i1 y that ex tends over time. Wer e we to take ser iously such views. the ;tppropr iateness, even rationalit}'· of OU J' e1·e r fee li ng gui Jt v \I' Oldd a(So lJe th rown intO d oubt , for this· feeling ge nera ll y arises because of a belief in one's g ui lt. A shared assumptio n appears w underli e the oppos ing r iews of co mm on sense and th ese philoso phers. G ui lt reguires "culpable re- spo nsibility for wrongdoing ... Thus , if one larked free ch oiLe or if o ne acted under a reason ab le mistake of fact or if ano ther. not o neself, were responsib le f or wrongdo ing. o ne wou ld not be Commo n sense proceeds on the ass um pt ion th e requircmem is so me ti mes satis- fi ed; the philosophers dispu te it. From th e fact that we defeat attributions of g uilt by citing absence of culpability. it is easy to c:o ndud e that th e cr it eria for g uilt . s umma- rized by rhe phrase "culpable responsibility tor wrongdo in g-.·· im pose cons tra ints (I ca ll them ··moral cons traims") on the concept's applica- tion. Fai lure to sa ti sfy th ese constra in ts implies absence of mora l guilt, which is th en ass umed to be the only genuine g uilt (a part from a formal conce pt of guilt suc h as we find in law). On this view, which I take to be co mmonl y held, one 's feeling guilt y, despire one·s n ot being gui lty, wo uld be inapp r op riate. 1 Such a view provides a hegemo ny over the whole sp here of gu ilt for moral guilt alone. My prin cipal aim here is to c ha llenge th is ,·iew. I believe it prov ides 1 J oel Femberg put s it yuitc: '·Guilt consists in till' intl!lllional transgression of prohibition. a ,·iolation of a bou ndan. or legal todc . bv a definite volu man act" (c it ing H. K. Lvn d. Ou Shllml' mul tlw Srarclt for l tlmtil _ , ·) . In Fein be rg. Du111g and Dt• .<m• in[! ( l 970 ). p. Princeton. :--.!J: Prim:eton l'ni' ersi1 1 Press. Nonmoral guilt :.?:l l a di storted pict ure of g ui lt 's rol e in our lives. My pla<l' lot inquiry is our emot ional life. co mpone nts of which seem to me dt •- valu ed by th is concep ti on of what constitutes "genuine gu il t." My atte ntion has been drawn to three types of case, each of wh ich mus t be regarded as puzzling if one subscribes lO the 1·iew that gu ilt is moral guilt and moral guilt alone. Fi rst, incli,·iduals report experienc- ing guilt, at least occasionally, m ·er certa in sta tes of mind al one, e\· en those states over which they appear to have no control. I have won- dered what sense might be made of such exper iences, and I have wondered, too. whe th er one's reeling might be ap propriate thou gh it a ri ses in circumstances 11·here. because th ere is no ··volumary act:· one is not ''culpably responsible for wro ngdoing." I have considered , with respect to these st ates, whether we might perhaps even be guilty, bu t not in a se nse subscribed to by ph il osoph ers . I have next been con - cer n ed with t he now ramiliar. th ough no less perplexing because of that , phenomena or "s ur vivo r" a nd associated ki nds of guil t. Here. as in th e f ormer Gtse. individual s wi th no culpable in i'Oivement report feeling St il l more s tran ge!) . they may claim they are guilty. l wo ndered what sense could be made of this and whether they mig ht be correct. Finally. in di,·iduals report feeling guilt)' in circumstances ,,·here not the y but others have acted wrong!) and where the y have no culpable rela ti onship to the wrongdoing: the y too, despite appa rent moral innocence, seem pre p ared to say not j ust that they feel guilty, but that they are guilty. Her e too I ha1e ,,·ondered wh ether the feel- ings might be appro priate an d wh ether th e) might co rrespond to a state ol guilt tha t is n ot conventionally moral. These phe nomena wo uld all seem. at least on the face of it, to co nf1i ct with th e common vie,,· that moral gu il t and it alone is the touchstone for ge n uine g ui lt and appr o pr ia te guilt l' ee lings - even a ll ow in g fo r so me disagr eement. as there is bound to be, over what consti tutes moral guilt. I ndi vi duals wo uld either be misdescribing th eir feelings (it's sha rn e. for exa mple, not gu ilt) or reflecting some con cept ual confusion (reg r et . for exa mple, is what t he y should be feeling) or , while truly feeling gu ilty. mistaking the tru e cause of their fee li ng (displace ment is at work). As for the that they are gui lt y. not just feeling it, this is a gross conceptu al confusion. for one cannot be gu ilty if one is no t morally guilty. My respon se to these cases has been quite different. First, l am skept i ca l abo ut any claim of wi despread of terms for emo- tional states, a nd I am genera ll y d isposed to accept lirst-person re- po rts as accurate. More important. reaction to such reports is tha t th e>· may be ent irely app ro priate. Finallv. 1 am also skep ti cal about

Nonmoral Guilt

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Nonmoral guilt HERBERT MORRI S

Most of us sha re th e be lief that we sometimes are and sometimes are not gu ilty. To deny it would seem to flout common sense. But, of course, philosophers h;l\·e done precisely t hi~. They ha,·e offered ar­guments w demonstrate the radical view that none of us is. or indeed ever cou ld be, guilty- art,'l.tments. for example. that cast doubt upon our ever possessing free choice o r our h;l\·ing an idenl i1 y that extends over time. Were we to take seriously such views. the ;tpp ropriateness, even rationalit}'· of OU J' e1·e r fee ling gui Jt v \I'Oldd a(So lJe th rown intO doubt, for this · fee ling generally a rises because of a belief in one's g ui lt.

A shared assumption appears w underlie the opposing r iews of common sense and these philosophers. Guilt reguires "culpable re­sponsibility for wrongdoing ... Thus, if one larked free choiLe or if one acted under a reasonable mistake of fa ct or if anothe r. not oneself, were responsible for wrongdoing. o ne wou ld not be guilt ~ ·· Common sense proceeds on the assum ption the requircmem is so meti mes satis­fied ; the philosophers dispute it.

From the fact that we defeat attributions of guilt by citin g absence of culpability. it is easy to c:ondude that the criteria for g uilt . summa­rized by rhe phrase "culpable responsibility tor wrongdo ing-.·· impose co nstraints (I call them ··moral constraims") on the concept's applica­tion. Failure to satisfy these constraints implies absence of moral guilt, which is then assumed to be the only genuine guilt (apart from a formal concept of guilt such as we find in law). On this view, which I take to be co mmonly held , one's feelin g guilty, despire o ne·s not being guilty, would be inappropriate. 1 Such a view provides a hegemony over the whole sphere of guilt for moral guilt alone.

My principal aim here is to challenge th is ,·iew. I believe it provides

1 J oel Femberg puts it yuitc: ~u<..ci ncll): '·Guilt consists in till' intl!lllional transgression of prohibition. a ,·iolation o f a ~peci lic t<~l>oo. boundan. or legal todc. bv a d efinite volu man act" (citing H. K. Lvnd. Ou Shllml' mul tlw Srarclt for ltlmtil_,·). In Feinberg. Du111g and Dt•.<m•in[! ( l 970). p. ~3 1 . Princeton . :--.!J : Prim:eton l'ni' e rsi1 1 Press.

Nonmoral guilt :.?:l l

a d istorted picture of gui lt 's role in our lives. My startin~ pla<l' lot inquiry is our emotio nal life. components of which seem to me dt•­valued by this conception of what constitutes "genuine guilt."

My attention has been d rawn to three types of case, each of which must be regarded as puzzling if one subscribes lO the 1·iew that gu ilt is moral guilt and moral guilt alone. Fi rst, incli,·iduals report experienc­ing guilt, at least occasionally, m·er certain states of mind alone, e\·en those states over which they appear to have no control. I have won­dered what sense might be made of such experiences, and I have wondered, too. whether one's reeling might be appropriate though it arises in circu mstances 11·here. because the re is no ··volumary act:· one is not ''cu lpably responsible for wrongdoing." I have considered, with respect to these states, whether we might perhaps even be guilty, but not in a se nse subscribed to by philosophers. I have next been con­cerned with the now ramil iar. though no less perplexing because of that, p he no mena or "survivo r" and associated kinds of guilt. Here. as in the former Gtse. individuals wi th no culpable ini'Oivement report fee ling gui l t~. Stil l more strange!) . they may claim they a re guilty. l wo ndered what sense could be made of this and whether they might be correct. Finally. indi,·iduals report feeling guilt)' in circumstances ,,·here not they but others have acted wrong!) and where they have no culpable relationship to the wrongdoing: they too, despite apparent moral innocence, seem prepared to say not j ust that they feel guilty, but that they are guilty. Here too I ha1e ,,·ondered whether the feel­ings might be appropriate and whether the) might correspond to a state ol guilt that is not conventionally moral.

These phenomena would all seem. at least on the face of it, to conf1ict with the common vie,,· that moral guil t and it alone is the touchstone for genuine gui lt and appropriate guilt l'eelings - even allowin g fo r some disagreement. as there is bound to be, over what consti tutes moral guilt. Individuals would either be misdescr ibing their feelings (it's sharne . for example, not guilt) or reflecting some conceptual confus ion (regret. for example, is what they should be feeling) or, while truly feeling guilty. mistaking the true cause of their feeling (displacement is at work). As for the possibil it~ that they are gui lt y. not just feeling it, this is a gross conceptual confusion. for one cannot be guilty if one is not morally guilty.

My response to these cases has been quite different. First, l am skeptical about any claim of widespread mi~use of terms for emo­tional states, and I am generally d isposed to accept lirst-person re­ports as accurate. More important. m~· reaction to such reports is that the>· may be entirely appropriate. Finallv. 1 am also skeptical about

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the "hegemony" of moral guilt over the whole sphere of guilt. I be­lieve that, if individuals sincerely believe themselves guilty, good rea­sons exist for accepting the belief. Problems arise on ly because of our longing for a neater conceptual world than we in fact possess. In these cases, then, feeling guilty is often not merely explainable, but has a j ustification as well.

My intent is not, of course, to proselytize for more gui lt. Some people surely feel too much of it, and some people might well do with a bit more. Whether we experience too little or too much guilt, whether such inquiries in the abstract make sense at a ll. do not in­terest me here. I would, however. be greatly concerned if the views 1 present promoted a tendency to put everyone. as it were. in the same boat, the morally guilty and the nonmorally guilty. Moral categories serve us well. and I would like to believe that my position does not promote their devaluation. Just as we draw distinctions among the morally guilty. some incu rring by their conduct more. some less, guilt, so we should continue to ,·iew moral guilt ;1s importa ntly different from any nonmoral kind we may come upon. Finall y. in each case 1 describe of nonmoral guilt, nonmoral beca use one is not "culpably responsible for wrongdoing," I believe the guilt incurred by the per­son derives from what may fa ir ly be described as a fund amental mor­a l posture toward the world.

T his study d ivides into five sections. 1 first address the issue of appropriateness, setting out prevalent conceptions of when feeling guilty is or is not appropriate. and because it is frequ ently invoked in those situations of concern to me, I also o ffe r an analysis o f "neurotic , guilt. " 1 then turn to the criteria that have guided my own j udgments of appropriateness. In the second section . because J place such weight on a contrast between moral and nonmoral gui lt, I offer brief analyses of a commonl y accepted philosophical conception of moral guilt and the nature of its associated fee lings. l n the final sections I turn to th ree kinds of anomalous cases: guilt for states of mind alone, guilt over unjust enrichment, and guilt oYer rhe actions of others.

Appropriateness

The common view I find wanting links appropriateness in a tight way to moral guilt. One appropriately feels guilty when one is guilty; one's response is inappropriate if one is aware of being guilty but does not fee l it. Further, responses are inappropriate if disproportionate -being overcome with intense guilt for something minor or feeling a

Nonmoral [!;Uilt 223

twinge for something rather significant or experiencing guilt too briefly or too persistently.

Whether one feels guilty appropriately or inappropriately, one's state would presumably have an accompanying explanation. Freud subscribes to this plausible view in a well-known passage from Totnn

and Taboo:

An obsessional neurotic may be weighed down bra sense of guilt that would be appropriate in a mass-murderer, while in fact. fmm his childhood on­wards, he has behaved to h is fellow-men as the most considerate and scru­pulous member of society. Nevertheless, his sense of guilt has a justification: it is founded on the in tense and frequent death-wishes against his fellows which are unconsciouslY at work in him. It has a justificat ion if what we take into account are unconscious thoughts and not intemion~tl deeds. Thu~ the om­nipotence of thoughts. the (1\'ervaluation of mental processes as compared \,·ith reality , is seen to have unrestncted play in the e motional life of neurotic patie nts and everything tha t clerives from it.~

Freud is here describing what we sometimes label "neu rotic gui lt." T he concept is rich and complex. and a full grasp of its meaning would require fam iliarity with those cases in the psychological liter­ature from which it evolved. This is my understanding of what these cases reveal. First, neurotic guilt requires that one feel guilty. If one is unaware of feeling guilty, as one might be when the feeling is entire!)· unconscious. there is no neurotic guilt. Second, the guilt that one acknowledges experiencing is inappropriate, given the beliefs one cites to support the feelin~. T his may be so for any number of rea­sons. The acknowledged belief may be irrational. as when one con­tin ues to claim rault and responsibi li ty when ()tl the nidence preselll­ed non~ was present: or it is inappropri<1te because, gi,·en the person's acknowledged belief, there is either no ground for guilt, as. s<~y, when one accepts that one was not at fault, " I know I'm not to blame but I sti ll can't help feeling guilty"; or when the intensity of the reaction is greater than warranted by one's beliefs about the seriousness of the guilt, " I know it was triYial but it's kill ing me ... Third. however. one also holds either acknowledged beliefs, as is commonly so with death wishes for one's parents, or if acknowledged , there is no acceptance that these beliefs account for one's feeling, as when one says, "Oh. yes, 1 did that, but it never affected me at all." T he causative, though unacknowledged beliefs. provide what Freud labels a ''justification" for the feeling. There is implied. then, in neurotic guil t the idea of

~ S/(11/dord Editiou (191:1). 13::-!7.

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displaced feel ings, feelings that are linked by th e person ex pe riencing them to an object o ther tha n the object in fact causing the feeling. The concept, then. o f neu rotic guilt implies both igno ra nce of the real object of one's feelings and a mista ke in one's citation of what ac­co unts for the feelin g. its intensity. o r its duration. Neurotic guilt is a species o f self-deception and as such requires obliqueness. ll is here that the idea o f unconscious thought processes has its particu lar ap­peal. for we ca nnot comprehend how we should simultaneously have in mind wha t is in fact so. tell ourselves a d eliberate li e. be duped. a nd ha ,·e our feelings respond accordingly. !\eurot ic guilt also implies not just ig no ra nce and self-deception . but a moti,·ated ig nora nce a nd a moti vated false a ttribution. One's acknowled ged guil t adhe res wan object with less pain ful associations than the a\'Oidcd ol~jcct. i)efense o pe rates. Fina lly. however. neu rotic guilt is more tha n mere! )' dis­placecl guilt, serving clef'ensin ' ends. for it is ~uilt ex perienced by a neurotic. As such, it is ma rked b~· typical ne urotic features. There is a lo nging ro cxperience g uil t: iris a n abso rbin g projetl. a nd the search fo r g uilt , the d welling upon ir . ancl rumina ting about it. a re central the mes in the neu rot ic's life. The~ a re att ached to in;tppropria te ob­jects a nd , com pelled by cirn unst;lllces to relinquish somt• p; trticular object. the) quick! ~· :-.eit.e upon a sub~Litute so that their hunger ra n be satisfied . It fo llows from all this that. while we mav be a ble to deter-. . mine displaceme nt b)' a tt ending to a quite limited segme nt o f' <t per­son 's li fe, in order to ascertain the presenLe of neurotic gu il t. we should have to cast our ne t wider , and seek evide nce of neu rosis as well.

I need now to say something mo re about Ill) 0\\ n usc or the u mcept "appropriate feelings." First, I d o not, by labe ling feelings "appro pri­ate ," impl y that a ll persons similarly situated wo uld be obligated to have the feeling. Nor. of course, do I impl y that the person is, or is on the way to becoming. something of a moral monster if' the feeling is no t present. We re a person in vulnerable to feeling g uilty in moral situations. \\'e sho uld be pu lled in these directions or towa rd j udg­ments of psycho pathy. b tt l such res ponses seem out of place whe n an individual does nul experience guilt in no mno ral situations.

The lirst facto r I rely upon is commo n acceptance of the repo rted feel in g without a corresponding widespread incl ination to seek for some explanation cnher than that offered by the person having the feeling. l f we a re disposed to think the feeling natural. the object cited as occasioning it a n acceptable one. and if there is no strong pull to view the feeling as displaced , there is good reason to regard it as

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appropriate. Any inappropriateness would then derive not from hav­ing the feelin g, but from its undue persistence or intensity.

A second consideralion I rely upon is existence of widespread re­spect for attit udes u nderl ying the feeling. Thus. if ind i,·iduals experi­e nce guilt in no nmoral sit uations as a n ine,·i table by-product of \vha t we regard not necessar ily as an obligatory but nevertheless as a per­fectly acceptable. even perhaps admirable stance toward the world. I have tllought this reason to regard the feeling as appropriate. Views of moral reality d iller. and whe n this difference mani fests itself in diffe re nces in emotional ex perie nces. we are j ustified. I belie\'e, in accord ing the fedin~ a respectful response.

Moral guilt and guilt feelings

I ,,·ant bri(' fly in this section to examine several issues concerning moral guilt and ~uilt feelings. This should throw into bold relie f the apparently a tHl tna lous nature of the no n moral cases. 1 say something. the n , about the cond itions fo r be ing morally guilt , the nawre of the state one is in when these conditio ns obtain, and the nature of the

att end ant feelings. The concept "cul pablt: responsibility for wrongdoing," intrinsic to

the thesis I reject , is open to different interpretations. T his is my understand ing of it. T he re must be a doing; it must be a rumcio rts d o ing; it must be a{n't' doing; there must be wro11~doing; there must be a momf wrongdoing; it. must be hy a pn so11: it must be by a 111oml penon ; this person must be respnmiblr for the wrongdoi ng; the guilt}' person must be the sPtr,,mnt' person as the one respon~ible for the wron gd oing; the person must be al .faull with respect to wrongdoing. Each o t these conditions requires careful elucidation . but I am g-oin g to assume they capture thost· conditio ns whose ex istence is presup­posed by a pe rson's being morally g uilt y of \vrongcloing. O nce these conditio ns are satisfied . a pe rson is in the state of being guil ty. What

d oes that im plr? First. moral requirement~ establish a moral order o r things in which

some actions a re and some actions are not to be perfo rmed and whe re viola tio n constilLltes wrongdoing. When one conducts oneself in com­pliance with the limits e mbodied in that order , one is joined together with othe rs; one is part o f a mora l community; one is part of a la rger whole. The fi rst important impljcation of one's being gui lty, then , is one at least temporary separation from this community. Second . a guilty act disru pts the moral order. causing what is viewed as an

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imbalance that requires righting. Next, the guilty individual, because he or she has d amaged that which individuals highly value, is an appropriate object of indignation and resentment. The guilty person has a lso usurped a privilege not provided by the rules. Principles have been subordinated to one's personal judgment or o ne's own interest. There is implied , then, an absence of appropriate deference. Being a guilty person also implies one 's being obligated to restore damaged relationships, to make amends and offer re pa ration for actual damage done. One's e ffective reestablishing of what has been dam­aged and one's reconciliation with the moral community seem also to require emotional reactions, attitudes, and conduct. such as guilt, contrition. repentance, and confession, that re flect recognitio n of one's proper relationship to mo ral norms, including an att itude of ap­propriate deference and humility.

What. then, is it to feel guilt? A person who feels gui lty has certain beliefs and feelings and is disposed to feel and act in certain charac­teristic ways. More specifically. a person who is feeling guilt will be feeling bad because of a unique set of beliefs that allow us to define the feeling. First. one realizes that something one valul's has been damaged, and this thought alone causes some pain. Second , just as there is a specia l satisfaction attached to thinking of oneself as the creator of what is valuable. so a special dissatisfaction derives from the realization that one has oneself damaged or destroyed what one val­ues. Third, in feeling guilty one reproaches o neself in a ma nner that corresponds to the reproach o ne would ha\·e visited upon ano ther had they been the responsible party. Fourth. part of one's feeling bad is accounted for by one's feeling apart and separated from those to whom one was attached . Finally, feeling guilty, we feel weighted down not just by these distressing feelings. but by a feelings of obligation as well- to confess, to make amends, to repair, and to restore. When all is said , then, the state of the person feeling guilt implies a division within the person, a separation from others and a need to put things right a nd together with oneself and others.

Let us now turn our attentio n to nonmoral guilt.

Guilt for states of mind alone

When contrasting thought and deed, we may have in mind any number o f differe nt mental states. I limit my own discussion to one of these: the wish that evil befall another.

Imagine someone who, feeling intense anger. wishes that another be struck dead. People commonly. particularly when the person is

.Vonmural guilt 227

someone close to them, feel guilty over such wishes. Let us quickly survey some of the responses we can anticipate to questions about the appropriateness of such feelings and whether they might have, as some are sure to claim. a moral basis.

In the analysis I offered in the above section, guilt requires a deed. The most questionable of the cited criteria for moral guilt, I have listed it principally because mo ral philosophers have appeared to sub­scribe to it.:1 J ust as some philosophers would question the moral status of a com mand that imposed a duty to perform what is impossi­ble. so they would be troubled by the moral status of any command that addressed itself to thought alone. carrying as it wou ld the im­plication that a fa ilu re to com ply constituted wrongdoing for which o ne could be morally guilty. Moral guilt may be seen as incurred by damage to a re lationship. damage tha t puts one in debt to another, that g-ives rise w familiar reparative and restorative obligations, a status that makes understandable asking for and gaining forgiveness. But if one has yet to act, how, it may be wondered, can there be damage? Moral wrongs that occasion guilt seem to require intrusion into the sphere of rights of others. Until there is such intrusion . we are immunized from moral condemnation. Morality allows. then, for a sphe re of privacy where one's wishes and fantasies are matters of concern only to the person having them. It may be claimed , to be sure. tha t a person who wishes evil for another and who derives satisfaction from the fantasies intrinsic to such wishes may not be as admirable a person as o ne free o f such propensities. But this assess­ment does not imply an)· moral guilt. Such guilt is incurred only when a specific moral wrong has been com mitted for which one is respon­sible.

Another compelling, more serious, objection to moral guilt for wishes is certain to be raised. Wishing evil for another often derives fro m the natu ral emotio n of anger. While some few individuals mig-ht achieve li beration from such disruptive feelings. most cannot. But mo rality concerns the humanly atta inable, and failures here might be thought to be immune from moral censure. Morality does not require the extraordinary. Wishes, the n. that are the result of natural emo­tions should not be viewed as incurring moral guilt.

The moral situation is, in actuality, far less clear than this picture would suggest. Christian morality focuses precisely on cond itions of heart and mind - the inner life of the human being. T his view is also reflected in the formula that law, as contrasted wi th moral ity, takes

·1 Se~ Feinberg, op. rit.

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external <.:onduct for its umcern. Reserved for IIH>rality. then. is the internal sphere - whatever that mig-ht be. 1 Neithe r the maxim " Law is conce rned with external. rnoral it)· with internal ronduct." nor the often q uo ted b iblical s;l\·ings o f J esus. such as that concern ing lust, make clear whe the r " ·ishes alone. withou t any accompanying conduc t, a nd d espite a n inability to control the ir o nset. are a basis fur g-uil t.

Ano th er response of interest comes from Freud . In CiPill :alitm and I ts Disrunlenls he o bserves'' that feeling gu ilt is initially experienced as anxiety. an anxie ty that cer tain conduct one wishes w engage in will mee 1 with the loss of the parent 's lo,·e or wit h punishme nt. In this early stage o r our d evelopment there is. as yet . 110 in terna li ta tio n. no superego a nd the re fore no dispositio n to puni:-.h o neself: there is me re ly a fear or discovery and imagined loss a nd punishn1cn1. It is o nly wh en ime rnalizat.ion has occurred that one G ill , for Freud. prop­e rly speak of a conscience and a sense () ( g11ilt. He wri tes:

AI this poi nl . . . I he f"ear of being fou nd 0111 C<llll l'~ lo au c nci : lhe cfi ~li nclion ,

moreon:r. hc1 ween doing so mel hing had and wishing '" d11 i1 di~appears en1 irely. since nmhing can be hidden !"rom the supn -ego, 11 111 t'I'CII 1 hough1s.6

... Bad imerllion~ .1re equaled wi1h bad ac1ious. and hent-c l'OIIIt' a scn~e o f g-uilt and a need !"or punishnwnt 7

With a supe rego in p lan:. aware as it is o f o ne-\ wis hes. it then r espo nd s: that is. o ne responds to oneseiL as one imagines one's par­ents would respond to o ne. not discriminating between wishes o r inte ntions and deeds. and o ne feels guilt y. One has int crnalizerl the anxiety, and to quiet it one a ttacks o nese lf as o ne ima~ines one's parents would a ttack o ne. It is nut . or course, Fre ud 's intention in these passages to addr ess issues of moral g uil t or the appropriateness of the feeling. !\:or d oes he raise the question, ''Wh y should th t· child a ttribute w the parent a lack of d iscriminatio n be l ween wish and deed~" H e be lieves, however, that he has made umlcrstandahle o ne 's experie ncing g uilt over wishes and intentio ns.

It will be r ecalled, however , that in Totem and Tnboo a nothe r view surfaced about guilt in connectio n with wishes. It may provide an answer to the questio n why the child imagines that the pa re llls wi ll fail to discriminate bet\H~en wishes and d eeds. In that work Freud claim­ed that guilt felt over unuinscious wishes had a justi !icatiun. This was

4 For the meaning behind this fo rmula ami what tnuh I here ma~ be in i1 . >C<' ~lurris, '" Punishment fo r Thou~ht s.'" iu Ou Gullt tmd lnnocmrt ( l ~l/li ). Berkeley: L'u iH-r,ity of California Press. 5 Stwulard £ditio11 (I !l31l). 2 1: 123ff. ~ Ibid .. p. 125. 7 Ibid ., p. 128.

Nonmoral f!Uill ~~! l

so beca use an unconscious belief" in om nipotence o f thought erases the distinction between wish and deed. Freud a ppears to ha,·e sub­scribed to the vie,,· that o ne can o nly be guilt)' if o ne believes one is

pe rpetrating some harm. Prot"csso r H erbert Fingareue. in his essay '" Real Guilt and ~eurotic

G uilt ,"H in Huenced by these ,-jews. adopts a position incompat ible wirh our fi rst respo nse LO whether h·ishes could occasion moral gui lt.

He ,,Tites:

).lm·al g-ui lt accrue~ hv l'i nue of our 1\'ishes. nol mtn·ll' our acl\. Ot course leg-al guih ciepends primarih· upon our .1ns. 1hou~h IH' should nnlt' 1ha1 e1·en here 1he assessmcn1 of mn1ive~ plays a role. Bu1 llw quc~lion of moral guilt dot:s rHll wail for :111S: il is in profound degree a <JIIl''lion o f wha1 Clllt' harbors in one's hean . This i' llu.: gislof Frnrd"s lMsic coln·pl of ··psychic rcali 1y ... In 1he psychic econnml'. 1he wish is otnuipotenl. To wish is. psvcholngically, to

haw done. Henrc .1 pnson su ffer' guih for his 1\'ishes. c1·en his unconscious ones.! 1

I lind this pa,sagt' p uzzling. Let us lea,·e aside what truth there may be in the claim that one is morally guilty by virtue of one·s wishes a lo ne. What is trou bling is that the argument offered in its d efense does not appea r to support it. Moral guilt \Hmld accrue not by ,-inu e or a wish alone, but, of course. g iven reliance o n a conception ot om nipotem thinking, because a wish is regarded by its possessor as equ ivalent to a deed. And so moral guilt would rest not upon a wish alone. hut upo n the fact that a person believes, unconsciously to be su•-e. that in wishing one is doing. This would be as link like guilt over wishes as the g ui lt that 1\'0tild be incu rred by a believn in 1·oodoo 11"110 supposed that another's death ,,·mild he brought ahotll b~· stickin g pins in a doll . Such a person is guilty because o r a l>l'iier I bat what is being done wi ll lead lO ckat h , not because or merely slicking pins in a

d o ll. further. the case of' unconscious wishes and hel ief"s is. of CC>llrse.

strik ingl>· different from a morally g uilty p ractitioner or \"OOdoo. Such a person is aware of the bel ief that is he ld - name I). that one can bring about d eath in a certain way - whi le ror Freud and Professor Fing a rctte. bv defini tion one is e ithe r a n infanl - th at is. a moral ly innocent agent - o r o ne is an adult who is unaware of the unconscious m agica l bel ief. 1'\onnally, however. if" l a m unaware that by d oing.'( I shall bring about l'. even if it is the case that I wish for r. it is nOL the case that I am morally guilty in bri nging about}' h y doing X. It " ·o uld

H Ou l<r>fl""·''bliit_v ( l!lli/ ). pp. H~-9·1. \"c\\· York: Basic 1\tKok~ . !I lhid .. P· R9.

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230 1-1 ERBE R' ! 1\!0RRI S

appear to be a consequence of Professor Fingareue's reliance on Freud's views or psychic reality that infants and one's unco nscious were the subjects of moral guilt. But this will not do.

So far . then . no pe rsuasive argu ment has been presented that merely to wish for evil for another is a basis for moral guih . and a number of reasons have been o ffe red why such wishes do not p rovide such a basis. Freud's explanations for why one might feel guilty over wishes might make one's having the feeling understandable, tho ugh not necessarily appropriate. and such a feelin~ would not be grounded upon a true belief in one's moral guil t. We need , I think, a new start.

Someone says, '' I feel gui ll )' whenever I think of killing her." or "I am bothe red by my conscienct' whenever ! think of bein g unfaithful." The confession may surprise us. but not th e feelings reported in it. We might eve n be tem pted to say. "Well. I should hope you 're feeling guilty!·· What 111ighr ex plain such feeling-s~

T wo so mewhat diffe renl t)' pes of ment<d ope ration olten appear to play a role in such Gtses, each of which nawrally results in one's feelin g guilty e\·en thoug h one has as yet to do anything. First. when o ne recollects something wrong tha t one has done, one may find o neself again . or pe rhaps for the first time. feel ing- ){ui lty. A causal rela tio n then exists between one's recollect ion and one's feeli ngs. This does not surprise us at all. Likewise. sometimes \,·hen \,·e think of acting in a certain wa y, in circumstances where \ \'l' have not as yet done so. we may find ourselves feeling guilt)' , a stat e thai would have been induced in us by imagining ourselves act in~ in a certain \\'ay -say, killing someone.

A second and somewhat different explanation lor fee ling guilty with regard to wishes is this: To wish for another's death is both to imagine the other 's death and to experience gratification as a conse­quence of what we imagine. Now one could . or course. as a conse­quence of one's imagined act, also imagine oneself' f'eeling g ui lty: but a constitutive aspect o f imagined feeling is <>l l e·~ actua lly f<:ding as one im agines oneself feeling, sometimes in an attenuated wa~· . to be sure. There is indeed something omnipotent. something magical in the phenomena of wishes. for fan tasied gratification is integral to the ir nature and fantasied gratification produces actual gratification. Gourmands frequently exploit th is truth by imagining feasts. thereby inducing sta tes similar to those they would be ex pe riencing were they in fact to feast. Thus. imagined wrong ful act ion and imagined guilt ove r such action can lead one to feel guilty.

In the first case I ha\·e described abo\·e there is a causal relation

Nonmoml guilt 231

betwee n wishing and one's feeling guilty; in the Iauer case it is con­stitutive o f imagining nne's feeling guilty that one feels that war.

What ca n we now say about the appropriateness of these f'eelings:­lf we ask about either of the situations I have desn;bed , " Is the perso n gu ilty of a nything?". the answer might seem to be "As yet. nothing. '' Of course it would be strange to describe the feelings in these siwatio ns as inappropriate, for we often value their existence and may urge individua ls to engage in imaginative exercises ("just think of how you will feel!") in the hope the feeling will be aroused and the indi\·idual induced to fo rbear fro m wrongful conduct. These cases alone establish that it would be wrong to insist upon actual moral guilt as a w nditio n fo r 1 he appropriat eness of one·~ feeling gui lt \ .

The more int e resting question is this: Might one be guilty and not just be feeling guilty because of one's wishes? Put another way. might the feelings lw ve not just an explanation. but a justification? I believe so. Recall the nature of wishing. T o wish is to imagine a situation that incorporates grati fication as a constituent element; in wishing one expe riences the gratification o ne imagines. It also. and now more to

the point. const itutes a realit y. a realit)' that may be viewed as damag­in g to \'a lued relatio nships with others. Here then is still another imerpretation of the phrase "omnipotence of thought." as applied to wishes. for wishes and expe rienced gratification , say at th e death of a lm-ed one. might itself be \·iewed as i~urious to or destructive of a valued relationship. l\lcntal states "a lone ... then . ha rdl y captures this co nception o f mental states as constitut i\·e of relationships. Indi­viduals may belie\·e that . entirely apart from their tree choice with respect to these mat ters. their condition l~tils to meet ~tandards thC) have set for themsell'es and that they thereby incur guil t. Their feel­ings would then corn·spond to a belief in their ~uilt. If a person chooses 10 adopt such a regulative principle, such a demanding moral posture. somethin g othe rs might \·iew as su pererogatory fro m a mor­al point of view. it nevertheless. so I belie\·e. is a position that should not be ruled out a~ irrational or conceptually odd . It mar gain our admiratio n.

Still o ther possibilities of guilt and guilt feeling exist where . as yet, there is no wrongful actio n . Imagine a person who wishes to kill anothe r and who is convinced that should circumstances prove fcl\·or­able. an intention to kill will be formed and an attempt made. It all depends on such ma tters as overcoming fear. adequate assurance that escape is possible. and perhaps some confidence that one will not be

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~32 II ERBER I .\IOKKI S

tormented by g uilt. Should these matters be L t n>rabl ~ resuh cd. one will act ; othe rwise o ne 'rill not. Alte rna tively. suppose a pe rson is convinced that had someth ing fortuitous not occurred. one's wishes ,,·ould have been conn:rted into deeds a nd one would have killed . "I was enraged. and I would certainly have st rangled him had I not suddenly noticed tha t he had a birthmark on his li>reheadj ttst li ke my liule sister. God must have been looking over me.··

:"Jow we can imagine a pe rson in the abon: s ituation ident ifying wi th those who kill. The pe rson might then fed. as a consequence of ident ifica tion with someone who has actua l!} ki lled. some guilt . I mag­i native activit}' would be linked to identification . and Gllt.~all } or oth­erwise. linked to the imaginative activity mig ht be some g uilt y feel­ings. This provid es an explanation for o ne's feeling guilty and, as such. is similar to that offered lor the feelings we may havl' when we imagine o u rselves performing some Wr<Htgful deed . .'\ nd. as with those other explanations for feeli ng gui lt ~. 1101hing about the t'eeling seems inappropriate - pa rticularly. agai n. because it may serve to inhibit wrongful conduct.

However, it ma y also be the case that otH::·s feeling guilt y in such circu mstances de rives from one'sjudgment that one is gui lt)·· The fact tha t blood appears sometimes on one pe rson ·s hands rather than another's, and that this may be fo rtuitous. no doubt pla)'Cd its role in leading J esus to cut through the reality of what peopk did and d id not do, probe more deep!)·, and discount differences between people that had before been treated as of great moral significance. In this view one's differences from anothe r arc less impo rtant than one's similarities. With such a d isposition . d eri,·ed fro m a moral posture toward the world, one ma y come to helic,·e that one is in fact guilty. Such a guilt derives. then. not from having do ne something wrong, but from some conception or the mo1·al solidarit) of human beings. The basis for the g ui lt is not a deed . but one's .~ baring a common humanity. Where that is one's be lie f, one·s feel ing guilty has nor just a psychological explanation but a j ustification, for it is grounded on what man y would rega,-d as a well-founded judgment of guilt.

Guilt over unjust enrichment

Consider these situations:

A flood causes the d eath of all in a large f;uni lr but one indi­,·idua l who survives through pure chance.

A life-preservi ng machine is detached fro m one person and at-

.\"0/1111111"111 ,1[11111 2~:\

tached to a nothe t who has in 110 way participated in the ac­rion: the former person dies and the latter sun·i,·es.

T he re are two siblings. one of whom is born heal thy and intelli­gen t. the other ~irk l \' and retarded.

The re a re t\\'0 brothers. equal!~· desen·ing of their father's gen­erosity; the fat hn rapririou sl~· leaves all his wealth to one son and disinherits the other.

or l\\'0 indi,·idua ls. one meri ts praise for a job well done wh ile the other docs not. but praise is bestowed equally upon both.

!\ person recci,·e~ re,,·ard and praise for saving another's life. but it is undcsened. rhc tTsttlt of mistaken identity.

It is not. I bdicve. uncom nHllt fo r ind ividuals to report feeling guilt\' in these-si tuations. Certain important themes appear to recur. Fir~t. those reporting such kel in~s view themselves as similarly situ­<lled wit h others i 11 so me mora lly relevant respect. Second, they be­lie, <· t hemscln·~ 110 more entitled than another to possess the good the\ do. One ei ther possesses something of ,·alue which one deserves no more than another or one possesses something of equal value with a not he r "·hich one deserYes less than the other. or one has been given a be nefit 1,·hid1 one d oes not desen-e in a situation in which such bestowal is normally regulated by principles of entitlement or desert. In 1 hese casl'S ind ividuals have either no right to possess something of 'alue or the\ have no more r ight to possess it than others who do not o r. if the' m;l\ be said to possess the right, as say in the proceeds or a lot te ry. it is recognized that onh· chance. not their merit or J esert. accounts lo r th eir goud and another's ill fortu ne. So \dtile no blame attaches to them. what they possess can nul be justified h ~ appeals to

justice or fairness. It is for this reason alone. and not of course he­cause of ~o1ne unj ust co ud urt. that I label these rases ones of "unjust en richmenl. ..

Finally. and of great impo rtance. in most instances identilicatory ties ex ist bet ween 1 he more and less fortunate. The stronger these ties, the more intense one's feeling of guilt. And so these f'eel ings commonly arise in familial contexts or where a group has been desig­nated by some com mon characteristic for persecution or where one's particular life situatiun, say a serious ill ness. disposes one toward ident ification with others similarly situa ted.

What sense can we make of these si tuations? We ma~· . o f course. wish to deny the accuracy of the report of' one·s

feelin gs. This impu lse should be checked . T he telltale signs of guilt are too evident !'or the feeling itself to be questioned . Thl'n: is fre-

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234 HERBERT MORRIS

quem foregoing good that life might offer, a disposition to get rid of what one claims one has no right to possess, even going so far as to punish oneself, certainly often attempting some fo rm of reparation, and of course, simply reporting that o ne feels guilty. !\tore credible than doubt over the feelin g's existence is doubt felt over its appropri­ateness. even its ratio nality.

Confron ted by a friend's revelation of such feelings, we can imag­ine thinking. even saying:

I do not doubt the genuineness of your feelings. but you o ught 11ot to feel as you d o. for you <~re 110 t to blame for such things. Yo u have be haved through­out as one would expect a decent and reasonable person to heha\·e. You should not add to the bu•·d en o f your loss the burde n o f an unjustified guilt.

These words may strike a responsive cho rd : but o ur compassionate response does not J.ddress full y. and it i ~ probably good that it does not, the inappropriateness we may think presem. At the same time as we attempt to talk sense to the person, we may be wondering where the real difficulty lies. The pe rson's feelings niay have any number of different, overlapping ex pla nations. Sometimes. it is something straightforwardly wrong that one has done and then hidden from oneself. What appeared. given the initial description. as pure chance was in fact influenced by the person's conduct. Or one might simply have wished that it be another and not o neself who suffered or that it be oneself and not a nother who benefited . and one feels guilty over preferring oneself. Operative, too, may be the unconscious belief that one's good fortune has been obtained al the expense o f anothe r so that one feels responsible for that other·s misfortune. It's possible that one's wish has associated with it the unconscious belie f that one ef­fectuated a situation that. prospectively or retrospectively, one wished for. Finally, we can surmise that guilt. because it allows for our feeling we have played some responsible role in the wodd . might serve to allay feelings of anxiety occasio ned by the sense of utter helplessness people experience in some of these situations. 10

All this has some plausibility and in any particular case might serve adeq uately lO explain one's feeling guilty: but I lind unconvincing explanations solely in terms of displacemem or purely defensive func­tio ns. My own immediate impulse upon learning that someone feels guilt) in these sit uations has been to think their reaction quite "natu­ral. .. entirely to be expected given the facts, rather than as inappropri-

111 Sec. on the topic o l ,_;uilt as a cie le nst· against anxiety. \\". R. D. Fairbaim ( 1943).'The Repressio n a nd tht· Return of Lht• 13ad Objects:· in Fairbairn (1952). P<.1·rhoanalytir Studu·., of thr l'moualit\·. Lo ndon: Ro utledge and Kegan Paul.

!\'on moral guilt 235

ate or a sign of some neurosis. Consequently, I believe we should look fu rther than depth psychology for a completely satisfactory expla-

nation. Karl Jaspers, in his book The Qul'slion of German Guilt, 11 ra ises the

possibility that the feelings we ha,·e been considering may have a basis in one's being guilty. He writes:

l\lorality is a lways in nuenced b1· mundane purposes. I may be morally bound to risk my l.ife . if a rea lization is at Mal..e: but there is 110 moral obligation to sao·i fice o ne's life in the sure kncMied ge thai nothing will ha,·e been gained. :\!orally we have a duty to dare. not a duty to choose catain doom. \ (ora lly. in either case. we rather have the contra ry duty, no I to d o what cannot serve the m u ndane purpose bu1 to sa,·e ourseh·es for realiza tio11s in the world.

Bul there is within us a guih con~riousness which springs from another snurre. Metaphy~iral guilt is the lack of absolute ~ol idaritv with 1he human heing as such - an iudelible claim bevond moralh meaningful duty. This <.olidarit,· is , ·io laied lw mv presence at a wro ng or a crime. I I is not enough 1 hal I cautioush risk nw life to pre,·ent it: if it happens. and if I was there. and il I sun·ive where the other is killed. l know from a ,·oice within mr self: I am

guih) o f still being aJi,·e . . . . T housands of Germans sought. or at lca~t fou nd death in battling the

regime, mosi oft hem anon ymous)). We sun·i,·ors did not seek it. We d id not go into the streets ,,·hen our jewish friends were led away; we did nut scream until we 100 Wt're destroyed . We p referred to stay alive. 011 the feeble. it logica l. ground that our death could not have helped anyone. We are gu ilty of being al ive. We kno,,· before God wh ich dee ply humiliates 11s. What hap­pened to us in these twelve years is like a transmutation o f our bein g.'~

J aspers's point in this moving passage is open. l believe. to at least two interpretations. A d istinction is drawn between tlu: demands of morali ty a nd some highe r demand. o ne beyond " morall y meaningfu l duty." A moral duty might require that we dare. but o nly if somethin g were possibly to be gained by doing so. A failure to act in these circu mstances would occasion, for Jaspers, moral guilt. But just ,,·hat is meta physical guilt:- Is it brouglu about- to consider j ust one pos­sibility - by the mere fact of one's survival \1·hen one happens to he present at some wrong o r crime from which others have suffered and not escaped? Th is seems suggested by the words, "if I sun·ive where the other is killed ... l am guilty of still being alive ." Is it rather that th e guilt arises from not fulfi lling the metaphysical requirement to act in accord with the principle of human solidari ty. even if one's action would be fu tile in preventing e\' il and certain 10 bring about death :-

II .J aspers (196 1). New York : Caprit"n' l\<Jok~. 1 ~ Ibid .. pp. il - :!.

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While some of.Jaspers\ language suggests that it is the me re fact of survival that occasions guilt. I believe the lltor<;! plausible reading would have guilt incurred b)' a failure to act. In the first imerpreta­tion guilt would he unavoidable: in the other. it is avoidable through sacrificial but fut ile action . .J as pe rs in this passage. then. does not respond to the issue direct! ~ · rele,·;ml LO guilt o,·er me re su n ·i,·a l. His words do. however. suggest a quite reasonable basis fo r one\ feeling gu i lt~· and bein!{ !{U ilty.

The feelings rnay have their source in one's belief that one's more fortuna te situation has created an obligation to rectify fortuitou s im­balances or injustices. In this interprelation. one is feel ing guilty be­cause of obli~ations yet to be met.

Duties and obligations can. of course. arise because ul' the exisrence of circumsrances on:r which one has no control. Comls known by one to be stolen ntust be re llln ted en:n thoug-h the possessor was without fault in acquiri ng the m. It ha:, also, of course. been cbinted that more is required o l those who ha,·e more. Thi~ ma,· seem pan icularly true when what one possesses i ~ not auributa ble to one's 111erit. Cenainly, the guilt l't'lt 1)\ sonH::Oll t' who retains an und eserved reward is not perplexing to us. And no doubt some of the guilt l'cl t in othe r cases I have described a rises from failure to lultill what one ,·ie,,·s as one's obligations. But does this suggestion . added lO the others. ex ha ust the possibi li ties? I think no t.

Imagine someone who experiences guilt over being a survivor say­ing the folJO\~· ing:

It has been difficult for me to accept that I preferred Ill\ lriend's deat h LO my own when one of us had to die. I even think that m' feeling guilty is partly explained by that preference and certain odd, unconsrious. belicls I had about my responsibility for his death. I also realize that I fed some guilt over not doing all that I reasonably could LO shm,· my gr<ttitude f(>r my good fortune. But when all those bases are covered, I still seem to feel guilty just ove r the fact that I profited from something I see as 1111 rair. that I should have been miraculously saved and not my friend .

These remarks suggest an interesting possibility. A pe rson might be guilty just because of benefiting from a distribution that cannot be defe nded as fair or just or deserved. One's guilt would deri,·e from being in an unjust position wi th regard to those with whom one iden­tified. It would be this guilt that gives rise to impulses to redress imbalances. One's obligat ions would follow !'rom one's guilt. no t one's gui lt from u nlullillecl obligat ions. Guilt \\'Ottlcl be based , as it were, on mere possession. not on remaining in possession o r otherwise failing

.Vollmora/ guilt ~ :n

to Fulfi ll obligations. If th ere is such a guilt. it wo ulci contrast sharply "·ith moral guilt. I t would be a guilt independe nt of any choice to do wrong- and. as such. a blameless guilt. One's tru e guilt would corre­spond to one's ackn<l\dedged g-uilt.

Feeling guiiL~· · then . wo uld both mark one's attachment to princi­ples of fairness and justice and manifest one's ~olidarity with oth.ers. While nonmoral. it would derive from a moral posture wward others. One's feelings would track the scope of one's identificawry ties with the less fortunate , those before whom one feels guiiLy. Some indi­viduals appear capable o f a ra t her limited range of such ties. others of encompassing the wh ole of humankind and perhaps even the animal kingdom as well.

I believe we understand. and even occasionally greatlv admire . indi­,·icluals who feel as I ha,·e described . Their moral posture, revealed in their emotional response. is no less commendable than th at adopted by othe rs. In fact . in reflecting upon such cases \\' t' may be more troublerl by persons who do not experience at least a ,,,·ing-e of guilt a nd a n accompan~·ing desire to rectifr morally indefensible im­balances. The absence o f these feelings may signal insensiti,·itv. a lack of humilit y. a fai lure w grasp emotionalh- how much of the good one possesses cannot be tallied on the credit side of our pe rsonal moral ledge r sheet. We may not ask of ourseh·es or of others that guilt be felt in thcst' situatio ns. But should we and others so feel. there need be nothing u ntoward about it , and any pathology in emotiona l re­sponses would d erive not from feelinR guilty. but from an abnormal intensi ty or persiste nce of such f'eeli ngs.

Vicarious guilt 1 :I

Consider the followin g. You are an American who has occasion to

visit Hiroshima shortly after the end of World War II and you report feeling guilty over what has taken place, even though you have not pe rsonally participated in the decision to drop the bomb and even thoug h you were horrified by it. Or consider a German youth of today who reflects upon events during the Nazi period, events that took place be fore his birth . Imagine that the youth reports feeling gu ilty over what was done by the l\azis.

Again, as with the former group of cases, doubt might arise. at least initially. over the fit between the feeling and the languag-e used w

t:l S~:e Feinberg. "Collt:ni'e Rt"•pono; ihilit\ ... op. m .. pp. ~2~-i'd . ~nd ~(or r i s. "Shared (;uih ." op. cit .. 1'1'· 111 -~11.

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describe it. We may be pulled to thinking that such persons confuse and hence misdescribe their feelings. taking ei ther mortification or anxiety or shame for guilt. In particular. people commonly treat in­terchangeably the terms "shame·· and "guilt''; and if one is in fact feeling shame over what others do, such phenomena seems common and not es pecially perplexing. Shame. unlike guilt. does not imply individual responsibility. It seems natural that just as one might take pride occasionally in one's American identity, so one might occasion­ally feel shame because of it. People always have and probably always wi ll , despite commitment to a conception of indiviuual responsibility, think of themselves as worth more or worth less because of what others with whom they identify have done, whe ther it be a member of their family or sex or race or team.

Although we do sometimes misdescribe our feelings , this explana­tion does not, I believe. dispose of all casq in which people report fee ling guilty over the actions of others. As with cases of unjust en­richment, persons who report feeling guiltr reveal guilt"s charac­teristic signs, principally reparative dispositions, dispositions we clear­ly associate with guilt, bur nor with shame. Further, their thinking tends to focus less on their worth as persons than on the wrongful deeds that have been performed by those with whom they idemify. Their feeling disposes them to confess rather than to hide or flee. Although some, then , may misdescribe their feelings , many, I believe, do not. I f they do feel gui lty, what might explain it?

Frequently, individuals, while not responsible for wrongdoing, knowingly benefit from it. Few would do ubt that one \,·ho knowingly receives and utilizes stolen goods is guilty and. should they feel guilty, their feeling would match appropriately their state. But if. for exam­ple, a present-day American youth feels guilty over 1 he imernment of Japanese-Americans during World War II . the feeling need nut, I believe, have its source in some judgment that one has benefited in some way from that internment.

Still another possible explana tion connects with a line of argument presented to justify guilt with regard to thought a lone. One may believe that only accidental d ifferences exist between oneself and those who have perpetrated wrongs. that chance has placed another rather than oneself in a causal role. and that. consequently. what in one's parents led to their acting wrongfully is e4ually in oneself. I have no doubt that this may play some role in explaining the guilt experienced by some individuals o\·er what their parents or fellow nationals have done. But this st ill does not appear to provide an

S onmoral guilt 239

entire ly satisfactory explanation for these cases. It is not evident that those who feel guil ty are in the grip of a thought such as, "there but for the grace of God go I." One may be thinking of oneself as guilty without judging oneself in this way. think of oneself as gu ilty just because one is an American or a German. An identification with others. then, may be operative that is not limited tO particular aims or

dispositions that have led to evil. If we are attacked, we commonly feel anger toward our attackers. lf

we ourselves deliberate()· injure what we care for. we may also under­standably reproach ourselves, identifying in so doing a present self with a past self. All of this is stra ightforwardly understandable be­cause individuals generally possess a sense of self-identity, an identity that extends over time. I suggested earlier that imagined activity in which we identify with some future self might also result in our feel­ing guilty in the present.

Suppose now that it is anot her real person with whom we identify­a twin. say, or a parent. If that person is attacked by another, identifi­cation implies that the feelings aroused in us are, of course, much the same as if we were ourselves attacked . One's identification with an­other implies. for example, that we suffer when they do, j ust as we are pleased when they are. We imagine their feelings, thereby "entering into" them. We have the feelings we imagine them to be having as contrasted with our merely responding in an appropriate way, say wit h sympathy, to the feelings we imagine them to be having.

Now ler us consider " ·hat might be felt when an individual with whom we identify engages in wrongdoing. Of course. we retain our own identity at the same time as we identify wirh the wrongdoer. Consequent ly. we can suppose we should experience some chagrin . some mortification. some anxiety, ar finding ourselves caught up in evil because another has chosen it. But these are essentially "sym­pathetic," responsive emotions, rather than identificatory ones; they respond to the other's state and do not. as identification implies. en ter into it. Identification would have us imagine what our own rea<.:tions would be were we the wrongdoer. It does not require that in imagin­ing how another would feel we imagine a state that corresponds to

how those with whom we identify do or did in fact feel. They may not, of course, have been feeling guilty; but the process of identification. once operative, carries a psychological momentum so that, in identify­ing with the person engaged in wrongdoing, one imagines how one wou ld oneself feel, not how the other with whom one identifies actu­ally feels. Ironically. then, one may find oneself feeling responsively

Page 11: Nonmoral Guilt

240 HERBERT MORRI S

guilly - namely, feeling guilty over the fact that those with whom one identifies did not feel guilty when they should have. One takes re· sponsibility for their emotional deficiencies.

Such feelings, derived from identification with others. can of course be carried to pathological extremes. This would be so if one literally believed that when another killed, one had oneself killed. Such delusion is possible. But surely the feeli ngs connected with iden­tificatory processes arc often perfectly normal, and it is their total absence that may occasion concern. I believe we und erstand and may admire a child's assuming special obligations to make amends and reparations for harm done by his or her parents. Such action reveals an unwillingness to abandon one's identity in circu mstances where strong inducement exists to reject it. T he question. "What does all this have to do with me? I didn 't do anything.'' based upon fa miliar moral criteria for guilt, may for some strike a frivolous note. For their in­clination is to say. "Well, because you are an American and Americans have, after all. the responsibility for the evil that was done.'' Indi­viduals may assume a responsibility to be what they see themselves as being. Because they have defined themselves in a manner that reveals identillcat.ion with others. the actions of those others are granted a power over them, determining their feelings and their obligations. Individuals may in these circumstances believe themselves guilty.

We may have great difficulty finding a philosophically satisfying accou nt of personal identity. It is, however . a principal assumption underlying one's ever being guilty. We assume such ide ntity: we take responsibility for what we have done and \·iew ourselves. the guilty person, as the self-same person responsible for wrongdoing. !'\ow, if we accept the legitimacy of identificatory ties moving not just to our­selves when we acted in the past - our not having changed in any relevant way - can we not also find it acceptable that individuals establish those identificatory ties with others and that they may do this without irra tionality? We might not ourselves make such commit­ments; but othe rs reveal through their emotional responses that they have. Some even reveal, as much religious thought makes evident, a scope of identification that embraces the human race. I do not myself presently see that such a position is open to challen ge. Again, as with guilt over thought alone and guilt over unjust e nrichment, a funda­mental moral posture toward the world both underlies and justifies a guilt that diverges fro m the philosopher's predominant conception of moral guilt.

10

Provocation and culpability ANDREW YO~ HIRSC H AND NILSJA R EBORG

A perpetrator of a crime deserves rerluced punishment. we com­monly think, when the conduct has been provoked. Why so? An in­quiry into provocation might shed light on the theory of culpability­and particu larly. on the seldom considered question of extrnt or culpabil ity.

I

Pro\·ocation typically involves situations where the defendant feels wronged by the victim - and responds in anger with the crime with which he or she is charged. The defendant is not warding off any immediate danger, however. Whatever harm was inflicted through the \·ictim's misconduct has already occurred, and may not have in­volved any physical threat to the defendant.

It cannot be said , in such a situation. that the defendant's conduct is j ustified.' Self-defense against a criminal assault is justified . in that the injury inflicted on the aggressor is deemed the ,·ight:! (or at least a permissibler1 outcome: Where the actor must be inj ured if he does

This css;~ y is based <.Ill a l<~cu h ~ st::m inM held a1 the Ltl\' Farult) a t L' pps;da L' ntvcrsit~. in Ma~ 19KI'>. The au lhors wish w th;mk the panicipants. pa rt icubrl) .·\ll'ar Nelson. Barry Fdd. Ul f (;iiranson. Le na Holnllp 'isl, .111d Len nan .. \ ql'isl for Lht:ir conLrii>LIIinn< w the disrussion . T he authors are gratt.:ful also to :VIichad \!oot·e. Ferdinaml Schoe· man. Richard Singe r , and P. 0 . T raskman for their helpfu l w mmcrus on lht· manuscripl. 1 On jnstitication and excuse generally, see J. L. Austin. "A Plea for Excuses." Pruafti· ing-' of the• AI7Stutdiau Socirt.v 57 ( 1957): l. reprinted inj. L. Auslin. Philo.!ophical Papm (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1961). chap. 6: H. L.A. Han, Puni.1hmmt and Rr· spmmbllif.'' (Oxford: Ox ford Un iversit v Press. 1968). chaps. I and 2: Eric D'Arc,·. Huma n Arts (Oxford : Oxford Universit~ Press, 1963). chap. 2: Jerome llall. Prit~riJJir., tJf thr Criminal Lnw, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-\1errill. 1960). ~3~-7. 2 On justification as im·ol\'ing situations where the outcome is rig-ht in Lhe ci rcum­stances. see George Fletcher. Rethinking Crimirwl Lnuo (Boston: Liule. Brown. I !l7~l. 759. 769- 73. :I On justific:tlion as involving situations where the tlUlCOillt' is permissible bul not necessarilr desi rable in 1he ri rr umstances. see J osh ua Dressler. ":-.icw Thoughts About the Concept o ( J usli fication in the Criminal La"·: :\ Critiq ue ol Fletcher\ T hin king and Rethinking," CCL.~ Law H.t'1!1flt ' :W ( 19ll4): l j I.